S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2

REVISION 2

NAVAL SHIPS TECHNICAL MANUAL CHAPTER 070

NUCLEAR DEFENSE AT SEA AND RADIOLOGICAL RECOVERY OF SHIPS AFTER NUCLEAR WEAPONS EXPLOSION

THIS CHAPTER SUPERSEDES CHAPTER 070 DATED 31 JULY 1996 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT C: DISTRIBUTION AUTHORIZED TO U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND THEIR CONTRACTORS: ADMINISTRATIVE AND OPERATIONAL USE (15 APRIL 1977). OTHER REQUESTS FOR THIS DOCUMENT WILL BE REFERRED TO THE NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND (SEA-03X22). WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS TECHNICAL DATA WHOSE EXPORT IS RESTRICTED BY THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT (TITLE 22, U.S.C., SEC. 2751, ET SEQ.) OR THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1979, AS AMENDED, TITLE 50, U.S.C., APP. 2401 ET SEQ. VIOLATIONS OF THESE EXPORT LAWS ARE SUBJECT TO SEVERE CRIMINAL PENALTIES. DISSEMINATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROVISIONS OF DOD DIRECTIVE 5230.25. DESTRUCTION NOTICE: DESTROY BY ANY METHOD THAT WILL PREVENT DISCLOSURE OF CONTENTS OR RECONSTRUCTION OF THE DOCUMENT.
PUBLISHED BY DIRECTION OF COMMANDER, NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND.

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30 JUL 1998

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S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2

TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter/Paragraph 070 NUCLEAR DEFENSE AT SEA AND RADIOLOGICAL RECOVERY OF SHIPS AFTER NUCLEAR WEAPONS EXPLOSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NUCLEAR WEAPONS EXPLOSIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page

70-1 70-1 70-1 70-1 70-1 70-1 70-1 70-1 70-2 70-2 70-2 70-2 70-2 70-2 70-3 70-3 70-3 70-3 70-3 70-3 70-4 70-4 70-4 70-4 70-4 70-4 70-5 70-5 70-5 70-5 70-5 70-5 70-5 70-5 70-6 70-6 70-6 70-6 70-6 i

SECTION 1.

070-1.1 INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.1.1 COMPARISON OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL EXPLOSIONS. 070-1.1.2 NUCLEAR SURVIVABILITY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.1.3 ORGANIZATION OF CHAPTER 070. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.2 NUCLEAR REACTIONS AND NUCLEAR RADIATION . . . . . 070-1.2.1 THE STRUCTURE OF MATTER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.2.1.1 Atomic Structure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.2.1.2 Isotopes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.2.1.3 Molecules. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.2.1.4 Ions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.2.2 NUCLEAR REACTIONS AND RADIOACTIVE DECAY. 070-1.2.2.1 Nuclear Fission. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.2.2.2 Nuclear Fusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.2.2.3 Radioactive Decay. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.2.3 FORMS OF NUCLEAR RADIATION. . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.2.3.1 Neutrons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.2.3.2 Gamma Rays. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.2.3.3 Alpha Particles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.2.3.4 Beta Particles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.2.3.5 X-rays. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

070-1.3 NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFECTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.1 COMPARISON OF THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.2 THE BURST REGION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.2.1 Fireball. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.2.2 High Altitude Fireball. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.2.3 Underwater Bubble. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.3 INITIAL NUCLEAR RADIATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.3.1 Effects of Initial Nuclear Radiation on Personnel. . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.3.2 Effects of Initial Nuclear Radiation on Equipment. . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.4 THERMAL RADIATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.4.1 Effects of Thermal Radiation on Personnel. . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.4.2 Effects of Thermal Radiation on Ship Structures and Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.5 VISIBLE LIGHT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.5.1 Flash and Fireball. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.5.2 Effects of Intense Visible Light on Personnel. . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.6 AIR BLAST. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.6.1 Effects of Air Blast on Ship Structures and Equipment. . . . . .

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued Chapter/Paragraph 070-1.3.6.2 Effects of Air Blast on Personnel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.6.3 Effects of Air Blast on Airborne Aircraft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.7 UNDERWATER SHOCK. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.7.1 Comparison of Underwater Shock and Air Blast. . . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.7.2 Effects of Underwater Shock on Ship Structures and Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.7.3 Effects of Underwater Shock on Personnel. . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.8 SURFACE WAVES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.8.1 Effects of Surface Waves on Ship Structures and Equipment. . . 070-1.3.8.2 Effects of Surface Waves on Personnel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.8.3 Effect of Surface Waves on Amphibious Operations. . . . . . . . 070-1.3.9 RESIDUAL NUCLEAR RADIATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.9.1 Base Surge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.9.2 Radioactive Pool. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.9.3 Fallout. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.9.4 Effects of Residual Nuclear Radiation on Personnel. . . . . . . . 070-1.3.10 ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.10.1 Effects of EMP on Personnel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.10.2 Effects of EMP on Ship Structures and Equipment. . . . . . . . 070-1.3.11 TRANSIENT RADIATION EFFECTS ON ELECTRONICS (TREE). . . . . 070-1.3.11.1 Effects of Gamma Radiation on Electronic Equipment. . . . . . 070-1.3.11.2 Effects of Neutrons on Electronic Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.11.3 Effect of Initial Radiation on Cable Insulation. . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.12 ELECTROMAGNETIC PROPAGATION EFFECTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.12.1 Blackout due to Ionization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.12.2 Scintillation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.12.3 Interference. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.12.4 Blackout due to Particulates and Water Droplets. . . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.12.5 Black Rain. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.3.13 BLUEOUT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.4 NUCLEAR WEAPON EFFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH DIFFERENT BURST TYPES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.4.1 TYPES OF NUCLEAR BURSTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.4.2 HIGH ALTITUDE BURST. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.4.3 AIR BURST. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.4.4 SURFACE BURST AT SEA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.4.5 SURFACE BURST ON LAND. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.4.6 UNDERWATER BURST. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.4.7 UNDERGROUND BURST. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.4.8 BURSTS IN TRANSITION ZONES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 70-7 70-7 70-7 70-7 70-7 70-8 70-8 70-8 70-8 70-8 70-8 70-8 70-9 70-9 70-9 70-9 70-9 70-9 70-10 70-10 70-10 70-10 70-10 70-11 70-11 70-11 70-11 70-11 70-11

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70-12 70-12 70-12 70-14 70-14 70-14 70-14 70-14 70-14 70-14 70-14 70-15 70-15 70-15

070-1.5 MITIGATION OF NUCLEAR EFFECTS ON SHIPS AND PERSONNEL 070-1.5.1 SHIP HARDENING. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.5.2 SHIP COUNTERMEASURES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.5.2.1 Severe Weather Procedures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.5.2.2 Ship Maneuvering. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued Chapter/Paragraph 070-1.5.2.3 Shielding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.5.2.4 Countermeasures Washdown System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.5.3 INDIVIDUAL PROTECTIVE COUNTERMEASURES. . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.5.3.1 Protection Against Thermal Radiation and Intense Visible Light. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.5.3.2 Protection Against Initial Nuclear Radiation. . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.5.3.3 Protection Against Shock, Blast and Water Waves. . . . . . . . . 070-1.5.3.4 Donning Individual Protective Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.6 RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE AND RECOVERY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.6.1 INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-1.6.2 PRINCIPLES OF RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE AND RECOVERY. . . . . SECTION 2. RADIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 70-15 70-15 70-15 70-16 70-16 70-16 70-16 70-16 70-16 70-17 70-17 70-17 70-17 70-17 70-17 70-17 70-17 70-18 70-18 70-18 70-18 70-18 70-18 70-18

070-2.1 RADIOLOGICAL MEASUREMENTS AND CALCULATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . 070-2.1.1 RADIOLOGICAL UNITS AND MEASUREMENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-2.1.1.1 Radiological Measurements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-2.1.1.2 Exposure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-2.1.1.3 Absorbed Dose. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-2.1.1.4 Differences from Accident and Incident Procedures. . . . . . . . 070-2.1.2 OVERVIEW OF RADIOLOGICAL CALCULATION PROCEDURES AND UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-2.1.2.1 Location and Movement of Fallout. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-2.1.2.2 Cessation of Fallout. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-2.1.2.3 Radiological Decay. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-2.1.2.4 Accumulated Dose Calculations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-2.1.2.5 Precision in Radiological Measurements and Calculations. . . . 070-2.2 RADIOLOGICAL CALCULATION PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-2.2.1 PLOTTING MEASURED INTENSITY, DETERMINING TIME OF CESSATION OF FALLOUT (TC ) AND PROJECTING FUTURE INTENSITY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-2.2.1.1 Use of Log-Log Paper in Radiological Plotting. . . . . . . . 070-2.2.1.2 Determination of TC and Prediction of Future Intensity. . . . 070-2.2.1.3 Reliability of Dose Rate Projections. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-2.2.1.4 Determination of Decay Rate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-2.2.1.5 Example One. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-2.2.2 CALCULATING ACCUMULATED DOSE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-2.2.2.1 Intensity Averaging. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-2.2.2.2 Estimating the Accumulated Dose Before TC . . . . . . . . . 070-2.2.2.3 Calculating Exposure After TC Using the Graphical Method. 070-2.2.2.4 Example Two. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-2.2.3 SAFE STAY TIME. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-2.2.3.1 Determining Time of Exit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-2.2.3.2 Example Three. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-2.2.3.3 Determining Time of Entry (TE ) and Time of Exit (TX ). . . . .

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70-18 70-19 70-20 70-20 70-21 70-21 70-22 70-24 70-24 70-27 70-27 70-29 70-29 70-30 70-30 iii

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued Chapter/Paragraph 070-2.2.4 070-2.2.3.4 Example Four. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . USE OF NOMOGRAMS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-2.2.4.1 Standard Intensity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-2.2.4.2 Example One with Nomograms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-2.2.4.3 Dose and Stay Time Calculations with Nomograms. . . . . . 070-2.2.4.4 Example Two with Nomograms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-2.2.4.5 Example Three with Nomograms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-2.2.4.6 Example Four with Nomograms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-2.2.5 SPECIAL PROCEDURES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-2.2.5.1 Determination of H-Hour. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-2.2.5.2 Conrming Cessation of Fallout. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-2.2.5.3 Example Five. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-2.2.5.4 Calculations with Overlapping Fallout Patterns. . . . . . . . . 070-2.2.5.5 Example Six. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-2.2.6 ATTENUATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-2.2.6.1 Transmission Factor (TF). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-2.2.6.2 Using Transmission Factors to Adjust Radiological Measurements and Calculations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-2.2.6.3 Underlying Assumptions in the Development of Transmission Factors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-2.2.6.4 Limitations on Use of Transmission Factors. . . . . . . . . . 070-2.2.6.5 Recommended Use of Transmission Factors. . . . . . . . . . 070-2.2.6.6 Availability of Approved Transmission Factors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 70-30 70-31 70-32 70-32 70-32 70-37 70-37 70-37 70-37 70-41 70-42 70-44 70-44 70-44 70-54 70-54 70-54 70-55 70-55 70-56 70-56 70-57 70-57 70-57 70-57 70-57 70-57 70-57 70-59 70-60 70-60 70-62 70-62 70-63 70-63 70-64 70-64 70-64 70-66

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SECTION 3.

DELINEATION OF THE RADIOLOGICAL SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . .

070-3.1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-3.1.1 DELINEATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-3.1.2 SHIPBOARD DETECTION CAPABILITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-3.2 SENSORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-3.2.1 RADIACS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-3.2.1.1 AN/PDR-27 Series RADIAC Set. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-3.2.1.2 AN/PDR-43 Series RADIAC Set. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-3.2.1.3 AN/PDR-65 Series RADIAC Set. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-3.2.1.4 Precision of Measurements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-3.2.1.5 Coordination of Measurements from Different Instruments. . 070-3.2.2 DOSIMETERS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-3.2.2.1 IM-143/PD Series Self-Reading Dosimeter and PP-4276/PD Series Detector Charger. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-3.2.2.2 DT-60/PD Series Non-Self-Reading Dosimeter and CP-95/PD Series Computer-Indicator. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-3.3 RADIOLOGICAL SURVEYS . . . . . . 070-3.3.1 GENERAL INFORMATION ON 070-3.3.2 ON-STATION MONITORING. 070-3.3.3 RAPID INTERNAL SURVEY. . iv . . . . . . . . . . . SURVEYS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued Chapter/Paragraph Identication of Locations Included in the Rapid Internal Survey. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-3.3.3.2 Rapid Internal Survey Gamma Monitoring Procedures. . . . 070-3.3.3.3 Rapid Internal Survey Beta Monitoring Procedures. . . . . . 070-3.3.4 RAPID EXTERNAL SURVEY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-3.3.5 SUPPLEMENTARY SURVEYS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-3.3.5.1 Use of Posted Dosimeters in Supplementary Surveys. . . . . 070-3.3.5.2 Coverage of Berthing and Messing Spaces in Supplementary Surveys. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-3.3.6 DETAILED SURVEYS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-3.3.7 WIPE TESTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-3.3.7.1 Uncontrolled Wipe Test. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-3.3.7.2 Controlled Wipe Test. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-3.3.8 HOT SPOTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-3.3.9 POTABLE WATER MONITORING. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-3.3.10 PERSONNEL MONITORING. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-3.3.10.1 General Personnel Monitoring Procedures. . . . . . . . . . . 070-3.3.10.2 Monitoring Outer Clothing, Battle Dress and Portable Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-3.3.10.3 Monitoring Inner Clothing and the Body. . . . . . . . . . . . SECTION 4. 070-4.1 070-3.3.3.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 70-66 70-66 70-69 70-69 70-69 70-69 70-69 70-69 70-74 70-74 70-74 70-74 70-75 70-75 70-75 70-75 70-78 70-78

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VENTILATION SYSTEMS AND INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION . . . . . . . . .

VENTILATION SYSTEMS CAPABILITY IN A RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.1.1 FUNCTIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.1.1.1 Filtration Capability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.1.1.2 Minimizing the Entry of Contaminants. . . . . . . . . 070-4.1.2 VENTILATION SYSTEMS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.1.2.1 Conventional Ventilation System. . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.1.2.2 Collective Protection System (CPS). . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.1.2.3 CPS Protection Levels for New Construction Ships. . 070-4.1.2.4 Selected Area Collective Protection System (SACPS). 070-4.1.2.5 References on Ventilation System Conguration and Capabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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70-78 70-78 70-78 70-78 70-78 70-78 70-78 70-79 70-79 70-79 70-80 70-80 70-80 70-81 70-81 70-81 70-82 v

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070-4.2 CONVENTIONAL VENTILATION SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.2.1 CONVENTIONAL VENTILATION SYSTEM OPERATION IN A RADIOLOGICAL HAZARD ENVIRONMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.2.1.1 Filtration Capability in a Conventional Ventilation System. . . . 070-4.2.1.2 Minimizing the Entry of Airborne Contamination with a Conventional Ventilation System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.2.1.3 Conventional Ventilation System Operation When the Ship is Enveloped in the Base Surge or Receiving Fallout. . . . . . . 070-4.2.1.4 Timing of Securing Conventional Ventilation with Respect to the Arrival of the Base Surge or Fallout. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.2.1.5 Recirculation System Operation to Reduce Heat Stress. . . . . .

