Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC DECISION November 29, 1940 G.R. No.

L-47903 JUAN SUMULONG, in his capacity as President of Pagkakaisa ng Bayan (Popular Front Party), petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and PEDRO ABAD SANTOS, respondents. Juan Sumulong and Lorenzo Sumulong for petitioner. Moises C. Nicomedes for respondent Pedro Abad Santos. Nicolas V. Villaruz as amicus curiae. Laurel, J.: In a petition bearing date of October 10, 1940, addressed to the Commission on Elections, Juan Sumulong, Esq. as president of Pagkakaisa ng Bayan (Popular Front Party), after setting forth at length the facts and circumstances upon which he bases his claim to minority representation on the boards of election inspectors in the impending general election for provincial and municipal officials, asks that the Commission se sirva declarar que el partido Pagkakaisa ng Bayan, tambien conocido como el patido del Frente Popular, del que el que subscribe es actual presidente, tiene derecho a nominar al tercer inspector de election y a su substituto en todas las localidades en que obtuvo el segundo lugar en numero de votos en las elecciones generales pasadas, asi como en acquellas localidades en que Pagkakaisa ng bayan es la unica minoria politica nacional existente. A supplementary petition was filed on October 17, 1940, to which certain documents were attached to support the contention that the petitioner, Juan Sumulong, and not Pedro Abad Santos, was the head of the Popular Front Party, and as such was the one entitled to make the proposal for the appointment of minority inspectors in the incoming election for provincial and municipal officials. Upon what appears to be a conflicting claim to minority representation on the boards of election inspectors, the Commission, on October 17, 1940, rendered its ruling in the form of telegraphic instruction, laying down certain rules to be followed by presiding officers of the municipal councils in the appointment of minority inspectors. The telegram is worded as follows: Exhibit C TELEGRAM FOR TRANSMISSION MANILA, October 17, 1940

This Commission considers it paramount that we decide immediately the question of representation of the opposition or so-called Popular Front Party in Boards Inspectors claimed by two different factions one headed by Juan Sumulong and the other by Pedro Abad Santos stop in view of lack of time to write a more elaborate opinion and because this Commission considers necessary the immediate promulgation of certain rules to settle election conflicts and their incidents in an expeditious manner we have laid down following rules for information and guidance of all presiding offices of councils in order that there may be uniformity in the appointment of election inspectorscolon number one the Popular Front Party which was recognized by the Supreme Court in its several decision open parenthesis Campomanes versus Municipal Council of Sariaya Tayabas thirty-six Official Gazette page one four two nine semicolon Tria Tirona versus Municipal Council of Dagupan Pangasinan thirty-six Official Board of the City of Manila and Mendoza versus Agustin thirty six official Gazette page one three five close parenthesis was a confederation of several minority parties stopEach of said minority parties composing the confederation continued to enjoy its personality separate and distinct from the said Popular Front Party which was recognized by the Supreme Court stopNumber two the personality of each minority party not having been lost comma The presiding officer of the council before making an appointment of election inspector to represent the Popular Front Party in the Board of Election Inspectors should make an investigation and decide whether the minority local party organized in his municipality is affiliated to the faction of the Popular Front Party headed by Juan Sumulong or to the Faction of the Popular Front Party headed by Pedro Abad Santos and to recognize the nominations made by Sumulong or Abad Santos depending as to whether the minority local party in his municipality pertained to the Sumulong Faction or the Abad Santos Factionstop Number three in the event that the local minority party has been divided into two groupscomma one of which belongs to Sumulong Faction and the other to Abad Santos Faction then the group with more following shall be recognized and the corresponding representative of that faction shall have the right to propose the minority election inspector paragraph This Commission declines to decide as to which of the two factions of the so-called Popular Front Party comma one headed by Sumulong and other by Pedro Abad Santos is entitled to use the name Popular Front Party because this question in the opinion of this commission properly pertains to the court of justice. PEDRO CONCEPCION Chairman Commission on Elections NOB. Free under sec. 20, Comm. Act No. 357 RODRIGO D. PEREZ, JR. Secretary of the commission On October 23, 1940 the petitioner, Juan Sumulong, moved for reconsideration of the foregoing ruling and instruction of the Commission, which motion for reconsideration was denied on November 4, 1940. In denying the motion for reconsideration, the Commission said: It is urged upon us that we decide the question of whether Hon. Juan Sumulong or Hon. Pedro Abad Santos is the real and true head of the Popular Front Party. On this respect this Commission reiterates its decision that the question is properly for the courts to decide. It is also urged upon this Commission that our aforesaid decision be amended to the effect that the provincial fiscal by virtue of his training, experience and knowledge of the law factions of the Popular Front Party, that headed by Sumulong or that headed by Abad Santos, is entitled to proposed election inspectors of said party, to the end that alleged abuses committed by municipal mayors in connection with the appointment of election inspectors be curtailed. With due regard to the laudableness of the

suggestion, it legitimately cannot be urged that the provincial fiscal be empowered by this Commission to conduct the investigation required of the presiding officer because that would be in contravention of law. As stated in our decision in question, in the event that the Popular Front party did not present a united front in the election for provincial and municipal officials held in 1937 and is again divided during the forthcoming election, both factions thereof claiming the right to propose inspectors for the said party, the presiding officer of the municipal council concerned is enjoyed to investigate the respective claims of the said two factions and grant inspectors to whichever faction had obtained more votes in the said election held in 1937 which constitute the next immediate place, and that if the Popular Front Party presented a solid front in the election held in 1937 but is divided in the forthcoming election that faction which has more following in the municipality shall be given the third minority inspector. The authority to determine by a thorough investigation the merits of the respective claims of the factions of the Popular Front Party is necessarily incident to the power of appointment vested by law in the presiding officer of the municipal council. To deprive the presiding officer of the authority to inquire into the fact and circumstances necessary to render his power of appointment rational in such specific cases would, in effect, abridge the power of appointment vested in him by the law. The argument that the power to investigate as to which faction is entitled to the Popular Front inspectors might be abused by the existence of the power. Every authority, however indispensable, may be subjected to abuse. However, if one of the factions of the Popular Front Party is not satisfied with the decision of the presiding officer of the municipal council, he may appeal to this Commission, which, according to section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 607, possesses the power to reverse the decision of the presiding officer and order him to reverse the decision of the presiding officer and order him to comply with the law. In view of all the foregoing, this Commission decides to deny the aforementioned petition of Hon. Juan Sumulong. Let the Secretary of this Commission furnish copies of this decision to Hon. Juan Sumulong and to all Provincial and City Fiscals, for their information and guidance. The petitioner now asks that we review the aforesaid ruling of the Commission on Elections in accordance with section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 607, approved August 22, 1940. The rules of this court do not prescribe the procedure to be followed in the review of cases elevated to it from the Commission on Elections, in view of the fact that said Rules were approved before the enactment (August 22, 1940) of Commonwealth Act No. 607, creating the Commission on Elections and authorizing the review of its decisions, orders and rulings by the Supreme Court. Proceeding by analog and in view of the urgent nature of the case, the respondent were required to forthwith answer the petition for review, setting the case at the same time for oral argument on the 28th of this month of November. Petitioner enumerates the reason for the allowance of his petition for review, and contends that the Commission on Elections has erred: (a) In holding that it has no jurisdiction to decide whether the petitioner or Pedro Abad Santos is the real head of Pagkakaisa ng Bayan. (b) In not holding that its power to decide whether petitioner or Pedro Abad Santos is the real head of Pagkakaisa ng Bayan is necessarily incident to its express power to decide on the appointment of election inspectors, including the appointment of the minority inspectors;

(c) In not holding that the duty of the municipal mayors to appoint election inspectors proposed by the directorates of the majority and minority parties is purely ministerial, and that in case of conflicting claims to the third inspectors as happened in the instant case the matter must be investigated and decided by the Commission on Election and not by the municipal mayors; (d) In not declaring that by his own admissions appearing in documents whose authenticity have not been denied, Pedro Abad Santos was merely the representative on Pagkakaisa ng Bayan for the province of Pampanga in the past election; (e) In not declaring that by own acts and declarations, the pa rty now headed by Pedro Abad Santos is the Communist Party of the Philippines, affiliated to the Communist International; (f) In not declaring the petitioner to be the real head of Pagkakaisa ng Bayan; (g) In not declaring that the alleged expulsion of the petitioner from Pagkakaisa ng Bayan was the act of irresponsible and unscrupulous Communist who falsely represented the late Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, Geronimo Santiago and Vicente Cruz to be members of their directorate so as to give semblance of legality to their claim that their convention at the Retono Building was the convention of Pagkakaisa ng Bayan; and (h) In not instructing the municipal mayors that Pagkakaisa ng Bayan under the presidency of the petitioner is the party entitled to nominate the third inspector and his substitute. (Petition for Review, par. VIII, pp. 9-10.) The prayer of the petitioner is that this Court require the respondent Commission on Elections to certify forthwith the record of all the proceedings had in the above matter, so that the same may be considered; that upon such hearing and consideration the decision of the said Commission of October 17 and November 4, 1940, be held to be erroneous, and that another order superseding the same be entered, declaring Pagkakaisa ng Bayan Under the presidency of the petitioner to be the party entitled to nominate the third inspector and his substitute. (Petition for Review, p. 15) On November 25, 1940, respondent Abad Santos, by his counsel, field his answer to the petition for review of the petitioner, and gives the reason why the claim of the petitioner should be rejected. These reason are as follows: 1. There is no legitimate organized political party known as Frente Popular or Pagkakaisa ng Bayan, except the one headed by respondent Pedro Abad Santos, petitioners claim to the contrary not withstanding; 2. At most, petitioners organization which he and those who commune with him pretend to call Frente Popular, is nothing but a spurious organization totally devoid of the ideology and basis principle which gave birth to the popular front movement as the political conception is known today all over the civilized world. Popular Front parties are, and have always been, initiated, organized and directed by communist, socialist and other progressive liberals and radicals, and never by the reactionary conservative elements of the bourgeoisie. These parties, by the nature of their organization, recognize no individual leadership or responsibility in the control and direction of their affairs of aims, such power being vested always upon an executive committee composed of duly appointed representatives from the different political units and entities under the confederation or front. Collective leadership is, therefore, the fronts slogan, and never individual leadership, such as the petitioner desire to assume when, after the organization of the original Pagkakaisa ng Bayan, he came within the fold as Chairman of its Advisory Council, which was a mere creation of the National Executive Committee. At most, the Advisory Council of the Frente Popular was an extra-legal body whose function, by common consent, were to give advise or counsel on questions of national or international import, which advice or counsel may or may not be heeded by the supreme organ, the National Executive Committee of the Front. The central idea behind this system is to check dictatorial tendencies of any given individual in the front, and democratization of delegate powers among the different duly elected members of the governing council, the executive committee

which acts as a single directing organ or body. Enclosed herewith is the printed original tract, known as Pact or Constitution of the Frente Popular, containing the frame-work or composition of its governing body, its fundamental aims and purposes, and the manner how such aims and purposes are to be carried out and pursued. 3. That the political tract or pact mentioned in the preceding paragraph was conceived, written, and agreed upon by a committee duly elected by the original singers thereto, of which committee, your respondent Pedro Abad Santos was the chairman. Petitioner Juan Sumulong was only a member of this committee of the Frente Popular. 4. It is admitted that respondent Pedro Abad Santos is the founder and President of the Socialist Party of Pampanga, VicePresident of the Communist Party of the Philippines (merger of the Socialist Party of Pampanga and the Communist Party of the Philippines of which Crisanto Evangelista is its President), and National Chairman of the Frente Popular, duly elected by a convention duly held on October 8, 1939, at the El Retono Building, Manila, on which occasion, the petitioner Juan Sumulong, as well as Geronimo Santiago, representing the Partido Socialista National, by unanimous vote, was expelled from the Frente Popular; 5. It is denied that the Frente Popular, of which respondent Pedro Abad Santos, is its present National Chairman, is the same as the Communist Party of the Philippines, affiliated to the Communist International. The fact is the Communist Party of the Philippines, which is affiliated to the Communist International, as an organized political party with a platform and constitution distinct and separate from the Pact or Constitution of the original Frente Popular, is an affiliate to the Frente Popular or Pagkakaisa ng Bayan now held by Pedro Abad Santos. In the beginning of the organization of the Frente Popular, the Communist Party of the Philippines, headed by Crisanto Evangelista, was not a member thereof, but the Radical Socialist of Pampanga, afterwards known as the Socialist Party of Pampanga, was a member thereof. Please see page 1 and 2 of the letter of respondent Pedro Abad Santos to the Electoral Commission dated October 10, 1940. The Communist Party of the Philippines officially became a member of the Frente Popular just shortly before the Convention held on October 8, 1939, which expelled Juan Sumulong and Geronimo Santiago from the folds of the Frente Popular; 5. The present Frente Popular, which is the same Frente Popular organized on September 20, 1936, now headed by Pedro Abad Santos, is composed of the same political parties and labor and civic bodies that originally affiliated with the Frente Popular on September 20, 1936, with the exception of the Lapi headed by Miguel Cornejo, which became inactive and was considered to have automatically withdrawn from the Frente Popular, and of the Partido Socialista Nacional, nominally headed by Geronimo Santiago, which was considered to have also withdrawn from the Pagkakaisa ng Bayan, with the expulsion of Geronimo Santiago therefrom. The loss of the Lapi and Partido Socialista Nacional was compensated by the admission of the Communist Party of the Philippines, since which time, with the adoption of a new platform or constitution differing slightly form the original Pact or Constitution of the Frente Popular organized on September 20, 1936, this political organization or Pagkakaisa ng Bayan remains intact to the present both in composition of its membership, ideologies, political direction in and control of its internal affairs, as well as the make-up of its controlling organs or bodies. and for these reason prays, among other things, that the right to nominate minority inspectors be exclusively granted to the Frente Popular headed by your respondent herein Pedro Abad Santos, because it is the Frente Popular that obtained the second highest total number of votes in the general elections of 1973 when there existed neither Sumulong nor Abad Santos faction of t he same, then (prayer of the Respondent, par. (b), p.5.)

The respondent Commission filed neither an answer nor any explanation for not filing one. This is either an indication of lack of interest in supporting the legal position it has taken in connection with the issuance of the instructions aforesaid, or because, in its opinion, it is unnecessary to do one or the other. It does not seem necessary to take up seriatim the errors assigned by the petitioner, for the reason that, in our opinion, the legal question raised may be reduced to two principal propositions: (1) whether or not the respondent Commission was empowered to issue the instructions hereinabove quoted; and (2) whether or not the instructions thus issued are in accordance with law. With reference to the first proposition, we observe that the Commission on Elections is a legislative creation and its organic act (Commonwealth Act No. 607, approved August 22, 1940) is virtually a reproduction of Article III of Resolution No. 73 of the National Assembly adopted April 11, 1940, proposing an amendment to the Philippine Constitution, by establishing an independent Commission on Elections. Under section 2 of this Act The Commission on Elections shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administrative questions affecting elections, including the determination of the number and location of polling place, and the appointment of the election inspectors and of other election officials. The constitution of the boards of election inspector s and the appointment of the members thereof are governed by section 6 of Act. No. 357 of the National Assembly. Section 69 thereof imposes upon the presiding officer of the municipal council the duty to appoint fifty days immediate prior to the date of a regular election, a board of election inspectors composed of three successors are appointed for the next regular election, unless they are sooner relieved. Adopting the system of bi-partisan representation on the boards, section 70 provides that two of the inspectors and the poll clerk and their substitutes shall belong to the party which polled the largest number of votes at the nest preceding election, and the other inspector and his substitute shall belong to the party which polled the next largest number of votes at said election. and in accordance with section 73, the inspectors and poll clerk and their respective substitutes shall be from among those proposed by the authorized representatives of the national directorates of the parties, imposing upon said parties the obligation to communicate in writing to the presiding officer of the municipal council at least three days before the day fixed for the appointment of the board of election inspectors, the names and addresses of all persons who shall act as their representative in connection with the appointment of the members of the board of inspectors. Section 71 prescribe the method to be followed in case two major political parties unite, and section 72 denies the right of representation to any branch of fraction which has seceded from its respective party, or from the party resulting from their fusion. It is apparent from these diverse provisions of the Election Code that it is, inter alia, the mandatory duty of the presiding officer of the municipal council to appoint an inspector of election to represent the minority party and that this appointment shall be made from amongst proposed by the authorized, representative of the national directorate of such party. If this is not done, the matter may be submitted to the Commission, or the Commission may, on its own initiative, direct compliance with the mandate of the law. To avoid having to decide each case as it comes up separately, the Commission

may issue general instructions, conformably with law, on the matter of the appointment of election inspectors for the guidance of all concerned. This is the case here. As there can be no election without election inspectors (Municipal Council of the City of Manila vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 45844, November 29, 1937, 36 O.G. 1335) and as the constitution of the boards of election inspectors and the appointment of the members thereof are matters that go to the root of clean and honest elections, the Commission on Elections in virtue of its authority to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections, is undoubtedly empowered to issue, for the guidance and compliance of all concerned, such instruction as are properly intended to carry into effect the requirement of law. Without deciding at this time the question of whether the powers conferred upon the Commission are more extensive than those exercised by the Department of the Interior before the enactment of Act No. 607, there was, in our opinion, at least, a complete transference of the power of direct supervision heretofore exercised by the Department of the Interior over all provincial, municipal and city officials, in the performance of their duties relative of the conduct of elections and the enforcement of the Election Law. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the respondent Commission has the legal authority to issue instruction conformably with law pertaining to the appointment of election inspectors, with a view to the effectuation and due enforcement of the laws enacted on the subject by the National Assembly. Upon the second proposition, namely, whether or not the instruction issued by the Commission on Elections are in accordance with law, it should be observed that such instruction are divided into four main parts now to be referred to. The first part refers to the confederated character of the Popular Front Party, according to the various decisions of this court. This point, however, is unimportant, and any inference drawn therefrom is also unimportant for the purposes of this decision. The second part lays down the general rule that the minority inspector should be accorded to the Sumulong faction or the Abad Santos faction in a given locality depending as to whether th e minority local party in his municipality pertain to the Sumulong faction or to the Abad Santos faction. This is not believed to be in harmony with the policy and mandate of the law. Minority representation is given to the party which polled the next largest number of votes at the immediately preceding, election. If the Popular Front Party is the party that obtained this number of votes, it id entitled to minority representation in the locality. It becomes also necessary to ascertain who are its authorized representatives or its chosen spokesman for the purpose of the application of section 73 of the Election Code with reference to the proposal of election inspectors and poll clerks. In case of secession of a branch of faction from an organized party, representation is denied to the seceding branch or fraction. The third of the instruction requires that in the event that the local minority party has been divided into two groups, one of which belongs to the Sumulong faction and the other to the Abad Santos faction, then the group with more following shall be recognized and the corresponding representative of that faction shall have the right to purpose the minority election inspectors. This instruction is contrary to law. It recognizes the right of groups to political representation on the electoral boards,

contrary to the policy of the law to deny recognition for this purpose to such groups in the presence of a duly organized political party in a locality. In the case of Campomanes vs. The Municipal Council of Sariaya, Tayabas, G. R. No. 45869, promulgated December 8, 1937, 26 O.G. 1430, we said: Section 417 of the Election Law, prior to its amendment by Commonwealth Act No. 233, recognizes the legal personality of political aggroupments for election purposes, and the right to purpose inspector of election. A political group is there defined. The amendatory section of Commonwealth Act No. 233 no longer accords this recognition and has eliminated the definition of this term. The evident purpose of the law is to foster and encourage the formation of political parties inspired by high political ideals of government. In case, therefore, of antagonism or conflict between a political party whose claim to national character is not denied and a mere political group, the claim of the former, as an opposition party, to an inspector of election under section 417 of the Election Law, as amended, must prevail over that of the latter. That such is the intention of the legislature is, furthermore, inferable from paragraph (f) of the same section. A part may have but small following, but if it has the legal standing of a party under section 76 of the Election Code, it may properly claim representation on the boards of election inspector as against a political group. The basis of majority and minority representation on the boards of election inspectors is, under section 70 of the Election Code, the number of votes received at the next preceding election, to be determined in the manner therein prescribed. As stated, if the Popular Front Party was the party that obtained the next largest number of votes at said election in a given municipality, this party and no other, is entitled to minority representation. This is true even if the Popular Front Party were considered as a mere confederation or alliance of other minority parties or groups. A party allied or temporarily consolidated with other parties may be such a party, in contemplation of section 76 of the Election Code, but if it came out as part and held itself under the banner of the resulting confederation, it is not entitled to minority representation under the law. This is because the votes received were accorded by the people to the aggroupment formed, consequent upon the entente cordiale or modus vivendi, and no succession to any political right is in order in concurrence with what still is an existing confederation. Although the fourth part of the instruction refers to the question of as to which of the two factions of the so-called Popular Front Party, one headed by Sumulong and the other headed by Abad Santos, is entitled to use the name Popular Front Party, a matter which, in the opinion of the Commission on Elections, pertains to the courts of justice the pleadings and the records disclose that the real question is as to who, upon the evidence presented, is the duly chosen and authorized head of the Popular Front Party and as such head is entitled to represent the directorate in the matter of the appointment of the third inspector of election to which the minority party is entitled under the law. The determination of this question of fact is necessarily involved in the appointment required to be made of the inspectors of election for the minority party. The appointing power much so ascertain, subject to the supervisory and reviewing authority of the Commission on Elections. For uniformity of action and in view of the urgency of the situation, this matter may now be speedily determined by the Commission in the public interest. Specifically and categorically stated, the right to minority representation on the board of election inspectors is tested by the following rules and is subject to the following conditions: (1) The political organization in whose the claim is made must be a political party in the sense t hat it is an organized

group of persons pursuing the same political ideals in a government (Sec. 76, Commonwealth Act No. 357.) This is a question of fact, or a mixed question of fact and law. (2) The political party must have taken part at the immediately preceding election and obtained the next largest number of votes at said election (Sec. 70, Ibid.) In concurrence with a political group in the locality, the political party is entitled to preferential recognition, if it had taken part in the immediately preceding election and had received votes and the claim of the party to representation is made in good faith. (3) The inspectors of election must be proposed by the authorized representatives of the national directorates of the parties (Sec. 73, Ibid.). Who constitute the party directorate and who are its authorized representatives for this purpose involve an ascertainment of fact which must be made by the appointing power, subject to the supervisory and reviewing authority of the Commission on Elections (Sec. 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 607.). Insofar as the instructions issued by the respondent Commission on Elections are in accordance with this decision and the rules herein specially formulated, the same are hereby reversed. The case will accordingly be remanded to that body for appropriate action, and if and when necessary, for determination of such facts as have to be ascertained for the proper application of the law and the rules herein given, without pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered. Avancea, C.J., Imperial, Diaz and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-1649 October 29, 1947

MELCHOR DILIZO LAGASCA, petitioner, vs. VICENTE DE VERA, FRANCISCO ENAGE and LEOPOLDO ROVIRA, respondents. The petitioner in his own behalf. First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Martiniano P. Vivo for respondents.

PERFECTO, J.: In communications addressed to the Commission on Elections, Reverend Melchor Dilizo Lagasca, herein petitioner, signed himself as President of the Goodwill Party, asking that the latter be recognized as a duly organized political party, that its party ticket be printed on the official ballots for national officers, and that it be granted the right to propose election inspectors in connection with the elections to be held on November 11, 1947. In a decision rendered on August 27, 1947, the Commission on Elections denied petitioner's prayers upon the conclusion that the so-called Goodwill Party is not a political party as contemplated in the Election Code. The Commission invoked the decisions of the Supreme Court in Mercado vs. Commission on Elections, G. R. No. 48607, and Tigbatas Party vs. Commission on Elections, G. R. No. 48594, and section 76 of the Election Code, section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 666, and sections 80 and 124 of the Revised Election Code. The facts in this case as found by the Commission on Elections appear in the appealed decision as follows: In the papers submitted by Mr. Lagasca, it is made to appear that the Goodwill Party is formerly the National Welfare Services Party. However when asked about the nature of the Goodwill Party, he stated that the Goodwill Party is only one of the twelve departments of the National Welfare Services, Inc., an organization, according to him, dedicated to the lofty object of promoting brotherhood among mankind, the Goodwill Party being the political department. He could not produce any evidence to show that the Goodwill Party is composed of or supported by a more or less known group of people pursuing the same political ideas. Mr. Lagasca limited himself to presenting to this Commission unsigned mimeograph copies of the "creed and platform" of the Goodwill Party without stating how, when and by whom said "creed and platform" was adopted and ratified. Our records further show that the Goodwill Party or the National Welfare Services, Inc., does not have a fixed address where this Commission may send its communications. Mr. Lagasca simply appeared in this Commission from time to time to file his various petitions and when asked to furnish the address of his party or its headquarters, the general address of Manila is given. In the Certificate of Candidacy for said party signed by Mr. Lagasca, as President and one

Amada C. Capinpin, as Acting Secretary, the following names were listed as its official candidates for Senators. 1. Jose P. Laurel 2. Melchor Dilizo Lagasca 3. Pedro C. Mendiola 4. Claro M. Recto 5. Hilario Moncado 6. Santiago Fonacier 7. Ricardo Gonzales 8. Alauya Alonto Manila Manila Manila Manila Quezon City Rizal City Manila Cotabato, Cotabato

The Certificate of Candidacy states that the above named persons were never consulted at all; that they all belong to the Liberal Party with the exception of Melchor Dilizo Lagasca who belongs to the Goodwill Party and Bishop Santiago Fonacier who belongs to the Nacionalista Party. Petitioner seeks review of the decision. He alleges that the Commission on Elections abused its discretion in not recognizing the Goodwill Party as a political party as defined by section 80 of the Revised Election Code, which reads as follows: Definition of political party. Political Party or, simply party, when used in this Code, means an organized group of persons pursuing the same political ideals in a Government and includes its branches and divisions. Petitioners alleges that the Goodwill Party is a political party composed of approximately 453,989 members. He also alleges that the Goodwill Party is formerly the National Welfare Services Party, the role and functions of which it assumed since May 8, 1946. It is also alleged that the National Welfare Services Party was recognized as a political party on March 14, 1946. The petition accompanied by Annex A, a petition dated August 1, 1947, addressed by petitioner to the Commission on Elections, alleging that the Goodwill Party is entitled to have its candidates' names printed in the official ballots and alleging that it has now 453,989 voters as against 396,224 voters in 1946; Annex B, a certificate of candidacy of twelve candidates for senator, none of them having been consulted as to whether they are agreeable to their candidacy or not, signed by petitioner as President and Amada C. Capinpin as Acting Secretary of the Goodwill Party, Annex C, the platform of the Goodwill Party signed by Reverend Gregorio Rumbawa as Assistant Secretary; Annex C-1, the proposed candidate's creed and platform to be signed by all the candidates of the party; Annex D, a copy of the decision of the Commission on Elections, dated August 27, 1947; Annex E, a resolution of the Commission on Elections dated March 1, 1946, to the effect that the National Welfare Services Party does not come within the purview of a political party as defined in section 76 of the Election Code and as contemplated by section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 725 and that it has no right to file a certificate of candidacy; Annex F, a resolution of the Commission on Elections dated March 14, 1946, giving due course to the certificates of candidacy of Francisco Zandueta and Paul Versoza as candidates of the National Welfare Services, Incorporated, by Melchor Dilizo Lagasca, President and general manager dated November 14, 1946. Respondents answered alleging that petitioner did not have a permanent address whatsoever; that the so-called Goodwill Party is neither organized nor is it composed of a group of persons pursuing the same political ideals in a government, it having no other members than petitioner

himself and possibly another, Amada C. Capinpin, who signed as acting secretary; that petitioner has not presented any other proof of membership or organizations aside from his gratuitous and unsubstantiated claim; that all its candidates do not belong to the Goodwill Party, except the petitioner himself; that one of petitioner's candidate, Claro M. Recto, has declined to become a candidate of the so-called Goodwill Party.
law phil.net

The whole issue in this case hinges on the question whether the Goodwill Party is a political party under the purview of the Election Code. As described by the Code, a political party is "an organized group of persons pursuing the same political ideals in a government." There cannot be any quarrel that the platform of the Goodwill Party, Annex C, embodies many ideals of a political character. But nowhere appears the existence of "an organized group of persons" pursuing said ideals. Petitioner's claim of a membership of 453,989 individuals is not enough. It is necessary that there should be "an organized group." There is absolutely no evidence on record as to the existence of an organized group of persons that composed the so-called Goodwill Party. In order that a group of persons be organized, it is necessary that all of them be joined in a corporate body, articulate, with the attributes of a social personality. A constitution, by-laws, rules, or some kind of charter is needed so as to give existence to the organization. Some kind of agreement, written or unwritten, must exist on how the group is to function, to be presided over, and how it is to express its collective will. Nothing of that sort has been shown in regard to the Goodwill Party. By half a century of experience in democracy, our people have been used to identify political parties by the existence of their leaders and directors, boards, committees, and other organizations. These external manifestations of the existence of a political party were not shown by petitioner with regard to his Goodwill Party. The alleged membership of 453,989 persons has not been proved by anything to be relied upon. No list of them has been shown although petitioner was asked about said list. This Court cannot decide a question of fact by merely relying on an allegation of petitioner which is denied by respondent. Petitioner's allegations as to the existence of the Goodwill Party as a political party is squarely challenged in respondents' answer. Petitioner cannot overcome the latter's denials without presenting competent evidence to show the truth of his allegations. At the hearing of this case, members of this Court had suggested the need that petitioner should offer evidence to substantiate his allegation as to the existence of the Goodwill Party, but petitioner chose not to offer any evidence at all. When there is controversy on a fact, the controversy can only be decided with the evidence in view. Who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Mere allegation is not an evidence. Much as we may value petitioner's allegations, the law imposes on us the duty of not accepting them if they are challenged by respondents unless proved by competent evidence. We are constrained to conclude that, upon the facts found by the Commission on Elections in its decision of August 27, 1947, which were not disproved by petitioner, the so-called Goodwill Party is not a political party. The petition is dismissed. Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-47771 March 11, 1978 PEDRO G. PERALTA, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. NATIONAL TREASURER, and KILUSANG BAGONG LIPUNAN,respondents. G.R. No. L-47803 March 11, 1978 JUAN T. DAVID, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC); LEONARDO B. PEREZ, Chairman-COMELEC; VENANCIO S. DUQUE, FLORES A. BAYOT, CASIMIRO R. MADARANG, VENANCIO L. YANEZA, Commissioners-COMELEC; JAIME LAYA, Budget Commissioner; and GREGORIO G. MENDOZA, National Treasurer, respondents. G.R. No. L-47816 March 11, 1978 YOUTH DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT, RAMON PAGUIRIGAN, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR., petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. G.R. No. L-47767 March 11, 1978 IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE ELECTION CODE OF 1978 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, petitioner. G.R. No. L-47791 March 11, 1978 B. ASUNCION BUENAFE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. G.R. No. L-47827 March 11, 1978 REYNALDO T. FAJARDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JAIME LAYA, as the BUDGET COMMISSIONER, GREGORIO G. MENDOZA, as the NATIONAL TREASURER, KILUSANG BAGONG LIPUNAN, and LAKAS NG BAYAN, respondents. Pedro G. Peralta in his own behalf.

Nemesio C. Garcia, Jr., Rodrigo H. Melchor, Dante, S. David, Julie David-Feliciano & Juan T. David for petitioner Juan T. David. Raul M. Gonzalez & Associates for petitioners Youth Democractic Movement, et al. Gualberto J. de la Llana in his own behalf. B. Asuncion Buenafe in his own behalf Binay Cueva, Fernandez & Associates for petitioner Reynaldo T. Fajardo. Tolentino Law Office for respondent Kilusang Bagong Lipunan. Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Vicente V. Mendoza and Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno for Commission of Elections (COMELEC).

ANTONIO, J.: These six (6) consolidated petitions pose for the determination of this Court the constitutionality of specific provisions of the 1978 Election Code (Presidential Decree No. 1269). I The first issue posed for resolution is: Whether or not the voting system provided for in Sections 140 and 155, subparagraphs 26 to 28, of the 1978 Election Code, granting to the voter the option to vote either for individual candidates by filling in the proper spaces in the ballot the names of candidates he desires to elect, or to vote for all the candidates of a political party, group or aggrupation by simply waiting in the space provided for in the ballot the name of the political party, group or aggrupation, violates Section 1 of Article IV and Section 9(1) of article XII-C of the Constitution. The specific provisions of the 1978 Election Code which are assailed as being in violation of the equal protection clause are the following: SEC. 140. Manner of preparing the ballot. The voter upon receiving his folded ballot shall forthwith proceed to one of the empty voting booths and shall there fill his ballot by writing in the proper space for each office the name of the candidate for whom he desires to vote: Provided, That in the election of regional representatives to the interim Batasang Pambansa, the voter may choose to vote for individual candidates by filling in the proper spaces of the ballot the names of candidates he desires to elect, but if for any reason he chooses to vote for all the candidates of a political party, group or aggrupation, by writing in the space provided for in the ballot the name of the political party, group or aggrupation: Provided further, That the ballots for the election of regional representatives to theinterim Batasang Pambansa shall be prepared by the Commission in such manner that the voter may vote for the straight ticket of a political party, group or aggrupation or for individual candidates, and for this purpose, the ticket of a regularly organized political party, group or aggrupation as certified under oath by their respective directorates or duly authorized representatives as wen as candidates not belonging to any particular political party, group or aggrupation, shall be printed in the upper portion of said ballots in a manner

which does not give undue advantage to any political party, group or aggrupation or candidate, and there shall also be a column containing blank spaces for the names of such candidates which spaces are to be filled by the voter who does not desire to vote for a straight ticket: Provided, finally, That a candidate may be in the ticket of only one political party, group or aggrupation; if he is included in the ticket of more than one political party, group or aggrupation presenting different sets of candidates, he shall immediately inform the Commission as to which ticket he chooses to be included, and if he fails to do so, he shall cease to be considered to belong to any ticket. The following notice shall be printed on the ballot: "If you want to vote for all the official candidates of a political party, group or aggrupation to the exclusion of all other candidates, write the name of such political party, group or aggrupation in the space indicated. It shag then be unnecessary for you to write the names of Candidates you vote for. On the other hand, if you want to vote for candidates belonging to different parties, groups or aggrupations and/or for individual candidates, write in the respective blank spaces the names of the candidates you vote for and the names written by you in the respective blank spaces in the ballot shall then be considered as validly voted for. xxx xxx xxx SEC. 155. Rules for the appreciation of ballots. In the reading and appreciation of ballots, the committee shall observe the following rules: xxx xxx xxx 26. If a voter has written in the proper space of the ballot the name of a political party, group or aggrupation which has nominated official candidates, a vote shall be counted for each of the official candidates of such party, group or aggrupation. 27. If a voter has written in the proper space of the ballot the name of a political party, group or aggrupation which has nominated official candidates and the names of individual candidates belonging to the ticket of the same political party, group or aggrupation in the spaces provided therefor, a vote shall be counted for each of the official candidates of such party, group or aggrupation and the votes for the individual candidates written on the ballot shall be considered as stray votes. 28. If a voter has written in the proper space of his ballot the name of a political party, group or aggrupation which has nominated official candidates and the names of individual candidates not belonging to the ticket of the same political party, group or aggrupation in the spaces provided therefor, an of the votes indicated in the ballot shall be considered as stray votes and shall not be counted. Provided, however, That if the number of candidates nominated by the political party, group or aggrupation written by the voter in the ballot is less than the number of seats to be filled in the election and the voter also writes the names of individual candidates in the spaces provided therefor not belonging to the ticket of the political party, group or aggrupation he has written in the ballot, the ballot shall be counted as votes in favor of the candidates of the political party, group or aggrupation concerned and the individual candidates whose names were firstly written by the voter in the spaces provided therefor, until the authorized number of seats is fined. The system which allows straight party voting is not unique in the Philippine experience. As early as 1941, the Second National Assembly of the Philippines enacted Commonwealth Act No. 666,

entitled "An Act to Provide for the First Election for President and Vice-President of the Philippines, Senators, and Members of the House of Representatives, Under the Constitution and the Amendments Thereof." Said Commonwealth Act enabled the voter to vote for individual candidates or for a straight party ticket by writing either the names of the candidates of his choice or of the political party he favored on designated blank spaces on the ballot. 1 While the original Election Code, Commonwealth Act No. 357, dated August 22, 1938, did not carry provisions for optional straight party voting, 2 the system was, however, substantially reinstituted in Republic Act No. 180, or the Revised Election Code, enacted on June 21, 1947. 3 The only im portent difference introduced was that in appreciating ballots on which the voter had written both the name of a political party and the names of candidates not members of said party, Republic Act No. 180 provided that the individual candidates whose names were written shall be considered voted for, 4 whereas Commonwealth Act No. 666 provided that the vote shall be counted in favor of the political party. 5 Likewise, it should be noted that in other jurisdictions, ballots providing for optional straight party voting have been accepted as a standard form, in addition to the "office-block" ballots in which all candidates for each office grouped together. Among the different states of the United States, for example, the following has been observed: The party-column ballot, used in about 30 states, is sometimes called the Indianatype ballot because the Indiana law of 1889 has served as a model for other states. In most states using the party column ballot, it is possible to vote for the candidates of a single party for all offices by making a single cross in the circle at the head of the column containing the party's candidates. In some states, the party emblem is carried at the top of its column, a feature which, in less literate days, was of some utility in guiding the voter to the right column on the ballot. To vote a split ticket on a partycolumn ballot usually requires the recording of a choice for each office, path the voter will presumably hesitate to follow when he has the alternative of making a single crossmark. Professional party workers generally favor the use of the party-column ballot because it encourages straight ticket voting. ...
In contrast with the party-column ballot is the office-block ballot, or, as it is sometimes called by virtue of its origin, the Massachussetts ballot. Names of all candidates, by whatever party nominated, for each office are grouped together on the office-block ballot, usually with an indication alongside each name of the party affiliation. The supposition is that the voter will be compelled to consider separately the candidates for each ballot, in contrast with the encouragement given to straight-ticket voting by the party column ballot. Pennsylvania uses a variation of the office-block ballot: the candidates are grouped according to office but provision is made for straight-ticket voting by a single mark. 6

Election laws providing for the Indiana-type ballot, as aforementioned, have been held constitutional as against the contention that they interfere with the freedom and equality of elections. Thus, in Oughton, et al. v. Black, et al., 7assailed as unconstitutional was a statutory proviso which required that ballots should be printed with the following instructions: "To vote a straight party ticket, mark a cross (x) in the square opposite the name of the party of your choice, in the first column. a crossmark in the square opposite the name of any candidate indicates a vote for that candidate." It was contended that such provision interferes with the freedom and equality of elections, and authorizes a method of voting for political parties and not 'or men. It was alleged that the special privilege given to straight ticket voters and denied to others injured appellants, who, as candidates, were opposed by other candidates who can much more easily be voted for. In resolving such question and declaring the law valid, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the "free and

equal exercises of the elective franchise by every elector is not impaired by the statute, but simply regulated. The regulation is for the convenience of the electors. The constitutionality of the law is not to be tested by the fact that one voter can cast his ballot by making one mark while another may be required to make two or more to express his will. When each has been afforded the opportunity and been provided with reasonable facilities to vote, the Constitution, and lies in the sound discretion of the Legislature." 8 The Pennsylvania Court further emphasized that elections are equal when the vote of every candidate is equal in its influence on the result, to the vote of every candidate; when each ballot is as effective as every other ballot. 9 To the same effect is the holding in Ritchie v. Richards, which sustained the validity of a statute containing a similar provisional. 10 At any rate, voting by party has been accepted in various states as a form of democratic electoral process. In Israel, for example, where the election system is one of proportional representation in which each political party presents a list of candidates to the citizenry, the voter selects a party, not a candidate, and each party is then represented in the Knesset in proportion to its strength on the polls. The head of the largest party is asked to form a government. 11 In France, on the other hand, under the electoral law of October 5, 1946, providing for the selection of National Assembly members, a list system of proportional representation was set up, whereby each electoral area elected several candidates in proportion to its voting strength. The voter was required to vote only for one party list; he could not split his vote among several candidates on different party lists, but could depart from the order of preference set up by the party. Commissioners then count the ballots for each party list and distribute the total number of seats among the different successful parties. 12 In Italy and West Germany, party voting is likewise in practice, and proportional representation seats are distributed on the basis of the number of votes received by the successful parties. Petitioners in the cases at bar invoke the constitutional mandate that no person shag be denied the equal protection of the laws (Article IV, Section 1) and the provision that "bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment or discrimination" (Article XII-C, Section 9[l]). The word "discrmination" in the latter provision should be construed in relation to the equal protection clause and in the manner and degree in which it is taken therein, since said provision "is in line with the provision of the Bill of Rights that no 'person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws' ". 13 The main objection of petitioners against the optional straight party' voting provided for in the Code is that an independent candidate would be discriminated against because by merely writing on his ballot the name of a political party, a voter would have voted for all the candidates of that party, an advantage which the independent candidate does not enjoy. In effect, it discontended that the candidate who is not a party member is deprived of the equal protection of the laws, as provided in Section 1 of Article IV, in relation to Section 9 of Article XII, of the Constitution. The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classifications. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. It is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies equally to all those belonging to the same class. 14 The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within the class and those who do not. 15 There is, of course, no concise or easy answer as to what an arbitrary classification is. No definite rule has been or can be laid down on the basis of which such question may be resolved. The determination must be made in

accordance with the facts presented by the particular case. The general rule, which is well-settled by the authorities, is that a classification, to be valid, must rest upon material differences between the persons, activities or things included and those excluded.' There must, in other words, be a basis for distinction. Furthermore, such classification must be germane and pertinent to the purpose of the law. And, finally, the basis of classification must, in general, be so drawn that those who stand in substantially the same position with respect to the law are treated alike. It is, however, conceded that it is almost impossible in some matters to foresee and provide for every imaginable and exceptional case. Exactness in division is impossible and never looked for in applying the legal test. All that is required is that there must be, in general, some reasonable basis on general lines for the division. 16 Classification which has some reasonable basis does not offend the equal protection clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety. 17 In the cases at bar, the assailed classification springs from the alleged differential treatment afforded to candidates who are party members as against those who run as independents. It must be emphasized in the election law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon a reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary. 18 The factual foundation to demonstrate invalidity must be established by the litigant challenging its constitutionality. 19 These principles are predicated upon the presumption in favor of constitutionality. This has to be so because of "the fundamental criteria in cases of this nature that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature, approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature as well. The question of the validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative department of the government itself. 20 Thus, to justify the nullification of a law, there must be "a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication." 21 There is practical unanimity among the courts in the pronouncement "that laws shag not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt. 22 We shall now test the validity of petitioners' arguments on the basis of these principles. In the challenged provision of the electoral law, unlike the previous block- voting statutes, all the names of the candidates, whether of parties, groups or independent candidates, are printed on the ballot. Before he prepares his ballot, the voter will be able to read all the names of the candidates. No candidate will receive more than one vote, whether he is voted individually or as a candidate of a party group or aggrupation. The voter is free to vote for the individual candidates or to vote by party, group or aggrupation. The choice is His. No one can compel him to do otherwise. In the case of candidates, the decision on whether to run as an independent candidate or to join a political party, group or aggrupation is left entirely to their discretion. Certainly, before filing his certificate of candidacy, a candidate is aware of the advantages under the law accruing to candidates of a political party or group. If he wishes to avail hihiself of such alleged advantages as an official candidate of a party, he is free to do so by joining a political party group or aggrupation. In other words, the choice is his. In making his decision, it must be assumed that the candidate had carefully weighed and considered the relative advantages and disavantages of either alternative. So long as the application of the rule depends on his voluntary action or decision, he cannot, after exercising his discretion, claim that he was the victim of discrimination. In the ordinary course of things, those who join or become members of associations, such as political parties or any other lawful groups or organizations, necessarily enjoy certain benefits and

privileges which are incident to, or are consequences of such membership. Freedom of association has been enshrined in the Constitution to enable individuals to join others of like persuasion to pursue common objectives and to engage in lawful activities. Membership in associations is considered as an extension of individual freedom. Effective advocacy of both public and private views or opinions is undeniably enhanced by group association. Freedom to engage in associations for the advancement of beliefs and Ideas is, therefore, an inseparable aspect of the liberty guaranteed by the fundamental law. Therefore, if, as an incident of joining a political party, group or aggrupation, the candidate is given certain privileges, this is constitutionally Permissible. Thus, under the provisions of the previous election laws, only the parties who polled the largest and the next largest number of votes in the last preceding presidential elections were entitled to representation in the Board of Election Inspectors. 23 Independent candidates had no representation in the Board; and yet it was never contended that the independent candidates were denied the equal protection of the laws. The official candidates of an organized political party may be distinguished from an independent candidate. The former are bound by the party's rules. They owe loyalty to the party, its tenets, its policies, its platform and programmes of government. To the electorate, they represent the party, its principles, ideals and objectives. This is not true of an independent candidate. If the electoral law has bias in favor of political parties, it is because political parties constitute a basic element of the democractic institutional apparatus. Government derives its strength from the support, activity or passive, of a coalition of elements of society. In modern nines the political party has become the instrument for the organization of societies. This is predicated on the doctrine that government exists with the consent of the governed. Political parties per. form an "essential function in the management of succession to power, as well as in the process of obtaining popular consent to the course of public policy. They amass sufficient support to buttress the authority of governments; or, on the contrary, they attract or organize discontent and dissatisfaction sufficient to oust the government. In either case they perform the function of the articulation of the interests and aspirations of a substantial segment of the citizenry, usually in ways contended to be promotive of the national weal." 24 The Constitution establishes a parliamentary system of government. Such a system implies the existence of responsible political parties with distinct programmes of government. The parliamentary system works best when party distinctions are well defined by differences in principle. As observed by a noted authority on political law, under a parliamentary system; "the maintenance and development party system becomes not only necessary but indispensable for the enforcement of the idea and the rule of government responsibility and accountability to the people in the political management of the country." 25 Indeed, the extent to which political parties can become effective instruments of self-government depends, in the final analysis, on the degree of the citizens' competence in politics and their willingness to contribute political resources to the parties. It is also contended that the system of optional straight party voting is anathema to free, orderly and honest elections or that it encourages laziness or political irresponsibility. These are objections that go to the wisdom of the statute. It is well to remember that this Court does not pass upon questions of wisdom or expediency of legislation. We have reiterated in a previous case that: "It is ... settled ... that only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid." 26 This notwithstanding, We deem it necessary, for the information of everyone concerned, to explain why such fears, in a growing climate of political maturity and social responsibility appear conjectural. There are no data to show that the system herein assailed was the proximate cause of all the frauds in the 1941, 1947 and 1949 elections. Besides, all procedures or manners of voting are susceptible

to fraud. The important thing to consider is that the 1978 Election Code is replete with new provisions designed to guarantee the sanctity and secrecy of the people's vote. As demonstrated in the experience of other democratic states, such a system has its advantages. It may enable deserving young candidates but without adequate financial resources of their own to win, with party support, in countrywide or regional elections. Since candidates of a party or group may pool their resources, it will tend to make elections less expensive. As this system of voting favors the strongly organized parties or groups, it tends to prevent the proliferation of political parties or groups. It thus results in the formation of stable and responsible political parties. On the part of the electorate, such a system of voting facilitates the exercise of their right of suffrage. It enables the laborer, the farmer and the voter of ordinary education to vote with greater facility for all the official candidates of the party of his choice. It thus broadens the ways and means by which the sovereign will can be expressed. Nor could it be true, as petitioners contend, that a system which allows straight ticket voting encourages laziness and political irresponsibility. While there may be those who may be moved to vote straight party by reason of lack of interest, nevertheless, there are still those sufficiently interested to cast an intelligent vote. It has been observed that in a straight ticket the motivated voter is more likely to organize his ballot in a highly structure pattern. His motivation may derive from an interest in parties, candidates, or issues or any combination of those. As observed by a survey research group: "Motivated straight ticket voting appears to reflect an intention on the part of the voter to accomplish his political purpose as fully as possible. Such a voter does not scatter his choices casually, he has a political direction in mind and he implements it through the choice of one party or the other on the ballot. The more highly motivated he is toward this political objective, the less willing he is to dilute his vote by crossing party lines." 27 II The second issue before Us is: Whether or not the provisions of Sections 11, 12 and 14 of the 1978 Election Code, which authorize the elections of the members of the interim Batasang Pambansa by regions, violate Section 2 of Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that the members of the National Assembly shall be apportioned among the provinces, representative districts and cities. Assailed as unconstitutional are the following provisions of the 1978 Election Code: SEC. 11. Composition. The interim Batasang Pambansa shall be composed of the incumbent President of the Philippines, representatives elected from the different regions of the nation, those who shag not be less than eighteen years of age elected by their respective sectors, and those chosen by the incumbent President from the members of the Cabinet." SEC. 12. Apportionment of regional representatives. There shall be 160 regional representatives to the interim Batasang Pambansa apportioned among the thirteen regions of the nation in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio ... : xxx xxx xxx The foregoing apportionment shall be not considered a precedent in connection with the re-apportionment of representative districts for the regular National Assembly under Section 2, Article VIII and Section 6, Article XVI I of the Constitution.

Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, the number of regional representative for any region shall not be less than the number of representative districts therein existing at the time of the ratification of the Constitution. There are also allotted two additional seats for regional representatives to Region IV in view of inhabitants, such as students, in the region not taken into account in the 1975 census. SEC. 14. Voting by region. Each region shall be entitled to such number of regional representatives as are allotted to it in Section 12 of Article II hereof. All candidates for region representatives shall be voted upon at large by the registered voters of their respective regions. The candidates receiving the highest number of votes from the entire region shall be declared elected. The constitutional provision relied upon is Section 2 of Article VIII, which provides: SEC. 2. The National Assembly shall be composed of as many Members as may be provided by law to be apportioned among the provinces, representative districts and cities in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Each district shall Comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Representative districts or provinces already created or existing at the time of the ratification of this Constitution shag have at least one Member each. In resolving the issue, the provisions of Amendment No. 1 to the Constitution, which took effect on October 27, 1976, should be considered and not, as pointed out by petitioner Juan T. David, those of Section 2 of Article VIII of the Constitution, which deal with the composition of the regular National Assembly. It should be recalled that under the term of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, 28 the membership of theinterim National Assembly would consists of the Incumbent President and VicePresident, the Senators and the Representatives of the old Congress and the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention who have opted to serve therein. The Filipino people rejected the convening of the interim National Assembly, and for a perfectly justifiable reason. By September of 1976, the consensus had emerged for a referendum partaking of the character of a plebiscite which would be held to establish the solid foundation for the next step towards normalizing the political process. By the will of the people, as expressed overwhelmingly in the plebiscite of October 15 and 16, 1976, Amendments Nos. 1 to 9 were approved, abolishing the interim National Assembly and creating in its stead an interim Batasang Pambansa. T was intended as a preparatory and experimental step toward the establishment of full parliamentary government as provided for in the Constitution. Amendment No. 1 provides: 1. There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly, an interim Batasang Pambansa, Members of the interim Batasang Pambansa, which shall not be more than 120, unless otherwise provided by law, shall include the incumbent President of the Philippines, representatives elected from the different regions of the nation, those who shall not be less than eighteen years of age elected by their respective sectors, and those chosen by the incumbent President from the Members of the Cabinet.Regional representatives shall be apportioned among the regions in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, while the sectors shall be determined by law. The

number of representatives from each region or sector and the manner of their election shall be prescribed and regulated by law. (Emphasis supplied.) The provisions of the Above Amendment are clear. Instead of providing that representation in the interimBatasang Pambansa shall be by representative districts, it specifically provides that; (1) the representatives shall be elected from the different regions of the nation; and (2) the "Regional representatives shall be apportioned among the regions in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio while the sector shall be determined by law. " No mention whatsoever is made of 4 provinces, representative districts and cities". Where the intent is to relate to the regular National Assembly, the Constitution made it clear and manifest, as indicated in Amendment No. 2 of the Constitution. 29 It is significant to note that nowhere in the said amendment is it provided that the members of the interim Batasang Pambansa shall be apportioned among the representative districts, in the same manner as the regular National Assembly. The clear import and intent of the Constitutional Amendment is, therefore, the election of the representatives from the different regions of the nation, and such regional representatives shall be alloted or distributed among the regions in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Neither does the Amendment provide that the members of the interim Batasang Pambansa "shall be elected by the qualified electors in their respective district for term of six years ..." as provided in Section 3[l] of Article VIII of the Constitution. To hold that Section 3[l] of Article VIII is applicable to the interim Batasang Pambansa would lead to the conclusion that the members of the Batasan shall have a term of six years, which is of course inconsistent with its transitory character. That the interim Batasang Pambansa is a distinct and special body, which, by reason of its transitory nature should be governed by specifically formulated rules, is apparent from the constitutional amendment which created it. Thus, its membership "shall not be more than 120, unless otherwise provided by law." Furthermore, it "shall include the incumbent President of the Philippines, representatives elected from the different regions of the nation, those who shall not be less than eighteen years of age elected by their respective sectors, and those chosen by the incumbent President from the Members of the Cabinet." The regular National Assembly, on the other hand, is limited in its membership to representatives to be apportioned among the provinces, representative districts and cities. By reason of its provisional character, the interim Batasang Pambansa has to be more flexible, both in its representation and the manner of election of its members. There is no denying the fact that as wide a range of representation as possible is required in order to hasten the nation's return to normalcy. It is for t reason that sectors are given adequate representation 30 and are considered as "national aggrupations. " Elections of sectoral representatives are specially provided for in the 1978 Election Code. 31 It should be emphasized that the regular National Assembly is distinct and different in composition, powers and manner of elections of its members from the interim Batasang Pambansa is to function during the period of transition while the regular National Assembly is to operate upon the restoration of normalcy. The composition of the interim Batasang Pambansa is indeed experimental. It is an experiment in size, form and distribution of constituencies in the hope of securing a legislature most truly representative of the views of the electorate. It would, therefore, be ludicrous to confine the members of such body within the strictures of the representative districts of the regular National Assembly. The fear of petitioner Juan T. David that several representative districts will be deprived of representation misconstrues the concept of regional elections. The representatives are to be elected by the voters of the entire region. They will represent the whole region and not merely its integral provinces, districts or cities. Moreover, Section 12 of the Code ensures that there shall be sufficient representatives for each region by providing that "the number of regional representatives for any region shall not be less than the number of representative districts therein existing at the time of the ratification of the Constitution." III

The following two issues raised by petitioners are interrelated and must be jointly discussed herein. They are: (a) Whether or not the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) and the Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN) may be registered and accredited as political parties under Section 8 of Article XII-C of the Constitution, so that their respective candidates for membership in the interim Batasang Pambansa may be voted for as a group under the 1978 Election Code; and (b) Whether or not members of a political party in the l971 elections may run under the ticket sponsored by any other party, group or aggrupation, considering the provisions of Section 10 of Article XII-C of the Constitution which prohibition candidates for any elective public office from changing party affiliation within six months s immediately preceding or following an election The resolution of the foregoing issues calls for the determination of the constitutionality of Section 199 of the 1978 Election Code, questioned by petitioners. Said section provides: SEC. 199. Registration of political parties. Pending the promulgation of rules and regulations to govern the registration and accreditation of political parties by the Commission in accordance with Article XII[C] of the Constitution, the registration with the Commission previous to 1972 of the Nacionalista Party, Liberal Party, Citizens' Party, and other national parties shall be deemed to continue and they may, upon notice to the Commission through their respective presidents or duly authorized representatives, amend or change their names, constitutions, by-laws, or other organizational papers, platfor, officers and members, and shag be entitled to nominate and support their respective candidates for representatives in the interim Batasang Pambansa. Similarly, any other group of persons pursuing the same political Ideals in government may register with the Commission and be entitled to the same rights and privileges. Invoked by petitioner are Sections 8 and 10 of Article XII-C of the Constitution, which provide: SEC. 8. A political party shall be entitled to accreditation by the Commission if, in the immediately preceding election, such party has obtained at least the third highest number of votes cast in the constituency to which it seeks accreditation. No religious sect shall be registered as political party, and no political party which seeks to achieve its goals through violence or subversion shall be entitled to accreditation. SEC. 10. No elective public officer may change political party affiliation during term of office, and no candidate for any elective public office may change political party affiliation within six months immediately preceding g or following an election. It should be recalled that the object of the afore-quoted provisions of the Constitution was to develop a third party and break the heretofore dominant hold on the political system by the two major political parties which have been in existence since the birth of the republic. These two major parties were considered as "in fact a one party system with two factions openly disagreeing on fringe issues but tacitly united by one common aim: alternate monopoly of power through a pattern of patronage politics." 32 The framers of the Constitution examined the weaknesses of the party system and saw the need "for discarding the old party system as a political farce that has been largely responsible for many of the country's ills ...". 33 They envisioned, therefore, a new era in Philippine politics, where elections were to be decided on issues rather than on personalities, and where the electoral process

was to be free, less expensive government depends on an organized and vigorous citizenry. Such can only exist if citizens can increase their effectiveness in politics by modernizing and using political parties to set the general directions of public policy and to influence the specific decisions of public institutions that affect their daily lives. It was intended, however, that some of these provisions would not operate during the interim period. Thus, from the wording of Section 8, it is obvious that said section is incapable of application during the first election because it states that no political party shall be entitled to accreditation unless in the immediately preceding election, it obtained at least the third highest number of votes cast in the constituency to which it seeks accreditation. That there cannot be any accreditation during the first election under the 1973 Constitution is evident from the sponsorship speech of the proponent of t constitutional provision. 34 Although their members are united by common policies and principles of government and apparently impelled by the same political Ideals, neither the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) nor the Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN) professes to be a political party in the sense of a stable organization with a degree of permanence, imposing strict discipline among the members, and with a party platform drafted and ratified in a party convention. It does not follow, however, that the KBL and LABAN are not political parties, in a generic sense, since a political party has been generally defined as "an association of voters believing in certain principles of government, formed to urge the adoption and execution of such principles in governmental affairs through officers of like belief." 35. Political parties "result from the voluntary association of electors, and do not exist by operation of law. The element of time is not essential to the formation of a legal party; it may spring into existence from the exigencies of a particular election, and with no intention of continuing after the exigency has passed." 36 As a matter of fact, it is only the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) and the Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN) that have polarized the major differences on vital public issues affecting the nation. And, during t first election in t period of transition when, obviously, no political party can be accredited, does the Constitution, in Article XII-C, Sections 2[5] and 8 limit registration to political parties as strictly understood by withholding it from aggrupations of persons pursuing the same political Ideals of government as provided in Section 199 of the 1978 Election Code? It clearly does not. The listing of political parties appears to have a dual aspect registration and accreditation Registration is a means by which the government is enabled to supervise and regulate the activities of various elements participating in an election. It would appear from Section 8 of Article XII-C that the only groups which cannot be registered are: (a) religious groups or sects; and (b) those political parties or groups who seek "to achieve its goals through violence and subversion". Accreditation is the means by which the registration requirement is made effective by conferring benefits to registered political parties. The condition for accreditation, aside from those mentioned, is that the political party must have obtained, in the immediately preceding election, at least "the third highest number of votes cast in the constituency to which it seeks accreditation. " The Constitution, however, does not state what are the effects of accreditation. There is, therefore, necessity for legislation. Moreover, to construe the term "political party" restrictively would delimit the supervisory authority of the Commission on Elections. More specifically, it would exempt aggrupations or other political groups from certain requirements. Under Section 199, the 1978 Election Code allows the registration of aggrupations or groups of persons "pursuing the same political Ideals in government"; consequently, they are subjected to the regulation of propaganda materials (Sec. 41) and the limitation of expenses for candidates (Sec. 52). From another point of view, a narrow construction may discourage the robust exercise of the right of association guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, which at t stage of our political tory appears, necessary.

The facts that the coming polls will be the first that we shall hold since the proclamation of martial law on September 21, 1972 makes it an event of no ordinary significance. "The Filipino society has outgrown its age of innocence. Today the acts of Filipino politicians must be judged by more mature standards and the test of national allegiance has become more strict and more demanding, even more binding." 37 By t election, we shall inaugurate a new stage in our political life, and commence our fateful transition from crisis government to a parliamentary system. But as President Ferdinand E. Marcos has significantly observed: ... this step, I repeat, is no mere restoration of electoral processes and representative government. The coming elections would be a perilous exercise indeed if they would merely return us to elections and representative institutions as we had known them in the past, and compromise what had taken us so much time and effort to construct over the last five years.
What we envision in t initiative is the permanence and continuity of the refor that we have launched under the aegis of crisis government. We envision in it the full emergence of a new political order that will give life and sustenance to our national vision of a new society. And it will have permanence and continuity because by the grace of suffrage and representative government, we shag thereby attain a formal mechanism for the exercise of participation and involvement by our people in nation-building and national development. 38

It is, therefore, necessary at t stage to encourage the emergence or growth of political parties that will truly reflect the opinions and aspirations of our people. The right of individuals to form associations as guaranteed by the fundamental law, includes the freedom to associate or refrain from association. 39 In accord with t constitutional precept, it is recognized that no man is compelled by law to become a member of a political party, or, after having become such, to remain a member. 40 The existence of responsible political parties with distinct programs of government is essential to the effectiveness of a parliamentary system of government. It is in recognition of t fact that Section 199 of the 1978 Election Code allows or sanctions the registration of groups of persons "pursuing the same political ideals in government" with the Commission on Elections. Moreover, to what extent the rights of organized political parties should be regulated by law is a matter of public policy to be determined by the lawmaker a matter which does not concern the courts. 41 T brings us to the next point raised by petitioners, namely, that under Section 10 of Article XII-C of the Constitution, no candidate for elective office may change party affiliation within six months immediately preceding or following an election. In the cases at bar, We understand that no candidate voluntarily changed party affiliation. On the contrary, the claim that the KBL and the LABAN are not political parties" is based partly on the fact that the candidates running under their banners have retained their party affiliation. Section 10 is a statement of a basic principle against political opportunism. To begin with, no legislation has been enacted to implement t constitutional prohibition. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive how the courts may apply the prohibition, in all the varied facts and circutances under which it may be invoked, without the aid of supplementary legislation. For instance, the provision in question states that no elective public officer may change political party affiliation during term of office. Suppose an elected representative in the legislature, belonging to one party, shall always vote and side with another political party. Will he be considered a "turncoat" even if he does not formally change party affiliation? Suppose it be decided that he is a "turncoat". What sanctions should be adopted? Should he be suspended or ousted from the legislature?

When one turns to political candidates, the same questions as to what should be considered "political opportunism" or "turncoatism" will be encountered. But the problem of procedure for hearing and deciding infringements of the prohibition or the determination of the appropriate sanction becomes more acute. Is the sanction to be found in the refusal by the Commission on Elections to register the party or group, or in the denial of certificate of candidacy, or are there other ways? Should political parties be prevented from "adopting" candidates? Or from forming coalitions? All of these are questions of policy, in resolving winch many immensurable factors have to be considered. The afore-cited constitutional provisions are commands to the legislature to enact laws to carry out the constitutional purpose. They are, therefore, addressed initially to the lawmaking department of the government. It is not part of the judicial department to deal with such questions without their authoritative solutions by the legislative department. It may be relevant to emphasize here that the jurisdiction of t Court is "limited to cases and controversies, presented in such form, with adverse litigants, that the judicial power is capable of acting upon them, and pronouncing and carrying into effect a judgment between the parties, and does not extend to the determination of abstract questions or issues framed for the purpose of invoking the advice of the court without real parties or a real case." 42 In any event, We cannot perceive how such constitutional prohibition could be applied in t first election. Precisely, the overriding constitutional purpose is to remove the dominant hold of the two major political parties and encourage the formation of new political parties. The intention is not to rebuild old party coalitions but to define new political means and instruments, within the parties or beyond them, that will allow the Filipino people to express their deeper concerns and aspirations through popular government. IV The fourth issue is: whether or not the forty-five-day period of campaign prescribed in the 1978 Election Code violates the Constitution because. (a) it was decreed by the President and not by the Commission on Elections as provided by Section 6 of Article XII-C; and (b) the period should cover at least ninety (90) days. Petitioners question the constitutionality of Section 4 of the 1978 Election Code, which provides: SEC. 4. Election and campaign periods. The election period shall be fixed by the Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Article XII-C of the Constitution. The period of campaign shall not be more than forty- five days immediately preceding the election, excluding the day before and the day of the election: Provided, That for the election of representatives to the interim Batasang Pambansa, the period of campaign shall commence on February 17, 1978 except that no election campaign or partisan political activity may be conducted on March 23 and 24, 1978. In support of the allegation of unconstitutionality, petitioners rely on Section 6 of Article XII-C of the Constitution, thus: SEC. 6. Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special cases, the election period shall commence ninety days before the day of election and shall end thirty days thereafter. At the outset, it should be considered that Amendment No. 1 provides that the "number of representatives from each region and the manner of their election shall be prescribed and regulated

by law " (emphasis supplied). Under Amendment No. 5, "the incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall have been lifted." The power conferred by these Amendment upon the lawmaker necessarily included the authority to prescribe the date and procedure for the holding of such elections. It should be borne in mind that the forthcoming election for members in the interim Batasang Pambansa will be a special election during a regime of martial law. It is, therefore, an election in a state of emergency. The exigencies of the situation require that it be governed by special rules. At t point, the objective is to hasten the normalization of government and, at the same time, to ensure that the nation is not exposed to the same critical proble that necessitated the declaration of martial law. In conferring upon the incumbent President the authority to determine the date of the election, those who drafted the Amendments must have realized that it is only the incumbent President who has the authority and the means of obtaining, through the various facilities in the civil and military agencies of the government, information on the peace and order condition of the country, and to determine the period within which an electoral campaign may be adequately conducted in all the regions of the nation. Thus, the 1978 Election Code was formulated to meet a special need, and t is emphasized by the fact that the Code itself limits its application. 43 Even assuming that it should be the Commission on Elections that should fix the period for campaign, the constitutional mandate is complied with by the fact that the Commission on Elections has adopted and is enforcing the period fixed in Section 4, Article I of the 1978 Election Code. At any rate, insofar as objections to the fixing of the campaign period for elections in general are concerned, it is apparent that there is a distinction between the ter "election period" and "campaign period". Thus, Section 4, Article I of the 1978 Election Code provides that the "election period shag be fixed by the Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Article XII (C) of the Constitution." The "campaign period", however, has been fixed so that "it shall not be more than forty-five days immediately preceding the election: Provided, That for the election of representatives to the interim Batasang Pambansa, the period of campaign shag commence on February 17, 1978 except that no election campaign or partisan political activity may be conducted on March 23 and 24, 1978." The distinction is further made apparent by the fact that the "election period" under Section 5 of Article XII-C of the Constitution extends even beyond the day of the election itself, while the "campaign period", by reason of its nature and purpose, must necessarily be before the elections are held. There is, therefore, no conflict with the constitutional provision. At t juncture, it may be relevant to note the efforts of the Commission on Elections to give more substance and meaning to the intent and spirit of the Constitution and the 1978 Election Code by giving the same practicable opportunities to candidates, groups or parties involved in the April 7, 1978 interim Batasang Pambansa elections. Thus, in Resolution No. 1289, the COMELEC removed the so-called undue advantage which the Nacionalista Party and the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) had over the Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN) in ter of authorized election expenses, appointment of election watchers and use of print and broadcast media. T circutance, contrary to the clai of petitioners, shows that the Commission on Elections, as a constitutional body charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections, and with broad powers, functions and duties under the 1973 Constitution, can give candidates, irrespective of parties, equal opportunities under equal circutances. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED, without costs. Castro, C.J., Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring: I concur in the disposition of all the petitions in these six cases made in the scholarly main opinion of Mr. Justice Antonio. I just want to articulate a few thoughts I have about the matters therein involved which I deem relevant, appropriate and timely. To begin with, I wish to make it clear that the series of interpretations I made during the hearings which might have created the impression that I am not in agreement with the defenses interposed and ably discussed by the Solicitor General were really intended to test whether or not what appeared seared to me to be vulnerable points in the position of the Government had any rational explanation. -1Actually, I have my misgivings about the propriety of blockvoting, and I wanted to be sure that in formulating my judgment, I am not influenced more by its allegedly being unfair and laden with potentialities of fraud rather than its demonstrated inconsistency with any provision of the charter or of any established constitutional principle. I fully realize that as a member of the Court, my vote here must be based on indubitable unconstitutionality. At the same time, as a Filipino, I have been entertaining the feeling that perhaps, in t particular stage of our transition from the old political traditions to the Idealistic concepts of the New Society, there could be enough justification to disregard the strict rule that unconstitutionality must be based only on manifest and indubitable collision between a questioned legislation or actuation, on the one hand, and the provisions of the Constitution, on the other. I feel that in these formative period of our new government, it might not be very helpful to disregard the issue of wisdom or unwisdom in favor of pure legality, such that any instance where the language of the Charter can somehow-be construed in a manner that would promote more effectively the objective of establishing a parliamentary system with its inherent concomittants in our country, that construction should be adopted, even if in doing so, there might a slight departure from the area circucribed within the literal meaning of the words employed in the statutory provisions under scrutiny. After mature reflection, however, I have come to the conclusion that even my best efforts along such line of thinking would not suffice to tilt the balance in favor of petitioners. Perhaps, it may not be in the context of the situations confronting Us in these cases that the approach I cherish may be applied. In any event, I am constrained, as a Filipino, to voice my deep regret that blockvoting has been adopted in the impending elections of April 7th next, even conceding as I do that it is not unconstitutional. I perceive shades of its incongruity with what lies at the bottom of Amendment No. 1 of the Constitution, seemingly blurred ironically enough by the plain connotation of its tenor. Indeed, the very reason advanced by the respondents that blockvoting has been adopted in order to more or less insure representation for the small provinces and the old congressional districts and thereby remove the undue advantage that individual voting affords to the more populous provinces or districts does not appeal to me to be within the original intent and contemplation of the amendment. The Solicitor General hielf has explained during oral argument against the petition of Atty. Juan David that the fact that the amendment fixes the number of members of or delegates to compose the interim Batasang Pambansa at 120, when viewed, on the one hand, in the light of the provision that implicitly includes in that number the sectoral representatives to be separately elected

and the members of the Cabinet to be selected by the President, and, on the other, the number of existing congressional districts, of nearly that number, eloquently attests for the obvious original intent of the amendment that the district concept of representation ordained for the members of the regular National Assembly is not yet to be in force. I have no doubt whatsoever that such pose of the Solicitor General is correct, I would add, importantly however, that it is quite apparent that the original concept must have been adopted for two fundamental reasons. First, in that manner and in that manner alone is it possible to reduce the size of the Batasan to the manageable and efficient body it was conceived to be. After all, it is going to be no more than a temporary transitional body whose legislative power would only be dual with the President until martial law shall have been lifted, the main purpose of its creation being to preserve the framework laid down by the Constitution that there be an interim legislature to carry out the provisions of Sections 5 and 6 of Article XVI and, thus pave the most expedient way to the establishment of the parliamentary system of government envisaged by the people thru the main body of the Charter. Relatedly, there is the consideration also of economizing as much as possible with such reduced legislative structure. All these, to be faithful to the clamor of the people thru the referendum of January 10-15, 1973 for the scuttling of the interim National Assembly which was condemned for being not only somehow immorally constituted, what with its automatically selected members, but also because of its being disproportionately large and unwieldy, contrary to the ideals of efficiency, expeditiousness and thrift of the New Society. Secondly, the concept of regional representation appears to be an innovative feature which could be tried in our search for an indigenous political set-up less western and more consonant with our political traditions, custo, expertise and experience. In other words, the regional Idea is a trial or experimental breakway from the district type of representation to which the people were accustomed in the past and to which could probably be traced the case with which political bossism and warlordism, so much detested and feared by all sectors of the people became not only possible but prevalent. I cannot divine any better intendment to attribute to the regional setup provided for in the amendment and I am not persuaded that circutances have so changed in less than a year and a half since its approval that a return to the old system is now warranted. The foregoing are the compelling considerations that make it incomprehensible to me why the proposal of some members of the Batasang Bayan to adopt blockvoting had to be accepted and made part of the election code. I find it difficult to avoid saddening disillusion and apprehension that somehow the pervasive influence of the so-called Old Society politics has not yet been entirely eradicated and that, on the contrary, it may yet, God forbid, resuscitate if it has somehow been deadened with a vengeance. If in any sense there was, on the part of the authors of the proposal, any design to reap undue political over-advantage by its adoption, I like to believe that such factor was not considered by the Batasan, for it would certainly detract from the image of fairness and square dealing portrayed by the New Society. It is of secondary importance, whether it was because of the monstrous electoral frauds and anomalies it brought in its wake that such modality of voting was legislated out by the Congress of the Philippines. What cannot be denied is that it was popular clamor against it that compelled the legislature to abandon it. And what would be a strange phenomenon is that something that the Old Society discarded as not suited to our principles and ideals about suffrage is apparently deemed as a blessing and a necessity by the New Society. In brief, while it may be fun of political wisdom to enlarge the base of suffrage and representation in the manner now provided for in the Election Code of 1978, and perhaps, this could make the people in the congressional districts happier than they would otherwise could be, I would not want the high Idealism and innovative spirit so apparent to me in Amendment No. 1 to pass away without the least semblance of some necrological lamentation. Granting that such evident underlying motivations as I have mentioned may not be enough to constrain or drownout what the language of the amendment in question see to allow, I would like to at least go on record that I honestly believe that the adoption

of the district concept of representation that brought for the need, for practical pur poses, to adopt blockvoting does not square exactly with what I have always cherished to be the idealistic and purifying tenets of the New Society. As a member of the Court, I cannot condemn it because it has not been shown to be against the fundamental law of the land, but I am truly saddened by it because, in my considered opinion, the New Society does not stand to gain from it in the plaintiff of the principles for which it stands. I reiterate that it is not the element of unfairness that others see in blockvoting that makes me feel as I do about it, since viewed in the light of the considerations so ably discussed in the main opinion, such unfairness is not legally and factually apparent. Rather, it is the disconcerting thought that because of it, the elaborate scheme framed by Amendment No. 1, of an interim legislative body exercised of the evils that characterized politics in the past, to prepare our people for the new type of government intended to be ushered in by the Constitution itself will no longer ma . What comes as the sole consolation for me is that great and deliberate care has been taken in the selection of the candidates, who if elected may be able to redeem the situation . But there is yet another very important consideration that impelled me to write this separate opinion. It relates to the golden opportunity, in my estimation, that has been allowed to to bring about a more desirable, if not perfect unity, of the nation. It has not been without passion that as a member of the Supreme Court I have always defended Our decision in the Javellana can as the foundation of the intimacy of the existing government. It is a matter of public knowledge more so in the ranks of the members of the bar and the that I have always maintained with all vehemence I can master that, viewed in the correct perspective of political and constitutional law, Proclamation 1102 on the ratification of the 1973 Constitution cannot be legally faulted, if only because the Amendment Clause of the 1935 Constitution was inapplicable thereto, considering that it refers to the ratification of amendments only and not of a new constitution, which it is within the sovereign prerogative of the people to adopt and ratify in any feasible manner under the prevailing circutances, as attested by no less momentous as precedent than the ratification of the present Constitution of the United States of America which was not done in accordance with the amendment clause of the Articles of Confederation. Neither Javellana, which hindsight teaches could have been more felicitously worded, nor any later decision of Ours has in any degree discouraged, much less quieted, the dissent of a quite respectable sector of our people to the view that the 1973 Constitution is the legitimate supreme law of the land. Much as we want to believe otherwise the transcendental division of the country on t score has persisted through all the five years since January, 1973. That the size of the opposition portended no danger to the peace and order of the country simply because it has lingered more as wpering campaign does not detract from the unwholesome implications of its existence. Without intending to claim any credit for it, if any could be due, it has been a self-assigned mission on my part to keep abreast of the developments related thereto, and I have long been hoping and praying that t scismic wound that has been pestering the nation would soon be healed. I may be naive in this respect, but I sincerely felt that when the leaders of the Liberal Party, former Senators Gerardo Roxas, Jovito Salonga and Francisco "Soc" Rodrigo, conditioned their participation in the forthcoming suffrage on the elimination of blockvoting among others, these others have been substantially agreed to by the administration I thought that without any way with their stand and tactics, this was the chance I had long of. If for any reason, blockvoting should result in any advantage at all for the administration, it is my very conviction that the unity I have in mind is worth much more than the complete victory of the administration ticket, which after all, political pundits con. outsider safe to predict with or without blockvoting, what with the unprecedented record of achievement and unfailing loyalty to the interests of the country and the people that it can proudly present to the world. All relevant considerations duly taken into account, I feel grieved by the loss of that chance to make even the dissenters to Javellana to unite in support of the government under the New Constitution not that those dissenters could be exempt from Owing loyalty to it otherwise,

but it always gives a wonderful feeling to think that more weapons to mute their objectives are available. Anent the invocation by petitioners of the provisions of Section 9(1) of Article XII C of the Constitution which enjoins that "Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination", I cannot share the holding in the main opinion that what the harassment and discrimination contemplated therein are comprehended already within the compass of the equal protection clause of the Bill of Rights in Article IV of the Charter, for which reason, the test applied to the complaint of petitioners against blockvoting as a form of harassment and discrimination is the rational classification test. Having in mind the peculiar, unique and ingenious for and ways of harassment and discrimination practiced by our politicians before, which could conceivably defy the equal-protection test of rational classification or discrimination, I prefer to hold that the provision in question refers to any form or means of harassment or discrimination, including those that might otherwise be sanctionable under the equal protection clause. The framers of the Constitution cannot be assumed to have indulged in an extravagant waste of words by phrasing the provision the way it appears. There was absolutely no need for Section 9(1), if all that the constitution makers had in mind was to guarantee all candidates equal protection of the laws. The unforgettable experience undergone by even members of the convention that spelled injustice and oppression during electoral combats should be read into this provision. This is a new provision and it was adopted because the most expansive construction of the old equal protection clause was found not to be enough guarantee against injustice and unfairness in the electoral arena. This is not saying, however, that the system of blockvoting under the Election Code of 1978 being assailed by petitioners contains the elements of harassment and discrimination under Section 9(1). I see nothing of harassment in optional blockvoting. Neither is there any degree of discrimination therein that is unduly oppressive. The argument that because neither the Kilusan ng Bayan nor the Lakas ng Bayan aggrupations are political parties, the candidates in their respective tickets should be deemed also as independent candidates who must be voted individually by their respective name to avoid discrimination overlooks the fact that said candidates have formally, if loosely, grouped together in the pursuit, not only of a common victory but of some common political beliefs, ideals and objectives revolving fundamentally around the promotion of the ai of the New Society. It is thus neither harassment to their independent opponents nor discrimination against them to treat the former as aggrupation. -2Coming now to the plea of petitioner that the provisions on turn-coatism under Section 10 of Article XII C and on accreditation of political parties in Section 8 of the same article be declared as in force and applicable in these cases, I am in full accord with the holding in the main opinion that application of the same to the coming election is entirely out of the question. Of course the said provisions are in force, but how could they be applied? I simply cannot see how one can talk of the political parties, which the Constitution obviously contemplates, in the context of our political situation today. Let us not forget that in the scheduled election of April 7, what is involved is not an institution established by the Constitution itself. The Batasan is not a creation of the Constitution but of Amendment No. 1. In fact, it is undeniable that the Constitution does not contemplate the election of an interimlegislature. The interim National Assembly it created was not designed to be an elective body. The Constitution itself designated who its members were supposed to have been. It is but fitting and proper, therefore, that, since the amendment itself does not provided for any specific manner of electing the members of the Batasan, such manner should be "prescribed and regulated by law", meaning necessarily, by a Presidential Decree.

Although Amendment No. 8 does provide that "all provisions of this Constitution not inconsistent with any of these amendments shall continue in full force and effect," plain common sense dictates that no constitutional provision can be applied when and where the situation contemplated for such application does not exist. In my view, the establishment of a Parliamentary system of government by the Constitution and the proclamation of martial law which brought forth the constitution of the New Society have together given birth to a new era in the political life of the Philippines that can hardly justify the recognition of the political parties existing in January, 1973 when the constitution took effect, for purposes of the accreditation referred to in Section 8 of Article XII C. Examining t provision closely, it will be noted that the system of accreditation established thereby constituted in itself a new process, which cannot be altered or modified by the legislature, thru which a more responsible party system could be developed. While it does not directly prohibit the creation of more than three political parties, it in effect compels all such Parties to so conduct theelves as to be worthy of the con. confidence of a substantial element of the voting populace, otherwise, those who cannot obtain the third highest number of votes in the p election would not be able to enjoy in the next one the rights and privileges usually needed to carry on a significant campaign. in this connection, the question that represents itself is this: Can the Nacionalista Party and the Liberal Party be accredited for the purposes of the coming election, taking into account the votes garnered by them in the last election held before the new Constitution came into being? The ready answer to t question is No, for the simple reason that by the letter of the code, this election is regional hence the constituency for which accreditation can only be asked is the region where it seeks to have candidates, just as the criterion for its accreditation has to be the number of votes it obtained in that region. And to be true to the concept of a constituency implicit in the system, the previous election must have also been regional which everyone knows has not been I held anywhere in the country. Indeed, there is no way of knowing exactly when the accreditation system envisaged in the Constitution will start to operate. Consequently, since no existing political party can be legitimately accredited, the rights and privileges which should accrue to accredited parties should be allowed to be enjoyed by any new group or aggrupation of candidates who happen to possess the nearest semblance of a political party by, in the words of Section 199 of the Code, "pursuing the same political ideals in government", if only for the purposes of the impending election. All these in the interest of holding an orderly election and enabling the sovereign people to exercise the right of in the manner most proximate to that designed in the Constitution. At the same time, the existence of groups or aggrupations in default of fully and duly organized political parties should pave the way to the organization of the kind of Political Parties that perhaps is envisioned by the Constitution. If the New Society is to mean anything at all, and if the vociferous and incessant condemnation of the politics of pre-martial law is to bear any useful fruit, any idea of applying the provisions of the Constitution on political parties to the existing ones must be discarded, until they have so reorganized and reformed as to fit within the concepts of the New Society. In the light of the foregoing considerations, I cannot see my way clear to consideration the inclusion of members of the Liberal Party in the ticket of the Kilusan ng Bayan as a change of party on their part, within the proscription of Section 10 of Article XII C of the Constitution. The Kilusan is not a party, and whatever it enjoys now that should pertain only to a party has to be given to it only by force of necessity for the purposes of t election. Section 10 was conceived to eradicate turncoatism a very laudable objective. But the concept of turncoatism it condemns does not apply to the situation Of those members of other political parties who have joined the Kilusan and, for that matter, those who joined the Takas ng Bayan or any other opposition or independent group. The nation is now precisely in that stage of its political life where the citizens who have the general welfare and the country's freedom, happiness and prosperity in their hearts, are trying to look for their respective rightful places where they can be of maximum utility in the reform movement that has endulged everyone and every human activity in t part of the world. To leave any of the old political parties now

and join another is not turncoatism that is to be disdained; it is a patriotic endeavor that is in keeping with the paramount objective of helping the Philippines to be great again. FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting: It is a reassuring feature of the martial law regime in the Philippines that t Court had repeatedly entertained suits challenging the validity of presidential decrees raised in appropriate legal proceedings. 1 It is a role it had never shunned. There is thus adherence to the path of constitutionalism, both in normal times and under crisis conditions. Even during this period of emergency, parties had come to this Tribunal whenever, in their opinion, the executive act assailed was tainted by the vice of nullity. They did complain, and they were heard. In that way, this Court manifested fealty to the basic tenet of constitutionalism. For there is no issue so basic that it cannot be settled within the constitutional framework. Courts, in the language of Chief Justice Concepcion, "have, not only jurisdiction to pass upon [such questions] but also the duty to do so, which cannot be evaded without violating the fundamental law and paving the way to its eventual destruction." 2 Judicial review is thus the dominant constitutional concept to assure that the Constitution remains supreme. It is an awesome power, to be sure, but reasons of delicacy as well as the courtesy due a coordinate branch do not suffice to ward off judicial intervention in proper cases. More specifically, this Tribunal cannot avoid the responsibility thrust upon it to vindicate the rights safeguarded by the Constitution. It is undeniable that the function of judicial review exists not because courts can initiate the governmental action to be taken, but because thereafter the duty to pass upon its validity, whenever raised in an appropriate case, is theirs to perform. The trust reposed in them is not to formulate policy but to determine its legality as tested by the Constitution. The function entrusted to them is to decide, assuming that a suit satisfies the requisites for an inquiry into a constitutional issue, whether there is a failure to abide by the fundamental law. If so, the outcome should not be in doubt. Care is to be taken though that the transgression alleged did in fact occur. The challenge may be insubstantial and the argument adduced inconclusive. It may come from parties resolved to transfer the site of conflict from the political arena to the judicial forum. That is not to be encouraged. Certainly, there must always be an awareness of the scope of the power to adjudicate. It goes no further than to assure obedience to and respect for the mandates of the Constitution. The limits imposed on the exercise of executive and legislative power must be observes The function of judicial review is intended to serve that Purpose It does not extend to an unwarranted intrusion into that broad and legitimate sphere of discretion enjoyed by the political branches to determine the policies to be pursued. This Court should ever be on the alert lest, without design or intent, it oversteps the boundary of judicial competence. Judicial activism may become judicial exuberance As was so well put by Justice Malcolm. "Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act." 3 Justice Laurel in the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, 4 decided eight months to the day from the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, put the matter in language notable for its impact, sweep, and enduring vitality. Thus: "The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments, it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting clai of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the par ties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed 'judicial supremacy' which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, t power of judicial

review is limited to actual cast and controversies to ex after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in t manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government." 5 Such a principle was earlier given expression, in words both lucid and emphatic, by Justice Malcolm: "If there is probable basis for sustaining the conclusion reached, [legislative] findings are not subject to judicial review. Debatable questions are for the legislature to decide. The courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories." 6 In that perspective and with such pronouncements of undoubted clarity, force, and authority coming from eminent constitutionalists, the conclusion reached by the Court commends itself for approval. Nor is t merely to pay heed to precepts fundamental in character. The principles set forth above were not only characterized by their responsiveness to the questions involved in such litigations but were also impressed with a validity which transcended the issues raised on those occasions. As it was then, so should it be now. While the judicial process does not take place in a social void, there are doctrines that are of the essence of the function of judicial review. The doubts that come to mind from an objective appraisal of the challenged provisions of the 1978 Election Code do not suffice then to call for a declaration of nullity. It is true that as to the optional block voting scheme, it may be said that the strictures of recent tory had been glossed over. To the extent, however, that it will undoubtedly be of great help to the unlettered and untutored who, as citizens, are entitled to participate in the democratic process, without impairing the freedom of choice in view of its not being compulsory, it cannot be said to be infected with the virus of invalidity. This is, of course, on the assumption that electoral frauds will be avoided. Moreover, insofar as the optional block voting scheme is a valid response to a compelling state interest, favoring as it does the growth and stability of political parties, petitioners who are independent candidates were unable to sustain the burden of proving that there is a denial of due process or of equal protection. 7 What added difficulty to their task was the rather tenuous character of their plea, premised as it is on their mere assertion that the challenged provision on the block voting scheme is void on its face. Thus they had to overcome the presumption of validity accorded a legislative or executive act. This they failed to do. Nor should nagging doubts prevail against the overriding consideration that thereby, the electorate is afforded the opportunity of choosing their representatives in a legislative body, even of an interim character. That is to pay homage to the fundamental principle of the Philippines being a republican state, with sovereignty residing in the people. 8 As was so well emphasized by justice Laurel in Moya v. Del Fierro: 9 "As long as popular government is an end to be achieved and safeguarded, suffrage, whatever may be the modality and form devised, must continue to be the means by which the great reservoir of power must be emptied into the receptacular agencies wrought by the people through their Constitution in the interest of good government and the common weal Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption of a representative type of government, necessarily points to the enfranced citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the established authority." 10 There is this added reinforcement to the conclusion reached by the Court. The forthcoming election is a major step toward the eagerly-awaited restoration of full civilian rule. There is thus a closer approximation to the Willoughby concept 11 that martial law merely confers on the Executive the competence to call on the armed forces to assist him in the faithful execution of the laws, primarily

the maintenance of peace and order, leaving unimpaired the full exercise of legislative and judicial powers by the other departments and thus maintaining civilian supremacy. Moreover, the existence of an interim Batasang Pambansa would be in consonance with the pronouncement of Justice Black in Duncan v. Kahanamoku 12 that even during such emergency period, legislatures and courts remain indispensable to the existence of a republican state. 13 I am thus persuaded to yield conformity to the able, exhaustive,. and learned opinion of Justice Antonio, except for the inclusion of the rule on appreciation of ballots found in paragraph 28 of Section 155 of the 1978 Election Code, which, to my mind, raises a serious constitutional question. For as it stands, there appears to be an undue intrusion in the freedom of choice implicit in the right of suffrage if an elector's preference for individual candidates would not be accorded recognition solely due to the fact that at the same time ballot likewise indicates voting for the slate of another party or aggrupation. In such a ease, it is my view that what should be disregarded is the vote for such other party or aggrupation and the vote for the individual candidates counted. To that extent, I am unable to yield entire concurrence. 1. Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, 14 in raising the question of standing of petitioners, relied on a well-settled doctrine concerning the procedural standards that must be met for the function of judicial review to come into play. "The unchallenged rule," according to Justice Laurel, in the equally leading case of People v. Vera, 15 "is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its'enforcement." 16 There was a reiteration of t doctrine in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 17 with t modification in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion: "Yet, there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that 'the expenditure of public funds by an office of the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds,' which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer." 18 Thus was the concept of a taxpayer's suit given the imprimatur of approval by this Court. It does not mean, however, that in each and every instance where such an exception is invoked, this Tribunal is left with no alternative except to hear the parties. Tan v. Macapagal" 19 clarified matters thus: "Moreover, as far as taxpayer's suit is concerned, tills Court is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained." 20 Solicitor General Mendoza was on solid ground therefore when he raised as one of defenses that taxpayer's suits as such do not necessarily call for the exercise of the function of judicial review. Fortunately for petitioner all of them could show an interest Personal and substantial. Two petitions were filed by registered voter, 21 two others, by registered candidates for the interim Batasang Pambansa; 22 and the last two, one by "a political and civil aggrupation" and the other by a former delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention who was also the Chairman of the Committee on Political Parties. 23 It only remains to be added that there apparently is a tendency in recent American decisions to retreat from the liberal rule as to standing announced in the 1968 decision of Flast v. Cohen. 24 There is no automatic reversion, however, to the rather rigid rule of Mellon v. Frothingham, 25 a 1923 decision. After a recent careful and analytical study of the trend discernible in cases heard the last two or three years by the American Supreme Court, 26 Professor Tushnet came to t conclusion: "Decisions on questions of standing are concealed decisions on the merits of the underlying constitutional claim. The Court finds standing when it wishes to sustain a chum on the merits and denies standing when the claim would be rejected were the merits reached." 27 2. Certainly, a voter whose right of suffrage 28 is allegedly impaired by the optional block voting scheme is entitled to judicial redress. The "enfranced citizen," to refer anew to Justice Laurel's opinion in Moya v. Del Fierro, 29 is "a particle of popular sovereignty and [is] the ultimate source of the established authority." 30 Such a thought was given expression by Chief Justice Concepcion in Ozamis v. Zosa 31 in words with a similar ring, characterizing the right to vote as "an attribute of sovereignty." 32 It follows then, to quote from Pungutan v. Abubakar, 33, that it is "a constitutional guarantee of the utmost significance. It is a right without which the principle of sovereignty residing in

the people becomes nugatory." 34 It is thus evident that petitioners who are registered voters cannot be denied the right to be heard. This Court is committed to such a principle. 35 So it is under American law where a denial of the right to vote could even be made the basis for a money claim. That was the ruling in the leading case of Nixon v. Herndon, 36 the opinion being penned by the illustrious Justice Holmes: "The objection that the subject-matter of the suit is political is little more than a play upon words. Of course, the petition concerns political action, but it alleges and seeks to recover for private damage. That private damage may be caused by such political action, and may be recovered for in a suit at law, hardly has been doubted for over two hundred years, since Ashby v. White, and has been recognized by this court." 37 Chief Justice Warren, in Wesberry v. Sanders, 38 was quite eloquent when he spoke on the matter: "No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined." 39 possible objection based on standing can be raised either when the suit is instituted by a candidate for public office 40 as well as a political party or aggrupation. 41Concerning as constitutional convention delegate, there had been no previous decisions on the matter. By analogy, however, inasmuch as members of the legislative body both in the Philippines 42 and in the United States43 could file actions to assail the validity of a challenged legislation or even a resolution of the Constitutional Convention, a delegate or former delegate is entitled to the same privilege. 3. It is unthinkable then for this Court not to inquire into any allegation of constitutional infirmity imputed to a provision of the Election Code that would emasculate the right to vote. Five of the six petitions assailed the options block voting scheme with unwonted severity, but the denunciation fell far short of overcoming the presumption of validity. To be more specific, three of the petitioners, Pedro G. Peralta, 44 B. Asuncion Buenafe, 45 and Juan T. David, 46 did manifest grave concern as to its possible adverse effects on their candidacies, the first two stressing their running as independents. The censure that came from the Youth Democratic Movement 47 was peripheral to its main submission. That leaves only petitioner De la Llana, 48 who filed a suit for declaratory relief treated by this Court as an action for prohibition, distinguished, if that is the appropriate term, by condensing the matter in four pages. Ostensibly, it is an attack on the optional block voting scheme, yet, instead of stressing the right to vote, it would premise its plea on the ground that no party could be accredited by the Conunission on Elections and subsequently no party could be voted for in the coming elections, referring to Article XII C, Section 2, paragraph 5 and Section 8 of the same Article. 49 All that was stated by him as to the optional block voting is that it "win result to (sic) the commission of gross electoral frauds and malpractices and the election win only be a farcical political exercise and a death blow to our democratic system." 50 What other conclusion can there be from such a bare assertion except that it is decidedly unpersuasive? It assumes what must be shown. There is nothing axiomatic about conclusion. It cannot just be taken for granted. There see to be lack of awareness of the rudimentary concept in constitutional law that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or decree is void on its face. 51 Without developing further how the right to vote of an elector, who is given the freedom of choice between casting ballot for individual candidates or for the favored party or aggrupation, had been infringed, it may be a rash assumption to affirm categorically that "the election win only be a farcical political exercise and a death blow to our democratic system." tory need not repeat itself. Precisely, measures to avoid abuses in the utilization of a device neutral in character and on its face not infected with the vice of nullity could be taken. It does not suffice to link past agonies with present hopes. Let me not be misunderstood. The desirability of any block voting provision, even if optional, is not by any means suggested. An that is set forth here is that respect for the deeplyrooted principle of according the, presumption of constitutionality to a legislative act or a presidential decree cautions against sustaining the plea of petitioner De la Llana. There was a dismal failure to sustain the burden incumbent upon him to demonstrate invalidity. The thirteen-page petition of the Youth Democratic Movement 52 is distinguished by a more conscientious and diligent appraisal of the constitutional issues. Its major thrust, however, is on the limitation of the election period, arousing the fear on the part of petitioner that the balloting would not reflect the true popular will. There is,

