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JOHNSTON VS REPUBLIC FACTS: petitioner-appellant Isabel Valdes Johnston, filed a petition for the adoption of one Ana Isabel

l Henriette Antonia Concepcion Georgiana, 2 years and 10 months old The petition shows that petitioner-appellant is 48 years old, married to Raymond Arthur Johnston, Filipino that the couple are childless; that the consent of the mother Superior of the orphanage and the husband of petitioner-appellant was obtained. Notice of the hearing of the petition was issued and duly the petition is granted by the lower court, declaring the child Ana Isabel Henriette Antonia Concepcion Georgiana freed from all legal obligations and obedience and maintenance with respect to its natural parents and is, to all legal intents and purposes, the child of the petitioner, with the corresponding change of surname VALDES, which is the surname of petitioner." The petitioner-appellant filed a motion, praying that the surname given to the minor be "Valdes Johnston", instead of "Valdes" only, but this motion was denied by the lower court in its order of Hence, this appeal. Petitioner-appellant argues that since she is now using the surname of her husband and because that is the surname, (Valdes Johnston) she used in filing the petition in the present case, and under which she is now known to all her relatives, friends and acquaintances, she had ceased to be known by her maiden surname, and the lower court should have decreed that the minor whom she adopted should be allowed to bear the surname she is now using. She also argues that the use of the surname "Valdes" by the adopted child, as prescribed by the lower court, will create the impression that she is the illegitimate child of petitioner- appellant begotten before her marriage, a situation which is humiliating to both adopter and adopted. The Solicitor General in reply argues that while it is true that a married woman is permitted to add to her surname her husband's surname, the fact remains that appellant's surname is Valdes and not Johnston; that a married woman has a surname of her own to which may be added her husband's surname if she so chooses; that if the minor be permitted to use the surname Valdes Johnston, much confusion would result because the public would be misled into believing that she was adopted by appellant's husband also, which is not true in this case. ISSUE: WON the child may use the surname JOHNSTON HELD: NO We agree with the decision of the lower court authorizing or prescribing the use of the surname Valdes by the adopted child. The provision of law (Art. 341, par. 4, Civil Code) which entitles the adopted minor to the use of the adopter's surname, refers to the adopter's own surname and not to her surname acquired by virtue of marriage. Petitioner-appellant's real surname is Valdes and not Johnston, and as she made the adoption singly without the concurrence of her husband, and not as a married woman, her name as adopter was her maiden name. The adoption created a personal relationship between the adopter and the adopted, and the consent of Raymond Johnston, Isabel Valdes' husband, to the adoption by her individually, did not have the effect of making him an adopting father, so as to entitle the child to the use of Johnston's own surname. Since adoption gives the person adopted the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter (Art. 341, par. 1, Civil Code), much confusion would indeed result, if the minor child herein were allowed to use the surname of the spouse who did not join in the adoption.

to allow the minor to adopt the surname of the husband of the adopter, would mislead the public into believing that she had also been adopted by the husband, which is not the case. And when later, questions of successional rights arise, the husband's consent to the adoption might be presented to prove that he had actually joined in the adoption. this Court is inclined to apply strictly the provision of the Civil Code to the effect that an adopted child use the surname of the adopter himself or herself, and not that which is acquired by marriage. FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the court below prescribing the use of the surname "Valdes" by the adopted minor Ana Isabel Henriette Antonia Concepcion Georgiana, is hereby affirmed