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued Chapter/Paragraph Operation of Conventional Ventilation Systems While the Ship is Receiving Fallout to Reduce Heat Stress. . . . . . . . . . 070-4.2.1.7 Operation of a Conventional Ventilation Systems After the Cessation of Fallout. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.2.2 PURGING PROCEDURES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.2.2.1 Example of Calculating Purge Time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.2.2.2 Purging a Compartment Served by a Recirculation System. . . 070-4.2.2.3 Post-Purge Survey. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.2.1.6 . . . . . . Page 70-82 70-82 70-82 70-83 70-83 70-83 70-83 70-83 70-84 70-84 70-84 70-84 70-84 70-84 70-85 70-85 70-87 70-87 70-87 70-87 70-87 70-88 70-88 70-88 70-88 70-88 70-88 70-88 70-91 70-91 70-92 70-92 70-93 70-93 70-93 70-93 70-94 70-94 70-94 70-94

070-4.3 NEW CONSTRUCTION CPS TOTAL PROTECTION (TP) ZONES . . . . . . . . . 070-4.3.1 TP ZONE DESIGN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.3.1.1 Zone Boundaries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.3.1.2 Zone Integrity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.3.1.3 TP Zone Access. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.3.1.4 TP Zone Operating Modes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.3.1.5 Conditional Spaces (OTP Zones). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.3.1.6 Compressed Air Systems in TP Zones. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.3.2 TP ZONE COMPONENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.3.2.1 CBR Filter System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.3.2.2 TP Zone Supply and Exhaust Fans. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.3.2.3 Three-Position Exhaust Damper. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.3.2.4 Pressure Control Valve (PCV). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.3.2.5 CPS Alarm System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.3.2.6 Zone Pressure Gauges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.3.2.7 Drain Traps in TP Zones. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.3.3 TP ZONE OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.3.3.1 Normal Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.3.3.2 Excessive Pressurization (High Zone Pressure). . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.3.3.3 Decient Pressurization (Low Zone Pressure). . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.3.3.4 Casualty Condition (Emergency Operation). . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.3.4 TP ZONE TROUBLE SHOOTING AND CASUALTY CONTROL. . . . . . 070-4.3.4.1 Casualty Control Procedures for Excessive Pressurization of TP Zone (High Zone Pressure). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.3.4.2 Casualty Control Procedures for Decient Pressurization of TP Zone (Low Zone Pressure). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.3.4.3 Casualty Control Procedures for Casualty Condition of TP Zone (Emergency Operation). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.3.4.4 Zone Boosting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.3.4.5 Isolating TP Zones or Areas Within TP Zones. . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.3.4.6 CPS Reset Procedure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.4 NEW CONSTRUCTION CPS LIMITED PROTECTION (LP) 070-4.4.1 LP ZONE DESIGN AND COMPONENTS. . . . . . 070-4.4.1.1 LP Zone Access. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.4.1.2 LP Zone Excess Exhaust. . . . . . . . . . 070-4.4.1.3 Compressed Air Systems in LP Zones. . 070-4.4.1.4 LP Zone HEPA Filter System. . . . . . . vi ZONES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued Chapter/Paragraph 070-4.4.2 070-4.4.1.5 Other LP Zone Ventilation Components. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VENTILATION CONTROL IN LP ZONES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 70-94 70-94 70-94 70-94 70-94 70-95 70-95 70-95 70-95 70-95 70-95 70-95 70-95 70-95 70-96 70-96 70-96 70-96 70-96 70-96 70-96 70-96 70-96 70-99 70-99 70-100 70-100 70-100 70-101

070-4.5 SELECTED AREA COLLECTIVE PROTECTION SYSTEM (SACPS) 070-4.5.1 SACPS ZONE DESIGN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.5.1.1 SACPS Coverage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.5.1.2 SACPS Positive Pressure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.5.1.3 SACPS Zone Operating Modes. . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.5.1.4 SACPS Zone Access. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.5.2 SACPS ZONE COMPONENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.5.2.1 SACPS Supply Fans. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.5.2.2 SACPS Alarm System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.5.2.3 Drain Traps in SACPS Zones. . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.5.2.4 Other SACPS Components. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.5.3 SACPS OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.5.3.1 Normal Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.5.3.2 Excessive Pressurization (High Zone Pressure). . . . 070-4.5.3.3 Casualty Condition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

070-4.6 CPS MAINTENANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.6.1 ORGANIZATIONAL AND INTERMEDIATE LEVEL MAINTENANCE RESPONSIBILITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.6.2 CPS AND SACPS TECHNICAL DOCUMENTATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.7 ACCESS TO CPS ZONES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.7.1 ACCESS CONTROL. . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.7.1.1 Air Locks. . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.7.1.2 Purging Air Locks. . . . . . . . . 070-4.7.1.3 Entering and Exiting Air Locks. 070-4.7.1.4 Pressure Locks. . . . . . . . . . 070-4.7.1.5 Revolving Pressure Doors. . . . 070-4.7.1.6 CPS Decontamination Station. . 070-4.7.1.7 TP Zone Access. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

070-4.8 INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.8.1 FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR INDIVIDUAL PROTECTIVE CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.8.1.1 Respiratory Protection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.8.1.2 Shielding Against Beta Radiation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.8.1.3 Protection of the Body from Contact With Contamination. . . 070-4.8.1.4 Facilitation of Personnel Decontamination. . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.8.2 INDIVIDUAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.8.2.1 Respiratory Protection Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.8.2.2 Protective Clothing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.8.3 INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-4.8.3.1 Individual Protection When the Ship Is Enveloped in the Base Surge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. 70-101 . . . . . . . . . 70-101 70-101 70-103 70-103 70-103 70-103 70-103 70-103 70-104

. 70-104 vii

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued Chapter/Paragraph 070-4.8.3.2 070-4.8.3.3 070-4.8.3.4 SECTION 5. Page Individual Protection During Deposition of Fallout. . . . . . . . 70-104 Protective Clothing Required Under Wet Spray Conditions. . . . 70-105 Protective Clothing Required for Contact Hazard. . . . . . . . . 70-105

RADIOLOGICAL EXPOSURE CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70-105

070-5.1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70-105 070-5.1.1 RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70-105 070-5.1.2 RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70-105 070-5.2 CONTAMINATION AVOIDANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.2.1 INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.2.2 COUNTERMEASURES WASHDOWN SYSTEM. 070-5.2.3 COVERS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.2.4 MATERIAL CONDITIONS OF READINESS. . . 070-5.2.5 READY SHELTER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.2.6 MARKING HOT SPOTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70-106 70-106 70-106 70-106 70-106 70-106 70-106 70-107 70-107 70-107 70-107 70-107 70-107 70-107 70-107 70-110 70-110 70-110 70-110 70-110 70-110 70-111 70-111 70-111 70-111

070-5.3 RADIATION MITIGATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.3.1 GENERAL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.3.2 DEEP SHELTER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.3.2.1 Initial Radiation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.3.2.2 Fallout Deposition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.3.2.3 Proximity to Battle Stations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.3.3 ROTATION OF PERSONNEL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.3.3.1 Cumulative Nature of Acute Exposure to Nuclear Radiation. 070-5.3.3.2 Biological Effects of Exposure to Nuclear Radiation. . . . . 070-5.3.3.3 Maximum Permissible Exposure (MPE). . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.3.3.4 Determining Accumulated Exposure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.3.3.5 Estimating Future Exposure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.4 SHIP DECONTAMINATION . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.4.1 INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.4.2 TOPSIDE DECONTAMINATION. . . . . 070-5.4.2.1 Sequence of Decontamination. 070-5.4.2.2 Quality Control. . . . . . . . . 070-5.4.3 INTERIOR DECONTAMINATION. . . . 070-5.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

DECONTAMINATION OF PERSONNEL, CLOTHING AND PORTABLE EQUIPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.5.1 INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.5.1.1 Purpose. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.5.1.2 Importance of Good Hygiene and Housekeeping. . . . . . . . . 070-5.5.1.3 Interface with Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.5.1.4 Recording Accumulated Exposure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.5.2 THE BASIC FUNCTIONS IN THE PERSONNEL DECONTAMINATION PROCESS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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70-111 70-111 70-111 70-112 70-112 70-112

. 70-112

viii

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued Chapter/Paragraph Gross Decontamination of Portable Equipment and Outer Garments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.5.2.2 Monitoring, Removal and Disposal of Outer Garments and Portable Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.5.2.3 Monitoring of Inner Clothing and the Body. . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.5.2.4 Removal and Decontamination of Inner Clothing. . . . . . . . 070-5.5.2.5 Body Cleansing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.5.2.6 Monitoring and Radiological Clearance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.5.3 SHIPBOARD DECONTAMINATION INSTALLATIONS. . . . . . . . . . 070-5.5.3.1 Gross Decontamination Areas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.5.3.2 Contamination Control Area (CCA). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.5.3.3 Conventional Decontamination Station. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.5.3.4 Collective Protection System (CPS) Decontamination Installations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.5.3.5 Storage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.5.3.6 Laundry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.5.3.7 Outtting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.5.4 PROCEDURES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.5.4.1 Establish Need. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.5.4.2 Selection of Decon Location. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.5.4.3 Equipment Readiness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.5.4.4 Gross Decontamination Procedures After Cessation of Fallout. 070-5.5.4.5 Gross Decontamination Prior to Cessation of Fallout. . . . . . 070-5.5.4.6 Entrance Monitoring. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.5.4.7 Removal of Outer Garments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.5.4.8 Stowage of Contaminated Outer Garments, Battle Dress Items and Portable Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.5.4.9 Monitoring and Removal of Inner Clothing. . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.5.4.10 Body Cleansing Procedures in a Conventional Decontamination Station. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.5.4.11 Body Cleansing Procedures in a CPS Decon Station. . . . . . 070-5.5.4.12 Laundry Operation with Contaminated Clothing. . . . . . . . . 070-5.5.4.13 Periodic Monitoring and Cleaning of Decontamination Locations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 070-5.5.4.14 Securing from Decon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SECTION 6. 070-5.5.2.1 Page . 70-113 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70-113 70-113 70-113 70-113 70-114 70-114 70-114 70-114 70-115 70-115 70-118 70-118 70-118 70-118 70-118 70-118 70-118 70-120 70-120 70-120 70-121

. 70-122 . 70-122 . 70-123 . 70-123 . 70-123 . 70-123 . 70-123

TECHNICAL SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS IN A RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70-124

070-6.1 BALANCING MISSION REQUIREMENTS AND PROTECTIVE POSTURE . . . 70-124 070-6.1.1 RISK MANAGEMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70-124 070-6.1.2 MISSION ORIENTED PROTECTIVE POSTURE (MOPP). . . . . . . . . . 70-124 070-6.2 SUPPORT OF OPERATIONAL DECISION MAKING IN A RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70-125 070-6.2.1 USE OF RADIOLOGICAL MEASUREMENTS AND CALCULATIONS IN RISK MANAGEMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70-125 ix

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued Chapter/Paragraph 070-6.2.2 Page TIMING OF TOPSIDE EVOLUTIONS AND RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE ACTIONS BASED ON RADIOLOGICAL INFORMATION. . . . . . . . 70-125 A-1

A. B.

GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TECHNICAL MANUAL LISTING FOR RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE EQUIPMENT

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B-1

C.

FALLOUT DECAY NOMOGRAMS AND TOTAL DOSE (FALLOUT) NOMOGRAMS FOR n = 0.2 THROUGH 2.0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

C-1

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 LIST OF TABLES Table 070-1-1 070-2-1 070-2-2 070-2-3 070-2-4 070-2-5 070-4-1 070-4-2 070-4-3 070-5-1 070-5-2 070-6-1 070-B-1 Title NUCLEAR WEAPON EFFECTS EXPERIENCED BY SHIPS AT SEA . . . . . . . RADIOLOGICAL INVOLVEMENT AFTER A NUCLEAR ATTACK SHALLOW UNDERWATER BURST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . EXAMPLE OF CALCULATION OF ACCUMULATED DOSE BEFORE TC USING INTENSITY AVERAGING METHOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NOMOGRAM CALCULATION SUMMARY FOR EXAMPLES ONE THROUGH FOUR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . RADIOLOGICAL INVOLVEMENT AFTER A NUCLEAR ATTACK (H-HOUR UNKNOWN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CALCULATION OF EXPOSURE RATES FROM MULTIPLE BURSTS . . . . . . Page 70-13 70-24 70-28 70-35 70-45 70-46 70-83 70-90

ESTIMATES OF AIR CHANGES REQUIRED TO REDUCE AGENT CONCENTRATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS AND CASUALTY CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . .

CPS ZONE ENTRY AND EXIT (ALL PROTECTED ZONES INTACT, TP ZONES PRESSURIZED) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70-102 BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR RADIATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70-108 OUTFITTING FOR RADIOLOGICAL DECONTAMINATION OF 100 INDIVIDUALS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70-119 DECISIONS INFLUENCED BY RADIOLOGICAL MEASUREMENTS AND CALCULATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70-126 TECHNICAL MANUAL LISTING FOR RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE EQUIPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-2

xi

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2

xii

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Figure 070-2-1. 070-2-2. 070-2-3. 070-2-4. 070-2-5. 070-2-6. 070-2-7. Title Log-Log Plotting Paper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Log-Log Plotting Paper with Axes Labeled for Radiological Calculations Decay Slopes (Use to make transparent overlay) . . . . . . Page 70-19 70-21 70-23 70-25 70-26 70-27

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Determination of Tc and Decay Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Estimation of Intensity at Future Times . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Enlarging One Cycle and Projecting Decay Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Selection of Inection Points for Intensity Averaging and Determining Average Intensity After Cessation of Fallout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Determination of Time of Exit (TX ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nomogram Calculation Summary Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Decay Nomogram Procedure for Example One . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Determination of Time of Entry (Te ) and Time of Exit (TX ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Total Dose Nomogram Procedure for Example Two . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

70-29 70-31 70-33 70-34 70-35 70-38 70-39 70-40 70-41 70-43 70-47 70-48 70-49 70-50 70-51 70-52 70-53 70-59 70-61 70-62 xiii

070-2-8. 070-2-9. 070-2-10. 070-2-11. 070-2-12. 070-2-13. 070-2-14. 070-2-15. 070-2-16. 070-2-17. 070-2-18. 070-2-19. 070-2-20. 070-2-21. 070-2-22. 070-2-23. 070-3-1. 070-3-2. 070-3-3.

Total Dose Nomogram Procedure for Example Three . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fallout Decay Nomogram Procedure for Example Four . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total Dose Nomogram Procedure for Example Four . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Value of RA /RB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Radiological Plot Versus Local Time, H-Hour Unknown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Enlargement Procedure, H-Hour Unknown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Radiological Plot Adjusted for Calculated H-Hour

Multiple Burst Plot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Second Burst Plot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Projection of Decay from First Burst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Projection of Decay from First Burst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AN/PDR-27S RADIAC Meter (Top Panel View) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AN/PDR-43F RADIAC Meter (Top Panel View) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AN/PDR-65 RADIAC Meter (Front Panel View) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS - Continued Figure 070-3-4. 070-3-5. 070-3-6. 070-3-7. 070-3-8. 070-3-9. 070-4-1. 070-4-2. 070-4-3. 070-5-1. 070-5-2. 070-C-1. 070-C-2. 070-C-3. 070-C-4. 070-C-5. 070-C-6. 070-C-7. 070-C-8. 070-C-9. 070-C-10. 070-C-11. 070-C-12. 070-C-13. 070-C-14. 070-C-15. xiv Title Radiological Survey Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sample Rapid Internal Survey Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sample Rapid External Survey Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sample Supplementary Survey Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sample Detailed Survey Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 70-65 70-68 70-71 70-72 70-73 70-77 70-80 70-86 70-98

Contamination Marking Kit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Typical Coverage and Zoning for a Level III Ship Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Typical CPS Total Protection (TP) Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Typical Air Lock Conguration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Generic Contamination Control Area (CCA) (Gross decontamination performed outside.)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70-116

Generic Contamination Control Area (CCA) (Gross decontamination performed inside.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70-117 Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 0.2) Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 0.3) Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 0.4) Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 0.5) Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 0.6) Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 0.7) Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 0.8) Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 0.9) Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 1.0) Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 1.1) Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 1.2) Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 1.3) Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 1.4) Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 1.5) Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 1.6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-2 C-3 C-4 C-5 C-6 C-7 C-8 C-9 C-10 C-11 C-12 C-13 C-14 C-15 C-16

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS - Continued Figure 070-C-16. 070-C-17. 070-C-18. 070-C-19. 070-C-20. 070-C-21. 070-C-22. 070-C-23. 070-C-24. 070-C-25. 070-C-26. 070-C-27. 070-C-28. 070-C-29. 070-C-30. 070-C-31. 070-C-32. 070-C-33. 070-C-34. 070-C-35. 070-C-36. 070-C-37. 070-C-38. Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 1.7) Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 1.8) Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 1.9) Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 2.0) Title . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page C-17 C-18 C-19 C-20 C-21 C-22 C-23 C-24 C-25 C-26 C-27 C-28 C-29 C-30 C-31 C-32 C-33 C-34 C-35 C-36 C-37 C-38

Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 0.2) Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 0.3) Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 0.4) Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 0.5) Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 0.6) Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 0.7) Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 0.8) Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 0.9) Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 1.0) Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 1.1) Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 1.2) Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 1.3) Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 1.4) Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 1.5) Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 1.6) Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 1.7) Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 1.8) Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 1.9) Total -1 Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 2.0)

xv / (xvi Blank)

xvi @@FIpgtype@@BLANK@@!FIpgtype@@

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 CHAPTER 70 NUCLEAR DEFENSE AT SEA AND RADIOLOGICAL RECOVERY OF SHIPS AFTER NUCLEAR WEAPONS EXPLOSION SECTION 1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS EXPLOSIONS. 070-1.1 INTRODUCTION.

