REPUBLIC ACT No. 3019 ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT Section 1. Statement of policy.

It is the policy of the Philippine Government, in line with the principle that a public office is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. Section 2. Definition of terms. As used in this Act, that term (a) "Government" includes the national government, the local governments, the government-owned and government-controlled corporations, and all other instrumentalities or agencies of the Republic of the Philippines and their branches. (b) "Public officer" includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government as defined in the preceding subparagraph. (c) "Receiving any gift" includes the act of accepting directly or indirectly a gift from a person other than a member of the public officer's immediate family, in behalf of himself or of any member of his family or relative within the fourth civil degree, either by consanguinity or affinity, even on the occasion of a family celebration or national festivity like Christmas, if the value of the gift is under the circumstances manifestly excessive. (d) "Person" includes natural and juridical persons, unless the context indicates otherwise. Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: (a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense. (b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other part, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law. (c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for another, from any person for whom the public officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Government permit or license, in consideration for the help given or to be given, without prejudice to Section thirteen of this Act. (d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private enterprise which has pending official business with him during the pendency thereof or within one year after its termination. (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. (f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party. (g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby. (h) Director or indirectly having financing or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest. (i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain, or having a material interest in any transaction or act requiring the approval of a board, panel or group of which he is a member, and which exercises discretion in such approval, even if he votes against the same or does not participate in the action of the board, committee, panel or group. Interest for personal gain shall be presumed against those public officers responsible for the approval of manifestly unlawful, inequitable, or irregular transaction or acts by the board, panel or group to which they belong. (j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled. (k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his office or by him on account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in advance of its authorized release date. The person giving the gift, present, share, percentage or benefit referred to in subparagraphs (b) and (c); or offering or giving to the public officer the employment mentioned in subparagraph (d); or urging the divulging or untimely release of the confidential information referred to in subparagraph (k) of this section shall, together with the offending public officer, be punished under Section nine of this Act and shall be permanently or temporarily disqualified in the discretion of the Court, from transacting business in any form with the Government. Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person having family or close personal relation with any public official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from any other person having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with the government, in which such public official has to intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree. The word "close personal relation" shall include close personal friendship, social and fraternal connections, and professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures free access to such public officer.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof. Section 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for any relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree, of the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to intervene, directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application with the Government: Provided, That this section shall not apply to any person who, prior to the assumption of office of any of the above officials to whom he is related, has been already dealing with the Government along the same line of business, nor to any transaction, contract or application already existing or pending at the time of such assumption of public office, nor to any application filed by him the approval of which is not discretionary on the part of the official or officials concerned but depends upon compliance with requisites provided by law, or rules or regulations issued pursuant to law, nor to any act lawfully performed in an official capacity or in the exercise of a profession. Section 6. Prohibition on Members of Congress. It shall be unlawful hereafter for any Member of the Congress during the term for which he has been elected, to acquire or receive any personal pecuniary interest in any specific business enterprise which will be directly and particularly favored or benefited by any law or resolution authored by him previously approved or adopted by the Congress during the same term. The provision of this section shall apply to any other public officer who recommended the initiation in Congress of the enactment or adoption of any law or resolution, and acquires or receives any such interest during his incumbency. It shall likewise be unlawful for such member of Congress or other public officer, who, having such interest prior to the approval of such law or resolution authored or recommended by him, continues for thirty days after such approval to retain such interest. Section 7. Statement of assets and liabilities. Every public officer, within thirty days after the approval of this Act or after assuming office, and within the month of January of every other year thereafter, as well as upon the expiration of his term of office, or upon his resignation or separation from office, shall prepare and file with the office of the corresponding Department Head, or in the case of a Head of Department or chief of an independent office, with the Office of the President, or in the case of members of the Congress and the officials and employees thereof, with the Office of the Secretary of the corresponding House, a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year: Provided, That public officers assuming office less than two months before the end of the calendar year, may file their statements in the following months of January. Section 8. Dismissal due to unexplained wealth. If in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act Numbered One thousand three hundred seventynine, a public official has been found to have acquired during his incumbency, whether in his name or in the name of other persons, an amount of property and/or money manifestly out of proportion to his salary and to his other lawful income, that fact shall be a ground for dismissal or removal. Properties in the name of the spouse and unmarried children of such public official may be taken into consideration, when their acquisition through legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shown. Bank deposits shall be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this section, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary. Section 9. Penalties for violations. (a) Any public officer or private person committing any of the unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years, perpetual disqualification from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful income. Any complaining party at whose complaint the criminal prosecution was initiated shall, in case of conviction of the accused, be entitled to recover in the criminal action with priority over the forfeiture in favor of the Government, the amount of money or the thing he may have given to the accused, or the value of such thing. (b) Any public officer violation any of the provisions of Section 7 of this Act shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the Court. The violation of said section proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public officer, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him. Section 10. Competent court. Until otherwise provided by law, all prosecutions under this Act shall be within the original jurisdiction of the proper Court of First Instance. Section 11. Prescription of offenses. All offenses punishable under this Act shall prescribe in ten years. Section 12. Termination of office. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery. Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him. Section 14. Exception. Unsolicited gifts or presents of small or insignificant value offered or given as a mere ordinary token of gratitude or friendship according to local customs or usage, shall be excepted from the provisions of this Act. Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted to prejudice or prohibit the practice of any profession, lawful trade or occupation by any private person or by any public officer who under the law may legitimately practice his profession, trade or occupation, during his incumbency, except where the practice of such profession, trade or occupation involves conspiracy with any other person or public official to commit any of the violations penalized in this Act. Section 15. Separability clause. If any provision of this Act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstances is declared invalid, the remainder of the Act or the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected by such declaration. Section 16. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect on its approval, but for the purpose of determining unexplained wealth, all property acquired by a public officer since he assumed office shall be taken into consideration. Approved: August 17, 1960

