IN RE GONZALES The Court CONSIDERED the 1st Indorsement dated 16 March 1988 from Mr. Raul M.

Gonzalez, "Tanodbayan/Special; Prosecutor" forwarding to Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan a "letter-complaint, dated 14 December 1987 with enclosure of the Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court," together with a telegram of Miguel Cuenco, for "comment within ten (10) days from receipt hereof." Mr. Justice Fernan had brought this 1st Indorsement to the attention of the Court en banc in view of the important implications of policy raised by said 1st Indorsement. The mentioned 1st Indorsement has two (2) attachments. First, an anonymous letter by "Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court" addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez referring to charges for disbarment brought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan and asking Mr. Gonzalez "to do something about this." The second attachment is a copy of a telegram from Mr. Miguel Cuenco addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, where Mr. Cuenco refers to pleadings he apparently filed on 29 February 1988 with the Supreme Court in Administrative Case No. 3135, which, in the opinion of Mr. Cuenco, made improper any "intervention" by Mr. Raul Gonzalez. Mr. Cuenco, nonetheless, encourages Mr. Gonzalez "to file responsive pleading Supreme Court en banc to comply with Petition Concerned Employees Supreme Court asking Tanodbayan's intervention. The Court DIRECTED the Clerk of Court to FURNISH Mr. Raul M Gonzales a copy of the per curiam Resolution, dated 17 February 1988 of the Court in Administrative Case No. 3135 entitled "Miguel Cuenco v. Honorable Marcelo B. Fernan" in which Resolution, the Court Resolved to dismiss the charges made by complaint Cuenco against Mr.Justice Fernan for utter lack of merit. In the same Resolution, the Court Resolved to require complainant Cuenco to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with for making unfounded serious accusations against Mr. Justice Fernan. Upon request of Mr. Cueco, the Court had granted him an extension of up to 30 March 1988, Mr. Cuenco filed a pleading which appears to be an omnibus pleading relating to, inter alia, Administrative Case No. 3135. Insofar as Administrative Case No. 3135 is concerned, the Court treated this pleading as a Motion for Reconsideration. By a per curiam Resolution dated 15 April 1988, the Court denied with finality Mr Cuenco's Motion for Reconsideration. It is important to underscore the rule of constitution law here involved. This principle may be succinctly formulated in the following terms. A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offence which carries with it the penalty of removal

from office, or any penalty service of which would amount to removal from office. The Court dealt with this matter in its Resolution of 17 February 1988 in Administrative Case No. 3135 in the following terms: There is another reason why the complaining for disbarment here must be dismissed. Members of the Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the Constitution, be members of the Philippine Bar and may be removed from office only by impeachment (Article XI [2], Constitution). To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member's incumbency, would in effect be to circumbent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional mandate theat Members of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution. Precisely the same situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI [8] in relation to Article XI [2], Id.), a majority of the members of the Commission on Elections (Article IX [C] [1] [1] in relation to Article XI [2], Id. and the members of the Commission on Audit who are not certified public accountants (Article XI [D] [1][1], Id.), all of whom are constitutionally required to be members of the Philippine Bar. (Emphasis supplied) This is not the first time the Court has had occasion to rule on this matter. In Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, 1 the Court said: The broad power of the New Constitution vests the respondent court with jurisdiction over "public officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations." There are exceptions, however, like constitutional officers, particularly those declared to be removed by impeachment. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution provides: Sec. 2 The President, the Members of the Supreme Court, and the Members of the Constitutional Commissions shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, other high crimes, or graft and corruption." Thus, the above provision proscribes removal from office of the aforementioned constitutional officers by any other method; otherwise, to allow a public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his office, would be violative of the clear mandate of the fundamental law. Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in his authoritative dissertation on the New Constitution, states that "judgement in cases of impeachment shall be limited to removal from office and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust, or profit under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution trial, and punishment, in accordance with law. The above provision is a reproduction of what was found in the 1935 Constitution. It is quite apparent from the explicit character of the above provision that the effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of position and disqualification to

hold any office of honor, trust or profit under the Republic. It is equally manifest that the party this convicted may be proceeded against, tried and thereafter punished in accordance with law. There can be no clearer expression of the constitutional intent as to the scope of the impeachment process (The Constitution f the Philippines, pp. 465-466)." The clear implication is, the party convicted in the impeachment proceeding shall nevertheless be liable and subject of prosecution, trial and punishment according to law; and that if the same does not result in a conviction and the official is not thereby removed, the filing of a criminal action "in accordance with law" may not prosper. 2 The provisions of the 1973 Constitution we referred to above in Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan are substantially reproduced in Article XI of the 1987 Constitution: Sec. 2 The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. Sec. 3 xxx xxx xxx

It follows from the foregoing that a fiscal or other prosecuting officer should forthwith and motu proprio dismiss any charges brought against a Member of this Court. The remedy of a person with a legitimate grievance is to file impeachment proceedings. The Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED to serve a copy of this Resolution upon Hon. Raul M. Gonzales and Mr Miguel Cuenco. DIGEST Facts: Gonzales was the Tanodbayan or Special Prosecutor. He forwarded a letter-complaint to Justice Fernan. The letter was said to be from concerned employees of the SC (an anonymous letter). The letter was originally addressed to Gonzales referring to the charges for disbarment sought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Justice Fernan, and asking him (Gonzales) to do something about it. The Supreme Court furnished a copy to Gonzales, the per curiam Resolution of the SC, dismissing the charges made by Cuenco against Justice Fernan for lack of merit. In that resolution, Cuenco was asked to show cause why he should not be held administratively liable for making serious accusations against Fernan. Issue: Whether or not a Supreme Court justice can be disbarred during his term of office Held: A public officer (such as Justice Fernan) who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan, or any other court, with any offense which carries with it the penalty of removal from office. Another reason why the complaint for disbarment should be dismissed is because under the Constitution, members of the SC may be removed only by impeachment. The above provision proscribes removal from office by any other method. Otherwise, to allow such public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his office with an office that carries the penalty of removal from office, would be violative of the clear mandate of the Constitution. The effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of position and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit under the Republic. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office. But the party convicted shall nevertheless be held liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law. The court is not saying that the members and other constitutional officer are entitled to immunity from liability. What the court is merely saying is that there is a fundamental procedural requirement that must be observed before such liability ma be determined. A member

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law. It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that it Members or the other constitutional officers we referred to above are entitled to immunity from liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that there is a fundamental procedural requirements that must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced. A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings. The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial independence and separation of powers. The rule is important because judicial independence is important. Without the protection of this rule, Members of the Supreme Court would be brought against them by unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other parties who, for any number of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the Court.

of the SC must first be removed from office, via the constitutional route of impeachment, and then only may he be held liable either criminally or administratively (that is, disbarment), for any wrong or misbehavior in appropriate proceedings.