LLANETA VS AGRAVA FACTS: Teresita's mother, one Atanacia Llaneta, was once married to Serafin Ferrer with whom she had but one child named Victoriano Ferrer. In 1942 Serafin Ferrer died, and about four years later Atanacia had relations with another man out of which Teresita was born. Shortly after Teresita's birth, Atanacia brought her and Victoriano to Manila where all of them lived with Atanacia's mother-in-law, Victoria vda. de Ferrer. Teresita was raised in the household of the Ferrers, using the surname of Ferrer in all her dealings and throughout her schooling. When she was about twenty years old, she applied for a copy of her birth certificate in Irosin, Sorsogon, where she was born, as she was required to present it in connection with a scholarship granted to her by the Catholic Charities. It was then that she discovered that her registered surname is Llaneta not Ferrer and that she is the illegitimate child of Atanacia and an unknown father. On the ground that her use thenceforth of the surname Llaneta, instead of Ferrer which she had been using since she acquired reason, would cause untold difficulties and confusion, Teresita petitioned the court below for change of her name from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer. After trial duly had, the respondent judge denied her petition; hence the present recourse. ISSUE: WON PETITIONER CAN USE THE SURNAME FERRER YES The petitioner has established that she has been using the surname Ferrer for as long as she can remember; that all her records, in school and elsewhere, put her name down as Teresita Ferrer; that her friends and associates know her only as Teresita Ferrer; and that even the late Serafin Ferrer's nearest of kin (who apparently have kept Teresita's illegitimacy a secret from her) have tolerated and still approve of her use of the surname Ferrer. a sudden shift at this time by the petitioner to the name Teresita Llaneta (in order to conform to that appearing in her birth certificate) would result in confusion among the persons and entities she deals with and entail endless and vexatious explanations of the circumstances of her new surname. In her official dealings, this would likewise mean a lifelong fending with the necessary affidavits. Moreover, it is a salutary law that would allow Teresita, inspite of her illegitimate birth, to carry on in society without her unfortunate status being bandied about at every turn. 2

HELD:

TELMO FACTS:

The respondent court places reliance on the doctrine, expounded in three decisions of this Court, that disallows such change of name as would give the false impression of family relationship. The principle remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in general. In the case at bar, however, the late Serafin Ferrer's widowed mother, Victoria, and his two remaining brothers, Nehemias and Ruben, have come forward in earnest support of the petition. Adequate publication of the proceeding has not elicited the slightest opposition from the relatives and friends of the late Serafin Ferrer. Clearances from various Government agencies show that Teresita has a spotless record. And the State (represented by the Solicitor General's Office), which has an interest in the name borne by every citizen within its realm for purposes of identification, interposed no opposition at the trial after a searching cross-examination, of Teresita and her witnesses. Whether the late Serafin Ferrer, who died some five years before Teresita was born, would have consented or objected to her use of his surname is open to speculation. One thing, however, is beyond cavil: those living who possess the right of action to prevent the surname Ferrer from being smeared are proud to share it with her. ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is reversed, and the petition of Teresita Llaneta for change of her name to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer is hereby granted. VS REPUBLIC Milagros Llerena was admitted to the bar in 1923. In her attorney's oath in 1946 (on file in the Bar Confidant's office) she used the name Milagros Llerena-Telmo. In 1930 or 1931 she married Pedro M. Telmo. They begot four sons, now all of age, who were baptized with the surname "Telmo" but who since kindergarten days have been using the surname "Thelmo". When the Telmo spouses sojourned in the United States, Pedro M. Telmo, following the American style, changed the spelling of his name to "Thelmo". In his diploma as mechanical and marine engineer issued by the University of Michigan, his surname is allegedly spelled as "Thelmo". Mrs. Telmo was appointed justice of the peace She was later appointed "midnight" Judge of the Court of First Instance but she was not able to exercise the functions of that office She admitted that in the administrative cases filed against her when she was a justice of the peace some complainants used the name "Telmo" and others used "Thelmo". She declared that in the administrative case which resulted in the termination of her tenure as justice of the peace, she used the name "Thelmo" she filed a petition praying that her husband's surname "Telmo" be changed to "Thelmo" Her husband did not join her as a co-petitioner. But he executed an affidavit wherein he manifested that he interposed no objection to his wife's petition Two of her four sons, Agapito L. Thelmo, a lawyer, and Bennett Ll. Thelmo, a businessman, executed a joint affidavit expressing conformity to their mother's petition The order setting the petition for hearing was published for three consecutive weeks in the Zamboanga Times At the hearing Mrs. Telmo presented the following documentary, evidence:

The certificates of the Board of Medical Examiners attesting that her sons Doctors Franklin L. Thelmo and William L. Thelmo, were admitted to practice as physicians (2) The high school diploma issued by the San Sebastian College to her son, Benito Thelmo); (3) The diploma of merit issued to her son Franklin Ll. Thelmo (4) The diploma issued by the University of Santo Tomas to her son, William Ll. Thelmo (5) A telegram sent by Mesdames Balboa, Legarda and Corpus to Atty. Milagros Thelmo (6) The articles of incorporation of Pyramid Insurance Co., Inc. and the articles of incorporation of Milathel Corporation wherein the petitioner, as an incorporator, used the name Milagros Ll. Thelmo Although Mrs. Telmo in her petition and testimony alleged that in some titles and deeds and in her visas and passports, she used the surname "Thelmo", she did not present them in evidence. She testified that she wanted to legalize her use of the surname "Thelmo". she alleged that she initiated the addition of the letter "h" to her husband's surname "Telmo" in order "to distinguish her sons from other Telmos who are the illegitimate children of the relatives of her husband". The City Fiscal of Zamboanga City in his opposition contended that the real party in interest is the husband and that the couple's four sons, who are of age, should have been impleaded as co-petitioners. The lower court granted the petition. It declared that petitioner's surname should be "changed from Telmo to Thelmo." The City Fiscal in his notice of appeal to this Court stated that the lower court's order granting the petition "is contrary to law and the evidence". The Solicitor General argues that the lower court erred in holding that the reasons adduced by the petitioner justify the change of her husband's surname. It should be clarified that the City Fiscal did not present any evidence. This appeal should be decided solely on the basis of Mrs. Telmo's evidence. The Solicitor General contends that the fact that Mrs. Telmo has been using "Thelmo" for a long time is not a sufficient justification for authorizing a change of name He points out that Mrs. Telmo's desire to distinguish her sons from her husband's illegitimate relatives surnamed "Telmo" concerns her sons, who are of age, and not herself, and that to allow her to change her husband's surname without granting a similar judicial authorization to her husband and sons would generate confusion since the latter "may still legally use the family name Telmo." The State's counsel further observes that the petitioner. "left the judiciary as a result" of some administrative cases which were brought against her under the name "Telmo" and that surname has become objectionable to her for reasons other than those alleged in her petition. the petitioner counters that the contentions of the Solicitor General involve a change of theory because in the lower court the City Fiscal opposed the petition merely on the ground that there was no joinder of the real parties in interest, namely, the husband and sons of Mrs. Telmo. ISSUE: WON there is ample justification to allow Mrs. Telmo to change the spelling of her husband's surname. HELD: NO Mrs. Telmo in the title of her petition did not indicate that she wanted her surname to be changed to "Thelmo". The published order setting her petition for hearing reproduced the defective title thereof. That publication was invalid and ineffective A change of name is a proceeding in rem.

(1)

Jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition for change of name is acquired after due publication of the order containing certain data, among which is the name sought to be adopted, which should be indicated in the title of the petition The reason for the rule is that the ordinary reader "glances fleetingly at the captions of the published orders or the titles of the petitions. Only if the caption or the title strikes him does the reader proceed to read on. And the probability is great that the reader does not at all notice the other names and/or aliases of the applicant if these are mentioned only in the body of the order or petition. The noninclusion of all the names and/or aliases of the applicant in the caption of the order or the title of the petition defeats the very purpose of the required publication." As the title of the petition in this case and the order setting it for hearing were deficient, the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the proceeding A married woman may use her husband's surname (Art. 370, Civil Code). It is axiomatic that if she desires judicial authorization to change the spelling of his surname, her husband should initiate the proceeding. In the instant case, the anomaly is that the husband did not ask for judicial authority to change the spelling of his surname. It was his wife who filed the petition. The irregularity in the petition is obvious. The lower court sanctioned the wife's change of the spelling of her husband's surname but no similar authority was granted to the husband because he did not file a petition for that purpose. It is true that the wife submitted to the court her husband's affidavit of conformity to the change in the spelling of his surname. But, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, that would not prevent him and their children from using the old spelling. And in that event, confusion and error might arise. Moreover, after a careful evaluation of the reasons advanced by Mrs. Telmo for changing the spelling of her husband's surname, the Court has arrived at the conclusion that those reasons are not substantial and cogent enough to sustain her petition. WHEREFORE, the lower court's order is reversed and the petition is dismissed.

