Nuclear Safety Objectives and History

A.A. 2013-2014

Nuclear safety objectives (1)

Ensure that both the siting of the plant and the plant conditions comply with adeguate principles: health principles, safety principles, radioprotection principles. The consequences on the health of the population and workers are less severe than established limits. The effects must be the lowest reasonably achievable (ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable) in all operational conditions and in case of accident.

Nuclear safety objectives (2)

GENERAL OBJECTIVE
Effective defences against radiological hazard are established and maintained in order to protect individuals, society and environment from harm

RADIATION PROTECTION OBJECTIVE

In all operational states the radiation exposure within the plant and outside (planned releases of radioactive materials) must be kept below prescribed limits and as low as reasonably achievable Radiological consequences of any accident must be mitigated

Nuclear safety objectives(3)

TECHNICAL SAFETY OBJECTIVE
All reasonably practicable measures must be taken in order to prevent accidents in nuclear plants In case of accidents, their consequences must be mitigated For all possible accidents taken into account in the plant design, there must be a high level of confidence that any radiological consequences is minor and below prescribed limits. The likelyhood of accidents with serious radiological consequences must be extremely low
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The early years Fermis Pile

Gravity driven shutdown rods: operated by cutting a retaining rope with an axe (SCRAM = Safety Control Rod Axe Man). A secondary shutdown system: buckets containing cadmium sulphate solution, could be emptied onto the pile should the need arise. Emergency cooling system missing (decay heat practically absent) No containment system

The early years

Reactors built for both military and civil purposes without containment system, located in remote sites.
Not all the necessary precautions were taken A war was in progress or just finished The knowledge of radiation protection was not yet advanced.

Later on these first reactors were either shutdown or modified by introducing:

Closed cycle cooling of the reactor Pressure-resistant containment Reliable disposal of radioactive liquids (no longer stocked in simple underground metallic tanks) The storage of spent fuel in leaking pools of water was abandoned
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R = 0.016 Pth (km)

1950-1960
Since 1960s, in the West, power reactors were located in a leakproof and pressure-resistant vessel Since 1950s, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safety (ACRS) of Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) fixed, for a non-contained reactor, an exclusion zone with a minimum radius:

R = 0.016 Pth (km)

3000 MWth reactor: R~ 30 km (the distance evacuated after the Chernobyl accident). An exclusion zone of this magnitude poses excessive problems to siting. In 1957 accident at Windscale (Cumberland, England) In 1961 accident at the SL-1 plant (Idaho, USA).

Windscale accident
Air-cooled, graphite-moderated plutonium production reactor, without containment While annealing the graphite moderator (slow raise of graphite temperature to release the energy stored in the graphite as fast neutrons knocked carbon atoms out of the lattice;Wigner effect), a fire started in one of the fuel channels and quickly spread to 150 other channels. 4 days necessary to extinguish the fire by flooding the reactor with water. Cooling air was directly released to the atmosphere. Radioactive materials dispersed and deposited over England, Wales and parts of the Northern Europe. Part of the iodine was attached to particular matter (20000-50000 Ci) and the stack filter retained between 800 to 1000 Ci of cesium. It was estimated that 25-43% of the iodine and 17-18% of the cesium must have escaped from the core. Iodine is a particularly dangerous element because it concentrates as it proceeds through the biological chain and finally is stored in the body. It was estimate that, as a result of the accident, the maximum individual thyroid dose to a child was 160 mSv

Stationary Low-power plant No.1 (SL-1)

3MW natural circulation, highly enriched (93% U-235) boiling water reactor at a remote military installation. Core: elements of uranium-aluminum alloy in aluminium-nickel cladding. During the recoupling of the shutdown and control rods to their drive shafts after maintenance, the manual withdraw of the central control rod led to a severe power excursion The steam explosion, some metal vaporisation and damage of 20% of the core. Two operators killed immediately; a third died within one hour. Between 5% and 15% of the total fission product inventory escaped from the reactor vessel Less than 0.5% of the I-131 and 0.01% of the non-volatile fission products (FP) found in the desert. Reactor building not designed specifically to contain radionuclides, FP release mitigated because the energy was released in a short time period, the system was not pressurised and the decay heat was not too high to cause the core to remain molten after the accident. Therefore there was little driving force for the radionuclides release.
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1960s-1970s (1)
These accidents strongly influenced subsequent thinking on consequences to the public. In the West, power reactors were located in a leak-proof and pressure resistant vessel. The whole refrigeration primary circuit was located completely inside the containment, so that all the escaped fluid would be confined in the containment envelope; Design pressure of the containment for water reactors: complete release of the primary water and part of the secondary water were assumed. In East Europe, these criteria were applied to a lesser degree: only the vessel was located within the containment; not very stringent leak-proof characteristics of the containment. In the West, the opinions on the accident assumptions were divided. The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safety (ACRS) proposed the use of maximum credible accidents.
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1960s-1970s (2)
A number of severe accidents were postulated (although they were deemed very unlikely). Plant designer developed various approaches to avoid the effects of these postulated severe accidents:
development of engineered safety systems to prevent core melt, provision of a containment vessel to retain the radioactive products if they were released.