Estrada v Desierto GR Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001 Ponente :Puno, J. Facts :1. In 1998, Joseph Estrada was elected President of thePhilippines, while Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo was elected VicePresident. The president was accused with corruption, culminating in Ilocos Sur Governor ChavitSingsons accusations that the president received millions of pesos from jueteng lords. 2. The Senate and the House of Representatives began earlyinvestigations regarding the accusation, while key sociopoliticalfigures like Cardinal Sin, former Presidents Aquino and Ramos,the vice president, senior advisers and cabinet members called onthe president to resign, and resigned from their cabinet poststhemselves .3. The impeachment trial began on 7 December 2000, with 21senator-judges presided over by Chief Justice HilarioDavide. At apoint when 11 senator-judges ruled gainst opening a second envelope of evidence showing the presidents P3.3 billion bank account under the name Jose Velarde, the public prosecutors resigned and a mass demonstration at EDSA began. 4. CJ Davide granted Senator Raul Rocos motion to postpone the impeachment trial until the House of Representatives resolvedthe lack of public prosecutors.5. With the defection of more officials and of the army and policefrom the Estrada administration, the president attempted toappease public sentiment by announcing a snap election and byallowing the second envelope to be opened. The measures failed,and the calls for resignation strengthened.6. On 20 January 2001, the president negotiated withrepresentatives of the vicepresident. News broke out that Chief Justice HilarioDavide would administer the oath of presidency tothe vice president at EDSA Shrine. Estrada issued two statementsone stating reservations on the constitutionality of Arroyospresidency, and another stating that he is incapable of dispensinghis responsibilities as president, thus allowing Arroyo to be theacting president.7. The Arroyo administration was met with acceptance by thedifferent branches of government, by majority of the public, andby the international community. The impeachment trial wasclosed, despite sentiments such as those of Senator DefensorSantiago that the impeachment court had failed to resolve thecase, leaving open questions regarding Estradas qualifications torun for other elected posts.8. The Office of the Ombudsman proceeded to file a series of casesregarding the corruption of Estrada. Estrada filed

a motioncompelling the Ombudsman to refrain from further proceedingsuntil his term as president was over. He also filed a petition to beconfirmed as the lawful and incumbent president, temporarilyunable to fulfill his duties, thus making Arroyo an actingpresident only.9. The Supreme Court ruled a) to inform the parties that they didnot declare the Office of the President vacant on 20 January 2001,b) to prohibit either party from discussing inpublic the merits of the case while in its pendency, c) to enjointhe Ombudsman from resolving pending criminal cases against Estrada for 30 days.Issues:I. Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.II. Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy,whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave whilerespondent Arroyo is an Acting President.III. Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is acondition precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitionerEstrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner isstill president, whether he is immune from criminal prosecution.IV. Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should beenjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicityRuling:I. The petitions present a justiciable controversy because thecases at bar pose legal, and not political, questions. Hence, thecases are within the jurisdiction of the Court to decide. Definition of political questions: ...thosequestions which, under the Constitution, are to bedecided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or inregard to which full discretionary authority has beendelegated to the legislative or executive branch of government. --Former CJ Roberto Concepcion Arroyos government is NOT revolutionary incharacter, since her oath was taken under the 1987Constitution. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and the right to assembly. It is intraconstitutional in this regard (within the scope of theConstitution). The resignation of Estrada that it causedand the subsequent succession of of Arroyo are subject to judicial review. II. Estrada is NOT a President onleave while Arroyo is Acting President. Under Section 11 Article VII, Estrada saysthat only Congress has the ultimate authority todetermine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided bysaid provision. Hence, Arroyo has no power to judge Estradas inability to do his job as President. However, both houses of Congress expressedtheir recognition and support of Arroyo as the newPresident, and it is implicitly clear in this recognition that Estradas inability is no longer temporary. Thus,Congress has rejected Estradas claim of inability. Furthermore, Court cannot exercise itsjudicial power to revise decision of Congress inrecognizing Arroyo. To do so would be to transgress principle of separation of powers, since this is a politicalissue.

III. Estrada contends that he has not beenconvicted in the impeachment case and that he enjoysimmunity from all kinds of suit. Executive immunity provision of 1973Constitution was no longer included in the 1986Constitution. This is in accordance with SC ruling in InRe: Saturnino Bermudez that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond. When the president has resigned, thenproper criminal and civil cases may already be filedagainst him IV. Estrada argued that respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting theinvestigation of the cases filed against him because of prejudicial publicity on his guilt, and that respondent has also developed bias. In People v Teehankee, Jr. and Larranaga vCourt of Appeals it was laid down that the right of anaccused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press.Responsible press. Our judges are smart enough to know thelaw and to disregard camera drama and off-court evidence. Their exposure to media does not affect theirimpartiality Francisco vs. House of Representatives (GR 160261, 10 November 2003) Francisco vs. House of Representatives(GR 160261, 10 November 2003)En Banc, Carpio Morales (J): 1 concurs, 3 wrote separate concurring opinions to which 4 concur, 2 wrote concurringand dissenting separate opinions to which 2 concur.Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Porceedings, superceding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11thCongress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee onJustice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by theChief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G.Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred tothe House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient inform," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. Four months and threeweeks since the filing of the first complaint or on 23 October 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by HouseRepresentatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a"Resolution of

Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives.Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint isunconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year." Issue: Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings.Held: The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. The "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courtsas a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversiesinvolving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with thecorollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that itsvast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves. The separation of powers is afundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division inour Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and issupreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. TheConstitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of thevarious departments of the government. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declareexecutive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court isthat while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature,that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied inSection 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI

thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach,and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official. The people expressed their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution. This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leavethe matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain welldefined limits, or "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review. There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to beinterpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of thecalibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution. Francisco vs. House of Representeatives G.R. No. 160261 FACTS: Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme CourtChief Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy in this case was the constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second complaint to controvert the rules of impeachment providedfor by law.ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief JusticeHilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives is constitutional, and whether theresolution thereof is a political question h; as resulted in a political crisis.HELD: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedingswhich were approved by the House of Representativesare unconstitutional. Consequently, thesecond impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, is barred underparagraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.REASONING:In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is evermindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among thelegislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absoluteautonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by thesovereign people.At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefullycalibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches mustbe given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutionalbasis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedingswould upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as awhole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it bythe Constitution.The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when aproposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at

least one-third of all the Members of theHouse shall be necessary to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal todelete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachmentproceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsementof the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at leastone-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of theHouse, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachmentcomplaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against thesame official within a one year period.The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits onlythe main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justicetransgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not goabout assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turnjusticiable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicialdominance over the other two great branches of the government Gutierrez vs. HR Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez vs. The House Of Representatives Committee On Justice, et.al. Doctrine: x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere. As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow. Facts: On July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa HontiverosBaraquel, et.al. (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint against petitioner. On August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes et.al. (Reyes group) filed another impeachment complaint. Both impeachment complaints were endorsed by different Party-List Representatives. On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as chairperson of the Committee on Rules, instructed the Deputy Secretary General for Operations to include the two complaints in the Order of Business, which was complied with by their inclusion in the Order of Business for the following day. On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the House of Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints to public respondent.