Serana vs Sandiganbayan, GR 162059, January 22, 2008 Posted by Pius Morados on November 10, 2011 (Public Officer, Student Regent) Facts: Accused movant charged for the crime of estafa is a government scholar and a student regent of the University of the Phillipines, Diliman, Quezon City. While in the performance of her official functions, she represented to former President Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the UP will be renovated and renamed as Pres. Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall and for which purpose accused requested the amount of P15,000,000.00. Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person because as a UP student regent, she was not a public officer due to the following: 1.) that being merely a member in representation of the student body since she merely represented her peers; 2.) that she was a simple student and did not receive any salary as a UP student regent; and 3.) she does not fall under Salary Grade 27. The Ombudsman contends that petitioner, as a member of the BOR is a public officer, since she had the general powers of administration and exercise the corporate powers of UP. Compensation is not an essential part of public office. Moreover, the Charter of the University of the Philippines reveals that the Board of Regents, to which accused-movant belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of administration and corporate powers in the university. It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only through its board of directors, or board of trustees in the case of non-stock corporations. Issue: WON a government scholar and UP student regent is a public officer. Held: Yes. First, Public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer. (Laurel vs Desierto) Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer. Second, Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explicitly vest the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Hence, it is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606 the statute defining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Third, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most, it is merely incidental to the public office. Hence, Petitioner is a public officer by express mandate of P.D.No. 1606 and jurisprudence.

[G.R. No. 124067. March 27, 1998]

PERLA A. SEGOVIA, REYNALDO C. SANTIAGO and WINIFREDO SM. PANGILINAN, petitioners vs. The SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and the PRESIDENT of the NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, respondents. DECISION NARVASA, C.J.: The special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar seeks nullification of two (2) Resolutions of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued in Criminal Case No. 21711 -- in which petitioners are prosecuted for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act : Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. The resolution assailed are: 1) that dated February 1, 1996, which ordered petitioners preventive suspension for ninety (90) days in accordanc e with Section 13 of said R.A 3019; and 2) that dated February 23, 1996, which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration of the suspension order. The primary issue raised is whether it is mandatory or discretionary for the Sandiganbayan to place under preventive suspension public officers who stand accused before it, pursuant to said Section 13 of the law. Section 13 reads: Sec. 13 Suspension and Loss of benefits. -- Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or propertty, whether as a simple or as a complex offense in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. ** ** It is petitioners' submission that preventive suspension under this section rest in the sound discretion of the Sandiganbayan despite the ostensibly mandatory language of the statute, and that that discretion was gravely abused by the Sandiganbayan, or it exceeded its jurisdiction, when it decreed their suspension. Petitioners -- Perla Segovia, Reynaldo Santiago, and Winifredo SM Pangilinan -- all hold regular executive positions in the National Power Corporation (NPC). They -- together with two other officers who have since resigned from the NPC, namely: Gilberto A. Pastoral and Cecilia D. Vales -were designated by the NPC Board to compose the Contracts Committee for said NPCs Mindanao Grid LDC & SCADA/EMS System Operation Control Center and Facilities Project. The Contracts Committee thus constituted conducted the prequalification and bidding procedures for the project. The lowest and second lowest bidders were the Joint Venture of INPHASE and T & D, and Urban Consolidated Constructors, Inc., respectively. The Technical Task Force on Bid Evaluation of the NPC reviewed all the bids submitted and recommended approval of the results. The contracts Committee, however, declared the lowest bidder (Joint Venture) disqualified after verification from the Philippines Contractors Accredition Board that that group, as well as the second lowest bidder (Urban) had been downgraded, thereby rending both ineligible as bidders. The Contracts Committee also stated that since a review of relevant factors disclosed that the other bids had exceeded the Approved Agency Estimates and the Allowable Government Estimates for Options A and B of the Project, it was was needful for the NPC Board to declare a failure of bidding and direct a re-bidding. The recommendation was unanimously approved by the NPC Board; but for reasons not appearing on record (and, in any event, not relevant to the inquiry), the project was eventually cancelled.

