Initial Work Plan ot the (Jounterterronsm Policy Team Page 1 ot y

Proposed Action Plan

Strategy Section of the Counterterrorism Policy Team

Warren Bass

Team 3

Draft: May 27,2003

Revised: June 6, 2003

Key Questions about Strategy

The policy team will seek to determine why the United States did not successfully stop al-Qa'ida before
September 11. It will also assess the effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism policy today.

The strategy section will tell the story of how America's overall counterterrorism grand strategy evolved
as the al-Qa'ida threat grew during both the Clinton and Bush administrations, examining such key
events as the 1993 World Trade Center attack, the 1998 Embassy bombings, the 2000 attack on the
U.S.S. Cole, and 9/11 itself. This section will allude to other issues—especially the instruments, or the
tactics whereby the overall strategy was implemented—but will seek to focus on an eagle's-eye view of
counterterrorism policy. Its focus will be on grand strategy, not on the closer-to-the-ground details of the
instruments section.

In particular, the strategy section plans to answer the following questions:

• What was U.S. counterterrorism policy, and how did it evolve—particularly from the 1998
embassy bombings through the immediate aftermath of 9/11?

• Were there gaps in America's strategy, and if so, how did policy makers address them?

• What factors hindered policy makers? Did they effectively widen their range of options and create
both public and international support for greater activism?

• Did the stated policy match actual policy?

This section will also conclude with recommendations—about whether the United States has the right
strategy for fighting al-Qa'ida and terrorism today, about which changes should be made, and about
which policymakers are responsible for making them.

Narrative Outline

1. Background I: Responding to State-Sponsored Terrorism, 1968-93

• A brief overview, from secondary sources, of the American encounter with terrorism since the
start of international hijacking placed the issue on the world agenda

• Particular mention will be made of the 1983 and 1984 suicide bombings in Lebanon, the 1986
raids on Libya, Pan Am 103, and state sponsors of terrorism
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• NB: To ensure that this section meets Commissioner Lehman's expectations, triage limited staff
time, and provide a robust preamble to our monograph, the team may wish to turn this section
over to a consultant.

2. Background U~ P^rmnrling ftrtr-PrrTTFTrfNlQ I'jiln, 1QQ1 Q R

sornewhat more detailed discussion of America's strategy, still based largely on secondary
sources but now leavened with some documents

• 1993 World Trade Center bombing and response

• June 1993 Tomahawk strike on Baghdad in reprisal for Iraq's April 1993 plot to kill former
President Bush in Kuwait

• Aum Shinrikyo's attack on the Tokyo subway, March 1995

• Oklahoma City, April 19,1995

\ Khobar Towers, June 25,1995

X PDD-39, June 21, 1995

V
3. Strategy I: Policy from 1998 to the End of the Clinton Administration

• From the embassy bombings to the Cole

4. Strategy II: Policy from the Start of the Bush Administration to 9/11

• From the Cole to 9/11, including questions of transition

5. Strategy III: Policy from September 11-20, 2001

• From 9/11 to President Bush's speech to Congress

6. Recommendations

Notional Document Review List

The strategy section will focus will on documents from the White House, especially the NSC, as well as
some documents from the State Department, the Defense Department, and the CIA (in its role as a
shaper in setting overall U.S. foreign policy strategy). This list will grow and become more specific as
the investigation proceeds. Our focus will remain on the period after January 1998, although we as a
team will need to make a strategic decision about which point to use to end our investigation—which
obviously could shape the narrative decisively.

We will seek to review options papers, strategy papers, policy recommendations, conclusions, minutes,
and other documents—including predecisional documents, which add a far richer sense of the evolution
of a strategy.

Documents particularly pertinent to this section include:

• Presidential Decision Directives and National Security Presidential Directives related to

counterterrorism policy;
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• Records of discussions of counterterrorism policy, particularly among "Small Group" and

"Counterterrorism Security Group" members;

• Records of the Transnational Threats Directorate at the National Security Council. This would
include briefing memos, meeting notes, and perhaps selected e-mails related, to key events;

• State Department records, from both Foggy Bottom and the field, related to counterterrorism
policy. The initial focus will be on documents from the Special Coordinator for Counterterrorism's
Office, the deliberations of senior State Department officials, and selected documents related to
policy toward key states in the war on terrorism, particularly Pakistan and Saudi Arabia;

• The Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and key commands' (CENTCOM, SOCOM)
documents related to counterterrorism strategy, particularly related to the use offeree;

Moreover, U.S. missions in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia regularly found themselves enmeshed in
diplomatic exchanges that shaped America's overall counterterrorism strategy. The strategy section will
seek to review documents to and from key officials at these posts.