however, t stray comment bearing on the optional block voting provision: "And t will be worse confounded by the introduction of the infamous block voting scheme which millions of our voters do not understand. Even intelligent professionals are confused. The result will be countless (sic) of stray ballots and a defeat of popular will." 53 Such a rather curt summary invites a similar appraisal. Clearly, the presumption of validity has not been overcome. 4. Petitioner Peralta was rather vehement in contending that the optional block voting scheme is violative of t provision of the Constitution: Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." 54 He sought the shelter of its protection for hielf and other independent candidates who, according to him, would be thus made to suffer if the assailed provision is not nullified. Essentially, in ter of individual rights, he would raise a due process and equal protection question. 55 5. First, as to the due process aspect. It is undoubted that if the optional block voting scheme, in the language of Cardozo, would outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression, it offends against such a guarantee. An executive or legislative act must satisfy the rational basis test. It is equally undoubted that with such a provision an advantage is afforded party candidates. Does that stamp it with invalidity? The answer is in the negative. The importance of political parties or political aggrupations to a republican state, especially so for a parliamentary system, calls for such a response. On that point, there is t Categorical declaration by Schattschneider: "The rise of political parties is indubitably one of the principal distinguishing marks of modern government. The parties, in fact, have played a major role as makers of governments, more especially they have been the makers of democratic government. it should be stated flatly at the outset that t volume is devoted to the thesis that the political parties created democracy and that modern democracy is unthinkable save in ter of the parties. As a matter of fact, the condition of the parties is the best possible evidence of the nature of any regime." 56 It is, to quote him anew, "first of all an organized attempt to get power." 57 As observed by Truman: "Whatever else it may be or may not be, the political party in the United States most commonly is a device for mobilizing votes, preferably a majority of votes."58 As a vote mobilizer he stated further, "a party must be an 'alliance of interests' to use Herring's phrase." 59 It is through a political party then that the shifting desires and pressure intensities of the various groups that compose the electorate may be ascertained. This is not to say though that it does not reflect the deep clash of forces within the community, but the crucial element in their campaign for votes, to repeat, is the drive for power. "The single purpose," to quote from Friedrich, "[is] victory." 60 Thus it has to be responsive to the needs and outlook of the elector. At times, it may be unavoidable that; there be compromises with both political principles and doctrinal symmetry. Nor is that necessarily undesirable for that could minimize the sharpness of conflicts which, with leaders of undeviating rigidity in their approach to political proble, could have caused an undue strain in the body politic. Through a political party, the feelings of the electorate about their own tangled proble and institutions may be canalized and thus be clarified. Likewise, it serves as a source of resiliency and cohesion. The party system, according to Lerner, "has given American democracy a rough kind of politically functioning unity without the social cast that the unity of a single-party totalitarian system would have involved." 61 What was said by the eminent British political scientist Laski is equally relevant. According to subject to a small number of exceptions, members are not elected "to Parliament for exceptional beauty of character, or distinction of mind; they have been returned there to support a party to which their supporters hope will win enough seats to be able to form a government under the Premiership of its leader." 62 He elucidated further. "No doubt the party system s we know it, has a special pathology of its own. It is hostile to the independent member; it makes the rise of new parties a difficult matter; it a general vote of confidence in men rather than a mandate upon measures; and once it has brought the new House of Commons into being, the character, of its party pattern gives both the House and the electorate a government which party discipline will usually maintain in office for a period pretty close to the five years set as its legal term by the Parliament Act of 1911." 63 It cannot be said, therefore, that the added advantage afforded parties or aggrupations by the optional block voting device is an

infringement of the due process guarantee. Whatever deficiencies may be attributed to it cannot go so far as to warrant the conclusion that thereby the rational basis test for governmental action had been disregarded. 6. Now as to the equal protection question. It is undoubted that independent candidates are at a disadvantage under an optional block voting scheme. Does that in itself justify a finding that it suffers from the corrosion of constitutional infirmity? The answer, if due regard be had to the authoritative and controlling doctrines, is in the negative. The teaching of our decisions is plain and unmistakable. It is too clear to be misread. So it has been from People v. Vera, 64 the second landmark opinion in constitutional law of Justice Laurel to Felwa v. Salas, 65cited in the opinion of Justice Antonio. The ponencia of Chief Justice Concepcion in Felwa is a succinct but comprehensive statement of the matter. Thus: "It is well settled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subjects of legislation, and that a classification is reasonable where: (1) it is based upon substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies, not only to present conditions, but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; and (4) the classification applies equally to all those who belong to the same class." 66 It is of interest to note that the applicable constitutional law doctrine in Malaysia is not dissimilar. So it is apparent in the masterly opinion of Lord President Tun Sufian of the Federal Court of Malaysia, promulgated in 1977, in Datuk Haji Harun bin Haji Idris v. Public Prosecutor. Like our Constitution the federal charter of Malaysia has an equality provision. 67 As was made clear by the Lord President, it is not absolute but qualified. 68 As in the Philippines, such a guarantee "applies to both substantive and procedural law" but "envisages that there may be lawful discrimination based on classification." 69 That the formulation of Justice Laurel in People v. Vera as to when there is a reasonable classification applies as well in Malaysia is evident from t portion of the opinion citing the Shri Ram Krishma Dalmia decision of the Indian Supreme Court to the effect that a discriminatory law is good law as long as there is reasonable and possible classification which "is founded on an intelligible differential which distinguishes persons that are grouped together from others left out of the group; and the differential a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the law in question. The classification may be founded on different bases such as geographical, or according to objects or occupations and the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the law in question." 70 Succinctly put, to quote anew fromPeople v. Vera, what is condemned is invidious discrimination. A recent decision, J. M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 71 has t relevant excerpt: "To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may, under such circutances, invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circutances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be snowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circutances which, if not Identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in ter of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest." 72 7. Petitioner Peralta's contention that there was an infringement of the equal protection clause is thus devoid of support in law. The optional block voting scheme, it cannot be too strongly emphasized, is one of the means of strengthening a party government which is a valid state objective. To the extent, therefore, that independent candidates may be placed in a less favorable category, it is not a suspect classification to which the rigid scrutiny test applies. 73 This Court is not

called upon then to nullify such a provision. Such a conclusion follows from another avenue of approach. In Aglipay v. Ruiz, 74 a 1937 decision of major importance, Justice Laurel as ponenterejected the contention that the issuance of postage stamps referring to Manila as the Seat of the XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress was violative of the constitutional provision against the use of public money or property for the use, benefit, or support of any sect or church or system of religion. 75 He explained why: "What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an even of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Goverment. We are of the opinion that the government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. 76 So in this case, in the emphatic language of Justice Laurel: "The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental results not contemplated." 77 If the independent candidates are to be prejudiced by the adoption of the optional block voting scheme, the resulting harm to their candidacy is attributable to their decision to run as such. There is nothing to prevent them from joining a party or aggrupation and hoping to be nominated as candidates. Any adversity suffered by them comes under the heading of a self-inflicted wound. Petitioner Peralta, undeterred, would seek to lend a semblance of deceptive plausibility by the assertion that in the Vera Opinion of Justice Laurel, a law may be considered bad not only when it actually denies but also when it permits inequality. There is a grave misapprehension on part. People v. Vera declared unconstitutional the former Probation Act 78 in view of the fact that its Section 11 would leave its applicability the appropriation by the Provincial Board of the salary of the probation officers. Since the Act was intended to operate equally in the Philippines, there certainly would be inequality if certain provinces failed to make the necessary appropriation As the purpose was for an enactment nationwide in operation, all provinces belong to the same class. To assert in the light of such undoubted statutory objective that a similar kind of inequality may be attributed to the optional block voting scheme that would thus favor political parties or aggrupations is to flounder in the mire of elusive analogy. For in the challenged provision, as in the cases of usury laws making a distinction between debtors and creditors, the Recto Installment Sales Law making a distinction between vendors and vendees, and in labor legislation making a distinction between management and the workingmen, the statute treates a separate class in a much more favorable manner without thereby incurring the vice of offending against the equal protection clause. So it is in the case of the assailed optional block voting scheme. The denunciatory favor in which the contention was made is thus unpersuasive. It cannot stand the test of scrutiny, not to mention the fact that the element of hyperbole was clearly apparent. The assertion that there is a denial of equal protection thus falls to the ground. 8. The questions raised in the David, the Youth Democratic Movement, and the Fajardo petitions, all of which bore evidence of considerable thought and reflection, with one of them characterized by objectivity seeming to melt away under the fierce fire of intense indignation, were squarely met and, to my mind, satisfactorily resolved, in the opinion of Justice Antonio. Nothing remains to be added except to point out that in the first two, with petitioner David being hielf a candidate in the forthcoming elections and petitioner Youth Democratic Movement being a political aggrupation with intent to present, so its petition stated, a complete ticket for the Metro Manila region, 79 it would appear that the doctrine of estoppel, which admittedly is not to be applied indiscriminately, enters into the picture and constitutes a bar, although not insurmountable, to the grant of the relief prayed for. 80 It is perhaps understandable why the Fajardo petition appears to be less than fully aware of the implications of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and ripeness of the constitutional question raised to call for adjudication, since petitioner is not a member of the bar. 81 It may likewise be stated

that considering the tensions of our days and the crisis of our times, it may be a counsel of wisdom not to anticipate the serious constitutional law proble that would arise under situations where only a tentative judgment is dictated by prudence. This is a decade of transition and, as pointed out in the opinion of justice Antonio, there is a great deal of allowable latitude for experimentation. It is only when there is a clear denial of a constitutional right evident on the face of a statute or decree that even in the absence of any evidentiary proof, it wig be time, to borrow from the language of Justice Laurel, "to make the hammer of [judicial review] fall, and heavily, but not until then." 82 To my mind, that stage had not been reached in the last three petitions. 9. It is quite obvious then that t separate opinion is essentially and almost wholly one of concurrence. If there is a dissent, it is submitted ex abundante cautela. As was made plain at the outset, it is not to an explicit ruling but merely the reference to Section 155 paragraph 28 of the Election Code that precluded, on my part, an agreement full and entire. The opinion of the Court set forth as the first issue: "Whether or not the voting system provided for in Sections 140 and 155, sub-paragraphs 26 to 28 of the 1978 Election Code, granting to the voter the option to vote either for individual candidates by filling in the proper spaces in the ballot the names of candidates he desires to elect, or to vote for all the candidates of a political party, group or aggrupation by simply writing in the space provided for in the ballot the name of the political party, group or aggrupation, violates Section 1 of Article IV and Section 9(1) of Article XII-C of the Constitution." 83 Then the aforesaid provision was quoted in full: "Sec. 155, par. 28: If a voter has written in the proper space of ballot the name of a political party, group or aggrupation which has nominated official candidates and the names of individual candidates not belonging to the ticket of the same political party, group or aggrupation in the spaces provided therefor, all of the votes indicated in the ballot shall be considered as stray votes and shall not be counted: ..." 84 Reference was likewise made to Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 666 which provided. "(g) If a voter had voted for the straight ticket of a political party and at the same time had written on one or more blank spaces of the ballot the names of candidates of other party or parties or of independent candidates, said names shall be deemed as not written and the vote shall be counted as cast for each and every one of the official candidates of the party voted for in the ballot." 85 It is that rule in the appreciation of ballots that to my mind is free from any unconstitutional taint. The will of the voter expressed in a manner free from doubt was given force and effect. This is not the case with paragraph 28 of Section 155 of the Election Code. After such a categorical expression of will to vote for specified candidates whose names he had taken the trouble to write, I am unable to accept any implication in the opinion of the Court that just because he had also made use of the optional block voting scheme, a statutory provision setting at naught will as to such candidates individually singled out could be viewed as free from any constitutional deficiency. I would not want then to be placed on record as having failed to express my conviction on the matter. Hence, this brief dissent. A few more words. Solicitor General Mendoza in the course of oral argument observed that two of the most eminent constitutionalists who sat on t bench, Jose P. Laurel and Claro M. Recto, while undoubtedly cognizant of the abuses to which block voting could give rise and did suffer as a consequence, did not challenge its validity in an appropriate case or Proceeding. Their failure to do so is, to my mind, impressed with significance considering that in the post World War II period, until they died, they had participated as counsel de parte or as amici curiae or had been consulted on major constitutional law cases. 86 They were, to follow Thomas Reed Powell, silently vocal on the matter. It would seem that for them such a question had more of a policy rather than a legal connotation, thus appropriately belonging to the political branches. It is to stress anew that it is primarily on that ground, with full reliance on the authoritative pronouncements in the aforecited cases of Angara, Pasay Transportation, and Lorenzo, the opinions coming from the pens of Justices Laurel and Malcolm, that I am persuaded to concur in the dismissal of these petitions. So I am led to conclude because, for me, there was no clear showing of invalidity based on the impairment of the right of suffrage or the denial of due process and equal pro. protection guarantees. The presumption of validity accorded a legislative act or executive decree was not therefor overcome. Stress must

equally be made on what was said before that the dismissal of these petitions, especially those impugning the validity of the optional block voting scheme, cannot be construed as an admission of its desirability. That is a matter the cognizance of which belongs to the other branches. Nor is it to deny that, as unfortunately happened in the past, it could be perverted from its legitimate use and could be a source of electoral frauds. As early as 1816, Justice Story, in the oficited case of Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 87 characterized an argument "from the possibility of an abuse" as "unsatisfactory." 88 He emphasized: "It is always a doubtful course, to argue against the use or existence of a power, from the possibility of its abuse." 89 T excerpt from an opinion of Justice Cardozo in Willia v. Baltimore 90 is equally relevant: "The judicial function is exhausted with the discovery that the relation between means and end is not wholly vain and fanciful, an illusory pretence. Within the field where men of reason may reasonably differ, the legislature [or the executive] must have its way." 91 At any rate, there is solace in the thought that outside of the 1978 Election Code being applicable only for t year's poll there are built-in provisions therein to guard against the perpetration of electoral misdeeds. Moreover, it is to the interest of the present Administration that every effort should be made to avoid such evil practices. If it fails, its achievements would stand discredited and the New Society itself condemned. There must be a true expression of the popular will, which, thereafter, must be obeyed. So both constitutionalism and democracy mandate.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting: I. I dissent from the majority's dismissal of the petition on the fundamental ground in consonance with my stand in earlier cases 1 that the so-called October 27, 1976 amendments to the 1973 Constitution which sought to crate the Interim Batasang Pambansa in lieu of the interim National Assembly provided for in Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution were constitutionally void and invalid since the constituent power to propose constitutional amendments during the transition period (between enforcement of the 1973 Constitution and election and assumption of office of the members of the regular National Assembly) is expressly vested in the interim National Assembly (not in the incumbent President) and the only way to fulfill the express mandate of the Constitution in proposing and effecting any constitutional amendments is the convening of the interim National Assembly to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments. This was not done, although it is universally recognized that the Constitution is a "superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means" 2 but only by the particular mode and manner therein prescribed for otherwise "there will not be stability in our constitutional system and necessarily no stability in our government." 3 But with the majority vote in Sanidad, supra the proposed amendments were proclaimed as ratified and in fun force and effect as of October 27, 1976 under Presidential Proclamtion No. 1595. And elections have been called for April 7, 1978 under Presidential Decree No. 1296 (1978 Election Code) for electing the members of the Interim Batasang Pambansa with greatly diluted powers and functions compared to those of the interim National Assembly. (Thus, contrary to the very tenets of the parliamentary system the Interim Batasang Pambansa which is shorn of the interim and regular Assembly's power to ratify treaties, cannot elect the Prime Minister nor replace the incumbent President as Prime Minister who may however dissolve the Batasan at any time 4 and who shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall have been lifted." 5 The President (Prime Minister) is further empowered to "issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instructions, which shag form part of the law of the land "whenever the Interim Batasang Pambansa

or the regular National Assembly "fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in judgment requires immediate action." 6 II. We are thus confronted with the reality of the scheduled April 7, 1978 election of Interim Batasang Pambansa members and the merits of the petitions at bar which in the main assail the validity and constitutionality of the so-called "optional block voting" system now resurrected in Presidential Decree No. 1296 for the said elections and pray that respondent Comelec be enjoined from implementing the same citing the Comelec's own position papers in the Batasan Bayan's last session on January 27, 1978 that "block voting would only make a mockery of the elections, that it is associated with electoral frauds and malpractices, that adopting it would seemingly insured political advantage to the candidates of the administration and, therefore, the credibility of the election would be impaired because of it." 7 I vote for the granting of the petitions and for the outlawing of the block voting scheme on the following grounds. 1. The block voting scheme offends the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution and is furthermore proscribed by the express injunction of the new provision in Article XII, section 9 (1) of the 1973 Constitution that "Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." Petitioner Peralta as an independent La Union candidate complains with reason that he is unfairly discriminated against and prejudiced by the block voting scheme in that "there are three ways to vote for a KIBALI [Kilusang ng Bagong Lipunan] candidate: (1) by writing name, (2) by writing KIBALI and (3) by writing NACIONALISTA, on the ballot. On the other hand, there is but one way to vote for an independent, like petitioner, only by writing name." 8Actually, the arbitrary and oppressive edge given the KBL candidate against an independent candidate amounts to 6 to 1 for judicial notice may be taken of the ballot subject of the petition in Case L-47883 entitled "Lakas ng Bayan (Laban) vs. Comelec" complaining against the double listing of KBL candidates in Metro Manila where the Comelec recognizes three additional ways of voting for a KBL candidate viz by writing (4) KBL (5) NP (for Nacionalista Party) or (6) just a plain N unless enjoined by the Court in said pending case. Said petitioner further aptly observes that "under martial law where the freedom, privileges and immunities of the citizens are curtailed or suspended, the evils of block voting are enhanced to a hundredfold." 9 2. Historically, it may be noted that block voting was repudiated by the people through Congress which abolished block voting in 1951 and never reinstituted the same. As observed by the former Senator Jovito Salonga, "(B)lock voting was used after the Second World War in two elections. In the 1947 elections, the administration almost wiped out the opposition. In the 1949 elections, through the use of block voting, massive frauds were committed and facilitated by the party in power. The two great oppositionists at the time, Jose P. Laurel and Claro M. Recto who headed the senatorial slate and the men who ran with them, became easy victi of block voting. So great was the indignation of the people that Congress had to abolish the optional block voting scheme in March, 1951. ... Block voting makes it easy for fake ballots to be used with maximum effect. Twentyone names of candidates in Metro Manila need not be written out, only the name of the political party or group. Block voting makes it easy to verify whether the voter who has been bribed will vote according to previous understanding. If he finishes accomplishing ballot in, let us say, five seconds, the one assigned to watch him can readily conclude that the voter complied with part of the bargain. One who writes out 21 names on ballot cannot finish the task in five seconds." 10 When taken against the backdrop of 5- years of martial law and its restraints without any political activity so much so that the main opposition party, the Liberal Party, has been urged in vain to take

part in the elections and the government's ticket of KBL candidates throughout the country are all but unopposed "in an awesome display of power" with only three reported "quixotic" pockets of opposition in Metro Manila, Region V (Bicolandia) and Region VII (Central Visayas), 11 the "invidious discrimination" that is inflicted by ,the block voting scheme upon the opposition and independent candidates calls for judicial protection of their constitutionally protected rights of due process and equal protection. This is all the more so since the block voting scheme that has been revived is closer to the pre-war scheme (under Commonwealth Act 666) of practically compulsory straight party balloting whereby the writing of the name of the party now cancels and invalidates the written names of the candidate(s) not member(s) of said party 12 (whereas in the prewar scheme, the writing of the party's name prevailed over the individual candidates as distinguished from the postwar scheme in 1947 and 1949 (under Rep. Act 180) which provided that the in. individual candidates' names as written prevailed over the party's. 13 It has thus been noted that "since the administration slate has more advantages than the opposition, it assumes a heavier burden in being fair." 14 3. The majority's thesis that "in other jurisdictions ballots providing for optional straight party voting have been accepted as a standard form" 15 and that there is reasonable basis for favoring official candidates against independent candidates who are free to avail of such advantages "by joining a political party, group or aggrupation" 16 with the observation that block voting "favors the strongly organized parties or groups and tends to prevent the proliferation of political parties or groups" 17 may hold true for other times, places and climes but y not in the context of the present martial law situation and the Philippine experience. It is a matter of daily comment in the press that the government's KBL slate is running practically unopposed and there certainly is no proliferation of parties or groups to even watch out for. Independent candidates under such circutances will not find it easy to follow the majority's solution that they become official candidates of non-existent or non- participating political parties or groups. Most importantly, aside from the people's repudiation of block voting since 1951, and 1973 Constitution has in effect outlawed the inherent discrimination in block voting against independent candidates through its new provision that bona fide candidates "shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." This new provision which is not found in the Constitution of other states and jurisdictions manifestly constricts the classifications heretofore permitted in the application of the general equal protection clause by specifically providing that in elections for any public office, bona fide candidates may not be subjected to any form of discrimination (such as that of block voting) which might otherwise have been permissible against independent candidates. Petitioner Reynaldo T. Fajardo who was chairman of the Committee on Political Parties in the 1971 Constitutional Convention submitted committee's printed report which bears out contention that block voting was outlawed by t new Constitutional provision. The Committee's explanatory note on the draft of said provision (which was adopted practically verbatim save that protection against harassment was added) further emphasized that t provision is to be understood as having special reference to unaffiliated or partyless bona fide candidates. Extending to them the equal protection of the law is but a matter of elementary justice. If the State guarantees equal protection to groups of individuals, such as political parties, it is but logical that the same protection be made available to individuals, separately, without discrimination in any form. 4. The basic consideration is the principle of due process and equal protection of the laws as enshrined in the very first clause of the Bill of Rights which negates state power or that of the party in power to act in an arbitrary or oppressive manner and stands as the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play and the guaranty of justice. In all this,U.S. Chief Justice Erl Warren had well stressed that it is the spirit and not the form of law that makes justice alive.

The late Justice Jose P. Laurel (hielf a victim of block voting in the 1949 elections 18 had earlier enjoined us that "(R)epublicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption of a representative type of government, necessarily points to the enfranced citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the established authority. He has a voice in Government and whenever possible it is the solemn duty of the judiciary, when caged upon to act in justifiable cases, to give it efficacy and not to stifle or frustrate it." 19 It was in t same spirit that U.S. Chief Justice Earl Warren in formulating the "one man, one vote" formula as the constitutional rule to be followed in the reapportionment of representation in State legislatures 20 held in upholding plaintiffs' contention that they were denied "equal suffrage in free and equal elections ... and the equal protection of the laws", that "... (E)specially since the right to exercise the france in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized ..." and "a denial of constitutionally protected rights demands judicial protection; our oath and our office require no less of us. ... To the extent that a citizen's right to vote is debased, he is that much less a citizen. " 5. Finally, petitioner Juan T. David has raised the prejudicial questions that since P.D. 1269, the 1978 Election Code, has not yet been published in the Official Gazette (as per certification dated February 16, 1978 of the Government Printing Office 21) the provisions thereof particularly those imposing penal sanctions may not be enforced until after the lapse of 15 days from publications in the Official Gazette and that block voting as therein provided may not be enforced because the Election Code of 1971 (which does not provide for block voting) should be deemed as still in force and as not having been legally repealed. This has sound basis under the pertinent laws, Article 2 of the Civil Code which provides that "Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided ... "and Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code which likewise requires that "(W)hen laws take effect. A statute passed by the Philippine Legislature (National Assembly) shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette, the date of issue being excluded. For the purpose of fixing such date the Gazette is conclusively presumed to be published on the day indicated therein as the date of issue. The Court held through then Chief Justice Ricardo Paras in People vs. de Dios 22 that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation" citing the general principle enunciated in an earlier case 23 that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties." Such legal requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for the effectivity of laws is vital and indispensable and may not be waved away with the contention that copies of the election decree have been published and distributed or the people advised thereof through the newspapers. In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the requirements of due process and of the Rules of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official government reporsitory promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.

MUOZ PALMA, J., dissenting:

The Constitution shall be the bedrock of our Republic. (From the Speech of President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the opening of the 1971 Constitution Convention, June 1, 1971) La Constitution, ... es la ley de la paternidad y de los afectos del poder creador, que rige la en sus diversos ordenes. Obra del pueblo, y no de un partido, ha de ser, por tanto, la Constitution para que el pueblo deba amarla y defenderla y los governantes respetarla y cumplirla. ... * (From the Speech of President Claro M. Recto at the opening of the 1934 Constitutional Convention, July 30, 1934; emphasis supplied) The Malolos Constitution "is the most glorious expression of the noble aspirations of the Filipino a mirror of their culture and a clear proof before the world of their capacity to govern themselves. (From the Speech of President Emilio Aguinaldo, Proclamation of the Malolos Constitution, January 21, 1899) It was in the spirit of the transcendental principles enunciated in the foregoing statements and of similarly inspired pronouncements, too many to be quoted, of our forbears and leaders of thought and of government of the past, that I wrote my dissenting Opinion in Sanidad, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., L-44640, October 12, 1976, and the accompanying cases. What was challenged in Sanidad was the constitutionality of Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033 which called for a referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976, on certain proposed constitutional amendments, one of which was to substitute the interim National Assembly with an Interim Batasang Pambansa. I expressed there the opinion that the incumbent President did not have constituent powers, that is, the power to propose amendments to the 1973 Constitution, and that if there was need of amending the Constitution the amendatory process provided for in Art. XVI, Section 1 (1) and (2), or Art. XVII, Section 15, of the 1973 Constitution, was to be followed. I said: xxx xxx xxx l. That sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them is a fundamental, basic principle of government which cannot be disputed, but when the people have opted to govern theelves under the mantle of a written Constitution each and every citizen , from the highest to the lowliest, has the sacred duty to respect and obey the Charter they have so ordained. xxx xxx xxx The Filipino people,, wanting to ensure to theelves a democratic republican form of government, have promulgated a Constitution whereby the power to govern theelves has been entrusted to and distributed among three branches of government; they have also mandated in clear and unmistakable ter the method by which provisions in their fundamental Charter may be amended or g done so, the people are bound by these constitutional limitations. For while there is no surrender or abdication of the people's ultimate authority to amend, revised, or adopt a new Constitution, sound reasondemands that they keep theelves within the procedural bounds of the existing fundamental law. (73 SCRA 455, 456)

My view in Sanidad was reiterated by me in Dela Llana v. COMELEC et al., L-47245, and Hidalgo v. COMELEC, et al., L-47239, December 9, 1977. The issue was on the validity of another national referendum for December 17, 1977, which referred to the 1976 amendments Nos. 3 and 7 of the Constitution. In these two cases, I stated that inasmuch as amendments Nos. 3 and 7 were not validly proposed and ratified, Presidential Decree No. 1229 which implements said amendments is nun and void. The cases now before Us raise legal questions which center on the election of representatives to the Interim Batasang Pambansa. Without necessity of giving my views on the different issues raised in these petitions, I vote to declare as unconstitutional the challenged portions of "The 1978 Election Code" as they are without constitutional basis, conformably to my opinion in Sanidad that the Interim Batasang Pambansa is not validly constituted and suffers from a basic constitutional infirmty. I strongly reiterate here what I wrote in Sanidad that the only possible measure that can lead our country and people to a "condition of normalcy" is the lifting and ending of the state of martial rule and the implementation of the Transitory Provisions of the 1973 Constitution for the convening of the Interim National Assembly in order that the latter may carry out the objectives for its creation as decreed in the 1973 Constitution. (supra. p. 46.)

Separate Opinions BARREDO, J., concurring: I concur in the disposition of all the petitions in these six cases made in the scholarly main opinion of Mr. Justice Antonio. I just want to articulate a few thoughts I have about the matters therein involved which I deem relevant, appropriate and timely. To begin with, I wish to make it clear that the series of interpretations I made during the hearings which might have created the impression that I am not in agreement with the defenses interposed and ably discussed by the Solicitor General were really intended to test whether or not what appeared seared to me to be vulnerable points in the position of the Government had any rational explanation. -1Actually, I have my misgivings about the propriety of blockvoting, and I wanted to be sure that in formulating my judgment, I am not influenced more by its allegedly being unfair and laden with potentialities of fraud rather than its demonstrated inconsistency with any provision of the charter or of any established constitutional principle. I fully realize that as a member of the Court, my vote here must be based on indubitable unconstitutionality. At the same time, as a Filipino, I have been entertaining the feeling that perhaps, in t particular stage of our transition from the old political traditions to the Idealistic concepts of the New Society, there could be enough justification to disregard the strict rule that unconstitutionality must be based only on manifest and indubitable collision between a questioned legislation or actuation, on the one hand, and the provisions of the Constitution, on the other. I feel that in these formative period of our new government, it might not be very helpful to disregard the issue of wisdom or unwisdom in favor of pure legality, such that any instance where the language of the Charter can somehow-be construed in a manner that would promote more effectively the objective of establishing a parliamentary system with its inherent

concomittants in our country, that construction should be adopted, even if in doing so, there might a slight departure from the area circucribed within the literal meaning of the words employed in the statutory provisions under scrutiny. After mature reflection, however, I have come to the conclusion that even my best efforts along such line of thinking would not suffice to tilt the balance in favor of petitioners. Perhaps, it may not be in the context of the situations confronting Us in these cases that the approach I cherish may be applied. In any event, I am constrained, as a Filipino, to voice my deep regret that blockvoting has been adopted in the impending elections of April 7th next, even conceding as I do that it is not unconstitutional. I perceive shades of its incongruity with what lies at the bottom of Amendment No. 1 of the Constitution, seemingly blurred ironically enough by the plain connotation of its tenor. Indeed, the very reason advanced by the respondents that blockvoting has been adopted in order to more or less insure representation for the small provinces and the old congressional districts and thereby remove the undue advantage that individual voting affords to the more populous provinces or districts does not appeal to me to be within the original intent and contemplation of the amendment. The Solicitor General hielf has explained during oral argument against the petition of Atty. Juan David that the fact that the amendment fixes the number of members of or delegates to compose the interim Batasang Pambansa at 120, when viewed, on the one hand, in the light of the provision that implicitly includes in that number the sectoral representatives to be separately elected and the members of the Cabinet to be selected by the President, and, on the other, the number of existing congressional districts, of nearly that number, eloquently attests for the obvious original intent of the amendment that the district concept of representation ordained for the members of the regular National Assembly is not yet to be in force. I have no doubt whatsoever that such pose of the Solicitor General is correct, I would add, importantly however, that it is quite apparent that the original concept must have been adopted for two fundamental reasons. First, in that manner and in that manner alone is it possible to reduce the size of the Batasan to the manageable and efficient body it was conceived to be. After all, it is going to be no more than a temporary transitional body whose legislative power would only be dual with the President until martial law shall have been lifted, the main purpose of its creation being to preserve the framework laid down by the Constitution that there be an interim legislature to carry out the provisions of Sections 5 and 6 of Article XVI and, thus pave the most expedient way to the establishment of the parliamentary system of government envisaged by the people thru the main body of the Charter. Relatedly, there is the consideration also of economizing as much as possible with such reduced legislative structure. All these, to be faithful to the clamor of the people thru the referendum of January 10-15, 1973 for the scuttling of the interim National Assembly which was condemned for being not only somehow immorally constituted, what with its automatically selected members, but also because of its being disproportionately large and unwieldy, contrary to the ideals of efficiency, expeditiousness and thrift of the New Society. Secondly, the concept of regional representation appears to be an innovative feature which could be tried in our search for an indigenous political set-up less western and more consonant with our political traditions, custo, expertise and experience. In other words, the regional Idea is a trial or experimental breakway from the district type of representation to which the people were accustomed in the past and to which could probably be traced the case with which political bossism and warlordism, so much detested and feared by all sectors of the people became not only possible but prevalent. I cannot divine any better intendment to attribute to the regional setup provided for in the amendment and I am not persuaded that circutances have so changed in less than a year and a half since its approval that a return to the old system is now warranted. The foregoing are the compelling considerations that make it incomprehensible to me why the proposal of some members of the Batasang Bayan to adopt blockvoting had to be accepted and made part of the election code. I find it difficult to avoid saddening disillusion and apprehension that

somehow the pervasive influence of the so-called Old Society politics has not yet been entirely eradicated and that, on the contrary, it may yet, God forbid, resuscitate if it has somehow been deadened with a vengeance. If in any sense there was, on the part of the authors of the proposal, any design to reap undue political over-advantage by its adoption, I like to believe that such factor was not considered by the Batasan, for it would certainly detract from the image of fairness and square dealing portrayed by the New Society. It is of secondary importance, whether it was because of the monstrous electoral frauds and anomalies it brought in its wake that such modality of voting was legislated out by the Congress of the Philippines. What cannot be denied is that it was popular clamor against it that compelled the legislature to abandon it. And what would be a strange phenomenon is that something that the Old Society discarded as not suited to our principles and ideals about suffrage is apparently deemed as a blessing and a necessity by the New Society. In brief, while it may be fun of political wisdom to enlarge the base of suffrage and representation in the manner now provided for in the Election Code of 1978, and perhaps, this could make the people in the congressional districts happier than they would otherwise could be, I would not want the high Idealism and innovative spirit so apparent to me in Amendment No. 1 to pass away without the least semblance of some necrological lamentation. Granting that such evident underlying motivations as I have mentioned may not be enough to constrain or drownout what the language of the amendment in question see to allow, I would like to at least go on record that I honestly believe that the adoption of the district concept of representation that brought for the need, for practical pur poses, to adopt blockvoting does not square exactly with what I have always cherished to be the idealistic and purifying tenets of the New Society. As a member of the Court, I cannot condemn it because it has not been shown to be against the fundamental law of the land, but I am truly saddened by it because, in my considered opinion, the New Society does not stand to gain from it in the plaintiff of the principles for which it stands. I reiterate that it is not the element of unfairness that others see in blockvoting that makes me feel as I do about it, since viewed in the light of the considerations so ably discussed in the main opinion, such unfairness is not legally and factually apparent. Rather, it is the disconcerting thought that because of it, the elaborate scheme framed by Amendment No. 1, of an interim legislative body exercised of the evils that characterized politics in the past, to prepare our people for the new type of government intended to be ushered in by the Constitution itself will no longer ma . What comes as the sole consolation for me is that great and deliberate care has been taken in the selection of the candidates, who if elected may be able to redeem the situation . But there is yet another very important consideration that impelled me to write this separate opinion. It relates to the golden opportunity, in my estimation, that has been allowed to to bring about a more desirable, if not perfect unity, of the nation. It has not been without passion that as a member of the Supreme Court I have always defended Our decision in the Javellana can as the foundation of the intimacy of the existing government. It is a matter of public knowledge more so in the ranks of the members of the bar and the that I have always maintained with all vehemence I can master that, viewed in the correct perspective of political and constitutional law, Proclamation 1102 on the ratification of the 1973 Constitution cannot be legally faulted, if only because the Amendment Clause of the 1935 Constitution was inapplicable thereto, considering that it refers to the ratification of amendments only and not of a new constitution, which it is within the sovereign prerogative of the people to adopt and ratify in any feasible manner under the prevailing circutances, as attested by no less momentous as precedent than the ratification of the present Constitution of the United States of America which was not done in accordance with the amendment clause of the Articles of Confederation. Neither Javellana, which hindsight teaches could have been more felicitously worded, nor any later decision of Ours has in any degree discouraged, much less quieted, the dissent of a quite respectable sector of our people to the view that the 1973 Constitution is the legitimate supreme law of the land. Much as we want to believe otherwise the transcendental division of the country on t score has persisted through all the five years since January, 1973. That the size of the opposition portended no danger to the peace

and order of the country simply because it has lingered more as wpering campaign does not detract from the unwholesome implications of its existence. Without intending to claim any credit for it, if any could be due, it has been a self-assigned mission on my part to keep abreast of the developments related thereto, and I have long been hoping and praying that t scismic wound that has been pestering the nation would soon be healed. I may be naive in this respect, but I sincerely felt that when the leaders of the Liberal Party, former Senators Gerardo Roxas, Jovito Salonga and Francisco "Soc" Rodrigo, conditioned their participation in the forthcoming suffrage on the elimination of blockvoting among others, these others have been substantially agreed to by the administration I thought that without any way with their stand and tactics, this was the chance I had long of. If for any reason, blockvoting should result in any advantage at all for the administration, it is my very conviction that the unity I have in mind is worth much more than the complete victory of the administration ticket, which after all, political pundits con. outsider safe to predict with or without blockvoting, what with the unprecedented record of achievement and unfailing loyalty to the interests of the country and the people that it can proudly present to the world. All relevant considerations duly taken into account, I feel grieved by the loss of that chance to make even the dissenters to Javellana to unite in support of the government under the New Constitution not that those dissenters could be exempt from Owing loyalty to it otherwise, but it always gives a wonderful feeling to think that more weapons to mute their objectives are available. Anent the invocation by petitioners of the provisions of Section 9(1) of Article XII C of the Constitution which enjoins that "Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination", I cannot share the holding in the main opinion that what the harassment and discrimination contemplated therein are comprehended already within the compass of the equal protection clause of the Bill of Rights in Article IV of the Charter, for which reason, the test applied to the complaint of petitioners against blockvoting as a form of harassment and discrimination is the rational classification test. Having in mind the peculiar, unique and ingenious for and ways of harassment and discrimination practiced by our politicians before, which could conceivably defy the equal-protection test of rational classification or discrimination, I prefer to hold that the provision in question refers to any form or means of harassment or discrimination, including those that might otherwise be sanctionable under the equal protection clause. The framers of the Constitution cannot be assumed to have indulged in an extravagant waste of words by phrasing the provision the way it appears. There was absolutely no need for Section 9(1), if all that the constitution makers had in mind was to guarantee all candidates equal protection of the laws. The unforgettable experience undergone by even members of the convention that spelled injustice and oppression during electoral combats should be read into this provision. This is a new provision and it was adopted because the most expansive construction of the old equal protection clause was found not to be enough guarantee against injustice and unfairness in the electoral arena. This is not saying, however, that the system of blockvoting under the Election Code of 1978 being assailed by petitioners contains the elements of harassment and discrimination under Section 9(1). I see nothing of harassment in optional blockvoting. Neither is there any degree of discrimination therein that is unduly oppressive. The argument that because neither the Kilusan ng Bayan nor the Lakas ng Bayan aggrupations are political parties, the candidates in their respective tickets should be deemed also as independent candidates who must be voted individually by their respective name to avoid discrimination overlooks the fact that said candidates have formally, if loosely, grouped together in the pursuit, not only of a common victory but of some common political beliefs, ideals and objectives revolving fundamentally around the promotion of the ai of the New Society. It is thus neither harassment to their independent opponents nor discrimination against them to treat the former as aggrupation. -2-

Coming now to the plea of petitioner that the provisions on turn-coatism under Section 10 of Article XII C and on accreditation of political parties in Section 8 of the same article be declared as in force and applicable in these cases, I am in full accord with the holding in the main opinion that application of the same to the coming election is entirely out of the question. Of course the said provisions are in force, but how could they be applied? I simply cannot see how one can talk of the political parties, which the Constitution obviously contemplates, in the context of our political situation today. Let us not forget that in the scheduled election of April 7, what is involved is not an institution established by the Constitution itself. The Batasan is not a creation of the Constitution but of Amendment No. 1. In fact, it is undeniable that the Constitution does not contemplate the election of an interimlegislature. The interim National Assembly it created was not designed to be an elective body. The Constitution itself designated who its members were supposed to have been. It is but fitting and proper, therefore, that, since the amendment itself does not provided for any specific manner of electing the members of the Batasan, such manner should be "prescribed and regulated by law", meaning necessarily, by a Presidential Decree. Although Amendment No. 8 does provide that "all provisions of this Constitution not inconsistent with any of these amendments shall continue in full force and effect," plain common sense dictates that no constitutional provision can be applied when and where the situation contemplated for such application does not exist. In my view, the establishment of a Parliamentary system of government by the Constitution and the proclamation of martial law which brought forth the constitution of the New Society have together given birth to a new era in the political life of the Philippines that can hardly justify the recognition of the political parties existing in January, 1973 when the constitution took effect, for purposes of the accreditation referred to in Section 8 of Article XII C. Examining t provision closely, it will be noted that the system of accreditation established thereby constituted in itself a new process, which cannot be altered or modified by the legislature, thru which a more responsible party system could be developed. While it does not directly prohibit the creation of more than three political parties, it in effect compels all such Parties to so conduct theelves as to be worthy of the con. confidence of a substantial element of the voting populace, otherwise, those who cannot obtain the third highest number of votes in the p election would not be able to enjoy in the next one the rights and privileges usually needed to carry on a significant campaign. in this connection, the question that represents itself is this: Can the Nacionalista Party and the Liberal Party be accredited for the purposes of the coming election, taking into account the votes garnered by them in the last election held before the new Constitution came into being? The ready answer to t question is No, for the simple reason that by the letter of the code, this election is regional hence the constituency for which accreditation can only be asked is the region where it seeks to have candidates, just as the criterion for its accreditation has to be the number of votes it obtained in that region. And to be true to the concept of a constituency implicit in the system, the previous election must have also been regional which everyone knows has not been I held anywhere in the country. Indeed, there is no way of knowing exactly when the accreditation system envisaged in the Constitution will start to operate. Consequently, since no existing political party can be legitimately accredited, the rights and privileges which should accrue to accredited parties should be allowed to be enjoyed by any new group or aggrupation of candidates who happen to possess the nearest semblance of a political party by, in the words of Section 199 of the Code, "pursuing the same political ideals in government", if only for the purposes of the impending election. All these in the interest of holding an orderly election and enabling the sovereign people to exercise the right of in the manner most proximate to that designed in the Constitution. At the same time, the existence of groups or aggrupations in default of fully and duly organized political parties should pave the way to the organization of the kind of Political Parties that perhaps is envisioned by the Constitution. If the New Society is to mean anything at all, and if the vociferous

and incessant condemnation of the politics of pre-martial law is to bear any useful fruit, any idea of applying the provisions of the Constitution on political parties to the existing ones must be discarded, until they have so reorganized and reformed as to fit within the concepts of the New Society. In the light of the foregoing considerations, I cannot see my way clear to consideration the inclusion of members of the Liberal Party in the ticket of the Kilusan ng Bayan as a change of party on their part, within the proscription of Section 10 of Article XII C of the Constitution. The Kilusan is not a party, and whatever it enjoys now that should pertain only to a party has to be given to it only by force of necessity for the purposes of t election. Section 10 was conceived to eradicate turncoatism a very laudable objective. But the concept of turncoatism it condemns does not apply to the situation Of those members of other political parties who have joined the Kilusan and, for that matter, those who joined the Takas ng Bayan or any other opposition or independent group. The nation is now precisely in that stage of its political life where the citizens who have the general welfare and the country's freedom, happiness and prosperity in their hearts, are trying to look for their respective rightful places where they can be of maximum utility in the reform movement that has endulged everyone and every human activity in t part of the world. To leave any of the old political parties now and join another is not turncoatism that is to be disdained; it is a patriotic endeavor that is in keeping with the paramount objective of helping the Philippines to be great again.

FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting: It is a reassuring feature of the martial law regime in the Philippines that t Court had repeatedly entertained suits challenging the validity of presidential decrees raised in appropriate legal proceedings. 1 It is a role it had never shunned. There is thus adherence to the path of constitutionalism, both in normal times and under crisis conditions. Even during this period of emergency, parties had come to this Tribunal whenever, in their opinion, the executive act assailed was tainted by the vice of nullity. They did complain, and they were heard. In that way, this Court manifested fealty to the basic tenet of constitutionalism. For there is no issue so basic that it cannot be settled within the constitutional framework. Courts, in the language of Chief Justice Concepcion, "have, not only jurisdiction to pass upon [such questions] but also the duty to do so, which cannot be evaded without violating the fundamental law and paving the way to its eventual destruction." 2 Judicial review is thus the dominant constitutional concept to assure that the Constitution remains supreme. It is an awesome power, to be sure, but reasons of delicacy as well as the courtesy due a coordinate branch do not suffice to ward off judicial intervention in proper cases. More specifically, this Tribunal cannot avoid the responsibility thrust upon it to vindicate the rights safeguarded by the Constitution. It is undeniable that the function of judicial review exists not because courts can initiate the governmental action to be taken, but because thereafter the duty to pass upon its validity, whenever raised in an appropriate case, is theirs to perform. The trust reposed in them is not to formulate policy but to determine its legality as tested by the Constitution. The function entrusted to them is to decide, assuming that a suit satisfies the requisites for an inquiry into a constitutional issue, whether there is a failure to abide by the fundamental law. If so, the outcome should not be in doubt. Care is to be taken though that the transgression alleged did in fact occur. The challenge may be insubstantial and the argument adduced inconclusive. It may come from parties resolved to transfer the site of conflict from the political arena to the judicial forum. That is not to be encouraged. Certainly, there must always be an awareness of the scope of the power to adjudicate. It goes no further than to assure obedience to and respect for the mandates of the Constitution. The limits imposed on the exercise of executive and legislative power must be observes The function of judicial review is intended to serve that Purpose It does not extend to an unwarranted intrusion into that

broad and legitimate sphere of discretion enjoyed by the political branches to determine the policies to be pursued. This Court should ever be on the alert lest, without design or intent, it oversteps the boundary of judicial competence. Judicial activism may become judicial exuberance As was so well put by Justice Malcolm. "Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act." 3 Justice Laurel in the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, 4 decided eight months to the day from the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, put the matter in language notable for its impact, sweep, and enduring vitality. Thus: "The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments, it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting clai of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the par ties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed 'judicial supremacy' which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, t power of judicial review is limited to actual cast and controversies to ex after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in t manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government." 5 Such a principle was earlier given expression, in words both lucid and emphatic, by Justice Malcolm: "If there is probable basis for sustaining the conclusion reached, [legislative] findings are not subject to judicial review. Debatable questions are for the legislature to decide. The courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories." 6 In that perspective and with such pronouncements of undoubted clarity, force, and authority coming from eminent constitutionalists, the conclusion reached by the Court commends itself for approval. Nor is t merely to pay heed to precepts fundamental in character. The principles set forth above were not only characterized by their responsiveness to the questions involved in such litigations but were also impressed with a validity which transcended the issues raised on those occasions. As it was then, so should it be now. While the judicial process does not take place in a social void, there are doctrines that are of the essence of the function of judicial review. The doubts that come to mind from an objective appraisal of the challenged provisions of the 1978 Election Code do not suffice then to call for a declaration of nullity. It is true that as to the optional block voting scheme, it may be said that the strictures of recent tory had been glossed over. To the extent, however, that it will undoubtedly be of great help to the unlettered and untutored who, as citizens, are entitled to participate in the democratic process, without impairing the freedom of choice in view of its not being compulsory, it cannot be said to be infected with the virus of invalidity. This is, of course, on the assumption that electoral frauds will be avoided. Moreover, insofar as the optional block voting scheme is a valid response to a compelling state interest, favoring as it does the growth and stability of political parties, petitioners who are independent candidates were unable to sustain the burden of proving that there is a denial of due process or of equal protection. 7 What added difficulty to their task was the rather tenuous character of their plea, premised as it is on their mere assertion that the challenged provision on the block

voting scheme is void on its face. Thus they had to overcome the presumption of validity accorded a legislative or executive act. This they failed to do. Nor should nagging doubts prevail against the overriding consideration that thereby, the electorate is afforded the opportunity of choosing their representatives in a legislative body, even of an interim character. That is to pay homage to the fundamental principle of the Philippines being a republican state, with sovereignty residing in the people. 8 As was so well emphasized by justice Laurel in Moya v. Del Fierro: 9 "As long as popular government is an end to be achieved and safeguarded, suffrage, whatever may be the modality and form devised, must continue to be the means by which the great reservoir of power must be emptied into the receptacular agencies wrought by the people through their Constitution in the interest of good government and the common weal Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption of a representative type of government, necessarily points to the enfranced citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the established authority." 10 There is this added reinforcement to the conclusion reached by the Court. The forthcoming election is a major step toward the eagerly-awaited restoration of full civilian rule. There is thus a closer approximation to the Willoughby concept 11 that martial law merely confers on the Executive the competence to call on the armed forces to assist him in the faithful execution of the laws, primarily the maintenance of peace and order, leaving unimpaired the full exercise of legislative and judicial powers by the other departments and thus maintaining civilian supremacy. Moreover, the existence of an interim Batasang Pambansa would be in consonance with the pronouncement of Justice Black in Duncan v. Kahanamoku 12 that even during such emergency period, legislatures and courts remain indispensable to the existence of a republican state. 13 I am thus persuaded to yield conformity to the able, exhaustive,. and learned opinion of Justice Antonio, except for the inclusion of the rule on appreciation of ballots found in paragraph 28 of Section 155 of the 1978 Election Code, which, to my mind, raises a serious constitutional question. For as it stands, there appears to be an undue intrusion in the freedom of choice implicit in the right of suffrage if an elector's preference for individual candidates would not be accorded recognition solely due to the fact that at the same time ballot likewise indicates voting for the slate of another party or aggrupation. In such a ease, it is my view that what should be disregarded is the vote for such other party or aggrupation and the vote for the individual candidates counted. To that extent, I am unable to yield entire concurrence. 1. Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, 14 in raising the question of standing of petitioners, relied on a well-settled doctrine concerning the procedural standards that must be met for the function of judicial review to come into play. "The unchallenged rule," according to Justice Laurel, in the equally leading case of People v. Vera, 15 "is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its'enforcement." 16 There was a reiteration of t doctrine in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 17 with t modification in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion: "Yet, there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that 'the expenditure of public funds by an office of the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds,' which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer." 18 Thus was the concept of a taxpayer's suit given the imprimatur of approval by this Court. It does not mean, however, that in each and every instance where such an exception is invoked, this Tribunal is left with no alternative except to hear the parties. Tan v. Macapagal" 19 clarified matters thus: "Moreover, as far as taxpayer's suit is concerned, tills Court is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained." 20 Solicitor General Mendoza was on solid ground therefore when he raised as one of defenses that taxpayer's suits as such do not necessarily call for the exercise of the function of judicial review. Fortunately for petitioner all of them could show an interest Personal and substantial. Two petitions were filed by registered voter, 21 two others, by registered candidates for

the interim Batasang Pambansa; 22 and the last two, one by "a political and civil aggrupation" and the other by a former delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention who was also the Chairman of the Committee on Political Parties. 23 It only remains to be added that there apparently is a tendency in recent American decisions to retreat from the liberal rule as to standing announced in the 1968 decision of Flast v. Cohen. 24 There is no automatic reversion, however, to the rather rigid rule of Mellon v. Frothingham, 25 a 1923 decision. After a recent careful and analytical study of the trend discernible in cases heard the last two or three years by the American Supreme Court, 26 Professor Tushnet came to t conclusion: "Decisions on questions of standing are concealed decisions on the merits of the underlying constitutional claim. The Court finds standing when it wishes to sustain a chum on the merits and denies standing when the claim would be rejected were the merits reached." 27 2. Certainly, a voter whose right of suffrage 28 is allegedly impaired by the optional block voting scheme is entitled to judicial redress. The "enfranced citizen," to refer anew to Justice Laurel's opinion in Moya v. Del Fierro, 29 is "a particle of popular sovereignty and [is] the ultimate source of the established authority." 30 Such a thought was given expression by Chief Justice Concepcion in Ozamis v. Zosa 31 in words with a similar ring, characterizing the right to vote as "an attribute of sovereignty." 32 It follows then, to quote from Pungutan v. Abubakar, 33, that it is "a constitutional guarantee of the utmost significance. It is a right without which the principle of sovereignty residing in the people becomes nugatory." 34 It is thus evident that petitioners who are registered voters cannot be denied the right to be heard. This Court is committed to such a principle. 35 So it is under American law where a denial of the right to vote could even be made the basis for a money claim. That was the ruling in the leading case of Nixon v. Herndon, 36 the opinion being penned by the illustrious Justice Holmes: "The objection that the subject-matter of the suit is political is little more than a play upon words. Of course, the petition concerns political action, but it alleges and seeks to recover for private damage. That private damage may be caused by such political action, and may be recovered for in a suit at law, hardly has been doubted for over two hundred years, since Ashby v. White, and has been recognized by this court." 37 Chief Justice Warren, in Wesberry v. Sanders, 38 was quite eloquent when he spoke on the matter: "No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined." 39 possible objection based on standing can be raised either when the suit is instituted by a candidate for public office 40 as well as a political party or aggrupation. 41Concerning as constitutional convention delegate, there had been no previous decisions on the matter. By analogy, however, inasmuch as members of the legislative body both in the Philippines 42 and in the United States43 could file actions to assail the validity of a challenged legislation or even a resolution of the Constitutional Convention, a delegate or former delegate is entitled to the same privilege. 3. It is unthinkable then for this Court not to inquire into any allegation of constitutional infirmity imputed to a provision of the Election Code that would emasculate the right to vote. Five of the six petitions assailed the options block voting scheme with unwonted severity, but the denunciation fell far short of overcoming the presumption of validity. To be more specific, three of the petitioners, Pedro G. Peralta, 44 B. Asuncion Buenafe, 45 and Juan T. David, 46 did manifest grave concern as to its possible adverse effects on their candidacies, the first two stressing their running as independents. The censure that came from the Youth Democratic Movement 47 was peripheral to its main submission. That leaves only petitioner De la Llana, 48 who filed a suit for declaratory relief treated by this Court as an action for prohibition, distinguished, if that is the appropriate term, by condensing the matter in four pages. Ostensibly, it is an attack on the optional block voting scheme, yet, instead of stressing the right to vote, it would premise its plea on the ground that no party could be accredited by the Conunission on Elections and subsequently no party could be voted for in the coming elections, referring to Article XII C, Section 2, paragraph 5 and Section 8 of the same Article. 49 All that was stated by him as to the optional block voting is that it "win result to (sic) the commission of gross electoral frauds and malpractices and the election win only be a farcical

political exercise and a death blow to our democratic system." 50 What other conclusion can there be from such a bare assertion except that it is decidedly unpersuasive? It assumes what must be shown. There is nothing axiomatic about conclusion. It cannot just be taken for granted. There see to be lack of awareness of the rudimentary concept in constitutional law that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or decree is void on its face. 51 Without developing further how the right to vote of an elector, who is given the freedom of choice between casting ballot for individual candidates or for the favored party or aggrupation, had been infringed, it may be a rash assumption to affirm categorically that "the election win only be a farcical political exercise and a death blow to our democratic system." tory need not repeat itself. Precisely, measures to avoid abuses in the utilization of a device neutral in character and on its face not infected with the vice of nullity could be taken. It does not suffice to link past agonies with present hopes. Let me not be misunderstood. The desirability of any block voting provision, even if optional, is not by any means suggested. An that is set forth here is that respect for the deeplyrooted principle of according the, presumption of constitutionality to a legislative act or a presidential decree cautions against sustaining the plea of petitioner De la Llana. There was a dismal failure to sustain the burden incumbent upon him to demonstrate invalidity. The thirteen-page petition of the Youth Democratic Movement 52 is distinguished by a more conscientious and diligent appraisal of the constitutional issues. Its major thrust, however, is on the limitation of the election period, arousing the fear on the part of petitioner that the balloting would not reflect the true popular will. There is, however, t stray comment bearing on the optional block voting provision: "And t will be worse confounded by the introduction of the infamous block voting scheme which millions of our voters do not understand. Even intelligent professionals are confused. The result will be countless (sic) of stray ballots and a defeat of popular will." 53 Such a rather curt summary invites a similar appraisal. Clearly, the presumption of validity has not been overcome. 4. Petitioner Peralta was rather vehement in contending that the optional block voting scheme is violative of t provision of the Constitution: Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." 54 He sought the shelter of its protection for hielf and other independent candidates who, according to him, would be thus made to suffer if the assailed provision is not nullified. Essentially, in ter of individual rights, he would raise a due process and equal protection question. 55 5. First, as to the due process aspect. It is undoubted that if the optional block voting scheme, in the language of Cardozo, would outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression, it offends against such a guarantee. An executive or legislative act must satisfy the rational basis test. It is equally undoubted that with such a provision an advantage is afforded party candidates. Does that stamp it with invalidity? The answer is in the negative. The importance of political parties or political aggrupations to a republican state, especially so for a parliamentary system, calls for such a response. On that point, there is t Categorical declaration by Schattschneider: "The rise of political parties is indubitably one of the principal distinguishing marks of modern government. The parties, in fact, have played a major role as makers of governments, more especially they have been the makers of democratic government. it should be stated flatly at the outset that t volume is devoted to the thesis that the political parties created democracy and that modern democracy is unthinkable save in ter of the parties. As a matter of fact, the condition of the parties is the best possible evidence of the nature of any regime." 56 It is, to quote him anew, "first of all an organized attempt to get power." 57 As observed by Truman: "Whatever else it may be or may not be, the political party in the United States most commonly is a device for mobilizing votes, preferably a majority of votes."58 As a vote mobilizer he stated further, "a party must be an 'alliance of interests' to use Herring's phrase." 59 It is through a political party then that the shifting desires and pressure intensities of the various groups that compose the electorate may be ascertained. This is not to say though that it does not reflect the deep clash of forces within the community, but the crucial element in their campaign for votes, to repeat, is the drive for power. "The single purpose," to quote from Friedrich, "[is] victory." 60 Thus it has to be responsive to the needs and outlook of the elector. At

times, it may be unavoidable that; there be compromises with both political principles and doctrinal symmetry. Nor is that necessarily undesirable for that could minimize the sharpness of conflicts which, with leaders of undeviating rigidity in their approach to political proble, could have caused an undue strain in the body politic. Through a political party, the feelings of the electorate about their own tangled proble and institutions may be canalized and thus be clarified. Likewise, it serves as a source of resiliency and cohesion. The party system, according to Lerner, "has given American democracy a rough kind of politically functioning unity without the social cast that the unity of a single-party totalitarian system would have involved." 61 What was said by the eminent British political scientist Laski is equally relevant. According to subject to a small number of exceptions, members are not elected "to Parliament for exceptional beauty of character, or distinction of mind; they have been returned there to support a party to which their supporters hope will win enough seats to be able to form a government under the Premiership of its leader." 62 He elucidated further. "No doubt the party system s we know it, has a special pathology of its own. It is hostile to the independent member; it makes the rise of new parties a difficult matter; it a general vote of confidence in men rather than a mandate upon measures; and once it has brought the new House of Commons into being, the character, of its party pattern gives both the House and the electorate a government which party discipline will usually maintain in office for a period pretty close to the five years set as its legal term by the Parliament Act of 1911." 63 It cannot be said, therefore, that the added advantage afforded parties or aggrupations by the optional block voting device is an infringement of the due process guarantee. Whatever deficiencies may be attributed to it cannot go so far as to warrant the conclusion that thereby the rational basis test for governmental action had been disregarded. 6. Now as to the equal protection question. It is undoubted that independent candidates are at a disadvantage under an optional block voting scheme. Does that in itself justify a finding that it suffers from the corrosion of constitutional infirmity? The answer, if due regard be had to the authoritative and controlling doctrines, is in the negative. The teaching of our decisions is plain and unmistakable. It is too clear to be misread. So it has been from People v. Vera, 64 the second landmark opinion in constitutional law of Justice Laurel to Felwa v. Salas, 65cited in the opinion of Justice Antonio. The ponencia of Chief Justice Concepcion in Felwa is a succinct but comprehensive statement of the matter. Thus: "It is well settled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subjects of legislation, and that a classification is reasonable where: (1) it is based upon substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies, not only to present conditions, but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; and (4) the classification applies equally to all those who belong to the same class." 66 It is of interest to note that the applicable constitutional law doctrine in Malaysia is not dissimilar. So it is apparent in the masterly opinion of Lord President Tun Sufian of the Federal Court of Malaysia, promulgated in 1977, in Datuk Haji Harun bin Haji Idris v. Public Prosecutor. Like our Constitution the federal charter of Malaysia has an equality provision. 67 As was made clear by the Lord President, it is not absolute but qualified. 68 As in the Philippines, such a guarantee "applies to both substantive and procedural law" but "envisages that there may be lawful discrimination based on classification." 69 That the formulation of Justice Laurel in People v. Vera as to when there is a reasonable classification applies as well in Malaysia is evident from t portion of the opinion citing the Shri Ram Krishma Dalmia decision of the Indian Supreme Court to the effect that a discriminatory law is good law as long as there is reasonable and possible classification which "is founded on an intelligible differential which distinguishes persons that are grouped together from others left out of the group; and the differential a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the law in question. The classification may be founded on different bases such as geographical, or according to objects or occupations and the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the law in question." 70 Succinctly put, to quote anew fromPeople v. Vera, what is condemned is invidious discrimination.

A recent decision, J. M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 71 has t relevant excerpt: "To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may, under such circutances, invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circutances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be snowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circutances which, if not Identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in ter of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest." 72 7. Petitioner Peralta's contention that there was an infringement of the equal protection clause is thus devoid of support in law. The optional block voting scheme, it cannot be too strongly emphasized, is one of the means of strengthening a party government which is a valid state objective. To the extent, therefore, that independent candidates may be placed in a less favorable category, it is not a suspect classification to which the rigid scrutiny test applies. 73 This Court is not called upon then to nullify such a provision. Such a conclusion follows from another avenue of approach. In Aglipay v. Ruiz, 74 a 1937 decision of major importance, Justice Laurel as ponenterejected the contention that the issuance of postage stamps referring to Manila as the Seat of the XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress was violative of the constitutional provision against the use of public money or property for the use, benefit, or support of any sect or church or system of religion. 75 He explained why: "What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an even of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Goverment. We are of the opinion that the government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. 76 So in t case, in the emphatic language of Justice Laurel: "The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental results not contemplated." 77 If the independent candidates are to be prejudiced by the adoption of the optional block voting scheme, the resulting harm to their candidacy is attributable to their decision to run as such. There is nothing to prevent them from joining a party or aggrupation and hoping to be nominated as candidates. Any adversity suffered by them comes under the heading of a self-inflicted wound. Petitioner Peralta, undeterred, would seek to lend a semblance of deceptive plausibility by the assertion that in the Vera Opinion of Justice Laurel, a law may be considered bad not only when it actually denies but also when it permits inequality. There is a grave misapprehension on part. People v. Vera declared unconstitutional the former Probation Act 78 in view of the fact that its Section 11 would leave its applicability the appropriation by the Provincial Board of the salary of the probation officers. Since the Act was intended to operate equally in the Philippines, there certainly would be inequality if certain provinces failed to make the necessary appropriation As the purpose was for an enactment nationwide in operation, all provinces belong to the same class. To assert in the light of such undoubted statutory objective that a similar kind of inequality may be attributed to the optional block voting scheme that would thus favor political parties or aggrupations is to flounder in the mire of elusive analogy. For in the challenged provision, as in the cases of usury laws making a distinction between debtors and creditors, the Recto Installment Sales Law making a distinction between vendors and vendees, and in labor legislation making a distinction between management

and the workingmen, the statute treates a separate class in a much more favorable manner without thereby incurring the vice of offending against the equal protection clause. So it is in the case of the assailed optional block voting scheme. The denunciatory favor in which the contention was made is thus unpersuasive. It cannot stand the test of scrutiny, not to mention the fact that the element of hyperbole was clearly apparent. The assertion that there is a denial of equal protection thus falls to the ground. 8. The questions raised in the David, the Youth Democratic Movement, and the Fajardo petitions, all of which bore evidence of considerable thought and reflection, with one of them characterized by objectivity seeming to melt away under the fierce fire of intense indignation, were squarely met and, to my mind, satisfactorily resolved, in the opinion of Justice Antonio. Nothing remains to be added except to point out that in the first two, with petitioner David being hielf a candidate in the forthcoming elections and petitioner Youth Democratic Movement being a political aggrupation with intent to present, so its petition stated, a complete ticket for the Metro Manila region, 79 it would appear that the doctrine of estoppel, which admittedly is not to be applied indiscriminately, enters into the picture and constitutes a bar, although not insurmountable, to the grant of the relief prayed for. 80 It is perhaps understandable why the Fajardo petition appears to be less than fully aware of the implications of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and ripeness of the constitutional question raised to call for adjudication, since petitioner is not a member of the bar. 81 It may likewise be stated that considering the tensions of our days and the crisis of our times, it may be a counsel of wisdom not to anticipate the serious constitutional law proble that would arise under situations where only a tentative judgment is dictated by prudence. This is a decade of transition and, as pointed out in the opinion of justice Antonio, there is a great deal of allowable latitude for experimentation. It is only when there is a clear denial of a constitutional right evident on the face of a statute or decree that even in the absence of any evidentiary proof, it wig be time, to borrow from the language of Justice Laurel, "to make the hammer of [judicial review] fall, and heavily, but not until then." 82 To my mind, that stage had not been reached in the last three petitions. 9. It is quite obvious then that t separate opinion is essentially and almost wholly one of concurrence. If there is a dissent, it is submitted ex abundante cautela. As was made plain at the outset, it is not to an explicit ruling but merely the reference to Section 155 paragraph 28 of the Election Code that precluded, on my part, an agreement full and entire. The opinion of the Court set forth as the first issue: "Whether or not the voting system provided for in Sections 140 and 155, sub-paragraphs 26 to 28 of the 1978 Election Code, granting to the voter the option to vote either for individual candidates by filling in the proper spaces in the ballot the names of candidates he desires to elect, or to vote for all the candidates of a political party, group or aggrupation by simply writing in the space provided for in the ballot the name of the political party, group or aggrupation, violates Section 1 of Article IV and Section 9(1) of Article XII-C of the Constitution." 83 Then the aforesaid provision was quoted in full: "Sec. 155, par. 28: If a voter has written in the proper space of ballot the name of a political party, group or aggrupation which has nominated official candidates and the names of individual candidates not belonging to the ticket of the same political party, group or aggrupation in the spaces provided therefor, all of the votes indicated in the ballot shall be considered as stray votes and shall not be counted: ..." 84 Reference was likewise made to Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 666 which provided. "(g) If a voter had voted for the straight ticket of a political party and at the same time had written on one or more blank spaces of the ballot the names of candidates of other party or parties or of independent candidates, said names shall be deemed as not written and the vote shall be counted as cast for each and every one of the official candidates of the party voted for in the ballot." 85 It is that rule in the appreciation of ballots that to my mind is free from any unconstitutional taint. The will of the voter expressed in a manner free from doubt was given force and effect. This is not the case with paragraph 28 of Section 155 of the Election Code. After such a categorical expression of will to vote for specified candidates whose names he had taken the trouble to write, I am unable to accept any implication in the opinion of the Court that just because he had also made use of the optional block voting scheme, a statutory provision setting at naught will as to such

candidates individually singled out could be viewed as free from any constitutional deficiency. I would not want then to be placed on record as having failed to express my conviction on the matter. Hence, this brief dissent. A few more words. Solicitor General Mendoza in the course of oral argument observed that two of the most eminent constitutionalists who sat on t bench, Jose P. Laurel and Claro M. Recto, while undoubtedly cognizant of the abuses to which block voting could give rise and did suffer as a consequence, did not challenge its validity in an appropriate case or Proceeding. Their failure to do so is, to my mind, impressed with significance considering that in the post World War II period, until they died, they had participated as counsel de parte or as amici curiae or had been consulted on major constitutional law cases. 86 They were, to follow Thomas Reed Powell, silently vocal on the matter. It would seem that for them such a question had more of a policy rather than a legal connotation, thus appropriately belonging to the political branches. It is to stress anew that it is primarily on that ground, with full reliance on the authoritative pronouncements in the aforecited cases of Angara, Pasay Transportation, and Lorenzo, the opinions coming from the pens of Justices Laurel and Malcolm, that I am persuaded to concur in the dismissal of these petitions. So I am led to conclude because, for me, there was no clear showing of invalidity based on the impairment of the right of suffrage or the denial of due process and equal pro. protection guarantees. The presumption of validity accorded a legislative act or executive decree was not therefor overcome. Stress must equally be made on what was said before that the dismissal of these petitions, especially those impugning the validity of the optional block voting scheme, cannot be construed as an admission of its desirability. That is a matter the cognizance of which belongs to the other branches. Nor is it to deny that, as unfortunately happened in the past, it could be perverted from its legitimate use and could be a source of electoral frauds. As early as 1816, Justice Story, in the oficited case of Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 87 characterized an argument "from the possibility of an abuse" as "unsatisfactory." 88 He emphasized: "It is always a doubtful course, to argue against the use or existence of a power, from the possibility of its abuse." 89 T excerpt from an opinion of Justice Cardozo in Willia v. Baltimore 90 is equally relevant: "The judicial function is exhausted with the discovery that the relation between means and end is not wholly vain and fanciful, an illusory pretence. Within the field where men of reason may reasonably differ, the legislature [or the executive] must have its way." 91 At any rate, there is solace in the thought that outside of the 1978 Election Code being applicable only for t year's poll there are built-in provisions therein to guard against the perpetration of electoral misdeeds. Moreover, it is to the interest of the present Administration that every effort should be made to avoid such evil practices. If it fails, its achievements would stand discredited and the New Society itself condemned. There must be a true expression of the popular will, which, thereafter, must be obeyed. So both constitutionalism and democracy mandate.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting: I. I dissent from the majority's dismissal of the petition on the fundamental ground in consonance with my stand in earlier cases 1 that the so-called October 27, 1976 amendments to the 1973 Constitution which sought to crate the Interim Batasang Pambansa in lieu of the interim National Assembly provided for in Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution were constitutionally void and invalid since the constituent power to propose constitutional amendments during the transition period (between enforcement of the 1973 Constitution and election and assumption of office of the members of the regular National Assembly) is expressly vested in the interim National Assembly (not in the incumbent President) and the only way to fulfill the express mandate of the Constitution in

proposing and effecting any constitutional amendments is the convening of the interim National Assembly to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments. This was not done, although it is universally recognized that the Constitution is a "superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means" 2 but only by the particular mode and manner therein prescribed for otherwise "there will not be stability in our constitutional system and necessarily no stability in our government." 3 But with the majority vote in Sanidad, supra the proposed amendments were proclaimed as ratified and in fun force and effect as of October 27, 1976 under Presidential Proclamtion No. 1595. And elections have been called for April 7, 1978 under Presidential Decree No. 1296 (1978 Election Code) for electing the members of the Interim Batasang Pambansa with greatly diluted powers and functions compared to those of the interim National Assembly. (Thus, contrary to the very tenets of the parliamentary system the Interim Batasang Pambansa which is shorn of the interim and regular Assembly's power to ratify treaties, cannot elect the Prime Minister nor replace the incumbent President as Prime Minister who may however dissolve the Batasan at any time 4 and who shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall have been lifted." 5 The President (Prime Minister) is further empowered to "issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instructions, which shag form part of the law of the land "whenever the Interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly "fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in judgment requires immediate action." 6 II. We are thus confronted with the reality of the scheduled April 7, 1978 election of Interim Batasang Pambansa members and the merits of the petitions at bar which in the main assail the validity and constitutionality of the so-called "optional block voting" system now resurrected in Presidential Decree No. 1296 for the said elections and pray that respondent Comelec be enjoined from implementing the same citing the Comelec's own position papers in the Batasan Bayan's last session on January 27, 1978 that "block voting would only make a mockery of the elections, that it is associated with electoral frauds and malpractices, that adopting it would seemingly insured political advantage to the candidates of the administration and, therefore, the credibility of the election would be impaired because of it." 7 I vote for the granting of the petitions and for the outlawing of the block voting scheme on the following grounds. 1. The block voting scheme offends the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution and is furthermore proscribed by the express injunction of the new provision in Article XII, section 9 (1) of the 1973 Constitution that "Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." Petitioner Peralta as an independent La Union candidate complains with reason that he is unfairly discriminated against and prejudiced by the block voting scheme in that "there are three ways to vote for a KIBALI [Kilusang ng Bagong Lipunan] candidate: (1) by writing name, (2) by writing KIBALI and (3) by writing NACIONALISTA, on the ballot. On the other hand, there is but one way to vote for an independent, like petitioner, only by writing name." 8Actually, the arbitrary and oppressive edge given the KBL candidate against an independent candidate amounts to 6 to 1 for judicial notice may be taken of the ballot subject of the petition in Case L-47883 entitled "Lakas ng Bayan (Laban) vs. Comelec" complaining against the double listing of KBL candidates in Metro Manila where the Comelec recognizes three additional ways of voting for a KBL candidate viz by writing (4) KBL (5) NP (for Nacionalista Party) or (6) just a plain N unless enjoined by the Court in said pending case. Said petitioner further aptly observes that "under martial law where the freedom, privileges and

immunities of the citizens are curtailed or suspended, the evils of block voting are enhanced to a hundredfold." 9 2. Historically, it may be noted that block voting was repudiated by the people through Congress which abolished block voting in 1951 and never reinstituted the same. As observed by the former Senator Jovito Salonga, "(B)lock voting was used after the Second World War in two elections. In the 1947 elections, the administration almost wiped out the opposition. In the 1949 elections, through the use of block voting, massive frauds were committed and facilitated by the party in power. The two great oppositionists at the time, Jose P. Laurel and Claro M. Recto who headed the senatorial slate and the men who ran with them, became easy victi of block voting. So great was the indignation of the people that Congress had to abolish the optional block voting scheme in March, 1951. ... Block voting makes it easy for fake ballots to be used with maximum effect. Twentyone names of candidates in Metro Manila need not be written out, only the name of the political party or group. Block voting makes it easy to verify whether the voter who has been bribed will vote according to previous understanding. If he finishes accomplishing ballot in, let us say, five seconds, the one assigned to watch him can readily conclude that the voter complied with part of the bargain. One who writes out 21 names on ballot cannot finish the task in five seconds." 10 When taken against the backdrop of 5- years of martial law and its restraints without any political activity so much so that the main opposition party, the Liberal Party, has been urged in vain to take part in the elections and the government's ticket of KBL candidates throughout the country are all but unopposed "in an awesome display of power" with only three reported "quixotic" pockets of opposition in Metro Manila, Region V (Bicolandia) and Region VII (Central Visayas), 11 the "invidious discrimination" that is inflicted by ,the block voting scheme upon the opposition and independent candidates calls for judicial protection of their constitutionally protected rights of due process and equal protection. This is all the more so since the block voting scheme that has been revived is closer to the pre-war scheme (under Commonwealth Act 666) of practically compulsory straight party balloting whereby the writing of the name of the party now cancels and invalidates the written names of the candidate(s) not member(s) of said party 12 (whereas in the prewar scheme, the writing of the party's name prevailed over the individual candidates as distinguished from the postwar scheme in 1947 and 1949 (under Rep. Act 180) which provided that the in. individual candidates' names as written prevailed over the party's. 13 It has thus been noted that "since the administration slate has more advantages than the opposition, it assumes a heavier burden in being fair." 14 3. The majority's thesis that "in other jurisdictions ballots providing for optional straight party voting have been accepted as a standard form" 15 and that there is reasonable basis for favoring official candidates against independent candidates who are free to avail of such advantages "by joining a political party, group or aggrupation" 16 with the observation that block voting "favors the strongly organized parties or groups and tends to prevent the proliferation of political parties or groups" 17 may hold true for other times, places and climes but y not in the context of the present martial law situation and the Philippine experience. It is a matter of daily comment in the press that the government's KBL slate is running practically unopposed and there certainly is no proliferation of parties or groups to even watch out for. Independent candidates under such circutances will not find it easy to follow the majority's solution that they become official candidates of non-existent or non- participating political parties or groups. Most importantly, aside from the people's repudiation of block voting since 1951, and 1973 Constitution has in effect outlawed the inherent discrimination in block voting against independent candidates through its new provision that bona fide candidates "shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination."

This new provision which is not found in the Constitution of other states and jurisdictions manifestly constricts the classifications heretofore permitted in the application of the general equal protection clause by specifically providing that in elections for any public office, bona fide candidates may not be subjected to any form of discrimination (such as that of block voting) which might otherwise have been permissible against independent candidates. Petitioner Reynaldo T. Fajardo who was chairman of the Committee on Political Parties in the 1971 Constitutional Convention submitted committee's printed report which bears out contention that block voting was outlawed by t new Constitutional provision. The Committee's explanatory note on the draft of said provision (which was adopted practically verbatim save that protection against harassment was added) further emphasized that t provision is to be understood as having special reference to unaffiliated or partyless bona fide candidates. Extending to them the equal protection of the law is but a matter of elementary justice. If the State guarantees equal protection to groups of individuals, such as political parties, it is but logical that the same protection be made available to individuals, separately, without discrimination in any form. 4. The basic consideration is the principle of due process and equal protection of the laws as enshrined in the very first clause of the Bill of Rights which negates state power or that of the party in power to act in an arbitrary or oppressive manner and stands as the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play and the guaranty of justice. In all this,U.S. Chief Justice Erl Warren had well stressed that it is the spirit and not the form of law that makes justice alive. The late Justice Jose P. Laurel (hielf a victim of block voting in the 1949 elections 18 had earlier enjoined us that "(R)epublicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption of a representative type of government, necessarily points to the enfranced citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the established authority. He has a voice in Government and whenever possible it is the solemn duty of the judiciary, when caged upon to act in justifiable cases, to give it efficacy and not to stifle or frustrate it." 19 It was in t same spirit that U.S. Chief Justice Earl Warren in formulating the "one man, one vote" formula as the constitutional rule to be followed in the reapportionment of representation in State legislatures 20 held in upholding plaintiffs' contention that they were denied "equal suffrage in free and equal elections ... and the equal protection of the laws", that "... (E)specially since the right to exercise the france in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized ..." and "a denial of constitutionally protected rights demands judicial protection; our oath and our office require no less of us. ... To the extent that a citizen's right to vote is debased, he is that much less a citizen. " 5. Finally, petitioner Juan T. David has raised the prejudicial questions that since P.D. 1269, the 1978 Election Code, has not yet been published in the Official Gazette (as per certification dated February 16, 1978 of the Government Printing Office 21) the provisions thereof particularly those imposing penal sanctions may not be enforced until after the lapse of 15 days from publications in the Official Gazette and that block voting as therein provided may not be enforced because the Election Code of 1971 (which does not provide for block voting) should be deemed as still in force and as not having been legally repealed. This has sound basis under the pertinent laws, Article 2 of the Civil Code which provides that "Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided ... "and Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code which likewise requires that "(W)hen laws take effect. A statute passed by the Philippine Legislature (National Assembly) shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day

after the completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette, the date of issue being excluded. For the purpose of fixing such date the Gazette is conclusively presumed to be published on the day indicated therein as the date of issue. The Court held through then Chief Justice Ricardo Paras in People vs. de Dios 22 that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation" citing the general principle enunciated in an earlier case 23 that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties." Such legal requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for the effectivity of laws is vital and indispensable and may not be waved away with the contention that copies of the election decree have been published and distributed or the people advised thereof through the newspapers. In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the requirements of due process and of the Rules of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official government reporsitory promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.

MUOZ PALMA, J., dissenting: The Constitution shall be the bedrock of our Republic. (From the Speech of President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the opening of the 1971 Constitution Convention, June 1, 1971) La Constitution, ... es la ley de la paternidad y de los afectos del poder creador, que rige la en sus diversos ordenes. Obra del pueblo, y no de un partido, ha de ser, por tanto, la Constitution para que el pueblo deba amarla y defenderla y los governantes respetarla y cumplirla. ... * (From the Speech of President Claro M. Recto at the opening of the 1934 Constitutional Convention, July 30, 1934; emphasis supplied) The Malolos Constitution "is the most glorious expression of the noble aspirations of the Filipino a mirror of their culture and a clear proof before the world of their capacity to govern themselves. (From the Speech of President Emilio Aguinaldo, Proclamation of the Malolos Constitution, January 21, 1899) It was in the spirit of the transcendental principles enunciated in the foregoing statements and of similarly inspired pronouncements, too many to be quoted, of our forbears and leaders of thought and of government of the past, that I wrote my dissenting Opinion in Sanidad, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., L-44640, October 12, 1976, and the accompanying cases. What was challenged in Sanidad was the constitutionality of Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033 which called for a referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976, on certain proposed constitutional amendments, one of which was to substitute the interim National Assembly with an Interim Batasang Pambansa. I expressed there the opinion that the incumbent President did not have constituent

powers, that is, the power to propose amendments to the 1973 Constitution, and that if there was need of amending the Constitution the amendatory process provided for in Art. XVI, Section 1 (1) and (2), or Art. XVII, Section 15, of the 1973 Constitution, was to be followed. I said: xxx xxx xxx l. That sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them is a fundamental, basic principle of government which cannot be disputed, but when the people have opted to govern theelves under the mantle of a written Constitution each and every citizen , from the highest to the lowliest, has the sacred duty to respect and obey the Charter they have so ordained. xxx xxx xxx The Filipino people,, wanting to ensure to theelves a democratic republican form of government, have promulgated a Constitution whereby the power to govern theelves has been entrusted to and distributed among three branches of government; they have also mandated in clear and unmistakable ter the method by which provisions in their fundamental Charter may be amended or g done so, the people are bound by these constitutional limitations. For while there is no surrender or abdication of the people's ultimate authority to amend, revised, or adopt a new Constitution, sound reasondemands that they keep theelves within the procedural bounds of the existing fundamental law. (73 SCRA 455, 456) My view in Sanidad was reiterated by me in Dela Llana v. COMELEC et al., L-47245, and Hidalgo v. COMELEC, et al., L-47239, December 9, 1977. The issue was on the validity of another national referendum for December 17, 1977, which referred to the 1976 amendments Nos. 3 and 7 of the Constitution. In these two cases, I stated that inasmuch as amendments Nos. 3 and 7 were not validly proposed and ratified, Presidential Decree No. 1229 which implements said amendments is nun and void. The cases now before Us raise legal questions which center on the election of representatives to the Interim Batasang Pambansa. Without necessity of giving my views on the different issues raised in these petitions, I vote to declare as unconstitutional the challenged portions of "The 1978 Election Code" as they are without constitutional basis, conformably to my opinion in Sanidad that the Interim Batasang Pambansa is not validly constituted and suffers from a basic constitutional infirmty. I strongly reiterate here what I wrote in Sanidad that the only possible measure that can lead our country and people to a "condition of normalcy" is the lifting and ending of the state of martial rule and the implementation of the Transitory Provisions of the 1973 Constitution for the convening of the Interim National Assembly in order that the latter may carry out the objectives for its creation as decreed in the 1973 Constitution. (supra. p. 46.)

Footnotes 1 Sec. 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 666 provides: SEC. 3. ... The ballot shag be prepared in such manner that the voter may vote for a straight party ticket or for individual candidates and for t purpose, the tickets of the

regularly organized political parties that participated in the last preceding election for national officials, as certified under oath by the national directorates of the respective parties, shall be printed on the ballot, and there shall also be one column containing blank spaces for the names of candidates for all elective positions to be filled in said election, which spaces are to be fined by the voter who does not desire to vote a straight ticket. The following notice shall be printed on said ballot: "If you want to vote for all the official candidates of a political party to the exclusion of all other candidates, write the name of such political party in the space indicated. It shall then be unnecessary for you to write the names of the candidates you vote for. On the other hand, if you want to vote for candidates belonging to different parties and/or for independent or individual candidates, write the names of the candidates you vote for."... . 2 Sec. 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 provides: SEC. 119. Official ballots. Uniform official ballots shall be provided at public expense for each election. Said ballots shall be of white paper in the shape of a strip one hundred and twenty millimeters wide and two hundred and forty millimeters long, exclusive of the stub and coupon containing the detachable number of the ballot and shall bear at the top the coat of ar of the Commonwealth, the words, "Official Ballot", the name of the municipality and province in which the election is held, the date of the election, and the following notice in eight point gothic type: "Fill out t ballot secretly inside the booth. Do not write anything nor put any distinctive mark thereon but the names of the candidates you vote for. Any violation of t instruction will invalidate your vote." On the body of the ballot shall be printed on the left margin the title of each one of the offices to be voted for in twelve point gothic type, followed by a blank line for the name of the candidate for whom the voter desires to vote, and if more than one is to be elected, the corresponding number of blank lines consecutively numbered, immediately below the title of the office. There shag not be anything on its reverse side. There shall be in the coupon a space for the thumbmark of the voter. 3 Sec. 124, Republic Act No. 180 provides: SEC. 124. Official Ballots. ... The ballots for national offices shall be prepared in such manner that the voter may vote for straight ticket of a political party or for individual Candidates, and, for t purpose, the ticket of the regularly organized political parties that participated in the last preceding election for national officials, as certified under oath by the national directorates of the respective parties, shall be printed on said ballots, and there shall also be one column containing blank spaces for the name of candidate for elective national positions to be filled in said election, which spaces are to be filled by the voter who does not desire to vote a straight ticket. The following notice shall be printed on the ballots for national offices: "If you want to vote for all the official candidates of a political party to the exclusion of all other candidates, write the name of such political party in the space indicated. It shall then be unnecessary for you to write the names of the candidates you vote for. On the other hand, if you want to vote for candidates belonging to different parties and/or for independent or individual candidates, write in the respective blank spaces the names of the candidates you vote for and the names written by you in the respective blank spaces of the ballot shall then be considered as validly voted for."... 4 Sec. 149[20] of Republic Act No. 180 provides:

SEC. 149. Rules for the appreciation of ballots. In the reading and appreciation of ballots, the following rules shall be observed: 20. If a voter should vote for individual candidates for national offices, only the names of the candidates written by him in the respective blank spaces of ballot shall be considered as validly voted for even though he has written on the corresponding space the name of a political party which has nominated official Candidates. 5 Sec. 4[g] of Commonwealth Act No. 666 provides: SEC. 4. In the reading and appreciation of ballots in making the canvassing, in addition to the rules of appreciation provided for by the Election Code, the boards of inspectors shall observe the following rules: (g) If a voter had voted for the straight ticket of a political party and at the same time had written on one or more blank spaces of the ballot the names of candidates of other party or parties or of independent candidates, said names shall be deemed as not written and the vote shall be counted as cast for each and every one of the official candidates of the party voted for in the ballot. 6 Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, 5th Ed., pp. 641-642. Cf. Sec. 2, of S. 303, Acts (1965) Indiana, Chapter 252; State ex rel Nebraska Republican State Central Committee v. Wait, 92 Neb. 313, 138 N.W. 159. Schmandt & Steinbicker, Fundamentals of Goverment, pp. 273-274. 7 Decided by the Sup. Court of Penn. in 1905. 61 Atlantic 346. 8 The Pennsylvania Court said: What is the real complaint of the appellants? Whether we confine ourselves to their bill beyond which we ought not to go in looking for it, or search for it in the elaborate briefs of their learned counsel, it is not that the acts of 1893 and 1903 deprive them, as can. candidates, of the right to be voted for by qualified electors, or that the latter are deprived of the right to vote. It is simply that certain electors, in going into the election booths, possessing no higher, but just the same, right to freely cast their votes and have them counted that every other elector in the commonwealth possesses, may mark their tickets more readily and quickly than the elector who, in wishing to assert absolute right of independence of any political party, makes up own ticket, and in doing so necessarily is required to consume more time. In other words, because those voters who insist upon making up their own tickets, as is their unquestioned right, must necessarily make a number of marks, the contention of the appellants is that elections are not equal if other electors may indicate the candidates of their choice by making fewer marks. Because some in giving expression to a freeman's will must make a number of marks, the position of the appellants, as logically understood, is that elections are not equal unless the rest of the electors, satisfied with party nominations and willing to vote for political candidates named, are required to spend as much time in marking their ballots. This is not the test of inequality. Each individual voter as he enters the booth is given an opportunity to freely express wilt with no one by him to influence or intimidate him, and from the face of the ballot he is instructed how to mark it. If unable to understand the instructions, a qualified elector of the district, selected by hielf, may enter the voting apartment and assist him. This is the right given to every elector, and therefore is an

equal one. The free and equal exercise of the elective france by every elector is not impaired by the statute, but simply regulated. A regulation for the convenience of certain electors providing that they may not must if they desire to vote a straight party ticket, vote for it by marking a cross in the square opposite the name of the party of their choice, is not inequality, as against these complainants. They have the right to vote in precisely the same way for all the candidates on the Municipal League ticket. If they wish to vote for offices for which candidates are not named on their ticket, they not only have the right to do so, but can do so by making the proper marks on the ballot, or writing out the names of their choice. The straight party man the voter who, as a rule, votes straight party ticket may, if unwilling to vote for the ticket named by party, omit the cross opposite the party name, and by separate marks on the party ticket indicate those candidates on it for whom he will vote, marking on other tickets those for whom he wishes to vote, instead of the candidates named for the same offices on party ticket. ... . ... They complain of inequality because an elector, in marking ticket from the names found on the official ballot, cannot make it up as readily and quickly as the voter who is given the privilege of voting a straight ticket by making a single mark. But how much more inconvenient is it, and how much more time must necessarily be consumed, when an elector makes up whole ticket by writing the names of those for whom would vote! If marking is inequality, writing is more so. The whole matter is but a regulation, working on inequality, but preserving the equal right to vote. (pp. 347348). Quoted in the same case was the decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan in Todd v. Election Commissioners (104 Mich. 474; 62 N.W. 564; 64 N.W. 496; 29 L.R.A. 330), wherein it was said: The Constitution does not guaranty that each voter shall have the same facilities with every other voter in expressing will at the ballot box, ... The constitutionality of the law is not to be tested by the fact that one voter can cast ballot by making one mark, while another may be required to make two or more to express will. When each has been afforded the opportunity and been provided with reasonable facilities to vote, the Constitution has been complied with. All else is regulation, and lies in the sound discretion of the Legislature, to whom alone such regulation is committed. Courts cannot hold such provisions unconstitutional because, in their judgment, they are harsh or unwise, or have their origin in partisan purposes. Constitutional laws often have their origin in such purposes, and un constitutional laws are often based upon pure motives an honest intentions, Courts have nothing to do with the motives of legislators, nor the reasons they may have for passing the law. The polar star of interpretation to guide them is the language of the Constitution itself, and the sole question always is, does the law destroy or abridge the right. (61 Atlantic 349). 9 The Pennsylvania Court further went on to state: ... In State ex rel. Runge v. Anderson, 100 Wis. 523, 76 N.W. 482, 42 L.R.A. 239, Ritchie v. Richards, 14 Utah, 345, 47 Pac. 670, and People ex rel. v. Hoffman, et al., 116 111. 587, 5 N.E. 596, 8 N.E. 788, 56 Am. Rep. 793, similar views seem to have been entertained. In the latter case, it was said, "Elections are equal when the vote of, every elector is equal, in its influence on the result, to the vote of every other elector; when each ballot is as effective as every other ballot."... .

What the Legislature has done has been to provide how free and equal elections are to be conducted. It has confined itself to regulating them, and has not gone beyond forbidden limits by interfering with their freedom and equality. It has neither denied, qualified nor restricted the right of every elector to vote freely and for the persons of choice. It has simply told him how he may vote freely and equally with all others, and in doing so has made no distinction that affects freedom or gives him a right that is not equal to that of every other elector to take ballot to the box, as he has made it up, to be counted as vote. This system of regulating free and equal elections would be more than a human device if it did not encounter criticism. Perfect though it were as the wisdom of man could make it, there would still be those among men to point to its defects, and, as in every case of legislation not in accord with the view or sense of right and propriety of those affected by it, the Constitution would be turned to as the shibboleth to strike it down. It may or may not be wise legislation. The convenience of the elector may not have been properly considered when it was passed. Another system might be more convenient, Defects in it may be fairly pointed out, and improvements suggested. But these are not matters for us. Our duty is to apply the touchstone of the Constitution, and if the response is, "Freedom and equality", the act must be upheld. Such is the response here. (p. 349). 10 The Supreme Court of Utah said: The plaintiff also insist that ballots prepared and printed according to the act of March 28th, above mentioned, and exclusively used at the November election, do not afford equal facilities to vote to all voters; that a ballot may be cast for party candidates with less difficulty than for those candidates who have no emblem on the ballot to represent them; that a partisan can vote easier than an independent; and that the law does not operate equally and uniformly on all voters. It is true that party organizations may, by the observance of certain requirements, have the names of their candidates and their emblem printed on the ticket, while other candidates are required to obtain the signatures of a specified number of voters to a certificate before their name can be printed on the ballot. And by simply placing a cross opposite a party emblem, a vote may be cast for all the candidates of a party, while a vote for any number of candidates of a party less than an can only be given by a cross opposite the name of each candidate; and if a voter wishes to cast a vote for a candidate whose name is not on it, he is obliged to write the name on the ballot, and place a cross opposite to it. Of course the voter should be allowed to perform t duty with the least difficulty and inconvenience consistent with an honest and fair election. No unnecessary impediments or inconveniences should be thrown in way. The system tends to encourage the voting of straight tickets and to discourage independent voting, which some think is an objection. The system has its merits as well as its demerits, and the legislative department of the state government has seen fit, in its wisdom, to enact the law; and we do not feel authorized to overturn the people,'s wilt as expressed through that body, in the law. The court holds that none of the various objections urged by the plaintiff is well founded. We therefore deny the application for the writ. (14 Utah. 345, 47 Pac. 670, 675). 11 Arian, The Choosing People: Voting Behavior In Israel, Press of Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland and London, 1973, p. 8. 12 Zurcher, Constitutions and Constitutional Trends Since World War II. New York University Press, 1951, p. 53.