Obviously feeling aggrieved by the turn of events, Urban filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against the Chairman and Members of the Board of Directors of NPC; the Chairman (Gilberto Pascual) and Members of the NPC Contracts Awards Committee; the Chairman (Perla Segovia) of the Pre-Qualification Bids & Awards Committee; the Manager (Cecilia D. Vales) of the Contracts Management Office, and two others.[1] Urban alleged that before the bidding, Joint Venture had been disqualified, but the Contracts Committee, without basis and in order to favor it, reconsidered its disqualification and thus enabled it to take part in the bidding and in fact to submit the lowest bid; that the NPC was already poised to award the contract to Joint Venture but because Urban protested, it was compelled to "post-disqualify" the former; however, intead of awarding the contract for the project to Urban as the second lowest bidder, the Committee and the NPC Board declared a failure of bidding and ultimately cancelled the project. These acts, it is claimed, constituted a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. A preliminary investigation was conducted by the Ombudsmans Office after which Graft Investigation Officer A.A. Amante submitted a Resolution dated August 2, 1994[2]recommending, among others, that: 1) petitioners Perla Segovia, Reynaldo Santiago, Winifredo SM Pangilinan, as well as Gilberto Pastoral and Cecilia Vales be charged with a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 of having in one way or the other extended undue advantage to Joint Venture through mani fest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence; and 2) the NPC President, NPC charman and Members of the Board of Directors be cleared of the ** complaint as their official actuation of sustaining a failure of bidding and the consequent re-bidding is supported by factual and legal basis. Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr., favorably endorsed the recommendation which was eventually approved on December 6, 1994 by Hon. Conrado M. Vasquez, then the Ombudsman.[3] An information was accordingly filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioners Segovia, Santiago, and Pangilinan, as well as Pastoral and Vales, docketed as Criminal Case No. 21711. They were charged with infringement of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019: i,e., causing undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial function through manifest partiality, evident bad faithy or gross inexcusable negligence. Petioners sought and obtained a reinvestigation of their case but gained no benefit thereby. For although the reinvestigating officer made a recommendation on March 7, 1995 that the information against petitioners be withdrawn -- because the prima facie case had already been overthrown, considering that, as it now stands, the evidence at hand cannot stand judicial scrunity [4] -- and that recommendation met with the aprroval of the Special Prosecutor, it was ultimately turned down by the chief Special Prosecutor [5] on April 18, 1995, and on April 20, 1995, by the Ombudsman himself.[6] The case thus proceeded in the Sandiganbayan. The accused were arraigned and entered pleas of not guilty; and a pre-trial was held which resulted in stipulation of facts embodied in an order dated January 11, 1996. [7] Earlier, the People had filed a Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite dated October 24, 1995, invoking Section 13 of RA 3019., as amended, and relevant jurisprudence, and alleging that the information/s is /are valid.[8] Petitioner opposed the motion.[9] In their pleading dated November 28, 1995, the theorized that the explicit terms of the law notwithstanding, their suspension was not mandatory in the premises. They claimed that the admissions at the pre-trial show that the transactions in question resulted in no unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference, or injury, to anyone; that two of the five accused were no longer employees of the NPC; that two of the five accused were no longer employees of the NPC; that the positions that Segovia, Pangilinan and Santiago continued to occupy in the NPC were quite sentitive and had no relation to prequalification of contractors, biddings or awards -- which was an additional function temporarily assigned to them and for which the received no compensation at all -- and their suspension might cause delay of vital projects of the NPC; and that under the circumstances obtaining, they were in no position to tamper with any evidence. Petitioners opposition was overruled. On January 31, 1996 the Sandiganbayan[10] handed down its Resolution suspending them for a period of ninety (90) days.[11] The Sandiganbayan held that the suspension was mandated under the law upon a finding that a proper preliminary investigation had been conducted , the information was valid, and the accused were charged with any of the crimes specified in the law; and stressed that its authority and power to suspend the accused had been repeatedly upheld in several precedents. It subsequently denied petitioners motion for reconsideration dated February 14, 1996, (c)onsidering the paucity of the(ir) arguments ** and in the light of the mass of jurisprudence involving the power and authority of this Court to issue orders for preventive suspension of the accused **.