A first rough cut of the documents most useful to the strategy team would include the following:

NSC DOCUMENTS RELATED TO:

• Aug. 7/98: East Africa bombings

• Aug. 20/98 retaliatory strikes on al-Qa'ida camps in Afghanistan and al-Shifa facility in
Khartoum, including all NSC/CSG/TNT discussions of avenues of response to the embassy
bombings

• 1999-2001 attempts to target UBL, including aborted cruise missile strikes

• post-1998 NSC requests for further military options on UBL and al-Qa'ida

• post-199 8 covert operations in Afghanistan, including ties to Afghan militias and local agents and
insertion of CIA operatives

• discussions with Saudi Arabia and UAE on terrorist financing

• 2001 interagency review of policy on al-Qa'ida, led by Clarke, including discussions of use of
Predator, arming of Uzbeks or other proxy force to fight al-Qa'ida, and increased support for
Northern Alliance, as well as other policies considered

• Aug. 13, 2001 Deputies Committee meeting on al-Qa'ida

• April 30, 2001 Deputies Committee meeting on al-Qa'ida

• July 2001 and earlier Deputies Committee meetings related to July decision to set goal of
eliminating al-Qa'ida rather than rolling it back —

• Sept. 4/01 Principals Committee meeting on al-Qa'ida

• all NSC, principals, deputies, and war cabinet meetings, Sept. 11-20, 2001

• high-level meetings between U.S., Saudi, and Pakistani officials, Aug. 1998 to Sept. 20, 2001
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DECISION DIRECTIVES:

• June 21/95: PDD-39 (centralizing CT policy in White House)

• Other Clinton administration PDDs

• Draft NSPD-9 (ready to go to President Bush on Sept. 10/01)

. NSPDs 1-8 of 2001

PENTAGON DOCUMENTS:

• post-1998 NSC and White House requests for further military options on UBL and al-Qa'ida

• JCS Chair Hugh Shelton's briefing for Berger's Small Group about "boots on the ground" options
in Afghanistan

• JCS and CINCENT Zinni's views on advisability of combat options in Afghanistan

• NSC's 2000 requests for a military package in Afghanistan

• Defense Secretary Cohen and Deputy JCS Chairman Myers' 2000 briefing for Berger andKerrick
on Special Forces options in Afghanistan

• Oct. 12, 2000 attack on U.S.S. Cole, including discussion of possible retaliatory measures

• JCS Chairman Shelton's combat options for Afghanistan, 1998-2001, including targeting of al-
Qa'ida leaders, networks, and training facilities; plans to support Afghan rebels; planned strikes on
Taliban targets; and Shelton's presentation to Sept. 15, 2001 war cabinet meeting

• high-level meetings between U.S., Saudi, and Pakistani officials, Aug. 1998 to Sept. 20, 2001

.CIA DOCUMENTS:

• post-1998 covert operations in Afghanistan, including ties to Afghan militias and local agents and
insertion of CIA operatives

• fall 1999: DCI Tenet's briefings for NSC/White House on possible millenium attacks

• Oct. 12, 2000 attack on U.S.S. Cole, including discussion of possible retaliatory measures

• DCI Tenet's May 2001 White House briefing for Rice and Hadley

• Blair House briefing on threats facing U.S. by DCI Tenet and DDO James Pavitt for Bush,
Cheney, and Rice about a week before Bush inauguration

• Jan. 10, 2001 CIA briefing for Rice showing video clip of UBL

• all Sept. 2001 meetings with ISI head Gen. Mahmoud Ahmad and DCI Tenet, DDO Pavitt, and
other senior agency officials

• CTC's Black's Sept. 13 briefing to NSC, including PowerPoint presentation

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• DCI Tenet's Sept. 15 briefing packet, "Going to War"

. DCI Tenet's draft Sept. 2001 MON on broader CIA authority in CT, as well as documents related
to its adoption

• Minutes of meetings by CTC's Black and Deputy Secretary Armitage during trip to Moscow circa
Sept. 18,2001

STATE DEPARTMENT DOCUMENTS:

• full minutes and other documents related to all 1998-2001 meetings between Assistant Secretary
Inderfurth and Taliban representatives, including Feb. 1999 meeting

• meetings between SC/T Michael Sheehan and Taliban representatives

• discussions with Saudi Arabia and UAE on terrorist financing

• views on advisability of arming the Northern Alliance, including opinions of Albright, Talbott,
Pickering, Powell, and Armitage _

• Oct. 12, 2000 attack on U.S.S. Cole, including discussion of possible retaliatory measures

• all Sept. 2001 meetings with Pakistani I SI head Gen. Mahmoud Ahmad and Powell, Armitage, or
other senior officials

• notes of all Sept. 11-20, 2001 Powell calls to Pakistani President Musharraf, Ambassador Bandar
bin Sultan, and Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia

• transcripts and memcons of all secretary and deputy secretary's calls to foreign leaders, Sept. 11-
20,2001 _

• Minutes of meetings by CTC's Black and Deputy Secretary Armitage during trip to Moscow circa
Sept. 18,2001

• high-level meetings between U.S., Saudi, and Pakistani officials, Aug. 1998 to Sept. 20, 2001

Key Interviews on Questions of Strategy

Interviews for the strategy section will focus upon the Clinton and Bush administrations'NSC staff, in
their capacity as overall directors and coordinators of CT policy. It will also include two other
categories: staffers at other agencies directly responsible for grand-strategy questions and more senior
White House officials charged with making major decisions about shifting the course of U.S.
counterterrorism policy.