After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both complaints sufficient in form, which complaints it considered to have been referred to it at exactly the same time. Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress was published on September 2, 2010. On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider the September 1, 2010 Resolution of public respondent. Public respondent refused to accept the motion, however, for prematurity; instead, it advised petitioner to await the notice for her to file an answer to the complaints, drawing petitioner to furnish copies of her motion to each of the 55 members of public respondent. After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7, 2010, found the two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, sufficient in substance. The determination of the sufficiency of substance of the complaints by public respondent, which assumed hypothetically the truth of their allegations, hinged on the issue of whether valid judgment to impeach could be rendered thereon. Petitioner was served also on September 7, 2010 a notice directing her to file an answer to the complaints within 10 days. Issue: When is impeachment deemed initiated? (Does the present impeachment complaint violate the one-year bar rule under the Constitution?) Held: The one-year bar rule. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent. Following petitioners line of reasoning, the verification of the complaint or the endorsement by a member of the House steps done prior to the filing would already initiate the impeachment proceedings. Contrary to petitioners emphasis on impeachment complaint, what the Constitution mentions is impeachment proceedings. Her reliance on the singular tense of the word complaint to denote the limit prescribed by the Constitution goes against the basic rule of statutory construction that a word covers its enlarged and plural sense. The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an impeachment complaint, for it is the matchstick that kindles the candle of impeachment proceedings. The filing of an impeachment

complaint is like the lighting of a matchstick. Lighting the matchstick alone, however, cannot light up the candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the candle wick. Referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted matchsticks light the candle at the same time. What is important is that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle. Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not among those motions that shall be decided without debate, but any debate thereon is only made subject to the five-minute rule. Moreover, it is common parliamentary practice that a motion to refer a matter or question to a committee may be debated upon, not as to the merits thereof, but only as to the propriety of the referral. With respect to complaints for impeachment, the House has the discretion not to refer a subsequent impeachment complaint to the Committee on Justice where official records and further debate show that an impeachment complaint filed against the same impeachable officer has already been referred to the said committee and the one year period has not yet expired, lest it becomes instrumental in perpetrating a constitutionally prohibited second impeachment proceeding. Far from being mechanical, before the referral stage, a period of deliberation is afforded the House, as the Constitution, in fact, grants a maximum of three session days within which to make the proper referral. As mentioned, one limitation imposed on the House in initiating an impeachment proceeding deals with deadlines. The Constitution states that [a] verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere. As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow. Allowing an expansive construction of the term initiate beyond the act of referral allows the unmitigated influx of successive complaints, each having their own respective 60-session-day period of disposition from referral. Worse, the Committee shall conduct overlapping hearings until and unless the disposition of one of the complaints ends with the affirmance of a resolution for impeachment or the overriding[ of a contrary resolution (as espoused by public

respondent), or the House transmits the Articles of Impeachment (as advocated by the Reyes group), or the Committee on Justice concludes its first report to the House plenary regardless of the recommendation (as posited by respondent-intervenor). Each of these scenarios runs roughshod the very purpose behind the constitutionally imposed one-year bar. Opening the floodgates too loosely would disrupt the series of steps operating in unison under one proceeding. Lecaroz vs Sandiganbayan Facts: Petitioner Francisco M. Lecaroz was the Municipal Mayor of Santa Cruz, Marinduque, while his son and co-petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz, was the outgoing chairman of the Kabataang Barangay (KB) of Barangay Bagong Silang, Santa Cruz, and currently a member of its SanguniangBayan (SB) representing the Federation of Kabataang Barangays. In the 1985 election of the Kabataang Barangay Jowil Red won the KB Chairman of Barangay Matalaba, Santa Cruz. Red was appointed by then President Marcos as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Santa Cruz representing the KBs of the municipality. However, Mayor Lecaroz informed Red that he could not yet sit as member of the municipal council until the Governor of Marinduque had cleared his appointment. When Red finally received his appointment papers, President Aquino was already in power. But still Red was not allowed to sit as sectoral representative in the Sanggunian. Meanwhile with the approval of the Mayor, Lenlie continued to receive his salary for more than a year. Finally Red was able to secure appointment papers from the Aquino administration after three years and nine months from the date he received his appointment paper from President Marcos. Subsequently, Red filed with the Office of the Ombudsman several criminal complaints against the Mayor and Lenlie arising from the refusal of the two officials to let him assume the position of KB sectoral representative. After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan thirteen (13) informations for estafa through falsification of public documents against petitioners, and one (1) information for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA No. 3019, the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the Mayor alone. The Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the two accused guilty on all counts of estafa. However, with respect to the charge of violation of RA No. 3019, The Sandiganbayan acquitted Mayor Lecaroz. The Sandiganbayan, having denied their motion for reconsideration, the accused, elevated their case to the Supreme Court. Issue:Whether or not an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is appointed or chosen or has qualified. Held: YES. To resolve these issues, it is necessary to refer to the laws on the terms of office of KB youth sectoral representatives to the SB and of

the KB Federation Presidents. Section 7 of BP Blg. 51 and Sec. 1 of the KB Constitution respectively provide Sec. 7. Term of Office. - Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years, which shall commence on the first Monday of March 1980. In the case of the members of the sanggunian representing the association of barangay councils and the president of the federation of kabataang barangay, their terms of office shall be coterminous with their tenure is president of their respective association and federation . Sec 1. All incumbent officers of the Kabataang Barangay shall continue to hold office until the last Sunday of November 1985 or such time that the newly elected officers shall have qualified and assumed office in accordance with this Constitution. The theory of petitioners is that Red failed to qualify as KB sectoral representative to the SB since he did not present an authenticated copy of his appointment papers; neither did he take a valid oath of office. Resultantly, this enabled petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz to continue as member of the SB although in a holdover capacity since his term had already expired. The Sandiganbayan however rejected this postulate declaring that the holdover provision under Sec. 1 quoted above pertains only to positions in the KB, clearly implying that since no similar provision is found in Sec. 7 of B.P. Blg. 51, there can be no holdover with respect to positions in the SB. The Supreme Court disagree with the Sandiganbayan. The concept of holdover when applied to a public officer implies that the office has a fixed term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term. It is usually provided by law that officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall remain in office not only for that term but until their successors have been elected and qualified. Where this provision is found, the office does not become vacant upon the expiration of the term if there is no successor elected and qualified to assume it, but the present incumbent will carry over until his successor is elected and qualified, even though it be beyond the term fixed by law. In the instant case, although BP Blg. 51 does not say that a Sanggunian member can continue to occupy his post after the expiration of his term in case his successor fails to qualify, it does not also say that he is proscribed from holding over. Absent an express or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is appointed or chosen and has qualified.The legislative intent of not allowing holdover must be clearly expressed or at least implied in the legislative enactment, otherwise it is reasonable to assume that the law-making body favors the same. Indeed, the law abhors a vacuum in public offices,and courts generally indulge in the strong presumption against a legislative intent to create, by statute, a condition which may result in an

executive or administrative office becoming, for any period of time, wholly vacant or unoccupied by one lawfully authorized to exercise its functions. This is founded on obvious considerations of public policy, for the principle of holdover is specifically intended to prevent public convenience from suffering because of a vacancy and to avoid a hiatus in the performance of government functions Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, 166 SCRA 316 (1988) Fast factsZaldivar (pet) is one of several defedants in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 12163-12177 (for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) pending before the Sandiganbayan. The Office of the Tanodbayan conducted the preliminary investigation and filed the criminal informations in those cases.Contention c/o Zaldivar Gonzales (resp), as Tanodbayan and under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, was no longer vested with power andauthority independently to investigate and to institute cases for graft and corruption against public officials and employees,and hence that the informations filed in the aforementioned Criminal Cases were all null and void.Philippine Daily Globe article Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case Gonzales is quoted in many occasions saying thatstopping him from investigating graft cases, like that involving Zaldivar, can aggravate the thought that affluent persons