[12] Petitioners would now have this Court strike down these resolution because supposedly rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The court will not do so. In no sense may the challeged resolutions be stigmatized as so clearly capricious, whimsical, oppressive, egregiously erroneous or wanting in logic as to call for invalidation by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. On the contrary, in promulgating those resolution, the Sandiganbayan did but adhere to the clear command of the law and what it calls a mass of jurispudence emanating from this Court, sustaining its authority to decree suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it. Indeed, that the theory o f discretionary suspension should still be advocated to this late date, despite the mass of jurisprudence relevant to the issue, it little short of amazing, bordering on contumacious disregard of the solemn magisterial pronouncements of the Highest court of the land. Republic Act no. 3019 was enacted by Congress more than 37 years ago, on August 17, 1960, becoming effective on the same date. The law was later amended by Republic Act No. 3047, Presidential Decree 677 and Presidential Decree No. 1288. The last amendment -- to Section 13 thereof -- was introduced by Batas Pambansa Bilang 195, approved on March 16, 1972. The validity of Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended -- treating of the suspension pendente lite of an accused public officer -- may no longer be put at issue, having been repeatedly upheld by this Court. As early as 1984, in Bayot v. Sandiganbayan,[13] the Court held by this Court. As suspension was not penal in character but merely a preventive measure before final judgement; hence, the suspension of a public officer charged with one of the crimes listed in the amending law, committed before said amendment, does not violate the constitutional provision against an ex post facto law. The purpose of suspension is to prevent the accused public officer from frustrating or hampering his prosecution by intimidating or influencing witnesses or tampering with documentary evidence, or from committing further acts of malfeasance while in office.[14]Substantially to the same effect was the Courts holding in 1991, in Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan,[15] that preventive suspension is not violative suspension remains entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence since his culpability must still be established. The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act implicitly recognizes that the power of preventive suspension lies in the court in which the criminal charge is filed; once a case is filed in court, all other acts connected with the discharge of court functions -- including preventive suspension -- should be aknowledged as within the competence of the court that has taken cognizance thereof, no violation of the doctrine of separation of powers being perceivable in that acknowledgment.[16] The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicated upon a valid information under Act, whether they be appointive or elective officials; or permenent or temporary employees, or pertaining to the career or non-career service.[17] It appears to a Public High School Principal;[18] a Municipal Mayor;[19] a Governor;[20] a Congressman;[21] a Department of Science and Technology (DOST) non-career Project Manager;[22] a Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).[23] The term office in Section 13 of the law applies to any office in relation to which he is charged.[24] It is mandatory for the court to place under preventive suspension a public officer accused before it. [25] Imposition of suspension, however, is not automatic or self-operative. A precondition therefor is the existence of a valid information, determined at a pre-suspension hearing. Such a hearing is in accord with the spirit of the law, considering the serious and far-reaching consequences of a suspension of a public official even before his conviction, and the demands of public interest for speedy determination of the issues involved in the case. [26] The purpose of the pre-suspension hearing is basically to detrmine the validity of the information and thereby furnish the court with a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, or refuse suspension of the latter and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the proceeding which impairs its validity. 27 The accused should be given adequate oppurtunity to challege the validity or regularity of the criminal proceedings against him; e.g. that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation; that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation; that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime (under R.A. 3019 or the Revised Penal Code) warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of the Act; or that the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.28 But once a proper determination