The last category, by necessity, includes many of the most high-profile current and former officials in
the U.S. government. Ideally, such interviews would be based upon a solid foundation of documents and
interviews with lower-level officials so as to make the most of the limited time of some extremely busy
people. But we will not be able to fulfil our mandate without access to the nation's top leadership. This
will, of course, require considerable advance planning.

Many of the people on this list will also be important interviews for other team members.

I propose beginning with ongoing, rolling conversations to open channels of communication to get the
Initial Work Flan ot the Counterterrorism Policy Team ^age 6 ot

lay of the land, better focus our document requests, and sharpen our inquiry. I'd suggest starting with
discussions with Daniel Benjamin, Steve Simon, and other members of Richard Clarke's circle, who
provided the core NSC team from 1998 through September 2001.

Particularly key working-level interviews are in bold.

Counterterrorism Specialists and Other Senior Working-Level Officials with Duties Related to
Counterterrorism Strategy

1. Richard Clarke, former National Coordinator for Counterterrorism

2. Ambassador Cofer Black, Special Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) and former
CTC Director

3. Ambassador Francis Taylor, former S/CT

4. Ambassador Michael Sheehan, former S/CT

5.-Ambassador Tom Pickering, senior State Department official in several administrations

6. Ambassador Chris Ross

7. General (ret.) Wayne Downing, former Coordinator for Counterterrorism

8. General John Gordon, Coordinator for Counterterrorism

9. General Tommy Franks, CINCCENT since June 2000

10. General (ret.) Anthony Zinni, former CINCCENT

1 1 . Ambassador Karl Inderfurth, former Asst. Secretary of State, South Asia

12. Ambassador Mark Parris, former Asst. Secretary of State, Near East

13. Ambassador William Bums, Asst. Secretary of State, Near East

14. Ambassador Martin Indyk, Asst. Secretary of State, Near East

15. Bruce Riedel, former Senior NSC Director for the Middle East

Select Additional NSC Staff

1. Susan Rice, former Director

2. Randy Beers, former Director

3. Lee Wolosky, former Director (CFR international affairs fellow)

4. William Wechsler, former Director

5. Fred Rosa, former Director (from Coast Guard)

initial Work Flan ot the Counterterronsm Policy Team Page 7 ot

6. Mary McCarthy, former Director

7. Daniel Benjamin, former Director

8. Steven Simon, former Senior Director

9. Roger Cressey, former Director

10. Michael Fenzel, former Director

11. Gayle Smith, former Senior Director (Africa)

12. Jeffrey Jones, Senior Director

13. William McRaven, Director

14. L isa Gordon-Hagerty, Director (from DOE)

15. Joseph (Jody) Myers, Director

16. Gregory Passic, Director

17. Nicholas Rasmussen, Director

Key Country Team Members from Germany,.Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan

(1998-2001)

1. Ambassador _

2. Chief of Station (CIA)

3. Deputy Chief of Mission

4. Legal AttachA© (FBI)

5. Other U.S. officials as appropriate

6. Foreign Ambassador to the United States

People Responsible for Overall Strategy

1. President George W. Bush

2. Former President William J. Clinton

3. Vice President Richard Cheney

4. Former Vice President Al Gore

5. Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor

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••

6. Samuel Berger, former National Security Advisor

7. Colin Powell, Secretary of State

8. Madeleine Albright, former Secretary of State

9. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

10. Former Secretary of Defense William Cohen

11. Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet

12. Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State

13. Strobe Talbott, former Deputy Secretary of State

14. Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense

15. Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

16. Steve Hadley, Deputy National Security Advisor

17. James Steinberg, former Deputy National Security Advisor

18._ Lt. General Donald Kerrick, former Deputy National Security Advisor

Proposed Work Schedule

June-July 2003

• File document requests

• Research and write background sections

• Hire consultant, if desired, to handle background sections

• Consultations with counterterrorism experts outside government

August, September., October 2003

• First wave of documents back from agencies (NB: this assumes that staff clearances will
be completed)

• File follow-up document requests

• Working-level interviews ~~

• Edit consultant's draft of background sections, if desired

November, December 2QQ3

• Receive follow-up documents from agencies

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• Research and writing for background sections

• Mid-level interviews

January, February 2004

• File any final mop-up document requests

• Senior-level interviews

March. April 2004

• Write and edit strategy sections

• Produce recommendations, working together with the rest of Team 3 and the front office

May 2004

• Strategy isport delivered to commissioners -

Draft - Unclassified but Commission Sensitive

Draft — Unclassified
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RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

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Strategy Section of the Counterterrorism Policy team

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