Considering the maximum credible accident was extremely useful in limiting or preventing the occurrence of severe accidents. It was realised that the engineered safety devices might not work exactly in accordance with their design, and that failures of such devices could lead to serious consequences. The word credible was added to imply that, while more severe scenarios could be envisaged, they were considered so unlikely as to be deemed incredible.
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1960s-1970s (3)
A substantial number of maximum credible accidents (Design Basis Accidents - DBAs) have been defined by the Atomic Energy Commission to establish the licensing basis for design requirements for nuclear safety systems. The most severe DBAs is the sudden, double-ended, guillotine break of the largest coolant pipe in the primary system of the reactor ( DBA Loss Of Coolant Accident). The blowdown of the high-pressure reactor primary coolant and the consequent increase in containment pressure are used to establish: the design pressure of the containment structure the requirements upon which the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) and other engineered safety features (such as containment sprays and cooling fans) of the plant were designed. Then double-ended pipe break LOCA became an incident that by definition would not result in melting of the reactor core.

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1960s-1970s (4)
Conservative assumptions concerning malfunctions in the safety systems, such as a single failure consisting in the failure, simultaneous with the initiating event, of one active component of one of the safety systems devoted to emergency safety functions during the accident (water injection system, reactor shutdown system and so on). On one side more cautious experts supported the need for keeping these conservative assumptions. On the other side more optimistic people (members of manufacturing industries and electric utilities) maintained that the above mentioned accident assumptions entailed a waste of resources. Many phenomena were still unknown: Auto-catalytic reaction of Zircaloy fuel cladding with water The swelling of the Zircaloy cladding before rupturing, preventing the flow of cooling water Only in the 1970s experts demonstrated the possibility that the break of a pipe could damage other nearby pipes or plant components (pipe whip effect).
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1960s-1970s (5)
Control bodies stipulated that the inherent safety systems and the resistance of plants to natural phenomena or man-made events had to be improved. These requests of improvement (backfitting) extended the construction times of the plants and increased their costs. The increase in costs as a consequence of the continuous requests for plant improvements, was strongly in contrast with the initial industrial expectations (i.e. cheapness). This continuous process of improvement produced very safe but also very costly and rather complicated plants, which were subject to a series of safety features additions to a substantially unchanged basic design. Up to TMI accident, not all nuclear technical experts believed that the adopted accident assumptions were reasonable ( some of them believed they were excessive).

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1960s-1970s (6)
Different approaches to siting in the USA and in Western Europe. In the USA the plant siting criteria, as far as demographic aspects were concerned, were substantially decoupled from the design features of the plant. The AEC defined a source term for the DBA-LOCA to help establish criteria for the licensing of plant sites that considered the kinds and magnitudes of public health hazards for the population distribution about those sites. Thus the source terms for DBAs were intentionally defined to be arbitrarily (and unrealistically) large. Although the DBA-LOCA would not result in a core melt, the source terms were defined in terms of quasi-core melt conditions. TID-14844 source term: 15%of the fission product activity was considered to be released to the containment vessel, containing 100% of the noble gases, 50% of the iodine in the gaseous form and 1% of the solids in the fission product inventory. Subsequently, one-half of the released iodine in the containment structure and all of the solid fission products were assumed to fall out, to be adsorbed onto the internal structures of the building, or to adhere to internal reactor components and, therefore, to be unavailable for release to the external environment. Reductions in the airborne iodine in accordance with the projected effectiveness of the containment spray systems could be considered as time passed following accidental releases during the hypothetical accident sequence.