070-1.1.1 COMPARISON OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL EXPLOSIONS. Both nuclear and conventional explosions involve a sudden, violent release of energy. Both produce hot, compressed gasses that rapidly expand, creating a destructive shock (or blast) wave in the surrounding medium. However, the mechanisms by which energy is released are different. In a conventional explosion energy is released by a chemical reaction, in which chemical elements and combinations of elements are rearranged into different relationships, but each original element is still present in the new structure. Energy is released in a nuclear explosion by a nuclear reaction, in which chemical elements are changed into different elements. The release of energy from a nuclear reaction is far greater than is possible with a chemical reaction and some of it is released in forms that are not present in a conventional explosion. In particular, nuclear radiation is unique to nuclear explosions. Nuclear radiation, or radioactivity, is the release of energy in the form of ionizing radiation. It results from a nuclear reaction or the decomposition of radioactive material. 070-1.1.2 NUCLEAR SURVIVABILITY. Nuclear survivability begins in the ship construction process. The ship must be hardened. That means it must be built strong enough to resist nuclear weapon effects to some degree. However, not everything that is needed to make the ship more survivable in a nuclear warfare environment can be done in a shipyard. There are shipwide countermeasures that are implemented by the crew and there are also protective actions that are performed by individual crew members to reduce their vulnerability. 070-1.1.3 ORGANIZATION OF CHAPTER 070. Section 1 of this chapter briey explains nuclear reactions and nuclear weapon effects. Most of these effects occur at the time of the explosion or immediately thereafter. The one exception is nuclear radiation, which is both an immediate and a delayed effect. It can remain a hazard for a day or more after the burst and reach areas that are hundreds of miles away. It may be the only nuclear weapon effect to which a ship is exposed. Ship countermeasures and personnel protective actions for the immediate effects are described in this section. Countermeasures for the delayed radiation (radiological) hazard are discussed in the remaining sections of this chapter. The reason for the emphasis on delayed radiation is this. A ship may be able to survive the immediate effects of a nuclear attack and retain mission capability, or it may be far enough away from the blast that it is not exposed to other effects, but the crew could still become disabled if proper radiological contamination control and radiation exposure control procedures are not followed. 070-1.2 NUCLEAR REACTIONS AND NUCLEAR RADIATION

070-1.2.1 THE STRUCTURE OF MATTER. Chemical elements are the substances of which all matter is composed. Each element has unique characteristics that distinguish it from other elements. An atom is the smallest part into which a chemical element can be divided that retains the characteristics of the element. An atom can be subdivided into smaller (subatomic) particles called protons, neutrons and electrons, but the subatomic particles from one element cannot be distinguished from those of other elements. For example, a proton from one element is the same as a proton from any other element. 70-1

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 070-1.2.1.1 Atomic Structure. Every atom consists of a relatively heavy central region, called the nucleus, which is surrounded by a number of electrons. The nucleus is made up of protons and neutrons. The proton has a positive electrical charge and the neutron, which is electrically neutral, has no charge. Neutrons have the same mass as protons. Electrons, which have a negative electrical charge, are much smaller. Protons and neutrons are approximately 1840 times larger than electrons. A normal atom is electrically neutral. That is, the number of protons is equal to the number of electrons, so the positive electrical charge of the protons is balanced by the negative charge of the electrons. Some atoms have two or more forms, called isotopes, each with a different number of neutrons. Isotopes are discussed in paragraph 070-1.2.1.2. Atoms of the same element or of different elements can be combined into molecules, in which electrons are shared. Molecules are described in paragraph 070-1.2.1.3. When an atom or a molecule loses or gains electrons, it becomes electrically charged and is called an ion. Ions are the subject of paragraph 070-1.2.1.4. 070-1.2.1.2 Isotopes. All atoms of a given element have the same number of protons but some have a different number of neutrons. These variations of an element are called isotopes. Since neutrons are electrically neutral, they do not affect the electrical balance of an atom, but they contribute to its mass. Thus, each isotope of an element has a different atomic weight because each has a different number of neutrons. Some isotopes are unstable and their nuclei have a tendency to break down, or decompose. As the nuclei decompose into a more stable state, they release energy in the form of ionizing radiation. These isotopes are said to be radioactive. They are sometimes called radioisotopes or radionuclides. If the decomposition process occurs naturally over time, it is called radiological decay. Radioisotopes of some elements, such as uranium and plutonium, can be forced to decompose rapidly under certain conditions. 070-1.2.1.3 Molecules. Atoms of the same element or different elements can be combined into a molecule. In a molecule, the atoms share electrons but their nuclei remain distinct. The electrical charges of the electrons and protons remain in balance. Oxygen is an example of an element that is normally found in molecular form. Two oxygen atoms form a molecule (O2 ). A molecule composed of two or more elements is called a compound. Water is an example of a compound. A water molecule is formed from two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom (H2 O). 070-1.2.1.4 Ions. In an atom or a molecule, the positive charge of the protons is equal to the negative charge of the electrons. An atom or molecule that has lost or gained electrons is called an ion and it is no longer electrically neutral. A negative ion is one that has gained electrons. A positive ion has lost electrons. The process of changing an atom or molecule into an ion is called ionizing, or ionization. Nuclear radiation is a form of ionizing radiation. It causes ionization to occur in materials with which it comes in contact. 070-1.2.2 NUCLEAR REACTIONS AND RADIOACTIVE DECAY. In a chemical reaction, only the outer electron patterns of the atoms or molecules are affected. The bonding energy that holds these electrons in place is released. The nuclei remain unchanged. The bonding forces in the nucleus are much greater. When these bonds are broken in a nuclear reaction, a great deal more energy is released than in a chemical reaction. Some of this energy is in the form of nuclear radiation. Radioisotopes also release nuclear radiation as they decay to a more stable state. The structure of the nucleus is changed in both nuclear reactions and radioactive decay. The difference is that nuclear reactions must be initiated by an outside stimulus. Radioactive decay occurs spontaneously at a predictable rate. 070-1.2.2.1 Nuclear Fission. This process is popularly described as the splitting of atoms. The radioisotopes of heavy elements, such as uranium and plutonium, are said to be ssionable. This means that energy from an external source can be used to force the nuclei of these isotopes to decompose and release energy. Energy is applied in the form of high speed neutrons. When a free neutron (a neutron that is not part of an atom) collides at suffi70-2

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 cient speed with a nucleus of one of these isotopes, it causes the nucleus to ssion, or split. This releases a large amount of energy. The nucleus breaks into ssion fragments, which are the nuclei of lighter elements or their isotopes, and emits two or more free neutrons. These emitted neutrons can start a chain reaction, inducing additional nuclei to ssion. Under certain conditions, the result of such a chain reaction is a nuclear explosion. 070-1.2.2.2 Nuclear Fusion. Fusion is the opposite of ssion. Instead of splitting the nuclei of isotopes of heavy elements, the isotopes of light elements are combined to form nuclei of heavier elements. This process is accompanied by a tremendous release of energy, even greater than that of ssion. Extremely high temperatures are necessary for nuclear fusion to occur. Nuclear ssion is used to create these high temperatures in a fusion weapon. Then, nuclei of hydrogen isotopes are combined to form nuclei of helium atoms. This is the reason fusion weapons are sometimes called hydrogen bombs. They are also called thermonuclear weapons because of the extremely high temperature required to initiate fusion. 070-1.2.2.3 Radioactive Decay. Radioactive decay is a process in which radioisotopes spontaneously release energy while decomposing into more stable forms. It occurs at a slower pace than the chain reactions that produce nuclear explosions. The rate of decomposition by radiological decay is called the half-life. After one halflife of a given radioisotope, half of the atoms that were present at the beginning will have decomposed. The level of radioactivity is also reduced by one half after one half-life. Fissionable materials decay by this process, as do ssion fragments. The half lives of ssionable materials range from thousands to billions of years. The half-lives of radioactive ssion fragments range from fractions of a second to about a million years. 070-1.2.3 FORMS OF NUCLEAR RADIATION. There are two basic types of nuclear radiation, electromagnetic energy and high speed particles. Electromagnetic radiation travels at the speed of light. Particles move at sub-light speeds. Both types can ionize materials that are exposed to them. As they pass through a substance, they can break electrically neutral atoms or molecules into electrically charged ions. This can damage living organisms, including humans, and some types of electronic equipment. Injury to humans can be caused by radiation from an external source or from radioactive material that is ingested, inhaled or absorbed through breaks in the skin. If radiation from a source outside the body can damage the skin, it is called a skin hazard . If it can penetrate the body and pose a health risk to internal organs, it is called a penetrating hazard . If radioactive material is taken into the body, it is called an internal hazard because the source of the radiation is inside the body, where it remains a hazard until it either decays or is eliminated by normal body functions. Some of this material may be deposited close to vital organs, where it can pose a long term health hazard. 070-1.2.3.1 Neutrons. Neutrons are subatomic particles that can be expelled at high speed from a nucleus during ssion and fusion. They are not released by radioactive decay. They can travel thousands of yards through air from a nuclear burst and have substantial penetrating power. They can penetrate a ships hull and superstructure and are not stopped by protective clothing. They are an external hazard within the rst minute after the burst. They are not an internal hazard because they are not emitted by radioactive material that is left behind after a nuclear explosion. 070-1.2.3.2 Gamma Rays. Gamma rays are electromagnetic radiation similar to radio signals. Like neutrons, they can travel thousands of yards through air and have great penetrating power. They can penetrate a ships hull and superstructure and are not stopped by protective clothing. Unlike neutrons, they are not particles. They are high frequency waves of energy. They are both an internal and an external hazard. They are released in nuclear reactions and in radioactive decay. The energy level of those released during reactions is higher. 070-1.2.3.3 Alpha Particles. Alpha radiation consists of particles that are identical to the nuclei of helium atoms. Each particle consists of two neutrons and two protons. It has a positive electrical charge. Alpha radiation 70-3

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 can travel only an inch or two in air. It cannot penetrate clothing or unbroken skin. While the external hazard of alpha radiation is negligible, it can be a signicant internal hazard. Alpha radiation is released by nuclear reactions and by the decay of ssionable material. Uranium and plutonium in a nuclear weapon continually release alpha radiation. Small amounts of these ssionable materials escape detonation when the weapon is exploded and they continue to release alpha radiation. If ssionable material enters the body through ingestion, inhalation or breaks in the skin, it can be retained close enough to vital organs for alpha radiation to damage them. Uranium and plutonium do not decay quickly, so this can be a long term health problem. However, material emitting alpha radiation is more likely to be present in a nuclear weapon accident or incident than in a post-burst environment. 070-1.2.3.4 Beta Particles. Beta radiation consists of particles that are released when a neutron decomposes into a proton and an electron. A beta particle is identical to an electron, so it has a negative charge. Beta particles are released during nuclear reactions and radioactive decay. Beta radiation can travel about ten feet (or slightly farther) in air. Layered clothing provides effective shielding against beta radiation. The working uniform alone stops most of it and it cannot penetrate structural materials. Beta burns can result from skin contact with radioactive material that is emitting beta particles. Thus, beta radiation from a source outside the body is a skin hazard, but it is not a penetrating hazard. Beta radiation is an internal hazard if material that is emitting beta particles is taken into the body. 070-1.2.3.5 X-rays. X-rays are electromagnetic radiation similar to gamma rays. Like gamma rays, they can damage living tissue, but they do not have much penetrating power. They are readily absorbed by the atmosphere and are limited to the immediate area of the reball. Although direct exposure to x-rays is not a concern after a nuclear explosion, their interaction with the atmosphere is responsible for creating several nuclear weapon effects. 070-1.3 NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFECTS

070-1.3.1 COMPARISON OF THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. A nuclear explosion is similar to a high explosive (HE) conventional detonation in some ways but very different in others. Both nuclear and conventional explosions can produce thermal radiation (including visible light), air blast, underwater shock, blueout, and water waves, although the magnitude of these effects can be much greater with a nuclear burst, especially in the case of thermal energy. The weapon effects that accompany only nuclear explosions are nuclear radiation, electromagnetic pulse (EMP), transient radiation effects on electronics (TREE), blackout and scintillation. The intensity of some nuclear effects depends on the strength, or yield, of the explosion. The yield is stated in terms of the amount of TNT it would take to release the same amount of explosive energy as a comparable nuclear explosion (excluding residual radiation, which is released after the burst). 070-1.3.2 THE BURST REGION. In a nuclear explosion, a tremendous amount of energy is released in a very short time. This energy is in the form of nuclear radiation, mostly x-rays. They interact with residue from the weapon and any surrounding medium (air, water, soil). Most of the radiation is absorbed by these materials and this interaction heats them to an extremely high temperature. This process is responsible for producing several of the weapon effects unique to nuclear weapons. The occurrence and strength of these effects is related to the height of the burst (HOB) above the surface of the earth, the depth of the burst (DOB) under water or underground, or the depth of the water (DOW). 070-1.3.2.1 Fireball. If the burst occurs in the atmosphere, any material present is heated to a temperature of tens of millions of degrees (C). It is instantaneously vaporized and forms a hot, glowing mass called the reball. If the burst occurs at an altitude between the surface and 100,000 feet, the shape is roughly spherical and the reball rises like a balloon, continuing to glow for about a minute. A radioactive cloud forms from condensation of the material that was vaporized in the reball. The radioactive cloud continues to rise and emit radiation. 70-4

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 070-1.3.2.2 High Altitude Fireball. and very large. Above 100,000 ft., the air is thinner and the reball may be non-spherical

070-1.3.2.3 Underwater Bubble. If the burst occurs underwater, a large bubble of compressed gas forms. It pulsates while it rises toward the surface alternately expanding and contracting. 070-1.3.3 INITIAL NUCLEAR RADIATION. Initial radiation is generated in the nuclear reaction that creates the explosion and in the interaction with the atmosphere that takes place in and near the reball and radioactive cloud. Ionizing radiation is released by both ssion and fusion. X-rays, alpha particles and beta particles are present as initial radiation, but only in the immediate vicinity of the nuclear burst, where other weapon effects are predominant. Neutrons and gamma rays, with longer effective ranges and greater penetrating power, are the components of initial radiation that are hazardous to personnel and electronic equipment. Most of the neutrons are released in a fraction of the rst second after the burst. Emission of gamma rays also begins immediately. Then the reball or radioactive cloud continues to emit gamma radiation as it rises. After approximately one minute, the cloud has risen to an altitude from which these radiations can no longer reach the surface. Therefore, initial radiation is limited to the rst minute after the burst. Both neutrons and gamma rays can travel thousands of yards in air. At low yields (about one kiloton), initial radiation can cause personnel injury at a greater distance from ground zero than the blast wave and thermal radiation. At higher yields, blast and thermal effects are generally a greater concern. 070-1.3.3.1 Effects of Initial Nuclear Radiation on Personnel. When initial radiation is a signicant concern, the hazard is a brief but intense external exposure. See paragraph 070-5.3.3 for detailed discussion of physiological effects on personnel. 070-1.3.3.2 Effects of Initial Nuclear Radiation on Equipment. Initial radiation is responsible, directly or indirectly, for several effects on equipment, discussed in paragraphs 070-1.3.10 and 070-1.3.11. 070-1.3.4 THERMAL RADIATION. Thermal energy is actually a form of electromagnetic radiation. As such, it travels at the speed of light and it reaches the ship before most other weapon effects. The frequency of the radiation is such that, when it strikes an object, it excites the molecules of that object, converting the electromagnetic energy into heat. Although heat is produced in a conventional explosion, thermal radiation is not an important feature. A temperature of several thousand degrees (C) is reached in a conventional explosion but the rate of emission of thermal energy is relatively low. In a nuclear explosion, the temperature reaches tens of millions of degrees (C) and the rate of energy emission is very high. Thus, thermal radiation is a very prominent characteristic of a nuclear explosion. However, it is probably more subject to the inuence of the environment than other effects. Clouds or haze can act as a protective screen. Moisture on a ships structure or equipment can help to keep their surfaces cool. Conversely, thermal radiation can be enhanced by a cloud cover that acts as a reector. Thermal radiation is attenuated by the atmosphere, so it diminishes with distance from the burst point. 070-1.3.4.1 Effects of Thermal Radiation on Personnel. Thermal radiation can cause skin burns several miles from the burst. The burns can be direct or indirect. Direct burns are ash burns resulting from direct exposure to thermal radiation. Indirect burns are the result of exposure to res ignited by the thermal radiation. First, second and third degree burns are possible. 070-1.3.4.2 Effects of Thermal Radiation on Ship Structures and Equipment. Paint can be blistered and ammable material can be ignited several miles from the burst. Exposed aluminum structures and components can be weakened and made more vulnerable to blast effects. Antennas and wave guides are particularly susceptible. 70-5

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 070-1.3.5 VISIBLE LIGHT. Some of the thermal energy in a nuclear explosion is in the form of visible light.

070-1.3.5.1 Flash and Fireball. A nuclear burst produces an extremely bright initial ash. Within milliseconds, a reball develops that is several times brighter than the sun at noon, even from great distances. A reball in the atmosphere emits visible light for about one minute.