of the validity of the Information has been made, it becomes the ministerial duty of the court to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension of the accused official on the pretext that the order denying the latters motion to quash is pending review before the appellate co urts.29 However, the preventive suspension may not be of indefinite duration or for an unreasonable length of time; it would be constitutionally proscribed otherwise as it raises, at the very least, questions of denial of due process and equal protection of the laws.30 The Court has thus laid down the rule that preventive suspension may not exceed the maximum period of ninety (90) days in consonance with Presidential Decree No. 807 (the Civil Service Decree), noew Section 52 of the Administrative Code of 1987. 31 While petitioners concede that this Court has al most consistently ruled that the preventive suspension contemplated in Section 13 of RA 3019 is mandantory in character, they nonetheless urge the Court to consider their case an exception because of the peculiar circumstances thereof. They assert that the evils sought to be avoidedby seperating a public official from the scene of his alleged misfeasance while the same is be ing investigated32 -- e.g., to preclude the abuse of the prerogative of ** (his) office, such as through intimidation of witnesses, 33 or the tampering with documentary evidence -- will not occur in the present situation where: 1. The Project has been cancelled. 2. (Their) ** official duties no longer pertain, in any manner, to the prequalification of contractors dealing with the NPC. Neither are they now involved in any bidding for or awarding of contracts, ** it (being) emphasized (in this connection) that they were merely designated as ad hoc members of the Committee without additional compensation for their additional duties. 3. All the relevant documentary evidence had been submitted either to the Ombudsman or the Honorable Sandiganbayan. They conclude that their preventive suspension at this point would actually be purposeless, as there is no more need for pre cautionary measures against their abuse of the prerogatives of their offic e. The arguments are not new. They have been advanced and rejected in earlier cases. They will again be so rejected in this case. The Courts pronouncements in Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan, supra.,34 are germane: Our holding that, upon the filing of a valid information charging violation of Republic Act No. 30 19, Book II, Title 7 of t he Revised Penal Code, or fraud upon government or public property, it is the duty of the court to place the accused under preventive suspension disposes of petitioners other contention that since the trial in the Sandiganbayan is now over with respect to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution there is no longer any danger that petitioner would intimidate prosecutions witnesses. The fact is that the possibility that the accused would intimid ate witnesses or otherwise hamper his prosecution is just one of the grounds for preventive suspension. The other one is, ** to prevent the accused from committing further acts of malfeasance while in office. Bolastig also disposes of the other contention that vital projects of NPC may be delayed by their preventive suspension, viz.:35 Finally, the fact that petitioners preventive suspension may deprive the people of Samar of the services of an official ele cted by them, at least temporarily, is not a sufficient basis for reducing what is otherwise a mandatory period prescribed by law. The vice governor, who has likewise been elected by them, will act as governor. (The Local Government Code of 1991, sec. 46[a]) Indeed, even the Constitution authorizes the suspension for not more than sixty days of members of Congress found guilty of disorderly behavior, (Art. VI, sec. 16[3]) thus rejecting the view expressed in one case (Alejandrino v. Quezon. 46 Phil. 83, 96 [1924]) that members of the legislature could not be suspended because in the case of suspension, unlike in the case of removal, the seat remains filled but the constitutents are deprived of reprensation. The firmly entrenched doctrine is that under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law, the suspension of a public officer is mandatory after a determination has been made of the validity of the information in a pre-suspension hearing conducted for that purpose. In Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,36 decided fairly recently, the Court again expatiated on the mandatory character of suspension pendente lite under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 and the nature of the pre-suspension hearing. This Court has ruled that under Section 13 of the anti-graft law, the suspension of a public officer is mandatory after the validity of the information has been upheld in a pre-suspension hearing conducted for that purpose. This pre-suspension hearing is conducted to determine basically the validity of the information, from which the Court can have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, or withhold the suspension of the latter and dismissed the case, or correct any part of the proceeding which impairs its validity. That hearing may be treated in the same manner as a challenge to the validity of the information by way of a motion to quash (See People vs. Albano, etc., et. al., L-45376-77, July 28, 1988, 163 SCRA 511) In the leading case of Luciano, et al. vs. Mariano, et al. (L-32950, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 187), we have set out the guidelines to be followed by the lower courts in the exercise of the power of suspension under Section 13 of the law, to wit: (c) By way of broad guidelines for the lower courts in the exercise of the power of suspension from office of public officers charged under a valid information under the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery, pursuant to section 13 of said Act, it may be briefly stated that upon the filing of such information, the trial court should issue an order with proper notice requiring the accused officer to show cause at a specific date of hearing why he shoud not be ordered suspended from office pursuant to the cited mandatory provisions of the Act. Where either the prosecution seasonably files a motion for an order of suspension or the accused in turn files a motion to quash the information or challenges the validity thereof, such show-cause order of the trial court would no longer be necessary. What is indispensable is that the trial court duly hear the parties at a hearing held for determining the validity of the information, and thereafter hand down its ruling, issuing the corresponding order of suspension should it uphold the validity of the information or withhold such suspension in the contrary case. (d) No specific rules need be laid down for such pre -suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings against him, e.g., that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary investigation, the act for which he stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or of bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of the Act, or he may present a motion to quash the information on any of the grounds provided in the Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. The mandatory suspension decreed by the act upon determination of the pendency in court or crimianl prosecution for violation of the Anti-Graft Act or for bribery under a valid information requires at the same time that the hearing be expeditious, and not unduly protracted such as to thwart the prompt suspension envisioned by the Act. Hence, if the trial court, say, finds the ground alleged in the quashal motion not to be indubitable, then it shall be called upon to issue the suspension order upon its upholding the validity of the information and setting the same for trial on the merits. With the aforequoted jurisrudential authority as the basis, it is evident that upon a proper determination of the validity o f the information, it bacomes mandatory for the court to immmediately issue the suspension order. The rule on the matter is specific and categorical. It leaves no room for interpretation. It is not within the courts discretion to hold in abeyance the suspension of the accused officer on the pretext that the order denying the motion to quash is pending review before the appellate courts. Its discretion lies only during the pre-suspension hearing where it is required to ascertain whether or not (1) the accused had been afforded due preliminary investigation prior to the filling of the information against him, (2) the acts for which he was charged constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act. No. 3019 or of the provisions of title 7, Book II of the revised Penal Code, or (3) the information against him can be quashed, under any of the grounds provided in Section 2, Rules 117 of the Rules of Court. (People vs. Albana, etc., at al. Supra, fn. 26) Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, then the court must issue the order of suspension as a matter of course. There are no ifs and buts about it. This is because a preventive suspension is not penalty. It is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. In view of this latter provisions, the accused elective public officer does not stand to be prejudiced by the immediate enforcement of the suspension order in the event that the information is subsequently declared null and void on appeal and the case dismissed as against him. Taking into consideration the public policy involved in preventively suspending a public officer charged under a valid information, the protection of public interest will definitely have to prevail over the private interest of the accused. (Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. Nos. 61776-61861, March 23, 1984, 128 SCRA 383)

