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Director of the Centre for Health Law, Science and Policy, School of Law, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK 2 Centre of Biomedical Ethics, School of Health and Population Sciences, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK Correspondence to Professor Jean McHale, School of Law, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK; j.v.mchale@bham.ac.uk Received 3 December 2010 Revised 26 April 2011 Accepted 24 May 2011 Published Online First 27 June 2011
ABSTRACT The precise nature and scope of healthcare condentiality has long been the subject of debate. While the obligation of condentiality is integral to professional ethical codes and is also safeguarded under English law through the equitable remedy of breach of condence, underpinned by the right to privacy enshrined in Article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998, it has never been regarded as absolute. But when can and should personal information be made available for statistical and research purposes and what if the information in question is highly sensitive information, such as that relating to the termination of pregnancy after 24 weeks? This article explores the case of In the Matter of an Appeal to the Information Tribunal under section 57 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, concerning the decision of the Department of Health to withhold some statistical data from the publication of its annual abortion statistics. The specic data being withheld concerned the termination for serious fetal handicap under section 1 (1)d of the Abortion Act 1967. The paper explores the implications of this case, which relate both to the nature and scope of personal privacy. It suggests that lessons can be drawn from this case about public interest and use of statistical information and also about general policy issues concerning the legal regulation of condentiality and privacy in the future.
concerning the decision of the Department of Health (DH) to withhold some statistical data from the publication of its annual abortion statistics.12 The specic data being withheld concerned the termination for serious fetal handicap under section 1(1) d of the Abortion Act 1967 as amended. This paper explores the implications of this case, which relate both to the nature and scope of personal privacy. It suggests that lessons can be drawn from this case about public interest and use of statistical information and also about general policy issues concerning the legal regulation of condentiality and privacy in the future. Abortion remains a criminal offence in English law. Section 58 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1868 makes it an offence to procure a miscarriage. Section 1 of the Infant Life Preservation Act 1929 also makes it an offence to destroy the life of a child capable of being born alive. Abortion is, however, lawful where the provisions of the Abortion Act 1967 (as amended) are complied with. The relevant provision for the purpose of this article relates to section 1(1) (d) where abortion is lawful until birth if authorised by two doctors who agree:
that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from some physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped.
INTRODUCTION
The precise nature and scope of healthcare condentiality has long been the subject of debate.1e3 While the obligation of condentiality is integral to professional ethical codes and is also safeguarded under English law through the equitable remedy of breach of condence, underpinned by the right to privacy enshrined in Article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998,4e7 it has never been regarded as absolute.8 9 At common law healthcare condentiality can be outweighed by the public interest in disclosure, something reected in professional ethical guidelines.10 11 In addition, safeguards in relation to information disclosure are provided in the context of data protection legislation under the Data Protection Act (DPA) 1998. But when can and should personal information be made available for statistical and research purposes and what if the information in question is highly sensitive information, such as that relating to the termination of pregnancy after 24 weeks? This issue arose in the recent case of In the Matter of an Appeal to the Information Tribunal under section 57 of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 2000, a judgement handed down in October 2009,
J Med Ethics 2012;38:31e34. doi:10.1136/jme.2010.041186
What precisely falls within this section remains a matter of some debate. What constitutes a serious handicap was left undened in the legislation and remains the source of debate and controversy.13 14 The provision was challenged by Joanna Jepson, a Church of England curate in 2003.15 She challenged the decision of West Mercia police not to investigate an allegation of unlawful abortion. Ultimately in this case the police decided not to take a prosecution further as they determined that the doctor had acted in good faith.