WARNING

Do not look at the reball from a nuclear burst. Permanent eye injury can result, even at extreme distances. 070-1.3.5.2 Effects of Intense Visible Light on Personnel. The initial ash can cause temporary ash blindness, even if the victim was not looking directly at the burst. Looking directly at the reball can cause permanent eye injury from retinal burns. Retinal burns can occur at much greater distances than skin burns. a. In the daytime, personnel facing the burst can be affected by ash blindness, even if they do not focus on the burst. If the reball is anywhere in their eld of vision, ash blindness can be caused by reected light. Although all useful vision is lost due to the bright afterimage, recovery normally takes only two minutes or less in daytime. b. At night, because the pupil is open wider, personnel facing in any direction are likely to be affected by ash blindness. Recovery takes longer than in the daytime, especially for individuals facing the burst. Night vision may not be recovered for 15 to 35 minutes. c. Retinal burns result from overheating due to focusing too much thermal energy on the retina. This occurs in personnel who look directly at the reball. These injuries are permanent and impair vision, particularly if they are in the central vision region. 070-1.3.6 AIR BLAST. The extremely high temperature and pressure generated by a nuclear burst immediately convert all materials in the reball into hot, compressed gasses. The pressure inside the reball is several million pounds per square inch (psi). These gasses expand rapidly in all directions, creating a shock wave in the surrounding medium. A shock wave traveling through air is called a blast wave, or air blast. Air blast is like a moving wall of compressed air. It causes damage and injuries by means of a crushing effect and by the drag force of the strong winds that accompany it. As the front of the blast wave passes, it creates a sudden increase in air pressure, called overpressure . Overpressure is measured in pounds per square inch (psi) above atmospheric pressure. This increase in air pressure is non-directional, so it is called static overpressure . The strong winds that accompany the blast front exert a directional force, or dynamic overpressure , that tends to drag exposed objects and personnel along with it. As the wave front travels outward from surface zero, its energy is spread over a larger space. As a result, the peak overpressure and the maximum wind speed decrease as the distance from the burst increases. Both the peak overpressure and the maximum wind speed occur immediately after the passage of the wave front. After the passage of the wave front, the overpressure drops quickly and the maximum winds diminish rapidly. After a few seconds, the air pressure has actually become slightly negative (below atmospheric) and the wind reverses direction, but the wind speed in this phase is much lower than it was in the positive overpressure phase. Gradually, the air pressure returns to normal. 070-1.3.6.1 Effects of Air Blast on Ship Structures and Equipment. When the atmospheric pressure outside the ship suddenly increases well above the pressure inside, weaker parts of the ships structure may collapse or 70-6

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 become permanently distorted (plastic deformation) before the pressure can equalize. At ranges close to surface zero, the hull may be ruptured, causing the ship to sink or, if the blast wave hits the ship broadside, it could cause severe heeling or even capsizing. At greater distances, where the overpressure is not high enough to rupture the ships hull, it could still damage the superstructure. The passage of the blast wave is accompanied by high winds. The drag force of these winds can damage or even tear loose topside equipment such as antennas, ladders and pipes. 070-1.3.6.2 Effects of Air Blast on Personnel. Individuals are subject to internal injuries from overpressure and they can be thrown into solid objects by the ships heeling or, if they are topside, by the high winds. Items that are not properly secured inside the ship can be jarred loose and become missile hazards to personnel. 070-1.3.6.3 Effects of Air Blast on Airborne Aircraft. Aircraft in the air may experience both the primary blast wave and a secondary wave reected from the surface of the earth. Ships do not experience this because the effects of both waves are merged at the surface. NOTE Air blast and underwater shock are weapon effects that result from both nuclear and conventional explosions. In fact, with nuclear and conventional explosions of the same yield, the magnitude of the blast and shock from the conventional explosion is greater. This is so because, in a conventional explosion, most of the energy is released in the blast wave, while in a nuclear explosion, the energy is released in several different forms. However, since much higher yields are possible with nuclear weapons, greater shock and blast effects can be achieved than is possible with the most powerful conventional explosives. 070-1.3.7 UNDERWATER SHOCK. The conversion of all materials in the burst region into hot, compressed gasses was described in paragraph 070-1.3.6. When these gasses expand, they create a shock wave in the surrounding medium. If the medium is water, the shock wave is called underwater shock or, simply, shock. The effect is like a sudden jolt. Actually, multiple jolts are likely. In addition to the direct shock wave, there may be reected shock waves from the bottom and surface. A shock wave can also be created by air blast from a burst in the atmosphere. 070-1.3.7.1 Comparison of Underwater Shock and Air Blast. However, there are three differences. a. The shock wave travels faster in water than in air. b. Underwater shock lasts only hundredths of a second. The overpressure from air blast lasts one or two seconds. c. The peak pressure created by underwater shock is higher. 070-1.3.7.2 Effects of Underwater Shock on Ship Structures and Equipment. The effect of a shock wave on a ship is like a sudden impact in an upward direction. Some objects are unable to absorb this impulse without damage. It can cause plastic deformation of the ships hull and framing structure below the waterline, including ruptures in the plating. Shock also imparts motion to objects inside the ship which can have drastic results. This sud70-7 Shock is similar to air blast in some respects.

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 den motion can damage securely mounted items by a whipping effect and it can dislodge items that are not properly secured and cause them to become missile hazards. Shafts and piping are vulnerable to misalignment. 070-1.3.7.3 Effects of Underwater Shock on Personnel. Shock is transmitted into the human body from the deck and can cause internal injuries. It can also produce personnel injuries by causing individuals to fall, to be thrown into solid objects or to be struck by missile hazards. 070-1.3.8 SURFACE WAVES. Underwater bursts and surface bursts in water can create large surface waves. The size of the waves depends on the yield of the explosion, the depth of the burst and the depth of the water. 070-1.3.8.1 Effects of Surface Waves on Ship Structures and Equipment. Major structural damage can occur out to hundreds of yards from the explosion. Capsizing is a possibility if the ship is broadside to the explosion. However, any ship close enough to surface zero to experience this kind of damage from waves would also be subject to severe damage from other effects, i.e., shock, blast or thermal radiation. Generally, these other weapon effects can disable a ship at greater ranges than surface waves. 070-1.3.8.2 Effects of Surface Waves on Personnel. The heeling of the ship, especially if it is broadside to the waves, could throw individuals against solid objects or create missile hazards. 070-1.3.8.3 Effect of Surface Waves on Amphibious Operations. At ranges from surface zero where damage to ships is unlikely, the waves could still be large enough to damage or capsize landing craft. Furthermore, waves increase in height as they move into shallower water. Flooding of beach areas can occur to a depth that is twice the height of the approaching surface waves. This could severely impact landings and beachhead operations. 070-1.3.9 RESIDUAL NUCLEAR RADIATION. Residual radiation arises not from nuclear reactions in the explosion but from radiological decay after the burst. Five to ten percent of the total energy released from a nuclear explosion is in the form of residual radiation. The source of residual radiation is radioactive contamination that is created in a nuclear explosion. As the reball cools, radioactive ssion fragments condense along with soil, water and weapon debris (including unexploded ssionable material) to form contaminated dust particles and water droplets. Gamma and beta radiation are released by radioactive products of ssion as they decay. Alpha radiation is released by unexploded uranium and plutonium but this is a not a signicant component of residual radiation. There are two basic forms of residual radiation, transit radiation and deposit radiation. Transit radiation is emitted from radioactive particles or droplets in the environment that do not adhere to the ship. Deposit radiation is emitted from radioactive particles that have landed on the ship. Not only are they an external radiation hazard wherever they are deposited, they are also a transfer hazard because they can be tracked to clean parts of the ship by foot traffic. They can also become an internal hazard by being transferred into the body. 070-1.3.9.1 Base Surge. This form of transit radiation is associated with underwater bursts and underground bursts. As the column of water (or dust) raised by the explosion falls back to the surface, a dense aerosol cloud of small water droplets (or dust particles) forms and moves rapidly outward in all directions from surface (or ground) zero. Initially, the cloud may expand outwardly at a speed of more than a mile a minute. After about ve minutes, its rate of expansion will have slowed to the prevailing wind speed. It is highly radioactive but may not deposit much contaminated material on a ship. Even after the water droplets evaporate and are no longer visible, the base surge remains radioactive and continues to expand. There is a signicant radiological hazard from the base surge for the rst ve to ten minutes after a shallow underwater burst. Then, although the hazard exists for at least another half hour, especially in the downwind direction, it is diminishing due to dispersion and radioactive decay. 70-8

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 070-1.3.9.2 Radioactive Pool. A pool of radioactive material remains at surface zero after an underwater or surface burst. It is gradually diffused by downward mixing and surface currents. The intensity level of the radiation, the size of the pool and the rate of dispersion are difficult to predict, as they depend on the yield of the weapon, the depth of the explosion, local currents and wind. Ships passing through the radioactive pool experience transit radiation. The radiation hazard may not be particularly signicant by wartime standards but it is an exposure that should not be accepted unnecessarily. 070-1.3.9.3 Fallout. Radiological fallout consists of radioactive particles that form when ssion fragments condense with dust, sea salts and debris that were vaporized in the reball. The heavier particles, which fall to the earth in the rst 24 hours, are called early fallout. The lighter particles may remain airborne for months or even years and are called delayed or worldwide fallout. Only early fallout is of tactical military signicance. Exposure to early fallout is the principal concern in radiological risk management. Fallout contamination on a ships weather surface is the primary consideration in radiological recovery. Fallout can take the form of rainout when the radioactive cloud from a nuclear burst merges with a rain cloud. In general, fallout is a product of surface bursts and underwater bursts. However, air bursts can produce rainout. Radiation from fallout is experienced by a ship as transit radiation while it is falling around it and as deposit radiation if it remains on the ship. 070-1.3.9.4 Effects of Residual Nuclear Radiation on Personnel. In contrast to initial radiation, which reaches the ship in the rst minute after the burst, exposure to residual radiation lasts until one of three conditions is satised: the radioactivity decays to a safe level, the contamination is removed or the individual moves to a safe area. Also, initial radiation is only an external exposure hazard. Residual radiation is an external exposure hazard but, if contamination is allowed to enter the body, it becomes an internal hazard as well. Gamma rays and beta particles are the primary concerns. Alpha particles may be present as residual radiation but their importance is outweighed by the hazards of gamma and beta radiation. Physiological effects on personnel are discussed in paragraph 070-5.3.3. 070-1.3.10 ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP). Initial radiation from a nuclear burst interacts with molecules and atoms of the gasses in the atmosphere to produce an ionized area called the deposition region, or source region. The negatively charged electrons are lighter and move outward faster than the positive ions. This separation of charges in the source region produces a strong electric eld. This eld reaches its peak strength in a hundredth of a microsecond or less. If the shape of the source region is unsymmetrical (at low altitudes) or if the electron ow is inuenced by the earths magnetic eld (at high altitudes), a surge of energy called EMP is generated. The pulse reaches its peak strength very rapidly and lasts for only tens of microseconds. The effect of EMP on electronic equipment is similar to that of lightning. However, EMP can be much stronger than lightning and it covers a much wider range of frequencies. In fact, most communications equipment and radars operate at frequencies within the EMP bandwidth. EMP induces high voltage electrical currents in such equipment, or in antennas and cables to which it is attached. These currents may overload its circuitry. The result may be permanent damage or temporary disruption. 070-1.3.10.1 Effects of EMP on Personnel. In order for personnel to be vulnerable to injury from EMP directly, they would have to be close enough to the burst that the danger from blast, shock or thermal radiation would be a bigger concern. At greater distances, a person in contact with a collector of EMP energy, such as a cable, pipe or handrail, could receive a severe shock. 070-1.3.10.2 Effects of EMP on Ship Structures and Equipment. There are two kinds of system degradation caused by EMP, upsets and damage. An upset is a temporary failure that is either self-recoverable or non-selfrecoverable. Normal operation is restored quickly after a self-recoverable upset without operator intervention. A non-self-recoverable upset requires the operator to reset the device before normal operation can be resumed. 70-9

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 Computer program failure is an example of an upset. Damage is permanent failure of a component due to burnout that requires repair or replacement. Solid state electronic equipment is particularly susceptible to EMP. 070-1.3.11 TRANSIENT RADIATION EFFECTS ON ELECTRONICS (TREE). Initial radiation from a nuclear explosion causes Transient Radiation Effects on Electronics (TREE). Gamma rays and neutrons, arriving in the rst minute after the burst, disrupt the currents and voltages that control the operation of electronic equipment. The term, transient, refers to the radiation, which is temporary. The effects on electronic equipment may be temporary upsets or they may be permanent damage. Equipment that contains semi-conductors is particularly susceptible to TREE. This includes most communications, radar and computer equipment. 070-1.3.11.1 Effects of Gamma Radiation on Electronic Equipment. TREE caused by gamma rays is the result of ionization. Gamma rays tend to cause temporary upsets unless the dose rate is very high. Permanent damage may result in that case. Examples of temporary upsets caused by gamma radiation are disruption of digital communications and computer logic. 070-1.3.11.2 Effects of Neutrons on Electronic Equipment. The effect of neutrons on electronics is likely to be permanent damage. Neutrons can cause ionization but primarily cause damage by atomic displacement. Unlike gamma radiation, which is pure energy, neutrons have mass. When they pass through a solid object, they collide with atoms and move some of them to new positions. Semi-conductor materials, which are used in solid state circuits, are vulnerable to damage or upset due to this process. An example is disruption of reference voltages to re control equipment. Some of the damage is restored within 30 minutes by a process called annealing, in which atoms migrate back to the original arrangement. Exposing semiconductor materials to higher temperatures enhances annealing, but some permanent damage usually remains. 070-1.3.11.3 Effect of Initial Radiation on Cable Insulation. One type of permanent damage that can be caused by both gamma rays and neutrons is reduced resistance in cable insulation. 070-1.3.12 ELECTROMAGNETIC PROPAGATION EFFECTS. The operation of communications and radar equipment is affected by atmospheric conditions that result from a nuclear burst. Unlike EMP and TREE, these effects do not damage the equipment. Instead, they create conditions in the atmosphere that affect the electromagnetic transmissions from the equipment. There are two types of atmospheric conditions caused by nuclear explosions that affect electromagnetic signals. a. Ionization of the Atmosphere. Nuclear radiation ionizes the air in and around the reball. At lower altitudes, the density of the atmosphere restricts the size of the reball and the area of ionization around it. The negative effects on radio and radar transmissions are momentary and are limited to the line of sight to the reball. At higher altitudes, where the air is less dense, the region of ionization from a nuclear burst is much larger. There are always positive ions and free electrons in the upper atmosphere that affect electronic transmissions. After a nuclear burst above 10,000 ft., the density of charged particles in that region is much higher than usual. The disruptive effects on electromagnetic signal propagation are much greater than those caused by normal atmospheric conditions. b. Dust, Smoke and Moisture in the Atmosphere. Soil and water vaporized in a nuclear explosion and smoke from res ignited by thermal radiation can leave water droplets and particles of dust and smoke suspended in the atmosphere for days or weeks over a large area. The forms of propagation interference that result from these conditions are described in the following paragraphs. 70-10

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 070-1.3.12.1 Blackout due to Ionization. Radio and radar signals cannot penetrate the reball and the ionized region around it. If the HOB is above 10 miles, transmissions on some frequencies may be degraded for hours due to the high level of ionization in the atmosphere. The mechanisms that produce this effect are absorption and scattering. They affect primarily frequencies at the low end of the spectrum (HF and lower) that are subject to refraction (bending). These frequencies are used for long range communications without satellites. a. Absorption. When an electromagnetic signal passes through an ionized region, it interacts with the free electrons, transferring energy to them and causing them to vibrate. This weakens the signal and may change its characteristics as well. If the density, or concentration, of the free electrons in the region is high enough, as it could be after a nuclear burst, the signal can be completely absorbed in this manner. b. Scattering. When an electromagnetic signal enters an ionized region, it is bent, or refracted, by its interaction with the free electrons. When a signal passes through areas of differing electron densities, it undergoes multiple refractions, which scatter the energy of the signal in different directions and thereby weaken it. 070-1.3.12.2 Scintillation. This phenomenon is similar to scattering but it affects higher frequencies (VHF and higher) that are less subject to refraction. These frequencies are used for satellite communications. Scintillation is caused by the release of beta particles (electrons) from ssion debris at altitudes above 35 miles. These charged particles are aligned by the earths magnetic eld into layers of different density. The characteristics of an electromagnetic signal are changed as it passes through varying concentrations of free electrons. This distorts the signal and makes effective communication difficult to achieve. 070-1.3.12.3 Interference. Background noise is normal in the operation of radio and radar equipment. It is electromagnetic energy that comes from the environment. The problem is to discriminate between the useful signals and the background noise. After a nuclear explosion at 10 miles or higher, the level of interference is much higher than normal due to increased ionization in the upper atmosphere. It may be impossible to distinguish the useful signals from the background noise. 070-1.3.12.4 Blackout due to Particulates and Water Droplets. Water droplets and particles of dust and smoke can scatter and absorb signals. They degrade the operation of radar, electronic navigation and line-of-sight communications systems. Smoke particles remain suspended in the atmosphere the longest. They affect lasers and infrared devices. 070-1.3.12.5 Black Rain. The dust and debris produced by a nuclear explosion provides an unusually large number of sites in the atmosphere for condensation of water vapor. The result is black rain, which absorbs higher frequency (SHF) transmissions used by line-of-sight communications, targeting and tracking radar and electronic navigation systems. 070-1.3.13 BLUEOUT. Blueout is acoustic reverberation (echoes) from underwater explosions. It can mask the sounds a sonar is supposed to detect. The shock wave and the pulsations of the gas bubble transmit acoustic energy (sound) into the water. The sound energy is repeatedly reected off the surface, the bottom and structures in the water. This is called reverberation. It may continue for some time. The size of the sea basin in which an underwater burst takes place is the primary inuence on the length of time blueout continues. The larger the basin, the longer blueout lasts. In the open ocean, blueout may last two to ve hours. The lower frequencies, which are used for passive sonar operation, are affected most by blueout. From the viewpoint of a sonar operator, blueout is acoustic interference that is well above the level of normal underwater background noise. It does not damage sonar equipment but it degrades its performance. The range at which useful acoustic (sound) information can be detected is reduced. 70-11