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1960s-1970s (7)
In the late 1960s, the TID-14844 source term was incorporated in the AEC safety guide 3 and 4, which specify the assumptions to be used in estimating off-site consequences of the maximum credible accident. Other US site criteria were the following: existence of an exclusion zone around the plant (radius 800-1000 m), where no dwellings or productive settlements exist and the access is under complete control of the plant management; existence of a low population zone around the plant (radius of roughly 5 km), which could be quickly evacuated in case of accident in the plant; radioactive product release from the core to the containment conventionally established as a function of the plant power only. In this approach, the decision about the adequacy of a proposed site could be taken only on the basis of the plant power level and, possibly, on the specific characteristics of its fission product removal systems.

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1960s-1970s (8)
Europe: the site selection criteria usually consider the site-plant complex. If a plant with the usual safety systems could not be located on a specific site because accident doses exceeded the reference limits, it was possible to make the plant acceptable for the same site by the improvement of the systems for fuel integrity protection in case of accidents. The need to take into account the specific plant features for the evaluation of the acceptability of the site arises from the much higher population density. The dose limits varied somewhat between various countries, but they were of the order of 5 mSv (500 mrem, effective dose) to the critical group of the population outside the exclusion zone for every credible accident (Design Basis Accidents). In order to evaluate the consequences of these accidents, no conventional figure for the releases is used, but conservative and more realistic assumption were adopted. Iodine released in the containment assumed equal to the inventory in the fuel-clad interface (i.e. 1-5% of the total core inventory)
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1970s-1980s (1)
Up to the TMI accident, three other facts influenced nuclear safety technology: defence against non-natural external events (initially accidental fall of an aircraft, then sabotage performed by the use of an aircraft or by explosives of various kind) the preparation of the Rasmussen report (WASH 1400) the introduction of the Quality Assurance (QA) in the design, construction and operation of plants. Plant protection against the various effects of the impact by a fighter aircraft (weighing about 20t) was adopted at least in Germany, Belgium, Switzerland and Italy. No country adopted a protection against the impact of a wide-bodied airliner of the Jumbo Jet type (weighing about 350 t), which would be far more onerous (possibly requiring the underground location of plants). It was calculated that the protection against a fighter aircraft included the protection against the fall of a large airliner too if the impact takes place with less damaging characteristics (lower speed of impact).

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1970s-1980s (2)
By the 1974, nuclear technology had advanced. Possible to try to make a realistic estimate of the probabilities and consequences of nuclear power plant accidents that might proceed beyond DBA limits to core melt. This was attempted by Rasmussen and his collaborators in the Reactor Safety Study (RSS) (NRC,1975). The RSS study team outlined logical sequences of accidental steps that could lead to the release of radioactive material, usually as result of a core melt. They attempted to assign probabilities to each step of the sequence. When available, historical data were used as bases for the projected probabilities; otherwise, engineering judgement took their place.

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1970s-1980s (3)
Before the RSS, it was widely assumed that only the DBAss could lead to core melt and release of appreciable radioactivity. RSS showed that many more such sequences exist; in total the probabilities of their occurrence exceeded that of the DBA. These sequences include small pipe breaks and various transientinitiated events. Models of the physical processes were developed to assess the magnitude and timing of the release, transport and deposition of the radioactive materials from the core through the primary system and the containment to the environment. Consequence models were also developed to evaluate the dispersal of radioactivity into the atmosphere so as to estimate the risks, thus coupling the probability and the health effect consequences of various accidents. The RSS, published in 1975, was the first study that included all conceivable accidents and also less probable scenarios, such as the catastrophic explosion of a reactor pressure vessel and an estimate of the probability of each scenario. It was a trend-setter in nuclear power safety analysis.
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1970s-1980s (4)
As a result, RSS has been criticised and extended. Because of the many criticisms of RSS and the uncertainties inherent in Probabilistic Risk Assessment (the probability data concerning the most unlikely phenomena are scarce or even absent, given the impossibility of studying these phenomena experimentally and the scarcity of applicable real-life data), the methodology was not used before 1979 for reactor design, reactor operator training, or for regulation. Nobody could support the validity of the absolute quantitative risk evaluations contained in it. At the same time, the validity of this study is universally acknowledged. Rasmussen report and similar studies are possible judgement instruments in the nuclear safety field, but they cannot be used alone. Sound engineering evaluations, based on operating experience and on research results are the necessary complement to the probabilistic evaluations. After TMI accident, severe accidents (those accidents more serious than those up then considered credible) were included in the design considerations for the nuclear plants.

