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DESTINATION PEACE

The News International, Wednesday, May 5, 2010 AN INITIATIVE OF THE TIMES OF INDIA AND JANG GROUP OF PAKISTAN

I vow my children wont live in a halved Kashmir

PEACE IN OUR TIME POSSIBLE

A 10-Step Formula: Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, chief of the all-party Hurriyat Conference, has a dream

he conflict in Kashmir can be solved, but if only a pragmatic, realistic and tangible strategy is established. Its a mistaken view that the dispute is too complex to be resolved and that India, Pakistan and the people of Kashmir hold inflexible positions. In any case, complexity is in the eye of beholder. There is not a single international issue that is not complex. I believe that peace and justice in Kashmir are achievable if the parties to the dispute make some sacrifices. The Hurriyat favours a mechanism that I have often described as triangular dialogue. What we mean by this is that the leadership from across the line of ceasefire be allowed to talk to the Indian and Pakistani leadership separately and then return to its people with their views. This will take time as well as effort. We have welcomed the initiation of talks between India and Pakistan. In the interests of peace, two caveats are required. First, that the dispute involves three parties India, Pakistan and the people of Kashmir (the ones directly affected). Therefore, any attempt to strike a deal between the two without the association of the third will not yield a credible settlement. This has been made unmistakably clear by the flimsy agreements that were contrived in the past. But if such talks are to mean anything, they must be accompanied by practical measures to restore an environment of non-vio-

KASHMIR SPECIAL

I recently had an opportunity to visit the other side of the ceasefire line. When we got into our cars at the Hurriyat office, I was intensely aware that I was taking the same route that my grandfather, Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah, took in 1947 when he was exiled
lence. We believe that the following measures are must: N The immediate cessation of military, para-military and militant action BEATING THE RETREAT? The Hurriyat favours complete withdrawal of the military from Kashmir NWithdrawal of the military from

towns and villages, and dismantling bunkers, watch towers and barricades NRelease of political prisoners NCessation of human rights violations NAnnulling repressive laws NRestoring the rights of peaceful association, assembly and demonstration NAllowing the Kashmiri leadership, which favours a negotiated resolution, to travel abroad NIssuing visas to the Kashmiri diaspora to visit the state NCreating the necessary conditions for an intra-Kashmiri dialogue embracing both sides of the ceasefire line NAllowing a transitional phase before the decisive elements of the peace package are put into effect My colleagues and I recently had an opportunity to visit the other side of the ceasefire line. When we got into our cars at the Hurriyat office, I was intensely aware that I was taking the same route that my grandfather, Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah, took in 1947 when he was exiled. I remember thinking that those were bitter times a bitterness that has dominated for six decades. The time has come to change that. As we travelled further up the roads that link the two halves of Kashmir, I vowed to myself my children wont live in a similar atmosphere. It convinced me that I must personally contribute towards the process that will bring resolution to the dispute. As told to M Saleem Pandit, Times of India

The zone of convergence

1 AUTONOMY

Extent remains a topic of debate

2 INVOLVEMENT

OF KASHMIRIS

Virtual consensus

Likely solution: Status quo, European model or middle path?

STATUS QUO
Converting the LoC, which was called ceasefire line before the Shimla agreement, into a permanent border and recognising Islamabads legitimacy over territory it controls What it would mean for India I It dovetails with PM Manmohan Singhs no-change-ofborders solution I It could allow India to focus on internal arrangements with the Kashmiris I It all but nullifies Parliaments 1994 resolution seeking to reclaim PoK What it would mean for Pakistan I Goes against Islamabads traditional stand on the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions to ascertain the peoples will on final resolution I Would enable it to concentrate on nation-building rather than embroiled in a draining conflict What it would mean for Kashmiris I Bad news for separatists I Bad news for secular nationalists such as the JKLF, which seeks independent, sovereign status for undivided Kashmir What it would mean for India I Critics say it would mean more cross-border terrorism, difficult to sell domestically post-26/11 I In line with Prime Minister Singhs belief that greater people-to-people contact make borders irrelevant anyway What it would mean for Pakistan I Might be willing provided it continues with Musharraf-era Kashmir policy What it would mean for Kashmiris I Might find it viable, especially after demonstrating overwhelming support for the opening of trade and bus routes across divided Kashmir

3 DEMILITARIZATION
OF J&K
Support across the board

THE TIME IS NOW: At this juncture, there is opportunity and the potntial to make headway

SOME GAINS, SIX DECADES OF PAIN

August, 1947: Under the Indian Independence Act of 1947, Kashmir could accede to India or
Pakistan. As Maharaja Hari Singh vacillated, armed tribesmen from Pakistan made inroads into Kashmir on Oct 27, 1947. The Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession with India, signing over key powers to the Indian government - in return for military aid and a promised referendum

Dec 31, 1948: The two sides call a ceasefire Apr 21, 1948: India moves the issue in the UN Security Council, which passed Resolution 47
imposing an immediate ceasefire. It said Delhi should retain a minimum military presence and that the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. Indian and Pakistani governments agree

Aug 1953: Kashmiri leader Sheikh Abdullah arrested; Kashmir erupts and observes a 20-day strike. Many say the Sheikhs arrest marked the beginning of separatism 1963: Pakistan cedes 20% of
Kashmir including Aksai Chin and the Trans-Karakoram Tract, also known as the Shaksam Valley, to China