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 070-1.4 NUCLEAR WEAPON EFFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH DIFFERENT BURST TYPES

070-1.4.1 TYPES OF NUCLEAR BURSTS. Nuclear weapon explosions are characterized by the location of the reball with respect to the surface of the earth. The location of the burst with respect to the surface of the earth and the interaction of the reball with the environment determine which weapon effects are predominant and which are secondary in each type of burst. The burst types are dened below. The weapon effects associated with each type of burst to which a ship is most likely to be exposed are described in paragraphs 070-1.4.2 through 070-1.4.7 and summarized in Table 070-1-1. a. High Altitude Burst. A high altitude burst takes place at altitudes of 100,000 feet or higher. Above this altitude, the density of the atmosphere is so low that the size of the source region is very large compared to other types of bursts. The earths magnetic eld is an important environmental inuence on the reball at these heights. b. Air Burst. An air burst takes place below an altitude of 100,000 feet. The reball interacts with the atmosphere. The reball does not touch the surface of the earth. c. Surface Burst. In a surface burst, the center of the reball is either at or slightly above the surface of the earth. In this manual, surface bursts on both land and water are considered. d. Underwater Burst. In an underwater burst, the center of the reball is below the surface of the water. The reball may break the surface or it may not, depending on the depth of burst (DOB) and the size of the explosion (yield). e. Underground Burst. In an underground burst, the center of the reball is below the surface of the ground. The reball may break the surface or it may not, depending on the depth of burst (DOB) below the surface and the explosive yield. Although the location of the burst is ashore, a ship can experience some of its effects if the burst and the ship are close enough to the shoreline. 070-1.4.2 HIGH ALTITUDE BURST. Nuclear bursts at altitudes from approximately 20 to 50 miles produce extremely bright reballs that are visible at the earths surface over hundreds of miles. They can cause eye injury at great distances. EMP generated by a high altitude burst can cause damage to unprotected electronic equipment over thousands of square miles. Nuclear radiation from a high altitude burst causes a very high level of ionization over a large area in the upper atmosphere. This ionization can persist for hours and degrade electronic transmissions over a broad range of frequencies. Blackout, scintillation and interference affect signal propagation over an area that may cover hundreds or thousands of square miles. In the thin air at high altitudes, energy that would be converted to blast at lower altitudes is radiated as thermal energy. Although it is possible that thermal radiation from a high altitude burst can reach the surface, EMP is by far the greater concern.

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Table 070-1-1 NUCLEAR WEAPON EFFECTS EXPERIENCED BY SHIPS AT SEA High Altitude Burst Thermal Radiation Visible Light Negligible Air Burst Can ignite res and cause burns several miles away. Intense. Can be seen tens of miles away as reball rises. Strong. Causes extensive damage over radius of several miles. Air blast can create underwater shock. Initial radiation Surface Burst on Water Can ignite res and cause burns several miles away. Intense but reball may be obscured by clouds as it rises. Strong, esp. near surface zero. Damage radius of several miles. Strong underwater shock, surface waves. Initial radiation, fallout, radioactive pool. Blackout only in direction of reball. EMP/TREE damage over several square miles. Surface Burst on Land Can ignite res and cause burns several miles away. Intense but reball may be obscured by dust as it rises. Strong. Damage radius of several miles. UnderWater Burst UnderGround Burst

Mostly absorbed by Mostly absorbed water. by soil, rock. Negligible unless reball breaks surface. None unless reball breaks surface.

Intense. Can be seen for hundreds of miles. None

Air Blast/ Wind

Limited if reball Limited if reball breaks surface; neg- breaks surface; negligible if not. ligible if not. Negligible

Waves/ Under-Water Shock Nuclear Radiation Propagation Interference EMP/ TREE

None

Negligible

Negligible

Blackout, Scintillation, Interference

Blackout in direction of reball if HOB below 10K ft. EMP damage over EMP/TREE damage thousands of square over several square miles. miles.

Strong underwater shock, surface waves likely. Initial radiation, fallout. Radioactive pool, base surge, rainout. Blackout only in direc- Blueout likely tion of reball. Negligible Negligible

Shallow burst can produce fallout. Negligible

Negligible

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2

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S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 070-1.4.3 AIR BURST. The predominant features of a medium to high yield air burst are thermal radiation (including visible light) and air blast. The blast from an air burst is less powerful than that of a surface burst, but the damage radius may be greater, especially for personnel injury and structures that are not hardened. If the burst is over water, the air blast can also generate underwater shock. EMP is not a signicant problem compared to blast and thermal effects. At higher altitudes (HOB above 10 miles), the effects on electronic transmissions become more like those of a high altitude burst. At lower altitudes, transmissions are affected only in the immediate area of reball and radioactive cloud. Initial radiation is generally contained by the thicker atmosphere at lower altitudes and it does not reach the surface from higher HOBs. Thermal and blast effects are predominant except for one case. At lower yields (a few kilotons), initial radiation can be harmful at greater distances from surface zero than blast and thermal effects. Therefore, TREE and radiation injury to personnel are a concern with a low yield, low altitude air burst. Fallout is insignicant unless the radioactive cloud merges with a rain cloud to produce rainout. 070-1.4.4 SURFACE BURST AT SEA. The predominant features of a surface burst on water are air blast, underwater shock and thermal radiation. Initial radiation and TREE are also signicant for a low yield burst. Water waves form and move rapidly outward from surface zero. EMP is very intense near surface zero, but it is doubtful that any ship in that area could survive the blast and thermal effects. For a short time after the explosion, electronic transmissions in the direction of the reball and radioactive cloud are completely absorbed or scattered. A large volume of sea water is vaporized in the reball so fallout in some form, possibly as rainout, is likely. 070-1.4.5 SURFACE BURST ON LAND. Fallout from a surface burst can affect ships at sea. This is the dirtiest type of burst in terms of producing fallout. Not only is a large volume of soil vaporized in the explosion, but updrafts, called afterwinds, also suck large amounts of dirt and debris into the reball as it rises. When the vaporized material starts to cool, radioactive ssion products and unexploded ssionable material condense with soil and debris to form the radioactive fallout. 070-1.4.6 UNDERWATER BURST. The major effects are underwater shock and blueout. If the burst is near the surface, some of the energy may be translated into air blast. Most of the thermal radiation and initial nuclear radiation are absorbed by the water. Formation of a base surge is likely unless the burst is at extreme depth. Fallout, possibly as rainout, is possible if the burst is near the surface. 070-1.4.7 UNDERGROUND BURST. Formation of a base surge is likely unless the burst is too deep underground to vent at the surface. The base surge is a dust cloud instead of mist. Ships close to shore could be enveloped in it. Fallout, similar to a surface burst, is possible from a shallow underground burst. 070-1.4.8 BURSTS IN TRANSITION ZONES. It is convenient to divide nuclear explosions into the ve types described in the preceding paragraphs and characterize them by the accompanying weapon effects. However, it is obvious that, in reality, there are no distinct borders between different types of bursts. Rather, there are transition zones in which a burst might exhibit characteristics of two types of bursts. For example, if the center of the reball is below (but very close to) the surface of the water, it is classied as a subsurface burst but it will exhibit some of the characteristics of a surface burst as well. Similarly, the higher the HOB of an air burst, the more it resembles a high altitude burst. 070-1.5 MITIGATION OF NUCLEAR EFFECTS ON SHIPS AND PERSONNEL

070-1.5.1 SHIP HARDENING. Nuclear weapon effects can damage a ships structure, mechanical systems and electrical systems at some distance from the burst. The distance at which a ship is vulnerable depends on the 70-14

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 yield, type of burst, height (or depth) of the burst, and on the ships hardness, or ability to resist damage from the various weapon effects. In some cases, hardening for nuclear effects is inherent in the hardness standards for conventional weapon effects (such as underwater shock) or environmental factors (such as waves). In other instances (such as EMP), there is no comparable conventional or environmental effect, so unique nuclear hardness standards have been developed. Ship hardening for nuclear weapon effects is addressed in the following directives: OPNAV Instruction 3401.3 (series), Nuclear Survivability of Navy and Marine Corps Systems; OPNAV Instruction 9070.1 (series), Survivability Policy for Surface Ships of the United States Navy; OPNAV Instruction 9072.2 (series), Shock Hardening of Surface Ships . 070-1.5.2 SHIP COUNTERMEASURES. The procedures below shall be implemented to the maximum extent possible to reduce the vulnerability of the ship and its equipment to damage and the crew to injury. Implementation in some cases depends on the tactical situation and adequate warning of a nuclear attack. 070-1.5.2.1 Severe Weather Procedures. Severe weather procedures shall be implemented insofar as possible when the ship is operating under threat of a nuclear attack. Potential missile hazards shall be tied down. The material condition of readiness specied for heavy weather shall be maintained unless a higher degree of closure is needed due to the tactical situation. 070-1.5.2.2 Ship Maneuvering. Several maneuvers can mitigate the impact of some nuclear effects on a ship.

a. If sufficient time is available, the bow should be oriented toward the blast. This makes the ship, its crew and equipment less vulnerable to thermal radiation, initial nuclear radiation, underwater shock, air blast and water waves. If this is not possible, antennas should be oriented side on to the burst. b. After a nuclear attack, if the tactical situation permits, the ship should be maneuvered to minimize the ships involvement in fallout. c. If the tactical situation permits, it is recommended that ships remain outside of a ve mile radius of surface zero for the rst 24 hours to avoid the radiation pool. It may be necessary for reasons of operational necessity to transit this area earlier. In that event, cooling water to equipment that is required for the mission cannot be secured. All other sea suctions should be closed, especially the evaporators and the re main. The ship should then make a rapid transit through the area. 070-1.5.2.3 Shielding. If sufficient warning is provided, topside personnel shall be directed to take shelter inside the ship for protection from thermal and nuclear radiation. Anywhere inside the ship is adequate for protection against thermal radiation. Locations deep inside the ship provide the best shielding against nuclear radiation. 070-1.5.2.4 Countermeasures Washdown System. This system of pipes and nozzles is used to prewet the topside area of the ship prior to a nuclear attack. This reduces the adherence of fallout particles to the ship. If the ship is enveloped in fallout after the attack, the system provides a moving screen of water that washes most of the fallout overboard. A full description of the countermeasures washdown system and its operation is provided in paragraph 070-5.2.2. 070-1.5.3 INDIVIDUAL PROTECTIVE COUNTERMEASURES. There are several things individual crew members can do to reduce their vulnerability to nuclear effects. Initial nuclear radiation and thermal radiation (including the bright ash of visible light) arrive instantaneously. Other effects arrive sequentially at intervals 70-15

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 depending on the range to surface zero. Underwater shock arrives quickly, usually followed by air blast, base surge, water waves and fallout. Although this sequence is not invariable, it is typical. Keep in mind that some effects may be absent with some types of bursts. 070-1.5.3.1 Protection Against Thermal Radiation and Intense Visible Light. If there is sufficient warning, topside personnel can take shelter inside the ship. Personnel inside the ship are not affected by thermal radiation. Individuals who are caught topside or who are stationed on the ships bridge when the initial ash is noted can protect themselves by getting behind an opaque (solid) object or at least lying at and shielding their heads. Any solid object between them and the reball provides protection against some of the thermal radiation. Battle dress provides some protection and may be adequate for personnel caught in the open but any uncovered skin is subject to injury. All personnel shall avoid looking at the reball. 070-1.5.3.2 Protection Against Initial Nuclear Radiation. In addition to taking shelter inside the ship if ordered, each individual shall have a personal dosimeter so that the dose received from initial radiation can be taken into account in radiation exposure management and personnel rotation. 070-1.5.3.3 Protection Against Shock, Blast and Water Waves. Helmets, which are part of battle dress, protect against missile hazards. All personnel shall take a brace when ordered by holding onto a solid object with both hands and standing on the balls of the feet with arms and legs slightly bent. Keep in mind that internal communications could be lost due to shock or other damage, so it may not be easy to know when it is safe to relax from the brace position. 070-1.5.3.4 Donning Individual Protective Equipment. In addition to battle dress, individual protective equipment is prescribed in Section 4 for a radiological environment. 070-1.6 RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE AND RECOVERY

070-1.6.1 INTRODUCTION. The rest of this manual is focused on radiological defense and recovery. Radiological defense is the area of nuclear survivability that is most subject to management by the ship. The ship and its equipment must be built with enough hardness to withstand, to some degree, the other nuclear weapon effects discussed in this section. The action that the crew can take to mitigate these other hazards is either limited or is the same as it would be for similar conventional weapon effects or environmental conditions. On the other hand, the radiological hazard is unique to nuclear weapons. A ship that is not exposed to any other weapon effect can have its mission capability reduced by the effects of radiation on the crew. The radiological hazard can endanger ships in areas hundreds of miles from surface zero and it lasts the longest of any of the nuclear weapon effects. That is why it is important to minimize the radiological hazard to personnel through the proper use of radiological defense and recovery procedures.

WARNING

The information and procedures in the following chapters apply only to radiological defense after a nuclear weapon explosion. They do not apply to either casualty control procedures for nuclear propulsion plants or to nuclear weapon accident or incident procedures. 70-16

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 070-1.6.2 PRINCIPLES OF RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE AND RECOVERY. Assessment, delineation and control are the three basic elements of radiological defense and recovery. Section 2 covers assessment techniques. It provides the procedures needed to predict the decay of the hazard. This information is needed to support operational decision making in a radiological environment. Section 3 discusses delineation of the hazardous area. The sensors that are needed to detect, localize and measure radiation are described and survey procedures are dened. The subject of radiological exposure control is covered in three sections. Section 4 covers individual and collective protection systems and equipment. Section 5 is on radiological contamination control and radiation mitigation. It provides methods for minimizing the crews exposure to radiation and contamination. Section 6 discusses technical support of operations in a radiological environment. SECTION 2. RADIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT 070-2.1 RADIOLOGICAL MEASUREMENTS AND CALCULATIONS

070-2.1.1 RADIOLOGICAL UNITS AND MEASUREMENTS. For radiological defense purposes, calculations are performed only on gamma radiation. This is the only type of nuclear radiation that can be detected and measured with the detectors used in radiological defense. A discussion of these sensors and their capabilities can be found in Section 3. 070-2.1.1.1 Radiological Measurements. Radiation can be measured as the amount of energy to which an object is exposed or as the amount of energy that is absorbed by the object. The amount absorbed is the greater concern, since this determines the biological effect on humans. Because gamma radiation has great penetrating power, the amount of this type of energy to which a body is exposed is approximately equal to the amount absorbed. This convenient relationship is another reason for using gamma measurements to perform radiological calculations. 070-2.1.1.2 Exposure. Exposure is the amount of gamma radiation to which an object or body is subjected, either in total over a period of time (accumulated exposure) or per unit of time (exposure rate). Total exposure to gamma radiation is measured in Roentgens (R). The exposure rate, or intensity, of gamma radiation is expressed in Roentgens per hour (R/hr) or milliroentgens per hour (mR/hr). 1 mR = 1/1000 R. RADIAC instruments are used to measure gamma intensity. 070-2.1.1.3 Absorbed Dose. The dose is the amount of radioactive energy that a body absorbs, either in total over a period of time (accumulated dose) or per unit of time (dose rate). The unit of measurement is the rad (Radiation Absorbed Dose), which is referred to by other services and allies as the CentiGray (cGy). With respect to gamma radiation, an exposure of one Roentgen results in an absorbed dose of approximately one rad. This relationship does not hold true for other forms of nuclear radiation but, since radiological calculations are performed with gamma measurements, it is assumed that 1 R = 1 rad. Therefore, if a person has been exposed to an average intensity of 10 R/hr for one hour, he or she is assumed to have absorbed a total dose of 10 rads (or cGy). If the exposure was only a half hour, the absorbed dose would be 5 rads (or cGy). The doses received from separate exposures are additive to some degree. The physiological effects are discussed in paragraph 070-5.3.3 and Table 070-5-1. 070-2.1.1.4 Differences from Accident and Incident Procedures. Gamma and beta radiation are not expected in a nuclear weapon accident or incident. Contaminants that may accompany an accident or incident, such as tritium and plutonium, are not characteristic of the post-burst environment that is the focus of this manual. Alpha 70-17

