Secularity in Great Britain

8.
Secularity in Great Britain

David Voas and Abby Day
T here is probably no common understanding of the term “secular” among

ordinary people, or even among scholars. Britain is formally a religious
country in a way that many modern states are not, having (different) established
churches in England and Scotland. There is also a willingness to countenance
religious involvement in the machinery of government: the Church of England
is represented by a number of its bishops in the upper house of Parliament,
and in 2000 the Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords even
recommended that other religions should be represented as well, increasing the
number of religious seats. The Labour government under Tony Blair did not
accept the proposed extension of religious representation, but neither did it
suggest eliminating the bishops.
The links between church and state have very little impact on contemporary
life, however. In some cases they seem to achieve the worst of both worlds,
creating an impression that offends one side without benefiting the other. The
law on blasphemy, for example, seems to Muslims to show that the English
deck is stacked in Christianity’s favor, and yet the law is effectively a dead letter;
it is almost inconceivable that a case could even be brought today, much less
successfully prosecuted.
Debates on the issue of establishment are often curious affairs, with some
bishops wanting to “cut the connection”1 and some Muslims seeing the Church
as a bulwark against secularism. In these circumstances the special privileges and
duties of the national churches have no necessary bearing on Britain’s character
as religious or secular.
The term “secular” might for many people be associated with the mission of
the National Secular Society, a lobby group for church-state separation, which is
overtly atheistic rather than merely opposed to giving religion a public role. (For
example, the society maintains that “supernaturalism is based upon ignorance
95
96 Secularism & Secularity
and assails it as the historic enemy of progress.”2)

In common usage, though, a contrast is usually apparent between “secular”
and “secularism.” “Secular” is the opposite of “religious,” and simply indicates an
absence of religious motivation or content (e.g. secular ceremonies, morality, art,
etc.). “Secularism” is an ideology that opposes religious privilege and frequently
religion itself. Because the British are typically non-religious rather than anti-
religious, many people are secular but far fewer are secularists.
Unlike Americans, Britons are accustomed to the idea of state-supported
religious education, religious broadcasting on network television, bishops in the
legislature, and so on. But unlike many continental Europeans, Britons do not
tend to feel that they need protection from religious institutions.
Indeed, the implicit assumption seems to be that a modest dose of religion
is good for people—or at least other people. The notion that God’s function is
to make children well-behaved, strangers helpful and shopkeepers honest means
that outright secularism is less popular in Britain than one might suppose. But
as individuals themselves, having little desire for divine supervision, are mostly
secular, the benign acceptance of public religion does little apart from frustrate
secularists and religious leaders impartially.
Social Scientific Approaches

It has become conventional to focus on three aspects of religious involvement:
belonging, belief, and behavior. There are three distinct though overlapping
ways of being secular: not belonging (not affiliating), not believing, and not
practicing.
None of these concepts is unambiguous. If the rather strict view is taken
that religious people must accept specific articles of faith and know basic church
doctrine, then only a fraction of the population qualify. But if accepting the
existence of a higher power or an ultimate moral order counts as religious belief,
the proportion is much more substantial.
Similarly with religious practice, it makes a great deal of difference whether
the focus is on regular attendance at services or if more occasional forms of
practice with a strong social dimension (e.g., church weddings and baptisms
or participation at Christmas, harvest festivals and the like) can be considered.
Private prayer may provide more or less evidence of a religious disposition,
depending on its form, content, and motivation.
Although affiliation (belonging) is simply what Americans label “religious
preference” rather than a measure of commitment, the growth in Britain in
the number of those who say that they have no religion has ironically turned
the simple willingness to accept a denominational label into an indicator of
8. Secularity in Great Britain 97
religiosity. Religion is still capable of being an aspect of personal identity that

does not depend on active participation, official membership, or even agreement
with basic doctrine. Precisely because of this subjectivity, though, self-
identification as having or not having a religion is sensitive to the wording and
context of the inquiry.
Beyond all of these definitional and methodological issues, one question
stands out: how much does religion matter to people? Many believe in God, call
themselves Anglican, and appear in church on occasion, but does that suffice for
them to be usefully regarded as religious rather than secular? If religion makes
little difference in their lives and does not seem important to them, or if they
describe themselves as not very religious, then there is a case for classifying them
as secular.
The study of secularity thus raises a double problem: first to try to measure
religious (non)adherence, and second to decide what the results might mean.
At the end of the day, perhaps, identifying with a religion, believing in the
supernatural, or attending religious services should not necessarily disqualify
someone from being regarded as basically secular. The argument will be
developed more fully later, but a few immediate remarks follow.
To someone in a traditional society, coming from such-and-such village may
be of the utmost importance, while for people in post-industrial society it may be
more or less incidental where they were born or grew up. Likewise with religion:
origins may mean a lot or a little. Most Britons are still able to specify their
religious background, just as they can name their birthplace, father’s occupation,
and secondary school. But whether these things make any difference to how they
see themselves or the way they are perceived by others is not at all certain.
Long after active religious participation has ceased, people may still want
services for special occasions; after even that degree of interest has waned, they
may still accept association with their religion of origin. The result is similar to
a self-description as working class by the owner of a large business, or claims to
Irishness by Americans who have a grandparent from Galway. Such personal
identities may be personally meaningful, but the chances of passing them
successfully to the next generation are slim. In any event, any characteristic
tends to disappear from self-description as it loses its social significance. Being a
Muslim currently seems sufficiently salient that very few British Muslims would
not describe themselves as such; for relatively few Christians is the same true.
With respect to belief, there is a strong inclination among sociologists to
include transient supernatural experiences or opinions as “religion,” which is
commonly held to include “the paranormal, fortune telling, fate and destiny,
life after death, ghosts, spiritual experiences, luck and superstition.”3 Such
definitions broaden the concept to include formulations known as (inter alia)

folk, common, invisible or implicit religion.4
Yet some people who describe themselves as Atheists often report seeing
ghosts or similar phenomena.5 They do not link such experiences to anything
religious or theistic but, rather, comment that science will one day explain
them. Moreover, what people describe as fate, luck or destiny varies widely from
pre-destination (“we can’t change fate”) to random events (“bad luck”) or self-
determination (“I am master of my destiny”).
Having a worldview that does not depend on supernatural powers is
consistent with believing that rationally inexplicable things happen, when these
episodes are viewed as incidental. The mere fact of holding some supernatural
beliefs should not prevent someone from being classed as secular. Being secular
is to have a non-theistic worldview; to accept the possibility of “something else
out there” does not in itself make one religious, especially where such beliefs play
no role and are accorded little importance in the person’s life.
Finally, while it is unusual to find unreligious people in church, religious
practice can occur even among the secular. Many parents in England hope—for
reasons that are academic or social rather than religious—to have their children
admitted to state-funded schools controlled by the Anglican or Catholic
churches, and they attend church in order to pass the religious qualification.
Others accompany religious parents or spouses, or (especially at cathedrals) go
for the music. Private prayer is frequently practiced even by people who do not
identify with a religion, attend services, or believe in a personal God;6 whether
and to what extent such people are thereby shown to be “spiritual” rather than
“secular” is debatable.
How Many People are Secular in Britain?

Affiliation (Belonging)
It might seem a simple matter to find out what proportion of people claim to
have a religion. Unfortunately the answers vary considerably depending on how
and in what context one asks the question. At one extreme, for example, the 2001
Census of Population shows 72 percent of people in England and Wales, and
65 percent of those in Scotland, categorized as Christian. On the census form
for England and Wales religion follows the questions on country of birth and
ethnicity, so that it appears to be a supplementary question on the same topic.
The positive phraseology (“What is your religion?”) combined with tick-box
options that simply list world religions (e.g., Christian/Muslim/Hindu) invite
the respondent to specify a cultural background rather than a current affiliation.
Note too that census forms are typically completed by the household head
on behalf of all individuals at the address, and to the extent that such people tend
to be older and more religious than average, the numbers may be higher than
they would be on confidential individual questionnaires. The religion question
used on the census form in Scotland preceded (rather than followed) those on
ethnicity, and also offered answer categories for specific Christian denominations;
perhaps as a result, people were nearly twice as likely as in England to give their
affiliation as “none.”
In contrast to the census, the question posed in the British Social Attitudes
(BSA) survey occurs in the context of a wide-ranging inquiry into opinion and
practice, and is worded in a way that might seem more likely to discourage
than to encourage a positive response: “Do you regard yourself as belonging
to any particular religion?” The respondent must interpret for him or herself
what “belonging” might mean, but for most it probably implies some current as
opposed to past affiliation. Indeed, the BSA questionnaire goes on to ask what
religion (if any) one was brought up in, and the answers are strikingly different.
While some 43 percent of people in 2004 said that they belonged to no religion,
only 16 percent declared that they had been raised without one—though this
figure has been increasing. A bare majority still present themselves as belonging
to a Christian denomination.
The importance of wording is strikingly apparent when the BSA results and
those from Gallup Polls are compared. In the latter the question has a strong
positive presumption, similar to that found in the recent census: “What is your
religious denomination?” In consequence, the proportion of “nones” is less than
half that found in BSA: 18 percent in Gallup vs. 39 percent in BSA. Fully a
fifth of people apparently do not regard themselves as belonging to a particular
religion, but if pushed to claim one will do so. Even nominal affiliation has
different levels: in conjunction with the phenomenon of “believing without
believing,” there are multiple ways of “belonging without belonging.” Relatively
few people actually practice their supposed religion; there is much more notional
than actual belonging.
Belief
Opinion polls in Britain show high levels of belief, but in all sorts of things,
including reincarnation (a quarter of respondents), horoscopes (also a quarter),
clairvoyance (almost half ), ghosts (nearly a third), and so on.7 It is far from
clear that these beliefs make any difference to the people claiming them.
Research suggests that casual believers, even in astrology, for example, which is
distinguished by its practical orientation, rarely do or avoid doing things because
of published advice.8 Studies on polling show that people are prepared to express
opinions about almost anything, whether or not they have any knowledge of or
interest in the topic. Such “beliefs” may be uninformed, not deeply held, seldom
acted upon, and relatively volatile. Feeling required to hold and even to express
opinions is one thing; finding those issues important is another.
While 25 percent of respondents may say that they believe in reincarnation,
one is not inclined to feel that they thereby express any basic truths about their
own identities. The corollary, though, is that it is difficult to be too impressed
by the apparent number of conventional believers. The argument here is not
that the large subpopulation that acknowledges the God of our fathers—the
memorably styled “ordinary God”9—is shallow or insincere. The point is simply
that it cannot be concluded from the fact that people tell pollsters they believe in
God that they give the matter any thought, find it significant, will feel the same
next year, or plan to do anything about it.
In any event one can no longer infer from the widespread inclination to
believe in a broadly defined God that people are basically Christian. Opinion
polls over recent decades suggest (even given the previous caveats about
interpreting survey evidence) that the characteristically Christian beliefs—
particularly in Jesus as the Son of God—have been in decline, and are now
held by a minority.10 Many Britons would like to be known as “spiritual” (the
alternatives seem unattractive; who wants to be labelled a “materialist?”) and will
therefore acknowledge a belief in something, but that something is less and less
likely to be recognizable as religious doctrine.
A useful supplementary approach (employed for example by Opinion
Research Business in its Soul of Britain survey, or in the Scottish Social Attitudes
survey module on religion in 2002) is to ask respondents to rate the personal
importance of various activities they might have tried, from prayer to divination.
Similar questions can be found on some national surveys; the British Household
Panel Survey, for example, periodically asks ‘How much difference would you say
religious beliefs make to your life?’ The responses are helpful in distinguishing
between real commitment and mild interest or nominal allegiance.
Behavior (Practice)
Comprehensive surveys of church attendance in England and Scotland have
been conducted by Christian Research, an organization that produces statistics
on organized religion. Although the most recent results11 are still confidential
pending publication, it is safe to say that at best 10 percent of the population
goes to church with any regularity (e.g. monthly or more often). Even if we
assume that half of all Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, Jews and other non-Christians
(who collectively make up 5.4 percent of the population) are observant, only one
eighth of people in Britain are religiously active.

Other criteria are possible, as mentioned above. Religious ceremonies for
rites of passage remain popular, though much less so than previously, and some
special services draw large congregations. Christmas attracts two and a half times
as many people to Anglican churches as appear on a normal Sunday. It seems
very likely, though, that tradition and nostalgia rather than sporadic religious
enthusiasm are largely responsible for high turnout at such times
It is well known that people tend to exaggerate the frequency of their
attendance at religious services when responding to surveys,12 a tendency that
varies with age.13 Asking whether the individual attended within the last seven
days (the question normally used in American Gallup polls) has produced values
even in Britain that are more than twice as high as observed weekly attendance.14
If being a churchgoer is part of one’s personal identity, there may be considerable
resistance to answering in a way that places one outside the fold. Clearly
subjective feelings of regularity are being translated into unrealistic frequencies;
it is not unreasonable, however, to label those who say that they attend monthly
or more often as religious, even if in self-description rather than in practice.
Fully 18 percent of respondents to the British Social Attitudes survey in 2004
claimed to attend services at least monthly—a figure we know to be half again
as large as the true value.
Estimating the Religious/Secular Composition of the Country

The European Social Survey provides good data on the three main areas of
religious affiliation, practice and belief, as follows; the actual questions are
provided in the Appendix:
Belonging current or past identification
(Affiliation)
Belief self-rated religiosity
importance of religion
Behavior attendance at religious services
(Practice) prayer
participation/support
(While these last two questions on how religious the respondent is and how
important religion is to him/her do not measure beliefs directly, it seems likely
that there is a strong association between these variables and strength of religious
belief.)
As an initial attempt to produce a typology to describe the religious
composition of Great Britain, one could define three categories: the actively
religious, the privately religious, and the unreligious. For example, someone
may be categorized as actively religious if he/she claims to attend services at
least monthly and rates him/herself as 6 or higher on a scale from 0 (not at all
religious) to 10 (very religious). The “privately religious” attend services rarely or
never, but they both rate themselves as more religious than not (6+ on the scale)
and also describe religion as more important than unimportant in their lives (6+
on the scale).
A rather strict definition of being unreligious would require the respondent
to satisfy all of the following:
• attends only at major holidays, less often, or never
• prays only at major holidays, less often, or never
• rates self as 0, 1 or 2 on a scale from 0 (not at all religious) to 10 (very
religious)
• describes the importance of religion in his/her life as 0, 1 or 2 on a scale
from 0 (extremely unimportant) to 10 (extremely important)
These three categories still only account for half the population, as seen in
Figure 8-1). A key question, therefore, is what characterises the other half of the
population. What do they believe, when do they go to church, and how do they
describe themselves? Are they somewhat religious or basically secular?
In 1998, about a quarter of British respondents answered a question on
the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) religion module with either
“I don’t believe in God” or “I don’t know whether there is a God and I don’t
believe there is any way to find out.” Not quite a quarter said ‘I know God really
exists and I have no doubts about it’. As the sample was only 800 the results
should be treated with caution. Nevertheless, these figures do correspond to the
distribution suggested here (a quarter religious, a quarter unreligious).
It seems reasonable to suppose that most of the “middle 50 percent”
identified here will fall into one or another of the remaining ISSP categories for
belief:
• I don't believe in a personal God, but I do believe in a Higher Power of
some kind
• I find myself believing in God some of the time, but not at others
• While I have doubts, I feel that I do believe in God
As for religious practice, few of these people attend church services except
for weddings, funerals, and possibly on special occasions such as Christmas.
Many (40 percent) never pray, but a quarter do so weekly or even daily.
Figure 8-1
Religious Composition of Great Britain
(Categories based on ESS data)
Actively religious
15%
Privately religious
?? 10%
50%
Unreligious
25%
Finally, about half identify with a religious group and half do not. Of those
who do not, two thirds have a religious background, generally in a mainline
Anglican/Protestant church.
In terms of general orientation, these respondents are by definition neither
particularly religious nor unreligious. Nearly three-quarters place themselves at
points 3, 4 or 5 on the 0-10 scale from “not at all religious” to “very religious.”
What is more striking, however, is how little religion seems to matter in their
lives. Nearly a third rate religion as unimportant (placing it at 0, 1 or 2 on the 0-
10 scale from extremely unimportant to extremely important), with another 30
percent rating it at 3 or 4 and 27 percent giving it a 5 (moderately unimportant).
Only 10 percent, in other words, think that religion is personally even somewhat
important rather than unimportant.
The dominant British attitude towards religion, then, is not one of rejection
or hostility. Many of those in the large middle group who are neither religious
nor unreligious are willing to identify with a religion, are open to the existence of
God or a higher power, may use the church for rites of passage, and might pray
at least occasionally. What seems apparent, though, is that religion plays a very
minor role (if any) in their lives.
Those who fall in the “middle 50 percent” may simply be at intermediate
(and possibly confused) stages between religion and irreligion. Perhaps, though,
characteristics on separate dimensions distinguish them from the others. A
possible typology is shown in Figure 8-2; in the absence of good quantitative

data the frequency distribution can only be guessed at. The following description
of the ‘nominalist’ categories is paraphrased from Day.15
Natal nominalists ascribe their Christianity (it is rarely anything else) to
familial heritage alone. Typically they were baptized and attended church when
they were young. They are unsure whether God exists, but if he does he does not
play a part in their lives. They do not refer to any religion or deity in answer to
questions about what they believe in, what is important to them, what guides
them morally, what makes them happy or sad, their purpose in life, or what
happens after they die. Christian natal nominalists admit that they rarely, if ever,
think about their religious identity. They assume religious identity is something
one acquires through birth or early upbringing.
Ethnic nominalists describe themselves as Christian (or Hindu, Muslim,
etc.) to position themselves as different from others. Like natal nominalists,
Christian ethnic nominalists are not convinced about God, do not engage in
religious practice, and do not give the matter much thought. They differ in
describing themselves as Christian as a way of identifying with a people or
culture. They see themselves as belonging to a distinct group, which may be
national (e.g. English as distinct from Welsh) rather than necessarily racial. In
doing so they clearly aim to separate themselves from other groups (in particular
Muslims?) that are identified with a different faith.
Aspirational nominalists describe themselves as Christian, and perhaps
more specifically as part of the established church, because they want to belong
to this group. It represents something to which they aspire. The emphasis on
membership in a group is shared with ethnic nominalists, but the identity carries
for them an additional notion of middle-class respectability and confidence. In
their view the label is attached not simply to people like themselves but to people
like they want to be.
Whereas these three “nominalist” categories have been defined largely by
reference to self-identification, the remaining two classes relate more closely to
belief. They include people who entertain beliefs about their fate, the afterlife,
a higher power, etc., that are quasi-religious but inconsistent with the teachings
of particular organized religions. Those in the “popular heterodox” group may
combine elements of astrology, reincarnation, divination, magic, folk religion
and conventional Christianity. They are not especially reflective about their
worldviews, which in consequence may be incoherent. The salience of these
beliefs tends to be rather low.
By contrast the “Sheilaists” are more conscious of spiritual seeking.
“Sheilaism” was the self-applied label used by a respondent (“Sheila Larson,” a
Figure 8-2
Religious Typology for Great Britain
Conventionally religious Actively religious

Privately religious
Unconventionally religious/spiritual Sheilaism
Popular heterodoxy
Nominal adherents Natal nominalists
Ethnic nominalists
Aspirational nominalists
Nonreligious Agnostics
Atheists
young nurse) in Habits of the Heart 16:

“I believe in God,” Sheila says. “I am not a religious fanatic. I can’t re
member the last time I went to church. My faith has carried me a long
way. It’s Sheilaism. Just my own little voice.”
Although the numbers active in what has been termed the ‘holistic milieu’17
are quite small, a more substantial proportion of the population will privately
follow a variety of self-spirituality.
Exactly where one should draw the line distinguishing the secular from the
rest is unclear. Many nominal adherents are failed Agnostics: they used to have
doubts, and now they just don’t care. Arguably, most are secular for all practical
purposes. If they are included, then at least half the British population could
reasonably be regarded as secular.
How Are Secular People Different from Others?

Socio-Demographic and Economic Characteristics
There is enormous variation by age in religious identification. Among people
aged 65 and over surveyed for the British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey in 2004,
only 22 percent say that they regard themselves as belonging to no religion, while
63 percent of young adults (18-24) so describe themselves. These differences
might be influenced by life stage (if older people are more religious than young
ones), but the evidence suggests that in the main they are generational (produced
by a steady decline in religiosity over time18). Although the ethno-religious
minority population is growing more rapidly than the rest, their numbers are too
small to prevent the arrival of a clear secular majority in the next decade or so.
Figure 8-3 shows the percentage of adult men and women classified as
having no religion on the 2001 census of England and Wales. Although these
figures may underestimate the actual size of the secular population, they do give a
good indication of the generational trend. As is evident, gender is also associated
with secularity. Exactly half of white men say that they have no religion (in the
BSA 2004), versus 41 percent of white women. To put it another way, men make
up 58 percent of the secular category as defined using European Social Survey
data, but only 36 percent of the religious groups.
Only 17 percent of religious people are not married, widowed, separated or
divorced; by contrast, nearly 40 percent of the secular are never-married. Most
but not all of this effect is explained by age; among those born before 1970,
17 percent of the secular and only 8 percent of the religious are never-married.
Likewise, only 15 percent of the religious born before 1970 say that they have
ever lived with a partner without being married, while 38 percent of the secular
have done so.
Both the religious and the secular are better educated, on average, than
those who are neither. (About 30 percent have been in higher education, as against
less than 20 percent for the others.) High levels of education often produce skepti
cism about religion and the self-confidence to be overtly Agnostic or Atheist, but
higher education is also associated with middle-class values, civic participation,
suburban living and other characteristics conducive to churchgoing. The
census shows a clear distinction between the “Nones” and “Christians” (among
people aged 25-49, for example, 32 percent and 23 percent respectively have
high qualifications), but the latter group includes nominal as well as religious
Christians. Conversely, 23 percent of religiously active BSA respondents have
degrees, as against only 18 percent for religiously unaffiliated non-attenders, but
this “secular” group (which includes 41 percent of the population) is much more
loosely defined than with the ESS or census criteria.
Actively religious respondents to the BSA are more likely to be in inter
mediate, managerial or professional occupations than unaffiliated non-attenders
(55 vs. 42 percent). Using 2001 census data for England and Wales, however,
there is a tendency for those responding “none” to the question “what is your
religion?” to be in the higher occupational categories. Among men (omitting
those not classified) 51 percent of the Nones were in intermediate, managerial or
professional occupations, as compared with 44 percent of (nominal) Christians.
These findings are consistent with the suggestion that many of those describing
themselves as Christian on the census were working class whites who viewed the
term as an ethno-national rather than a religious label.19 As with education, it
30
25 Figure 8-3
No Religion by Age and Sex (England and Wales, 2001 Census)
20
30
15 25 Men
Men
Women
Women
20
No Religion (%)
10
15
5
10
0
25 30 35 40 5 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85
Age
0
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85
Age
is apparent that the better-off are over-represented among both the genuinely
religious and the overtly secular.
Social and Political Attitudes

Using the categories already defined with European Social Survey data it is
possible to examine the social and political views of the secular and religious
subpopulations. The secular are somewhat more likely to appear on the left of
a left-right scale (30 percent left vs. 26 percent right), with the opposite true of
religious people (25 percent left vs. 31 percent right). The secular are somewhat
more likely to say that they never discuss politics, however (25 percent vs. 18
percent among the religious). A similar picture comes from looking at the de
rived left-right scale variable in the BSA 2004; here the mean value (on a scale
from 1 to 5) is 2.7 for those who have no religion and rarely or never attend
services, as opposed to 2.9 for people who identify with a denomination and
are regular attenders. Again, only 26 percent of the secular (vs. 37 percent of the
religious) say that they have “quite a lot” or “a great deal” of interest in politics.
These results hold up even when controlling for age.
On a libertarian-authoritarian scale derived for the BSA, religiously active
respondents are somewhat more authoritarian than unaffiliated non-attenders,
but the difference largely disappears once one controls for age. Both of these
groups are more libertarian than the in-between category, which probably relates
to the educational and class distributions mentioned above.
Unsurprisingly nearly two thirds of religious people describe the view that
“it is important to follow traditions and customs” as “like me” or even “very
much like me;” not even a quarter of the secular do the same. More unexpectedly,
hedonistic values are not claimed solely by the secular: 46 percent identify with
the statement that “it is important to seek fun and the things that give pleasure,”
but 36 percent of the religious do so as well. The gap is modest, but perhaps
the secular have some catching up to do; in answer to the question “how happy
are you?,” 39 percent of religious people but only 29 percent of the secular
placed themselves at 9 or 10 on a scale from 0 to 10. (A similar finding has
been reported from the U.S. General Social Survey.)20 The association is partly
explained by a remarkably strong age effect, however: 45 percent of people born
before the end of the Second World War say that they are extremely happy (9 or
10 on the scale), against only 28 percent of those born since 1945.
Conclusion
So, are secular and religious people in Great Britain different? Yes and no.
The age contrasts are significant, with younger, more secular generations
gradually replacing the older and more religious. At the same time, people
who are consciously and consistently religious or unreligious tend to be better
educated and in higher occupational categories than those in the muddled
middle. Sociologists of religion have tended to concentrate on the core religious
constituency, and this volume is a welcome opportunity to examine the opposite
pole.
Ultimately, the challenge lies in understanding the group in between.
When it comes to religion, the British have been “puzzled people” for decades.21
Their secularity, like their religiosity, is casual and unconcerned. Britain may
illustrate how the secular triumphs: by default.
Endnotes
1. Buchanan, Colin, Cut the Connection: Disestablishment and the Church of England
(London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1994).
2. See http://www.secularism.org.uk/generalprinciples.html.
3. Davie, Grace, Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing without Belonging (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1994) 83.
4. Bailey, Edward, ‘Implicit religion: A bibliographical introduction’, Social Compass,
37(4): 499-509; Davie, Grace, Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing without Be-
longing (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); Luckmann, Thomas, The Invisible Religion (Lon-
don: Collier-Macmillan, 1967).
5. Day, Abby. (2006) Believing in Belonging in Contemporary Britain: A case study

from Yorkshire, unpublished PhD thesis, Lancaster University.
6. Bänziger, Sarah. ‘Praying in Dutch society: The socialization versus individualism
hypotheses’, paper presented at the annual conference of the BSA Sociology of Reli-
gion Study Group, Manchester, 4 April 2006.
7. Gill, Robin, C. Kirk Hadaway, and Penny Long Marler. ‘Is religious belief declining
in Britain?’ Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 37(3): 507-16.
8. Spencer, Wayne. ‘Are the stars coming out? Secularization and the Future of Astrol-
ogy in the West,’ Predicting Religion: Christian, Secular and Alternative Futures. ed.
Grace Davie, Paul Heelas, and Linda Woodhead, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003).
9. Davie.
10. Gill et al.; see also The Tablet, 18 December 1999: 1729
11. Brierley, Peter, Pulling Out of the Nose Dive: A Contemporary Picture of Churchgoing,
(London: Christian Research, 2006).
12. C. Kirk Hadaway, Penny Long Marler, and Mark Chaves, ‘What the polls don’t
show: A closer look at US church attendance’, American Sociological Review, 58:
741-52.
13. C. Kirk Hadaway and Penny Long Marler, ‘How many Americans attend worship
each week? An alternative approach to measurement’, Journal for the Scientific Study
of Religion, 44 (3): 307-322.
14. C. Kirk Hadaway and Penny Long Marler, ‘Did you really go to church this week?’,
The Christian Century, 6 May 1998, pp. 472-5.
15. Day.
16. Bellah, Robert, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, Steven M. Tip-
ton. Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life. (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1985).
17. Heelas, Paul, Linda Woodhead, Benjamin Seel, Bronislaw Szerszynski, and Karin
Tusting. The Spiritual Revolution: Why Religion is Giving Way to Spirituality. (Ox-
ford: Blackwell, 2005).
18. see David Voas and Alasdair Crockett, ‘Religion in Britain: Neither believing nor
belonging’, Sociology 39(1): 11-28; Alasdair Crockett and David Voas, ‘Generations
of decline: Religious change in twentieth-century Britain’, Journal for the Scientific
Study of Religion 45(4).
19. David Voas and Steve Bruce, ‘The 2001 census and Christian identification in Brit-
ain’, Journal of Contemporary Religion 19(1): 23-8; Day.
20. see David G. Hope, ‘The funds, friends, and faith of happy people’, American Psy-
chologist, 55(1): 56-67.
21. Mass Observation, Puzzled People: A Study in Popular Attitudes to Religion, Ethics,
Progress & Politics in a London Borough (London: Gollancz, 1948).
Appendix: European Social Survey 2002 Questions on Religion

• Do you consider yourself as belonging to any particular religion or denomination?
[Footnote: Identification is meant, not official membership.]
Yes/No (if yes, which; if no…)
• Have you ever considered yourself as belonging to any particular religion or
denomination?
Yes/No (if yes, which)
• Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say
you are? (0 = Not at all religious . . . 10 = Very religious)
• Apart from special occasions such as weddings and funerals, about how often do you
attend religious services nowadays?
1. Every day
2. More than once a week
3. Once a week
4. At least once a month
5. Only on special holy days
6. Less often
7. Never
• Apart from when you are at religious services, how often, if at all, do you pray?
1. Every day
2. More than once a week
3. Once a week
4. At least once a month
5. Only on special holy days
6. Less often
7. Never
• Looking at this card, how important is each of these things in your life. (0 = Extremely
unimportant . . . 10 = Extremely important)
1. religion?
[Other items are family, friends, leisure time, politics, work, voluntary
organizations]
• For each of the voluntary organizations I will now mention, please use this card to tell me
whether any of these things apply to you now or in the last 12 months, and, if so, which.
—a religious or church organization?
• None
• Member
• Participated
• Donated money
• Voluntary work
[If the response is other than ‘none’, ask…]
• Do you have personal friends within this organization?
Yes/No
[Other organizations—in a list of 12—include sports clubs, trade unions, etc.]

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