13 "A Matter of Elementary Justice", Sponsorship speech of Delegate Jose A. Leido, Sr. 14 Felwa v. Salas, 19 SCRA 606; Rafael v. Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board, 21 SCRA 336, Ichong, etc., et al. v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1157. 15 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, pp. 824-825; Tan Ty v. Land Tenure Administration, 35 SCRA 250; Ichong, etc. et al v. Hernandez, supra. 16 Meklos v. Milwaukee, 156 Wis. 591, 146 N.W. 882. 17 Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 1 L. ed. 2d 1485. 18 Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78, 79, 55 L. ed. 369, 372. 19 O'Gorman and Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance, 282 U.S. 251. 20 People v. Vera, 65 Phil 56,95. 21 Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall 14. 22 Dodd, Cases on Constitutional Law, 3rd Ed., (1942) 56. 23 Sec. 144, Rep. Act 6388; Sec. 76, Rep. Act No. 180 as amended by Rep. Acts 599, 867, 2242, 3036, 3522, 3588, 4168, 4364 and 4421. 24 Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, 5th Ed., p. 9. 25 "Goverment Responsibility and Accountability", Rebuttal Speech of Delegate Vicente G. Sinco. 26 Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424, 450. 27 Campbell and Miller, "The Motivational Basis of Straight and Split Ticket Voting", A Survey Conducted by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan in October and November, 1965, The American Political Science Review, Vol. LI, No. 2, pp. 293, 303. 28 Sections 1 and 2 of Article XVII. 29 Amendment No. 2 provides: 2. The interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members thereof However, it shall not exercise the powers provided in Article VIII, Section 14[l] of the Constitution. 30 Thus, Section 13 of the 1978 Election Code provides:

SEC. 13. Sectoral representatives. There shall be three sectors to be represented in the interimBatasang Pambansa, namely: (1) youth; (2) agricultural labor; and (3) industrial labor to be elected in the manner herein provided. Each sector shall be entitled to four sectoral representatives, two of whom shall come from Luzon, one from Visayas, and one from Mindanao: Provided, That the youth sector shall be entitled to two additional sectoral representatives who shall be elected from any region. 31 The pertinent provisions of the 1978 Election Code are the following. SEC. 15. Sectors are national aggrupations. The sectors named in Section 13 of Article 11 hereof shall be considered as national aggrupations and as such shall elect their respective national representatives to the interim Batasang Pambansa through their own Electoral Councils which shall be constituted in the manner hereinafter provided. SEC. 16. Delegates from provinces to the electoral councils. At any time after the date of the election fixed herein, but not later than twenty days, the Kagawads representing agricultural labor, industrial labor and youth in the Sangguniang Bayan or Panlungsod of the municipalities and cities in every province shall meet at the provincial capital and, subject to the supervision of the Conunission or its authorized representatives, shall choose from among themselves one delegate of their sector to their respective Electoral Councils, The meetings of the sectoral Kagawads shall be held separately at a time and place to be designated by the Commission or its authorized representatives. A majority of all the Kagawads of each sector shall constitute a quorum. The Kagawad obtaining the highest number of votes shag be the provincial delegate of the sector to the corresponding Electoral Council. In the case of Metro Manila (Region IV), the members of the agricultural and industrial labor sectors in every barangay, if any, upon call of the barangay captain and under the supervision of the Commission, shall choose one Kagawad each for their respective sectors. The sectoral Kagawadselected shall meet on a date and at a place designated by the Conunission to choose from among theelves ten delegates each to their respective Electoral Councils. In the case of the youth sector in Metro Manila, the Presidents of the Kabataang Barangay in the four cities and thirteen municipalities shall likewise elect from among theelves ten delegates for the youth sector to their Electoral Council. Upon call of the Commission which shall be made not later than twenty days after the date of the election fixed herein and at such time as it may determine, existing national aggrupations of industrial labor and agricultural labor as accredited by the Department of Labor, and the Department of Agriculture and Department of Agrarian Reform, respectively ,shall elect to their Electoral Councils ten delegates for their respective sectors. The election shall be under the supervision of the Commission. SEC. 17. Election and proclamation of sectoral remembers. The delegates of each sector shall, upon call of the Commission, convene in Manila to elect from among those sectoral members who have filed their certificates of candidacy two representatives from each sector from Luzon, one from Visayas, and one from

Mindanao. The delegates of the youth sector shall also elect the two additional representatives of their sector provided in Section 13, Article II of t Code. The Commission shall supervise the conduct of the election and proclaim the results thereof. 32 Report of the Committee on Political Parties, 3rd Publication , p. E. 16. 33 Reynaldo T. Fajardo, A New Party System for the Philippines; The New Constitution, by Cirilo Montejo, p. 199. 34 Explaining the operation of the provision on accreditation, Delegate Pacifico A. Ortiz said: The second requirement is accreditation Let me explain the concept of and the need for accreditation. Section 3, par. (b) of t proposed article states: "A registered political party shall be entitled to accreditation only if in the immediately preceding elections under t Constitution it shag have obtained at least 5% of the votes cast in the constituency to which it seeks accreditation." Let us visualize the mechanics involved in t provision. Let us first suppose that hopefully we shall have the new Constitution ratified in June 1973. Secondly, let us suppose that the first national elections under t Constitution shall take place in November 1973. At these 1973 elections the political parties areregistered but none shall be considered as yet accredited. All parties start under equal conditions at t political baseline the first elections under t Constitution. Thirdly, let us suppose that in t 1973 elections only four registered parties obtain 5% or better of the votes cast for national offices. In that supposition, only these four registered parties shall be considered accredited as national parties; other parties which failed to gain at least 5% of the votes shall not be considered accredited. Fourthly, let us suppose that the next national or local elections will take place in 1975. In these 1975 elections only the four accredited national or local level which the Comelec may deem wise to extend, privileges which by their very nature can not be extended to all registered political parties in sentence without promoting the proliferation of splinter and nuisance parties or creating for the Comelec unsolvable proble of accommodation." ("The Meaning and Implications of Section 3 ", Sponsorship Speech of Delegate Pacifico A. Ortiz, Report of the Committee on Political Parties, 3rd Publication, pp, 24-25.) 35 Bell v. Hill, 74 S.W. (2d) 113, 114. 36 Ibid, p. 115. 37 Jesus E. Bigornia, Newsman's Notes, Bulletin Today, March 8, 1978. 38 Ferdinand E. Marcos, Five Years of the New Society. 39 Emerson, Freedom of Association 74 Yale Law Journal, 1, 4 (1964). 40 25 Am. Jur. 2nd 800; Bell v. Hill, supra, wherein the Supreme Court of Texas said: In order that we may understand the questions involved in t case, it is essential that we clearly comprehend the nature of a political party, such as the Democratic Party. First of ala it is a voluntary association; an association formed of the free will and

unrestrained choice of those who compose it. No man is compelled by law to become a member of a political party; or, after having become such, to remain a member. He may join such a party for whatever reason see good to him and may quit the party for any cause, good, bad, or indifferent, or without cause, A political party is the creation of free men, acting according to their own wisdom, and in no sense whatever the creation of any department of the government. ... 41 Bell v. Hill, supra. 42 Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis (1927) 273 U. S. 70, 74 71 L. ed. 541, 47 S. Ct. 282, Antieau,Modern Constitutional Law, p. 643; Justice Enrique M. Fernando on the Philippine Constitution, pp. 41-42 (1974), citing Angara v. Electoral Com., 63 Phil. 139; Tan v. Macapagal 43 SCRA 677, 681. 43 Section 2 of the 1978 Election Code provides: SEC.2. Applicability. This Code shall govern the election Of the members of the interim Batasang Pambansa and, to the extent appropriate, elections for local officials, referenda and plebiscites. Fernando, J.: 1 Cf. Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, I,36142, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30; Aquino, Jr. v. Ponce Enrile, L-35546, Sept. 17, 1974, 59 SCRA 183; Aquino, Jr. v. The Commission on Elections, L-40004, Jan. 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 275; Aquino, Jr. v. Military Commission No. 2, 1,37364, May 9, 1975, 63 SCRA 547; Sanidad v. The Commission on Elections, L-44640, Oct. 12, 1976, 73 SCRA 333; Dela Llana v. The Commission on Elections, L-47245, Dec. 9, 1977; Hidalgo v. Honorable Ferdinand E. Marcos, L- 47329, Dec. 9, 1977. 2 Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051, 1061-1062 (1967). 3 Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co., 57 Phil. 600, 605 (1932) 4 63 Phil. 139 (1936). 5 Ibid, 158-159. 6 Lorenzo v. Director of Health, 50 Phil 596, 597 (1927). Justice Malcolm cited 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., 379 (1927). 7 According to Article 10, Section I of the Constitution: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws." 8 According to Article 11, Section 1 of the Constitution: "The Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." 9 69 Phil. 199 (1939).

10 Ibid, 204. 11 3 Willoughby on the Constitution, 2nd ed. 1591 (1929). The Law of the American Constitution (1922) by Burdick and Constitutional Law of the United States by Willis discussed the matter in the same fashion. 12 327 US 304, 322 (1946). 13 The writer of this concurrence had expressed such views in his separate opinions in Aquino, Jr. v. Ponce Enrile; Aquino, Jr. v. Military Commission; and Sanidad v. The Commission on elections referred to above. 14 He was assisted by Assistant Solicitors General Vicente V. Mendoza and Reynato S. Puno. 15 65 Phil. 56 (1937). 16 Ibid, 89. 17 110 Phil. 331 (1960). 18 Ibid, 342-343. 19 L-34161, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 677. 20 Ibid, 680. 21 L-47767, De la Llana v. The Commission on Election and L-47803, David v. The Commission on Elections. 22 L-47771, Peralta v. The Commission on Elections and L-47791, Buenafe v. The Commission on Elections. 23 L-47816, Youth Democratic Movement V. The Commission on Elections and L47827, Fajardo v. The Commission on Elections. 24 391 US 83. 25 262 US 447. 26 Cf. United States v. Richardson, 418 US 166 (1974); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 US 39311975); Warth v. Seldin, 422 US 490 (1975); Franks v. Bonman Transportation Co., 424 US 747 (1976); Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital 425 US 738 (1976); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 US 26 (l976). 27 Tushnet, The New Law of Standing, A Plea for Abandonment 62 Comet Law Review 663 (1977). 28 According to Article VI, Section 1 of the Constitution: "Suffrage shall be ex by citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are eighteen years

of age or over, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage. The National Assembly shall provide a system for the purpose of securing the secrecy and sanctity of the vote." 29 69 Phil. 199 (1939). 30 Ibid, 204. 31 L-28228, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 424. 32 Ibid, 431. 33 L-3354 1, January 20, 1972, 43 SCRA 1. 34 Ibid, 11. 35 Cf. Abanil v. Justice of the Peace, 70 Phil. 28 (1940); Cristobal v. Labrador, 71 Phil. 34 (1940); Teves v. The Commission on Elections, 90 Phil. 370 (1951); Mayor v. Villacete, 112 Phil. 442 (1961). 36 273 US 536 (1927). 37 Nixon v. Herndon was cited with approval in Nixon v. Condon 286 US 73 (1932) and Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186 (1962), constitution decisions of just more than ordinary significance. 38 376 US 1 (1964). 39 Ibid, 17. 40 Cf. Sanagustin v. Barrios, 68 Phil. 475 (1939); Perez v. Suller, 69 Phil. 196 (1939); Moya v. Del Fierro, 69 Phil. 199 (1939); Torres v. Mayo, 69 Phil. 208 (1939); Imperial v. Secretary of Interior, 70 Phil. 454 (1940); Agado v. Del Rosario, 71 Phil. 243 (1941); Pelobello v. Palatino, 72 Phil. 441 (1941); Cesar v. Abaya, 73 Phil. 316 (1941); Laya v. Lopez Vito, 73 Phil. 390 (1941); Gallego v. Verra, 73 Phil. 453 (1941); The above decisions were all promulgated during the Commonwealth period. 41 Sumulong v. Commission on Elections, 70 Phil. 703 (1940); Sumulong v. Commission on Elections, 71 Phil. 12 (1940); Tigbatas Party v. Lopez Vito, 73 Phil. 219 (1941); Vinzons v. Conunission on Elections, 73 Phil. 228 (1941); Moncado v. Commission on Elections, 73 Phil. 237 (1941); Vinzons v. Commission on Elections, 73 Phil. 247 (1941); Sumulong v. Commission on Elections, 73 Phil. 257.(1941); Sumulong v. Commission on Elections, 73 Phil. 288 (1941); Santiago v. Far Eastern Broadcasting, 73 Phil. 408 (1941); Lagasca v. De Vera, 79 Phil. 376 (1947); Nacionalista Party v. Angelo Bautista, 85 Phil. 101 (1949); Nacionalista Party v. Conunission on Elections, 85 Phil. 149 (1949).

42 Cf. Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1 (1947); Macias v. Commission on Elections, 113 Phil. 1 (1961); Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, L-34150, October 16, 1971, 41 SCRA 702. 43 Cf. 307 US 433 (1940). 44 Peralta v. The Commission on Elections, L-47771. 45 Buenafe v. The Commission on Elections, L-47791. 46 David v. The Commission on Elections, L-47803. 47 Youth Democratic Movement v. The Commission on Elections, L-47816. 48 De la Llana v. The Commission on Elections. L-47767. 49 Petition, par. IV. Article XII C, Section 2, par. 5 reads as follows: "Register and accredit political parties subject to the provisions of Section eight hereof." Section 8 thereof is worded thus: "A political party shall be entitled to accreditation by the Commission if, in the immediately preceding election, such party has obtained at least the third highest number of votes cast in the constituency to which it seeks accreditatioin. No religious sect shall be registered as a political party, and no political party which seeks to achieve its goals through violence or subversion shall be entitled to accreditation. " 50 Ibid, par. VII. 51 Cf. Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, L-24693, July 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 849. 52 Youth Democractic Movement v. The Commission on Elections, L-47816. 53 Ibid, 9. 54 Article XII C, Section 9, par. 9 of the Constitution. 55 According to Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. " 56 Schattschneider, Party Government 1 (1941). 57 Ibid, 35. 58 Truman, The Government Process 270-271 (1965). 59 Ibid, 271. The author quoted a phrase in Herring's The Politics of Democracy 55 (1940). 60 Friedrich, Man and His Government 120 (1963).

61 Lerner, America as a Civilization 383 (1957). 62 Laski, Reflections on the Constitution, 37 (1951). 63 Ibid, 55-56. 64 65 Phil.56 (1937). 65 L-26511, October 29,1966,18 SCRA 606. 66 Ibid, 612. This doctrine has been adhered to in the following cases after People v. Vera and prior to the Felwa decision: People v. Cayat, 68 Phil 12 (1939); People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328 (1939); Antamok Goldfields v. Court of industrial Relations, 70 Phil 340 (1940); Int. Hardwood and Veneer Co. v. Pangil Fed. of Labor, 70 Phil. 602 (1940); Austria v. Solicitor General 71 Phil 288 (1941); Laurel v. Misa, 76 Phil 372 (1946); People v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535 (1947); Manila Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Employees'Assn., 79 Phil 409 (1947); People v. Isnain, 85 Phil. 648 (1950); Tolentino v. Board of Accountancy, 90 Phil 83 (1951); In re Cunanan, 94 Phil 534 (1954); Suarez v. Santos, 96 Phil. 302 (1954); Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1165 (1957); People v. Solon, 110 Phil. 39 (1960); People v. Ventura, 114 Phil. 162 (1962) and Phil. Constitution Assn. v. Gimenez, L-23326, Dec. 18, 1965, 15 SCRA 479. Subsequent decisions after Felwa follow: Viray v. City of Caloocan, L-23118, July 26, 1967, 20 SCRA 791; Rafael v. Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board, L-19978, Sept. 29, 1967, 1 SCRA 336; Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor, L-24693, Oct. 23, 1967, 21 SCRA 449; Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City, 1,23794, Feb. 17, 1968, 22 SCRA 603; Luque v. Villegas, L-22545, Nov. 28, 1969, 30 SCRA 408; J.M. Tuason and Co. v. Land Tenure Administration, L-21064., Feb. 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413; In re Subido, L32436, Sept. 9, 1970, 35 SCRA 1; Imbong v. Ferrer, L-32432, Sept. 11, 1970, 35 SCRA 28; Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, L-30026, Jan. 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 420, Central Bank v. Cloribel, L-26971, April 11, 1972,44 SCRA 307; Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, L-25246, Sept. 12, 1974, 59 SCRA 54: Basa v. Federacion Obrera, L-27112, Nov. 19, 1974, 61 SCRA 93. 67 Article 8 the Malaysian Constitution. 68 Idris v. Public Prosecutor, Federal Court Criminal Appeal No. 19,32. 69 Ibid. 70 Ibid, 33. 71 L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413. 72 Ibid, 435. 73 Cf. Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Hrv. Law Rev. 1-48 (1972) and Morris, Constitutional Alternatives to Racial Preferences in Higher Education, 17 Santa Clara Law Review, 279-327 (1877).

74 64 Phil. 201. 75 That was formerly Article VI, Section 12, par. 3 of the amended 1935 Constitution. it is now found in Article VIII, Section 18, par. 2 of the new Constitution which reads as follows: "No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, paid, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or for. the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium." 76 Ibid, 209-210. 77 Ibid, 210. 78 Act No. 4421 (1934). 79 Youth Democractic Movement v. The Commission on Elections, L-47816, 2. 80 Cf. Zandueta v. de la Costa, 66 Phil 615 (1938)and Tanada v. Cuenco. 103 Phil. 1051 (1957). 81 Cf. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action, Chapter 10, Ripeness and Review of All Orders, 395-423 (1965) and Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 Harvard Law Review 1037-1070 (1964). 82 Laurel, J., concurring, in Zandueta v. de la Costa, 66 Phil 615,627(1957). 83 Opinion of Justice Antonio, 2. 84 Ibid, 4. 85 Ibid,6 and 7. 86 Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil 865 (1947); Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil 1 (1947); Vargas v. Rilloraza, 80 Phil. 297 (1948); Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil 368 (1949); Nacionalista Party v. Bautista, 85 Phil. 101 (1949); Nacionalista Party v. De Vera, 85 Phil 126 (1949); Nacionalista Party v. The Commission on Elections, 85 Phil. 149 1949); Nava v. Gatmaitan, 90 Phil 172 (1951); Montenegro v. Castaneda, 91 Phil 882 (1952); Lacson v. Roque, 92 Phil 456 (1953); Rodriguez, Sr. v. Gella, 92 Phil 603 (1953); Rutter v. Esteban, 93 Phil. 68 (1953); Salaysay v. Castro, 98 Phil 515 (1956). If a personal allusion were permissible, the writer of tills opinion, who had himself appeared or been consulted in the above cases, except for Laurel v. Misa, had sat in on conferences where both jurists gave freely of their time and extensive knowledge regarding the constitutional issues raised. 87 1 Wheat 304 (1916). 88 Ibid, 345. 89 Ibid.

90 289 US 36, 41 (1933). 91 Ibid, 42. Teehankee, J.: 1 Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333 (Oct. 12, 1976); De la Llanna vs. Comelec, L47245, Dec. 9, 1977; Hidalgo vs. Marcos, L-47329, Dec. 9, 1977; Aquino vs. Comelec, 62 SCRA 275 (Jan. 31, 1975); and Gonzales vs. Comelec, L-40117, Feb. 22, 1975. 2 Marshall, C.J. in Marbury vs. Madison. 1 Cranch 137 (1803) 3 Zaldivar,, J., dissenting op. in Javellana vs. Exec. Sec., 50 SCRA 30 (1973). See Tolentino vs. Comelec, 41 SCRA 702 (1971) and Resolution denying motion for reconsideration dated Nov. 4, 1971. 4 Amendment No. 3, October 27, 1976 amendments. 5 Amendment No. 5, Idem. 6 Amendment No. 6, Idem. 7 Petition of Pedro G. Peralta in 1,47771, page 7. The Bulletin Today issue of January 28, 1978 reported. "(S)olicitor General Estelito R. Mendoza, chairman of the committee on revision of laws and the election code, read on the floor the official stand of the commission on elections. The Comelec said block voting belonged to a period of the nation's history associated more with electoral frauds and malpractices. It added that the people may take it as a form of political backsliding 'incompatible with the reformist image of the New Society.' The poll body said that in block voting there is strong possibilities that only the administration may present candidates because opposition groups would shy away from the polls." (at page 11) The Times Journal issue of the same day reported. "(C)ommission on Elections Chairman Leonardo B. Perez said in his position paper that blockvoting would only make a mockery of the elections as there is a strong possibility that only the administration party will present nominees. 'The credibility of the results of the elections would then be impaired,' he said. Even Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, chairman of the Batasan Bayan's committee on revision of laws which drafted the 1978 electoral code, denounced the Espinosa proposal, saying it was an easy way of suppressing the free and deliberate exercise in judgment." (at page 1) The Evening Express in its editorial of January 31, 1978 entitled "Block voting needs a second hard look" commented that: "(W)hen certain pro- administration leaders and independent minded individuals and even the Commission on Elections come out against block voting because it is associated more with electoral malpractices in the past than with electoral reformation, then it's time to have a second hard look. What is most important, to our mind, is not only to insure free, orderly and honest elections but also to make them credible. When the Comelec, the watchdog of political exercises, says that the credibility of the elections may be impaired because of 'block voting' then we can say that this independent (constitutional) body has the best of intention to protect and preserve the popular wilt 8 Peralta supplementary memorandum, page 1.

9 Peralta petition, page 8, 10 Panorama Magazine Bulletin Today issue of Feb. 26, 1978, page 6. 11 Orlando F. Aquino: "Keeping Posted". Evening Post issue of March 8, 1978. 12 Sec. 155 of P.D. 1296, par. 28 provides: "If a voter has written in the proper space of his ballot the name of a political party, group or organization which has nominated official candidates and the names of individual candidates not belonging to the ticket of the same political party, group or aggrupation in the spaces provided therefor, all of the votes indicated in the ballot shall be considered as stray a votes and shall not counted, ... (emphasis supplied) 13 See main opinion, pages 5-6. 14 Apolonio Batalla: Second Thoughts, Bulletin Today issue of March 9, 1978. 15 At main opinion, pages 6-7. 11. 16 Idem, page 14. 17 Idem, page 16. 18 Supra, par. 2 hereof at page 5. 19 Moya vs. del Fierro, 69 Phil. 199, 204 (1939). 20 Reynolds vs. Sims, 377 vs. 533 (1964). 21 Petitioner David's Memorandum of Feb. 26, 1978, Annex A. 22 L-11003, August 31, 1969. 23 People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640 (1954); See also Lim vs. Central Bank, 104 Phil. 573 (1958) and Comm. of Civil Service vs. Cruz, 15 SCRA 638 (1965). * In order that it may be effective as an instrument for organizing the powers of the State and of society; in order that it may command the respect and reverence of all, governors as well as governed; in short, in order that the people may consider it their duty to love and defend it, the Constitution should be the work of the people,their legitimate creation, moulded from their hands, lke a gem from the hands of the artificer, like the universe from those of God. It is the law of paternity and of the affections, of the creative power, that rules life in its diverse manifestations. The Constitution must be, therefore, the work of the people and not a political party if the people are to love and defend it, and if the governors are to respect and obey it. (President Recto's Inaugural Address, The Fraiming of the Philippine Constitution by Jose M. Vol. I, p. 54, emphasis supplied)

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW), represented herein by its secretary-general, MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO, petitioner, vs. ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION and others under "Organizations/Coalitions" of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION; LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO; PDPLABAN; LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG; and others under "Political Parties" of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. respondents. x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001 BAYAN MUNA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION (NPC); LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCDUMDP; LIBERAL PARTY; MAMAMAYANG AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS; JEEP; and BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION, respondents. PANGANIBAN, J.: The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the State's benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and groups, including those which now dominate district elections, to have the same opportunity to participate in party-list elections would desecrate this lofty objective and mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics. The Case Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 1issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly

that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented. The Factual Antecedents With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for registration filed by sectoral parties, organizations and political parties. According to the Comelec, "[v]erifications were made as to the status and capacity of these parties and organizations and hearings were scheduled day and night until the last party w[as] heard. With the number of these petitions and the observance of the legal and procedural requirements, review of these petitions as well as deliberations takes a longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2) divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on political parties. These numerous petitions and processes observed in the disposition of these petition[s] hinder the early release of the Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions which were promulgated only on 10 February 2001." 2 Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec Resolution No. 3426 dated December 22, 2000, the registered parties and organizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating their intention to participate in the party-list elections. Other sectoral and political parties and organizations whose registrations were denied also filed Motions for Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent to participate in the party-list elections. Still other registered parties filed their Manifestations beyond the deadline. The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154 parties and organizations, but denied those of several others in its assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which we quote: "We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this system of proportional representation scheme will encourage multi-partisan [sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral parties or organization to directly participate in this electoral window. "It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system' is a 'mechanism of proportional representation' in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections. "However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must recognize the fact that there is a need to keep the number of sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable level, keeping only those who substantially comply with the rules and regulations and more importantly the sufficiency of the Manifestations or evidence on the Motions for Reconsiderations or Oppositions." 3 On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition praying that "the names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be accordingly amended." It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be proclaimed. 4 On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. 5 On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two disqualification cases to file Comments within three days from notice. It also set the date for hearing on April 26, 2001, 6 but subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001. 7 During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 8

Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a Petition 9before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated April 17, 2001, 10 the Court directed respondents to comment on the Petition within a non-extendible period of five days from notice. 11 On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition, 12 docketed as GR No. 147613, also challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001, 13 the Court ordered the consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the second Petition to file their respective Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that the Comelec may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast for the party-list elections, but barred the proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders of the Court. Thereafter, Comments 14 on the second Petition were received by the Court and, on May 17, 2001, the Oral Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order given in open court, the parties were directed to submit their respective Memoranda simultaneously within a non-extendible period of five days. 15 Issues: During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the following issues: "1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More specifically, is there no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law? "2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections. "3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented' sectors and organizations. "4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785." 16 The Court's Ruling The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the Comelec which will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, as specified in this Decision. First Issue: Recourse Under Rule 65 Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 is improper because there are other plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. 17 The Office of the Solicitor General argues that petitioners should have filed before the Comelec a petition either for disqualification or for cancellation of registration, pursuant to Sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 of Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A 18 dated November 9, 2000. 19

We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the Constitution 20 and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before this Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. 21 The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the Comelec a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. 22 The Comelec, however, did not act on that Petition. In view of the pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for there was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proven the urgency of petitioner's action; to this date, the Comelec has not yet formally resolved the Petition before it. But a resolution may just be a formality because the Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General, has made its position on the matter quite clear. In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. 23 It has been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." 24 Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of Representatives. Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system, which this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to "formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules." 25 Finally, procedural requirements "may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice x x x when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available." 26 Second Issue: Participation of Political Parties In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of political parties in the party-list system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution." 27 For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the participation of "major political parties." 28 On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, like the impleaded political parties, submits that the Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow political parties to participate in the party-list elections. It argues that the party-list system is, in fact, open to all "registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations." 29 We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."

Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-list system. "Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution. "Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law." 30 During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S. Monsod pointed out that the participants in the party-list system may "be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, 31Magsasaka, or a regional party in Mindanao." 32 This was also clear from the following exchange between Comms. Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople: 33 "MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng UNIDO, PDPLaban, PNP, Liberal at Nacionalista? MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga partido." Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress. 34 He explained: "The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party-list system." For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines "political party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office." Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the party-list system. We quote the pertinent provision below: "x x x "For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system. x x x" Indubitably, therefore, political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections.

Third Issue: Marginalized and Underrepresented That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any political party -- or any organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides as follows: "(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." (Emphasis supplied.) Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of the Constitutional Commission declared that the purpose of the party-list provision was to give "genuine power to our people" in Congress. Hence, when the provision was discussed, he exultantly announced: "On this first day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new chapter to our national history, by giving genuine power to our people in the legislature."35 The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like "in accordance with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this wise: "SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible." The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will "enable" the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens, 1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and

2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but 3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and underrepresented," and "lack ofwell-defined constituencies." "Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals." However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5. 36 Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidateorganization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y] " refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified with the "marginalized or underrepresented." In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are "marginalized and underrepresented" become members of Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style. The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x x, to become members of the House of Representatives." Where the language of the law is clear, it must be applied according to its express terms. 37 The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states: "SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals." While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are

interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association. 38 The Party-List System Desecrated by the OSG Contentions Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General submits that RA No. 7941 "does not limit the participation in the party-list system to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society." 39 In fact, it contends that any party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6 40 of RA 7941 may participate in the elections. Hence, it admitted during the Oral Argument that even an organization representing the super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmarias Village could participate in the party-list elections. 41 The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). We stress that the party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens specifically those belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties to be elected to the House of Representatives. The assertion of the OSG that the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented disregards the clear statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the party-list system. Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's position to treat them similarly defies reason and common sense. In contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan 42 admitted during the Oral Argument that a group of bankers, industrialists and sugar planters could not join the party-list system as representatives of their respective sectors. 43 While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are neither marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is that their economic clout engenders political power more awesome than their numerical limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate from the size of one's constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from the number and amount of one's bank accounts. It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system was enacted -to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past the farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in the underground movement to come out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and participated during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle. Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the congressional district elections normally dominated by traditional politicians and vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives were set aside for the party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who normally controlled 80 percent of the seats in the House could participate in the party-list elections for the remaining 20 percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference between the congressional district elections and the party-list elections.

As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, 44 in order to enhance the chance of sectoral groups and organizations to gain representation in the House of Representatives through the simplest scheme possible. 45 Logic shows that the system has been opened to those who have never gotten a foothold within it -- those who cannot otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore need the "simplest scheme possible" to do so. Conversely, it would be illogical to open the system to those who have long been within it -- those privileged sectors that have long dominated the congressional district elections. The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when compared to a student dormitory "open house," which by its nature allows outsiders to enter the facilities. Obviously, the "open house" is for the benefit of outsiders only, not the dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even without such special privilege. In the same vein, the open party-list system is only for the "outsiders" who cannot get elected through regular elections otherwise; it is not for the nonmarginalized or overrepresented who already fill the ranks of Congress. Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the party-list system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries. This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted by those who are neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must permeate every discussion of the qualification of political parties and other organizations under the party-list system. Refutation of the Separate Opinions The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and Vicente V. Mendoza, are anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the framers of the Constitution as culled from their deliberations. The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the primary source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. 46 In other words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision being construed. 47 Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary 48 that "the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention [may be consulted] in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution x x x only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention 'are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face.' The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers' understanding thereof."

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched in clear terms: the mechanics of the system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. In understanding and implementing party-list representation, we should therefore look at the law first. Only when we find its provisions ambiguous should the use of extraneous aids of construction be resorted to. But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain words. Section 2 thereof unequivocally states that the party-list system of electing congressional representatives was designed to "enable underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole x x x." The criteria for participation is well defined. Thus, there is no need for recourse to constitutional deliberations, not even to the proceedings of Congress. In any event, the framers' deliberations merely express their individual opinions and are, at best, only persuasive in construing the meaning and purpose of the constitution or statute. Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA 7941 is not an issue here. Hence, they remain parts of the law, which must be applied plainly and simply. Fourth Issue: Grave Abuse of Discretion From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution. On the contrary, it seems to have ignored the facet of the party-list system discussed above. The OSG as its counsel admitted before the Court that any group, even the non-marginalized and overrepresented, could field candidates in the party-list elections. When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. 49Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. 50 In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright disqualification of the major political parties Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and PMP on the ground that under Comelec Resolution No. 4073, they have been accredited as the five (six, including PDPLaban) major political parties in the May 14, 2001 elections. It argues that because of this, they have the "advantage of getting official Comelec Election Returns, Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll watchers x x x." We note, however, that this accreditation does not refer to the party-list election, but, inter alia, to the election of district representatives for the purpose of determining which parties would be entitled to watchers under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7166. What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual determination of whether respondents herein and, for that matter, all the 154 previously approved groups, have the necessary qualifications to participate in the party-list elections, pursuant to the Constitution and the law. Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD), because "it is a government entity using government resources and privileges." This Court, however, is not a trier of facts. 51 It is not equipped to receive evidence and determine the truth of such factual allegations.

Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an opportunity to show that they qualify under the guidelines promulgated in this Decision, before they can be deprived of their right to participate in and be elected under the party-list system. Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the latter to determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply with the requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show -- through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track record -that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors. Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives." In other words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and other similarly situated political parties admitted as much during the Oral Argument, as the following quote shows: "JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying is, the political party must claim to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors? ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes."52 Third, in view of the objections53 directed against the registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. The extent of the constitutional proscription is demonstrated by the following discussion during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission: "MR. OPLE. x x x In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even international networks of members and supporters, in order to circumvent this prohibition, decides to form its own political party in emulation of those parties I had mentioned earlier as deriving their inspiration and philosophies from well-established religious faiths, will that also not fall within this prohibition? MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the prohibition, then certainly the Comelec can pierce through the legal fiction."54 The following discussion is also pertinent:

"MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed "EXCEPT RELIGIOUS GROUPS," he is not, of course, prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who may be elected by, say, the indigenous community sector to represent their group. REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the Iglesia ni Kristo, the Catholic Church, the Protestant Church et cetera."55 Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious denominations and sects shall not be registered."56 The prohibition was explained by a member57 of the Constitutional Commission in this wise: "[T] he prohibition is on any religious organization registering as a political party. I do not see any prohibition here against a priest running as a candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the registration of a religious sect as a political party."58 Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows: "(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes; (2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal; (3) It is a foreign party or organization; (4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes; (5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections; (6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition; (7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered."59 Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for violation of or failure to comply with election laws and regulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list system seeks to "enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties x x x to become members of the House of Representatives." A party or an organization, therefore, that does not comply with this policy must be disqualified. Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government. The participation of the government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only illegal60 and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations to be elected to the House of Representatives.

Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows: "SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election. In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term." Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented. Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina explained during the bicameral committee proceedings that "the nominee of a party, national or regional, is not going to represent a particular district x x x."61 Epilogue The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives." Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle that those who have less in life should have more in law. The party-list system is one such tool intended to benefit those who have less in life. It gives the great masses of our people genuine hope and genuine power. It is a message to the destitute and the prejudiced, and even to those in the underground, that change is possible. It is an invitation for them to come out of their limbo and seize the opportunity. Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and the other respondents that the party-list system is, without any qualification, open to all. Such position does not only weaken the electoral chances of the marginalized and underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the party-list system. Instead of generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it would further weaken them and aggravate their marginalization. In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of the Constitution and RA 7941 are nothing more than a play on dubious words, a mockery of noble intentions, and an empty offering on the altar of people empowerment. Surely, this could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution and the makers of RA 7941.

WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last party-list elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its hearings for the parties and organizations that appear to have garnered such number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice hereof.
1wphi 1.nt

The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec "to refrain from proclaiming any winner" during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after the Comelec itself will have complied and reported its compliance with the foregoing disposition. This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections' receipt thereof. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur. Davide, Jr., C.J., in the result. Vitug and Mendoza, JJ., see dissenting opinion. Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., join the dissent of J. Vicente M. Mendoza. Ynares-Santiago, J., abroad on official business.

Footnotes
1

Signed by Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo and Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco, Rufino S. B. Javier, Ralph C. Lantion, Mehol K. Sadain, Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason Jr.
2

Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, p. 13; Rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 40. Ibid., pp. 21-22; Rollo, pp. 48-49. Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 272-273. Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 250-263. Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 282-283. See Rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 223. TSN (GR No. 147589 and 147613), May 17, 2001, p. 49. Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 4-73. Rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 74.

10

11

Comments were filed by MAD, Bagong Bayani, The True Marcos Loyalists, the Comelec, Partido ng Masang Pilipino, the Liberal Party, the Office of the Solicitor General, CREBA, Lakas-NUCD-UMDP, the Philippine Local Autonomy Movement, Aksyon Demokratiko, Citizens' Drug Watch Foundation, Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, Ang Lakas ng OCW, and Sports and Health Foundation.
12

Rollo (GR No. 147613), pp. 3-45. Rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 46.

13

14

These were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Comelec, the Bagong Bayani Organization, Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga, and the Philippine Local Autonomy Movement.
15

Memoranda were filed by Petitioners Bayan Muna and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party; and Respondents Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga, CREBA, the Bagong Bayani Organization, the Office of the Solicitor General, and Aksyon Demokratiko. Manifestations instead of memoranda were filed by Lakas-NUCD and OCW.
16

See the May 17, 2001 Resolution, p. 2; Rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 88.

17

See, e.g., the Bagong Bayani Organization's Memorandum, pp. 3-4; Aksyon Demokratiko's Memorandum, pp. 2-3; and MAD's Memorandum, pp. 3-6.
18

Rules and regulations governing the filing of a petition for registration, a manifestation to participate, and the names of nominees under the party-list system of representation in connection with the May 14, 2001 national and local elections.
19

OSG's Memorandum, pp. 6-14; Rollo (GR No. 147613), pp. 151-159.

20

Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, provides: "Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
21

"SECTION 1. What pleadings are not allowed. The following pleadings are not allowed: xxx

d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except in election offense cases; xxx"
22

Docketed as SPA 01-113. As earlier noted, Akbayan also filed before the Comelec a similar Petition, docketed as SPA-01-109. See Annexes 1 and 2, Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General; Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 250 et seq. and 266 et seq.
23

Section 1, Rule 65. See Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222, October 16, 1996; BF Corporation v. CA, 288 SCRA 267, March 27, 1998; GSIS v. Olisa, 304 SCRA 421, March

10, 1999; National Steel Corporation v. CA, GR No. 134437, January 31, 2000; Sahali v. Comelec, GR No. 134169, February 2, 2000
24

Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 269 SCRA 316, March 7, 1997, per Panganiban, J. See also ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Commission on Elections, GR No. 133486, January 28, 2000; Central Bank v. Cloribel, 44 SCRA 307, April 11, 1972.
25

Salonga v. Cruz Pao, 134 SCRA 438, February 18, 1985, per Gutierrez, Jr., J. See also Taada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997; Guingona v. Gonzales, 219 SCRA 326, March 1, 1993.
26

ABS-CBN v. Comelec, GR No. 133486, January 28, 2000, per Panganiban, J. Petition of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, p. 15; Rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 18. Petition of Bayan Muna, p. 18; Rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 20. OSG Comment, p. 18; Rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 244. Emphasis supplied. See also 17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution.

27

28

29

30

31

It may be noted that when the Constitution was being drafted in the early days of the postMarcos era, UNIDO was the dominant political party.
32

Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 86. Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 570. Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 86. Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 561. Infra.

33

34

35

36

37

Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 747, February 26, 1997; Ramirez v. CA, 248 SCRA 590, September 28, 1995.
38

82 C.J.S. Statutes 331. OSG Comment, p. 18; Rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 244. Infra. TSN, May 17, 2001, pp. 147-148. Counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko. TSN, May 17, 2001, pp. 178-180.

39

40

41

42

43

44

Supra. See also 6, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, which reads: "A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people, subject to the provisions of this Article."
45

Section 2 of RA 7941 states in part as follows: "x x x. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible."
46

JM Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413, February 18, 1970; cited in Ruben C. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., p. 311. See also Gold Creek Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil 259, 264 (1938).
47

See Agpalo, Ibid., p. 313.

48

194 SCRA 317, February 22, 1991, per Fernan, CJ; quoting Commonwealth v. Ralph, 111 Pa 365, 3 Atl 220.
49

Taada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997. See also Santiago v. Guingona, 298 SCRA 756, November 18, 1998; Miranda v. Aguirre, 314 SCRA 603, September 16, 1999; Garcia v. HRET, 312 SCRA 353, August 12, 1999.
50

Veterans Federation Party et al. v. Comelec et al., GR No. 136781, October 6, 2000.

51

See Valmonte v. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 278, February 18, 1999; Inciong Jr. v. CA, 257 SCRA 578, June 26, 1996; Palomado v. NLRC, 257 SCRA 680, June 28, 1996; Heirs of the Late Teodoro Guaring Jr. v. CA, 269 SCRA 283, March 7, 1997; Sesbreo v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals, 270 SCRA 360, March 24, 1997; PCGG v. Cojuangco Jr., 302 SCRA 217, January 27, 1999.
52

TSN, May 17, 2001, p. 180. Petition of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, p. 16; Rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 19. Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 636. Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 589. 2 (5), Article IX (C). Christian S. Monsod. Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 634 See also 11, Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A. See 2 (4), Article IX (B) of the Constitution. See also Article 261 (o), BP 881.

53

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

61

The bicameral conference committee on the disagreeing provision of Senate Bill No. 1913 and House Bill No. 3040, January 31, 1994, p. 4.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 82380 April 29, 1988 AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD. and McELROY & McELROY FILM PRODUCTIONS, petitioners, vs. HON.IGNACIO M. CAPULONG and JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents. G.R. No. 82398 April 29, 1988 HAL MCELROY petitioner, vs. HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134 and JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.: Petitioner Hal McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Petitioner Ayer Productions pty Ltd. (Ayer Productions), 1 envisioned, sometime in 1987, the for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release, the histolic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA (Epifanio de los Santos Avenue). Petitioners discussed this Project with local movie producer Lope V. Juban who suggested th they consult with the appropriate government agencies and also with General Fidel V. Ramos and Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, who had played major roles in the events proposed to be filmed. The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the Movie Television Review and Classification Board as wel as the other government agencies consulted. General Fidel Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production. In a letter dated 16 December 1987, petitioner Hal McElroy informed private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile about the projected motion picture enclosing a synopsis of it, the full text of which is set out below: The Four Day Revolution is a six hour mini-series about People Powera unique event in modern history that-made possible the Peaceful revolution in the Philippines in 1986. Faced with the task of dramatising these rerkble events, screenwriter David Williamson and history Prof Al McCoy have chosen a "docu-drama" style and created [four] fictitious characters to trace the revolution from the death of Senator Aquino, to the Feb revolution and the fleeing of Marcos from the country. These character stories have been woven through the real events to help our huge international audience understand this ordinary period inFilipino history.

First, there's Tony O'Neil, an American television journalist working for major network. Tony reflects the average American attitude to the Phihppinence once a colony, now the home of crucially important military bases. Although Tony is aware of the corruption and of Marcos' megalomania, for him, there appears to be no alternative to Marcos except the Communists. Next, Angie Fox a fiery Australian photo-journalist. A 'new girl in town,' she is quickly caught up in the events as it becomes dear that the time has come for a change. Through Angle and her relationship with one of the Reform Army Movement Colonels (a fictitious character), we follow the developing discontent in the armed forces. Their dislike for General Ver, their strong loyalty to Defense Minister Enrile, and ultimately their defection from Marcos. The fourth fictitious character is Ben Balano, a middle-aged editor of a Manila newspaper who despises the Marcos regime and is a supporter an promoter of Cory Aquino. Ben has two daughters, Cehea left wing lawyer who is a secret member of the New People's Army, and Eva--a -P.R. girl, politically moderate and very much in love with Tony. Ultimately, she must choose between her love and the revolution. Through the interviews and experiences of these central characters, we show the complex nature of Filipino society, and thintertwining series of events and characters that triggered these remarkable changes. Through them also, we meet all of the principal characters and experience directly dramatic recreation of the revolution. The story incorporates actual documentary footage filmed during the period which we hope will capture the unique atmosphere and forces that combined to overthrow President Marcos. David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright with some 14 hugely successful plays to his credit(Don's Party,' 'The Club,' Travelling North) and 11 feature films (The Year of Living Dangerously,' Gallipoli,' 'Phar Lap'). Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American historian with a deep understanding of the Philippines, who has worked on the research for this project for some 18 months. Together with Davi Wilhamgon they have developed a script we believe accurately depicts the complex issues and events that occurred during th period . The six hour series is a McElroy and McElroy co-production with Home Box Office in American, the Australian Broadcast Corporation in Australia and Zenith Productions in the United Kingdom The proposed motion picture would be essentially a re-enact. ment of the events that made possible the EDSA revolution; it is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four (4) fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary footage as background. On 21 December 1987, private respondent Enrile replied that "[he] would not and will not approve of the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation" and further advised petitioners that 'in the production, airing, showing, distribution or exhibition of said or similar film, no reference whatsoever (whether written, verbal or

visual) should not be made to [him] or any member of his family, much less to any matter purely personal to them. It appears that petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of private respondent Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion picture. On 23 February 1988, private respondent filed a Complaint with application for Temporary Restraining Order and Wilt of Pretion with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, docketed as Civil Case No. 88-151 in Branch 134 thereof, seeking to enjoin petitioners from producing the movie "The Four Day Revolution". The complaint alleged that petitioners' production of the mini-series without private respondent's consent and over his objection, constitutes an obvious violation of his right of privacy. On 24 February 1988, the trial court issued ex-parte a Temporary Restraining Order and set for hearing the application for preliminary injunction. On 9 March 1988, Hal McElroy flied a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Petition for Preliminary Injunction contending that the mini-series fim would not involve the private life of Juan Ponce Enrile nor that of his family and that a preliminary injunction would amount to a prior restraint on their right of free expression. Petitioner Ayer Productions also filed its own Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of cause of action as the mini-series had not yet been completed. In an Order 2 dated 16 March 1988, respondent court issued a writ of Preliminary Injunction against the petitioners, the dispositive portion of which reads thus: WHEREFORE, let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued, ordering defendants, and all persons and entities employed or under contract with them, including actors, actresses and members of the production staff and crew as well as all persons and entities acting on defendants' behalf, to cease and desist from producing and filming the mini-series entitled 'The Four Day Revolution" and from making any reference whatsoever to plaintiff or his family and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which nevertheless is based on, or bears rent substantial or marked resemblance or similarity to, or is otherwise Identifiable with, plaintiff in the production and any similar film or photoplay, until further orders from this Court, upon plaintiff's filing of a bond in the amount of P 2,000,000.00, to answer for whatever damages defendants may suffer by reason of the injunction if the Court should finally decide that plaintiff was not entitled thereto. xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied) On 22 March 1988, petitioner Ayer Productions came to this Court by a Petition for certiorari dated 21 March 1988 with an urgent prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order, which petition was docketed as G.R. No. L-82380. A day later, or on 23 March 1988, petitiioner Hal McElroy also filed separate Petition for certiorari with Urgent Prayer for a Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction, dated 22 March 1988, docketed as G.R. No. L-82398. By a Resolution dated 24 March 1988, the petitions were consolidated and private respondent was required to file a consolidated Answer. Further, in the same Resolution, the Court granted a Temporary Restraining Order partially enjoining the implementation of the respondent Judge's Order of 16 March 1988 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued therein, and allowing the petitioners

to resume producing and filming those portions of the projected mini-series which do not make any reference to private respondent or his family or to any fictitious character based on or respondent. Private respondent seasonably filed his Consolidated Answer on 6 April 1988 invoking in the main a right of privacy. I The constitutional and legal issues raised by the present Petitions are sharply drawn. Petitioners' claim that in producing and "The Four Day Revolution," they are exercising their freedom of speech and of expression protected under our Constitution. Private respondent, upon the other hand, asserts a right of privacy and claims that the production and filming of the projected mini-series would constitute an unlawful intrusion into his privacy which he is entitled to enjoy. Considering first petitioners' claim to freedom of speech and of expression the Court would once more stress that this freedom includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and to exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television. In our day and age, motion pictures are a univesally utilized vehicle of communication and medium Of expression. Along with the press, radio and television, motion pictures constitute a principal medium of mass communication for information, education and entertainment. In Gonzales v. Katigbak,3 former Chief Justice Fernando, speaking for the Court, explained:
1. Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of Ideas and the expression of the artistic impulse. Their effect on the perception by our people of issues and public officials or public figures as well as the pre cultural traits is considerable. Nor as pointed out in Burstyn v. Wilson (343 US 495 [19421) is the Importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform' (Ibid, 501). There is no clear dividing line between what involves knowledge and what affords pleasure. If such a distinction were sustained, there is a diminution of the basic right to free expression. ... 4

This freedom is available in our country both to locally-owned and to foreign-owned motion picture companies. Furthermore the circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression. In our community as in many other countries, media facilities are owned either by the government or the private sector but the private sector-owned media facilities commonly require to be sustained by being devoted in whole or in pailt to revenue producing activities. Indeed, commercial media constitute the bulk of such facilities available in our country and hence to exclude commercially owned and operated media from the exerciseof constitutionally protected om of speech and of expression can only result in the drastic contraction of such constitutional liberties in our country. The counter-balancing of private respondent is to a right of privacy. It was demonstrated sometime ago by the then Dean Irene R. Cortes that our law, constitutional and statutory, does include a right of privacy. 5 It is left to case law, however, to mark out the precise scope and content of this right in differing types of particular situations. The right of privacy or "the right to be let alone," 6 like the right of free expression, is not an absolute right. A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute of apublic character. 7Succinctly put, the right of privacy cannot be invoked resist publication and dissemination of matters of public interest. 8 The interest sought to be protected by the right of privacy is the right to be free

from unwarrantedpublicity, from the wrongful publicizing of the private affairs and activities of an individual which are outside the realm of legitimate public concern. 9 Lagunzad v. Vda. de Gonzales, 10 on which private respondent relies heavily, recognized a right to privacy in a context which included a claim to freedom of speech and of expression. Lagunzad involved a suit fortion picture producer as licensee and the widow and family of the late Moises Padilla as licensors. This agreement gave the licensee the right to produce a motion Picture Portraying the life of Moises Padilla, a mayoralty candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the Municipality of Magallon, Negros Occidental during the November 1951 elections and for whose murder, Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of the Liberal Party then in power and his men were tried and convicted. 11 In the judgment of the lower court enforcing the licensing agreement against the licensee who had produced the motion picture and exhibited it but refused to pay the stipulated royalties, the Court, through Justice Melencio-Herrera, said: Neither do we agree with petitioner's subon that the Licensing Agreement is null and void for lack of, or for having an illegal cause or consideration, while it is true that petitioner bad pled the rights to the book entitled "The Moises Padilla Story," that did not dispense with the need for prior consent and authority from the deceased heirs to portray publicly episodes in said deceased's life and in that of his mother and the member of his family. As held in Schuyler v. Curtis, ([1895],147 NY 434,42 NE 31 LRA 286.49 Am St Rep 671), 'a privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a deperson to protect his memory, but the privilege wts for the benefit of the living, to protect their feelings and to preventa violation of their own rights in the character and memory of the deceased.'
Petitioners averment that private respondent did not have any property right over the life of Moises Padilla since the latter was a public figure, is neither well taken. Being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto a person's right to privacy. The right to invade a person's privacy to disseminate public information does not extend to a fictional or novelized representation of a person, no matter how public a he or she may be (Garner v. Triangle Publications, DCNY 97 F. Supp., SU 549 [1951]). In the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-to-life Story Of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little romance in the film because without it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality. 12

In Lagunzad, the Court had need, as we have in the instant case, to deal with contraposed claims to freedom of speech and of expression and to privacy. Lagunzad the licensee in effect claimed, in the name of freedom of speech and expression, a right to produce a motion picture biography at least partly "fictionalized" of Moises Padilla without the consent of and without paying pre-agreed royalties to the widow and family of Padilla. In rejecting the licensee's claim, the Court said: Lastly, neither do we find merit in petitioners contention that the Licensing Agreement infringes on the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press, in that, as a citizen and as a newspaperman, he had the right to express his thoughts in film on the public life of Moises Padilla without prior restraint.The right freedom of expression, indeed, occupies a preferred position in the "hierarchy of civil liberties" (Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 191 [1963]). It is not, however, without limitations. As held in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA 835, 858 [1960]: xxx xxx xxx

The prevailing doctine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the "balancing of interest test" (Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando on the Bill of Rights, 1970 ed. p. 79). The principle "requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in given situation or type of situation" (Separation Opinion of the late Chief Justice Castro in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, supra, p. 899).
In the case at bar, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by respondent and the right of freedom of expression invoked by petitioner . taking into account the interplay of those interests, we hold thatunder the particular circumstances presented, and considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern." 13

Whether the "balancing of interests test" or the clear and present danger test" be applied in respect of the instant Petitions, the Court believes that a different conclusion must here be reached: The production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture "The Four Day Revolution" does not, in the circumstances of this case, constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent's "right of privacy." 1. It may be observed at the outset that what is involved in the instant case is a prior and direct restraint on the part of the respondent Judge upon the exercise of speech and of expression by petitioners. The respondent Judge has restrained petitioners from filming and producing the entire proposed motion picture. It is important to note that in Lagunzad, there was no prior restrain of any kind imposed upon the movie producer who in fact completed and exhibited the film biography of Moises Padilla. Because of the speech and of expression, a weighty presumption of invalidity vitiates. 14 The invalidity of a measure of prior restraint doesnot, of course, mean that no subsequent liability may lawfully be imposed upon a person claiming to exercise such constitutional freedoms. The respondent Judge should have stayed his hand, instead of issuing an ex-parte Temporary Restraining Order one day after filing of a complaint by the private respondent and issuing a Preliminary Injunction twenty (20) days later; for the projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look like. There was, in other words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy that private respondent could lawfully assert. 2. The subject matter of "The Four Day Revolution" relates to the non-bloody change of government that took place at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in February 1986, and the trian of events which led up to that denouement. Clearly, such subject matter is one of public interest and concern. Indeed, it is, petitioners' argue, of international interest. The subject thus relates to a highly critical stage in the history of this countryand as such, must be regarded as having passed into the public domain and as an appropriate subject for speech and expression and coverage by any form of mass media. The subject mater, as set out in the synopsis provided by the petitioners and quoted above, does not relate to the individual life and certainly not to the private life of private respondent Ponce Enrile. Unlike in Lagunzad, which concerned the life story of Moises Padilla necessarily including at least his immediate family, what we have here is not a film biography, more or less fictionalized, of private respondent Ponce Enrile. "The Four Day Revolution" is not principally about, nor is it focused upon, the man Juan Ponce Enrile' but it is compelled, if it is to be historical, to refer to the role played by Juan Ponce Enrile in the precipitating and the constituent events of the change of government in February 1986.