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 radiation is the form that would most likely be present in an accident or incident. Although alpha radiation may be present after a nuclear explosion, it is generally considered to be negligible in the post burst environment. 070-2.1.2 OVERVIEW OF RADIOLOGICAL CALCULATION PROCEDURES AND UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES. By providing the commander with a reliable assessment of risk, radiological measurements and calculations help him to avoid unnecessary personnel exposure. They also enable him to consider the full range of action that is available to him within the bounds of operational exposure guidance. The following paragraphs describe in general the types of calculations that are performed. 070-2.1.2.1 Location and Movement of Fallout. Procedures provided in Allied Tactical Publication (ATP) 45 and RADFO messages from Fleet Weather Central can be used to project the downwind movement of fallout. This is not a damage control function, however, and the only aspect that will be discussed in this manual is its interface with the calculations described in this section. 070-2.1.2.2 Cessation of Fallout. The most critical radiological calculation is the determination of time of cessation of fallout, TC (normally called T sub c). This is a watershed event during operations in a radiological environment because several functions cannot be effectively implemented while the ship is still receiving fallout (see Table 070-6-1). An indication that the ship is clear of fallout can be obtained from plotting the movement of fallout on navigation charts, as discussed in the previous paragraph, and comparing it to the ships location. However, TC must be conrmed by the method described in paragraph 070-2.2.1.2. This method is based on radiological decay. 070-2.1.2.3 Radiological Decay. After fallout has ceased, the dose rate on a ship does not remain constant. It decreases exponentially at a rate that can be determined. Then it can be projected into the future to predict intensities at future times. It is critical to remember that calculations based on radiological decay cannot be performed until fallout has ceased . There are two reasons for this. First, there is no way to determine how much more fallout will be deposited on the ship. Second, measurements taken while fallout is still arriving will reect not only the intensity from fallout that has already been deposited on the ship, but also radiation from fallout in the atmosphere around the ship. 070-2.1.2.4 Accumulated Dose Calculations. The dose that is accumulated over any time period after TC can be estimated. This is true for both future exposures and previously accumulated doses. This information is used in exposure management. 070-2.1.2.5 Precision in Radiological Measurements and Calculations. Exposure rate measurements should be as accurate as possible and calculations should be as precise as possible but not at the expense of time. It is better to have a good answer in a hurry than a perfect answer that is too late. This is not to say that sloppy procedures are acceptable. Exact values should be used if they can be obtained in a timely manner. The commander wants the best answer he can get but it is, at best, an estimate and he probably does not need it calculated to three decimal places. 070-2.2 RADIOLOGICAL CALCULATION PROCEDURES

070-2.2.1 PLOTTING MEASURED INTENSITY, DETERMINING TIME OF CESSATION OF FALLOUT (TC ) AND PROJECTING FUTURE INTENSITY. This paragraph provides procedures for determining when a stable decay rate has been established and using it to make dose rate predictions. 70-18

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 070-2.2.1.1 Use of Log-Log Paper in Radiological Plotting. Since radioactive material decays exponentially, the key to determining TC is to detect the emergence of a stable decay pattern. Exponential decay can be represented by functions that have certain characteristics: 1. Their values approach, but never reach, zero. 2. On standard graph paper, they are curved. 3. On log-log graph paper, they are straight lines.

Figure 070-2-1. Log-Log Plotting Paper 070-2.2.1.1.1 The third of these characteristics provides an easy method to quickly establish TC . Common logarithms (base 10) are employed to shorten mathematical calculations. Log-log (or full logarithmic) graph paper has common logarithmic scales on both axes. An example is shown in Figure 070-2-1. It is a 3 x 3 loglog graph. Note the following characteristics: 1. The unequal spacing between units. The space between them decreases to the right and upwards. 2. The origin is labeled 1 instead of 0 on both axes. 3. The gures 1 (or 10) through 9 are repeated 3 times on each axis (3 cycles). NOTE Several different types of log-log graph paper are available. The format can vary in several characteristics, including the number of cycles, the numbering on the axes and the density of grid lines and tic marks. A 3 x 3 cycle log-log graph is shown in Figure 070-2-1. That means it has three complete cycles of 1 through 10 on each axis. The number of cycles is usually between 1 x 1 and 3 x 5, but other formats are possible. Sometimes the axes are labelled in powers of 10, i.e., 10-1 for .1, 102 for 100, 103 for 1000. The more grid lines a graph has in each 70-19

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 cycle, the easier it is to plot. For clarity of presentation, the log-log graphs in this section do not have as ne a grid or tic mark system as some other formats that are available. 070-2.2.1.1.2 In order to use log-log paper for radiological calculations, it is convenient to label the axes as shown in Figure 070-2-2. Time after H-hour (H-hour is the time of the nuclear burst) is the independent variable and is shown on the horizontal axis. Intensity, the dependent variable, is read on the vertical axis. The rst number 10, from left to right on the horizontal axis, is labelled as 1 hour. Therefore the number, 1, at the origin, represents 1/10 of an hour, or 6 minutes. The second time the number, 10, appears, it represents 10 hours. This pattern is repeated through all cycles. The next number 10 would be 100 hours, and so on. The values in each cycle are related to other cycles by multiples of 10. The same is true on the vertical axis. The number, 1, at the origin is 10 Roentgens/hr (R/hr). The rst number 10, represents 100 R/hr. The second is 1000 R/hr, and so on. Other units are equally acceptable as long as they maintain the relationship of the cycles as multiples, or powers of 10. For example, the origin could be chosen to represent 1 hour and 100 R/hr. Also, the horizontal scale could be denominated in minutes instead of hours and fractions of hours. The origin could be 1 minute, the rst number 10 would then be 10 minutes, the second would be 100 minutes, and so on. NOTE All measurements for a single log-log plot shall be taken from the same RADIAC instrument at the same location, position and orientation. Additional plots based on measurements from other instruments may be maintained for comparison if desired. 070-2.2.1.2 Determination of TC and Prediction of Future Intensity. The Time of Cessation of fallout is determined after the fact when three successive data points plotted on log-log paper fall in a downward sloping straight line. The rst of the three points is TC . The decay rate is the slope of the line. The line is simply extended to predict dose rates at times in the future . This line will be called the decay line. If the decay rate remains stable, future measurements will fall on or very close to the extended decay line. In actual practice, it is unlikely that all the plotted points will fall exactly on the line. However, they should be very close to it, and distributed about evenly on both sides. Plotting is continued for two reasons: to lengthen the time frame over which valid projections can be made using the current decay slope and to detect a change in the decay rate if one occurs. It may change for a number of reasons. If the decay rate changes, or if the original decay line was not placed correctly, a new decay line is drawn. 070-2.2.1.3 Reliability of Dose Rate Projections. The longer the time interval between the rst point on the decay line (TC ) and the latest point plotted on it, the longer reliable dose calculations can be made from it. Exposure rate calculations can be projected over a time period that is three times the monitoring time interval. For example, if TC is at H + 90 minutes and the latest plot (assuming all the intermediate points fall on or very near the straight line between them) is at H + 100 minutes, calculations based on this decay slope can be used for 3 x 10 minutes, or 30 minutes after H + 100. Across the line representing the decay rate, draw a line at H + 130 as a reminder of this limit. After additional measurements are taken that conrm this decay rate, a line should be drawn across the decay line at the new limit. NOTE The lower case letter, n, is used to represent the decay rate (the slope of the decay line) in formulas and nomograms. 70-20

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Figure 070-2-2. Log-Log Plotting Paper with Axes Labeled for Radiological Calculations 070-2.2.1.4 Determination of Decay Rate. Although it is possible to predict the intensity at given times in the future without determining the slope of the decay line, this rate must be determined to use nomograms to perform radiological calculations. The decay rate is also required for operational reports. It can be determined by using an overlay made from Figure 070-2-3. Extend the decay line down and to the right to the horizontal axis of the log-log plot. Place the horizontal axis of the overlay on the horizontal axis of the log-log plot. Place the origin of the overlay (the arrow) on the decay line at the horizontal axis of the log-log plot. Align the horizontal axis of the overlay with the horizontal axis of the log-log plot. Align the vertical axis of the overlay parallel to the vertical axis of the log-log plot. Find the line on the overlay that aligns most closely with the decay line on the log-log plot. Obtain the slope of the decay line from the upper end of the corresponding line on the overlay. If the line on the log-log plot falls between lines on the overlay, use the line on the overlay that lies beneath the decay line on the log-log plot, as this will provide a safety factor. The decay rate is also useful in evaluating whether or not TC has occurred. Generally, the decay rate will be between 0.8 and 2.0. The slope most often observed in weapons tests has been 1.2 . It is referred to as standard decay and can be used in radiological calculations if the actual decay rate is unknown. Sometimes radiological decay rates are described as negative because they slope downward and to the right on a log-log plot. However, this is not necessary, as the word, decay , implies a reduction over time. It may be useful at this point to apply the procedures outlined thus far using some sample data. 070-2.2.1.5 Example One. The values in Table 070-2-1 will be used for illustrative purposes. A plot of this data on 2 x 2 log-log paper is shown in Figure 070-2-4. The interval between each adjacent pair of digits on the horizontal scale represents 6 minutes in the rst cycle. Therefore, the intensities at H-hour and H+3 minutes are not plotted, since the numeral 1 at the origin represents 6 minutes (.1 hour). In the second cycle, each interval between digits represents 1 hour. On the vertical scale, the interval between digits represents 10 R/hr in the rst cycle and 100 in the second. Relatively high intensities are recorded between H+9 and H+15 minutes. This rapid build-up in intensity is followed within minutes by a rapid decline to very low exposure rates. This is an indication that the ship was enveloped in the base surge rather than fallout. This should be conrmed with the navigation team, which is plotting the ships track and the predicted fallout pattern. The exposure rates recorded at H+0:36 (.6 hr) and H+0:42 (.7 hr) indicate the ship then may be receiving fallout. It is unlikely that this is the 70-21

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 base surge because its effects normally do not last more than a half hour. The measurements at H+48 minutes (.8 hr) and H+0:54 (.9 hr) show that the exposure rate is still increasing. The navigation team should be consulted to see if their plot conrms that the ship is in fallout. The intensity peaks at 150 R/hr at H+1:06 (1.1 hrs). As it decreases, one might suspect that a stable decay rate has been established as early as H+1:18 (1.3 hrs). However, use of the overlay from Figure 070-2-3 shows that the slope would be steeper than 2.0, so it is discounted. At H + 1:42 (1.7 hrs), it is possible to estimate that TC occurred at H + 1:30 (1.5 hrs). At this point, the decay slope can be determined as 1.0 using Figure 070-2-3. Valid projections can be made out to H+2:18 (2.3 hrs). A line is drawn across the intensity plot at this point to indicate this limit, as shown in Figure 070-2-5. To predict the intensity at some time in the future, nd the point on the horizontal axis that corresponds to the elapsed time after H-hour at which the predicted dose rate is desired. Draw a vertical line from that point that intersects the decay line. From this intersection, draw a horizontal line to the vertical axis. Read the exposure rate on the vertical axis at that point. That is the expected intensity. At H+2:18 (2.3 hrs), for example, an intensity of 43 R/hr is expected. After prociency in this procedure is attained, it is not necessary to draw the lines. The lower right grid from Figure 070-2-5 is enlarged in Figure 070-2-6 on 1 x 1 log-log paper. The enlargement process permits more precise plotting of measurements and more accurate determination of TC .

070-2.2.2 CALCULATING ACCUMULATED DOSE. The basis for decisions about future operations in a radiological environment is the dose that the crew members have already absorbed and the doses they would receive under different courses of action in the future. The preferred source of information about a previously accumulated dose is a personal dosimeter. However, the tactical situation may not allow time to check the nonself-reading types. Self-reading dosimeters are less reliable and are not issued to all hands. When speed is necessary and reliable dosimetry data is not readily available, intensity averaging provides a quick method to estimate accumulated dose .

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Figure 070-2-3. Decay Slopes (Use to make transparent overlay)

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S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 Table 070-2-1 RADIOLOGICAL INVOLVEMENT AFTER A NUCLEAR ATTACK SHALLOW UNDERWATER BURST
Sample for Illustrative Purposes Only Time After H-Hour HRS:MIN 00:00 00:03 00:06 00:09 00:12 00:15 00:18 00:21 00:24 00:27 00:30 00:36 00:42 Intensity (Dose Rate) R/HR background background 10 420 150 200 20 17 15 20 15 20 95 Time After H-Hour HRS:MIN 00:48 00:54 01:00 01:06 01:12 01:18 01:24 01:30 01:36 01:42 01:48 01:54 02:00 Intensity (Dose Rate) R/HR 110 140 120 150 110 80 78 66 62 58 55 52 49

070-2.2.2.1 Intensity Averaging. The procedure is simply to multiply the time interval of exposure by the average intensity per unit of time over that period. As explained in paragraph 070-2.1.1.3, exposure in Roentgens is assumed to be equal to the dose in rads. Total Exposure = Average Intensity x Time Interval = Total Dose 070-2.2.2.2 Estimating the Accumulated Dose Before TC . shown in the formula below. Average intensity is determined algebraically as

Where: E = Total Gamma Exposure in Roentgens T1 = Time in minutes after H-Hour at which rst measurement was taken T2 = Time in minutes after H-Hour at which second measurement was taken I1 = Exposure Rate at Time T1 in R/hr I2 = Exposure Rate at Time T2 in R/hr D = Total gamma dose in rads (or cGy) (If time is given in hours, do not divide by 60.) Identify times before TC at which relatively sharp changes in intensity have been recorded (inection points). Calculate the exposure for the segment between each pair of inection points using intensity averaging. Add the doses in all the segments to get the total dose. Selection of inection points should be conservative, that is, it 70-24

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 should err to the safe, or high, side. This can best be accomplished graphically by using the log-log plot. Select the peaks as inection points. The line between the chosen points should be above the plot of recorded intensities except at the inection points, where they meet. This procedure is illustrated in example two.

Figure 070-2-4. Determination of Tc and Decay Rate

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Figure 070-2-5. Estimation of Intensity at Future Times

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Figure 070-2-6. Enlarging One Cycle and Projecting Decay Line 070-2.2.2.3 Calculating Exposure After TC Using the Graphical Method. After a stable decay slope has been conrmed, the log-log plot can be used to calculate the accumulated dose since TC or to estimate future doses. The basic intensity averaging formula is used (dose = average intensity x time) but average intensity is determined using a different method that yields more accurate results. On the log-log plot, use a compass or ruler (not the log-log scale on the vertical axis) to bisect the segment of the decay line that represents the time over which total dose is to be calculated. The average intensity is then read off the vertical axis at the mid-point of this segment and multiplied by the length of the time interval to obtain the estimated exposure. It is important to remember that this method for determining average intensity is used only for time periods after TC . 070-2.2.2.4 Example Two. The data used in example one from Table 070-2-1 will be used to illustrate both methods of intensity averaging. An estimate of the accumulated exposure from the burst to H+3 hours is required. 70-27

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 TC was determined in example one to be H+1:30. To estimate topside exposure before TC , inection points are chosen as shown in Figure 070-2-7. The intensity averaging formula, using the algebraic method of determining average intensity, is then used to calculate the accumulated dose from the burst to TC . A summary of these calculations is provided in Table 070-2-2. To nd the accumulated dose after TC , the graphical method of determining average intensity is used as shown in Figure 070-2-7. To nd the topside exposure from TC to H+3:00, average intensity of 47 R/hr is multiplied by the time interval, 1.5 hours, to yield a dose of 70.5 rad. This is added to the estimated dose of 171 rads accumulated before TC to yield a total estimated dose of 241.5 rad by H+3:00.

Table 070-2-2 EXAMPLE OF CALCULATION OF ACCUMULATED DOSE BEFORE TC USING INTENSITY AVERAGING METHOD
Time After H-Hour HRS:MIN :06 :09 :15 :24 :42 :54 1:06 1:30* Intensity (Dose Rate) R/HR 10 420 200 15 95 140 150 66 Average Intensity (IAVG ) (I1 +I2 )/2 215 310 108 55 118 145 108 Time Interval (T) (T1 +T2 )/60 .05 .1 .15 .3 .2 .2 .4 TOTAL DOSE = Dose 1AVG x T RADS 11 31 16 17 24 29 43 171

NOTE The algebraic method of determining average intensity is used in estimating doses accumulated before cessation of fallout . It can be used in the prediction of future exposure after fallout has ceased. However, this method yields conservative answers after TC . That is, they are higher than the actual gures. Better estimates can be obtained after the cessation of fallout by using the graphical method to obtain average intensity.

