Management of Fishing Capacity and Resource Use Conflicts in Southeast Asia: A Policy Brief

Mahfuzuddin Ahmed Nerissa D. Salayo K. Kuperan Viswanathan Len R. Garces Michael D. Pido August 2006

The WorldFish Center (Malaysia) In collaboration with:

Department of Fisheries (Cambodia) University of the Philippines in the Visayas (Philippines) Southern Marine Fisheries Development Center and Coastal Resources Institute (Thailand) University of Cape Town (South Africa) Ford Foundation (USA) Deutsche Gesellschaft fr Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ-Germany)

www.worldfishcenter.org

Acknowledgements
The authors acknowledge the collaboration with research partners, including Director Nao Thuok of the Department of Fisheries, Director Srun Lim Song, Lieng Sopha, Hap Navy, Keang Seng and Seng Leang of the Inland Fisheries Development Institute (Cambodia); Chancellor Ida Siason, Alice Joan Ferrer and Harold Monteclaro of the University of the Philippines in the Visayas (Philippines); Director Manoch Roongratri, Pakjuta Khemakorn, Amnaj Siripech and Amnuay Kongprom of the Southern Marine Fisheries Development Center, and Ayut Nissapa and Awae Masae of the Coastal Resources Institute (Thailand); Maria Hauck of the University of Cape Town (South Africa); and Robert Pomeroy, WorldFish Senior Research Fellow, for his comments. The WorldFish Center appreciates the grants from the Ford Foundation (USA) and Deutsche Gesellschaft fr Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ-Germany) with the belief that the benefits from the outcomes of this Fish Fights over Fish Rights project are worth the investment. Furthermore, we thank the numerous researchers, policy-makers and government regulatory personnel who joined in workshop deliberations on the management options for resolving conflicts in the fisheries in the region.

Executive summary
Most fisheries in the developing countries of Southeast Asia (SEA) are experiencing conflicts arising from excess fishing capacity. An analysis of the issues and a range of recommendations for managing fishing capacity are provided in this policy brief. The policy recommendations suggest four main thematic categories of action plans for fishery stakeholders. These are: (1) uphold institutional partnership and networking in research and development; (2) build non-fishery human capacity to reduce fishing capacity; (3) promote and harmonize action plans through good governance; and (4) advocate management options and make politicians aware of the security threats of conflicts arising from excess fishing capacity.

Fishing capacity Conflicts over resource use in fisheries have been escalating all over the world. This is particularly true in Southeast Asia (SEA). Its productive fisheries resource systems provide the much needed employment and protein requirements of the population. Increasing fishing pressure and over-harvesting of fishery resources, however, have resulted in tense competition for resource between small-scale and large-scale fishing operations, as well as the reduction and/or collapse of important viable fish populations. These, in turn, have led to high levels of conflicts among different users over remaining stocks. The rapid population growth rate in a societal context of reduced income, increased poverty and an overall decline in the standard of living often drive users to employ more effective, but destructive, fishing technologies. This Policy Brief offers a set of management options and policy recommendations for managing the problem. This is cognizant of the intricately related problems/issues faced by most fisheries in Southeast Asia concerning over-capacity, particularly in the context of resource use conflicts. This Brief is intended for policy makers and fishery managers involved in the small-scale fishery sector. Several management measures are needed to effectively address over-capacity, and not all resource use conflicts are due to over-capacity. The key strategies to exit from the fisheries pertain to effort reduction and sustainable alternative livelihoods. The complementary strategies include improving governance and property rights, participatory management, enhancement of stakeholder awareness and capacity building for non-fishing livelihoods. Over-capacity is the situation where the capacity to capture is much more than the target to be captured (Pascoe and Greboval 2003:4; Pascoe et al. 2003). Over-capacity and excess capacity are terms used interchangeably in this policy brief. Overcapacity in fisheries has been noted in Bangladesh (Rahman et al., 2003), India (Vivekanandan et al., 2003) and Sri Lanka (Samaranayake 2003). In Indonesias Java Sea, excess effort is estimated at 428 units of 25-gross-tonnage trawlers (Purwanto 2003). In Vietnam, from 1987-1999, the three-fold increase in horsepower resulted in only 1.81 times increase in the total catch (Son, in Silvestre et al. 2003). The serious state of the fishery resources highlights the urgent need for the countries in the region to take action, particularly in terms of managing excess fishing capacity. In 1995, East Asia contributed about 78 per cent to global capacity with its approximate 980,000 decked fishery vessels (PEMSEA 2003). Causes of excess fishing capacity Over-capacity and resource use conflicts are intricately linked (Figure 1). There are societal drivers that bring about over capacity. In turn, over-capacity leads to various negative impacts. Among the key impacts are resource use conflicts. There is a feedback loop to indicate that resource use conflicts may also lead to over-capacity. It must be noted, however, that over-capacity may still occur even in conditions where there is no resource use conflicts.

Main Drivers

Key Problem

Impacts

Policies, Institutions for Governance, Property Rights Population increase, Poverty

O V E R

Over-fishing

Environmental degradation

Economic incentives, Markets, New / Improved Technology

C A P A C I T Y

Resource use Conflicts Threats to food, livelihood and human security

Figure 1. A conceptual framework for contextualizing over-capacity in fisheries in Southeast Asia with reference to main drivers, and impacts with emphasis on resource use conflicts (modified from Kuperan and Garces 2003 and Salayo et al. 2005). Case studies from Asia Cambodia, the Philippines, and Thailand were chosen for case studies. These three countries provide various modes of excess capacity, as well as varying types of resource use conflicts in various geographic settings: coastal marine, riverine and freshwater lakes. The research methods employed included household surveys, focused group discussion (FGD), key informant interview (KII), questionnaire interview, rapid appraisal and stakeholder analysis. The sample size of the respondents also varied among the sites, and most of the data were gathered in 2004.

Figure 2. Location of eight case study sites in Southeast Asia

Box 1 Cambodia: Conflicts in Ton Le Sap Lake, Mekong River tributary and coastal fishing areas of the Gulf of Thailand (Source: Seng et al. 2004)

The case study examined: (1) the allocation of fishing rights to large- and small-scale operators; (2) the impact on fishing capacity and equity policies to reduce fishing capacity; and (3) the reduction of tensions between poor small-scale operators and larger commercial operators. In Cambodia, many boundaries of fishing lots were either neglected or the government was unable to re-demarcate the lots during the war. This resulted in confrontations between lot owners and the residents. Conflicts also arose between and among other fisher groups. A survey was conducted of 270 respondents from Community Fisheries (CF) and Non-Community Fisheries (NCF) in three provinces of Kandal, Pursat and Kampot. Kandal and Pursat provinces represented the freshwater fishers, while Kampot was chosen to represent coastal (marine) fishers. Aside from key informant interviews, the study also conducted 12 FGDs interviews with 18 institutions in the study areas. During the projects National Workshop held on 11-12 November 2004, the following conflicts were identified and validated: 1. conflicts between various types of fishers brought about by competition for access to resources; 2. conflicts between fishers and local authority, arising mainly from leasing/selling of fishing grounds; 3. conflicts between fishers and lot owners due to land conversion for agriculture and water extraction; 4. conflicts between provincial fisheries officers and local influential people who allegedly try to protect illegal fishers; 5. conflicts between community members and community committee members for selling the fishing grounds, including deep fishing areas; 6. conflicts between local fishers and outside fishers due to resources use competition and the outsiders who use illegal fishing gears; 7. conflicts between local fishers and foreign fishers due to poaching and the foreign fishers using modern fishing gears; 8. conflicts between fishers and seaweed culturists, because the latter restrict the formers fishing areas; 9. conflicts between fishers and fish culturist; 10. conflicts between farmers and lotus farmers, whose activities lead to loss of fishing areas due to sedimentation; 11. institutional conflicts brought about by unclear delineation of responsibilities among the fisheries management bodies; 12. conflicts concerning cutting of flooded forest for different economic activities, such as shrimp farming and charcoal production, leading to more losses of flooded forest; 13. environmental conflicts, especially when dam building in one country poses environmental threat in another country; and 14. ethnic group conflictsthat are often associated with competition for fishing grounds.

Box 2 Thailand: Fisheries Conflicts and Excess Fishing Capacity in the Gulf of Thailand (Songkhla Province) (Source: Nisappa et al. 2004)

The case study in Songkhla in southern Thailand focused on conflicts between anchovy fishers and other gear operators (shrimp gill nets, crab gill nets and fish gill nets). Such conflicts have been occurring since 1996. The small-scale fishers were mostly from Bo-daeng sub-district and the local anchovy fishers were from Natub sub-district. Small-scale local fishers claimed that light luring anchovy fishery had caused serious destruction to aquatic resources, causing declines in their catches. The effects of these conflicts had grown and became a problem at the national level. The problems were taken to the National Committee for Fisheries Policy for deliberation, which designated the Department of Fisheries as the agency to manage all anchovy fishing activities in Thai waters. On 10 February 2000, a multi-stakeholder committee addressed conflicts through a resolution on the delineation of anchovy fishing zones. The details of the resolution are: Zone 1: Areas five nautical miles from the shoreline are designated as fishing area for small-scale fishers. Anchovy fishing using light luring bulbs is prohibited, except in the area of Mae Nam Natub, Jana district up to the marine boundary between Songkhla Province and Pattani Province, where the distance shall be three nautical miles from the shoreline. Zone 2: Areas between 5 and 12 nautical miles shall be allowed for fishing activities by anchovy fishers using falling nets and lift nets, with boats of less than 14 meters in length. Zone 3: Areas between 12 and 15 nautical miles shall be prohibited from anchovy fishing with light luring bulbs. Zone 4: Areas 15 nautical miles outward shall be allowed for fishing activities by anchovy fishers using lift nets and falling nets, with boats of over 14 meters in length. The study employed rapid appraisal techniques for data and information gathering, with qualitative approach for data analysis. Data were collected using key informants and semi-structured questionnaires. The local key informants were small-scale fishers, anchovy fishers, anchovy processors, academicians and fishery scientists, a local leader and an NGO officer. In addition to the above primary survey, data and information from published sources were collected for referencing and joint analysis. The study documented that the conflicts have subsided since the enforcement of the zoning regulation, but they have not been entirely eliminated. In addition, there are optimistic views that strict zoning - along with enrichment with appropriate artificial reefs placements, and enforcement of closed season and protected areas - can help sustain the resources. Experiences from a few months of closed fishing season have shown some satisfactory recovery rates

Box 3 The Philippines: Fisheries conflicts and fishing capacity in the Visayan Sea (Source: Siason et al. 2004)

The 1998 Fisheries Code stipulated the limits of municipal waters and the reserved status for use of municipal (or small-scale) fishers. However, this has provided some flexibilities for local government units (LGUs) to allow certain commercial fishers in the 10.1-15 km zone from the shoreline. In turn, ordinances have been promulgated by the LGUs to implement the provisions of this Code on access to municipal waters. The potential conflicts that arise from this zoning regulation include those within municipalities, between municipalities, between municipal and commercial fishing sectors, and between fishers and local government / implementing agencies. Three separate case studies in three locations were drawn of the fisheries conflicts arising from zoning regulations to enable better understanding of the dynamics of fishing over-capacity, conflicts and security issues in the Philippines. A semi-structured questionnaire was used within an interview context to gather information on the variables under study. These were complemented by Key Informant Interviews and Focus Group Discussions. A total of 258 respondents from three coastal municipalities in the Visayan Sea were interviewed, namely: Conception, Iloilo (108); Escalante City, Negros Occidental (90); and Daanbantayan, Cebu (60). The study has documented the inter-group and intra-group conflicts reported by the respondents. Among commercial fishers, there is competition for the perceived best spot for fishing. When one fisher does not respect the primacy of whoever arrives first, there is gear entanglement that results in damages. Among municipal fishers, the overcrowding in the same area due to their number and perceived best location also brings out gear conflicts. The more common conflicts are those between the municipal and commercial fishers. The typical occurrence, for example, is the running-over/bumping of municipal fishers smaller crafts by the commercial boats, resulting in net and outrigger entanglements, loss of small fishers gears, damage to stationary gear and fish aggregating devices. In addition, the less visible loss is the decrease in the small fishers catch because the commercial fishers insist on operating in the municipal waters using their highly efficient gears. Other types of conflicts in the Visayan Sea area include: (1) institutional conflicts (involving Bantay Dagat or local sea wardens, local government officials, and middlemen); (2) issues related to the establishment of marine protected areas (MPAs); (3) migrant fishers who generally are not aware of the ordinance; (4) area coverage: fishing activity legal in one municipality but illegal in another neighboring municipality; and (5) piracy (e.g. theft of boat engines and fishing gears). The following approaches were suggested for managing conflicts and exit in fisheries in the study area: introduction of unified, consistent, and complementary fishery ordinances within the same ecosystem; amendment of relevant provisions of the RA 8550 (for example, to include 3.1-20 gross tonnage (GT) boats in the municipal fishing); investigation of the production and marketing system to determine the proper GT and type of gears to be used within the municipal waters; proper implementation of licensing and registration (to regulate the number of both municipal and commercial fishing vessels); addressing the issues on production in the short run and productivity in the long run; and focusing on the optimum utilization of the resource (e.g. eco-tourism, etc.).

Strategies for exit from the fisheries Exit strategies are the main "management handles to address over-capacity in smallscale fisheries; these must be put in place before instituting other measures. These exit strategies are broadly classified into regulatory and economic measures. Effort reduction and gear/area/temporal restrictions are regulatory in nature. Such measures are sometimes called as sticks. Sustainable alternative livelihoods are primarily economic incentives. Measures like these are also referred to as carrots. The reactions of the case study respondents to these exit strategies are reflected in Table 2. Overall, measures concerning effort reduction are not acceptable to most fishers. Although most measures within the cluster gear/area/temporal restrictions are acceptable, there is certain ambivalence towards closed season. Sustainable alternative livelihoods are well accepted.
Table 2. Reactions of respondents to exit strategies based on the case studies in Cambodia, Philippines and Thailand.
Exit strategy Cambodia Philippines Thailand 1. Effort reduction Catch limitation Disagreed Disagreed n/a Limiting the number of fishers Disagreed Disagreed n/a 2. Gear / area / temporal restrictions Banning the use of certain gears Agreed Agreed Recommended Closed season / non-fishing seasons Disagreed Ambivalent n/a Establishment of protected areas n/a Agreed Recommended 3. Sustainable alternative livelihoods Agreed Agreed Recommended Notes: 1. Agreed means more than 50 per cent of all fisher groups were in favor of the strategy. 2. Disagreed means more than 50 per cent of all fisher groups were not in favor of the strategy. 3. Ambivalent means the percentages were close between fisher groups who agreed and disagreed. 4. n/a means the question was not specifically asked to respondents. 5. Recommended means the strategy was identified, but the specific percentage of respondents was unknown. Source: Seng et al. (2004); Siason et al. (2004); Nissapa et al. (2004).

The policy goal is to promote sustainability in fisheries by managing excess capacity in such manner that the conflict concerns are adequately addressed. The appropriateness and/or suitability of the proposed management measures were evaluated using several indicators during the regional workshop 1 . These indicators serve as preliminary and qualitative parameters in the absence of quantitative data sets. An indicator serves as a reference point for judging. Seven indicators were used in the analysis (Box 4). Each indicator was defined, and provided with a specific measure and/or sets of measures. In terms of technical adequacy, all the proposed management measures have technical merits, i.e. availability of credible technical and scientific bases. The main exception is catch limitation, due to the limited availability of quantitative and time series information.
Regional Consolidation Workshop on Fish Fights over Fish Rights: Managing Conflicts and Exit from Fisheries and Security Implications for South and Southeast Asia, International Rice Research Institute Complex, Philippines, 17th 20th May 2005
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Generating reliable information for catch limitation is difficult in the tropics, particularly in the Philippines, because of multi-species marine fisheries. Even in inland fisheries, with fairly limited geographical environment, no effective scheme for limitation of catch has been established yet. Catch limitation may work best in commercial fisheries whose landings can be monitored. Global banning of gears must be put in context. Regulation should consider what gear is being used and where. While trawls may be destructive in nearshore waters, these are legitimate gears in deeper waters. Hence, controlling the use of certain gears may be more appropriate rather than total banning per se. For net benefit, it will be positive for some measures and negative for others. It would also be dependent on the social units: for example, establishment of MPA, zoning and sustainable alternative livelihood have positive net benefits at the household level.

Box 4 Acceptability indicators for management measure 1. Technical adequacy relates to the availability of credible technical and scientific bases for the proposed exit strategy. This is expressed in a five-point Likert scale. A rating of 5 implies availability of more credible technical and scientific bases for the proposed exit strategy, while a rating of 1 implies the reverse. 2. Net benefit pertains to the ratio of cost over benefit of doing a particular strategy. Its net benefit is positive if the benefits outweigh the cost. This criterion is often expressed in monetary term or value. For this exercise, the measure is either positive or negative. 3. Administrative feasibility is measured by the estimated cost of the particular strategy. As such, this is expressed in terms of the projected or estimated cost of implementing the strategy. Scale for administrative feasibility is in terms of net cost: 1 as the least costly and 5 as the costliest. 4. Legality pertains to the existence of a legal pronouncement and/or basis to legitimize the implementation of a certain exit strategy. This is simply measured by either a yes or no response. 5. Social acceptability is measured by the perceived and/or actual level of support of the fisher groups for a particular strategy. This is likewise expressed in a five-point Likert scale. Hence, the rate for social acceptability for an intervention is 1 if it is the least acceptable, and 5 if it is the most acceptable. 6. Political acceptability is measured by the perceived and/or actual level of support of the local government unit for the management measure. Its rating system is similar to social acceptability. 7. Equity is measured qualitatively in terms of a relative fairness of a strategy. Hence, a rating of 1 suggests that the measure is least acceptable, while a value of 5 implies that it is the most acceptable.

Policy recommendations

The major policy recommendations are grouped into four clusters. These are based on the recommendations derived from the case studies, as well as the suggestions given in various workshops and consultations. These are generic policy directions that may be pursued in the Southeast Asian fisheries. Institutional partnership in research and development (R&D) Undertake relevant R&D programs. Provide scientific/ technical advice and other relevant information. Enhance institutional networking. Building non-fishery human capacity to reduce fishing capacity Build capacity of institutions at all levels of governance. Develop coordination and partnerships among stakeholders. Facilitate community organizing and development. Act as key partner in sustainable resource management. Participate actively in action programs at the local level. Secure access to resources for sustainable livelihood. Promote and harmonize action plans through good governance Formulate and implement a national plan of action for addressing over-capacity and resource use conflicts in fisheries. Harmonize the relevant plan of action at the international/regional level. Promote collaboration in implementing international / regional action programs. Advocate management interventions and politicize security threats Promote a conducive policy climate. Promote effective natural resource management. Support fisheries and resource management. The policy recommendations are likewise based on institutional partnership. Hence, the academe, research institutions, national/local governments, NGOs/peoples organizations (POs), international/regional organizations, donors/investors, private sector and primary stakeholders have crucial roles to play. The recommendations are also geared toward actions that may be implemented singly or collectively by the various partners.

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