The complaint also contained a claim for damages which the petitioner, however, waived. An application for a writ of preliminary injunction was filed as well. respondent Consuelo David filed her answer admitting she has been using and continues to use the surname Tolentino. The application for the writ was heard with both parties presenting evidence in support of their respective claims. the trial court issued an order granting the petitioner's action for a writ of preliminary injunction with the actual writ being issued on January 20, 1972. The order granting said writ reads: The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner Constancia respondent Consuelo filed a motion for leave to file a third party complaint against her former husband. The motion was granted After the hearings, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. The private respondent appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals raising several issues, among them, the prescription of the plaintiff's cause of action and the absence of a monopolistic proprietary right of the plaintiff over the use of the surname Tolentino. the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows: Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.

ISSUE: whether or not a woman who has been legally divorced from her husband may be enjoined by the latter's present wife from using the surname of her former husband. HELD: The petitioner's contention that her cause of action is imprescriptible is without merit. In fact, it is contradictory to her own claim. The petitioner insists that the use by respondent Consuelo David of the surname Tolentino is a continuing actionable wrong and states that every use of the surname constitutes a new crime. The contention cannot be countenanced because the use of a surname by a divorced wife for a purpose not criminal in nature is certainly not a crime. The rule on prescription in civil cases such as the case at bar is different. Art. 1150 of the Civil Code provides: "The time for prescription for all kinds of actions, when there is no special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought." All actions, unless an exception is provided, have a prescriptive period. Unless the law makes an action imprescriptible, it is subject to bar by prescription and the period of prescription is five (5) years from the time the right of action accrues when no other period is prescribed by law (Civil Code, Art. 1149). The Civil Code provides for some rights which are not extinguished by prescription but an action as in the case before us is not among them. Neither is there a special law providing for imprescriptibility. Moreover, the mere fact that the supposed violation of the petitioner's right may be a continuous one does not change the principle that the moment the breach of right or duty occurs, the right of action accrues and the action from that moment can be legally instituted The respondent Court of Appeals, on the other hand, is of the opinion that the period of prescription should be four (4) years, since it appears to be an action based on quasi-delict. Whatever the period, it cannot be denied that the action has long prescribed whether the cause accrued on April 21, 1945 when the petitioner and Arturo Tolentino got

TOLENTINO VS CA FACTS: The petitioner is the present legal wife of Arturo Tolentino in 1945 The union produced three children. Respondent Consuelo David was legally married to Arturo Tolentino in 1931. Their marriage likewise produced children. The marriage was dissolved and terminated pursuant to the law during the Japanese occupation in 1943 by a decree of absolute divorce The trial court granted the divorce on its finding that Arturo Tolentino was abandoned by Consuelo David for at least three (3) continuous years. Thereafter, Arturo Tolentino married a certain Pilar Adorable, who however, died soon after their marriage. Tolentino subsequently married Constancia Consuelo David, on the other hand, continued using the surname Tolentino after the divorce and up to the time of the filing of this complaint. The third party defendant, in his answer, admitted that the use of the surname Tolentino by the private respondent was with his and his family's (brothers and sisters) consent. A complaint was filed by petitioner Constancia C. Tolentino against Consuelo David for the purpose of stopping and enjoining her by injunction from using the surname Tolentino.