incapable of judging him impartially and fairly. The SC deliberately rendered an erroneous decision when it rendered it Decision on April 27, 1988 That decision was rendered in retaliation by the SC against him for the position he had taken that the SC Justices cannotclaim immunity from suit or investigation by government prosecutors, and in order to stop respondent from investigatingcases against some of the protgs or friends of some SC Justices. The members of the SC have improperly pressured him to render decisions favorable to their colleagues and friends,including dismissal of cases against 2 of its own members.Held & RatioConsidering the kinds of statements of lawyers discussed above which the Court has in the past penalized as contemptuousor as warranting application of disciplinary sanctions, the SC holds that the statements made by Gonzales clearly constitutecontempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the SC. The statements, especially the one which mentionsthat the SC made a deliberately erroneous decision, constitute the grossest disrespect for the Court. Such statements veryclearly debase and degrade the SC and, through the SC, the entire system of administration of justice in the country.DispositiveAtty. Raul M. Gonzales is suspended from the practice of law indefinitely and until further orders from theSC, the suspensions to take effect immediately Almonte v. Vasquez

can prevent the progress of trialWhat I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that while rich andinfluential persons get favorable actions from the SC, it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given duecourse. He continues to accuse that this issue will promote further lack of confidence in the judiciary. While he has beensupposedly been assigned by President Aquino to preside over graft cases as Tanodbayan, the SC has been continually preventing him to do so.April 27, 1988 SC DecisionOrder Gonzales too cease and desist from conducting investigations and filing criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise exercising the powers and functions of the Ombudsman.Statements in MFR filed by Gonzales on April 28, 19881. That he had been approached by a leading member fo the SC and he was asked to go slow on Zaldivar and not be toohard on him2. That he was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the COA report on illegal disbursements in the SC because it will embarrass this Court3. That in several instances, the respondent was called over the phone by a leading member of the SC and was asked todismiss cases against 2 members of the CourtAuthority to disciplineThe SC, as regulator and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority todiscipline lawyers stems from the Courts constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law, whichincludes as well authority to regulate the practice itself of law.Contentions c/o Gonzales Members of the court should inhibit themselves as they were biased and prejudiced against him The issues of the proceeding should be passed upon the IBP because he does not expect due processfrom the SC, that the SC has become

Facts: This is a case wherein respondent Ombudsman, requires petitioners Nerio Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as chief accountant and record custodian, respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988" and all evidence such as vouchers from enforcing his orders. Petitioner Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Perez is Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been written by an employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished several government offices, including the Office of the Ombudsman. May be erased: [The letter reads in pertinent parts: that the EIIB has a syndicate headed by the Chief of Budget Division who is manipulating funds and also the brain of the so called "ghost agents" or the "Emergency Intelligence Agents" (EIA); that when the agency had salary differential last Oct '88 all money for the whole plantilla were released and from that alone, Millions were saved and converted to ghost agents of EIA; Almost all EIIB agents collects payroll from the big time smuggler syndicate monthly and brokers every week for them not to be apprehended.

In his comment on the letter-complaint, petitioner Almonte denied all the allegations written on the anonymous letter. Petitioners move to quash the subpoena and the subpoena duces tecum but was denied. Disclosure of the documents in question is resisted with the claim of privilege of an agency of the government on the ground that "knowledge of EIIB's documents relative to its Personal Services Funds and its plantilla . . . will necessarily [lead to] knowledge of its operations, movements, targets, strategies, and tactics and the whole of its being" and this could "destroy the EIIB." Issue: Whether petitioners can be ordered to produce documents relating to personal services and salary vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea that such documents are classified without violating their equal protection of laws. Held: YES. At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters and in addition, privilege to withhold the identity of persons who furnish information of violation of laws. In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting." Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling production, no similar excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other considerations. The Ombudsman is investigating a complaint that several items in the EIIB were filled by fictitious persons and that the allotments for these items in 1988 were used for illegal purposes. The plantilla and other personnel records are relevant to his investigation as the designated protectors of the people of the Constitution. Nor is there violation of petitioners' right to the equal protection of the laws. Petitioners complain that "in all forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can only hale respondents via their verified complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed," while in proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation. In the first place, there can be no objection to this procedure because it is provided in the Constitution itself. In the second place, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints "in any form and in a manner," the framers of the Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of the people which keep them from complaining against official wrongdoings. As this Court had occasion to point out, the Office of the Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and

prosecutory agencies of the government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them. On the other hand complainants are more often than not poor and simple folk who cannot afford to hire lawyers. Finally, it is contended that the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum would violate petitioners' right against self-incrimination. It is enough to state that the documents required to be produced in this case are public records and those to whom the subpoena duces tecum is directed are government officials in whose possession or custody the documents are. Moreover, if, as petitioners claim the disbursement by the EII of funds for personal service has already been cleared by the COA, there is no reason why they should object to the examination of the documents by respondent Ombudsman CABALIT V. COA (2012) [G.R. No. 180236, January 17, 2012] FACTS: As per investigation of the State Auditors Cabalit and Coloma in their Joint-Affidavit, a scheme was perpetrated by LTO employees Leonardo G. Olaivar, Gemma P. Cabalit, Filadelfo S. Apit and Samuel T. Alabat, in the vehicle registration fees. In a Joint Evaluation Report, Graft Investigators Pio R. Dargantes and Virginia Palanca-Santiago found grounds to conduct a preliminary investigation.[11] Hence, a formal charge for dishonesty was filed against Olaivar, Cabalit, Apit and Alabat before the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas, and the parties were required to submit their counter-affidavits. In response, Olaivar, Cabalit, Apit and Alabat submitted separate counter-affidavits, all essentially denying knowledge and responsibility for the anomalies. After proper hearing the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas rendered judgment, finding petitioners liable for dishonesty for tampering the official receipts to make it appear that they collected lesser amounts than they actually collected. Accordingly, they were given the penalty of dismissal from the service with the accessory penalties of cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and disqualification from re-employment in the government service. Petitioners sought reconsideration of the decision, but their motions were denied by the Ombudsman. Hence filed with the CA separate petitions. The CA dismissed the consolidated petition and modified that Olaiver be held administratively liable for gross neglect of duty which carries the same penalty as dishonesty.

Petitioners sought reconsideration of the CA decision, but the CA denied their motions. Issues: 1. Whether or not there was a violation of the right of due process. 2. Whether or not the petitioners were administratively liable. Ruling: 1. No. In this case, the Office of the Ombudsman afforded petitioners every opportunity to defend themselves by allowing them to submit counter-affidavits, position papers, memoranda and other evidence in their defense. Since petitioners have been afforded the right to be heard and to defend themselves, they cannot rightfully complain that they were denied due process of law. It is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. More often, this opportunity is conferred through written pleadings that the parties submit to present their charges and defenses. But as long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his or her interests in due course, said party is not denied due process.

preventive suspension. This includes the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, or censure of a public officer or employee. CRUZ VS SANDIGANBAYAN GARCIA, J.: Thru this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Buencamino Cruz seeks to set aside the Decision dated 30 January 1998[1] of the Sandiganbayan in its Criminal Case No. 22830, finding him guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and its Resolution dated 14 July 1998,[2] denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The factual antecedents are not at all disputed: Following the May 1992 local elections and his proclamation as mayor-elect of the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, Victor Miranda sought an audit investigation of the municipalitys 1991-1992 financial transactions. Petitioner Buencamino Cruz served as municipal mayor of the town in 1991 until his term ended in the middle of 1992. Acting on the request, the Commission on Audit (COA) issued COA Order No. 19-1700 constituting a Special Audit Team. In the course of the investigation, the Special Audit Team discovered that certain anomalous and irregular transactions transpired during the covered period, the most serious being the purchase of construction materials evidenced by Sales Invoices No. 131145 and 131137 in the aggregate amount of P54,542.56, for which payment out of municipal funds was effected twice. The double payments were made in favor of Kelly Lumber and Construction Supply (Kelly Lumber, for short) and were accomplished through the issuance of two (2) disbursement vouchers (DVs), i.e., DV No. 101-92-06-1222 and DV No. 101-92-01-195. Petitioner signed the vouchers and encashed the two (2) corresponding PNB checks, both of which were payable to his order. The findings of the Audit Team were embodied in a 336-page SAO Report No. 93-28, on the basis of which petitioner was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. The provision reads: Sec. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are declared to be unlawful: xxx xxx xxx

