EVIDENCE | B2015 CASE DIGESTS

Heirs of Clemena v. Heirs of Bien

September 11, 2006 Corona, J. Raeses, Roberto Miguel O.

support its stand, may relieve consequences of his admission.

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SUMMARY: Irene Bien (predecessor of the Heirs of Bien) filed a case for recovery of possession and ownership of several parcels of land, one being the land covered by Tax Dec. 5299, against Pedro Clemea y Zurbano. One of Pedro Clemea y Zurbanos statements in his answer said that the land was in his exclusive possession. While the case was pending resolution, the parties were substituted by their respective heirs. The RTC ruled in favor of the Heirs of Clemea, but subsequently reconsidered its findings, stating that none of the parties proved their ownership of the subject land. The CA affirmed the RTC, but reversed the RTCs findings with regard to the land covered by Tax Dec. 5299. It awarded damages to the Heirs of Bien, as well as stating that it was the Heirs of Bien who had ownership over the land. When the case reached the SC, the Heirs of Clemea claimed that they should not be liable for damages because, for one, they never took possession of the SC. The SC dismissed such claim, stating that they were bound by the statement of Pedro Clemea y Zurbano, which amounted to a judicial admission. DOCTRINE: An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. (Sec. 4, Rule 129, RoC) A judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot thereafter contradict it. The exception is found only in those rare instances when the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion and because of strong reasons to

FACTS: The subject land in this case, covered with Tax Dec. No. 5299, with a surface area of more or less 20,644 sq. m., was one of three lots involved in two consolidated cases for recovery of possession and ownership filed by Irene Bien (predecessor of the respondents) against Pedro Clemea y Zurbano (predecessor of the petitioner). Biens averments as found in the complaint: 1. She acquired the land by purchase from Victoriano Napa in a deed of sale. 2. Napa acquired the same lot by purchase from Francisco Barrameda who bought the land from the administrator of the estate of Pedro Clemea y Conde. 3. Ever since Pedro Clemea y Zurbano was removed as administrator of the said estate in 1939 deliberately continued to occupy and usurp the possession and use of the subject land. 4. The defendant has also refused to relinquish the possession of the same to the lawful owner, considering he has no right or any color of title. 5. The plaintiff (Bien) will suffer damages and in fact has suffered damages beginning Oct. 1943 at the rate of 25 cavans of palay per harvest of 50 cavans yearly. Pedro Clemea y Zurbanos answer: 1. The land was his and was in his exclusive possession. 2. Claim of ownership based on a sale by the estate of the late Pedro Clemea y Conde to his predecessorin-interest. Neither of the parties lived to see the end of the trial, being succeeded by their heirs. Case was then re-raffled to the RTC of Legaspi City in Nov. 1994. Ruling of the RTC:

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1. Ruled in favor of the Heirs of Clemea, declaring them as the absolute owners of the subject land. 2. Subsequently reconsidered its findings and ruled that both parties failed to prove their respective claims. Therefore, the land belonged to the original owner. a. The land covered by Tax Dec. No. 5299 was not included in the lands sold by the estate of Pedro Clemea y Conde to Francisco Barrameda (predecessor of Irene Bien). b. Neither was it included in the sale executed by Special Administrator Salustiano Zubeldia in favor of Jesus Salazar (predecessor-ininterest of the Heirs of Clemea). c. The Heirs of Clemea, in their MR, no longer disputes the ownership of the Heirs of Bien as regards another parcel of land [Tax Dec. 5681] involved in another case, the latter have been declared as owners thereof. d. No damages are due the Heirs of Bien, as there was no proof that the Heirs of Clemea entered and occupied a portion of the abovementioned property. e. Another parcel of land [Tax Dec. No. 5685] was included in the sale executed by Special Administrator Zubeldia to Jesus Salazar, and the deed of sale is earlier than the sale executed in favor of Barameda. Therefore, the Heirs of Clemea are declared the owners thereof. Ruling of the CA: Affirmed the ruling of the RTC regarding the other two parcels of land, but reversed the ruling on the ownership of the land covered by Tax Dec. No. 5299 (subject land in this case). Awarded the Heirs of Bien P118,000 in damages as compensation for their having been deprived of possession and the owners share in the harvest. Based the finding of ownership in favor of the Heirs of Bien on some documents of sale.

Based the amount of damages on the testimony of George Clemea1.