married, or on August 30, 1950, when the present Civil Code took effect, or in 1951 when Constancia Tolentino came to know of the fact that Consuelo David was still using the surname Tolentino. It is the legal possibility of bringing the action which determines the starting point for the computation of the period of prescription The petitioner should have brought legal action immediately against the private respondent after she gained knowledge of the use by the private respondent of the surname of her former husband. As it is, action was brought only in November 23, 1971 with only verbal demands in between and an action to reconstitute the divorce case. The petitioner should have filed her complaint at once when it became evident that the private respondent would not accede to her demands instead of waiting for twenty (20) years. On the principal issue of whether or not a divorced woman may continue using the surname of her former husband, Philippine law is understandably silent. We have no provisions for divorce in our laws and consequently, the use of surnames by a divorced wife is not provided for. There is no merit in the petitioner's claim that to sustain the private respondent's stand is to contradict Articles 370 and 371 of the Civil Code. It is significant to note that Senator Tolentino himself in his commentary on Art. 370 of the Civil Code states that "the wife cannot claim an exclusive right to use the husband's surname. She cannot be prevented from using it; but neither can she restrain others from using it." Art. 371 is not applicable to the case at bar because Art. 371 speaks of annulment while the case before us refers to absolute divorce where there is a severance of valid marriage ties. The effect of divorce is more akin to the death of the spouse where the deceased woman continues to be referred to as the Mrs. of her husband even if the latter has remarried rather than to annulment since in the latter case, it is as if there had been no marriage at all. The private respondent has established that to grant the injunction to the petitioner would be an act of serious dislocation to her. She has given proof that she entered into contracts with third persons, acquired properties and entered into other legal relations using the surname Tolentino. The petitioner, on the other hand, has failed to show that she would suffer any legal injury or deprivation of legal rights inasmuch as she can use her husband's surname and be fully protected in case the respondent uses the surname Tolentino for illegal purposes. There is no usurpation of the petitioner's name and surname in this case so that the mere use of the surname Tolentino by the private respondent cannot be said to have injured the petitioner's rights. "The usurpation of name implies some injury to the interests of the owner of the name. It consists in the possibility of confusion of identity . . . between the owner and the usurper. It exists when a person designates himself by another name. . . . . The following are the elements of usurpation of a name: 1) there is an actual use of another's name by the defendant; 2) the use is unauthorized; and 3) the use of another's name is to designate personality or identify a person" None of these elements exists in the case at bar and neither is there a claim by the petitioner that the private respondent impersonated her. In fact, it is of public knowledge that Constancia Tolentino is the legal wife of Arturo Tolentino so that all invitations for Senator and Mrs. Tolentino are sent to Constancia.

Consuelo never represented herself after the divorce as Mrs. Arturo Tolentino but simply as Mrs. Consuelo David-Tolentino. The private respondent has legitimate children who have every right to use the surname Tolentino. She could not possibly be compelled to use the prefix "Miss" or use the name Mrs. David, different from the surnames of her children. The records do not show that she has legally remarried. Considering the circumstances of this petition, the age of the respondent who may be seriously prejudiced at this stage of her life, having to resort to further legal procedures in reconstituting documents and altering legal transactions where she used the surname Tolentino, and the effects on the private respondent who, while still not remarried, will have to use a surname different from the surnames of her own children, we find it just and equitable to leave things as they are, there being no actual legal injury to the petitioner save a deep hurt to her feelings which is not a basis for injunctive relief. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED

LEGAMIA VS IAC FACTS: Corazon Legamia lived with Emilio N. Reyes until Emilio died During their live-in arrangement they produced a boy who was named Michael Raphael Gabriel L. Reyes. From the time Corazon and Emilio lived together until the latter's death, Corazon was known as Corazon L. Reyes; s he styled herself as Mrs. Reyes; and Emilio introduced her to friends as Mrs. Reyes. shortly after Emilio's death, Corazon filed a letter claim in behalf of Michael with the Agricultural Credit Administration (where Emilio work as a branch manager) for death benefits. The letter was signed "Corazon L. Reyes." The voucher evidencing payment of Michael's claim in the amount of P2,648.76 was also signed "Corazon L. Reyes." Felicisima Reyes who was married to Emilio filed a complaint which led to Corazon's prosecution. Parenthetically, the amount paid to Michael is "equivalent to 2/5 of that which is due to each legitimate child Corazon Legamia was accused of using an alias in violation of Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended. The information against her reads: , the said accused did then and there wilfully and unlawfully use the substitute or alias name CORAZON L. REYES, which is different from Corazon Legamia y Rivera with which she was christened or by which she has been known since childhood, nor as a pseudonym for literary purpose and without having been previously authorized by a competent Court to do so; The trial court ruled against the petitioner On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, the sentence was affirmed in toto. Hence the instant petition. The law: Commonwealth Act No. 142 provides in Section 1: "Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry, or with which he was baptized for the first time, or in case of an alien, with which he was registered in the Bureau of Immigration upon entry; or such substitute