To further emphasize the ministerial duty of the court under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, it is said that the court trying the case has neither discretion nor duty to determine whether or not a preventive suspension is required to prevent the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue commiting malfeasance in office. The presumption is that unless the accused is suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in same way that upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. The law does not require the court to determine whether the accused is likely to escape or evade the jurisdiction of the court. The Court is satisfied that the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan, after upholding the validity of the information against petitioners, correctly ordered their preventive suspension from any public office for period of ninety (90) days. As was stressed in Libanan v. Sandiganbayan 37 ** When the statute is clear and explicit, there is h ardly room for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law. Republic Act No. 3019 unequivocally mandates the suspension of a public official from office pending a criminal prosecution against him. This Court has repeatedly held that such preventive suspension is mandatory **, and there are no ifs and buts about it. WHEREFORE, the petition in this case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Cost against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

Miriam Defensor Santiago vs Sandiganbayan Political Law Suspension of a Member of Congress RA 3019 On or about 17 Oct 1988, Santiago the then Commissioner of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) approved theapplication for legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran counter against RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The legalization of such is also a violation of EO 324 which prohibits the legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by Santiago were allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two other criminal cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this information, Garchitorena, presiding Justice of Sandiganbayan, issued the arrest of Santiago. Santiago petitioned for a provisional liberty since she was just recovering from a car accident which was approved. After a long series of appeals and court battles between Santiago and Sandiganbayan, in 1995 the latter moved for the suspension of Santiago, who was already a senator by then, from office. Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate president (Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days. ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate without violating the Constitution. HELD: The Constitution provides that each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days. On the other hand, Sec 13 of RA 3019 provides : SEC. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him. In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the HOR, as the case may be, upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the Senate. But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID commissioner, can she still be suspended as a senator? In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the SC has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayans authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employe es indicted before it. Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word office would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he stands accused. Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she still be suspended? The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records another evidence before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure. _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Republic Act No. 7080

July 12, 1991 AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING THE CRIME OF PLUNDER

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:: Section 1. Definition of Terms - As used in this Act, the term a) Public Officer means any person holding any public office in the Government of the Republic of the Philippines by virtue of an appointment, election or contract. b) Government includes the National Government, and any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. c) Person includes any natural or juridical person, unless the context indicates otherwise. d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes: 1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;

2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned; 3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or -controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; 4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; 5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or 6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines. See Section 2 As amended by Section 12 of RA No.7659 Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Seventy-five million pesos (P75,000,000.00), shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by life imprisonment with perpetual absolute disqualification from holding any public office. Any person who participated with said public officer in the commission of plunder shall likewise be punished. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stock derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State. Section 3. Competent Court - Until otherwise provided by law, all prosecutions under this Act shall be within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Section 4. Rule of Evidence - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. Section 5. Suspension and Loss of Benefits - Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and other benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime, administrative proceedings have been filed against him. Section 6. Prescription of Crimes - The crime punishable under this Act shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. However, the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officers from them or from their nominees or transferees shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel. Section 7. Separability of Provisions - If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby. Section 8. Scope - This Act shall not apply to or affect pending prosecutions or proceedings, or those which may be instituted under Executive Order No. 1, issued and promulgated on February 28, 1986. Section 9. Effectivity - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days from its publication in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation. Approved: July 12, 1991

ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001 Facts: Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused. The focal point of the case is the alleged vagueness of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this terms are: combina tion, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law using the facial challenge. Ruling: On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. The petitioners contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the petitioners reliance since ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only b e invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude. On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists. Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial challenge of a statute in free speech cases. With respect to such statue, the established rule is that one to who application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than real.

The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the Congress decision to include it among the heinou s crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for lacking merit. ESTRADA vs SANDIGANBAYAN Issues: 1. WON Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague

No. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the language of law, indicating w/ reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have committed. We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms combination and series in the key phrase a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental right to due process. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them. A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of other may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. 2. WON the Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process No. Sec. 4 (Rule of Evidence) states that: For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. The reasonable doubt standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof of reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. Not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime chargedthe element of the offense. Relative to petitioners contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that pattern is a very important element of the crime of plunder; and that Sec. 4 is two-pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime, such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder We do not subscribe to petitioners stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to sec. 1 par. (d). Sec. 4 purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operated in furtherance of a remedy. What is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 3. WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it.

No. It is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed willfully, unlawfully and criminally. It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner. In support of his contention In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Taada made during the deliberation on S.B. No.733 Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown. The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent. Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being. There are crimes however in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger sociopolitical and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit

[G.R. No. 136916. December 14, 1999]

FLEURDELIZ B. ORGANO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and the JAIL WARDEN OF MANILA, respondents. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: Under Republic Act (RA) No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over accused public officials only when they occupy positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher. Thus, RA 7080, insofar as it provided that all prosecutions for plunder fell within the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, was impliedly repealed.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Habeas Corpus under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, praying that this Court direct the jail warden of Manila to produce the body of petitioners mother, Lilia B. Organo, and to set her at liberty without delay. Earlier, the accused had been detained, pursuant to a Warrant of Arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan[1] in connection with an Information[2] for plunder dated August 14, 1997 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 24100. Petitioner maintains that the Warrant was invalid, because that court had no jurisdiction over her mother.