The motion for reconsideration of the Heirs of Clemea was denied. ISSUES: WON the Heirs of Clemea should be liable for damages awarded by the CA to the Heirs of Bien. RULING: Yes, they should be liable for damages.
1

Q: This second parcel of land described in the SECOND cause of action which is Tax No. 5299, what kind of land is this? A: Riceland. Q: How big is this parcel of land? A: More or less, two (2) hectares. Q: What is the average owners share of the harvest? A: About fifty cavans of palay. xxx xxx xxx

Q: From the time you filed this case in the year 1943, who had been receiving the owners share from this property, known as Tax No. 5299? A: The late Pedro Clemea y Zurbano when he was still alive and then his children after his death. He likewise testified on the changes in the price of a cavan of palay over the years, thus: Q: What was the current average price of palay after liberation, starting from the year 1945 up to 1950? A: About Fifteen (P15.00) Pesos a sack. Q: How about after 1950 to 1960? A: The same. Q: How about from 1960 to 1970? A: At present, it is Twenty Five (P25.00) Pesos per cavan. We believe, in the exercise of discretion, that the [respondents] are entitled to an award of damages in the amount of P118,000 computed in the following manner: P1,500.00 (50 cavans multiplied by two [the number of harvests in a year] multiplied by P15.00) multiplied by 27 years (1943 to 1970) and P2,700.00 (50 cavans multiplied by two [the number of harvests in a year] multiplied by P25.00) multiplied by 31 years (1971-2001).

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RATIO: Arguments of the Heirs of Clemea: They no longer dispute the ownership the subject parcel of land. However, they claim that they should not be liable for damages because: 1. They never took possession of the subject lot. 2. The evidence the CA rlied on to determine the amount of damages, as it was based on the testimony of one of the plaintiffs, was self-serving and therefore could not have been a proper basis for such an award. Supreme Court: 1. The Heirs of Clemeas contention that the land was never in their possession must be dismissed. a. Pedro Clemea y Zurbanos alleged in his answer that the land with Tax Dec. 5299 was in his exclusive possession. i. This statement took on the character of a judicial admission as stated in Sec. 4, Rule 129 of the RoC. 1. A judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot thereafter contradict it. The exception is found only in those rare instances when the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion and because of strong reasons to support its stand, may relieve a party from the consequences of his admission. ii. The rule on judicial admissions found its way into black-letter law only in 1964, but its contents had been supplied by much older case law.

1. Irlanda v. Pitargue: acts or facts admitted do not require proof and cannot be contradicted unless it can be shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake. 2. Ramirez v. Orientalist Co.: An admission made in a pleading can not be controverted by the party making such admission; and all proof submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should simply be ignored by the court, whether objection is interposed by the opposite party or not 3. Cunanan v. Amparo: the allegations, statements, or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position contrary to, or inconsistent with, his pleadings. b. Given the above pronouncements, the Heirs of Clemea can no longer say that were never in possession of the land. i. They are bound by the admission of Pedro Clemea y Zurbano. ii. Such statement cannot be contradicted without any showing of palpable mistake. c. Furthermore, the issue of possession is a question of fact. Questions of this nature cannot be raised in a petition for review on certiorari as the remedy is confined to pure questions of law. i. The Heirs of Clemea invoke the exceptions to the doctrine, namely: (1) the factual findings of the trial court

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and the CA are contradictory; (2) the decision sought to be reviewed is against the law and in complete disregard of the rules on evidence; (3) there was grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; and (4) the CA failed to notice relevant facts and evidence which if properly considered would justify a different conclusion. ii. The case does not fall within any of the above. 2. As for the testimony of Gregorio Clemea, the Heirs of Clemea claim that it is self-serving and therefore an improper basis for the damages awarded to the Heirs of Bien, the same must be dismissed. a. Self-serving evidence, perhaps owing to its descriptive formulation, is a concept much misunderstood. b. The term is employed as a weapon to devalue and discredit a partys testimony favorable to his cause. That, it seems, is the sense in which petitioners are using it now. This is a grave error. c. Self-serving evidence is not to be taken literally to mean any evidence that serves its proponents interest. i. The term, if used with any legal sense, refers only to acts or declarations made by a party in his own interest at some place and time out of court, and it does not include testimony that he gives as a witness in court. d. Evidence of this sort is excluded on the same ground as any hearsay evidence, that is, lack of opportunity for cross-examination by the adverse party and on the consideration that its admission would open the door to fraud and fabrication. i. In contrast, a partys testimony in court is sworn and subject to cross-

examination by the other party, and therefore, not susceptible to an objection on the ground that it is selfserving. e. The Heirs of Clemea never once alleged, much less tried to show, that his testimony was inaccurate or untrue. As already observed, petitioners objection is founded solely on the mere fact that he, being a plaintiff, was a witness interested in the outcome of the case. f. Now, it is true that a partys interest may to some extent affect his credibility as a witness To insist otherwise would be the height of naivet. Nonetheless, the SC cannot subscribe to the view, implicit in petitioners argument, that a partys testimony favorable to himself must be disregarded on account solely of his interest in the case. DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The April 4, 2002 decision and October 1, 2002 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50912 are AFFIRMED.