name as may have been authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons, whose births have not been registered in any local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one year from the approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames." (As amended by R.A. No. 6085.) ISSUE: WON the petitioner violate the law in the light of the facts abovestated HELD: NO It is not uncommon in Philippine society for a woman to represent herself as the wife and use the name of the man she is living with despite the fact that the man is married to another woman. The practice, to be sure, is not encouraged but neither is it unduly frowned upon. A number of women can be identified who are living with men prominent in political, business and social circles. The woman publicly holds herself out as the man's wife and uses his family name blithely ignoring the fact that he is not her husband. And yet none of the women has been charged of violating the C.A. No. 142 because ours is not a bigoted but a tolerant and understanding society. It is in the light of our cultural environment that the law must be construed. In the case at bar, Corazon had been living with Emilio for almost 20 years. He introduced her to the public as his wife and she assumed that role and his name without any sinister purpose or personal material gain in mind. She applied for benefits upon his death not for herself but for Michael who as a boy of tender years was under her guardianship. Surely, the lawmakers could not have meant to criminalize what Corazon had done especially because some of them probably had their own Corazons. WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby set aside; the petitioner is acquitted of the charge REPUBLIC VS ABADILLA FACTS: Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino have been living together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. During their cohabitation, Luzviminda begot two children, Emerson and Rafael. In the Certificates of Birth of these two children, they were registered with the surname "Abadilla" and the name of their father was entered as "Herson" Abadilla. Moreover, the entry in the date and place of marriage of the children's parents appeared as June 19, 1987 at Dingras, Ilocos Norte. Thereafter, an Amended Petition for Correction/Cancellation of Entries was filed by Gerson Abadilla, Luzviminda Celestino and their two minor children, Emerson and Rafael, seeking to have the following corrections made in the Certificates of Birth of Emerson and Rafael: a. ordering that the entries as to the date and place of marriage of petitioner GERSON R. ABADILLA and LUZVIMINDA M. CELESTINO appearing in the certificates of birth of Emerson C. Abadilla and Rafael C. Abadilla be deleted; b. ordering that the entry as to the first name of petitioner Gerson C. Abadilla appearing in the certificates of birth of (sic) Emerson C. Abadilla and Rafael C. Abadilla be corrected as GERSON; During the hearing of the petition, both Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino testified that they are not yet married to each other despite bearing two children. the trial court granted the petition It ordered to issue an Amended Birth Certificate and Change an Entry therein by deleting the first name HERSON in the column "Name of Father" and substitute it with GERSON, and also to delete the entry appearing the column "Date of Marriage of Parents" and "Place of Marriage of Parents and leave it blank, after payment of the required fees.