Here the statistical information related to two different categories of person: (a) the person who had had the termination and (b) the doctor(s) who had authorised the termination. As to whether the disclosure would be fair , the Tribunal were satised that patients would not be misled regarding the form used to collate the statistics but at the same time would have an expectation that they would not be identiable. The Tribunal took the approach that there was a lower expectation of condentiality towards doctors because: < it is their profession; < they have a public role; < it is not sensitive personal data; < there is a criminal sanction for failure to comply with the law of abortion.12d However the Tribunal also recognised that where a doctor had treated a particular patient it was not generally information which would be made public. A further fundamental issue was the question of identiability. The guidance for national statistics provides a guarantee that no statistics will be produced that are likely to identify one individual unless specically agreed with them.18 It commented that the national statistician has advised that nine cases or fewer hold greater possibility for identication, thus ought not to be disclosed.19 It commented that:
(F) Of some variables at a high geographical level it might be argued that the threshold of 10 is high, since it does not expressly relate to guidance provided in the Code of Practice or Protocol or a specic intruder scenario. This may lead to higher levels of suppression than are necessary to maintain the condentiality of the restricted notice information. However, the sensitivity of these statistics needs to be considered.19
The Tribunal recognised that non-disclosure was not an absolute guarantee of condentiality. It also noted that the guidance itself was inuenced by concerns of disclosure after the Jepson litigation. The Tribunal noted that statistics here operated at a national level and were also indicative of the base pool that is all females of childbearing age.12e The Tribunal did not agree that Jepson was an example of individuals being identiable from statistics in that the complaint arose in relation to the Metropolitan Police precisely because the complainant could not identify where the termination had taken place, nor was it possible to identify it from the statistics. Further, there was no evidence that the hospital or doctor had been identied from the general data. Moreover the second doctor in the Jepson litigation had never been identied. They took the view that note should have been taken of the motivated defender where hospitals dealing with the sensitive issue of abortion should be well able to appreciate the importance of not conrming or denying involvement.12f The
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checks, outside opinions or quality control of the basis for the termination.12k The Tribunal also saw that such information could be useful to identify trends and in planning healthcare services, including monitoring of fetal abnormality rates. It took the view that the need for a balanced and factually accurate public debate militated in favour of disclosure. The Tribunal considered whether disclosure would have a disproportionate impact upon the data subject. It recognised that identication of a patient could have very serious consequences. However, it suggested that such risk of identication was so unlikely that a patients fear of identication was unrealistic. The Tribunal did recognise that there could be very serious implications for doctors who were identied. However, the risk of identication would not deter doctors from the profession. Furthermore, as with patients it noted that the prospect of identication is so remote that the disclosure of the disputed information would not be unwarranted.12l
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The Tribunal decision in In the Matter of an Appeal to the Information Tribunal under section 57 of the FOIA 2000, raises some interesting issues. It highlights what has been a longstanding tension in medical practice over many years between safeguarding condentiality and the public interest. The importance of the case concerns the question of public access to information regarding abortion as a clinical procedure. The need to maintain patient condentiality, both for women who have had terminations and for those who will have in the future, is of course paramount to good healthcare. This is undoubtedly highly sensitive information. Clearly, it is crucial to ensure that effective data security measures are in place to ensure condentiality for individual women. However, substantial public interests exist in data being released both in relation to NHS service provision in the future and also in relation to effective research which may be impeded where access to accurate data is denied. The risk of identication is so remote that the public interest arguments weigh in favour of the disclosure of accurate data. If it is impossible to ensure effective data security this would also raise serious concerns about anonymisation as a justication for enabling the use of healthcare information in a wide range of other healthcare contexts. Equally, the case raises a series of broader questions about the disclosure of personal health information which require future engagement. The case operated through the prism of the FIOA and the DPA and was rooted in DH disclosure of information. But who precisely should control access to personal health information and where should the boundaries of disclosure lie? To what extent can and should the health service itself control access to information, albeit anonymised or should this be simply an issue for control by the individual? These are important questions given the value placed by researchers upon the ability to use anonymised information. This is an area which is underpinned by questions of human rightsdnotably, the right to privacy. The law in this area provides a somewhat uncertain backdrop for health service policy and practice in this area. In some instances there is explicit statutory recognition through section 251 of the NHS Act 2006 (previously section 60 of the Health and Social Care Act 2001) and related regulations that anonymised information may be disclosed where this falls within certain specied public interest categories. This provision is controversial and has been the subject of academic discussion.23 24 The development of statutory exceptions and indeed the growth in the use of anonymised information in such an ad hoc way needs to be regarded with some caution as
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13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.
REFERENCES
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. McHale JV. Medical Condentiality and Legal Privilege. London: Routledge, 1993, chapter 4. Laurie G. Genetic Privacy Cambridge. CUP, 2004. Human Genetics Commission Inside Information. London: HGC, 2002. X v Y [1988] 2 All ER 648. Campbell v. Mirror Group Newspapers [2004] 2 All ER 99. Jackson E. Medical Lawe Text, Cases and Materials. Oxford: OUP, 2010, Chapter 6.
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doi: 10.1136/jme.2010.041186
These include:
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Notes