2. Yes. Neglect of duty implies only the failure to give proper attention to a task expected of an employee arising from either carelessness or indifference. However, the facts of this case show more than a failure to mind one's task. Rather, they manifest that Olaivar committed acts of dishonesty, which is defined as the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant to one's office or connected with the performance of his duty. It implies a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle. Hence, the CA should have found Olaivar liable for dishonesty. The CA correctly imposed the proper penalty upon Olaivar. Under Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty, like gross neglect of duty, is classified as a grave offense punishable by dismissal even if committed for the first time. Under Section 58, such penalty likewise carries with it the accessory penalties of cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and disqualification from reemployment in the government service. In the exercise of his duties, the Ombudsman is given full administrative disciplinary authority. His power is not limited merely to receiving, processing complaints, or recommending penalties. He is to conduct investigations, hold hearings, summon witnesses and require production of evidence and place respondents under

e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply

to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. The Information[3] against petitioner, filed before the Sandiganbayan and thereat docketed as Criminal Case No. 22830, alleged: That on June 26, 1992, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Buencamino M. Cruz, a public officer being then the Municipal Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite and while in the performance of his official function, acting in evident bad faith, did then and there wilfully, (sic) unlawfully and criminally pay Kelly Lumber and Construction Supply the amount of Fifty Four Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Two Pesos and 56/100 (P54,542.56), Philippine Currency, despite the fact that said account had been previously paid by the Municipality, thus, causing undue injury to the Government in the amount aforestated. CONTRARY TO LAW. Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of Not Guilty. In time, trial ensued. In a decision[4] dated 30 January 1998, the respondent court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 and sentenced him to serve imprisonment of Seven (7) years, and One (1), month as minimum, to Ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum, with consequent perpetual disqualification from holding public office, as provided by law.

Exh. B-2-A) which proves that payment was made upon the prior request of the accused Buencamino M. Cruz, and that the said amount of P21,041.56 had already been paid under the same Voucher No. 101-9201-194. Also Exhs. E, E-1 to E-7 show that under Disbursement Voucher No. 1163, dated June 26,1992, payment had been made together with other invoices, per PNB Check No. 197813 in the total sum of P150,000.00; whereas, the same account of P33,501.00 had already been paid on January 30, 1992, thereby, showing that there is double payment and the two checks issued in payment of these two invoices to the accused: Buencamino Mallari-Cruz as payee, shows indubitably, that there was a willful act, with malice aforethought, in having a second payment made, in order that the accused may be able to pocket the money, as he in fact did by encashing the said two checks. For it is likewise evident under the principle RES IPSA LOQUITOR (The thing speaks for itself), namely: that if the money of P54,542.56 were indeed payment for the goods delivered by the supplier-Kelly Lumber and Construction Supply, simple reason and well accepted commercial practice demand for the checks in the first place, to made payable to the suppliers of goods sold in payment thereof. But, why should payment be made to Mayor Buencamino M. Cruz, when he ought not to derive any material benefits, whatsoever, or any pecuniary interest from the transactions entered into by him, for and on behalf of the Municipality, . . . . The only excuse given by the accused when he finally testified in his own defense, in very lame. For the excuse he gave, in explaining the anomaly or irregularity is that he was not aware of the double payment and that, he just signed the voucher for payment, as the last officer to sign the voucher, in order to effect payment thereon, to the supplier . . ., and that it was the duty of the Municipal Treasurer to verify the actual deliveries of the goods sold and their payment afterwards. This may be true, if the ensuing checks issued in payment of the goods covered by the voucher for payment, were made payable, indeed, to the real suppliers of the goods, and not made payable to the Mayor, . . ., and who in fact encashed the checks. The only real defense put up here by the accused is that: The supplier-Kelly Lumber and Construction Supply had subsequently reimbursed the Municipality of the amount of P54,542.56 thereby precluding denial of the double payment as shown in Exh. 1 of the accused, . . . . (Underscoring in the original). With his motion for reconsideration having been denied, per the graft courts resolution of 17 July 1998,[5] petitioner is now with us via the instant recourse. Petitioner acknowledges signing the DVs which paved the way for the double payment situation. He also admits encashing the checks corresponding to the DVs in question. He nonetheless urges the setting aside of the assailed decision, anchoring his virtual plea for acquittal on four (4) basic issues, to wit: (1) the fatally flawed Information filed against him; (2) the applicability in his favor of what he tagged as the Arias Doctrine; (3) the absence of bad faith on his part; and (4) the refund of the amount representing overpayment.

The anti-graft court predicated its judgment of conviction on the strength of the following main premises: The numerous, other alleged anomalies and irregularities fully detailed and outlined in said S.A.O. Report No. 9328 did not appear to the Special Audit Team, as meriting prosecution of those who might have been guilty thereof. But, the same report strongly recommended prosecution as notwithstanding . . . the subsequent refund of the total amount of P54,542.56 from the supplier, Kelly Lumber . . . for the alleged double payment especially due . . . to the fact that the amount was not directly paid to the supplier but the Municipal Mayor, as shown in Exh. 1 for P150,000.00 and Exh. H for P20,000.00 and Exhs. 1-1 and H-1 showing that the said two checks were actually encashed by the Municipal Mayor, respondent herein ( See: p.192 of the S.A.O. Report No. 93-28). A painful examination of Exhs. B and B-1 to B-11 shows that although there was a total sum due of P31,198.01 and supported by documents under Disbursement Voucher No. 1019201-194, they are really, only supported by documents showing the statement of the account thereof and yet Sales Invoice No. 131145 was not attached to support the voucher. Besides, said Sales Invoice No. 131145 had already been paid previously as shown by a photocopy of PNB Check No. 214785, dated January 30, 1992 (see.

We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and found nothing therein to warrant a reversal of the challenged decision of the respondent court. Petitioner maintains, anent the first issue, that the Information filed against him was fatally defective in that it did not allege that he is an officer charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. Petitioners contention is flawed by the very premises holding it together. For, it presupposes that Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 covers only public officers vested with the power of granting licenses, permits or similar privileges. Petitioner has obviously lost sight, if not altogether unaware, of our ruling in Mejorada vs. Sandiganbayan,[6] where we held that a prosecution for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law will lie regardless of whether or not the accused public officer is charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. Following is an excerpt of what we said in Mejorada: Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt practices of any public officers (sic) declared unlawful. Its reference to any public officer is without distinction or qualification and it specifies the acts declared unlawful. We agree with the view adopted by the Solicitor General that the last sentence of paragraph [Section 3] (e) is intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and employees of officers (sic) or government corporations which, under the ordinary concept of public officers may not come within the term. It is a strained construction of the provision to read it as applying exclusively to public officers charged with the duty of granting licenses or permits or other concessions. (Emphasis and words in bracket supplied) At any rate, the Local Government Code, particularly Section 444 (b)(3)(iv and v), Chapter 3, Title II, Book III thereof,[7] empowers municipal mayors to issue licenses and permits. Any suggestion that a reference to such power in the information is a condition sine qua non for a successful prosecution for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 has to be rejected. As the Solicitor General aptly observed, matters of law are deemed incorporated or read into the information. Still, with respect to the first issue, petitioner submits that a conviction could arise only for an inculpatory act alleged in the information and duly established in the trial, arguing in this regards that the information alleged that Kelly Lumber was paid twice for the same materials but what was found during the trial was that the said payment was given to petitioner. Pressing the point, petitioner states in fine that a variance obtains between what was alleged in the Information filed in this case and what was proven during trial. We are not persuaded. As held in Socrates vs. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines[8]:

xxx Evidentiary facts need not be alleged in the information because these are matters of defense. Informations need only state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be proved during the trial. x x x (Underscoring supplied) And what petitioner took to be a variance between the allegation in the information, i.e., the excess payment was given to Kelly Lumber, and the acts proven, i.e., the payment in excess was given to petitioner, is more apparent than real. The perceived variance cannot plausibly be taken as invalidating the information and necessarily petitioners conviction. As may be noted, the information in question states that x x x accused Buencamino M. Cruz, a public officer being then the Municipal Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite and while in the performance of his official function, acting in evident bad faith, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally pay Kelly Lumber and Construction Supply the amount of Fifty Four Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Two Pesos and 56/100 (P54,542.56), Philippine Currency x x x. What was found during the trial, however, was that, albeit double payment was eventually made, or appeared to have been made, to Kelly Lumber, the covering checks initially were made payable to petitioner. As a matter of fact, Kelly Lumber was even made to appear to have refunded and returned the second or double payment, as demonstrated by a Certification to this effect issued on the 19th day of March 1997 and signed by Bacoor Municipal Treasurer Salome U. Esagunde, which Certification reads in its material part, as follows: CERTIFICATION TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: THIS IS TO CERTIFY that as per records of this office, Kelly Hardware & Construction Supply paid this office the following:

1. Refund to double payment on Voucher No. 101-92-06-1222, paid under OR#4251401 dated September 30, 1993 P33,500.00 2. Refund to double payment on Voucher No. 101-92-01-195, paid under OR No. 4251402 dated September 30, 199321,041.56

Total (posted at CBV# 101-9309-2273)...P54,542.56 Issued this 19th day of March, 1997 upon request of _____________ for whatsoever legal purpose this may serve. (Signed) SALOME U. ESAGUNDE Municipal Treasurer

Moreover, petitioner even admitted in his memorandum[9] that the refund by Kelly Lumber and Construction Supply is the best proof that he did not pay himself for the costs of the supply x x x. It bears stressing that an information needs only allege the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense[10], in this case, the fact that petitioner made payment to Kelly Lumber twice, without need of going into specifics of how such payment was made. The accompanying details of the process of payment can be established during trial through evidentiary offer. Invoking the lessons taught in Arias vs. Sandiganbayan[11], petitioner next argues that he cannot be held guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 for, following the doctrine established in that case, he had every right to rely, to a reasonable extent, on the bona fides of his subordinates, referring to the municipal treasurer and accountant, who prepared the DVs and the checks in question. Petitioners reliance on Arias is very much misplaced. As may be recalled, this Court, in acquitting the accused in Arias, made the following pronouncements: We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have probed records, inspected documents, received procedures, and questioned persons. It is doubtful if any auditor for a fairly-sized office could personally do all these things in all vouchers presented for his signature. The Court would be asking for the impossible. All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. If a department secretary entertains important visitors, the auditor is not ordinarily expected to call the restaurant about the amount of the bill, question each guest whether he was present at the luncheon, inquire whether the correct amount of food was served, and otherwise personally look into the reimbursement vouchers accuracy, propriety, and sufficiency. There has to be some added reason why he should examine each voucher in such detail. Any executive head of even small government agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of papers that must be signed. There are hundreds of documents, letters, memoranda, vouchers, and supporting papers that routinely pass through his hands. x x x. There should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval appearing on a voucher to sustain a conspiracy charge and conviction. (Italics in the original; Underscoring supplied). Unlike in Arias, however, there exists in the present case an exceptional circumstance which should have prodded petitioner, if he were out to protect the interest of the municipality he swore to serve, to be curious and go beyond what his subordinates prepared or recommended. In fine, the added reason contemplated in Arias which would have put petitioner on his guard and examine the check/s and vouchers with some degree of circumspection before signing the same was obtaining in this case.

We refer to the unusual fact that the checks issued as payment for construction materials purchased by the municipality were not made payable to the supplier, Kelly Lumber, but to petitioner himself even as the disbursement vouchers attached thereto were in the name of Kelly Lumber. The discrepancy between the names indicated in the checks, on one hand, and those in the disbursement vouchers, on the other, should have alerted petitioner - if he were conscientious of his duties as he purports to be - that something was definitely amiss. The fact that the checks for the municipalitys purchases were made payable upon his order should, without more, have prompted petitioner to examine the same further together with the supporting documents attached to them, and not rely heavily on the recommendations of his subordinates. It need no stretching of the mind to understand that the person or entity in whose favor a voucher is processed should also be the payee appearing in the checks issued to satisfy the same. Yet, for still unexplained reasons, petitioner chose to deviate from what to us is an ordinary accounting procedure, doubtless for a consideration less than honest. Apropos the third issue, it is petitioners submission that, while he might have been negligent in the performance of his duties, the prosecution had not, at its end, established his being in bad faith. Whether or not petitioner acted in good or bad faith in effecting what, at bottom, is an unauthorized double payment, addresses a question of credibility. As a general proposition, the determination of credibility is the domain of the trial court, not this Court.[12] And it cannot be overemphasized that the respondent court has declared petitioner to have acted with malice afterthought, a disposition which, in the language of that court, is evident from checks originally issued in payment for goods paid twice made in favor of the accused himself. Added the respondent court: Indeed by the mere fact that the accused herein had two (2) checks issued to him in his name, and then, collecting the money in cash without any reason therefore (sic), is evident bad faith, as against bonafides (good faith) for his very act of having these two (2) checks in his name runs against the gamut of public accountability . Lest it be overlooked, the offense defined under Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 may be committed even if bad faith is not attendant, the elements of the crime being: (1) that the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that the prohibited act/s were done in the discharge of the public officers official, administrative or judicial functions; (3) that they cause undue injury to any party, whether Government or a private person;

(4) that such injury is caused by giving any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such party; and (5) that the public officers acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. [14] In Sistoza vs. Desierto, et al.,[15] we held: xxx Evidently, mere bad faith or partiality and negligence per se are not enough for one to be held liable under the law since the act of bad faith or partiality must in the first place be evident or manifest, respectively, while the negligent deed should both be gross and inexcusable. Xxx Given the above perspective, it is abundantly clear that a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 may be committed even through negligence provided that said negligence is both gross and inexcusable. Assuming, in gratia argumenti, that petitioner did not act in bad faith, he cannot plausibly deny that his negligence under the premises was not only gross but also inexcusable. For, although the checks were on their face payable to him even as the supporting disbursement vouchers were in the name of Kelly Lumber, petitioner still affixed his signature thereon. It is unthinkable that such irregularity, given his stature and the nature of his position, would have passed him unnoticed. In turn, his subordinates could not have so easily, and with such daring, presented him with a set of questionable documents - as petitioner would want to impress this Court - without his instructions. Finally, it is puerile for petitioner to contend that Kelly Lumbers act of refunding the amount subject of double payment argues against the idea of the government suffering damages. The injury suffered by the government is beyond cavil. This conclusion was aptly explained by the Sandiganbayan in the following wise: Damage to the government in that instance [referring to the alleged double payment] is inevitable for the simple reason that money taken from the coffers was used by someone else for about two years and without paying interest and without authority for its use. (N.B. 19 March 1997 is only two months short of two years from filing of this case). Moreover, refund of the amount subject of the prosecution is not one of those enumerated under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code[16] which would totally extinguish criminal liability. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code applies in a suppletory character as provided for under Article 10[17] of the same Code. As regards the penalty imposed by the respondent court, we find the same to be proper in point of severity, albeit its employment of the term prision mayor is inappropriate. It is proper because Section 9 of R.A. 3019 provides: SECTION 9. Penalties for violations

