Philosophy Plato Euthyphros first definition of piety as that which is loved by all the gods (7a) is susceptible to a major

r criticism in the polytheistic ancient Greek context, namely the one represented by Socrates. It is known that in Greek culture there are acts that some gods find dear and others hold with disdain. Zeuss punishment of his father Cronus is an example of this division: while Zeus may sympathize with Euthyphros punishment of his father, Cronus might not. Socrates argues that if the gods do not all agree on what is pious, and they do not all love the same things, any given act may be considered simultaneously pious and impious. Thus according to Socrates, this definition does not successfully define piety, because it includes acts that can be either pious or impious. For Euthyphros revision that the pious is that which is loved by all the gods, Socrates points out a dilemma: is something pious because it is loved by the gods, or do the gods love something because it is pious? In the dialogue, Euthyphro elects the latter (10d), leading to a dilemma. If the gods love the pious because it is pious, and not the other way round, then piety must be able to be defined independent of the gods. As the rest of the dialogue illustrates, the problem of defining piety still persists deeply. But for the theologian Euthyphro, the departure from the gods is crucial. Were I Euthyphro, I would choose the first option: that piety can only be defined in relation to the gods. Disregarding the problem of theological epistemology, I would slightly adjust and elaborate on my definition of piety as what all the gods love (9e). I would propose that piety is a contingent concept, and existing on a scale of piousness rather than a simple binary, all in relation to what the gods think of the act in question. Importantly, there is no one overarching authority for matters of piety. An argument for what is pious must take into account the complexity of the relationships of the gods, and selectively illustrate with relevant examples why the gods consider an act pious. Under this system, there is room for much contestation regarding any act, but as Euthyphro, this is better for me - my acts might be considered wrong if a rudimentary secular definition of piety were founded. But if piety remains defined in relation to the gods, the law will be more likely to favor my relative point of view, and as a theologian, I will be better able to argue a convincing case. This definition, in relation to contemporary philosophy, can be considered as a theological discourse on morality. Piety then, in relation to the gods, is a kind of socially constructed intersubjective abstraction. Humans are required to imagine they are the gods and that they understand their social system. Piety does still exist in this case, it is just tenuous: a discursive construction. Moreover, if there are actually no gods at all, except as they are created by humans like Homer, the comparison is even more relevant. The gods are themselves an intersubjective construction, and piety is a subset of that construction. In either case, piety is essentially held in human hands, whether they realize it or not. Works Cited

Plato. Euthyphro Plato: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Gorgias, Menexenus. Ed. Reginald E. Allen. Vol. 1. Yale University Press, 1984. Jaidan Leeworthy 639666 jleeworthy@student.unimelb.edu.au