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TMI accident - 1979

In March 1979, during a rather frequent plant transient, a valve on top of the pressurizer of the TMI plant remained stuck open. Continuous loss of coolant, void reactor pressure vessel and full pressurizer. It was believed that the RSS methodology was completely wrong because it had not predicted that type of accident. That particular sequence (TMLQ) was evaluated for the Surry plant to have a frequency of once in 105 years. If the RSS procedure had been applied to a Babcock and Wilcox reactor like TMI-2, the frequency would have predicted a frequency of once in 300 years. The difference stemmed from: The pressure relief valve settings caused the valve to be released before the reactor scram. The steam generator (of the once-through type) had a small heat capacity and dried out in ten minutes, compared with a time of about an hour calculated U-tube SG. The actual values of the probabilities and frequencies calculated in the reactor safety study may not be correct , but, if the methodology had been applied to the reactor at TMI, the plant specific scenario might have been noted, modifications might have been made, and the accident perhaps avoided.
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From TMI accident to Chernobyl (1)

This realization led to a general acceptance of the methodology of Probabilistic Risk Assessment. TMI accident completely changed the attitude of the industry towards safety in all OECD countries. The provision of safety features previously considered to be pointless by some was acknowledged as valid in the light of the possibility of unforeseeable events. Organizations were created for the exchange of information on operational events at nuclear plants and for the promotion of excellence in the nuclear safety field. Long lists of lessons learned were prepared and a three Mile Island Action Plan was compiled, which contained a large number of specific provisions against the possible repetition of similar accidents in the future. To implement them, an amount of money ranging between several millions dollars and several ten millions dollars was spent for each plant .
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From TMI accident to Chernobyl (2)

The concepts of Defence in Depth and of Safety Culture were reinforced. The Defence in Depth initiative is a concept meaning that many, mutually independent, levels of defence against initiation and progression of accidents are created. The various levels include physical barriers (fuel cladding, primary system, containment, etc.). Safety Culture: the set of convictions, knowledge and behaviour in which safety is placed at the highest level in the scale of values . As a result many countries gave attention to severe accidents. A severe accident is defined as one exceeding in severity the DBAs, which are those against which plant safety systems are designed in such a way that: core does not exceed the limits of irreversible damage of the fuel (1200 C maximum, 17% local oxidation of the cladding); external releases do not exceed the maximum tolerable ones, according to the national criteria in force.
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From TMI accident to Chernobyl (3)

Severe accident according to IAEA: accident conditions more severe than a design basis accident and involving significant core degradation. All the OECD countries agreed on the need of studying and implementing severe accident management technique on their plants. Examples of typical equipment and procedures for severe accidents are the following: portable electric generators, transportable from the plant to another on the same site or on a different site; procedures to supply electric energy to the essential loads, in case of total loss of electric power; procedures for the voluntary depressurization of the primary system in case of loss of the high pressure emergency injection system, and so on.

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From TMI accident to Chernobyl (4)

By the 1980s, all the plants in the OECD area were equipped with Severe Accident Management Plans. Some countries (France, Switzerland and Germany) have installed filtered containment venting systems to prevent the rupture of the containment in case of a severe accident. In Italy, a set of criteria was developed: 95-0.1%. criterion, according to which, by the installation of appropriate systems (filtered venting system) a release of iodine higher than 0.1% of the
core inventory could be avoided with a probability higher than 95%.

Preventative system for the voluntary depressurization of the primary system in PWRs and for the passive injection of water into the primary system for about 10 hours. This core rescue system (CRS) could decrease the core melt probability by a factor of at least 10. The system was proposed as a modification of the design chosen for the Italian Unified Nuclear Design, but it was not considered necessary by the designers at that time. A few years later, the designers applied it, to the passive reactor AP600 and to a German reactor design. The voluntary primary system depressurization has subsequently been adopted by all the more modern PWR designs, such as the European Pressurised Reactor (EPR).
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Chernobyl Accident
There were two primary causes of the Chernobyl tragedy:
The plant had been designed with excessive optimism as far as safety was concerned. In some operating conditions (low power, low steam content in the pressure tubes) the reactor was very unstable: an increase in power or a loss of coolant caused reactivity insertions

With completely extracted control rods (a situation forbidden by operational procedures), the potential instability was more severe . The operators were working in a condition of frantic hurry for various reasons. The leakproof and pressure resistant containment did not include a significant portion of the reactor itself: the fuel channel heads were in a normal industrial building. A complete uncontained accident, therefore, happened.