(a) Any public officer or private person committing any of the unlawful acts or omission enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than six years and one month nor more than fifteen years, perpetual disqualification from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful income. In the same breath, however, the use of the same term is inappropriate because the penalty of prision mayor is imposable only for felonies punishable under the Revised Penal Code or when a special law specifically provides for such penalty for a given crime. As we have said in People vs. Simon With respect to the first example, where the penalties under the special law are different from and are without reference or relation to those under the Revised Penal Code, there can be no suppletory effect of the rules for the application of penalties under said Code or by other relevant statutory provisions based on or applicable only to said rules for felonies under the Code. In this type of special law, the legislative intendment is clear. The same exclusionary rule would apply to the last given example, Republic Act No. 6539. While it is true that the penalty of 14 years and 8 months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the duration of the medium period of reclusion temporal, such technical term under the Revised Penal Code is not given to that penalty for carnapping. Besides, the other penalties for carnapping attended by the qualifying circumstances stated in the law do not correspond to those in the Code. The rules on penalties in the Code, therefore, cannot suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 6539 and special laws of the same formulation. (Italics in the original; Underscoring supplied Republic Act 3019 under which petitioner was prosecuted and convicted is a special law which does not provide for a penalty of prision mayor for any of the acts punishable therein. Accordingly, a modification of the decision under review with respect to its penalty component is in order. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution of the Sandiganbayan AFFIRMED, with the modification that petitioner BUENCAMINO MALLARI-CRUZ is hereby sentenced to a prison term of seven (7) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from holding public office, as provided by law. SO ORDERED. BUENASEDA vs. FLAVIER GR No. 106719QUIASON, J: Facts:

Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or TemporaryRestraining Order Petition sought to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman on January 7, 1992, directing preventive suspension of petitioners, Dr. Brigida Buenaseda, Isabelo Banez, Jr., Conrado Matias, Cora Solis and Enya Lopez. It alsosought to disqualify Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero from participation in the preliminary investigation of the charges against petitioner. Issues: 1.Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees workingin offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the administrativecomplaints filed against said officials and employees2.Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction Held: 1.YES. The power to recommend the suspension of a public official or employees vested by theConstitution to the Ombudsman is referred to as a punitive measure. Section 24 of RA 6770, whichgrants Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public officials and employees facingadministrative charges before him, is a procedural statute. It stated that preventive suspension is imposedafter compliance with the requisites as an aid in the investigation of administrative charges.It is expressed in the Constitution that Ombudsman is authorized to recommend to the appropriateofficial the discipline or prosecution of erring public officials or employees. To make an intelligentdetermination whether to recommend such actions, the Ombudsman has to investigate. In turn, to beexpeditious and efficient, he may need to suspend the respondent. The need for preventive suspensionmay arise from causes such as: the danger of tampering or destruction of evidence in possession of respondent, intimidation of witnesses, etc. The Ombudsman should be given the discretion to decidewhen the person facing administrative charges should be preventively suspended.2.NO. The questioned order of the Ombudsman was validly issued even without a full-blown hearing andformal presentation of evidence since it was a mere order for preventive suspension. Ombudsman issuedthe order of preventive suspension only after petitioners had filed their answer to the administrativecomplaint and the Motion for the Preventive Suspension of petitioners, which incorporated the chargesin the criminal complain against them, private respondents had filed a reply to the answer of the petitioners, specifying 23 cases of harassment by petitioners to private respondents and preliminaryconference wherein the complaint and the respondents in the administrative case agreed to submit their list of witnesses and documentary evidence.Wherefore, petition was DISMISSED and the status quo ordered to be maintained in the Resolution datedSeptember 22, 1992 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE

LASTIMOSA VS VASQUEZ Facts: On February 18, 1993 Jessica Villacarlos Dayon, public health nurse of Santa Fe, Cebu, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for frustrated rape and an administrative complaint for immoral acts, abuse of authority and grave misconduct against the Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo. The graft investigation officer assigned to the case found, after investigation, no prima facie evidence and accordingly recommended for the dismissal of the case. However, upon review of the matter, Ombudsman, Hon. Conrado Vasquez, disapproved the recommendation and instead directed that Mayor Illustrisimo be charged with attempted rape in the Regional Trial Court. The case was then referred by the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas, Arturo Mojica, to the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar for the filing of appropriate information with the RTC of Danao City. The same was eventually assigned to herein petition, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Gloria G. Lastimosa. On preliminary investigation, petitioner found that only acts of lasciviousness had been committed. With the approval of the Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar, an information for act of lasciviousness against Mayor Ilustrisimo on July 4, 1994 with the MTC of Santa Fe. Deputy Ombudsman Mojica wrote two letters to the Provincial Prosecutor inquiring on any action taken on the referred case. And since no case for attempted rape had been filed, Deputy Ombudsman Mojica ordered the Provincial Prosecutor and petitioner Lastimosa to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt for refusing and failing to obey the lawful directives of the Office of the Ombudsman. For this purpose, hearings were duly conducted. As a result, Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and petitioner Gloria Lastimosa were placed under preventive suspension for a period of six (6) months Issue/s: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on the Provincial Prosecutor to assist it in the prosecution of the case for attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo. Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case against the mayor because the crime was not committed in relation to a public office and whether it has authority to place petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension Ruling: The court ruled that the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act of omission appears to be illegal, unjust,

improper or inefficient. This power has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a public official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are related to, or connected with, or arise from the performance of his official duty. It is enough that the act or omission was committed by a public official. Hence, the crime of rape, when committed by a public official like a municipal mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute. In the exercise of his power, the Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance as provided in Section 31 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989. Even if the preliminary investigation had been given over to the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct, his determination of the nature of the offense to be charged would still be subject to the approval of the Office of the Ombudsman. This is because under Section 31 of the Ombudsman's Act, when a prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the "supervision and control" of the Ombudsman which means that he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify his (prosecutor's) decision. Section 15(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives the Office of the Ombudsman the power to "punish for contempt, in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein." There is no merit in the argument that petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar cannot be held liable for contempt because their refusal arose out of an administrative, rather than judicial, proceeding before the Office of the Ombudsman. Neither is there any doubt as to the power of the Ombudsman to discipline petitioner should it be found that she is guilty of grave misconduct, insubordination and/or neglect of duty, nor of the Ombudsman's power to place her in the meantime under preventive suspension. Sections 21 & 24 of the same Act provides for this power. Under Section 24 of the Ombudsman Act, preventive suspension is warranted if evidence against the public official is strong. As held in Buenaseda v. Flavier, whether the evidence of guilt is strong is left to the determination of the Ombudsman. The administrative complaint against petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar was filed in connection with their designation as deputies of the ombudsman in the prosecution of a criminal case against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo. Given the attitude displayed by petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor toward the criminal case against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo, their preventive suspension is justified to the end that the proper prosecution of that case may not be hampered. In addition, because the charges against the two prosecutors involve grave misconduct, insubordination and neglect of duty and these charges, if proven, can lead to a dismissal from public office, the Ombudsman was justified in ordering their preventive suspension. Under the same provision of the law, it provides that the preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay. Their preventive suspension for six (6) months without pay is thus according to law.