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Figure 070-2-7. Selection of Inection Points for Intensity Averaging and Determining Average Intensity After Cessation of Fallout 070-2.2.3 SAFE STAY TIME. Determining safe stay time is the reverse of calculating exposure after TC . Instead of calculating exposure, a maximum allowable dose is established. Either a time of entry (TE ) into the high radiation area or the length of stay required to complete the task is specied. If TE is given, a time of exit (TX ) is calculated to stay under the allowable exposure. If length of stay is given, the earliest possible TE is determined for that stay time and the allowable exposure. 070-2.2.3.1 Determining Time of Exit. Given time of entry (TE ) and total dose allowed, time of exit (TX ) can be determined. This procedure is used when a station must be manned regardless of the exposure rate. In this situation, a time of exit from that station is calculated in order to rotate personnel before their accumulated expo70-29

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 sure exceeds a limit established by the Commanding Officer. A trial and error method is used. Pick a point to the right of TE on the decay line. Read the exposure rate at that point and multiply it by twice the time interval from TE to that point. If the result is higher than the allowable dose, move up the decay line to the left and try again. If lower, move down the decay line to the right. Repeat this procedure until a point on the decay line is found that, when multiplied by twice the time interval from TE , yields a dose that is within 5 Roentgens of the allowable exposure. That point will be mid point of the segment of the decay line between TE and TX . The intensity that corresponds to that point is the average intensity. TX is found by using this point on the decay line to mark off a distance to the right that is equal to the distance to TE along the decay line to the left. These are absolute distances along the decay line, not from the log-log scales on the axes. This procedure is illustrated in example three. 070-2.2.3.2 Example Three. This is a continuation from examples one and two based on the data in Table 070-2-1. Suppose the helo deck must be manned at H+3 hours and the Captain wants to limit the exposure of the helo detail to 50 R. The exposure rate at H+3:00 is 32 R/hr. This is consistent with the 1.0 decay slope determined in example one. Since the same decay rate has been plotted from TC (H+1:30) to H+3:00, valid estimates can be made out to H+7:30. A sheet of 1 x 1 log-log paper is used as shown in Figure 070-2-8 to determine the safe stay time. Since the topside intensity at H+3 hours is only 32 R/hr, it is obvious that the safe stay time will exceed 1 hour. Therefore, the rst point to be tested as a potential mid point will be 1 hour after TE , or H+4. The intensity at that time is projected to be 24 R/hr. This value will be used as average intensity. Use a ruler or compass to mark off a distance down the decay line from H+4:00 equal to the distance along this line from H+3:00 to H+4:00. This distance falls at H+5:18. The time interval from H+3:00 to H+5:18 is 2.3 hours. Using the intensity averaging formula, exposure = 24 R/hr x 2.3 hrs = 55.2 R. This exceeds the Captains 50 R allowable limit by more than 5 R so another mid point up the decay slope to the left must be found. Try H+3:50. This changes TX to H+5:00 with an IAVG of 25.5 R. Using the formula again, exposure = 25.5 R x 2.00 hrs = 51 R. This is within 5 R of the maximum dose set by the Captain so there is no need to check other points. The safe stay time is 2 hours, 3 minutes. In actual practice, the rst result might be acceptable, especially if the answer is needed quickly. In this example, however, the process was continued to illustrate the technique. Another alternative, when the rst mid point yields a dose that is very close to being within acceptable limits, as it did in this case, is to double the time from TE to the mid point to nd TX . This would result in a TX of H+5:00 in this case, a safe stay time of 2 hrs. 070-2.2.3.3 Determining Time of Entry (TE ) and Time of Exit (TX ). Given total dose permitted and length of stay, TE and TX can be found. This procedure would be used when a designated team, such as a decon team, needs a known amount of time to perform a specic task. Entry is delayed until the dose rate is low enough to allow the job to be completed without the accumulated exposures of the team members exceeding the allowable limit. It is necessary to nd the average intensity along the decay line that, when multiplied by the time required, yields a result equal to the maximum allowable exposure (5 R). Take the time on the horizontal axis that corresponds to this point. This point will be the mid point of the segment of the decay line between TE and TX . This procedure is illustrated in example four. 070-2.2.3.4 Example Four. Suppose there is a hot spot at a refueling station with an intensity of 69 R/hr at H+2:18. The decay rate is 1.4. (This is not a continuation of examples one, two and three. The data in Table 070-2-1 is not relevant.) It will take three hours to refuel and the Captain wants to restrict the exposure of the refueling station crew to 60 R. Find the earliest TE and TX that meet these criteria. The process is illustrated in Figure 070-2-11. A sheet of 1x1 log-log paper is used. The axis will be H+1 hours and 10 R/hr. First, a decay line with a 1.4 slope is drawn starting at 69 R/hr (measured on the vertical axis) and H+2:18 (2.3 hours on the horizontal axis). To construct the decay line from this point, Figure 070-2-3 is used. Since a three hour on-station time is required and a 60 R maximum exposure has been established, the average intensity for the period will be 60 R divided by 3 hrs, or 20 R/hr. This dose rate is found on the decay line at H+6:06. Therefore, TE is 1.5 hours 70-30

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 earlier, or H+4:36, and TX is three hours after TE , at H+7:36. Actually, TX could be as late as H+8:00. This can be seen in Figure 070-2-11 by marking off a distance down the decay line and to the right that is equal to the distance up the decay line and to the left to TE . However, the ne adjustments necessary to advance TE are not worth the effort, and performing the calculations as described provides a safety margin in case the evolution takes longer than planned.

Figure 070-2-8. Determination of Time of Exit (TX ) 070-2.2.4 USE OF NOMOGRAMS. Nomograms can be used to perform many of the foregoing calculations. There is a different set of nomograms for each decay slope from 0.2 to 2.0. These are provided in Appendix C as Figure 070-C-1 through Figure 070-C-38. Each set consists of two nomograms. One is a fallout decay nomogram. The other is a total dose (fallout) nomogram. To use a nomogram, a straight edge is aligned with known values. The straight edge then passes through the unknown values that correspond to the known values. Sometimes, an intermediate value, or pivot point, must be determined rst. The pivot point is then used with the remaining known values to nd the answer. A format that can be used to keep track of nomogram calculations is provided in Figure 070-2-9. The columns appear in the same sequence as the scales on the nomograms. Known 70-31

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 information is entered rst, then the values that go in the remaining column(s) are determined from the nomogram. Columns (1), (2) and (4) are used with the fallout decay nomogram. Columns (3) through (7) are used with the total dose nomogram. Nomograms cannot be used to perform calculations until TC and the decay rate have been determined from the log-log plot as described in paragraphs 070-2.2.1.2 and 070-2.2.1.4. The nomograms are based on radioactive decay, so they cannot be used for calculations until after the cessation of fallout. The decay rate is needed so the nomograms based on that decay rate can be used for the calculations.

070-2.2.4.1 Standard Intensity. Standard intensity is dened as the exposure rate at H+1 hour based on the decay rate. It is needed to estimate exposure rates with the fallout decay nomogram and safe stay times with the total dose nomogram. If the ship is still receiving fallout at H+1, the measured exposure rate will not be the same as the standard intensity. The standard intensity cannot be determined until after TC has been determined and the decay rate has been established. Standard intensity is found with the fallout decay nomogram using the procedures in paragraph 070-2.2.4.2. Once standard intensity is known, the dose rate at any other time after TC can be estimated.

070-2.2.4.2 Example One with Nomograms. For comparison, example 1 is reworked here with nomograms. The objective is to estimate the exposure rate at H+2:18. TC and the decay rate are rst determined from the loglog plot as described in paragraph 070-2.2.1.5. They are H+1:30 and 1.0, respectively. The fallout decay nomogram for this decay rate (Figure 070-C-9) is then used to estimate future exposure rates. The estimated dose rate at H+2:18 is solved in two steps. First, standard intensity (R1 ) is determined. From the log-log plot, it is known that TC occurred at H+1:30. Therefore, the measured intensity at that time or any time thereafter can be used to nd R1 . Then, R1 can be used to estimate the intensity at any time after TC . This is shown in Figure 070-2-10 using the exposure rate at H+1:42 from Table 070-2-1 to nd R1 , then reversing directions to estimate the intensity at H+2:18. The nomogram calculation summary is shown in Table 070-2-3.

070-2.2.4.3 Dose and Stay Time Calculations with Nomograms. The total dose nomogram is used for these calculations. The standard intensity, (R1 ) is needed to enter this nomogram. The total dose nomogram is never used to nd R1 . The fallout decay nomogram is always used for that purpose. In addition to R1 , two of the following three values are needed to determine the third: total dose (D), stay time (TS ), and entry time (TE ). The index scale is used to provide a pivot point when going from one side of the nomogram to the other.

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Figure 070-2-9. Nomogram Calculation Summary Form

70-33

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Figure 070-2-10. Decay Nomogram Procedure for Example One

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Figure 070-2-11. Determination of Time of Entry (Te ) and Time of Exit (TX )
Table 070-2-3 NOMOGRAM CALCULATION SUMMARY FOR EXAMPLES ONE THROUGH FOUR

70-35

Table 070-2-3 NOMOGRAM CALCULATION SUMMARY FOR EXAMPLES ONE THROUGH FOUR Continued
Known Values in Bold Type (1) Intensity At Time Other Than H+1 (RT ) EXAMPLE Step 1 Step 2 EXAMPLE EXAMPLE EXAMPLE Step 1 Step 2 1 58 R/hr 43 R/hr 2 3 4 69 R/hr H+2:30 60 rad H+1:42 H+2:18 70 rad 50 rad 99 R/hr 99 R/hr 99 R/hr 99 R/hr 250 R/hr 250 R/hr (2) Time Other Than H+1 (T) (3) Total Dose (D) (4) Standard Intensity (R1 ) (5) Index (Pivot Point) (6) Stay Time (TS ) (7) Time of Entry (TE )

70-36

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2

0.7 0.5

1.5 hrs 2 hrs

H+1:30 H+3:00

.24

3 hrs

H+4:30

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 070-2.2.4.4 Example Two with Nomograms. Only the accumulated dose after TC can be determined using the total dose nomogram for the decay slope. The standard intensity was determined in example one to be 99 R/hr, the decay rate was found to be 1.0 and TC occurred at H+1:30. Since the objective is to estimate the dose from TC to H+3:00, TC is used as TE . TS is 1.5 hours, the amount of time between H+1:30 and H+3:00. TE (1.5) and TS (1.5) are used on the nomogram to nd the pivot point, 0.7, on the index scale. The index is then used with R1 to nd the total dose, 70 rad. As in example two with the graphical method, 70 rad is added to the dose accumulated before TC to nd the total dose (see paragraph 070-2.2.2.4). The nomogram procedure on the total dose nomogram for a decay rate of 1.0 is shown in Figure 070-2-12. The nomogram calculation summary is in Table 070-2-3.

070-2.2.4.5 Example Three with Nomograms. The objective of this example is to nd safe stay time (TS ). Since the same set of data is being used in example three as in examples one and two, it is already known that R1 is 99 R/hr. TE is H+3:00, the time the helo detail is set. Total dose (D) is limited by the Captain to 50 rad. First, R1 is used with D (50 rad) to nd a pivot point on the index scale, 0.5. The pivot point is then used with TE to nd TS , which is two hours. The nomogram procedure is shown in Figure 070-2-13. The nomogram calculation summary is in Table 070-2-3.

070-2.2.4.6 Example Four with Nomograms. In this example, the objective is to limit the dose at a hot spot to 60 rad in a three hour period. The intensity at the hot spot is 69 R/hr at H+2:30. It is necessary to nd R rst. The procedure on the fallout decay nomogram for a decay rate of 1.4 is shown in Figure 070-2-14. R1 is 250 R/hr. As in example three, R1 and D, which is given as 60 rad, are used to nd a pivot point on the index scale. The pivot point is .24. It is then used with TS , which is given as 3 hours, to nd TE , which is 4.6 hours, or H+4:36. This means TX is 3 hours later, at H+7:36. The procedure on the total dose nomogram is shown in Figure 070-2-15. The nomogram calculation summary is in Table 070-2-3.

070-2.2.5 SPECIAL PROCEDURES. The foregoing procedures apply to single bursts when H-Hour is known. Different procedures are needed when H-Hour is unknown or when fallout is received from more than one burst.

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Figure 070-2-12. Total Dose Nomogram Procedure for Example Two

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Figure 070-2-13. Total Dose Nomogram Procedure for Example Three

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Figure 070-2-14. Fallout Decay Nomogram Procedure for Example Four

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Figure 070-2-15. Total Dose Nomogram Procedure for Example Four 070-2.2.5.1 Determination of H-Hour. As previously explained, the time of the nuclear burst is called H-hour. After TC has been conrmed, future exposure rates can be projected if H-hour is known. If H-Hour is unknown, the times on the log-log plot must be based on an assumed H-Hour. Unless the assumed H-hour is very close to the actual time of the burst, the decay line, which should plot as a straight line after TC , will be curved and will not reect the true decay slope. The farther off the assumed H-Hour is from the real one, the more the plot of a stable decay slope will curve. Even if it seems to plot as a straight line initially, the apparent slope may lie outside the expected range of decay slopes as described in paragraph 070-2.2.1.4. This makes it difficult to conrm the cessation of fallout and reduces the accuracy when estimating future intensities, doses and safe stay times. The formula given below can be used to estimate H-hour after TC has been determined. Given the difficulty of conrming that fallout has ceased with the usual procedure, described in paragraph 070-2.2.1.2, the best thing to do is to look for the emergence of a stable pattern, either a straight line or a slight curve, regardless of the slope. Use the time at which the pattern developed as TC . It may be possible to corroborate this with other information as described in paragraph 070-2.2.5.2. In any case, once TC is adjudged to have occurred, select times and the corresponding exposure rates after TC to calculate H-Hour with this formula. Then replot the exposure rates that have been recorded using their times since the calculated H-Hour.

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T1 = Time after H-hour at which Reading RA was made. TA = Local time at which Reading RA was taken. TB = Local time at which Reading RB was taken. RA = First measurement. RB = Second measurement. n = Decay slope. The value of (RA /RB )1/n may be calculated or may be read from Figure 070-2-16. It is difficult to use this graph if the ratio of RA to RB is not two to one or greater. In any case, the formula is easy to use on a scientic calculator and is more accurate. For decay rate, use n = 1.2, the standard decay slope, unless better information is available from sources external to the ship. After T1 has been determined, subtract it from TA to nd H-hour. Adjust TA accordingly and lay out a decay line from it using as its slope the n-value used in the formula. TC can then be determined and future intensities, doses and safe stay times can be predicted.

070-2.2.5.2 Conrming Cessation of Fallout. When the ship is exposed to fallout and H-Hour is unknown, other means are available to support the determination of the time of cessation of fallout. The AN/PDR-65 RADIAC, with an external detector head (DT-358) mounted on the mast, may provide an indication. When fallout ceases, all RADIACs will show that uctuations in the intensity of the radiation have been replaced by more stable readings. However, the AN/PDR 65 may record a sharper decline in exposure rate than the other RADIACs. This is because the sensor on the mast is better positioned to detect fallout in the air around the ship than the fallout that has been deposited on the ships exterior surfaces. The RADIACs at other locations register radiation from fallout that is arriving and fallout that has already been deposited. Also, the bridge or Combat Information Center may have received operational reports that can be used to corroborate these observations or provide a decay rate on the suspected source of the fallout.

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Figure 070-2-16. Value of RA /RB

70-43

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 070-2.2.5.3 Example Five. The data from Table 070-2-4 will be used to illustrate the determination of H-Hour. The intensities are shown for local time because H-hour is unknown. The data is plotted on Figure 070-2-17. Local time is shown along the bottom axis. The lower right hand corner in Figure 070-2-17 is blown up in Figure 070-2-18. The intensity seems to stop uctuating and to decline at a slower, more stable rate after about 0845. For the next three hours, the intensities seem to plot close to a straight line constructed from the plots of the intensities recorded between 0845 and 1000. However, when the overlay from Figure 070-2-3 is used, the slope of this line is found to be below 0.8, an early indication that it does not represent the actual decay rate. Also, as time passes, the plotted intensities fall farther below the line. It is necessary to determine H-hour and to adjust the plot to the proper location on the log-log plot. Using the formula in paragraph 070-2.2.5.1, let TA = 0900 and TB = 1000. The corresponding exposure rates, from Table 070-2-4, are TA = 85 R/hr and TB = 72 R/hr. In the absence of any other information on the decay rate, use standard decay, n = 1.2.

