Informal briefing notes

Team 5 meeting with Dave Barton, former Joint Inquiry staffer, May 13, 2003. Phone is
228-3533 (direct); 224-2627 (main); 228-4469 (fax)

JKR and TE in attendance

Dave Barton is currently minority professional staff on the Senate Governmental Affairs
Committee, Minority, for ranking Member Joe Lieberman. Dave was on the Joint
Inquiry, where he focused on "other" matters: DoD, State, DoT, Treasury, INS, DoE,
and DIA.

Bkgrd: 17 years in the House, part of which working for Lee Hamilton, where he did
national security and arms control; published at a think tank; 6 yrs with State Dept in
national security and nonproliferation. (Knows Zach Davis)

Work on JI: DIA cooperative and provided good info, including cables and sr. exec
briefs, giving good foothold.

DoD was of limited value; took months to receive briefings on whether the military had
developed a capability on bin Ladin; military had, but options believed by policy people
to be unrealistic. Didn't receive documents.

Border Security: question at JI was "how did hijackers get into country undetected?"
sought answer from State (1) visas and (2) watchlists. On (1), original 19 visas
requested by Shelby in Senate Intel, and those were quickly rec'd. Then had 3 to 5 mtgs
with consular affairs and visa offices in Mideast, with experts going through every single
visa for misspellings, inaccuracies, wrong addresses. Visas had mistakes, but overall
there was nothing outstanding in them to red flag them. So JFs conclusion was that the
problem lay with (2) watchlists, not (1) visas.

Examined visa policy, but reality was Saudi programs were lenient b/c immigration
policy geared towards immigration, and Saudi not likely to seek immigration.

In Germany, visa offices didn't save originals.

JI 'scrubbing' revealed there was no way to better the visa process. Visa Express only
lasted a few monthes; it was an attempt to use travel agencies to facilitate consulate work.
Ended in June/July '01. 19 were clean, and 2 known terrorists were stopped upon
applying multiple times for visas. Binalshibh applied 4 times. Tracked down why the
two were stopped, and turned out that if a Saudi applied from Germany, and already in
school in Germany, then visa denied. Once in system as a denial, not likely to be granted
visa subsequently.

Consular offices are interviewing more people now, but more likely to catch them now?
Maybe.
The FTTTFs set up as an experimental hub for database screening to try alleviate a huge
backlog of visa applications. A few names did get kicked back out, but basically the FBI
went into a blackhole. The FTTTF is now defunct; don't know if perhaps reincarnated
somewhere else.

Watchlist. State's watchlist started with John Arriza's shoebox, where he devised a
extensive algorithm for names, all aliases. 800 persons turned away with TIPOFF. Intel
feeds come from FBI, State, DoD, CIA. Staff of 10. Arriza keeps printouts on each
individual entered in the database, including source listings. TIPOFF has print-outs on
all records received on 19. TIPOFF is available at consular offices and PoEs. CIA
makes decisions as to whether to let folks listed on TIPOFF in for operational reasons.

Why didn't watch lists work?

Problem with CIA. Mary Ryan testified before Senate Judiciary's Terrorism subcmte,
with Feinstein chair. Ryan testified that hijackers names' weren't on watchlist so State
didn't know to stop them. Since 9/11, huge increase in intel provided to State.

Both FBI and CIA admitted not sending info pre-9/11. MOUs among State/FBI/CIA
weren't followed.

Was there a concerted effort to deny State info? Probably not. CTC personnel needed
more training to understand information needed and why important. Arriza did brief
analysts at CIA. CIA should've been more open to others trying to do their job.

Problem with FBI. State never received from FBI names on the NCIC criminal watchlist,
and this is database state/locals get on their laptops. (If State doesn't know an applicant
on NCIC, then can't screen properly, and can come in legally.) NCIC info is now
provided.

TIPOFF still has no real home; it remains at INR and has survived off of machine
readable visa fees. These fees now way down.

Recent GAO report Isits 12 watchlists, but TIPOFF most important.

Sen Kyi's letter asked "what process in place for visas?" Paula DeSutter was Kyi's
staffer.

JI did NOT look at INS MOUs with State on TIPOFF. Nor looked at PoEs.

INS does have the tracking capability on overstays, etc. in VT, but have to be alerted to
it.

What agency has what capability? How are capabilities coordinated? INS' Greene says
INS could've tracked in Vermont, Texas, and in diplomatic security at State. JI did not
look at INS capabilities closely.
Customs has a great database on travelers.

USSS has great connectivity to databases and tracking capabilities.

Was there any possibility of tracking 19? USSS did it within 2 weeks of 9/11 using
linkage analysis through financial databases. Had charts on financial crimes.

State INR connected 19 to Al Quaida in a "culpability cable ". TIPOFF has reports on
associates of 19.

Dennis Lormel of FBI Financial Crimes said FBI could've connected 19. What is the
protocol for providing information on terrorists to TIPOFF?

TTIC is supposed to be a fusion of intel and law enforcement information. Has potential
to use tremendous technology to integrate databases, but FBI has refused to appoint a
deputy director.

CAPS I pulled moe than 3 of 19 over.

Dick Clarke wasn't sleeping nights in June /July '01.

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