the Office of the Solicitor General appealed on the ground that the trial court committed a reversible error when it allowed the deletion of the "date and place of marriage of parents" from the birth certificates of minors Emerson C. Abadilla and Rafael C. Abadilla but failed to order the change of the minors' surname from "Abadilla" to "Celestino." ISSUE: WON THE SURNAMES OF THE MINORS BE CHANGED TO CELESTIONO (MOTHERS SURNAME) HELD: YES There is no dispute that Emerson C. Abadilla and Rafael C. Abadilla are illegitimate children, their parents, Spouses Herson and Luzviminda not being married to each other even up to now. During the birth of Emerson 6 and Rafael, the Family Code was already the governing law and Article 176 of which explicitly provides as follows: "Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one half of the legitime of a legitimate child." Thus, as illegitimate children, Emerson and Rafael should bear the surname of their mother, Luzviminda Celestino. Resultingly, with the correction of the entries in their birth certificates which deleted the entry in the date and place of marriage of parents, the corresponding correction with respect to their surname should have also been made and changed to Celestino, their mother's surname. ACCORDINGLY, the ASSAILED Decision is hereby MODIFIED. The Civil Registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte is hereby ordered to change the entry in the Amended Birth Certificates of respondent-minors Emerson C. Abadilla and Rafael C. Abadilla with respect to their surname, and enter instead therein the surname "Celestino". VALENCIA Facts: Leonor Valencia in behalf of her minor children Bernardo and Jessica Go filed a petition for the cancellation and/or correction of entries of their birth in the Civil Registry in the City of Cebu. The TC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and the date of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the city and province of Cebu once a week for three consecutive weeks and notice was duly served on the SolGen, the Local Civil Registrar and Go Eng. The petition seeks to change the nationality or citizenship of Bernardo and Jessica from Chinese to Filipino and their status from Legitimate to Illegitimate and changing also the status of the mother from married to single. The Local Civil Registrar avers that the corrections sought are not merely clerical but substantial, involving as they do the citizenship and status of the minors and the status of the mother. The TC granted the petition. Issue: WON the proceedings that took place could be regarded as proper suit or appropriate action for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register. Held: Yes. Ratio: The persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register are-(1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to-(l) issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. The following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition: (I) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought. If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as "summary". There can be no doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to be cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversary proceedings.

The decision of the TC was affirmed by the SC MARCOS Republic v Marcos 182 SCRA 223 Facts: Pang Cha Quen, a Chinese national married Alfredo De la Cruz, a Filipino citizen. She had a previous marriage to a Chinese citizen Sia Bian who fathered her child, May Sia alias Manman Huang. She registered her daughter as an alien under the name Mary Pang, which is her maternal surname because the childs father has abandoned them. Now Pang Cha Quen prays that her daughters name be changed to Mary Pang De la Cruz since Alfredo has grown to love her as his own daughter. Judge Marcos granted such petition. WON the name of Mary Pang can be changed to Mary Pang De la Cruz Held: No. Firstly, the republic pointed out that the petition to change the name did not include Mary Pang but only May Sia and Manman Huang. The omission of her other alias "Mary Pang" in the captions of the court's order and of the petition defeats the purpose of the publication. The general rule is that a change of name should not be permitted if it will give a false impression of family relationship to another where none actually exists. Furthermore, Mary Pang is the only one who can pray for the change of her name. This cannot be done by her mother for her. LABAYO Facts: Emperatriz Labayo-Rowe filed a petition for the correction of entries in the civil registry with the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga. She asked the court to order the Local Civil Registrar of San Fernando, Pampanga to correct the entries in the birth certificates of her children Vicente L. Miclat, Jr. and Victoria Miclat especially with regard to petitioner's name which appears in both certificates as "Beatriz Labayo-Labayu and as regards her civil status and date of marriage which appears in the birth certificate of Victoria Miclat as "married" with the year appearing "1953 Bulan." She claimed that she was never married to Vicente Miclat and that she was now married to an American citizen, William Rowe. Her petition was granted changing her civil status from married to single in the birth certificate of Victoria. WON Emperatriz can change her civil status from married to single in Victorias birth certificate Held: No. The petition for correction of entries in the civil registry does not only involve the correction of petitioner Labayo's name and surname registered as "Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayo in the birth certificates of her children. The petition also seeks the change of her status from "married" to "not married" at the time of her daughter's birth, thereby changing the status of her child Victoria Miclat from "legitimate" to "illegitimate." The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be substantially impaired if her status would be changed from "legitimate" to "illegitimate." Moreover, she would be exposed to humiliation and embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate VELEZ Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters (the Vargases). Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides: "Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. The immediate duty of burying the body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons hereinbelow specified: "(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child, and left any kin, the duty of burial shall devolve upon the nearest of kin of the deceased, if they be adults and within the Philippines and in possession of sufficient means to defray the necessary expenses." WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED

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