Commission Sensitive

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Note: This needs to be completed against the actual tape, too confusing.

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York Air Route Center Interview
with Peter Mulligan
Type of event: Recorded Interview
Date: Tuesday, October 1, 2003
Special Access Issues: None
Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown and Miles Kara
Team Number: 8
Location: FAA New York Air Route Center, Rokonkomo, New York
Participants - Non-Commission: Alfred , FAA General Consul
Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown

NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion of
the interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account.

Background
Mulligan has been employed by the FAA in June 1973 as an Air Traffic Control
specialist at ZNY assigned to Area A where he spent 9 years before moving to Area E for
5 years as a full performance level controller. He then moved to the Traffic Management
Unit (TMU) for3 years and then became Supervisor Area C for 3-4 years. He then
supervised in the oceanic areas for 3-4 more yrs. More recently he supervised Area D for
3-4 years, then Area B for3-4 years and finally ended up as a TMU specialist.
Events of 9-11
He was one of two supervisors on the 7-3 shift. The norm on weekdays would try and
have two on duty, weekends sometimes would only have one. Rosenberg was the other
supervisor that day. The Operations Manager in Charge (OMIC) that day was Bruce
Barrett. The Air Traffic Manager was Michael McCormack, responsible for operational
side of building. The Assistant Facility Manager was Dave LaCates.
The watch desk area receives a supervisor briefing from the OMIC, or the Senior Traffic
Manager in Charge (STMC) who worked the mid shift. Mid shift is usually 1030pm to
630am.
His awareness that something was wrong occurred approximately 0810-0815 when Pete
McCloskey, Shift Coordinator, received a call from Boston center about a non-
communicating NORDO), non-transponding AA11. McCloskey informed Mulligan. It
was not anunusual situation for an aircraft to loose communications. A call came to ZNY
because the airplane had altered its course 90 degrees and entered New York airspace.
Communication loss, loss of beacon, and course deviation
At that point hijack was not in Mulligan's mind. His first thought was some kind of
emergency. Normally a plane in such trouble would make a 180 degree turn and head
back to airport, but AA11 did a 90 degree turn and headed to New York. So that was
unusual.
A monitoring scope was set up to spot a fast moving primary that hadn't yet penetrated
New York airspace. They used Sparta/Carmel VOR information to confirm that the
primary spotted was the right one. At that point the aircraft was 70-90 miles from the
New York City area. On the heading observed it would have passed 70 miles to the west
of metro New York.
At that point Mulligan was still thinking emergency and thought the airplane probably
wanted to land at a major airport. He got on the Tracon hotline and probably talked to a
Traffic Manager. His first call was through Tracon to give information to the towers. He
had Pete McCluskey call Newark and JFK to inform them of thesituation after AA11
went under ZNY airspace. [Mulligan's use of the work "under" is deliberate. It is
technically possible that AA11 never "entered" New York Center airspace. The nature of
the vertical division of airspace is that New York TRACON underlies New York Center
airspace and it is possible that AA11 went from Boston Center airspace to TRACON air
space directly.]
Handling the Hijacking
The thought of a hijack first entered Mulligan's mind when he received information from
Marty Rosenberg's call with the airlines over a possible hijack. He is not sure if that call
was through the Traffic Management Unit or another area (see Rosenberg MFR). The
Company [American Airlines] would normally call the cockpit on a cell phone. But if
something is going wrong the pilot would call company first. Information on the possible
stabbing of a stewardess did not reach Mulligan until after the trade center was first hit.
People were speculating hijacking, but no one had told him there were threatening
communications or anything else related to the hijacking. Later on he heard of the
threatening conversations but that was at a recapitulation at some point. That information
would have changed his thinking about emergency vs. hijacking.
UA93
He heard from the departure coordinator, James Kurz or Jim Stoneworthy, of another
possible radio failure at Cleveland Center. UA93 might have been next in the cue in that
something was amiss. It was unusual for an airline to be off course and not
communicating and this would be the second occurrence. [Miles Kara's notes indicated
that Mulligan probably confounded UA93 with AA77]
Ground Stop
Mulligan called Ben Sliney at the Command Center informing him of the NY ground
stop. He believes this occurred before any information came to him on the cockpit
compromise on AAl 1.

Other Comments
One can tell from the lack of input in logs the sheer volume of work done on that
morning. He personally made a pile of paperwork that was handed to Bruce Barrett.
He first heard the report of fire at WTC from Newark tower. His feeling was it was still
an emergency. He had received no key word on anything else. He thought it was a very
good possibility that AAl 1 was the hit since when the controllers lost its signal it was 20
miles within metro New York airspace. When employees came back from cafeteria and
informed of the hit, he thought it was a 767, AAl 1—crash but not necessarily a hijack. He
was convinced that it was AAl 1.
After report of fire at trade center he was informed of a problem with UAL 175-only
minutes between information of the fire and of UA175. He can't guarantee that he heard
of UAL175 before or after heard about UA93 bit is pretty confident that UA93 came into
play in situational awareness before UA175. He initially thought it was 93 that hit the
WTC.
UAL175
He received the UAL175 information from Area B Controller-in-Charge, Ivonna Dowis.
There is not much to be told with sequence of events with 175. He believe Bob Felser,
Military Operations Specialist (MOS), came around corner and Mulligan told him to call
the military. [Note: At Boston Center the MOS desk was merged into the watch desk. At
New York Center the MOS desk is literally in a separate room walled away from the rest
of the Center.] When he asked Felserr to scramble planes he was thinking to scramble
planes on threat of a plane coming out of Cleveland Center. Mulligan then changed his
story and said that actually he definitely asking him to scramble on UA175. UA 93 being
out of Cleveland would be too far away
He does remember the transponder code change with UAL175 since they were getting a
coast track on UAL175. Three issues were occurring at same time—Cleveland, AAl 1
and UAL 175. He knew UAL 175 was off course at a fairly early time and he may have
taken an amount of time to talk to Herndon (Ricky Bell) wanting to find out if fighters
had been scrambled. One of his phone calls to Bell got information that fighters had been
scrambled. He thought they scrambled in response to UAL175. [Note: there is some
confusion as to whether NEADS was notified of and scrambled against UA175.
Mulligan is the only person interviewed who recalled anything about a scramble re
UA175.]
At 0849 EDT Mulligan requested Felser to get on line with NEADS to get a number for
Mulligan to call. 10 minutes later Barrett asks to do same thing.
UAL175 - took a look at all of 56 and part of 42 sectors. Wasn't a doubt in mind that
there was activity going on. UAL 175 seemed very similar to AAl 1 except feels that
UAL 175 target was lost because sector is high altitude, and changed primary target that
isn't selected you could lose it. Lost it on the see all. Never confirmed in own mind that
mulligan saw tracer.
Not as vivid in mind of communication and information sharing. After UAL 175 went
into the second tower Marty Rosenberg had to leave. Thinks Marty was present when hit
tower two. Thinks Marty was not there for first hit. Both of them were working together
on the phones.
Learned of second impact from Tracon or from CNN out of cafeteria. When was told or
heard of second hit, no doubt in mind that he was doing the same thing. And everyone
assumed it was 175 since it had same circumstances of AA11.
After second impact, remember hearing of 11 still being airborne? No. only conflicting
information being circulated was when AA11 hit first tower people were saying a light
aircraft hit tower, and AA11 still out there. Couldn't believe the light aircraft could do
that much damage. And after second hit only 175 could have done that much damage.
Squawking beacon code 3321. AA11 completely shut off beacon code. Was it easier to
follow and determine crash because of 3321? No transponder very hard to track. If have
beacon, as in 175, you have all information you want. If transponder is changed, get the
coast target with squawked code. Can do certain things with that. Start new track. Having
a transponder with wrong code is better than having none at all.
Can see alt as long as there is an operating transponder. As long as you have the
computer set to a certain setting that reads mode c. you would see alt. Mode c intruders
are an example.
AA11 with code off completely all you have is primary and very difficult to have. That's
why asking Ivonna on alt. With UAL175 can watch the alt descend. Also can see mode c
on radar target.
Recommendations
Special codes have not changed over time
After Reviewing Transcript
At 0841 EDT he received information from the Traffic Management Unit that American
11 had been hijacked. That information probably came through Marty Rosenberg who
was on line with company (American Airlines at approximately 0830 EDT. Information
on the flight attendant being stabbed was later, to Mulligan's recollection.
Military assistance was requested from Felserr around 0843. Time was of the essence so
that is why he asked Felserr since he figured Felserr would have a pre-programmed
scrambled phone to the appropriate place in his office. He could contact the right people.
Written procedures to request military assistance is there now - just didn't take as much
urgency as now. Numbers to call NEADS. Can get anyone from airman to colonel.
Bounced to phone to phone to phone. Tried in past to get info from military since so
much going on. Sometimes it takes too long a period of time to get the information.
Traffic management coordinator twice - one a hijack to Ivonna, had to be in 70s observed
in area a. second was as a TMC late 80s one area in New York got involved. Don't know
where departed from. Information through ATC. Mostly informed as procedures just to
stay quiet and wait to see what requests are made.
Probably very similar procedures to today. Contact command center.
On 9/11 would have been about same procedures to get military assistance. Probably in
OMIC handbook guide. Call NEADS to get fighters.
One recommendation would be that on DEN gets headquarters clerk, NEADS, customs -
would get a quick response. Unfortunately the way the DEN is being used it is getting
like "the little boy who cries wolf, procedures from FAA need to be more thorough and
more professional. Have people more air traffic savvy when dealing with these hotlines.
Should have a number directly to someone who has the authority to make immediate
decisions. Right now bureaucracy might get in its way. If fighters were 6 or 7 minutes
earlier still would have taken to long to get permission to engage. More than likely those
fighters would have been left waiting for orders. Should streamline communications and
have people with real time information directly linked to people with authority to make
decisions.
Training and awareness of people. ATCs and air traffic controllers need to be aware.
Need to be part of basic training to deal with unusual situations. Vast majority of ATCs
got training from military in past. Training was a little hard nosed. Many more training
failures. But the product was a better product. Do have refresher training. Brings
awareness back but can't compare to actual events.
Fictitious situations in which there could be simulations that are as far out of the box as
the event of 9/11. Pre 9/11 one scenario Forbes through out was about a plane being run
into a building. If you were developmental, it would be what would you do if somebody
coming out of Philadelphia wanted to hit the un building.. .type of training that used of
happen back then. Different types of emergencies in military dealing with fighters than
with commercial carriers. Have to be more flexible with training. Can't get too far out of
the box in training - 9/11 taught that. Would be positive if people tried to pick up new
9/11 type scenario.