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General lesson to be learned (1)

No weak point compromising safety must be left in a plant. Human errors will succeed in finding weak points and will cause disasters and fatalities. Experience indicates that accident possibility must be seriously considered during all the phases of the life of a nuclear plant.
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General lesson to be learned (2)

Chernobyl reactors were not well known in the western world. The pertinent information was kept confidential because this reactor (RBMK) could potentially be used for plutonium production. Copies of a safety analysis of an RBMK reactor (performed some years before the accident) were circulated among the experts only after the accident: it concluded that this reactor did not meet the safety standards in use in the Western world. The Chernobyl accident had not much to teach the Western nuclear safety engineers, but it was not possible to convince the public that such an accident could only happen in that specific design of reactor. In Italy some political parties exploited the evident fear generated in the population and led the country towards the immediate and sudden dismissal of the nuclear source.

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After Chernobyl (1)

Nuclear plant design evolved by successive additions and had become too complicated. It was useful to think to simpler systems, based on concepts of passive rather than active safety. Accidents should have modest consequences beyond the exclusion zone of the plant and should require small emergency plans, especially concerning the quick evacuation of the population. The concept of the passive safety meant the use of systems based on simple physical laws (safety injection systems on water reactors which use, as a motive force, gravity instead of pumps). AP600 adopted this principle, a voluntary fast depressurisation system of the primary circuit and the provision of a water reservoir at an elevated position with respect to the reactor vessel. Passive cooling of the containment was also incorporated in the design. The rating of 600 MWe was initially chosen on the basis of a poll among the US utilities, but a weak point of this concept has always been the reduced power and its consequent bad scale economy. In 2004 NRC approved the design of the AP1000.
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After Chernobyl (2)

In the French-German EPR of approximately 1400 MWe, the passive safety has been adopted with a higher degree of caution but with a strong tendency towards the reduction of emergency plans. Many precautions against severe accidents have been taken:
molten core containment structures, core catchers, multiple devices for the quick recombination of hydrogen, voluntary primary system depressurization, etc.

New concept based on passive safety under study (Generation IV)

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Innovative nuclear applications -1

Innovative reactor concepts for: energy production reduction of nuclear wastes
EVOLUTIVE REACTORS Reactor designs strongly based on the existing reactor fleet (Gen II-Gen III systems) with improved characteristics for what concerns safety and fuel utilization INNOVATIVE REACTORS Reactor designs adopting different concepts with respect to the existing fleet, devised to largely overcome present reactors under several points of view
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Generation IV

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Evolutive reactors
EPR (European Pressurized Reactor, or Evolutive Pressurized Reactor)
Same idea ad PWR Improved safety features, with an increased complexity of the plant itself

AP1000
Again, a PWR More in the direction of simplification + passive safety features http://www.ap1000.westinghousenuclear.com/
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Innovative Reactors
Generation IV International Forum (GIF): is a cooperative international endeavor organized to carry out the research and development (R&D) needed to establish the feasibility and performance capabilities of the next generation nuclear energy systems.

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Generation IV Int. Forum Members

Argentina, Brazil, Canada, France, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States signed the GIF Charter in July 2001. Subsequently, it was signed by Switzerland (2002), Euratom (2003), and the Peoples Republic of China and the Russian Federation (both in 2006).
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Generation IV
The goals adopted by GIF provided the basis for identifying and selecting six nuclear energy systems for further development. The six selected systems employ a variety of reactor, energy conversion and fuel cycle technologies. thermal and fast neutron spectra, closed and open fuel cycles and a wide range of reactor sizes from very small to very large. large Generation IV systems were expected to become available for commercial introduction in the period between 2015 and 2030 or beyond.
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Gen IV Safety & Reliability (1)