THE MIDDLE PATH

I Former Pakistan ruler Pervez Musharrafs out-of-the-

What it would mean for Kashmiris I Well supported in Jammus Hindu-dominated areas and addresses their resentment to deals between the Centre and Kashmiri Muslims, which they regard as a fait accompli

1965: Second India-Pakistan war,

box formula, seeking to satisfy all parties and requiring all parties partially to step back It seeks I To demilitarize conflict-ridden parts of Kashmir I Curb militant aspects of the freedom struggle I Introduce self-rule and a joint management mechanism to oversee it What it would mean for India I In line with Delhis stand that it wouldnt agree to change of the borders I Fear of increased cross-border terrorism I Would call for loosened hold over Kashmir What it would mean for Pakistan I Fits Islamabads stand that it cant accept the LoC as a permanent border I Would call for loosened hold over Kashmir What it would mean for Kashmiris I Acceptable to Kashmiri separatists I Acceptable to chief minister Omar Abdullah I Is seen to have elements of the state opposition Peoples Democratic Partys Self-rule formula

AUTONOMY
Revoking all legislation enacted by Delhi and made applicable to J&K from 1953; greater autonomy for the state; devolution of more powers to the state to address Kashmiri alienation. The PMs Working Group on Kashmir recommended restoration of autonomy to the extent possible earlier this year What it would mean for India I Its within the purview of the Indian constitution I The Union Cabinet rejected the J&K Assemblys autonomy resolution in 2000, saying it sets the clock back and reverses the natural process of harmonizing the aspirations of the people of J&K with the integrity of the nation What it would mean for Pakistan I Rejects the formula as it has no stake in it I What it would mean for Kashmiris Is the main election plank of the ruling National Conference I Rejected by Jammu-based and separatist outfits

following Pakistan's Operation Gibraltar, designed to infiltrate J&K. The five-week war ends in a UN-mandated ceasefire; subsequently the Tashkent Declaration

REFERENDUM
A plebiscite, under UN auspices, offering the choice of merging with India or Pakistan What it would mean for India I An outdated, possibly unworkable option in the changed realities of the region today I Goes against News Delhis position on the issue What it would mean for Pakistan I This has been Islamabads long-held position on the issue I Pakistan might find it hard to fulfil one of the basic conditions before a plebiscite is held vacating portions of Kashmir that it occupies What it would mean for Kashmiris I Anathema to Kashmiri nationalists because it does not offer the independence option

agree to settle issues including J&K through peaceful means within the framework of the UN Charter in the subsequent Simla Agreement

1971: Another war results in the Pakistan military's surrender in East Pakistan; both countries 1975: After decades of incarceration, the Sheikh abandons self-determination
and signs the Delhi accord with Indira Gandhi, seeking a place of honour and dignity in terms of safeguards provided under article 370.

1987: Rigged elections trigger insurgency

infiltrate J&K during winter. They occupy vacant mountain peaks of the Kargil range. Conflict between the Indian and Pakistan armies

1999: Armed fighters from the Pakistan side

SIR OWEN DIXONS FORMULA

The former UN Kashmir representative suggested the disputed territorys division into three and separate plebiscites What it would mean for India I J&Ks division along religious lines unacceptable to New Delhi What it would mean for Pakistan I In line with Pakistans stand on the issue What it would mean for Kashmiris I Unacceptable to Kashmiri nationalists and Jammu-based parties

EUROPEAN MODELS
Solutions to Europes many, successive Kashmir disputes, such as Trieste, Northern Ireland, Sough Tyrol and Aaland. Each solution was based on self-rule, greater economic access and open borders between the divided regions. Each conflict ended with the party in political control retaining this while the other was given economic access. In the Kashmir dispute, New Delhi could have political control and Pakistan given economic access. The state would have open borders

Apr 2003: PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee, often de-

scribed as the architect of the peace process, visits Srinagar and extends the hand of friendship quickens when Vajpayee and Pakistani ruler Per vez Musharraf meet in Islamabad and announce measures to normalise relations. Later, a Hurriyat delegation meets Vajpayee and deputy prime minister L. K. Advani in the first face-to-face encounter between separatists and leading politicians in government secretaries and an eight-item agenda, including Kashmir, is agreed upon. Further meetings in the second half of 2004 to set an agenda that included a trans-LoC bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad

ABROGATION OF ARTICLE 370

Stripping J&K of its special status for its complete integration with India What it would mean for India I A key demand of the opposition BJP What it would mean for Pakistan I Outright rejection

Jan 2004: The thaw

Text: Sameer Arshad, Times of India

Feb 2004: The first round of talks between India and Pakistan foreign

Dec 2008: Extraordinary balloting in November-December state elections sees a record 68% turnout
THE FIRST STEP LET US KNOW WHAT YOU THINK
Feedback, contributions, photos, letters: Email: amankiasha@janggroup.com.pk Fax: +92-21-3241-8343 Post: aman ki asha c/o The News, I.I. Chundrigar Road, Karachi

Kashmir is too complex for a cut and paste solution. Its a multi-dimensional problem and needs a bit of most of the solutions Mehbooba Mufti, PDP Leader

Every imaginable solution has been forwarded (but) India and Pakistan see themselves, as too weak to make significant concessions, fearful that to do so would lead to more demands, and a slippery slope

Stephen Cohen South Asia Expert

A peace initiative whose time has come...

Destination Peace: A commitment by the Jang Group, Geo and The Times of India Group to create an enabling environment that brings the people of Pakistan and India closer together, contributing to genuine and durable peace with honour between our countries.