3. The extent of the instrusion upon the life of private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile that would be entailed by the production and exhibition of "The Four Day Revolution" would, therefore, be limited in character. The extent of that intrusion, as this Court understands the synopsis of the proposed film, may be generally described as such intrusion as is reasonably necessary to keep that film a truthful historical account. Private respondent does not claim that petitioners threatened to depict in "The Four Day Revolution" any part of the private life of private respondent or that of any member of his family. 4. At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking place, private respondent was what Profs. Prosser and Keeton have referred to as a "public figure:" A public figure has been defined as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has become a 'public personage.' He is, in other words, a celebrity. Obviously to be included in this category are those who have achieved some degree of reputation by appearing before the public, as in the case of an actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other entertainment. The list is, however, broader than this. It includes public officers, famous inventors and explorers, war heroes and even ordinary soldiers, an infant prodigy, and no less a personage than the Grand Exalted Ruler of a lodge. It includes, in short, anyone who has arrived at a position where public attention is focused upon him as a person. Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least, their tight to privacy. Three reasons were given, more or less indiscrimately, in the decisions" that they had sought publicity and consented to it, and so could not complaint when they received it; that their personalities and their affairs has already public, and could no longer be regarded as their own private business; and that the press had a privilege, under the Constitution, to inform the public about those who have become legitimate matters of public interest. On one or another of these grounds, and sometimes all, it was held that there was no liability when they were given additional publicity, as to matters legitimately within the scope of the public interest they had aroused. The privilege of giving publicity to news, and other matters of public interest, was held to arise out of the desire and the right of the public to know what is going on in the world, and the freedom of the press and other agencies of information to tell it. "News" includes all events and items of information which are out of the ordinary hum-drum routine, and which have 'that indefinable quality of information which arouses public attention.' To a very great extent the press, with its experience or instinct as to what its readers will want, has succeeded in making its own definination of news, as a glance at any morning newspaper will sufficiently indicate. It includes homicide and othe crimes, arrests and police raides, suicides, marriages and divorces, accidents, a death from the use of narcotics, a woman with a rare disease, the birth of a child to a twelve year old girl, the reappearance of one supposed to have been murdered years ago, and undoubtedly many other similar matters of genuine, if more or less deplorable, popular appeal.
The privilege of enlightening the public was not, however, limited, to the dissemination of news in the scene of current events. It extended also to information or education, or even entertainment and amusement, by books, articles, pictures, films and broadcasts concerning interesting phases of human activity in general, as well as the reproduction of the public scene in newsreels and travelogues. In determining where to draw the line, the

courts were invited to exercise a species of censorship over what the public may be permitted to read; and they were understandably liberal in allowing the benefit of the doubt. 15

Private respondent is a "public figure" precisely because, inter alia, of his participation as a principal actor in the culminating events of the change of government in February 1986. Because his participation therein was major in character, a film reenactment of the peaceful revolution that fails to make reference to the role played by private respondent would be grossly unhistorical. The right of privacy of a "public figure" is necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizen. Private respondent has not retired into the seclusion of simple private citizenship. he continues to be a "public figure." After a successful political campaign during which his participation in the EDSA Revolution was directly or indirectly referred to in the press, radio and television, he sits in a very public place, the Senate of the Philippines. 5. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events. There must, in other words, be no knowing or reckless disregard of truth in depicting the participation of private respondent in the EDSA Revolution. 16 There must, further, be no presentation of the private life of the unwilling private respondent and certainly no revelation of intimate or embarrassing personal facts. 17 The proposed motion picture should not enter into what Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera in Lagunzad referred to as "matters of essentially private concern." 18 To the extent that "The Four Day Revolution" limits itself in portraying the participation of private respondent in the EDSA Revolution to those events which are directly and reasonably related to the public facts of the EDSA Revolution, the intrusion into private respondent's privacy cannot be regarded as unreasonable and actionable. Such portrayal may be carried out even without a license from private respondent. II In a Manifestation dated 30 March 1988, petitioner Hal McElroy informed this Court that a Temporary Restraining Order dated 25 March 1988, was issued by Judge Teofilo Guadiz of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 147, in Civil Case No. 88-413, entitled "Gregorio B. Honasan vs. Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd., McElroy Film Productions, Hal McElroy, Lope Juban and PMP Motion for Pictures Production" enjoining him and his production company from further filimg any scene of the projected mini-series film. Petitioner alleged that Honasan's complaint was a "scissors and paste" pleading, cut out straight grom the complaint of private respondent Ponce Enrile in Civil Case No. 88-151. Petitioner Ayer Productions, in a separate Manifestation dated 4 April 1988, brought to the attention of the Court the same information given by petitoner Hal McElroy, reiterating that the complaint of Gregorio B. Honasan was substantially identical to that filed by private respondent herein and stating that in refusing to join Honasan in Civil Case No. 88-151, counsel for private respondent, with whom counsel for Gregorio Honasan are apparently associated, deliberately engaged in "forum shopping." Private respondent filed a Counter-Manifestation on 13 April 1988 stating that the "slight similarity" between private respondent's complaint and that on Honasan in the construction of their legal basis of the right to privacy as a component of the cause of action is understandable considering that court pleadings are public records; that private respondent's cause of action for invasion of privacy is separate and distinct from that of Honasan's although they arose from the same tortious act of petitioners' that the rule on permissive joinder of parties is not mandatory and that, the cited cases on "forum shopping" were not in point because the parties here and those in Civil Case No. 88-413 are not identical.

For reasons that by now have become clear, it is not necessary for the Court to deal with the question of whether or not the lawyers of private respondent Ponce Enrile have engaged in "forum shopping." It is, however, important to dispose to the complaint filed by former Colonel Honasan who, having refused to subject himself to the legal processes of the Republic and having become once again in fugitive from justice, must be deemed to have forfeited any right the might have had to protect his privacy through court processes. WHEREFORE, a) the Petitions for Certiorari are GRANTED DUE COURSE, and the Order dated 16 March 1988 of respondent trial court granting a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby SET ASIDE. The limited Temporary Restraining Order granted by this Court on 24 March 1988 is hereby MODIFIED by enjoining unqualifiedly the implementation of respondent Judge's Order of 16 March 1988 and made PERMANENT, and b) Treating the Manifestations of petitioners dated 30 March 1988 and 4 April 1988 as separate Petitions for Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order, the Court, in the exercise of its plenary and supervisory jurisdiction, hereby REQUIRES Judge Teofilo Guadiz of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 147, forthwith to DISMISS Civil Case No. 88-413 and accordingly to SET ASIDE and DISSOLVE his Temporary Restraining Order dated 25 March 1988 and any Preliminary Injunction that may have been issued by him. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Yap, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Footnotes 1 On April 7, 1988, petitioners, in G.R. No. 82380 asked for deletion Production's as party petitioner qqqt company but merely a corporate tradename used by Ayer Productions. "McElroy and McElroy Film Production's" will therefore be disregarded in this Decision. 2 Annex "A" of the Petitions. 3 137 SCRA 717 (1985). 4 137 SCRA at 723. 5 The Constitutional Foundations of Privacy," in Cortes, Emerging Trends in Law, pp.1-70 (Univ. of the Philippines Press, 1983). This lecture was originally delivered in 1970. 6 See Cortes, supra, Note 5 at 12 et seq. where she traces the history of the development of privacy as a concept

7 Prosser and Keeton on Torts, 5th ed., pp. 854-863 (1984); and see, e.g., Strykers v. Republic Producers Corp., 238 P. 2d 670 (1952). 8 Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 63 L Ed. 2d 867 (1977). 9 Smith v. National Broadcasting Co., 292 P 2d 600 (1956); underscoring supplied. 10 92 SCRA 476 (1979). 11 People v. Lacson, et al., 111 Phil. 1 (1961). 12 92 SCRA 486-487. 13 92 SCRA at 488-489; Emphasis supplied. 14 Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, 36 SCRA 228 (1970); New York Items Co. v. United States,403 U.S. 713, 29 L Ed, 2d 822 (1971); Times Film Corporation v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 5 L Ed. 2d 403 (1961); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 67 L Ed. 1357 (1931). 15 Prosper and Keeton on Torts, 5th ed. at 859-861 (1984); underscoring supplied

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 177271 May 4, 2007

BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT OR BA-RA 7941, represented by MR. AMEURFINO E. CINCO, Chairman, AND URBAN POOR FOR LEGAL REFORMS (UP-LR), represented by MRS. MYRNA P. PORCARE, Secretary-General, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BIYAHENG PINOY, KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKAKULONG NA WALANG SALA (KAKUSA), BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), AHON PINOY, AGRICULTURAL SECTOR ALLIANCE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (AGAP), PUWERSA NG BAYANING ATLETA (PBA), ALYANSA NG MGA GRUPONG HALIGI NG AGHAM AT TEKNOLOHIYA PARA SA MAMAMAYAN, INC. (AGHAM), BABAE PARA SA KAUNLARAN (BABAE KA), AKSYON SAMBAYANAN (AKSA), ALAY SA BAYAN NG MALAYANG PROPESYUNAL AT REPORMANG KALAKAL (ABAY-PARAK), AGBIAG TIMPUYOG ILOCANO, INC. (AGBIAG!), ABANTE ILONGGO, INC. (ABA ILONGGO), AANGAT TAYO (AT), AANGAT ANG KABUHAYAN (ANAK), BAGO NATIONAL CULTURAL SOCIETY OF THE PHILIPPINES (BAGO), ANGAT ANTAS-KABUHAYAN PILIPINO MOVEMENT (AANGAT KA PILIPINO), ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONAL (ABS), ASSOSASYON NG MGA MALILIIT NA NEGOSYANTENG GUMAGANAP INC. (AMANG), SULONG BARANGAY MOVEMENT, KASOSYO PRODUCERS CONSUMER EXCHANGE ASSOCIATION, INC. (KASOSYO), UNITED MOVEMENT AGAINST DRUGS (UNI-MAD), PARENTS ENABLING PARENTS (PEP), ALLIANCE OF NEO-CONSERVATIVES (ANC), FILIPINOS FOR PEACE, JUSTICE AND PROGRESS MOVEMENT (FPJPM), BIGKIS PINOY MOVEMENT (BIGKIS), 1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UNTAK), ALLIANCE FOR BARANGAY CONCERNS (ABC), BIYAYANG BUKID, INC., ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD), AKBAY PINOY OFW-NATIONAL INC., (APOI), ALLIANCE TRANSPORT SECTOR (ATS), KALAHI SECTORAL PARTY (ADVOCATES FOR OVERSEAS FILIPINO) AND ASSOCIATION OF ADMINISTRATORS, PROFESSIONALS AND SENIORS (AAPS), Respondents. x--------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 177314 May 4, 2007

REP. LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION, BANTAY KATARUNGAN FOUNDATION,Petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. DECISION GARCIA, J.: Before the Court are these two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which have manifested their intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.

In the first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 177271, petitioners Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941, for short) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR, for short) assail the various Comelec resolutions accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list elections on May 14, 2007 without simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees possess the requisite qualifications defined in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, or the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to represent. In the second, docketed as G.R. No. 177314, petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution 07-0724 dated April 3, 2007 effectively denying their request for the release or disclosure of the names of the nominees of the fourteen (14) accredited participating party-list groups mentioned in petitioner Rosales previous letter-request. While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions,1 the petitioners in G.R. No. 177271 have the following additional prayers: 1) that the 33 private respondents named therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the party-list elections as sectoral organizations, parties or coalition for failure to comply with the guidelines prescribed by the [Court] in [Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec2]" and, 2) correspondingly, that the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups from participating in the May 2007 elections. In separate resolutions both dated April 24, 2007, the Court en banc required the public and private respondents to file their respective comments on the petitions within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from notice. Apart from respondent Comelec, seven (7) private respondents3 in G.R. No. 177271 and one party-list group4mentioned in G.R. No. 177314 submitted their separate comments. In the main, the separate comments of the private respondents focused on the untenability and prematurity of the plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR to nullify their accreditation as party-list groups and thus disqualify them and their respective nominees from participating in the May 14, 2007 party-list elections. The facts: On January 12, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 7804 prescribing rules and regulations to govern the filing of manifestation of intent to participate and submission of names of nominees under the party-list system of representation in connection with the May 14, 2007 elections. Pursuant thereto, a number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations. Among these and ostensibly subsequently accredited by the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections - are 14 party-list groups, namely: (1) BABAE KA; (2) ANG KASANGGA; (3)AKBAY PINOY; (4) AKSA; (5) KAKUSA; (6) AHON PINOY; (7) OFW PARTY; (8) BIYAHENG PINOY; (9) ANAD; (10) AANGAT ANG KABUHAYAN; (11) AGBIAG; (12) BANAT; (13) BANTAY LIPAD; (14) AGING PINOY. Petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR presented a longer, albeit an overlapping, list. Subsequent events saw BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR filing with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify, thereunder seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations. Both petitioners appear not to have the names of the nominees sought to be disqualified since they still asked for a copy of the list of nominees. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent petition has yet to be resolved. Meanwhile, reacting to the emerging public perception that the individuals behind the aforementioned 14 party-list groups do not, as they should, actually represent the poor and marginalized sectors, petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed a letter5 dated March 29, 2007 to Director Alioden Dalaig of the Comelecs Law Department requesting a list of that groups

nominees. Another letter6 of the same tenor dated March 31, 2007 followed, this time petitioner Rosales impressing upon Atty. Dalaig the particular urgency of the subject request. Neither the Comelec Proper nor its Law Department officially responded to petitioner Rosales requests. The April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, however, carried the front-page banner headline "COMELEC WONT BARE PARTY-LIST NOMINEES",7 with the following sub-heading: "Abalos says party-list polls not personality oriented." On April 16, 2007, Atty. Emilio Capulong, Jr. and ex-Senator Jovito R. Salonga, in their own behalves and as counsels of petitioner Rosales, forwarded a letter8 to the Comelec formally requesting action and definitive decision on Rosales earlier plea for information regarding the names of several party-list nominees. Invoking their constitutionally-guaranteed right to information, Messrs. Capulong and Salonga at the same time drew attention to the banner headline adverted to earlier, with a request for the Comelec, "collectively or individually, to issue a formal clarification, either confirming or denying the banner headline and the alleged statement of Chairman Benjamin Abalos, Sr. xxx" Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en bancResolution 07-07249 under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales basic disclosure request. In its relevant part, Resolution 07-0724 reads as follows: RESOLVED, moreover, that the Commission will disclose/publicize the names of party-list nominees in connection with the May 14, 2007 Elections only after 3:00 p.m. on election day. Let the Law Department implement this resolution and reply to all letters addressed to the Commission inquiring on the party-list nominees. (Emphasis added.) According to petitioner Rosales, she was able to obtain a copy of the April 3, 2007 Resolution only on April 21, 2007. She would later state the observation that the last part of the "Order empowering the Law Department to implement this resolution and reply to all letters inquiring on the party-list nominees is apparently a fool-proof bureaucratic way to distort and mangle the truth and give the impression that the antedated Resolution of April 3, 2007 is the final answer to the two formal requests of Petitioners".10 The herein consolidated petitions are cast against the foregoing factual setting, albeit petitioners BARA 7941 and UP-LR appear not to be aware, when they filed their petition on April 18, 2007, of the April 3, 2007 Comelec Resolution 07-0724. To start off, petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR would have the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the respondent party-list groups named in their petition on the ground that these groups and their respective nominees do not appear to be qualified. In the words of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR, Comelec xxx committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted the assailed accreditations even withoutsimultaneously determining whether the nominees of herein private respondents are qualified or not, or whether or not the nominees are likewise belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they claim to represent in Congress, in accordance with No. 7 of the eightpoint guidelines prescribed by the Honorable Supreme in the Ang Bagong Bayani11 case which states that, "not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees." In the case of private respondents, public respondent Comelec granted accreditations without the required simultaneous determination of the qualification of the nominees as part of the accreditation process of the party-list organization itself. (Words in bracket added; italization in the original)12

The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for cancellation of accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. For, such course of action would entail going over and evaluating the qualities of the sectoral groups or parties in question, particularly whether or not they indeed represent marginalized/underrepresented groups. The exercise would require the Court to make a factual determination, a matter which is outside the office of judicial review by way of special civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not called upon to decide factual issues and the case must be decided on the undisputed facts on record.13 The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does not include a review of the tribunals evaluation of the evidence.14 Not lost on the Court of course is the pendency before the Comelec of SPA Case No. 07-026 in which petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR themselves seek to disqualify the nominees of the respondent party-list groups named in their petition. Petitioners BA-RA 7941s and UP-LRs posture that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted the assailed accreditations without simultaneously determining the qualifications of their nominees is without basis. Nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the qualification of a party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an organization. And as aptly pointed out by private respondent Babae Para sa Kaunlaran (Babae Ka), Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941 requires a petition for registration of a party-list organization to be filed with the Comelec "not later than ninety (90) days before the election" whereas the succeeding Section 8 requires the submission "not later than forty-five (45) days before the election" of the list of names whence party-list representatives shall be chosen. Now to the other but core issues of the case. The petition in G.R. No. 177314 formulates and captures the main issues tendered by the petitioners in these consolidated cases and they may be summarized as follows: 1. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the Constitution; and 2. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public the names of said nominees. While the Comelec did not explicitly say so, it based its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of subject party-list groups on Section 7 of R.A. 7941. This provision, while commanding the publication and the posting in polling places of a certified list of party-list system participating groups, nonetheless tells the Comelec not to show or include the names of the party-list nominees in said certified list. Thus: SEC. 7. Certified List of Registered Parties.- The COMELEC shall, not later than sixty (60) days before election, prepare a certified list of national, regional, or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions which have applied or who have manifested their desire to participate under the party-list system and distribute copies thereof to all precincts for posting in the polling places on election day. The names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list. (Emphasis added.) And doubtless part of Comelecs reason for keeping the names of the party list nominees away from the public is deducible from the following excerpts of the news report appearing in the adverted April 13, 2007 issue of theManila Bulletin:

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) firmed up yesterday its decision not to release the names of nominees of sectoral parties, organizations, or coalitions accredited to participate in the party-list election which will be held simultaneously with the May 14 mid-term polls. COMELEC Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. said he and [the other five COMELEC] Commissioners --- believe that the party list elections must not be personality oriented. Abalos said under [R.A.] 7941 , the people are to vote for sectoral parties, organizations, or coalitions, not for their nominees. He said there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec to disclose the names of nominees. xxx (Words in brackets and emphasis added) Insofar as the disclosure issue is concerned, the petitions are impressed with merit. Assayed against the non-disclosure stance of the Comelec and the given rationale therefor is the right to information enshrined in the self-executory15 Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz: Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Complementing and going hand in hand with the right to information is another constitutional provision enunciating the policy of full disclosure and transparency in Government. We refer to Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading: Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise. And for every right of the people recognized as fundamental lies a corresponding duty on the part of those who govern to respect and protect that right. This is the essence of the Bill of Rights in a constitutional regime.16 Without a governments acceptance of the limitations upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties, without an acknowledgment on its part of those duties exacted by the rights pertaining to the citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry. By weight of jurisprudence, any citizen can challenge any attempt to obstruct the exercise of his right to information and may seek its enforcement by mandamus.17 And since every citizen by the simple fact of his citizenship possesses the right to be informed, objections on ground of locus standi are ordinarily unavailing.18 Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion right of access to official records are not absolute. As articulated in Legaspi, supra, the peoples right to know is limited to "matters of public concern" and is further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. Similarly, the policy of full disclosure is confined to transactions involving "public interest" and is subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law. Too, there is also the need of preserving a measure of confidentiality on some matters, such as military, trade, banking and diplomatic secrets or those affecting national security.19

The terms "public concerns" and "public interest" have eluded precise definition. But both terms embrace, to borrow from Legaspi, a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally whet the interest of an ordinary citizen. At the end of the day, it is for the courts to determine, on a case to case basis, whether or not at issue is of interest or importance to the public. If, as in Legaspi, it was the legitimate concern of a citizen to know if certain persons employed as sanitarians of a health department of a city are civil service eligibles, surely the identity of candidates for a lofty elective public office should be a matter of highest public concern and interest. As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the partylist groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies. The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: "[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the Comelec under said Section 7 is limited in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which the same provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to read into the law something that is not intended. As it were, there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the "Certified List" the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec obviously misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007 elections. The interpretation thus given by the Comelec virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941. The Comelecs reasoning that a party-list election is not an election of personalities is valid to a point. It cannot be taken, however, to justify its assailed non-disclosure stance which comes, as it were, with a weighty presumption of invalidity, impinging, as it does, on a fundamental right to information.20 While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives. The Court is very much aware of newspaper reports detailing the purported reasons behind the Comelecs disinclination to release the names of party-list nominees. It is to be stressed, however, that the Court is in the business of dispensing justice on the basis of hard facts and applicable statutory and decisional laws. And lest it be overlooked, the Court always assumes, at the first instance, the presumptive validity and regularity of official acts of government officials and offices. It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their representatives on the basis of an informed judgment. Hence the need for voters to be informed about matters that have a bearing on their choice. The ideal cannot be achieved in a system of blind voting, as veritably advocated in the assailed resolution of the Comelec. The Court, since the 1914 case of Gardiner v. Romulo,21 has consistently made it clear that it frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that would hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election.22 So it must be here for still other reasons articulated earlier. In all, we agree with the petitioners that respondent Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein petitions.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177271 is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the accreditation of the respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the same petition and the petition in G.R. No. 177314 are GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 party-list elections. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court its compliance herewith within five (5) days from notice hereof. This Decision is declared immediately executory upon its receipt by the Comelec. No pronouncement as to cost. SO ORDERED. CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice WE CONCUR: REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice (on leave) MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Asscociate Justice ANTONIO T. CARPIO Asscociate Justice (on leave) RENATO C. CORONA Asscociate Justice ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Asscociate Justice MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Asscociate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Asscociate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

At least nine (9) party-list groups subject of the second petition are respondents in the first petition.
2

G. R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001, 359 SCRA 698. ABS, Babae Ka, PEP, ANC, FPJPM, AAPS, AANGAT ka Pilipino and KALAHI. AKSA. Annex "E," of Petition in G.R. No. 177314. Annex "F," of Petition in G.R. No. 177314. Petition (G.R. 177314), p. 8. Annex "G," of Petition in G.R. No. 177314. Annex " B," of Petition in G.R. No. 177314. Petition in G.R. SP. No.177314, p. 3. Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Part v. Commission on Elections, Supra note 2. Page 5 of the petition in G. R. No. 177271. Pobre v. Gonong, G. R. No. L-60575, March 16, 1987, 148 SCRA 553.

10

11

12

13

14

Sea Power Shipping Enterprises, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 138270, June 28, 2001, 360 SCRA 173; Oro v. Diaz, G.R. No. 140974, July 11, 2001, 361 SCRA 108.
15

Gonzales v. Narvasa, G.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000, 337 SCRA 733.

16

Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, G. R. No. L-72119, May 19, 1987, 150 SCRA 530, citing Cooley.
17

Tanada v. Tuvera, G. R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 27. Bernas, The Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 334.

18

19

Chavez v. PCGG, G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998, 299 SCRA 744. Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, G.R. No. L- 82380, April 29, 1988, 160 SCRA 861. G. R. No. L-8921, January 9, 1914, 26 Phil. 521.

20

21

22

Rodriquez v. Commission on Elections, G. R. No. L-61545, December 27, 1982, 119 SCRA 465.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 177271 May 4, 2007

BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT OR BA-RA 7941, represented by MR. AMEURFINO E. CINCO, Chairman, AND URBAN POOR FOR LEGAL REFORMS (UP-LR), represented by MRS. MYRNA P. PORCARE, Secretary-General, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BIYAHENG PINOY, KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKAKULONG NA WALANG SALA (KAKUSA), BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), AHON PINOY, AGRICULTURAL SECTOR ALLIANCE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (AGAP), PUWERSA NG BAYANING ATLETA (PBA), ALYANSA NG MGA GRUPONG HALIGI NG AGHAM AT TEKNOLOHIYA PARA SA MAMAMAYAN, INC. (AGHAM), BABAE PARA SA KAUNLARAN (BABAE KA), AKSYON SAMBAYANAN (AKSA), ALAY SA BAYAN NG MALAYANG PROPESYUNAL AT REPORMANG KALAKAL (ABAY-PARAK), AGBIAG TIMPUYOG ILOCANO, INC. (AGBIAG!), ABANTE ILONGGO, INC. (ABA ILONGGO), AANGAT TAYO (AT), AANGAT ANG KABUHAYAN (ANAK), BAGO NATIONAL CULTURAL SOCIETY OF THE PHILIPPINES (BAGO), ANGAT ANTAS-KABUHAYAN PILIPINO MOVEMENT (AANGAT KA PILIPINO), ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONAL (ABS), ASSOSASYON NG MGA MALILIIT NA NEGOSYANTENG GUMAGANAP INC. (AMANG), SULONG BARANGAY MOVEMENT, KASOSYO PRODUCERS CONSUMER EXCHANGE ASSOCIATION, INC. (KASOSYO), UNITED MOVEMENT AGAINST DRUGS (UNI-MAD), PARENTS ENABLING PARENTS (PEP), ALLIANCE OF NEO-CONSERVATIVES (ANC), FILIPINOS FOR PEACE, JUSTICE AND PROGRESS MOVEMENT (FPJPM), BIGKIS PINOY MOVEMENT (BIGKIS), 1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UNTAK), ALLIANCE FOR BARANGAY CONCERNS (ABC), BIYAYANG BUKID, INC., ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD), AKBAY PINOY OFW-NATIONAL INC., (APOI), ALLIANCE TRANSPORT SECTOR (ATS), KALAHI SECTORAL PARTY (ADVOCATES FOR OVERSEAS FILIPINO) AND ASSOCIATION OF ADMINISTRATORS, PROFESSIONALS AND SENIORS (AAPS), Respondents. x--------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 177314 May 4, 2007

REP. LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION, BANTAY KATARUNGAN FOUNDATION,Petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. DECISION GARCIA, J.: Before the Court are these two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which have manifested their intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.

In the first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 177271, petitioners Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941, for short) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR, for short) assail the various Comelec resolutions accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list elections on May 14, 2007 without simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees possess the requisite qualifications defined in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, or the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to represent. In the second, docketed as G.R. No. 177314, petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution 07-0724 dated April 3, 2007 effectively denying their request for the release or disclosure of the names of the nominees of the fourteen (14) accredited participating party-list groups mentioned in petitioner Rosales previous letter-request. While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions,1 the petitioners in G.R. No. 177271 have the following additional prayers: 1) that the 33 private respondents named therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the party-list elections as sectoral organizations, parties or coalition for failure to comply with the guidelines prescribed by the [Court] in [Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec2]" and, 2) correspondingly, that the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups from participating in the May 2007 elections. In separate resolutions both dated April 24, 2007, the Court en banc required the public and private respondents to file their respective comments on the petitions within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from notice. Apart from respondent Comelec, seven (7) private respondents3 in G.R. No. 177271 and one party-list group4mentioned in G.R. No. 177314 submitted their separate comments. In the main, the separate comments of the private respondents focused on the untenability and prematurity of the plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR to nullify their accreditation as party-list groups and thus disqualify them and their respective nominees from participating in the May 14, 2007 party-list elections. The facts: On January 12, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 7804 prescribing rules and regulations to govern the filing of manifestation of intent to participate and submission of names of nominees under the party-list system of representation in connection with the May 14, 2007 elections. Pursuant thereto, a number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations. Among these and ostensibly subsequently accredited by the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections - are 14 party-list groups, namely: (1) BABAE KA; (2) ANG KASANGGA; (3)AKBAY PINOY; (4) AKSA; (5) KAKUSA; (6) AHON PINOY; (7) OFW PARTY; (8) BIYAHENG PINOY; (9) ANAD; (10) AANGAT ANG KABUHAYAN; (11) AGBIAG; (12) BANAT; (13) BANTAY LIPAD; (14) AGING PINOY. Petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR presented a longer, albeit an overlapping, list. Subsequent events saw BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR filing with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify, thereunder seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations. Both petitioners appear not to have the names of the nominees sought to be disqualified since they still asked for a copy of the list of nominees. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent petition has yet to be resolved. Meanwhile, reacting to the emerging public perception that the individuals behind the aforementioned 14 party-list groups do not, as they should, actually represent the poor and marginalized sectors, petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed a letter5 dated March 29, 2007 to Director Alioden Dalaig of the Comelecs Law Department requesting a list of that groups

nominees. Another letter6 of the same tenor dated March 31, 2007 followed, this time petitioner Rosales impressing upon Atty. Dalaig the particular urgency of the subject request. Neither the Comelec Proper nor its Law Department officially responded to petitioner Rosales requests. The April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, however, carried the front-page banner headline "COMELEC WONT BARE PARTY-LIST NOMINEES",7 with the following sub-heading: "Abalos says party-list polls not personality oriented." On April 16, 2007, Atty. Emilio Capulong, Jr. and ex-Senator Jovito R. Salonga, in their own behalves and as counsels of petitioner Rosales, forwarded a letter8 to the Comelec formally requesting action and definitive decision on Rosales earlier plea for information regarding the names of several party-list nominees. Invoking their constitutionally-guaranteed right to information, Messrs. Capulong and Salonga at the same time drew attention to the banner headline adverted to earlier, with a request for the Comelec, "collectively or individually, to issue a formal clarification, either confirming or denying the banner headline and the alleged statement of Chairman Benjamin Abalos, Sr. xxx" Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en bancResolution 07-07249 under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales basic disclosure request. In its relevant part, Resolution 07-0724 reads as follows: RESOLVED, moreover, that the Commission will disclose/publicize the names of party-list nominees in connection with the May 14, 2007 Elections only after 3:00 p.m. on election day. Let the Law Department implement this resolution and reply to all letters addressed to the Commission inquiring on the party-list nominees. (Emphasis added.) According to petitioner Rosales, she was able to obtain a copy of the April 3, 2007 Resolution only on April 21, 2007. She would later state the observation that the last part of the "Order empowering the Law Department to implement this resolution and reply to all letters inquiring on the party-list nominees is apparently a fool-proof bureaucratic way to distort and mangle the truth and give the impression that the antedated Resolution of April 3, 2007 is the final answer to the two formal requests of Petitioners".10 The herein consolidated petitions are cast against the foregoing factual setting, albeit petitioners BARA 7941 and UP-LR appear not to be aware, when they filed their petition on April 18, 2007, of the April 3, 2007 Comelec Resolution 07-0724. To start off, petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR would have the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the respondent party-list groups named in their petition on the ground that these groups and their respective nominees do not appear to be qualified. In the words of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR, Comelec xxx committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted the assailed accreditations even withoutsimultaneously determining whether the nominees of herein private respondents are qualified or not, or whether or not the nominees are likewise belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they claim to represent in Congress, in accordance with No. 7 of the eightpoint guidelines prescribed by the Honorable Supreme in the Ang Bagong Bayani11 case which states that, "not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees." In the case of private respondents, public respondent Comelec granted accreditations without the required simultaneous determination of the qualification of the nominees as part of the accreditation process of the party-list organization itself. (Words in bracket added; italization in the original)12

The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for cancellation of accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. For, such course of action would entail going over and evaluating the qualities of the sectoral groups or parties in question, particularly whether or not they indeed represent marginalized/underrepresented groups. The exercise would require the Court to make a factual determination, a matter which is outside the office of judicial review by way of special civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not called upon to decide factual issues and the case must be decided on the undisputed facts on record.13 The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does not include a review of the tribunals evaluation of the evidence.14 Not lost on the Court of course is the pendency before the Comelec of SPA Case No. 07-026 in which petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR themselves seek to disqualify the nominees of the respondent party-list groups named in their petition. Petitioners BA-RA 7941s and UP-LRs posture that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted the assailed accreditations without simultaneously determining the qualifications of their nominees is without basis. Nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the qualification of a party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an organization. And as aptly pointed out by private respondent Babae Para sa Kaunlaran (Babae Ka), Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941 requires a petition for registration of a party-list organization to be filed with the Comelec "not later than ninety (90) days before the election" whereas the succeeding Section 8 requires the submission "not later than forty-five (45) days before the election" of the list of names whence party-list representatives shall be chosen. Now to the other but core issues of the case. The petition in G.R. No. 177314 formulates and captures the main issues tendered by the petitioners in these consolidated cases and they may be summarized as follows: 1. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the Constitution; and 2. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public the names of said nominees. While the Comelec did not explicitly say so, it based its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of subject party-list groups on Section 7 of R.A. 7941. This provision, while commanding the publication and the posting in polling places of a certified list of party-list system participating groups, nonetheless tells the Comelec not to show or include the names of the party-list nominees in said certified list. Thus: SEC. 7. Certified List of Registered Parties.- The COMELEC shall, not later than sixty (60) days before election, prepare a certified list of national, regional, or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions which have applied or who have manifested their desire to participate under the party-list system and distribute copies thereof to all precincts for posting in the polling places on election day. The names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list. (Emphasis added.) And doubtless part of Comelecs reason for keeping the names of the party list nominees away from the public is deducible from the following excerpts of the news report appearing in the adverted April 13, 2007 issue of theManila Bulletin:

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) firmed up yesterday its decision not to release the names of nominees of sectoral parties, organizations, or coalitions accredited to participate in the party-list election which will be held simultaneously with the May 14 mid-term polls. COMELEC Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. said he and [the other five COMELEC] Commissioners --- believe that the party list elections must not be personality oriented. Abalos said under [R.A.] 7941 , the people are to vote for sectoral parties, organizations, or coalitions, not for their nominees. He said there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec to disclose the names of nominees. xxx (Words in brackets and emphasis added) Insofar as the disclosure issue is concerned, the petitions are impressed with merit. Assayed against the non-disclosure stance of the Comelec and the given rationale therefor is the right to information enshrined in the self-executory15 Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz: Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Complementing and going hand in hand with the right to information is another constitutional provision enunciating the policy of full disclosure and transparency in Government. We refer to Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading: Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise. And for every right of the people recognized as fundamental lies a corresponding duty on the part of those who govern to respect and protect that right. This is the essence of the Bill of Rights in a constitutional regime.16 Without a governments acceptance of the limitations upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties, without an acknowledgment on its part of those duties exacted by the rights pertaining to the citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry. By weight of jurisprudence, any citizen can challenge any attempt to obstruct the exercise of his right to information and may seek its enforcement by mandamus.17 And since every citizen by the simple fact of his citizenship possesses the right to be informed, objections on ground of locus standi are ordinarily unavailing.18 Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion right of access to official records are not absolute. As articulated in Legaspi, supra, the peoples right to know is limited to "matters of public concern" and is further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. Similarly, the policy of full disclosure is confined to transactions involving "public interest" and is subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law. Too, there is also the need of preserving a measure of confidentiality on some matters, such as military, trade, banking and diplomatic secrets or those affecting national security.19

The terms "public concerns" and "public interest" have eluded precise definition. But both terms embrace, to borrow from Legaspi, a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally whet the interest of an ordinary citizen. At the end of the day, it is for the courts to determine, on a case to case basis, whether or not at issue is of interest or importance to the public. If, as in Legaspi, it was the legitimate concern of a citizen to know if certain persons employed as sanitarians of a health department of a city are civil service eligibles, surely the identity of candidates for a lofty elective public office should be a matter of highest public concern and interest. As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the partylist groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies. The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: "[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the Comelec under said Section 7 is limited in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which the same provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to read into the law something that is not intended. As it were, there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the "Certified List" the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec obviously misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007 elections. The interpretation thus given by the Comelec virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941. The Comelecs reasoning that a party-list election is not an election of personalities is valid to a point. It cannot be taken, however, to justify its assailed non-disclosure stance which comes, as it were, with a weighty presumption of invalidity, impinging, as it does, on a fundamental right to information.20 While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives. The Court is very much aware of newspaper reports detailing the purported reasons behind the Comelecs disinclination to release the names of party-list nominees. It is to be stressed, however, that the Court is in the business of dispensing justice on the basis of hard facts and applicable statutory and decisional laws. And lest it be overlooked, the Court always assumes, at the first instance, the presumptive validity and regularity of official acts of government officials and offices. It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their representatives on the basis of an informed judgment. Hence the need for voters to be informed about matters that have a bearing on their choice. The ideal cannot be achieved in a system of blind voting, as veritably advocated in the assailed resolution of the Comelec. The Court, since the 1914 case of Gardiner v. Romulo,21 has consistently made it clear that it frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that would hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election.22 So it must be here for still other reasons articulated earlier. In all, we agree with the petitioners that respondent Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein petitions.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177271 is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the accreditation of the respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the same petition and the petition in G.R. No. 177314 are GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 party-list elections. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court its compliance herewith within five (5) days from notice hereof. This Decision is declared immediately executory upon its receipt by the Comelec. No pronouncement as to cost. SO ORDERED. CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice WE CONCUR: REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice (on leave) MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Asscociate Justice ANTONIO T. CARPIO Asscociate Justice (on leave) RENATO C. CORONA Asscociate Justice ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Asscociate Justice MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Asscociate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Asscociate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

At least nine (9) party-list groups subject of the second petition are respondents in the first petition.
2

G. R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001, 359 SCRA 698. ABS, Babae Ka, PEP, ANC, FPJPM, AAPS, AANGAT ka Pilipino and KALAHI. AKSA. Annex "E," of Petition in G.R. No. 177314. Annex "F," of Petition in G.R. No. 177314. Petition (G.R. 177314), p. 8. Annex "G," of Petition in G.R. No. 177314. Annex " B," of Petition in G.R. No. 177314. Petition in G.R. SP. No.177314, p. 3. Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Part v. Commission on Elections, Supra note 2. Page 5 of the petition in G. R. No. 177271. Pobre v. Gonong, G. R. No. L-60575, March 16, 1987, 148 SCRA 553.

10

11

12

13

14

Sea Power Shipping Enterprises, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 138270, June 28, 2001, 360 SCRA 173; Oro v. Diaz, G.R. No. 140974, July 11, 2001, 361 SCRA 108.
15

Gonzales v. Narvasa, G.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000, 337 SCRA 733.

16

Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, G. R. No. L-72119, May 19, 1987, 150 SCRA 530, citing Cooley.
17

Tanada v. Tuvera, G. R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 27. Bernas, The Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 334.

18

19

Chavez v. PCGG, G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998, 299 SCRA 744. Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, G.R. No. L- 82380, April 29, 1988, 160 SCRA 861. G. R. No. L-8921, January 9, 1914, 26 Phil. 521.

20

21

22

Rodriquez v. Commission on Elections, G. R. No. L-61545, December 27, 1982, 119 SCRA 465.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 161265. February 24, 2004]

LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, represented by its Chairman EDGARDO J. ANGARA VS. THE COMMISION ON ELECTIONS and AGAPITO A. AQUINO DECISION
TINGA, J.:

The Bible tells the story of how two women came to King Solomon to decide who among them is the babys true mother. King Solomon, in his legendary wisdom, awarded the baby to the woman who gave up her claim after he threatened to split the baby into two. It is fortunate that the two women did not ask the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to decide the babys fate; otherwise, it would have cut the baby in half. For that is what the COMELEC exactly did in this case. On December 8, 2003, the General Counsel of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), a registered political party, informed the COMELEC by way of Manifestation that only the Party Chairman, Senator Edgardo J. Angara, or his authorized representative may endorse the certificate of candidacy of the partys official candidates. The same Manifestation stated that Sen. Angara had placed the LDP Secretary General, Representative Agapito A. Aquino, on indefinite forced leave. In the meantime, Ambassador Enrique A. Zaldivar was designated Acting Secretary General. The Manifestation concluded with this prayer:

A.

The Honorable Commission recognizes [sic] only those Certificates of Candidacy to which are attached Certificates of Nomination executed by LDP Party Chairman Edgardo J. Angara or by such other officers of the LDP whom he may authorize in writing, and whose written authorizations shall be deposited with the Honorable Commission by the LDP General Counsel. The Honorable Commission declares [sic] as a nullity, denies [sic] due course or cancels [sic] all Certificates of Candidacy not endorsed by LDP Party Chairman Angara or by such other LDP officials as may be authorized by him.

B.

C.

The Honorable Commission takes [sic] note of the designation of Ambassador Enrique Ike A. Zaldivar as Acting Secretary General of the LDP, and for the Honorable Commission to honor and recognize the official acts, to the exclusion of everyone, of Ambassador Zaldivar for and in behalf of the LDP as Secretary General.
[1]

On December 16, 2003, Rep. Aquino filed his Comment, contending that the Party Chairman does not have the authority to impose disciplinary sanctions on the Secretary General. As the Manifestation filed by the LDP General Counsel has no basis, Rep. Aquino asked the COMELEC to disregard the same. On December 17, 2003, the parties agreed to file a joint manifestation pending which the proceedings were deemed suspended. On December 22, 2003, however, only the LDP General Counsel filed an Urgent Manifestation reiterating the contents of the December 8, 2003 Manifestation. The COMELEC also received a Letter from Rep. Aquino stating that the parties were unable to arrive at a joint manifestation. The next day, the LDP General Counsel filed a Second Urgent Manifestation disputing newspaper accounts that Rep. Aquino had suspended Sen. Angara as Party Chairman. On December 26, 2003, the COMELEC issued an Order requiring the parties to file a verified petition. It turned out that, two days before, Sen. Angara had submitted a verified Petition, in essence, reiterating the contents of its previous Manifestations. Attached to the Petition was a Resolution[2] adopted by the LDP National Executive Council, stating:

WHEREAS, on September 25, 2003, the National Executive Council of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) convened and unanimously passed a resolution granting full authority to Party Chairman Edgardo J. Angara to enter, negotiate and conclude a coalition agreement with other like-minded opposition parties, aggrupations and interest groups with the sole purpose of uniting the political opposition and fielding a unity ticket for the May 10, 2004 elections; WHEREAS, on December 3, 2003, the LDP, together with the Puwersa ng Masang Pilipino (PMP) and the Partido Demokratiko ng Pilipinas - LABAN (PDP-LABAN) forged a coalition to form the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP); WHEREAS, the Executive Committee of the KNP subsequently adopted its resolution entitled: Resolution Choosing Mr. Fernando Poe, Jr. as the Standard Bearer of the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 10, 2004 National Elections; ....