Excel in safety and reliability Have a very low likelihood and degree of reactor core damage Eliminate the need for offsite emergency response This requirement has got even larger relevance after the Fukushima events, since:
an accident sequence may be more complex, or lasting-intime than foreseen; the impossibility of actuating countermeasures properly (or in due time) must be accounted for, even in case of a perfect implementation of the nuclear safety culture (education, training and preparedness of the operators).
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Gen IV Safety & Reliability (2)

Cyber attack to a nuclear facility (happened in Iran)
Possible introduction of errors in logic and in the decisions of the operator, as a result of incorrect information

While we cannot eliminate the concept of risk, we must limit it to the utility owing the plant. The effects of whatever event occurring must be confined into the plant, without involving its barriers, as if the plant were pre-sheltered from its construction.
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Gen IV Sustainability
Generate energy sustainably, and promote long-term availability of nuclear fuel Minimize nuclear waste and reduce the long term stewardship burden

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Gen IV - Proliferation Resistance & Physical Protection

Be a very unattractive route for diversion or theft of weapons-usable materials. Provide increased physical protection against acts of terrorism

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Economics
Have a life cycle cost advantage over other energy sources Have a level of financial risk comparable to other energy projects

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Nuclear Energy Economics (1)

Nuclear energy programmes imply long-term commitments from policy makers and investors, so financial risks and future liabilities arising from nuclear activities deserve careful consideration. Nuclear power plants are capital-intensive, but have low and stable marginal production costs. Investment typically represents some 60% of the total generation cost of nuclear electricity. The capital cost of a 1 GWe nuclear unit is roughly US$ 2 billion. It takes a long time (two decades) to amortise the capital invested in a nuclear power plant.
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Nuclear Energy Economics (2)

Once built, nuclear plants have rather low fuel and operating costs. The cost of uranium represents only some 5% of the cost of electricity from nuclear plants: rises in the cost of uranium have little impact on the total cost of electricity. Because of the high energy density of nuclear fuel, nuclear energy requires a very small flow of energy materials and makes small demands on the natural resource base and the environment The large size of uranium resources and their balanced geopolitical distribution worldwide ensure long-term security of supply.
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Nuclear Energy Economics (3)

Economically recoverable uranium resources are large enough to cover demand for many decades at current rates of consumption. Advanced fuel cycles (fissile material recycling) could allow the resource base to be further extended by a factor of sixty or more. A significant proportion of nuclear energy cost is due to safety features designed to prevent nuclear workers and the public from receiving radiation doses in excess of permitted levels

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Nuclear Energy Economics (4)

The production and use of electricity creates costs external to traditional accounting practices: damages to human health and the environment. Those external costs are supported by society as a whole, now or in the future. Within a sustainable development framework, social and environmental costs for present and future generations must be taken into account. Economists are looking for ways of valuing these costs and incorporating them into prices, i.e. internalising the externalities.

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Nuclear Energy Economics (5)

Stringent environmental and safety regulations. Future financial liabilities arise from the need to cover the costs of decommissioning nuclear facilities and disposing of long-lived radioactive waste. The industry and governments must establish and guarantee adequate funds for these liabilities. The production and use of electricity creates costs external to traditional accounting practices: damages to human health and the environment. Those external costs are supported by society as a whole, now or in the future. External costs of long-lived radioactive waste disposal and plant decommissioning must be considered
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Nuclear Energy Economics (6)

Assessments of competitiveness should be based upon comparisons of full costs to society of a product or a service. Within a sustainable development framework, social and environmental costs for present and future generations must be taken into account.

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Nuclear Energy Economics (7)

The need to run the plant at a high rate of utilisation for many years before the investment is paid back raises financial risks associated not only with potential technical failures, but also with uncertainties about the stability of regulation and the growth of market demand. The relative competitiveness of alternative options for electricity generation depends strongly on the discount rate used to calculate cost estimates. With a 5% discount rate, nuclear power plants that would be built today would compete favourably with alternatives in many countries, but with a 10% discount rate gas-fired power plants would be the winner nearly everywhere.

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Nuclear Energy Economics (8)

High discount rates enhance the competitiveness of technologies that are not capital-intensive, such as gas turbines. Low discount rates, which reflect a preference for a future consistent with sustainable development goals, favour capital-intensive technologies such as nuclear power and renewable energy sources. The nuclear industry sector requires a comprehensive infrastructure, a high level of technical and managerial knowhow, that contributes to increasing human capital assets. Therefore the nuclear industry sector brings macroeconomic and social benefits

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