Fortune Insurance and Surety Co., Inc., vs.

CA

[G.R. No. 115278, May 23, 1995]

Facts: On June 29, 1987, Producers Bank of the Philippinesarmored vehicle was robbed, in transit, of seven hundred twenty-five thousand pesos (Php 725,000.00) that it was transferring from its branch in Pasay to its main branch in Makati. To mitigate their loss, they claim the amount from their insurer, namely Fortune Insurance and Surety Co.. Fortune Insurance, however, assails that the general exemption clause in the Casualty Insurance coverage had a general exemption clause, to wit: GENERAL EXCEPTIONS The company shall not be liable under this policy in respect of (b) any loss caused by any dishonest, fraudulent or criminal act of the insured or any officer, employee, partner, director, trustee or authorized representative of the Insured whether acting alone or in conjunction with others. . . . And, since the driver (Magalong) and security guard (Atiga) of thearmored vehicle were charged with three others as liable for the robbery, Fortune denies Producers Bank of its insurance claim. The trial court and the court appeals ruled in favor of recovery, hence, the case at bar. Issue: Whether recovery is precluded under the general exemptionclause. Held: Yes, recovery is precluded under the general exemptionclause. Howsoever viewed, Producers entrusted the three with the specific duty to safely transfer the money to its head office, with Alampay to be responsible for its custody in transit; Magalong to drive thearmored vehicle which would carry the money; and Atiga to provide the needed security for the money, the vehicle, and his two other companions. In short, for these particular tasks, the three acted as agents of Producers. A "representative" is defined as one who represents or stands in the place of another; one who represents others or another in a special capacity, as an agent, and isinterchangeable with "agent." 23 In view of the foregoing, Fortune is exempt from liability under the general exceptions clause of the insurance policy.

Insurance Case Digest: Guingon V. Del Monte, 20 SCRA 1043 (1967) FACTS: Julio Aguilar owner and operator of several jeepneys insured them with Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. February 20, 1961: Along the intersection of Juan Luna and Moro streets, City of Manila, the jeepneys operated by Aguilar driven by Iluminado del Monte and Gervacio Guingon bumped and Guingon died some days after Iluminado del Monte was charged with homicide thru reckless imprudence and was penalized 4 months imprisonment The heirs of Gervacio Guingon filed an action for damages praying that P82,771.80 be paid to them jointly and severally by the driver del Monte,owner and operator Aguilar, and the Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. CFI: Iluminado del Monte and Julio Aguilar jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs the sum of P8,572.95 as damages for the death of their father, plus P1,000.00 for attorney's fees plus costs Capital Insurance and Surety Co., Inc. is hereby sentenced to pay P5,000 plus P500 as attorney's fees and costs to be applied in partial satisfaction of the judgment rendered against Iluminado del Monte and Julio Aguilar in this case ISSUE: 1. W/N there a stipulation pour autriu to enable that will enable the heirs to sue against Capital Insurance and Surety Co., Inc.? - YES

HELD: Affirmed in toto.

1. YES policy: the insurer agreed to indemnify the insured "against all sums . . . which the Insured shall become legally liable to pay in respect of: a. death of or bodily injury to any person . . . ." - indemnity against liability TEST: Where the contract provides for indemnity against liability to third persons, then third persons to whom the insured is liable, CAN sue the insurer. Where the contract is for indemnity against actual loss or payment, then third persons CANNOT proceed against the insurer, the contract being solely to reimburse the insured for liability actually discharged by him thru payment to third persons, said third persons' recourse being thus limited to the insured alone.

Republic Glass v. Qua Facts

Republic Glass, Gervel and Qua were shareholders of Ladtek Ladtek obtained loans from Metrobank and Private Devt Corp of the Phils (PDCP) They entered into agreement that in case of default in payment of Ladtek loans, the parties will reimburse each other the proportionate shares of any sum that any might pay to creditors Ladtek defaulted on its obligation to Metrobank and PDCP Republic Glass Corp and Gervel Corp payed Metrobank 7M (not full payment of the amount due) Republic Glass and Gervel demanded to Qua reimbursement of the total amount that RGC and GC paid to Metrobank Qua refused to pay Qua filed a complaint for injunction with damages with application for TRO Issues W/N payment of the entire obligation is an essential condition for reimbursement? W/N there was novation of agreements as held by CA (that there was implied novation) Ruling On the first issue:

Contrary to RGC and GCs claim, payment of any amount will not automatically result in reimbursement. If a solidary debtor pays the obligation in part, he can recover reimbursement from the co-debtors only in so far his payment exceeded his share in the obligation. This is precisely because if solidary debtor pays an amount equal to his proportionate share in the obligation, then he in effects pay only what is due to him. If the debtor pays less than his share in the obligation, he cannot demand reimbursement because his payment is less than his actual debt. Since they only made partial payments, RGC and GC should clearly and convincingly show that their payments to Metro bank and PDCP exceeded their proportionate shares in the obligations before they can seek reimbursement from Qua. RGC and GC failed to do this, thus they cannot seek reimbursement from Qua On the second issue: There was no novation of the agreements. The parties did not constitute new obligations to substitute the agreements. The terms and conditions of the agreement remains the same. Novation extinguishes obligation by 1) changing the object or principal conditions; 2) substituting the person of the debtor and 3) subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor