2009 BAR (TRUE or FALSE): A law fixing the passing grade in the Bar examinations at 70%, with no grade

lower than 40% in any subject, is constitutional.

FALSE. Although law making is inherent in the Legislative, such law would infringe with the Supreme Court's constitutional right to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the Integrated Bar.

2008 BAR Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution states that The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof. No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its members. With the Congress establishing the right to trial by jury, it violates the basic principle of the Separation of Powers. Clearly, the Congress, through this enactment, had encroached upon the sphere of the judiciary. The act of the Congress in changing the procedural system of courts without the concurrence or advice of the Supreme Court renders the legislation unconstitutional.

2004 BAR The effect of the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution is to limit resort to the political question doctrine and to broaden the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Judiciary, ended? The previous Constitution, would have left to the political departments to decide. If a political question is involved, the Judiciary can determine whether or not the official whose action is being question acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Marcos vs Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1981]) Thus, although the house of Representatives

Electoral Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to decide election contents involving Members of the House of Representatives, the Supreme Court nullified the removal of one of its members for voting in favor of the protestant, who belongs to a difference party. (Bondoc vs Pineda, 201 SCRA 792 [1991]) CREBA vs ERC GR no. 174697 July 8, 2010

Facts: Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, inc. (CREBA) averts that Section 2-6 of the Distribution services and Open access Rule (DSOAR), which obligate certain elections to advance the amount needed to cover expenses of extending lines and installing additional facilities, promulgated by respondent Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), is unconstitutional and contrary to Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise known as The Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA).

Issue: is the challenge on unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA)of transcendental importance? Does the petitioner have legal standing?

Ruling:

No. The Court provided the following instruction as guides for determining whether a matter is of transcendental importance: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest

in the questions being raised. In this case, the three determinants are glaringly absent. Public funds are not involved. The allegations of constitutional and statutory violations of the public respondent agency are unsubstantiated by facts and are mere challenges on the wisdom of the rules. In addition, parties with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being raised the residential end-users undoubtedly exist and are not included as parties to the petition, thus the petitioner has no legal standing. Legal standing or locus standi refers to a partys personal and substantial interest in a case, arising from the direct injury it has sustained or will sustain as a result of the challenged governmental action. Legal standing calls for more than just a generalized grievance. The term interest means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the governmental action, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or mere incidental interest. Unless a persons constitutional rights are adversely affected by a statue or governmental action, he has no legal standing to challenge the statue or governmental action. Therefore the petition is dismissed for its serious procedural and technical defects.

ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO and ATTY. EVANGELINE J.LOZANO-ENDRIANO vs. SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, Representative, Majority, House of

Representatives

Facts: The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled A Resolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for th e Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Threefourths Vote of All the Members of Congress. Both petitions seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a definitive interpretation by the Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution. The petitioners alleged that HR 1109 is unconstitutional for deviation from the

prescribed procedures to amend the Constitution by excluding the Senate of the Philippines from the complete process of proposing amendments to the Constitution and for lack of thorough debates and consultations.

ISSUE------

RULING: In the present case, the fitness of petitioners case for the exercise of judicial review is grossly lacking. In the first place, petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act complained of. In the second place, House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been adopted. More importantly, no proposal has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. In short, House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of an uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The House has not yet performed a positive act that would warrant an intervention from this Court.

De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council GR No. 191002, March 17, 2010 Facts:

The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. Even before the event actually happens, it is giving rise to many legal dilemmas.This dilemma is rooted in consideration of Section 15, Art VII of the Constitution prohibiting the President orActing President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential election and up to the end of his term, except when temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. However, Section 4 (1), Art VIII of the Constitution also provides that any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within 90 days from occurrence. The question leads to who should appoint the next Chief Justice and may the JBC resume the process of screening candidates should the incumbent president not prohibited to do so. Issue:-----Ruling: We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed. We need not await the occurrence of the vacancy by May 17, 2010 in order for the principal issue to ripe for judicial determination by the Court. It is enough that one alleges conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but seemingly proscribed by the Constitution. A reasonable certainty of the occurrence of the perceived threat to a constitutional interest is sufficient to afford a basis for bringing a challenge, provided the Court has sufficient facts before it to enable it to intelligently adjudicate the issues.[65] Herein, the facts are not in doubt, for only legal issues remain. .

Re: Entitlement to Hazard Pay of SC Medical and Dental Clinic Personnel A.M. No. 03-9-0 November 27, 2008 572 SCRA 1

FACTS The Supreme Court Medical and Dental Services (SCMDS) Division were entitled to hazard pay through Republic Act (RA) 7305, also known as The Magna Carta of Public Health Workers. This paved the way to the issuance of Administrative Circular No. 572004 which prescribed the guidelines of the grant of hazard allowance in favor of the SCMDS personnel. The circular initially classified SCMDS employees according to level of exposure to health hazards, and not on salary grades alone. But the Department of Health (DOH) abolished the classification, and declared that a uniform hazard pay rate should be given, without regard for the nature of the risks and hazards to which they are exposed. Thus, 11 SCMDS personnel requested that the hazard grant must be based not on the salary grade, but on the degree of hazard. However, before the request could be acted upon, AO 2006-011 was issued with the amended guidelines in the payment of hazard pay, regardless of the nature of their appointment. Hence, some concerned personnel requested that the subject circular be amended to conform AO 2006-011, which was found reasonable by Chief Administrative Officer Atty. Eden Candelaria. She issued a memorandum recommending that the classification as whether employees are exposed to high or low risk be abolished, and that the payment of the adjusted hazard

allowance be charged against the regular savings of the Court. The Court referred the memorandum to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office (FMBO) and to the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) for comment. OCAT posits that the subject Circular be amended in accordance to AO 2006-0011. But FMBO advances a contrary position.

ISSUE Does the DBM have authority to review Supreme Court issuances relative to court personnel on matters of compensation?

HELD The role of the DBM is "supervisorial in nature, its main duty being to ascertain that the proposed compensation, benefits and other incentives to be given to (government) officials and employees adhere to the policies and guidelines issued in accordance with applicable laws." Thus, its authority to review Supreme Court issuances relative to court personnel on matters of compensation is very limited, circumscribed as it is by the provisions of the Constitution, specifically Article VIII, Section 3 on fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. The Court, in its ruling, has to deny the request because the subject Circular cannot be amended according to the mechanism of hazard pay allocation under AO 2006-0011. Moreover, AO 2006-0011 reveals that DOH has exceeded its powers in implementing the provisions of RA 7305, for it tried to modify the rates of hazard pay and the mechanism for its allocation. It was an attempt to amend the rates of hazard allowance and mechanism as provided for in RA 7305. With this, the Court finds that the administrative order violates the established principle that administrative issuances cannot amend and act of Congress. The request of the Supreme Court Medical and Dental Services Division to amend AO 57-2004 to the provisions of DOH AO 2006-0011 is DENIED.

League of Cities in the Philippines v. COMELEC November 18, 2008

Facts: During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 which took effect on June 30, 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirements in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirements in RA 9009. On December 22, 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on June 7, 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the Presidents signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue

Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

Issues: 1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and 2. Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

Held: 1. The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.

2. Yes. There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.

Canlas v. NHA

G.R. No. 182795 June 5, 2008

FACTS The petitioners, settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in Barangay Manggahan, Pasig City, filed and sought for the issuance of a "Writ of Amparo" on the premise that they were deprived of their liberty, freedom and/or rights to shelter as embodied in our Constitution. Their dwellings/houses have either been demolished as of the time of filing of the petition, or is about to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment. With the claim that land titles were fraudulent and spurious, they expressed willingness to help the government to unearth the so called "syndicates" clothed with governmental functions, and by way of the said prayer for the issuance of the "Writ of Amparo, the petitioners request that the unprincipled Land Officials be summoned to answer their participation in the issuances of fraudulent and spurious titles, which are now in the hands of the private respondents. The petition was actually made to seek the reversal of the Court's dismissal of previous petitions in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, considering that no motion for reconsideration can be filed for the second or third time in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE Is the Writ of Amparo available against a threatened demolition of a dwelling?

HELD "The Writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal

killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof." The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court is not included among the enumeration of rights stated in the quoted description of "The Writ of Amparo". Their claim of their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and security. Thus, the petition has no legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo. The petition is DISMISSED.

about an hour ago Like Subscribe Rev. Robert Reyes VS Court of Appeals G.R No. 182161 Dec 3, 2009 Facts: Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege and was brought to Camp Crame to await inquest proceedings. The Department of Justice (DOJ) conducted inquest proceedings to ascertain whether or not there was probable cause to hold petitioner and the others for trial on charges of Rebellion and/or Inciting to Rebellion. The petition for a writ of amparo is anchored on the ground that respondents violated petitioners constitutional right to travel. Petitioner argues that the DOJ

Secretary has no power to issue a Hold Departure Order (HDO) and the subject HDO has no legal basis since Criminal Case No. 07-3126 has already been dismissed. The CA rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the petition and denying the privilege of the writ of amparo. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration thereon was also denied in the assailed Resolution.

Isssue: Can a travel restraint be reached by the writ of amparo?

Ruling: The restriction on petitioners right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy. Additionally, petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo due to his apprehension that the DOJ may deny his motion to lift the HDO. Petitioners apprehension is at best merely speculative. Thus, he has failed to show any clear threat to his right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo. The absence of an actual controversy also renders it unnecessary for us on this occasion to pass upon the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17, Series of 1998.

BOAC vs CADAPAN

G.R. Nos. 184461-62 May 31, 2011

Facts:

Armed men abducted Sherlyn Cadapan (Sherlyn), Karen Empeo (Karen) and Manuel Merino (Merino) from a house in San Miguel, Hagonoy, Bulacan. The three were herded onto a jeep bearing license plate RTF 597 that sped towards an undisclosed location.

Spouses Asher and Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeo filed a petition for habeas corpus1 before the Court impleading then Generals Romeo Tolentino and Jovito Palparan (Gen. Palparan), Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac (Lt. Col. Boac), Arnel Enriquez and Lt. Francis Mirabelle Samson (Lt. Mirabelle) as respondents. The Court issued a writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the habeas corpus petition. Petitioners in moved for a reconsideration of the appellate courts decision. During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration in, Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeo filed before this Court a Petition for Writ of Amparo.

Issue: refer to syllabus...=P

Ruling:

An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain the criminal liability of individuals or entities involved. Neither does it partake of a civil or administrative suit.46 Rather, it is a remedial measure designed to direct specified courses of action to government agencies to safeguard the constitutional right to life, liberty and security of aggrieved individuals.The appellate court deemed it a superfluity to issue any inspection order or production order in light of the release order. As it earlier ruled in the habeas corpus case, it found that the three detainees right to life , liberty and security was being violated, hence, the need to immediately release them, or cause their release. The appellate court went on to direct the PNP to proceed further with its investigation since there were enough leads as indicated in the records to ascertain the truth and file the appropriate charges against those responsible for the abduction and detention of the three.

OCA vs. Judge Floro Facts: It was in 1995 that Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. first applied for judgeship. A prerequisite psychological evaluation on him then by the Supreme Court Clinic Services (SC Clinic) revealed "(e)vidence of ego disintegration" and "developing psychotic process." Judge Floro later voluntarily withdrew his application. In June 1998, when he applied anew, the required psychological evaluation exposed problems with selfesteem, mood swings, confusion, social/interpersonal deficits, paranoid ideations, suspiciousness, and perceptual distortions. Both 1995 and 1998 reports concluded that Atty. Floro was unfit to be a judge. Because of his impressive academic background, however, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) allowed Atty. Floro to seek a second opinion from private practitioners. The second opinion appeared favorable thus paving the way to Atty. Floros appointment as Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge of Branch 73, Malabon City, on 4 November 1998. Upon Judge Floros personal request, an audit on his sala was conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) from 2 to 3 March 1999.2 After conducting the audit, the audit team, led by Atty. Mary Jane DacarraBuenaventura, reported its findings to erstwhile Court Administrator, Alfredo L. Benipayo, who submitted his own report/memorandum 3 to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. dated 13 July 1999 recommending, among other things, that his report be considered as an administrative complaint against Judge Floro and that Judge Floro be subjected to an appropriate psychological or mental examination. Court Administrator Benipayo recommended as well that Judge Floro be placed under preventive suspension for the duration of the investigation against him. Issue: is Judge Floro guilty of conduct unbecoming necessitating his dismissal? Ruling: "Misconduct" is defined as wrong or improper conduct while "gross" connotes something "out of all measure; beyond allowance; not to be excused; flagrant; shameful." 40 For serious misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be

corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or a persistent disregard of wellknown legal rules. 41With the foregoing as yardstick, we find the act of Judge Floro in circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements constitutive of simple misconduct in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it appears that Judge Floro was not motivated by any corrupt motive but, from what we can see from the evidence, a persistent and unquenchable thirst for recognition. Concededly, the need for recognition is an all too human flaw and judges do not cease to be human upon donning the judicial robe. Considering, however, the proscription against judges seeking publicity for personal vainglory, they are held to a higher standard as they must act within the confines of the code they swore to observe. RELIEVE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. of his functions as Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Malabon City and consider him SEPARATED from the service due to a medically disabling condition of the mind that renders him unfit to discharge the functions of his office, effective immediately.

CSC v. Andal G.R. No. 185749 December 16, 2009

FACTS Herminigildo L. Andal, respondent, holds the position of Security Guard II in the Sandiganbayan. He filed an application to take the Career Service Professional Examination-Computer Assisted Test (CSPE-CAT), was admitted to take the examination, and the result showed that he passed with the rate of 81.03%. However, when Arlene S. Vito who claimed to have been authorized by respondent to secure the results of the examination went to do so, verification and comparison of the pictures attached to the Picture Seat Plan and the identification card of Andal brought by Vito

showed dissimilarity in the facial features. Civil Service Commission National Capital Region (CSC-NCR) rendered judgment finding the respondent guilty of dishonesty and imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal from the service. Aggrieved, the respondent appealed, however, it was denied. He then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA), in which the CA ruled in favor of the respondent. The CSC filed a motion for reconsideration in the CA but was denied. Hence, the present petition for reversal of the decision of the CA.

ISSUE Does the CSC's disciplinary jurisdiction extend to court personnel?

HELD The Court of Appeals ruled that the CSC encroached upon the Supreme Courts power of administrative supervision over court personnel. In reversing the CSC resolutions, the Court of Appeals cited Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. The Court of Appeals further stated that what the CSC should have done was to refer the administrative case for dishonesty against respondent to the Office of the Court Administrator for appropriate action instead of resolving the case. The CSCs authority and power to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases are not in dispute. The question is whether the CSCs disciplinary jurisdiction extends to court personnel in view of Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. In the present case, while respondent may have filed his Answer to the formal charge of dishonesty after having been directed to do so, he denied having taken the civil service examination and did not even appear at the formal investigation conducted by the CSCNCR. He appealed to the CSC after the adverse decision of the CSC-NCR was rendered but raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction over his person. He argued that as an employee in the Judiciary, the jurisdiction to hear disciplinary action against him

vests with the Sandiganbayan or the Supreme Court. It cannot therefore be said that he was estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the CSC. This notwithstanding, the Court reiterates that it will not and cannot tolerate dishonesty for the judiciary expects the highest standard of integrity from all its employees. The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice is circumscribed with a heavy burden or responsibility. The Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables. The instant petition is DENIED. The Court orders the Civil Service Commission to refer the case of respondent Andal to the Office of the Court Administrator, for the filing of the appropriate administrative case against him.

CONCERNED LAWYERS OF BULACAN VERSUS JUDGE PORNILLOS

FACTS: Complainants, Concerned Lawyers of Bulacan, charged respondent, Judge Pornillos with having violated Republic Act Nos. 3019 and 6713, the Canons of Judicial Conduct, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Rules of Court, Rule 140, Sections 1, 8 (pars. 1-4, 6-9) and 9 (pars. 2, 4), as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC[1][1] (2001). Complainants alleged that Respondent has a notorious history of committing graft and corruption , is maintaining amorous relationships with her driver and bodyguards,

borrowing money from her staff and other court officers , reports to court only twice a week, obtained loans from court personnel and lawyers during the pendency of a case. ISSUE: Will debt-condonation admibnistratively absolved a judge for =boorowing money from a lawyer-creditor who has pending cases before his sala?

RULING:

Judge Victoria Villalon-Pornillos is found guilty of violating paragraph 7, Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court (borrowing money from a lawyer in a case pending before her court) which is also a gross misconduct constituting violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The impression that respondent would rule in favor of complainant because the former is indebted to the latter is what the Court seeks to avoid. She is DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality. .

in the matter of the charges of Justice Del Cstillo Facts:

Justice Mariano C. del Castillo wrote the decision for the Court on the case of petitioners Isabelita C. Vinuya and about 70 other elderly women, all members of the Malaya Lolas Organization, filed with the Court, a special civil action of certiorari with application for preliminary mandatory injunction against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of Justice, and the Office of the Solicitor General. Their petition was denied. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Courts decision. More than 2 month later on counsel for petitioners, Atty. Herminio Harry Roque, Jr., announced in his online blog that his clients would file a supplemental petition "detailing plagiarism committed by the court" under the second reason it gave for dismissing the petition and that "these stolen passages were also twisted to support the courts erroneous conclusions that the Filipino comfort women of World War Two have no further legal remedies." The media gave publicity to Atty. Roques announcement. Issue: 1. Whether or not, Justice Del Castillo plagiarized the published works of authors Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis. 2. Whether or not Justice Del Castillo twisted the works of these authors to make it appear that such works supported the Courts position in the Vinuya decision. Ruling: 1.) the Supreme Court ruled that, Del Castillo did not commit plagiarism because

when his researcher "cut" research materials from a law website and "pasted" them on the decision's main manuscript, the attributions were "accidentally deleted." 2.) the SC said the allegation is baseless because the lifted portions only provided

background facts and that the charge of 'twisting' or misrepresentation against him is to say the least, unkind. To be more accurate, however, SC claimed the charge is reckless and obtuse.

Suplico vs. NEDA, GR 178830, July 14, 2008

FACTS: Respondent avers that there is no more justiciable controversy with the ZTE National Broadband Network Project controversy for the Court to resolve. Petitioners contend that because of the transcendental importance of the issues raised in the petition, which among others, included the Presidents use of the power to borrow, i.e., to enter into foreign loan agreements, this Court should take cognizance of this case despite its apparent mootness.

ISSUE: Is the moot and academic principle a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case?

RULING: Judicial power presupposes actual controversies, the very antithesis of mootness. In the absence of actual justiciable controversies or disputes, the Court generally opts to refrain from deciding moot issues. Where there is no more live subject of controversy, the Court ceases to have a reason to render any ruling or make any pronouncement. For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or

academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. Where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, and an adjudication thereon would be of no practical use or value as courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging.

While there were occasions when the Court passed upon issues although supervening events had rendered those petitions moot and academic, the instant case does not fall under the exceptional cases. In those cases, the Court was persuaded to resolve moot and academic issues to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines or rules for future guidance of both bench and bar.

De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council

GR No. 191002, March 17, 2010

Facts:

The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. Even before the event actually happens, it is giving rise to many legal dilemmas.This dilemma is rooted in consideration of Section 15, Art VII of the Constitution prohibiting the President

orActing President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential election and up to the end of his term, except when temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. However, Section 4 (1), Art VIII of the Constitution also provides that any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within 90 days from occurrence. The question leads to who should appoint the next Chief Justice and may the JBC resume the process of screening candidates should the incumbent president not prohibited to do so.

Issue:------

Ruling:

We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed. We need not await the occurrence of the vacancy by May 17, 2010 in order for the principal issue to ripe for judicial determination by the Court. It is enough that one alleges conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but seemingly proscribed by the Constitution. A reasonable certainty of the occurrence of the perceived threat to a constitutional interest is sufficient to afford a basis for bringing a challenge, provided the Court has sufficient facts before it to enable it to intelligently adjudicate the issues.[65] Herein, the facts are not in doubt, for only legal issues remain.