The Facts

The facts of the case, as summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General, are as follows: "In an Information filed before the Sandiganbayan on August 15, 1997, Dominga S. Manalili, Teopisto A. Sapitula, Jose DP. Marcelo, Lilia B. Organo, Gil R. Erencio, Reynaldo S. Enriquez and Luis S. Se, Jr. were charged with the violation of RA No. 7080 (Plunder) committed as follows: That on or about 05 November 1996, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon Ci ty, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Dominga S. Manalili, Teofisto A. Sapitula, Joel DP. Marcelo, Lilia B. Organo, being then public officers and taking advantage of their official positions as employees of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Region 7, Quezon City, and Gil R. Erencio, Reynaldo S. Enriquez and Luis S. Se, Jr., conspiring, confabulating and confederating with one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass and acquire funds belonging to the National Government by opening an unauthorized bank account with the Landbank of the Philippines, West Triangle Branch, Diliman, Quezon City, for and in behalf of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and deposit therein money belonging to the government of the Philippines, consisting of revenue tax payments then withdraw therefrom the sum of Pesos: One Hundred Ninety Three Million Five Hundred Sixty Five Thousand Seventy Nine & 64/100 (P193,565,079.64) Philippine Currency, between November, 1996 to February, 1997, without proper authority, through checks made payable to themselves and/or the sole proprietorship firms of the above-named private persons, thereby succeeding in misappropriating, converting, misusing and/or malversing said public funds tantamount to a raid on the public treasury, to their own personal gains, advantages and benefits, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforestated amount. CONTRARY TO LAW. The Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 24100, was raffled to the First Division of the Sandiganbayan. On August 20, 1997, Lilia B. Organo filed a Motion to Quash Information for lack of jurisdiction and to defer the issuance o f a warrant of arrest. Thereafter, with the creation of [the] 4th and 5th Divisions of the Sandiganbayan, the case was unloaded to the respondent court, 4th Division. On September 29, 1997, respondent court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused in Criminal Case No. 24100. On October 1, 1997, Organo filed an Urgent Motion to Recall and /or Quash Warrant of Arrest Pending Resolution on the Issue of Lack of Jurisdiction and Other Incidents. The motion was opposed by the prosecution. In a Resolution dated November 20, 1997, respondent court denied Organo's motion. On December 9, 1997, Organo filed with the respondent court a Motion for Reconsideration of the November 20, 1997 Resolution . On April 28, 1998, respondent court denied Organo's Motion for Reconsideration ruling as follows: The Motion for Reconsideration dated December 9, 1997 filed by accused Lilia Organo, through counsel, is hereby denied, there being no valid and compelling reason to set aside our Resolution dated November 28, 1997 denying her Motion to Quash Information for Lack of Jurisdiction. Besides, accused movant is still a fugitive from justice and continues to evade arrest so that jurisdiction over her person has not yet been acquired by this Court. Hence, movant Organo has no right to file with this Court her said Motion to Quash which was denied, and subsequently her subject Motion for Reconsideration. Movant Organo should first surrender and place her person under the jurisdiction of this Court before she may file any further pleading with this Court. With the denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, Organo filed before the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against herein respondents People of the Philippines and the 4th Division of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner alleges in the main that respondent court has no jurisdiction over a case of plunder if the officials or employees fall below salary grade 27 and that respondent court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in failing to act on her motion to Quash before issuing a warrant of arrest. x x x. With the warrant of arrest issued by the respondent court, Organo was arrested and detained by the National Bureau of Invest igation in its detention cell. Thereafter, she was transferred to the Manila City Jail.[3]

The Issue

Petitioner submits this sole issue for the consideration of the Court: Does the Respondent Court, the Honorable Sandiganbayan, have jurisdiction over a case of plunder when none of the accused occupy Salary Grade 27 or higher as provided under Republic Act No. 6758 x x x"[4]