WHEREAS, the process of unification of the political opposition and the actions taken in connection therewith by Chairman Angara and by other governing bodies of the LDP required the taking of immediate and forceful action by them to preserve and protect the integrity, credibility, unity and solidarity of the LDP, and ensure the attainment of unification of the political opposition; WHEREAS, such immediate and forceful action include those that have to do with pre-emptive efforts to diffuse the chaos, confusion and disunity projected by the pronouncements and acts of some officers and members to the general membership of the LDP and the electorate, such as the one taken by the Regional Committee for Region VI (Western Visayas) on December 6, 2003; the enforcement of order in the LDP through the voice of a central leadership in command in an otherwise extraordinary and emergency situation, such as the one taken by Party Chairman Angara on December 6, 2003; the filing of the Manifestation with the COMELEC on the matter of the authorized signatories for the nominations and, the adoption of resolutions by the regional committees affirming their trust and confidence in Chairman Angara, and authorizing him to choose the presidential standard bearer for the May 10, 2004 elections; NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, By the National Executive Council, to ratify and confirm the Covenant of National Unity, the Declaration of Unity entered into by Party Chairman Edgardo J. Angara, and all acts and decisions taken by him to enforce and implement the same; RESOLVED, FURTHER, To ratify and confirm all other acts and decisions of Chairman Angara and other governing bodies to preserve the integrity, credibility, unity and solidarity of the LDP; and, RESOLVED, FINALLY, To reiterate the vote of confidence of the National Executive Council in, and support to, the continued efforts of Chairman Angara to unite the political opposition.
[3]

Rep. Aquino filed his Answer to the Petition on December 30, 2003. The COMELEC heard the parties on oral arguments on the same day, after which the case was submitted for resolution. Pending resolution, a Certificate of Nomination of Sen. Panfilo Lacson as LDP candidate for President was filed with the COMELEC. The Certificate of Nomination was signed by Rep. Aquino as LDP Secretary General. On January 6, 2004, the COMELEC came to a decision. The Commission identified the sole issue as who among the [LDP] officers [are] authorized to authenticate before the Commission that the person filing the certificate of

candidacy as party nominee for a certain position is the official candidate of the party chosen in accordance with its Constitution.[4] The COMELEC recognized that it has the authority to act on matters pertaining to the ascertainment of the identity of [a] political party and its legitimate officers.[5] In the same breath, however, it held that internal party matters and wranglings [sic] are purely for the party members to settle among themselves and any unsettled controversy should be brought to the proper forum with jurisdiction. The question of who was suspended by whom was thus left for such proper forum to resolve. [6] Noting that the intramurals in the LDP as an internal party matter seems to be irreconcilable for the present when the filing of Certificate of Candidacy and Certificate of Nomination are about to reach the deadline, the COMELEC disposed of the Petition in the following fashion:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED with LEGAL EQUITY for both Petitioner and Oppositor. The candidates for President down to the last Sangguniang Bayan Kagawad nominated and endorsed by LDP Chairman Edgardo J. Angara are recognized by the Commission as official candidates of LDP Angara Wing. The candidates from President down to the last Sangguniang Bayan Kagawad as nominated and endorsed by LDP Secretary General Agapito Butz Aquino are recognized as official candidates of LDP Aquino Wing. Consequently, each faction or Wing is entitled to a representative to any election committee to which it may be entitled as created by the Commission for the May 10, 2004 elections. For the copies of the election returns, the Angara Wing will be entitled to the copies corresponding to odd number of precincts, that is, Precinct Nos. 1, 3, 5, etc., and for the Aquino Wing to the even number of precincts, that is Precinct Nos. 2, 4, 6, etc. This is on the assumption that the LDP or as a party within a registered Political Coalition becomes a recognized and denominated as a Dormant [sic] Minority Party under the Election Laws. The two LDP Wings are further entitled to and be accorded the rights and privileges with corresponding legal obligations under Election Laws.
[7]

Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco, Ralph C. Lantion, Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. concurred in the Resolution authored by Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier. Chair Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr., joined by Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain, submitted dissenting opinions. Sen. Angara thus filed the present petition for Certiorari[8] assailing COMELEC Resolution for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. Thereafter, Rep. Aquino filed his Comment. The Office of the Solicitor General submitted a Manifestation and Motion praying for the granting of the Petition. The COMELEC thus filed a separate Comment to the Petition. the

The COMELEC correctly stated that the ascertainment of the identity of [a] political party and its legitimate officers is a matter that is well within its authority. The source of this authority is no other than the fundamental law itself, which vests upon the COMELEC the power and function to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.[9] In the exercise of such power and in the discharge of such function, the Commission is endowed with ample wherewithal and considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the accomplishment of the great objectives for which it was created to promote free, orderly and honest elections.[10] Thus, in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections which involved the leadership fight in the Liberal Party, [11] this Court held:

that the respondent [COMELEC] has jurisdiction to hear and decide SP Case No. 85-021 [involving a petition to prohibit Eva Estrada Kalaw from usurping or using the title or position of President of the Liberal Party] in view of its powers under Article IX-C, Section 2, of the Constitution to, among others, enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections, decide all questions affecting elections, register and regulate political parties, and insure orderly elections. These powers include the determination of the conflicting claims made in SP Case No. 85-021, which are likely to cause confusion among the electorate if not resolved. Additionally, the COMELEC is mandated by the Election Code to inter alia require candidates to specify their political party affiliation in their certificates of candidacy, allow political parties to appoint watchers, limit the expenditures of each political party, determine whether or not a political party shall retain its registration on the basis of its showing in the preceding elections, etc. These matters include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts and the resolution of such controversies as the one now before it where one party appears to be divided into two wings under separate leaders each claiming to be the president of the entire party. [Emphasis supplied.]
Likewise in Palmares v. Commission on Elections,[12] to which the assailed Resolution made reference and which involved the Nacionalista Party, [13] this Court ruled

that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the issue of leadership in a political party. Under the Constitution, the COMELEC is empowered to register political parties [Sec. 2(5), Article IX-C.] Necessarily, the power to act on behalf of a party and the responsibility for the acts of such political party must be fixed in certain persons acting as its officers. In the exercise of the power to register political parties, the COMELEC must determine who these officers are. Consequently, if there is any controversy as to leadership, the COMELEC may, in a proper case brought before it, resolve the issue incidental to its power to register political parties.

This Court then proceeded to quote from Kalaw, supra. The two cited decisions find support in Sumulong v. Commission on Elections[14] and Sotto v. Commission on Elections,[15]where this Court, in resolving the issue as to who between the factions of a political party was entitled to nominate election inspectors, necessarily settled claims to the partys leadership. Both cases were decided without question on the COMELECs power to determine such claims. In conformity with jurisprudence, this Court did not identify the COMELECs jurisdiction as an issue when this case was heard on oral argument. There is no inconsistency between the above cases on the one hand and this Courts more recent ruling in Sinaca v. Mula[16] on the other. In the latter case, this Court held:

A political party has the right to identify the people who constitute the association and to select a standard bearer who best represents the partys ideologies and preference. Political parties are generally free to conduct their internal affairs free from judicial supervision; this common-law principle of judicial restraint, rooted in the constitutionally protected right of free association, serves the public interest by allowing the political processes to operate without undue interference. Thus, the rule is that the determination of disputes as to party nominations rests with the party, in the absence of statutes giving the courts [sic] jurisdiction. Quintessentially, where there is no controlling statute or clear legal right involved, the court will not assume jurisdiction to determine factional controversies within a political party, but will leave the matter for determination by the proper tribunals of the party itself or by the electors at the polls. Similarly, in the absence of specific constitutional or legislative regulations defining how nominations are to be made, or prohibiting nominations from being made in certain ways, political parties may handle such affairs, including nominations, in such manner as party rules may establish. [Emphasis supplied.]
Sinaca, unlike previous cases, did not involve the question of party identity or leadership; hence, it was not necessary for the COMELEC to delve therein. None of the candidates involved in that case were claiming to be the political partys sole candidate. In the case at bar, the Party Chairman, purporting to represent the LDP, contends that under the Party Constitution only he or his representative, to the exclusion of the Secretary General, has the authority to endorse and sign party nominations. The Secretary General vigorously disputes this claim and maintains his own authority. Clearly, the question of party identity or leadership has to be resolved if the COMELEC is to ascertain whether the candidates are legitimate party standard bearers or not. The repercussions of the question of party identity and leadership do not end at the validity of the endorsement of the certificates of candidacy of persons claiming to be the

partys standard bearer. The law grants a registered political party certain rights and privileges,[17] which, naturally, redound to the benefit of its candidates. It is also for this significant dimension that Sinaca is not applicable in this case. As conceded in Sinaca itself, the Court will have to assume jurisdiction to determine factional controversies within a political party where a controlling statute or clear legal right is involved.[18] Verily, there is more than one law, as well as a number of clear legal rights, that are at stake in the case at bar. The law accords special treatment to political parties. The dominant majority party, the dominant minority party as determined by the COMELEC, for instance, is entitled to a copy of the election returns.[19] The six (6) accredited major political parties may nominate the principal watchers to be designated by the Commission. [20] The two principal watchers representing the ruling coalition and the dominant opposition coalition in a precinct shall, if available, affix their signatures and thumbmarks on the election returns for that precinct.[21] Three (3) of the six accredited major political parties are entitled to receive copies of the certificate of canvass.[22]Registered political parties whose candidates obtained at least ten percent (10%) of the total votes cast in the next preceding senatorial election shall each have a watcher and/or representative in the procurement and watermarking of papers to be used in the printing of election returns and official ballots and in the printing, numbering, storage, and distribution thereof.[23] Finally, a candidate and his political party are authorized to spend more per voter than a candidate without a political party.[24] It is, therefore, in the interest of every political party not to allow persons it had not chosen to hold themselves out as representatives of the party. Corollary to the right of a political party to identify the people who constitute the association and to select a standard bearer who best represents the partys ideologies and preference[25] is the right to exclude persons in its association and to not lend its name and prestige to those which it deems undeserving to represent its ideals. A certificate of candidacy makes known to the COMELEC that the person therein mentioned has been nominated by a duly authorized political group empowered to act and that it reflects accurately the sentiment of the nominating body.[26] A candidates political party affiliation is also printed followed by his or her name in the certified list of candidates. [27] A candidate misrepresenting himself or herself to be a partys candidate, therefore, not only misappropriates the partys name and prestige but foists a deception upon t he electorate, who may unwittingly cast its ballot for him or her on the mistaken belief that he or she stands for the partys principles. To prevent this occurrence, the COMELEC has the power and the duty to step in and enforce the law not only to protect the party but, more importantly, the electorate, in line with the Commissions broad constitutional mandate to ensure orderly elections. Having revisited and clarified the jurisdiction of COMELEC to rule upon questions of party identity and leadership as an incident to its enforcement powers, this Court cannot help but be baffled by the COMELECs ruling declining to inquire into which party officer has the authority to sign and endorse certificates of candidacy of the partys nominees. The only issue in this case, as defined by the COMELEC itself, is who as between the Party Chairman and the Secretary General has the authority to sign certificates of

candidacy of the official candidates of the party. Indeed, the petitioners Manifestation andPetition before the COMELEC merely asked the Commission to recognize only those certificates of candidacy signed by petitioner Sen. Angara or his authorized representative, and no other. To resolve this simple issue, the COMELEC need only to turn to the Party Constitution. It need not go so far as to resolve the root of the conflict between the party officials. It need only resolve such questions as may be necessary in the exercise of its enforcement powers. The LDP has a set of national officers composed of, among others, the Party Chairman and the Secretary General.[28] The Party Chairman is the Chief Executive Officer of the Party, whose powers and functions include:

(1)

To represent the Party in all external affairs and concerns, sign documents for and on its behalf, and call the meetings and be the presiding officer of the National Congress and the National Executive Council.
[29]

The Secretary General, on the other hand, assists the Party Chairman in overseeing the day-to-day operations of the Party. Among his powers and functions is:

(1)

When empowered by the Party Chairman, to sign documents for and on behalf of the Party.
[30]

The Secretary Generals authority to sign documents, therefore, is only a delegated power, which originally pertains to the Party Chairman. Rep. Aquino claims that he was authorized to exercise to sign the party candidates certificates of candidacy in the previous elections. Indeed, the COMELEC found that:

In fact, during the May 14, 2001 elections, oppositor Agapito Butz Aquino, as LDP Secretary General, was authorized by the LDP to sign for the Certificates of Nomination of the LDP Senatorial Candidates, including the Certificate of Nomination for Senatorial Candidate Edgardo J. Angara, a copy of said Certificate of Nomination and a copy of the Certificate for Senator Edgardo J. Angara are attached as Annexes A and B, respectively. This action by Secretary General Aquino is in accordance with the Constitution and By-laws of LDP, not questioned by the LDP signed by its Secretary General. This revocation has not been revoked or recalled by the National Congress of the LDP which is the one authorized to nominate candidates for President and Vice-President, respectively.
[31]

Assuming that Rep. Aquino previously had such authority, this Court cannot share the COMELECs finding that the same has not been revoked or recalled. No revocation of such authority can be more explicit than the totality of Sen. Angaras Manifestations andPetition before the COMELEC, through which he informed

the Commission that Rep. Aquinos had been placed on indefinite forced leave and that Ambassador Zaldivar has been designated Acting Secretary General, who shall henceforth exercise all the powers and functions of the Secretary General under the Constitution and By-Laws of the LDP.[32] As the prerogative to empower Rep. Aquino to sign documents devolves upon Sen. Angara, so he may choose, at his discretion, to withhold or revoke such power. Both respondents Rep. Aquino and COMELEC also cited Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6453[33] as basis for the Party Secretary Generals authority to sign certificates of candidacy. Said Section 6 states:

SEC. 6. Certificate of nomination of official candidates by political party. The certificate of nomination of registered political parties or coalitions of political parties of their official candidates shall be filed not later than the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy, which is January 2, 2004 duly signed and attested under oath by the party president, chairman, secretary-general or any other duly authorized officer and shall bear the acceptance of the nominee by affixing his signature in the space provided therein. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied.]
Clearly, however, the above provision presupposes that the party president, chairman or secretary-general has been duly authorized by the party to sign the certificate of candidacy. COMELEC Resolution No. 6453 cannot grant a party official greater authority than what the party itself grants, lest such Resolution amount to a violation of the partys freedom of association. Neither does the Party Secretary General have the power to nominate the official candidates of the LDP. That power resides in the governing bodies of the Party. [34] In particular, the National Congress, which is the highest policy-making and governing body of the Party, has the power

(6)

To nominate the official candidates of the Party for President, Vice President, and Senators, and, whenever the corresponding conventions fail to meet or to make the requisite nominations, to nominate the official candidates for municipal city, congressional district, provincial and regional elective offices.
[35]

Not only does Rep. Aquino insist on his power to sign Certificates of Candidacy on behalf of the LDP but he would also deny Sen. Angara that power on account of the latters preventive suspension. It seems, however, that respondent has abandoned this tack by the silence of his Memorandum on the matter. In any case, it appears that on November 28, 2003, Representative Rolex Suplico, LDP Region VI Regional Chairman, filed a complaint with Rep. Aquino against Party Chairman Sen. Angara for disloyalty to the Party, gross violation of the Party Constitution, and other divisive acts inimical to the interest of the party and its members. Rep. Aquino, as Secretary General, created a committee composed of three

(3) members of the LDP National Executive Council to investigate the complaint and recommend appropriate action thereon. On December 12, 2003, the investigating committee issued a resolution placing Sen. Angara under preventive suspension effective immediately and directing him to refrain from performing acts in behalf of the party until the committee finishes its investigation and submits its final recommendations. The authority to create the investigating committee supposedly rests on Section 9 (4), Article VI of the LDP Constitution, which enumerates the powers and functions of the Secretary General:

(4)

With the concurrence of the Party Chairman, to enforce Party discipline. {Emphasis supplied.]

Evidently, just as Rep. Aquino has no power to sign and nominate candidates in behalf of the LDP, neither does he have the power to enforce Party discipline or, as an incident thereto, to create an investigating committee, without the Party Chairmans concurrence. Much less does the investigating committee so created have the power to place the Party Chairman under preventive suspension since its authority stems from a nullity. Simply put, the spring has no source. The lack of Rep. Aquinos authority to sign documents or to nominate candidates for the LDP would not result in the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the certificates of candidacy he may have signed on behalf of the LDP. [36] The exclusive ground for the denial of due course to or the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy for any elective office is that any material representation contained therein as required by law is false.[37] Since the signature of Rep. Aquino was affixed either prior to, or on the basis of, the challenged Resolution recognizing his authority to sign on behalf of the LDP, the same would not constitute material representation that is false. In such case, the candidates are simply deemed as not nominated by the LDP and are considered independent candidates pursuant to Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6453:

SEC. 7. Effect of filing certificate of nomination. A candidate who has not been nominated by a registered political party or its duly authorized representative, or whose nomination has not been submitted by a registered political party shall be considered as an independent candidate.
COMELEC Commissioner Sadain referred to the above provision in his Dissenting Opinion, and this Court finds refreshing wisdom so sorely wanting in the majority opinion in his suggestion that:

All other party members representing themselves to be candidates of the party shall not be deprived of their right to file their respective certificates of candidacy and run for office, if so qualified, but that they shall not be accorded the rights and privileges reserved by election laws for official nominees of registered political parties. Instead, they shall be treated as independent candidates.
[38]

From the foregoing, it is plain that the COMELEC misapplied equity in the present case. For all its conceded merits, equity is available only in the absence of law and not as its replacement.[39] Equity is described as justice without legality, which simply means that it cannot supplant, although it may, as often happens, supplement the law.[40] The COMELEC should have decided the case on the basis of the party constitution and election laws. It chose not to because of its irrational fear of treading, as respondent Aquino put it, on unchartered territories.[41] But, as shown above, these territories have long been charted by jurisprudence and, in any case, the COMELEC need not have sailed far from the shore to arrive at the correct conclusion. In truth, the COMELEC Resolution is indecision in the guise of equity. Worse, the COMELEC divided the LDP into wings, each of which may nominate candidates for every elective position. Both wings are also entitled to representatives in the election committees that the Commission may create. In the event that the LDP is accorded dominant minority party election status, election returns of odd-numbered precincts shall be furnished the Angara wing and those of even-numbered precincts, the Aquino wing. By creating the two wings, the COMELEC effectively diffused the LDPs strength and undeniably emasculated its chance of obtaining the Commissions nod as the dominant minority party. By allowing each wing to nominate different candidates, the COMELEC planted the seeds of confusion among the electorate, who are apt to be confounded by two candidates from a single political party. In Recabo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,[42] this Court declared that the electoral process envisions one candidate from a political party for each position, and disunity and discord amongst members of a political party should not be allowed to create a mockery thereof. The admonition against mocking the electoral process not only applies to political parties but with greater force to the COMELEC. By according both wings representatives in the election committees, the COMELEC has eroded the significance of political parties and effectively divided the opposition. The COMELEC has lost sight of the unique political situation of the Philippines where, to paraphrase Justice Perfectos concurring opinion in Sotto, supra, the administration party has always been unnecessarily and dangerously too big and the opposition party too small to be an effective check on the administration. The purpose of according dominant status and representation to a minority party is precisely to serve as an effective check on the majority. The COMELEC performed a disservice to the opposition and, ultimately, to the voting public, as its Resolution facilitated, rather than forestalled, the division of the minority party. By splitting copies of the election returns between the two factions, the COMELEC has fractured both wings. The practical purpose of furnishing a party with a copy of the election returns is to allow it to tally the results of the elections at the precinct level. Ultimately, it is a guard against fraud. Thus, resort to copies thereof may be had when the election returns are delayed, lost or destroyed,[43] or when they appear to be tampered or falsified.[44] A split party without a complete set of election returns cannot successfully help preserve the sanctity of the ballot.

It bears reminding respondent Commission of this Courts pronouncement in Peralta v. Commission on Elections,[45] which, while made in the backdrop of a parliamentary form of government, holds equally true under the present government structure:

political parties constitute a basic element of the democratic institutional apparatus. Government derives its strength from the support, active or passive, of a coalition of elements of society. In modern times the political party has become the instrument for the organization of societies. This is predicated on the doctrine that government exists with the consent of the governed. Political parties perform an essential function in the management of succession to power, as well as in the process of obtaining popular consent to the course of public policy. They amass sufficient support to buttress the authority of governments; or, on the contrary, they attract or organize discontent and dissatisfaction sufficient to oust the government. In either case they perform the function of the articulation of the interests and aspirations of a substantial segment of the citizenry, usually in ways contended to be promotive of the national weal.
The assailed COMELEC Resolution does not advance, but subverts, this philosophy behind political parties. As if to rationalize its folly, the COMELEC invokes the constitutional policy towards a free and open party system.[46] This policy, however, envisions a system that shall evolve according to the free choice of the people,[47] not one molded and whittled by the COMELEC. When the Constitution speaks of a multi-party system, it does not contemplate the COMELEC splitting parties into two. For doing just that, this pretender to the throne of King Solomon acted whimsically and capriciously. Certiorari lies against it, indeed. WHEREFORE, the assailed COMELEC Resolution is ANNULLED and the Petition is GRANTED IN PART. Respondent Commission on Elections is directed to recognize as official candidates of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino only those whose Certificates of Candidacy are signed by LDP Party Chairman Senator Edgardo J. Angara or his duly authorized representative/s. SO ORDERED. Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ.,concur. Davide, Jr., C.J., in the result. Puno, J., on leave. Vitug, J., please see separate opinion. Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., please see dissenting opinion. Corona, J., joins the dissenting opinion of J. Gutierrez.

[1]

Rollo, p. 58. Resolution Ratifying and Confirming the Covenant of National Unity, the Declaration of Unity entered into by Party Chairman Edgardo J. Angara, and All Acts and Decisions taken by him to Enforce and Implement the same; Ratifying and Confirming All other Acts and Decisions of Chairman Angara and other Governing Bodies to Preserve the Integrity, Credibility, Unity and Solidarity of the Party; and, further Reiterating the Vote of Confidence of the National Executive Council in, and support to, the continued efforts of Chairman Angara to Unite the Political Opposition. Rollo, pp. 63-65. Id., at 44. Id., at 46. Id., at 43. Id., at 47-48. Emphasis in the original. Sen. Angara was authorized to filed the Petition pursuant to a Resolution of the LDP National Executive Council issued adopted and confirmed on January 8, 2004, and stating: RESOLVED, That Senator Edgardo J. Angara, LDP Party Chairman, be as he is hereby, authorized to sign, verify, and cause the filing with the Supreme Court, of the Petition for Certiorari from the Resolution dated January 6, 2004 of the Commission on Elections in Election Matter No. 03-018 entitled: In Re[:] Certificates of Candidacy of Official Candidates of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino for the May 10, 2004 Elections, Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino, Petitioner. [Rollo, p. 38.]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

CONSTITUTION, art. IX-C, sec. 2 (1). Sanchez v. Commission on Elections, 199 Phil. 617 (1982), citing Cauton v. Comelec, L-25467, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 911 (1967). G.R. No. 80218, November 5, 1987. G.R. Nos. 86177-78, August 31, 1989. Rollo, p. 46, at note 12. 70 Phil. 703 (1940). 76 Phil. 516 (1946). 373 Phil. 896 (1999). OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE, sec. 60. Note 13, supra. Rep. Act No. 7166, sec. 27, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8173. Id., sec. 26. Rep. Act No. 6646, sec. 12. Rep. Act. No. 7166, sec. 29. Rep. Act No. 6646, sec. 8. Rep. Act No. 7166, sec. 13. Sinaca v. Mula, supra. Alialy v. Commission on Elections, L-16165, July 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 957.

[10]

[11]

[12]

[13]

[14]

[15]

[16]

[17]

[18]

[19]

[20]

[21]

[22]

[23]

[24]

[25]

[26]

[27]

Rep. Act. No. 6646, sec. 4. LDP Constitution, art. VI, sec. 1 (1) and (4). Id., sec. 5. Emphasis supplied. Id., sec. 9. Emphasis supplied. Rollo, p. 45. Id., at 57, 85. Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2004 National and Local Elections. The governing bodies of the Party are: (1) the Municipal Committee, (2) the City Committee, (3) the Congressional District Committee, (4) the Provincial Committee, (5) the Regional Committee, for each region, including the National Capital Region and Autonomous Regions, and (6) the National Congress. [LDP Constitution, art. V, sec. 1.] The first four Committees and the Autonomous Region Regional Committee also act as conventions to choose the official candidates of the Party for the elective offices in their corresponding political units. [LDP Constitution, art. V, sec. 3(7), sec. 5 in relation to sec. 3(7), sec. 7 (2), sec. 9 (5) and sec. 13.] LDP Constitution, art. V, sec. 1. See Alialy v. Commission on Elections, supra. OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE, sec. 78. Rollo, p. 50. Tankiko v. Cezar, G.R. No. 131277, 362 Phil. 184 (1999), 302 SCRA 559. Ibid. Comment, p. 20. G.R. No. 134293, June 21, 1999, 308 SCRA 793. Omnibus Election Code, sec. 233. Id., sec. 235. L-47771, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30. Comment, p. 6. CONSTITUTION, art. IX-C, sec. 6.

[28]

[29]

[30]

[31]

[32]

[33]

[34]

[35]

[36]

[37]

[38]

[39]

[40]

[41]

[42]

[43]

[44]

[45]

[46]

[47]

EN BANC

V.C. CADANGEN andALLIANCE OF CIVIL SERVANTS, INC., Petitioners,

G.R. No. 177179

Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, CARPIO, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES,* CHICO-NAZARIO,* VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, and BERSAMIN, JJ. Promulgated:

- versus -

June 5, 2009

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

For resolution is a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed under Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the March 26, 2007 Resolution[1] of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc in SPP Case No. 06-040 (PL). In the questioned resolution, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioners motion for the reconsideration of the February 13, 2007 Resolution[2] of the COMELEC Second Division.

The relevant antecedent facts and proceedings follow.

On September 13, 2006, petitioner Alliance of Civil Servants, Inc. (Civil Servants), represented by its then president, Atty. Sherwin R. Lopez, filed a petition for registration as a sectoral organization under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941[3] or the Party-List System Act. It claimed, among others, that it had been in existence since December 2004 and it sought to represent past and present government employees in the party-list system.[4]

The COMELEC Second Division, on December 11, 2006, issued an Order requiring Civil Servants to file a memorandum that would prove its presence or existence nationwide, track record, financial capability to wage a nationwide campaign, platform of government, officers and membership, and compliance with the provisions of the Party-List System Act and the eight-point guideline laid down by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections.[6]
[5]

Civil Servants consequently filed the required memorandum attaching thereto the following documents: (1) copies of its letters to the respective election directors/officers/registrars of the Cordillera Administrative Region, Second District of Quezon City, and the cities of Iloilo, Cotabato, Urdaneta and Dagupan, informing them of the names and addresses of its members in the said localities; (2) revised list of its members as of November 30, 2006; (3) list of its incorporators with brief descriptions of their credentials, including their designations/appointments in government offices; (4) printed screen shot of the Internet homepage of its on-line forum; (5) summary of its major activities and accomplishments since its inception; (6) financial statement showing its net asset of P399,927.00; (7) platform of government; and (8) list of its current officers with a summary of their credentials.[7]

With its petition for registration pending, Civil Servants also filed on February 8, 2007 a Manifestation[8] of intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections.

On February 13, 2007, however, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution[9] denying Civil Servants petition for registration. We quote the relevant portions of the resolution, thus

Owing its mandate to the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941, the party list system of elections is an important component of the Filipino peoples participation in the legislative process. Members of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors now have a chance to be veritable law makers themselves through their representatives. Given the importance of the role they play in legislation, not all sectors who claim to be representative of the marginalized and underrepresented can be granted the opportunity to participate in the party list elections. Thus, the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Electionsenunciating the eight (8) point (sic) guideline must be complied with by those who seek to participate, x x x.

xxxx

Likewise, R.A. 7941 laid down the definitive sectors covered by the system which include the following: labor, peasant, fisher folk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers and professionals.

Thus, in determining whether or not a party can participate in the party list elections, the Commission (Second Division) is not only bound to verify the veracity of every petition, but also to see to it that members of these organizations belong to the marginalized and the underrepresented. Also put to test here is every petitioners capacity to represent and voice out the sentiments and needs of the sector it represents. The eight-point guideline also requires that the party or organization seeking registration should lack a well-defined political constituency but could, nonetheless, contribute to the formulation of appropriate legislation to benefit the nation as a whole. Thus, guided by the provisions of R.A. 7941 and the eight point (sic) guideline enunciated in the Ang Bagong Bayani case, the Commission (Second Division) hereby resolves the following petitions for registration.

xxxx

CIVIL SERVANTS is an alliance of government employees aimed at advancing the economic and social welfare of government employees, upholding the fundamental rights of civil servants and safeguarding the professional interest of government workers, among others. In its platform of government, CIVIL SERVANTS espouses the principles of efficient civil service, economic and social welfare, upholding the fundamental rights and the professional development of civil servants.

CIVIL SERVANTS likewise claims national constituency and that it has membership throughout the different regions in the country. In support thereof, petitioner presented a picture of their website where they discuss different issues confronting government employees. In relation thereto, petitioner asserts that it had divided itself to (sic) different working committees to address several issues the report of which is to be submitted in an annual meeting to be held on March 2007.

On the issue of petitioners constituency which it claims to be nationwide, this cannot be established by mere letters to the Commissions Election Officers and providing them with a copy of the list of officers and members. To establish the extent of the constituencies of the different parties and organizations as claimed by them, the Commission directed its Election Officers to verify the existence of petitioners chapters allegedly present in the NCR and the different regions. The verification report shows that CIVIL SERVANTS exists only in Paraaque Citys (1st and 2nd Districts) and in Quezon Citys (4th District), contrary to petitioners claim of national constituency in its memorandum. For having failed to prove its existence nationwide and for having declared an untruthful statement in its memorandum, We resolve to DENY the instant petition.[10]

Aggrieved, Civil Servants moved for reconsideration,[11] arguing in the main that the law does not require a sectoral organization to have a nationwide presence or existence for it to be registered under the party-list system. It posited that the COMELEC Second Division, in imposing such an additional requirement, went beyond the bounds of the law.

Not persuaded by Civil Servants arguments, the COMELEC en banc, in the assailed March 26, 2007 Resolution,[12]denied the motion. It ruled that Civil Servants failure to assail the COMELEC Second Divisions order requiring proof of existence or presence nationwide, and the subsequent submission of its compliance therewith, which was later found to be insufficient, effectively barred the organization from subsequently questioning the legality of the aforementioned order.[13]The COMELEC en banc further ratiocinated that

Incidentally, the requirement of presence or existence in majority of the regions, provinces, municipalities or cities, as the case may be, is not based on mere whims or caprices of the Commission. It was made a necessity to serve as a gauge in assessing the capacity of the applicant to conduct a campaign and as a proof that it is not just a fly-by-night organization but one which truly represents a particular marginalized and underrepresented sector. It must be remembered that Republic Act

7941 empowers the Commission to ask the applicant to provide other information, which it may deem relevant, in deciding an application for registration of a party, organization or coalitions. It is under this provision that the Commission has required the petitioner to show its existence in the areas it claimed to have members.

At any rate, the Second Division was correct in rejecting the application for registration of the herein petitioner. And with no additional evidence to back the petitioners claim of existence all over the country, the Commission En Banc cannot do otherwise but to likewise reject this motion for reconsideration.[14]

Left with no other recourse, petitioner filed the instant case praying for the issuance of a writ of certiorari to nullify the resolutions of respondent, and a writ of mandamus to command the latter to register the former as a sectoral organization.[15]

We dismiss the petition.

Incumbent on petitioner is the duty to show that the COMELEC, in denying the petition for registration, gravely abused its discretion. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave, as when it is exercised arbitrarily or despotically by reason of passion or personal hostility. The abuse must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law. [16] Here, petitioner failed to demonstrate, and neither do we find, that the COMELEC, through the questioned issuances, gravely abused its discretion.

We note that in the registration of a party, organization, or coalition under R.A. No. 7941, the COMELEC may require the submission of any relevant

information; and it may refuse, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition based on any of the grounds enumerated in Section 6 thereof, among which is that the organization has declared untruthful statements in its petition.[17] The COMELEC, after evaluating the documents submitted by petitioner, denied the latters plea for registration as a sectoral party, not on the basis of its failure to prove its nationwide presence, but for its failure to show that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Further, the COMELEC found that petitioner made an untruthful statement in the pleadings and documents it submitted.

The Court emphasizes that the sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and it does not include a review of the tribunals evaluation of the evidence.[18] The findings of fact made by the COMELEC, or by any other administrative agency exercising expertise in its particular field of competence, are binding on the Court.[19] The Court is not a trier of facts;[20] it is not equipped to receive evidence and determine the truth of factual allegations.[21] The Courts function, as mandated by Section 1,[22] Article VIII of the Constitution, is merely to check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, this Court will have no occasion to exercise its corrective power. It has no authority to inquire into what it thinks is apparent error.[23]

Thus, in this case, the Court cannot grant the prayer of petitioner for registration as a sectoral party, because to do so will entail an evaluation of the evidence to determine whether indeed petitioner qualifies as a party-list organization and whether it has made untruthful statements in its application for registration.

The dismissal of this petition, however, shall not be taken to mean a preclusion on the part of the petitioner from re-filing an application for registration compliant with the requirements of the law.

WHEREFORE, premises mandamus is DISMISSED.

considered,

the

petition

for certiorari and

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice

(on official leave) CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice

(on official leave) MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

On official leave. Penned by Commissioner Resurreccion Z. Borra (retired), with Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. (resigned), Commissioners Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. (retired), Romeo A. Brawner (deceased), Rene V. Sarmiento and Nicodemo T. Ferrer, concurring; rollo, pp. 35-39.
[1]

[2]

Penned by Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento, with Commissioners Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. (retired) and Nicodemo T. Ferrer, concurring; rollo, pp. 97-109. [3] Entitled AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF PARTY -LIST REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, app roved on March 3, 1995. [4] Rollo, pp. 40-41. [5] Id. at 60-61. [6] 412 Phil. 308 (2001). [7] Rollo, pp. 62-94. [8] Id. at 95-96. [9] Supra note 2. [10] Rollo, pp. 98-107. [11] Id. at 110-124. [12] Supra note 1. [13] Rollo, p. 37. [14] Id. at 37-38. [15] Id. at 32. [16] Cantoria v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 162035, November 26, 2004, 444 SCRA 538, 543. [17] R.A. No. 7941, Secs. 5 and 6 read in full: Section 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation. The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within fifteen (15) days from the date it was submitted for decision but in no case not later than sixty (60) days before election. Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds: (1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious purposes; (2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal; (3) It is a foreign party or organization; (4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes; (5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections; (6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition; (7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. [18] Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 177271, May 4, 2007, 523 SCRA 1, 11. [19] Aklat-Asosasyon Para sa Kaunlaran ng Lipunan at Adhikain Para sa Tao, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 162203, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 712, 720; Idulza v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 160130, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 701, 707-708. [20] Juan v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 166639, April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 119, 128. [21] Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, supra note 6, at 341. [22] Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution reads in full: Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [23] Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC, 407 Phil. 618, 647 (2001); BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Exec. Sec. Zamora, 396 Phil. 623, 664-665 (2000); Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives , G.R. Nos. 92191-92, July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA 692, 701.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC DECISION December 7, 1949 G.R. No. L-3452 THE NACIONALISTA PARTY, petitioner, vs. FELIX ANGELO BAUTISTA, Solicitor General of the Philippines, respondent. Manuel C. Briones, Claro M. Recto, Jesus Barrera, J. Antonio Araneta, Antonio Barredo and Jose W. Diokno for petitioner. Respondent Felix Angelo Bautista in his own behalf. Padilla, J.: The prayer of the petition filed in this case reads, as follows: Wherefore, petitioner respectfully prays that after due hearing a writ of prohibition issue commanding the respondent Solicitor General to desist forever from acting as acting member of the Commission on Election under the designation rendered to him by President Quirino on November 9, 1949 unless he is legally appointed as regular member of the said Commission on Elections . . . . It is averred, in support of the prayer, that on 9 November 1949, while the respondent held, as he still holds, the office of Solicitor General of the Philippines, the President designated him as acting member of the Commission on Elections, and on that same date the respondent took the oath of office and forthwith proceeded to assume and perform the duties of the office; that at the time of the respondents designation he had not resigned from the office of Solicitor General of the Philippines nor does he intend to do so but continues to exercise all the powers and duties of the last mentioned office. It is contended that such designation invalid, illegal, and unconstitutional, because there was on 9 November 1949 no vacancy in the Commission on Elections, for the acceptance, approval, or granting of the application for retirement filed by Commissioner Francisco Enage on such date constitutes or amounts to abuse of discretion and was done in bad faith by the President and therefore null and void; and because Commissioner Enage is entitled to leave and until after the expiration of such leave he does not cease to be a member of the Commission on Elections. The contention that the granting of the retirement application of Commissioner Enage constitutes an abuse of discretion and was made in bad faith is based upon the allegation and claim that the Commissioner had voted to suspend the elections in Negros Occidental and Lanao and the Liberal Party fears he might vote to annul said elections.

It is claimed, in the alternative, that even if there was on that date a vacancy in the Commission on Elections, still the respondents designation to act as such member of the Comm ission, in addition to his duties as Solicitor General, pending the appointment of a permanent member, is invalid, illegal, and unconstitutional, because membership in the Commission is a permanent constitutional office with a fixed tenure, and therefore, no designation of a person or officer in an acting capacity could and can be made; because a member of the Commission cannot at the same time hold any other office; and because the respondents as Solicitor General belongs to the executive department and cannot assume the powers and duties of a member in the Commission. There are other averments that do not go to the root of the main question raised in this case, such as the subordinate position of the office of the office of the respondent to that of the Secretary of Justice who as a member of the Cabinet campaigned for the election of the present incumbent to the presidency of the Republic; the defense of the President made by the respondent in the impeachment proceedings in Congress an din the emergency powers cases in this Court; the alleged advice given the President by his advisers, among whom was the respondent, not to suspend the elections in Occidental Negros and Lanao; the alleged setting aside or revocation of the Commissions resolutions on the suspension of elections in Occidental Negros and Lanao by the respondent and Chairman Vera, and, for these reasons, it is claimed that impartiality of judgment in matters concerning the last elections cannot be expected of the respondent, thereby impairing the independence of the Commission on Elections. The answer of the respondent admits his designation as acting members of the Commission on Elections in a temporary capacity pending the appointment of a permanent one and retention of his office as Solicitor General, and denies the other averments, conclusions, claims and contentions set out in the petition. The respondent contends that his designation is lawful and valid, not only because the power to appoint vested in the President includes the power to designate, but also because it is expressly so provided in Commonwealth Act No. 588; and that the offices held by him, one permanent and the note temporary, are not incompatible. The claim that the office held by Commissioner Francisco Enage is not vacant is not vacant for the reasons given by the petitioner is without foundation in law and in fact, because Francisco Enage as member of the Commission on Election applied for retirement in 1941 and reiterated his application in 1946 and 1948 and the President of the Philippines granted it on 9 November 1949, and because even if he were entitled to leave he did not apply for it. So that upon acceptance of his application for retirement without applying for leave, even if he were entitled thereto, Francisco Enage vacated his office in the Commission on Elections. Whether the granting of the application for retirement constitutes an abuse of discretion or was done in bad faith buy the President, as alleged and claimed by the petitioner, is a subject matter into which are not at liberty to inquire because of the well known principle of separation of powers. Besides, the President of the President of the Philippines is not a party to these proceedings. Nevertheless, as petitioner predicated its conclusion of bad faith and abuse of discretion upon the allegation that the Commission had voted to suspend the elections in

Negros Occidental and Lanao and the Liberal Party fears he might vote to annul said elections, it may be stated to set matters aright that there is no legal basis for this allegation, because the Commission on Elections cannot vote to suspend an election but may vote to recommend or may recommend only to the President the suspension of an election when for any serious cause the holding of an election should become impossible in any political division or subdivision, pursuant to section 8 of Republic Act No. 180, and because the Commission on Election cannot vote to annul said elections for it has no power to annul the election. What at most it may do is to express its views in the report to be submitted to the President and the Congress on the manner in which such election was conducted, pursuant to section 4, Article X, of the Constitution. As there was a vacancy in the membership of the Commission on Elections, the next point to determine is whether the designation of the respondent as Acting Member of the Commissions on Elections, in addition to his duties as Solicitor General, pending the appointment of a permanent of Commissioner Francisco Enage, is unlawful and unconstitutional. Under the constitution, the Commission of Elections is an independent body or institution. (Article X of the Constitution), just as the General Auditing Office is an independent office (Article XI of the Constitution). Whatever may be the nature of the functions of the Commissions on Elections, the fact that the framers of the Constitution wanted it to be independent from the other departments of the Government. The membership of the Commission is for a fixed period of nine years, except as to first members appointed who were to hold office for nine, six and three years. With these periods, it was intention to have one position vacant every three years, so that no President can appoint more than one Commissioner thereby preserving and safeguarding the independence and impartiality of the Commission. But despite all the precautions, the constitution failed to plug the loophole or forestall the possibility that a member or members die, resign, retire, as in the case, or be removed by impeachment or disqualified, or become physically or mentally incapable, to perform the duties and functions of the office. By death, resignation, retirement, or removal by impeachment, a vacancy in the Commission is created. In these cases the President may appoint the Commissioner for the unexpired term. When such an event should come to pass the limitation to one appointment by a President would be ineffectual. By disqualification or incapacity no vacancy is created. When this possibility should eventuate to two Commissions function would be stopped or paralyzed. Perhaps, a designation of other members during the incumbents temporary disability would not harm the public interest and common weal. But at the case at bar is not one of disqualification or incapacity creating no vacancy but of a retirement resulting in a vacancy. The principle or rule that the power to appoint implies or includes the authority to designate, in the same way that the power carries with it the authority to remove, under the theory that the whole includes and is greater than the part, is not absolute but subject to certain limitations. Thus, justice of the Court of Appeals appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the Congress may be removed by impeachment only (sec. 24, Rep. Act No. 296); the President may remove a member of the judiciary only upon recommendation of the Supreme Court, after inquiry, in the case of judges of the court of First Instance (sec. 67, Rep. Act No. 296), and upon recommendation of the judge of the Court of the First Instance or on Presidents own motion, after investigation, in the case of justices of the peace

(sec. 97, Rep. Act No. 296); and the President or the department head may remove an officer or employee in a Civil Service, appointed by him or by the department head upon the recommendation of the bureau of head, only for causes as provided by law (sec. 4, Article XII, of the Constitution). Likewise, if it were not for the express provision of law (secs. 9 and 27, Rep. Act No. 296), the President could not a designate a justice of the Court of Appeals or a judge of the Court of the First Instance to fill temporarily a vacant office of the justice in the Supreme Court or in the Court of Appeals; and he cannot certainly designate an attorney to fill temporarily such vacancy in the Supreme Court or in the Court of Appeals, but must appoint him ad interim, if Congress is not in session, or nominate him, if Congress is in session. The President cannot designate an attorney to fill temporarily a vacant position of a judge in a Court of First instance or of a justice of the peace. By the very nature of their functions, the members of the Commission on Elections must be independent. They must be made to feel that they are secured in the tenure of their office and entitled to fixed emolument during their incumbency (economic security) so as to make them impartial in the performance of their functions, their powers and duties. they are not allowed to do certain things, such as to engage in the practice of a profession; to intervene, directly or indirectly, in the management or control of any private enterprise; or to be financially interested in any contract with the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof (sec. 3 Article X, of the Constitution). These safeguards are all conducive or tend to create or bring about a condition or state of mind that will lead the members of the Commission to perform with impartiality their great and important task and functions. That independence and impartiality may be shaken and destroyed by a designation of a person or officer to act temporarily in the Commission on Elections. And, although Commonwealth Act No. 588 provides that such temporary designation shall in no case continue beyond the date of the adjournment of the regular session of the National Assembly (Congress) following such designation does not remove the cause for the impairment of the independence of one designated in a temporary capacity to the Commission on Elections. It would be more in keeping with the intent, purpose and aim of the framers of the Constitution to appoint a permanent Commissioner than to designated, tested by the nature and character of the functions he has to perform in both offices, but in the broad sense there is an incompatibility, because his duties and functions as Solicitor General require that all his time be devoted to their efficient performance. Nothing short of that is required and expected of him. Before proceeding to dispose of the last point involved in this controversy we notice that the petitioner alleges that it is organized and registered under the laws of the Philippines. It does not aver that it is incorporated to entitle it to bring this action. It may be organized and registered as a political party in or with the Commission on Elections for the purposes of the Revised Election Code (Republic Act No. 180 ), but for the purpose of bringing an action in the courts of justice such organization and registration are not sufficient. It has to be incorporated under Act 1459 for only natural or juridical persons may be parties in a civil action. (Sec. 1, Rule 3) But this technical defect may be cured by allowing the substitution of the real parties in interest for the petitioner.

The last point is whether prohibition is the proper remedy. Strictly speaking, there are no proceedings of the Commission on Elections in the exercise of its judicial or ministerial functions, which are being performed by it or without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of its discretion (sec 2, Rule 67). The only basis for the petition is that the designation of the respondent as temporary member of the Commission on Elections is illegal and invalid be cause it offends against the Constitution. This special civil action as our Rule call it, or this extraordinary legal remedy following the classical or chancery nomenclature, is in effect to test the validity or legality of the respondents designation in a temporary capacity as member of the Commission on Elections pending the appointment of a permanent member or Commissioner. It is in the nature of a quo warranto, and as such it may only be instituted by the party who claims to be entitled to the office (sec. 6, Rule 680 or by the Solicitor General (sec. 3,4, Rule 68). The authorities and decisions of courts are almost unanimous that prohibition will not lie to determine the title of a de facto judicial officer, since its only function is to prevent a usurpation of jurisdiction by a subordinate court (Highs Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3d ed., p. 715; Tayko vs. Capistrano, 53 Phil. 866, 871). In the case at bar, however, as we have found that the respondents designation to act temporarily a member of the Commission on Elections is unlawful because it offends against the provision of the Constitution creating the Commission on Elections, the dismissal of the petition would deny and deprive the parties that are affected by such designation of a remedy and relief, because no one is entitled now to the office and a party who is not entitled to the office may not institute quo warrant proceedings, and the respondent as Solicitor General, the only other party who may institute the proceedings, would not proceed against himself. In these circumstances, it is incumbent upon and the duty of this Court to grant a remedy. There are cases involving a situation similar to the one under the consideration wherein it was ruled that the remedy of prohibition may lie. In his treatise entitled Extrao rdinary Legal Remedies, High on this point says: Thus, when the legislature have, by an unconstitutional statute, referred to a body of judges the determination of the validity of a statute concerning the liability of the state upon bonds issued in aid of railways, prohibition will lie to prevent such body from acting upon the matters thus submitted. So when an act of legislature delegates to a judge powers partly judicial and partly of a legislative character, as regards the determination of petitions for the incorporation of villages, the act being held unconstitutional because assuming to delegate legislative powers to a court or judicial body, prohibition will lie to prevent the exercise of the powers thus conferred. (Highs Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3d ed., p. 708; Emphasis supplied) Prohibition will not be granted as a substitute for quo warranto for the purpose of trying title to a judicial office by restraining an intruder or de facto officer from acting, on the ground that he is an intruder or a de facto officer. (22 R.C.L., 17) However, in Chambers vs. Jennings (1702) 2 Salk. 553, 91 Eng. Reprint 469, involving an action in the Court of Honor, Holt, Ch. J., doubted whether there was or could be any such court, but said a prohibition would lie to a pretend court. (77 A. l. R., 247.) (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, in Ex parte Roundtree (1874) 51 Ala. 42, where the statute in question purported to create the law and equity court of Morgan county, and , in contravention of the Constitution, which prov ided

that the judges of inferior courts should be elected by the people, declared that the circuit judge of a designated court should act as judge of the new court, it was held that prohibition was a proper remedy, and in fact, the only adequate remedy, to prevent the circuit judge from presiding in the court created, and taking or exercising jurisdiction of a certain cause therein pending against the petitioner, and proceeding against the petitioner, who had been summoned as a juror. The supreme Court declared that if a court against which a writ of prohibition is sought is one of established jurisdiction, a plea that the subject matter of a particular suit lies without its jurisdiction, or that the party is not amenable to its cognizance, will ordinarily afford full relief; but when the question involves the legal existence and construction of a court, a denial of all jurisdiction and not of the particular jurisdiction proposed to be exercised, a prohibition . . . is the only adequate remedy. So, in Curtis vs. Cornish (1912) 109 Me. 384, 84 A. 799, where a statute was plainly unconstitutional in so far as it provided for the creation of a tribunal of justices to hear and consider accusations of corrupt practices in elections, made no provision for exemptions, and denied the right of appeal, except as to questions of the eligibility of candidates to public office (so that in particular case there was no means of review except through certiorari or writ of error, neither of which would lie until after the unconstitutional tribunal should have completed its hearings and made futile findings which it had no jurisdiction to make, and both of which were otherwise so defective under the circumstances as to be remedies in form rather than in substance,) it was held proper to determine an issue as to the constitutionality of the statute in a prohibition proceeding. In state ex rel. Hovey vs. Noble (1889) 118 Ind., 350, 21 N. E., 244, 4 L.R.A., 101, 10 Am. St. Rep., 143, where a writ of prohibition was issued against certain persons to prevent their acting as supreme court commissioners by appointment made under an unconstitutional statute, the somewhat lengthy opinion contains no suggestion of doubt as to the propriety of the remedy in view of the conclusion that statute in its entirety was utterly void. The statute purported to create the offices of commissioners of the supreme court as well as to provide for the appointment of commissioners. (113 A.L. R., 799.) The foregoing authorities are invoked in view of the peculiar and extraordinary circumstances obtaining in this case already referred to, to wit: that as no one is entitled to the office there is no party who in his name may institute quo warranto proceedings, and that the respondent the only other party who may institute the proceedings in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, would not proceed against himself. Were it not for this anomalous situation where there would be no remedy to redress a constitutional transgression, we would adhere strictly to the time-honored rule that to test the right to an office quo warranto proceedings is the proper remedy. The petitioner is granted five days within which to amend its petition so as to substitute the real parties in interest for it (the petitioner), or to show that it is a juridical person entitled to institute these proceedings. Otherwise, or of the petitioner does not amend its petition or does not show that it is a juridical entity, the petition will be dismissed. After the amendment or showing referred to shall have been made, the writ prayed for will issue, without costs. Moran, C.J. and Bengzon, J., concur.