The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Motion to Lift Order of Preventive Suspension is DENIED. PCGG vs Desierto Facts: On October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc FactFinding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee) which was tasked to inventory all behest loans, determine the parties involved and recommend whatever appropriate actions to be pursued thereby. On November 9, 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 61 expanding the functions of the Committee to include the inventory and review of all non-performing loans, whether behest or non-behest. The Memorandum set the following criteria to show the earmarks of a "behest loan," to wit: "a) it is undercollaterized; b) the borrower corporation is undercapitalized; c) a direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials like presence of marginal notes; d) the stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation are identified as cronies; e) a deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended; f) the use of corporate layering; g) the nonfeasibility of the project for which financing is being sought; and, h) the extraordinary speed in which the loan release was made." Among the accounts referred to the Committee's Technical Working Group (TWG) were the loan transactions between NOCOSII and PNB. After it had examined and studied all the documents relative to the said loan transactions, the Committee classified the loans obtained by NOCOSII from PNB as behest because of NOCOSII's insufficient capital and inadequate collaterals. Specifically, the Committee's investigation revealed that in 1975, NOCOSII obtained loans by way of Stand-By Letters of Credit from the PNB; that NOCOSII was able to get 155% loan value from the offered collateral or an excess of 85% from the required percentage limit; that the plant site offered as one of the collaterals was a public land contrary to the General Banking Act; that by virtue of the marginal note of then President Marcos in the letter of Cajelo, NOCOSII was allowed to use the public land as plant site and to dispense with the mortgage requirement of PNB; that NOCOSII's paid-up capital at the time of the approval of the guaranty was only P2,500,000.00 or only about 6% of its obligation. Based on the Sworn Statement of PCGG consultant Orlando Salvador, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman the criminal complaint against respondents. Petitioner alleges that respondents violated the following provisions of Section 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019.

The respondents failed to submit any responsive pleading before the Ombudsman, prompting Graft Investigator Officer (GIO) I Melinda S. Diaz-Salcedo to resolve the case based on the available evidence. In a Resolution dated January 12, 1998 in OMB-0-95-0890, GIO DiazSalcedo recommended the dismissal of the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence or lack of probable cause against the respondents and for prescription of the offense. Ombudsman Desierto approved the recommendation on May 21, 1999. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by GIO DiazSalcedo in the Order dated July 9, 1999, which was approved by Ombudsman Desierto on July 23, 1999. Issue Whether respondents violated the following provisions of Sec 3 (e) and (g), specifically corrupt practices of public official, of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act? Held: On the issue of whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that no probable cause exists against respondents, it must be stressed that the Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. Said exercise of powers is based upon his constitutional mandate and the courts will not interfere in its exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much the same way that courts will be swamped if they had to review the exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time they decided to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. While there are certain instances when this Court may intervene in the prosecution of cases, such as, (1) when necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2) when necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3) when there is a prejudicial question which is sub-judice; (4) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (5) where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (8) where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (9) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (10) when there is clearly no prima facie case

against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied, none apply here. After examination of the records and the evidence presented by petitioner, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Ombudsman. No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the Ombudsman. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. The herein assailed Orders being supported by substantial evidence, there is no basis for the Court to exercise its supervisory powers over the ruling of the Ombudsman. As long as substantial evidence supports the Ombudsman's ruling, that decision will not be overturned. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Except as to prescription, the assailed Resolution dated May 21, 1999 and Order dated July 23, 1999 of the Ombudsman in OMB No. 0-95-0890 are AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED Caasi v. CA, 191 SCRA 317 Caasi v. CA GR No. 88831, 84508November 8, 1990Grino-Aquino, J. Doctrine: To be qualified to run for elective office in the Philippines, the law requiresthat the candidate who is a green card holder must have waived his status as apermanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country. Nature: Petition for review of the decision of the CA and Petition for certiorari toreview the decision of the Commission on Election Facts: Merito Miguel was elected as municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan in thelocal elections of 1988. Petitions were filed for his disqualification under Sec 68 of the OmnibusElection Code, on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence, apermanent resident of the US, not of Bolinao One of the petitioners is Mateo Caasi, his rival candidate for the positionof mayor Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the USImmigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the US

He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that hemay freely enter the US for his periodic medical examination and to visithis children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan thathe voted in all previous elections. COMELEC dismissed the petitions, except for Commissioner Anacleto Badoy, Jr. According to COMELEC, the possession of a green card by Miguel doesnot sufficiently establish that he had abandoned his residence in thePhilippines COMELEC said that as the respondent meets the basic requirements of citizenship and residence for candidates to elective local officials underSec 42 of Local Govt. Code, there is no legal obstacle to his candidacyfor mayor. In the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Badoy, he opined that a greencard holder, being a permanent resident of or an immigrant of a foreigncountry, under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, has to prove thathe has waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant to bequalified to run for election office. Issue: Is green card a proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the US? Yes. Did Miguel waive his status as permanent resident or immigrant to US prior tothe local elections? No.Is he disqualified to become a candidate of municipal mayor? Yes. Ruling: Miguels immigration to the US in 1984 constituted an abandonment of hisdomicile and residence in the Philippines The intention to live there permanently is evidenced by his applicationfor an immigrants visa. Immigration removing into one place from another/entering into acountry with the intention of residing in it. Immigrant person who removes into a country for the purpose of permanent residence As a resident alien in the US, Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance tothe US, in return for the protection given to him during the period of hisresidence. Sec 18, Art XI of the 1987 Constitution is not applicable to Miguel Any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship oracquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenureshall be dealt with by law

not applicable to Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of USbefore he was elected to public office, not during his tenure as mayor Sec 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is the applicable law to him Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreigncountry shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under thisCode, unless such person has waived his status as permanent residentor immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residencerequirement provided for in the election laws Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective officefor at least 1 year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy is oneof the qualifications that a candidate for elective public office mustpossess He resided in Bolinao for only 3 months after his return to thePhils and before he ran for mayor Clear policy of excluding from the right to hold elective publicoffice those Philippine citizens who possess dual loyalties andallegiance, as such are incapable of the entire devotion to theinterest and welfare of their homeland To be qualified to run for elective office in the Philippines, the law requires thatthe candidate who is a green card holder must have waived his status as apermanent resident or immigrant of a for eign country. His act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in thePhilippines did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as apermanent resident or immigrant of US The waiver of green card should be manifested by some act or actsindependent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office Without such prior waiver, he was disqualified to run for any electiveoffice Miguels application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the USand his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of US despite his occasional visits to thePhilippines Miguel filled up his application for Immigrant Visa in his ownhandwriting, answering Permanently on the question of his length of intended stay. On its face, the green card identifies Miguel in clear bold letters as aResident Alien SC annulled the election of Miguel as municipal mayor.