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

Sole Issue: Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

Petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to hear Criminal Case No. 24100 and to issue a warrant of arrest therein. True, Section 3 of Republic Act 7080, the law penalizing plunder, states that [u]ntil otherwise provided by law, all prosecutions under this Act shall be within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. When the crime charged was allegedly committed, however, already in effect were RA 7975 [5] and RA 8249,[6] which confined the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction to public officials wi th Salary Grade 27 or higher. Since not one of the accused occupies such position, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 24100. We agree. The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over petitioners mother and the other accused in Criminal Case No. 24100 has been resolved by the Supreme Court in Lilia B. Organo v. Sandiganbayan.[7] In that case, we ruled that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crime of plunder unless committed by public officials and employees occupying the positions with Salary Grade 27 or higher, under the Compen sation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office. The Court explained that the crime of plunder defined in Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, was provisionally placed within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan until other wise provided by law. Republic Act No. 8249, enacted on February 5, 1997, is the special law that provided for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan otherwise than that prescribed in Republic Act No. 7080. (Italics supplied) The Office of the Solicitor General argues, however, that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over cases of plunder, regardless of the public officials salary grade. Arguing that a special law will prevail over a statute or law of general application, it maintains that RA 8249 provides for the general jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, while RA 7080 is a special law which deals with the crime of plunder. Furthermore, it avers that a close perusal of RA 8249 would show that the legislature did not intend to repeal or alter the provisions of RA 7080 as regards the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases of plunder. In fact, Section 4 (a) shows the instances wherein the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is limited to those where the accused public official occupies a Salary Grade of 27 or above only involves Violations of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter 11, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code. Subsection (a) does not mention cases involving violations of RA 7080. Necessarily, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases relating to plunder is not subject to the limitations under Section 4 of RA 8249. Had the legislature intended to modify the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving plunder, it would not have left out cases involving violations of RA 7080 from the enumeration in Subsection (a) Section 4, RA 8249.[8] The argument is incorrect. Section 4 of RA 8249 is reproduced in full as follows: Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving: a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads; (b) City mayors, vice mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads. (c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; (e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor; (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations; (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or high er, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. It is true that a violation of RA 7080 penalizing plunder is not mentioned in Section 4 (a) of RA 8249. However, the crime falls squarely under Section 4 (b), which we again quote below: b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office. Plunder is clearly a crime committed by public officials in relation to their office. Hence, there is no doubt that this crime is covered by Section 4 (b). Clearly, RA 7080 was impliedly repealed by RA 8249, such that prosecutions for plunder are cognizable by the Sandiganbayan only when the accused is a public official with Salary Grade 27 or higher. Explaining the effect of RA 8249, the Court in People v. Magallanes[9] has categorically ruled that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over public officials only if their positions fall under Salary Grade 27 or higher. As a consequence of these amendments, the Sandiganbayan partly lost its exclusive original jurisdiction in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended; R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. It retains only cases where the accused are those enumerated in subsection a, Section 4 above and, generally, national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6758). Moreover, its jurisdiction over other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office is no longer determined by the prescribed penalty, viz., that which is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six years or a fine of P6,000.00; it is enough that they are committed by those public officials and employees enumerated in subsection a, Section 4 above. However, it retains its exclusive original jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to or in connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A. Moreover, the Court in Rodrigo v. Sandiganbayan[10] has explained that the intent of Congress in RA 8249 was to make Salary Grade 27 the demarcation line determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and other courts. The apparent intendment of these amendments is to ease the dockets of the Sandiganbayan and to allow the Anti -Graft Court to focus its efforts on the trial of those occupying higher positions in government, the proverbial big fish. Section 4, as amended, freed the Sandiganbayan from the task of trying cases involving lower-raking government officials, imposing such duty upon the regular courts instead. The present structure is also intended to benefit these officials of lower rank, especially those residing outside Metro Manila, charged with crimes related to their office, who can ill-afford the expenses of a trial in Metro Manila. As the Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 9825 states: One is given the impression that only lowly government workers or the so-called small fry are expediently tried and convicted by the Sandiganbayan. The reason for this is that at present, the Sandiganbayan has the exclusive and original jurisdiction over graft cases committed by all officials and employees of the government, irrespective of rank and position, from the lowest-paid janitor to the highly-placed government official. This jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan must be modified in such a way that only those occupying high positions in the government and the military (the big fishes) may fall under its exclusive and original jurisdiction. In this way, the Sandiganbayan can devote its time to big time cases involving the big fishes in the government. The regular courts will be vested with the jurisdiction of cases involving less-ranking officials (those occupying positions corresponding to salary grade twenty-seven (27) and below and PNP members with a rank lower than Senior Superintendent. This set-up will prove more convenient to people in the provinces. They will no longer have to travel to Manila to file their complaint or to defend themselves. They can already file their complaint or their defense before the Regional Trial Court or the Municipal Trial Court in their respective localities, as the case may be. To distinguish the big fish from the small fry, Congress deemed the 27th Grade as the demarcation between those who should come under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and those within the regular courts.

Epilogue

Desperate people sometimes resort to desperate methods. In the present case, desperation may have impelled this original action because petitioner was frantic to free her mother from detention. While we understand her plight, we must call attention to the folly of her act. Inasmuch as a Petition for Certiorari (GR No. 133535) raising the same issue had already been submitted by her mother before the Court at the time, the present Petition for Habeas Corpus should not have been filed at all. A motion in GR No. 133535 asking for Mrs. Organos release would have accomplished the same result even more expeditiously and would have avoided the double vexation on this Courts time and attention. While the elements of forum shopping may not be present because the herein petitioner was not a party in GR No. 133535, still we must express our displeasure at the attempt to vex this Court twice for the same relief. Hence, though granted relief, petitioner is assessed costs. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the Manila jail warden is ORDERED to immediately release Lilia B. Organo from custody, unless a valid information has been filed in the proper court and a warrant for her arrest properly issued. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.