Separate Opinions REYES, J., concurring: I concur, except as to the requirement that petitioner amend its petition. Under the rules, objection to the personality of petitioner is deemed waived if not pleaded. OZAETA, J., concurring: I concur in granting the petition for prohibition. I do not deem it necessary to pass upon the disputed propriety and legality of the acceptance by the President of Commissioner Enages application for retirement under the circumstances alleged in the petition, specially because said commissioner is not a party in this case. Assuming the existence of a vacancy, I agree with the majority that the designation of the respondent Solicitor General as acting member of the Commission on Elections is contrary to the Constitution. My views are briefly as follows: The Commission on Elections is an independent office created by the Constitution (section 1, Article X). It is not appended to either the Executive, the Legislative, or the Judicial Department of the Government. The Constitution provides that the Chairman and the two other members shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of nine years and may not be reappointed. They may be removed from office only by impeachment as provided in the Constitution. Their salaries shall neither be increased nor be diminished during their term of office. The purpose of the Constitution in providing a fixed and secure tenure of office for the members of the Commission with a fixed salary which may neither be increased nor be diminished during their term of office, is to insure and preserve the independence of that body in the impartial performance of its important and delicate task of enforcing and administering all laws relative to the conduct of elections. That purpose would be defeated if, instead of appointing an incumbent for a fixed term removable only by impeachment, the President should fill the position by designation, which he can change at will. Such method would also destroy the schedule of rotation provided by the Constitution whereby a new member of the Commission is appointed every three years. The Presidents letter of designation, dated November 9, 1949, and addressed to the respondent, reads in part as follows: In the interest of the public service and pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 588, you are hereby designated Acting Member of the Commission on Elections, in addition to your duties as Solicitor General, pending the appointment of a permanent member to fill the vacancy caused by the retirement of Commissioner Francisco Enage, effective at the beginning of office hours today.

Commonwealth Act No. 588 is entitled An Act authorizing the President of the Philippines to make temporary appointments in certain public offices. It was approved on August 12, 1940, i.e., before the approval of the amendment to the Constitution whereby the Commission on Elections was created. Said Act expressly and only refers to a an officer in the Executive Department of the Government, whose position the President is authorized to fill temporarily by designating another officer already in the service or any other competent person. Since a member of the Commission on Elections is not an officer in the Executive Department of the Government but is as independent of the executive as a judicial officer is in the performance of his duties, it is to me clear that the Act cited is not applicable. It cannot be and has never been applied to a judicial officer. Respondents designation, being repugnant to the constitution, is null and void ab initio. It is idle to discuss and decide in this case whether or not the President may designate an acting member of the Commission on Elections when a regular member thereof is unable to perform the duties of his office owing to illness, absence, or other cause. We could decide that question only when such a case should arise. Upon the propriety of prohibition as a remedy, I concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice Padilla. However, I do not deem it necessary to require the petitioner to amend the petition as a matter of formality, especially in the absence of any question raised on that point by the adverse party. Paras and Tuason, JJ., concur. MONTEMAYOR, J., concurring and dissenting: It is unnecessary for me to state the facts and issues involved in this case for the reason that they are well stated in the learned majority opinion penned by Mr. Justice Padilla. I concur in the majority opinion except where it denies to the Chief Executive the right to temporarily fill a permanent vacancy in the Commission on Elections, it is valid only in the present case in the sense that it may not bind Commissioner Enage who took no part in these proceedings. As a rule and unless qualified by constitutional or statutory provision the power to appoint includes the lesser power to designate. There are times and occasions a temporary designation, particularly in the Commission on Elections is necessary and imperative. There are only three Commissioner in the Commission. Should one of the three Commissioners be disqualified, or be on leave or be sick and unable to perform his duties, and should there be a deadlock in voting between the two remaining Commissioners, the President must necessarily designate another to act temporarily as Commissioner so as not to interrupt or hamper the functions of the Commission. He cannot make a permanent appointment for the reason that there is a vacancy. In case two of the Commissioners are absent on leave or sick or disqualified, designation of one or two persons temporarily act in the Commission would still be more necessary and imperative. Fortunately, the majority opinion concedes, though it seems, reluctantly and rather indirectly that in such cases the Chief Executive may make designations temporarily. With this concession, I deem it unnecessary to elaborate on this point.

Now let us go to the main issue of the legality or illegality of temporarily filing a permanent vacancy with a designation as what happened in the present case. The majority holds that in a case of permanent vacancy, the legal and proper thing to do is for the President to make a permanent or ad interim appointment for the reason that to designate one to act temporarily in the Commission would impair the independence of that body, provided for and guaranteed by the Constitution. I fail to see any difference or distinction between designation to temporarily fill a vacancy and ad interim appointment to permanently fill the same vacancy in the Commission on Elections in relation to and in their effect on the independence of that entity. The majority opinion fails to show such alleged distinction or difference otherwise enlighten us on the point. Both designation and ad interim appointment in my opinion if conferred on the right and proper person do not and will not affect the Commissions independence. I suppose the majority starts from the theory that a person desig nated temporarily to the Commission cannot act independently because his tenure being temporary, precarious and at the pleasure of the President, he is, so to speak, always, always under the thumb of the Chief Executive who may withdraw the designation and put him out the moment he (the one designated) acted against the interests of the President or of his party. So to keep the designation and continue acting in the Commission, the one designated sacrifices the independence of the Commission, the one designated sacrifices the independence of the Commission and his own selfrespect and does the Presidents bidding. The flaw in this theory, however, is that it assumes or presupposes the appointing power to be so utterly lacking in mental honesty, fair dealing and plain decency, and the person designated equally devoid of character, and independence of judgment, but cursed with mistaken sense of loyalty to the one designating him. I believe that we should not indulge in or entertain such a presumption unless there be valid grounds for the same, based on the proof. But assuming for a moment all these evils to be possible, they may and do equally apply to designations to be made by the President where there is no vacancy but only disqualification, physical disability or absence of any of the Commissioners, so that from the point of view of the majority, in every case of designation to the Commission, whether to temporarily fill a vacancy or in case merely disqualification, sickness or absence of any of the Commissioners, the independence of that body is always menaced and impaired. It seems that the main, if not the whole objection on the part of the petitioner to the designation made in this particular case lies in the fact that the person designated, the Solicitor General, had previously been representing the Chief Executive in the impeachment proceedings before Congress and in the emergency powers cases brought before this Court; that by reason thereof, said Solicitor Generals loyalty to the Chief Executive has so crystallized and definitely settled that in acting now in the Commission, he would consciously be guided and his decisions colored by such loyalty, especially since the present Chief Executive as a candidate in the last presidential election is interested in the acts of the Commission in regard to said elections. But as the majority opinion itself states, there is not much, if any, that the Commission on Election can do a favor or to prejudice a presidential candidate. According to the majority, the Commission may not suspend the election in any province as two of its Commissioners had voted in a resolution approved by them. Neither may the Commission annul the elections in any province or district as the said two Commissioners had supposedly

threatened to do if the elections in some provinces were not postponed. There would therefore be not much, if any, then a person designated by the Chief Executive under these circumstances could do even if want only disposed. Had the President in this case designated someone else say, a Judge of the Court of First Instance or a Justice of the Court of Appeals or any practising attorney, it is to be doubted if said designation would have been questioned. Going back to the alleged impairment of the independence of the Commission by a designation to temporarily fill a permanent vacancy, the same danger so much predicted and feared by the majority and the petitioner would equally be present in case of a permanent, though ad interim appointment. To me, it would even be worse because the hazard through which a person with an ad ]interim appointment has to go is greater. In the case of a designation as was done in the present case, supposing that the Chief Executive held the withdrawal of the designation as a sword of Damocles over the head of the Solicitor General so that the moment the latter displeased the President with his actuations in the Commission the designation will instantly be withdrawn, in such a case Solicitor General Bautista would not suffer or lose anything. Perhaps, after all, the loss of the designation to the Commission was a welcome relief to him because the designation meant additional work and even embarrassment to him as is happening in his case. He did not lose his post as Solicitor general and he would be but glad to return to it. But not so with one favored with an ad interim appointment. Such a person if an officer of the government losses and forfeits his official post the moment he accepts the ad interim appointment. if he is a practising attorney he has to dispose of his pending cases, and dissolve his connections with his law firm, if any, as well as give up all control or management of any private enterprise which may be affected by the functions of his office, including financial interest in any contract with the Government. (Art. X, section 3, Philippine Constitution.) We must bear in mind that in these examples we are assuming or presupposing an appointing power who is evil-minded, lacking in mental honesty and disposed to go to any extremes to achieve his desires. Let us also remember that we have here the party system where the Chief Executive ordinarily is a member and is the head of the majority party in power. If the person with an ad interim appointments fails to act in the Commission in accordance with the dictates and desires of the President, his confirmation may easily be blocked in the Commission on Appointments. The Commission on Appointments in order to accommodate the Chief Executive may not only fail to confirm the appointment but may even reject it for supposed lack of qualification in training, education, and experience or even of character qualification. The appointee is naturally embarrassed if not disgraced. He loses the appointment; he had already lost his official post that he vacated when he accepted the ad interim appointment, and if he is a private practitioner, he had lost at least temporarily his clients in his law office. So, I say that if a person designated temporarily to fill a permanent vacancy and one given an ad interim appointment to fill a similar vacancy were both persons with a distorted sense of loyalty to the appointing power, and lacking in the character and dignity and a sense of duty, were similarly situated, and under the same pressure and threat from the appointing power, there might be more temptations in the case of the person with an ad interim appointment to abuse his powers and discretion in the Commission to

favor the Chief Executive, for the reason that the danger and alternative consequences are far greater and more serious. Considering the circumstances surrounding the designation of Solicitor General Bautista to act in the Commission in a temporary capacity the majority opinion has well said that we may not inquire into the motives prompting said designation. Taking a casual view of the case, it is possible that a happier designation, of someone else could have been made, not in the sense that Solicitor General Bautista is not qualified by the education, training and experience or by character to act in the Commission, for he appears to be fully qualified for this post, but because any other person who has had no association or connection with the President if designated would have aroused no speculation or suspicion or fear about his actuations in the Commission. But in favor of the action of the President, it is said that he believed that he was merely following a precedent set by the late President Quezon who, in 1941, designated the then Solicitor General Roman Ozaeta, to act temporarily in the Commission on Elections. Said designation is published in the Official Gazette. Justice Ozaeta, however says that he does not recall any such designation in his favor. There is no reason whatsoever to doubt even for a moment Justice Ozaetas word. It is highly possible that the designation through officially made may not have been communicated to him and he never acted in the Commission, perhaps because subsequently there was no longer any necessity or occasion for him to do so. Hence his lack of knowledge or inability at recollection. Be that as it may, the President was informed of this precedent and according to Solicitor General Bautista, he was designated merely, if not exclusively on the strength of such precedent. One may ask why the President could not and did not make a permanent appointment to fill the vacancy in the Commission. We are not in a position to give the right answer. Any answer that one may give would at best be confined to the realm of speculation. But it is not hard to imagine that to permanently fill a vacancy in a constitutional body like the Commission on Elections vested with important delicate functions, with remuneration to the members thereof relatively high, and naturally requiring high and special qualifications of character, training and experience, the Chief Executive may need time to select the right person. To be sure that his appointment will be confirmed, he might find it necessary or advisable to consult the members of the Commission on Appointments or the leaders thereof. The person he has in mind may not be immediately available. He may be absent from the capital or if he is present and is consulted he may need time to decide whether to accept or decline the appointment tendered or offered. Even if he has decided to accept the offer he may need time to wind up his private affairs and dispose of his pending legal cases if actively practicing the legal profession. On the other hand, the need for someone to act in the Commission to fill the vacancy even temporarily, was pressing and imperative. There were only two remaining Commissioners and one of them had disqualified himself on some matters pending hearing and action before the Commission. And the Nacionalista Party was threatening to ask for his absolute disqualification in all cases regarding the presidential elections. Furthermore, at least according to the press, there was an alleged difference of opinion about some phases of the presidential elections between these two remaining Commissioners with the possibility , if not probability, of a deadlock or tie when it came to a vote. The President may have deemed it necessary to act quickly.

All these things may, or might have prompted the Chief Executive to designate Solicitor General Bautista to act temporarily in the Commission. Of course, he could have designated someone else, not perhaps better qualified but less subject to objection and speculation. But that was the problem, the privilege and the right of the Chief Executive. I am, as it were, merely thinking out loud. But I believe and hold that the Chief Executive has the inherent right to designate one to act temporarily in an office to fill a vacancy even in the Commission on Elections. That the power may be abused is no argument against its existence. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 296 provides that in case of vacancy in the Supreme Court or in the event that any of the Justices is absent, disabled or incapacitated to perform his duties , the requisite number of Justices necessary to constitute a quorum or to render a judgment in any given case, is not present, the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Chief Justices of the Court of Appeals. The majority or District Judges as may be necessary to sit temporarily as Justices of the Supreme Court. Section 27 of the same Act makes a similar provision for the Court of Appeals. The majority claims that were it not for those legal provisions, the President would have no power to make designations for the two courts. I disagree. I believe that the President has the inherent power to make temporary designations in the two courts, power necessarily included in his power to appoint the justices in said courts. Sections 9 and 27 of Republic Act No. 296 merely limit such power. Without such legal provisions, the President may designate anyone legally qualified , even from outside the Judiciary, in order not to hamper or paralyze the functions of these two tribunals. But there is another aspect of these two legal provisions. Considering them, the Legislature has evidently seen no objection to or anomaly in the President filing temporarily a permanent vacancy in these two courts by a mere designation. The legislature does not see any danger to the independence of the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the President making a designation to temporarily fill a vacancy occurring in said Courts, a danger so much emphasized and feared by the majority. I do not see the danger myself. In conclusion I hold that the President has the right to designate one to act temporarily to fill a vacancy where he has the right to make the permanent appointment, and that in the present case the Chief Executive has the right to designate the Solicitor General to act temporarily to fill a vacancy in the Commission on Elections especially under circumstances urgently calling for the services of one to act in said Commission. Whether the designation was a happy one, advisable or expedient, is beside the point. As long as the Presidents designation is valid and constitutional, we may not pass upo n its wisdom or propriety. If I have dwelt a little extensively in this opinion on the power of designation, it is because I regard the present case and its implications very important and of far-reaching consequences. This Court is defining and limiting the power of appointment of the Chief Executive, not only for the present incumbent but for administrations to come, and I feel it may duty to explain my views on the point. TORRES, J., concurring in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Montemayor:

In addition to the views expressed in his dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Montemayor in which I fully concur, I deem it proper, however, to say a few words about a theory expounded by counsel of petitioner during the hearing of this case before this Court. Elaborating on the meaning of the word independent found at the beginning of section 1 of Article X of the Constitution, as amended, it has been argued that such word means that the Commission on Elections created thereby is an independent body and, as such, its organization and functions should not be interfered with by the Executive. Section 1 of Article X of the Constitution says that There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and two other members to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, . . . . Does the word independent used in the above quoted constitutional provision mean that the Commission on Elections is a body completely separate, not dependent, not subject to control by other governmental entities, self-governing? My answer is, yes, and no. The Commission on Elections is independent as regards the exercise of its functions; except as provided in section 2 of Article X of the Constitution it can not be interfered with by any other governmental instrumentality, because it was created as a special body charged with the duty of conducting the elections, and as stated this court in Sumulong vs. Commission on Elections, 40 O.G. 3663, the power to review the acts of said Commission should, as a general proposition, be used sparingly but firmly in appropriate cases. Aside from what I have just stated, I hold that the Commission on Elections is not absolutely independent. Under the scheme of our Government as provided in the Constitution, which was framed with the United States Constitution as the model, it consists of three powers or branches known as the legislative, the executive and the judicial branch. This does not mean that each branch or power is completely independent of each other; on the contrary, they are coordinated powers or branches, each linked or connected with the other in such a way that the idea frequently expounded by some that, for instance, the judicial branch is independent from the other two branches, finds no support when we have to deal with practical cases wherein the question of separation of powers is involved. In effect, in my humble opinion, it is unthinkable to maintain that one of those three powers or branches of the Government is independent of the others, if we take into consideration, that the Executive has to depend on or deal with the legislative branch whenever it wants legislation or appropriation for funds approved by the latter branch in order to carry out is governmental program and maintain the complicated machinery of the Government. It has to submit for confirmation of the Commission nominations or appointments made by it; and it has to deal with the legislative branch in order to assure the success of his administration. On the other hand, the legislative branch, whose functions consists mainly of passing legislative measures, sees to it that the executive branch puts into effect the legislative program by carrying into execution the measures approved by it during the legislative session. Finally, in the judicial branch, the judicial officers, high and low, are appointed by the President, with the confirmation of the corresponding body of the legislative branch, and, what is more important, the funds which are

necessary for the judiciary to function are recommended by the executive in the budget prepared by it and approved by the legislature. In the light of what has just been briefly described, could anyone still maintain that the three branches of the Government are so separate and independent of each other that not a single branch has anything to do with the other two? It is for this reason that the late Mr. Justice Holmes of the Supreme Court of the United States, in its now famous dissenting opinion in the cases of Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands and Agoncillo vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 72 Law. ed. U.S. 277, pp. 852-853, said: The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white, Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other. Property must not be taken without compensation, but with the help of a phrase (the police power) some property may be taken or destroyed for public use without paying for it, if you do not take too much. When we come to the fundamental distinctions it is still more obvious that they must be received with a certain latitude or our government could not go on. It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and divide the branches into watertight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires. In the light of the above, I can not, therefore, conceive a governmental instrumentality, such as the Commission on Elections established by the Constitution, completely disassociated, disconnected from the other governmental entities created by the Constitution or the law. The Government is a machinery composed of many parts, each intended to perform a certain function within the whole of the same, so as to accomplish the purpose for which it has been built. The fact that a specific place is found in the Constitution for the Commission on Elections does not necessarily mean that such body shall work and function in entire disregard of the other governmental entities. The Commission on Elections was organized when the Executive filled the positions created by section 1 of Article X of the Constitution, and is now carrying out its functions by means of yearly appropriations included in the general budget of the Government passed by the Congress and approved by the Executive. This means that the Commission on Elections did not come into being spontaneously but through positive acts of the Executive and the Congress.

Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court Manila EN BANC

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), Petitioner,

G.R. No. 179271

- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of Canvassers), Respondent.

ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, Intervenor.

AANGAT TAYO, Intervenor.

COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS), Intervenor. x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - x BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ACTION, COOPERATION AND HARMONY TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL REFORMS, INC., and ABONO, Petitioners, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, - versus TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, and BERSAMIN, JJ. CARPIO MORALES, PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, Present: G.R. No. 179295

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. _______________________

Promulgated:

x-------------------------x DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) in a petition for certiorari and mandamus,[1]assails the Resolution[2] promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-041 (PL). The COMELECs resolution in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) approved the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for being moot. BANAT filed before the COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC, a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives

Provided by the Constitution.

The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and Science Professionals (ABS), Aangat Tayo (AT), and Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens).

Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) in a petition for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition,[3] assails NBC Resolution No. 07-60[4] promulgated on 9 July 2007. NBC No. 07-60 made a partial proclamation of parties, organizations and coalitions that obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast under the Party-List System. The COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans

Federation

Party

v.

COMELEC[5]

(Veterans).

Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of the Veterans Freedom Party, filed a motion to intervene in both G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295.

The Facts The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System.[6] On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives

Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC.

BANAT filed its petition

because [t]he Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats.[7] There were no intervenors in BANATs petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a memorandum on 19 July 2007. On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabrielas Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOPNATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono. We quote NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in its entirety below:

WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as National Board of Canvassers, thru its SubCommittee for Party-List, as of 03 July 2007, had officially canvassed, in open and public proceedings, a total of fifteen million two hundred eighty three thousand six hundred fifty-nine (15,283,659) votes under the Party-List System of Representation, in connection with the National and Local Elections conducted last 14 May 2007; WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of the National Board of Canvassers reveals that the projected/maximum total party-list votes cannot go any higher than sixteen million seven hundred twenty three thousand one hundred twenty-one (16,723,121) votes given the following statistical data:

Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007 Elections

i. Total party-list votes already canvassed/tabulated 15,283,659 ii. Total party-list votes remaining uncanvassed/ 1,337,032

untabulated (i.e. canvass deferred) iii. Maximum party-list votes (based on 100% outcome) from areas not yet submitted for canvass (Bogo, Cebu; Bais City; Pantar, Lanao del Norte; and Pagalungan,

102,430

Maguindanao) Maximum Total Party-List Votes 16,723,121

WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act) provides in part:

The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: provided, that those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: provided, finally, that each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected total of party-list votes, the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold can be pegged at three hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes; WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC , reiterated its ruling in Veterans Federation Party versus COMELECadopting a formula for the additional seats of each party, organization or coalition receving more than the required two percent (2%) votes, stating that the same shall be determined only after all party-list ballots have been completely canvassed;

WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have thus far garnered at least three hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes are as follows:

RANK

PARTY/ORGANIZATION/ COALITION

VOTES RECEIVED

BUHAY 1 BAYAN MUNA 2 CIBAC 3 GABRIELA 4 APEC 5 A TEACHER 6 AKBAYAN 7 ALAGAD 8 BUTIL 9 COOP-NATCO 10 BATAS 11 ANAK PAWIS 12 ARC 13 ABONO 14

1,163,218

972,730

760,260

610,451

538,971

476,036

470,872

423,076

405,052

390,029

386,361

376,036

338,194

337,046

WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an URGENT PETITION FOR CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF REGISTRATION AND DISQUALIFICATION OF

PARTY-LIST NOMINEE (With Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the
Commission, docketed as SPC No. 07-250, all the parties, organizations and coalitions included in the

aforementioned list are therefore entitled to at least one seat under the party-list system of representation in the meantime.

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941, and other election laws, the Commission on Elections, sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVES to PARTIALLY PROCLAIM, subject to certain conditions set forth below, the following parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the Party-List System:

Buhay Hayaan Yumabong 1 Bayan Muna 2 Citizens Battle Against Corruption 3 Gabriela Womens Party 4 Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives 5 Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment 6 Action, Cooperation and Harmony Educational Reforms, Inc. Akbayan! Citizens Action Party 7 Alagad 8 Luzon Farmers Party 9 Cooperative-Natco Network Party 10 Anak Pawis 11 Alliance of Rural Concerns 12 ARC ANAKPAWIS COOP-NATCCO BUTIL ALAGAD AKBAYAN Through Towards A TEACHER APEC GABRIELA CIBAC BAYAN MUNA BUHAY

Abono 13 ABONO

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations, or coalitions which may later on be established to have obtained at least two percent (2%) of the total actual votes cast under the PartyList System.

The total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results.

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) is hereby deferred until final resolution of SPC No. 07-250, in order not to render the proceedings therein moot and academic.

Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.

Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy thereof to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.[8] (Emphasis in the original)

Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-72, which declared the additional seats allocated to the appropriate parties. We quote from the COMELECs interpretation of the Veterans formula as found in NBC Resolution No. 07-72:

WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers proclaimed thirteen (13) qualified parties, organization[s] and coalitions based on the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold of 334,462 votes from the projected maximum total number of party-list votes of 16,723,121, and were thus given one (1) guaranteed party-list seat each; WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory Committee of the National Board of Canvassers, the projected maximum total party-list votes, as of July 11, 2007, based on the votes actually canvassed, votes canvassed but not included in Report No. 29, votes received but uncanvassed, and maximum votes expected for Pantar, Lanao del Norte, is 16,261,369; and that the projected maximum total votes for the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalition[s] are as follows:

Party-List

Projected total number of votes

BUHAY

1,178,747

BAYAN MUNA

977,476

CIBAC

755,964

GABRIELA

621,718

APEC

622,489

A TEACHER

492,369

AKBAYAN

462,674

ALAGAD

423,190

BUTIL

409,298

10

COOP-NATCO

412,920

11

ANAKPAWIS

370,165

12

ARC

375,846

13

ABONO

340,151

WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (Buhay) obtained the highest number of votes among the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, making it the first party in accordance with Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC, reiterated in Citizens Battle Against

Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC;

WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the party-list system of representation that have obtained one guaranteed (1) seat may be entitled to an additional seat or seats based on the formula prescribed by the Supreme Court in Veterans; WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the first party, the correct formula as expressed in Veterans, is:

Number of votes of first party ----------Total votes for party-list system

Proportion of votes of first = party relative to total votes for

party-list system

wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without rounding off) shall entitle it to additional seats:

Proportion of votes received by the first party Equal to or at least 6% Equal to or greater than 4% but less than 6% Less than 4%

Additional seats

Two (2) additional seats One (1) additional seat No additional seat

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the following percentage:

1,178,747 ----16,261,369 = 0.07248 or 7.2%

which entitles it to two (2) additional seats.

WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, the correct formula as expressed in Veterans and reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows:

No. of votes of concerned party Additional seats for a concerned party first party = No. of additional No. of votes of x seats allocated to first party

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows:

Party List BAYAN MUNA

Percentage

Additional Seat

1.65 CIBAC 1.28 GABRIELA 1.05 APEC 1.05

A TEACHER 0.83 AKBAYAN 0.78 ALAGAD 0.71 BUTIL 0.69 COOP-NATCO 0.69 ANAKPAWIS 0.62 ARC 0.63 ABONO 0.57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941 and other elections laws, the Commission on Elections en banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to proclaim the following parties, organizations or coalitions as entitled to additional seats, to wit:

Party List BUHAY

Additional Seats

2 BAYAN MUNA 1 CIBAC 1

GABRIELA 1 APEC 1

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or coalitions which may later on be established to have obtained at least two per cent (2%) of the total votes cast under the party-list system to entitle them to one (1) guaranteed seat, or to the appropriate percentage of votes to entitle them to one (1) additional seat. Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.

Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy hereof to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.[9]

Acting on BANATs petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on 3 August 2007, which reads as follows:

This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution filed by the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT).

Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) party-list, Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, National Board of Canvassers Legal Group submitted his comments/observations and recommendation thereon [NBC 07-041 (PL)], which reads:

COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS:

Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), in its Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution prayed for the following reliefs, to wit:

1.

That the full number twenty percent (20%) of Party-List representatives as mandated by

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution shall be proclaimed.

2.

Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2% threshold votes, should be

harmonized with Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and with Section 12 of the same RA 7941 in that it should be applicable only to the first party-list representative seats to be allotted on the basis of their initial/first ranking.

3.

The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and

4.

Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of seats corresponding to every 2% of the

votes they received and the additional seats shall be allocated in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941, that is, in proportion to the percentage of votes obtained by each party-list group in relation to the total nationwide votes cast in the party-list election, after deducting the corresponding votes of those which were allotted seats under the 2% threshold rule. In fine, the formula/procedure prescribed in the ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST SEATS, ANNEX A of COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25 June 1996, shall be used for [the] purpose of determining how many seats shall be proclaimed, which party-list groups are entitled to representative seats and how many of their nominees shall seat [sic].

5.

In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 and that the

procedure in allocating seats for party-list representative prescribed by Section 12 of RA 7941 shall be followed.

RECOMMENDATION:

The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.

The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution

No. 07-60 promulgated July 9, 2007 re In the Matter of

the Canvass of Votes and Partial Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations and Coalitions Participating Under the Party-List System During the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections resolved among others

that the total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to the Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of Canvassers RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve and adopt the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, NBC Legal Group, to DENY the herein petition of BANAT for being moot and academic. Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution. SO ORDERED.[10]

BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 0788. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.

On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC. [11]

Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the COMELEC proclaimed three other party-list organizations as qualified parties entitled to one guaranteed seat under the Party-List System: Agricultural Sector Alliance of the Philippines, Inc. (AGAP), [12] Anak Mindanao (AMIN),[13] and An Waray.[14] Per the certification[15] by COMELEC, the following party-list organizations have been proclaimed as of 19 May 2008:

Party-List 1.1 Buhay

No. of Seat(s)

3 1.2 Bayan Muna 2

1.3

CIBAC 2

1.4

Gabriela 2

1.5

APEC 2

1.6

A Teacher 1

1.7

Akbayan 1

1.8

Alagad 1

1.9

Butil 1

1.10

Coop-Natco [sic] 1

1.11

Anak Pawis 1

1.12

ARC 1

1.13

Abono 1

1.14

AGAP 1

1.15

AMIN 1

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an Urgent Petition for Cancellation/Removal of Registration and Disqualification of Party-list Nominee (with Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the COMELEC, was deferred pending final resolution of SPC No. 07-250.

Issues

BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:

1.

Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives or is it merely a ceiling?

provided in Section 5(2),

Article VI of the Constitution mandatory

2.

Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941

constitutional?

3.

Is the two percent threshold and qualifier votes prescribed by the

same Section 11(b) of

RA 7941 constitutional?

4.

How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?[16]

Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following issues in their petition:

I.

Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National Board of Canvassers, committed grave lack or excess of jurisdiction when it promulgated NBC seats to qualified partyNo. 07-60 to implement the First-Party Rule in the allocation of

abuse of discretion amounting to Resolution list organizations as said rule:

A.

Violates the constitutional principle of proportional

representation.

B.

Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly:

1.

The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule in

allocating additional seats for under

the First Party RA 7941.

violates the principle of proportional representation

2. First Section

The use of two formulas in the allocation of Party and another 11(b) of RA 7941. for the

additional seats, one for the qualifying parties, violates

3.

The proportional relationships under the First Party 7941;

Rule are different from those

required under RA

C.

Violates the Four Inviolable Parameters of the Philippine

party-list system as provided for

under the same case of

Veterans Federation Party, et al. v. COMELEC.

II. seats issues

Presuming that the Commission on Elections did not commit grave to qualified party-list organizations, the same being merely in

abuse of discretion consonance with the ruling interpretation and

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in Veterans Federations Party, et al. v.

when it implemented the First-Party Rule in the allocation of

COMELEC, the instant Petition is a justiciable case as the

involved herein are constitutional in nature, involving the correct

implementation of RA 7941, and are of transcendental importance to our nation.[17]

Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:

1.

Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in ceiling?

Section 5(2), Article VI of the

Constitution mandatory or merely a

2.

Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

3.

Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA

7941 to qualify for one seat

constitutional?

4.

How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?

5. list

Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from elections?[18]

participating in the party-list

elections? If not, can the major

political parties be barred from participating in the party-

The Ruling of the Court

The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election has at least four inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:

First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed
twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list;

Second, the two percent threshold only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total
valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained,
is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats;

Fourth, proportional representation the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed in proportion to their total number of votes.[19]

However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the term proportional representation, this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations.

Number of Party-List Representatives: The Formula Mandated by the Constitution

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list. xxx

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The House of Representatives shall be composed of district representatives and party-list representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of the members of the House of Representatives. Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list representatives to the total number of representatives. We compute the number of seats available to party-list

representatives from the number of legislative districts. On this point, we do not deviate from the first formula in Veterans, thus:

Number of seats available to legislative districts

x .20 =

Number of seats available to party-list representatives

.80

This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since the 14 th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list representatives.

220

x .20 =

55

.80

After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of representatives, the Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to party-list representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.

Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives: The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold and the Three-Seat Cap

All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats reserved under the Party-List System, as well as on the formula to determine the guaranteed seats to party-list candidates garnering at least two-percent of the total party-list votes. However, there are numerous interpretations of the

provisions

of

R.A.

No.

7941 the

on First

the Party

allocation Rule,[20]

of additional Justice

seats under V.

the

Party-List dissent

System. Veterans produced

and

Vicente

Mendozas

in Veterans presented Germanys Niemeyer formula[21] as an alternative.

The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating the seats for party-list representatives. Congress enacted R.A. which provide: No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11 and Section 12 of

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. x x x

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,[22] the following procedure shall be observed:

(a)

The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on

the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

(b)

The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast

for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. (Emphasis supplied)

In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to allocate party-list representative seats.

The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on the 2% requirement with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT described this procedure as follows:

(a)

The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percent (20%) of the total Members of the

House of Representatives including those from the party-list groups as prescribed by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, Section 11 (1st par.) of RA 7941 and Comelec Resolution No. 2847 dated 25 June 1996. Since there are 220 District Representatives in the 14thCongress, there shall be 55 Party-List Representatives. All seats shall have to be proclaimed.

(b)

All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for every two per centum (2%) of the

total party-list votes they obtained; provided, that no party-list groups shall have more than three (3) seats (Section 11, RA 7941).

(c)

The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the party-list groups under the

immediately preceding paragraph and after deducting from their total the votes corresponding to those seats, the remaining seats shall be allotted proportionately to all the party-list groups which have not secured the maximum three (3) seats under the 2% threshold rule, in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941.[23]

Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANATs first interpretation.

The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote requirement is declared unconstitutional, and apportions the seats for party-list representatives by following Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT states that the COMELEC:

(a) (b) (c) list

shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions rank them according to the number of votes received; and,

on a nationwide basis;

allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the partysystem.[24]

by each party, organization or

BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the proportional percentage of the votes received by each party as against the total nationwide party-list votes, and the other is by making the votes of a party-list with a median percentage of votes as the divisor in computing the allocation of seats.[25] Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be awarded under BANATs second interpretation.

In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the COMELECs original 2 -4-6 formula and the Veterans formula for systematically preventing all the party-list seats from being filled up. They claim that both formulas do not factor in the total number of seats alloted for the entire PartyList System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the three-seat cap, but accept the 2% threshold. After determining the qualified parties, a second percentage is generated by dividing the votes of a qualified party by the total votes of all qualified parties only. The number of seats allocated to a qualified party is computed by multiplying the total party-list seats available with the second percentage. There will be a first round of seat allocation, limited to using the whole integers as the equivalent of the number of seats allocated to the concerned party-list. After all the qualified parties are given their seats, a second round of seat allocation is conducted. The fractions, or remainders, from the whole integers are ranked from highest to lowest and the remaining seats on the basis of this ranking are allocated until all the seats are filled up.[26]

We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list representatives.

Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes garnered during the elections.[27]

Rank

Party BUHAY 1

Votes Garnered

Rank

Party KALAHI

Votes Garnered

1,169,234

48

88,868

BAYAN MUNA 2 CIBAC 3 GABRIELA 4 APEC 5 A TEACHER 6 AKBAYAN 7 ALAGAD 8 COOP-NATCCO 9 BUTIL 10 BATAS 11 ARC 12 ANAKPAWIS 13 ABONO 14 AMIN 15 AGAP 16 AN WARAY 17 YACAP 18

APOI 979,039 49 BP 755,686 50 AHONBAYAN 621,171 51 BIGKIS 619,657 52 PMAP 490,379 53 AKAPIN 466,112 54 PBA 423,149 55 GRECON 409,883 56 BTM 409,160 57 A SMILE 385,810 58 NELFFI 374,288 59 AKSA 370,261 60 BAGO 339,990 61 BANDILA 338,185 62 AHON 328,724 63 ASAHAN MO 321,503 64 AGBIAG! 310,889 65 50,837 51,722 54,522 54,751 55,846 57,012 57,872 58,717 60,993 62,220 71,544 74,686 75,200 77,327 78,424 78,541 79,386

FPJPM 19 UNI-MAD 20 ABS 21 KAKUSA 22 KABATAAN 23 ABA-AKO 24 ALIF 25 SENIOR CITIZENS 26 AT 27 VFP 28 ANAD 29 BANAT 30 ANG KASANGGA 31 BANTAY 32 ABAKADA 33 1-UTAK 34 TUCP 35 162,647 82 164,980 81 166,747 80 169,801 170,531 78 177,028 77 188,521 76 196,266 75 197,872 74 213,058 73 217,822 72 218,818 71 228,637 70 228,999 69 235,086 68 245,382 67 300,923 66

SPI 50,478 BAHANDI 46,612 ADD 45,624 AMANG 43,062 ABAY PARAK 42,282 BABAE KA 36,512 SB 34,835 ASAP 34,098 PEP 33,938 ABA ILONGGO 33,903 VENDORS 33,691 ADD-TRIBAL 32,896 ALMANA 32,255 KA 29,130

AANGAT 79PILIPINO AAPS

26,271 HAPI 25,781 AAWAS 22,946

COCOFED 36 AGHAM 37 ANAK 38 ABANSE! PINAY 39 PM 40 AVE 41 SUARA 42 ASSALAM 43 DIWA 44 ANC 45 SANLAKAS 46 ABC 47 90,058 97,375 93 99,636 92 107,021 91 110,440 90 110,732 89 110,769 88 119,054 87 130,356 86 141,817 85 146,032 84 155,920 83

SM 20,744 AG 16,916 AGING PINOY 16,729 APO 16,421 BIYAYANG BUKID 16,241 ATS 14,161 UMDJ 9,445 BUKLOD FILIPINA 8,915 LYPAD 8,471 AA-KASOSYO 8,406 KASAPI 6,221

TOTAL

15,950,900

The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each. This clause guarantees a seat to the two-percenters. In Table 2 below, we use the first 20 party-list candidates for illustration purposes. The percentage of votes garnered by each party is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for all party-list candidates.

Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective percentage of votes garnered over the total votes for the party-list.[28]

Rank

Party

Votes Garnered

Votes Garnered over Total Votes for Party-List, in %

Guaranteed Seat

BUHAY 1 BAYAN MUNA 2 CIBAC 3 GABRIELA 4 APEC 5 A TEACHER 6 AKBAYAN 7 ALAGAD 8 COOP-NATCCO 9 BUTIL 10 BATAS[29] 11 ARC 12 ANAKPAWIS 13

1,169,234

7.33%

979,039

6.14%

755,686

4.74%

621,171

3.89%

619,657

3.88%

490,379

3.07%

466,112

2.92%

423,149

2.65%

409,883

2.57%

409,160

2.57%

385,810

2.42%

374,288

2.35%

370,261

2.32%

ABONO 14 AMIN 15 AGAP 16 AN WARAY 17 321,503 2.02% 1 328,724 2.06% 1 338,185 2.12% 1 339,990 2.13% 1

Total YACAP 18 FPJPM 19 UNI-MAD 20 245,382 1.54% 300,923 1.89% 310,889 1.95%

17

From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2% from the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. The 17 qualified party-list candidates, or the two-percenters, are the party-list candidates that are entitled to one seat each, or the guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat allocation, we distributed 17 guaranteed seats. The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. This is where petitioners and intervenors problem with the formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause in proportion to their total number of votes to be in proportion to the votes of the first party. This interpretation is contrary to the express language of R.A. No. 7941.

We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.

To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.

We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.[30]

In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:

1.

The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest

based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

2.

The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes

cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.

3. allocated.

Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be

entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are

4.

Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for

allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the twopercenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:

Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats

Votes Garnered over Votes Garnered Total Votes for Party List, in %

Guaranteed Seat

Additional Seats

(B) plus (C), in whole integers

Applying the three seat cap

Rank

Party

(A)

(First Round)

(Second Round)

(E) (D)

(B) (C)
BUHAY 1 BAYAN MUNA 2 CIBAC 3 GABRIELA 4 APEC 5 A Teacher 6 AKBAYAN 7 ALAGAD 8 COOP9[31] NATCCO BUTIL 10 BATAS 11 ARC 12 ANAKPAWIS 13 ABONO 14 339,990 2.13% 1 1 370,261 2.32% 1 1 374,288 2.35% 1 1 385,810 2.42% 1 1 409,160 2.57% 1 1 409,883 2.57% 1 1 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 466,112 2.92% 1 1.11 490,379 3.07% 1 1.17 619,657 3.88% 1 1.48 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 1,169,234 7.33% 1 2.79

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

AMIN 15 AGAP 16 AN WARAY 17 YACAP 18 FPJPM 19 UNI-MAD 20 ABS 21 KAKUSA 22 KABATAAN 23 ABA-AKO 24 ALIF 25 SENIOR 26 CITIZENS AT 27 VFP 28 ANAD 29 BANAT 30 ANG 31 KASANGGA 170,531 1.07% 0 1 1 N.A. 177,028 1.11% 0 1 1 N.A. 188,521 1.18% 0 1 1 N.A. 196,266 1.23% 0 1 1 N.A. 197,872 1.24% 0 1 1 N.A. 213,058 1.34% 0 1 1 N.A. 217,822 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A. 218,818 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A. 228,637 1.43% 0 1 1 N.A. 228,999 1.44% 0 1 1 N.A. 235,086 1.47% 0 1 1 N.A. 245,382 1.54% 0 1 1 N.A. 300,923 1.89% 0 1 1 N.A. 310,889 1.95% 0 1 1 N.A. 321,503 2.02% 1 1 2 N.A. 328,724 2.06% 1 1 2 N.A. 338,185 2.12% 1 1 2 N.A.

BANTAY 32 ABAKADA 33 1-UTAK 34 TUCP 35 COCOFED 36 155,920 0.98% 0 1 1 N.A. 162,647 1.02% 0 1 1 N.A. 164,980 1.03% 0 1 1 N.A. 166,747 1.05% 0 1 1 N.A. 169,801 1.06% 0 1 1 N.A.

Total

17

55

Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-list representatives from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties with sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three seats for each party, are shown in column (D).

Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections

The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties to participate in the party-list elections. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly bear this out, thus:

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x x We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. x x x.

xxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties. My question is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the party list concept or must they be under the district legislation side of it only?

MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned can field candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also participate in the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only sectoral candidates.

MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.

MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Taada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he represents the farmers, would he qualify?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Taada would not qualify.

MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?

MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly minority political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are also organized along sectoral lines.

MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it is precisely the contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree?

MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang reserve. Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.

MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running under the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?

MR. TADEO. The same.

MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.

xxxx

MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and mass organizations to seek common ground. For example, we have the PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they should not be able to make common goals with mass organizations so that the very

leadership of these parties can be transformed through the participation of mass organizations. And if this is true of the administration parties, this will be true of others like the Partido ng Bayan which is now being formed. There is no question that they will be attractive to many mass organizations. In the opposition parties to which we belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact mass organizations so that with their participation, the policies of such parties can be radically transformed because this amendment will create conditions that will challenge both the mass organizations and the political parties to come together. And the party list system is certainly available, although it is open to all the parties. It is understood that the parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC the names of representatives of mass organizations affiliated with them. So that we may, in time, develop this excellent system that they have in Europe where labor organizations and cooperatives, for example, distribute themselves either in the Social Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and their very presence there has a transforming effect upon the philosophies and the leadership of those parties.

It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFL-CIO always vote with the Democratic Party. But the businessmen, most of them, always vote with the Republican Party, meaning that there is no reason at all why political parties and mass organizations should not combine, reenforce, influence and interact with each other so that the very objectives that we set in this Constitution for sectoral representation are achieved in a wider, more lasting, and more institutionalized way. Therefore, I support this [Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It installs sectoral representation as a constitutional gift, but at the same time, it challenges the sector to rise to the majesty of being elected representatives later on through a party list system; and even beyond that, to become actual political parties capable of contesting political power in the wider constitutional arena for major political parties.

xxx R.A.

[32]

(Emphasis supplied) 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the Constitutional

No.

Commission. Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.

(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing

their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.

It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.

(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and concerns of their sector,

(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.

(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes.

Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party from dominating the party-list elections.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the partylist system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups.[33] In defining a party that participates in party-list elections as either a political party or a sectoral party, R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.

Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other

major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.

The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:

Qualifications

of

Party-List

Nominees. No

person

shall

be

nominated

as

party-list

representative unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the elections, able to read and write, bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term. the age of

Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organizations nominee wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity[34] as there is no financial status required in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,[35] that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a

fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of partylist representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress: The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; partylist representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.

However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major political parties from the party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with this ponencia.

WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats. The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System shall be in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of this Decision. Major political parties are disallowed from participating in party-list elections. This Decision is immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Read case digest here.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice

WE CONCUR: REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

[1]

Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

[2]

Rollo (G.R.

No.

179271),

pp.

86-87.

Signed

by

Chairman

Benjamin

S.

Abalos,

Sr., V.
[3]

Commissioners

Resurreccion Z. Borra, Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., Romeo A. Brawner, Rene

Sarmiento, and Nicodemo T. Ferrer. Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

[4]

Rollo (G.R.

No.

179295),

pp.

103-108.

Signed

by

Chairman

Benjamin

S.

Abalos, V.

Sr., Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra, Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., Romeo A. Brawner, Rene Sarmiento, and Nicodemo T. Ferrer.
[5]

396 Phil. 419 (2000).

[6]

Rollo (G.R.

No.

179271), pp.

969-986; rollo (G.R.

No.

179295),

pp.

798-815.

Party-List

Canvass
[7]

Report No. 32, as of 31 August 2007, 6:00 p.m.

Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), p. 70. Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), pp. 88-92.
Id. at 150-153. Id. at 86-87.

[8]

[9]

[10]

[11]

Rollo (G.R. No. 179295), p. 112. Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), pp. 158-159. NBC Resolution No. 07-74, 24 July 2007.
Id. at 160-161. NBC Resolution No. 07-87, 3 August 2007. NBC Resolution No. 07-97, 4 September 2007.

[12]

[13]

[14]

[15]

Rollo (G.R. No. 179295), pp. 816-817. This COMELEC certification should have included An Waray,

which was proclaimed on 4 September 2007 under NBC Resolution No. 07-97.
[16]

Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), p. 14. Rollo (G.R. No. 179295), pp. 21-22. Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), p. 553; rollo (G. R. No. 179295), p. 341.
Supra note 5 at 424. Id. at 446-451. We quote below the discussion in Veterans explaining the First Party Rule:

[17]

[18]

[19]

[20]

Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party

Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only basis given by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice the latters number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for computing the numb er of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows:

Number of votes of first party Total votes for party -list system = Proportion of votes of first party relative to total votes for party-list system

If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional seat.

We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled to the maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than the total number of available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the highest rank and are thus entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to which all the parties are entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved in the House of Representatives.

xxx

Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of additional seats the first

party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the number of additional seats of the other qualified
parties. As explained earlier, the use of the same formula for all would contravene the proportional representation parameter. For example, a second party obtains six percent of the total number of votes cast. According to the above formula, the said party would be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. However, if the first party received a significantly higher amount of votes say, twenty percent to grant it the same number of seats as the second party would violate the statutory mandate of proportional representation, since a party getting only six percent of the votes will have an equal number of representatives as the one obtaining twenty percent. The proper solution, therefore, is to grant the first party a total of three seats; and the party receiving six percent, additional seats in proportion to those of the first party.

Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are
entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is encompassed by the following complex fraction: No. of votes of concerned party Total no. of votes Additional seats for concerned = for party-list system x No. of additional seats allocated to

party first party Total no. of votes for party list system

No. of votes of

the first party

In simplified form, it is written as follows: No. of votes of Additional seats for concerned party first party xxx = concerned party No. of votes of x seats allocated to the first party No. of additional

Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the number of votes for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The end result would be zero additional seat for each of the other qualified parties as well.

The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number of additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical proportions are not whole numbers and are not rounded off for the reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in the awarding of a number of seats in excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum of two additional slots. An increase in the maximum number of additional representatives a party may be entitled to would result in a more accurate proportional representation. But the law itself has set the limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we need to work within such extant parameter.
[21]

Id. at 475-481. The second vote cast by a registered voter is for the party-list candidates as provided in of R.A. No. 7941.

[22]

Section 10
[23]

Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), p. 47.

[24]

Id. at 48. Id. at 1076.

[25]

[26]

Rollo (G.R. No. 179295), pp. 66-81. Rollo (G.R.

No. 179271), pp. 969-974; rollo (G.R. No. 179295), pp. 798-803. Party-List

[27]

Canvass
[28]

Report No. 32, as of 31 August 2007, 6:00 p.m.

Id. Proclamation deferred by COMELEC. Section 2, R.A. No. 7941. The product of the percentage and the remaining available seats of all parties ranked nine below is less than one. II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 256-257 (25 July 1986), 568 (1 August 1986). Id. at 584 (1 August 1986). Dissenting opinion of Justice Jose C. Vitug in Ang Bagong Bayani-

[29]

[30]

[31]

and
[32]

[33]

OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, 412 Phil. 308,

[34]

350 (2001).

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, 412 Phil. 308, 336 (2001).
Section 2, R.A. No. 7941.

[35]