Thus, TA , which is 0900 local, is estimated to be 6.7 hours, or 6 hours and 42 minutes, after the burst. Estimated H-hour is 09:00 local time - 06:42 = 0218 local time. The decay line will be drawn through H+6:42 with a slope of 1.2. The adjusted plot is shown in Figure 070-2-19. Local time on the lower axis has been adjusted to correspond to time elapsed since the nuclear burst on this plot. Compared to the plot in Figure 070-2-18, it is more compressed and the apparent decay slope is steeper. The data now plots close to the -1.2 decay line until about H+15:00. Eventually, the data points consistently lie above the 1.2 line. This indicates that the actual decay rate is slower than -1.2 and H-hour was actually later than 0218. Nonetheless, fairly reliable predictions can be made from this projected decay line. At 0700 local time on the second day, the error is about 13 R/hr on the original plot, Figure 070-2-18. It is only 3 R/hr on the adjusted plot, Figure 070-2-19. This relatively small divergence can be treated as a change in the decay rate. Use Figure 070-2-3 to estimate the actual decay slope and project a new decay line from the latest actual reading. 070-2.2.5.4 Calculations with Overlapping Fallout Patterns. A ship may be exposed simultaneously to fallout from two or more nuclear weapon detonations. The bursts will most likely have occurred at different times (different H-Hours) and may have different decay slopes as well. This complicates the calculations. Intensities and doses at future times cannot be projected accurately based only on the observed dose rate. The dose rate of the fallout from each burst needs to be separated from the other(s). Calculations are performed separately on the decay from each individual detonation to predict the intensity or dose attributable to each at a specic time. The contributions of all the bursts to the overlapping fallout pattern are summed to nd the exposure rate or dose at that time. 070-2.2.5.5 Example Six. A nuclear detonation occurs at 1630 local time. The ship maneuvers to minimize involvement in the fallout but is exposed to the outer edge of the pattern at H+00:42. Time of peak intensity (TP ) occurs at H+1:00. By H+2:00, the ship has cleared the fallout and determined that the decay rate of the contamination left on the ship is 1.0. At 1900 local, a second nuclear detonation occurs and by 1930, fallout is arriving on the ship. TP occurs at 2000 and by 2030, the navigation team reports that the ship has cleared the fallout area. The log-log plot is shown in Figure 070-2-20. Although the ship is no longer enveloped in fallout from either detonation after 2030, the data does not plot as a straight line. This is because the two bursts occurred at different times, so time elapsed since H-hour is not the same for the two decay lines. The effects of the two decay patterns must be separated to make valid predictions. This is done by starting a second log-log plot as shown in Figure 070-2-21 based on the time of the second burst. Fallout arrives from the second burst at H+00:30 (1900 local). This corresponds to H+3:00 on the plot of the rst detonation. To nd the radiation level attributable to 70-44

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 the fallout from the second burst, the predicted dose rate on the decay line from the rst detonation at H+3:00 is subtracted from the total reading at the corresponding local time, 1900. The remainder is plotted at H+00:30 on the second log-log plot, Figure 070-2-21. This process is continued, and by 2130 local time, which corresponds to H+5:00 on the rst plot and to H+2:30 on the second, it is apparent that the decay rate from the second explosion is 1.5. This process is summarized in Table 070-2-5. The Captain intends to set the refueling detail at 0430 and he wants to know what the topside dose rate will be at that time. This corresponds to H+12:00 on the rst decay line and to H+9:30 on the second. To nd the corresponding intensities, the decay line from the rst burst on Figure 070-2-20 is projected onto Figure 070-2-22 and the decay line from the second burst on Figure 070-2-21 is projected onto Figure 070-2-23. The dose rate for the rst will be 8.3 R/hr. The second will be 6.7 R/hr. These gures are added to predict a combined dose rate at 0430 local of 15 R/hr. Table 070-2-4 RADIOLOGICAL INVOLVEMENT AFTER A NUCLEAR ATTACK (H-HOUR UNKNOWN)
Sample for Illustrative Purposes Only Local Time HRS:MIN 07:00 07:06 07:12 07:18 07:24 07:30 07:36 07:42 07:48 07:54 08:00 08:06 08:12 08:18 08:24 08:30 08:36 08:42 08:48 08:54 09:00 09:06 09:12 09:18 09:24 09:30 09:36 09:42 Intensity (Dose Rate) R/HR Local Time HRS:MIN 09:48 09:54 10:00 10:30 11:00 11:30 12:00 12:30 13:00 13:30 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 24:00 01:00 02:00 03:00 04:00 05:00 06:00 07:00 Intensity (Dose Rate) R/HR 74 73 72 67 62 59 55 52 50 47 45 42 38 36 33 31 29 28 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 20 19 18

10 30 55 45 76 124 116 151 189 145 160 125 134 105 90 89 87 85 83 82 80 79 78 77 75

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Table 070-2-5 CALCULATION OF EXPOSURE RATES FROM MULTIPLE BURSTS Total Intensity (R/hr) Exposure Rate From First Burst (R/hr) Reference Time Second Burst Exposure Rate From Second Burst (R/hr)

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Local Time 1630 1700 1712 1730 1800 1830 1900 1930 2000 2030 2100 2130

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2

Reference Time First Burst H+00:00 H+00:30 H+00:42 H+01:00 H+01:30 H+02:00 H+02:30 H+03:00 H+03:30 H+04:00 H+04:30 H+05:00

50 190 65 50 40 60 140 133 91 70

50 190 65 50 40 33 29 25 22 20

H+00:00 H+00:30 H+01:00 H+01:30 H+02:00 H+02:30

27 111 108 69 50

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Figure 070-2-17. Radiological Plot Versus Local Time, H-Hour Unknown

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Figure 070-2-18. Enlargement Procedure, H-Hour Unknown

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Figure 070-2-19. Radiological Plot Adjusted for Calculated H-Hour

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Figure 070-2-20. Multiple Burst Plot

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Figure 070-2-21. Second Burst Plot

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Figure 070-2-22. Projection of Decay from First Burst

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Figure 070-2-23. Projection of Decay from First Burst

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S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 070-2.2.6 ATTENUATION. Radiation is attenuated (reduced) by absorption as it passes through any material. The more dense the material and the greater its thickness, the more shielding it provides. A ships structure provides some protection by attenuating gamma and neutron radiation. Beta radiation is unable to penetrate an intact ships hull with accesses closed, so it is not a concern in shielding calculations.

070-2.2.6.1 Transmission Factor (TF). Some radiological measurements and calculations can be adjusted to allow for attenuation. The protection that is provided by a shielded location can be taken into account by applying a transmission factor (TF) , sometimes called a shielding factor or a reduction factor. A transmission factor is a fraction that indicates the percentage of radiation that shielding allows to pass through. The transmission factor is the ratio of the total exposure or the exposure rate behind the shielding to the total exposure or the exposure rate, respectively, that would be experienced there without shielding.

Transmission factors are always less than one, and the lower they are, the better the shielding. The lower a compartments transmission factor, the less radiation its occupants receive. Transmission factors should always be slightly conservative, that is, they should be slightly high. This provides a safety margin so that the estimated total exposure or exposure rate is higher than the actual.

070-2.2.6.2 Using Transmission Factors to Adjust Radiological Measurements and Calculations. As a practical matter, topside (outside) and interior (inside) values are used in the transmission factor equation instead of shielded and unshielded measurements. The denition of a transmission factor then becomes:

By rearranging this equation, transmission factors can be used in either direction. If the outside total exposure or the outside exposure rate is known, it can be used with the transmission factor to estimate the corresponding value behind the shielding.

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For example, suppose a compartment has a residual gamma transmission factor of 0.6. If the total external exposure is 50 R, the total exposure in the compartment is 0.6 x 50 R = 30 R Conversely, the total exposure or the exposure rate behind the shielding can be used to estimate the corresponding value outside the shielding.

For example, suppose the transmission factor for residual gamma radiation for a compartment is .5 and the intensity measured there is 20 R/hr. The estimated topside exposure rate is

070-2.2.6.3 Underlying Assumptions in the Development of Transmission Factors. Transmission factors are scenario dependent. A single set of transmission factors would not be equally valid in all situations for the following reasons. a. The energy levels of gamma rays released during ssion are higher than those from radioactive decay, as explained in paragraph 070-1.2.3.2. As a result, initial radiation and residual radiation have different types of interactions with a ships structure. b. In developing a set of transmission factors for a ship, assumptions must be made on the number of radiation sources that would be present during or after a nuclear attack and the conguration (elevation and relative bearing) of those sources. These assumptions, especially for initial and transit radiation, can be quite different from an actual radiological event in wartime. 070-2.2.6.4 Limitations on Use of Transmission Factors. Direct measurements with RADIAC instruments or dosimeters are always preferred over estimates based on transmission factors. Nonetheless, if approved transmis70-55

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 sion factors are available, they may be useful in some operational situations in which it would take too long to obtain actual measurements for all locations of concern. Whenever transmission factors are be used in radiological calculations, there are restrictions on the ways in which they can be applied.

a. Transmission factors shall be used only for situations for which they are valid. A set of transmission factors that was developed for residual radiation after cessation of fallout shall not be used in calculations with initial or transit radiation. b. Actual measurements are needed to apply TFs. Transmission factors shall not be applied to estimates that are based on other transmission factors. c. Transmission factors shall be used with actual measurements taken in close proximity to the location of interest. Measurements at a single topside location, such as the AN/PDR-65, cannot be used with transmission factors for compartments all over the ship. It is not safe to assume that a reading at one topside location is applicable to all topside locations. The radiation intensity from nuclear contamination deposited on horizontal surfaces may vary from one location to another by as much as a factor of ten. On vertical surfaces, intensity may vary by a factor of 100 or more. d. A ship that does not have a set of transmission factors approved by NAVSEA for radiological defense shall not use transmission factors in the radiological calculations described in this section . See paragraph 070-2.2.6.6 for a discussion on the availability of approved transmission factors.

070-2.2.6.5 Recommended Use of Transmission Factors. Transmission factors that are valid for residual radiation after fallout has ceased are most useful. They can be used with the results of the rapid internal survey to estimate the exposure rate at topside vital stations. See paragraph 070-3.3.3 for information on survey procedures. See paragraph 070-3.3.3.1 for guidance on marking survey locations with transmission factors.

WARNING

Transmission factors (or shielding factors) developed for purposes other than radiological defense, such as nuclear propulsion or nuclear weapon safety, shall not be used in radiological defense calculations.

070-2.2.6.6 Availability of Approved Transmission Factors. Derivation of transmission factors for shipboard radiological defense is a costly and time consuming process. It is not routinely funded and, as a result, most ships have not been provided with a valid set of transmission factors for use in radiological calculations. Only transmission factors approved by NAVSEA for use in shipboard radiological defense are authorized for this purpose. If an approved set has not been provided, transmission factors from other sources shall not be substituted . If an approved set has been provided, the transmission factor for each compartment that would be occupied after a nuclear attack (primarily vital stations, ready shelter and deep shelter) shall be posted. The type of radiation for which the transmission factor is valid (initial gamma, transit radiation, or deposit radiation) shall be indicated. 70-56

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 SECTION 3. DELINEATION OF THE RADIOLOGICAL SITUATION 070-3.1 INTRODUCTION

070-3.1.1 DELINEATION. Delineation is the act of identifying areas where a radiological hazard exists and measuring the intensity. The hazard may be only ionizing radiation or it may be both radiation and contamination. Radiation is the energy that is released as radioactive material decays. Contamination is the radioactive material that is the source of the radiation. The radiation hazard area is likely to extend beyond the boundaries of the contaminated area. 070-3.1.2 SHIPBOARD DETECTION CAPABILITIES. A nuclear explosion involves the ssion (splitting) of complex radioactive isotopes. These isotopes are unstable forms of certain elements that emit ionizing radiation as they decay to a more stable state. The ssion fragments are also radioactive. The radiation from ssion fragments consists primarily of gamma rays and beta particles. Shipboard instruments are calibrated to measure gamma radiation at the energy levels associated with fallout. The energy levels associated with prompt or initial gamma radiation are higher. Current shipboard instruments can detect, but not measure, beta radiation. This is because the energy levels associated with beta particles vary so widely that it is difficult to accurately measure beta intensity. 070-3.2 SENSORS

070-3.2.1 RADIACS. Nuclear radiation cannot be detected by any of the ve human senses. To detect the presence of nuclear radiation, or measure the amounts present, special devices called RADIAC instruments have been developed. RADIAC is an acronym for Radiation Detection, Indication, And Computation. Shipboard RADIAC instruments for radiological defense are designed to measure the amount of gamma radiation present and, in some cases, to detect the presence of beta radiation. The Roentgen (R) is the unit of measure commonly used on high range RADIAC scales and the milliRoentgen (mR), which is one-thousandth of a Roentgen, is used on scales that measure low levels of radiation. 070-3.2.1.1 AN/PDR-27 Series RADIAC Set. The AN/PDR-27 is the standard low-range beta-gamma RADIAC set for use in low level surveys and for personnel monitoring. The detector is a probe that is attached to the body of the instrument by a coiled cable. Earphones provide an audio indication of gamma intensity changes. It is battery powered. It uses two Geiger-Mueller (GM) tubes: a large tube for two lower operating ranges, and a small tube for two higher operating ranges. The meter scale is an illuminated, direct-reading dial with four operating ranges selected by a range switch: 0 - 0.5 mR/hr (gamma), 0 - 5.0 mR/hr (gamma), 0 - 50 mR/hr (gamma), and 0 - 500 mR/hr (gamma). This instrument can detect the presence of beta radiation on the two lowest scales but cannot measure the beta exposure rate. A drawing of the AN/PDR-27S RADIAC meter is provided in Figure 070-3-1.

a. Prior to commencing a survey, the instrument range switch is turned to the BAT COND (battery condition) position. The meter needle should indicate in the battery area on the meter scale. If not, the batteries should be replaced. The instrument should be left on until the survey is completed, or if turned off it should be rechecked prior to actual use. 70-57

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WARNING

The AN/PDR-27 will become saturated at intensities at or above 1000 R/hr, which may cause the meter indication to drop back to zero or near zero. If this happens, pre-operational checks must be repeated before the instrument is placed in use. If the AN/PDR-27 is used in a location where the radiological intensity may go above 500 mR/hr, a high range RADIAC shall be carried as well. b. When using the AN/PDR-27 for surveying areas it is recommended that the instrument be left on the lowest range setting and that the range switch be rotated to higher ranges only as the needle goes off scale on the lower range. This will result in the most accurate measurements. It is calibrated to an accuracy of plus-orminus twenty percent. It will saturate in elds of radiation greater than 1,000 R/hr and indicate no radiation is present. If the meter unexpectedly indicates a zero reading, the monitor should immediately return to a sheltered area. The AN/PDR-43 should then be used to determine the actual radiation level. c. Beta detection capability is provided on the two lower ranges. To detect beta radiation, the aluminum beta shield is rotated aside to expose the thin mica window. If the meter reading increases when the beta shield is open, the window is pointed at a beta source. d. GM detectors, such as the AN/PDR-27 adjust quickly to changes in the level of radiation intensity. Even when shifting to a different range scale, only one second is required for meter adjustment.

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Figure 070-3-1. AN/PDR-27S RADIAC Meter (Top Panel View) 070-3.2.1.2 AN/PDR-43 Series RADIAC Set. The AN/PDR-43 is a battery powered, high range, beta-gamma RADIAC set used for low and high level surveys and, possibly, personnel monitoring. It uses a GM detector and has a built-in Krypton-85 source to check for proper operation on all three operating ranges: 0-5 R/hr (gamma); 0-50 R/hr (gamma); and 0-500 R/hr (gamma). GM detectors, such as the AN/PDR-43 adjust quickly to changes in the level of radiation intensity. Even when shifting to a different range scale, only one second is required for meter adjustment. At intensities above 500 R/hr, the meter pegs but does not become saturated. It is calibrated to an accuracy of plus-or-minus 20 percent. A drawing of the AN/PDR-43F RADIAC meter is provided in Figure 070-3-2.

WARNING

The AN/PDR-43 contains an internal radioactive test source. This source provides enough beta radiation to produce tissue damage, especially to the eyes, from prolonged exposure. The internal components of the instrument shall not be removed from the casing except by qualied technicians at a repair and calibration facility. 70-59

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2

a. Prior to commencing a survey, the instrument range switch is turned to the BATT position. An indication in the battery area of the meter shows that the two D-cell batteries have not been discharged. If the batteries do not test satisfactorily, they can be replaced by the operator. In addition, each of the three direct-reading operating ranges is checked by moving the function selector switch to the CHECK position. A reading between one-half and three R/hr shows that the meter is operating properly. b. The AN/PDR-43 detects beta radiation on all three gamma range scales. The function selector switch is spring-loaded to stay on the GAMMA position. To detect beta radiation, this switch is moved to the BETA position. The beta window is on the bottom of the case. If the reading on the meter increases when the window is opened, beta is present. c. The range switch is left on the lowest range unless the radiation exceeds 5 R/hr.

WARNING

If the AN/PDR-65 is removed for calibration, it must be accompanied by the remote detector probe and the connecting cable.

070-3.2.1.3 AN/PDR-65 Series RADIAC Set. The AN/PDR-65 is a very high-range gamma survey instrument. Aboard ship, it is normally mounted permanently and used with an external probe, but it could be used as a portable meter. The shipboard installation consists of a RADIAC meter, a control and power supply unit and a detector unit. The primary location for the AN/PDR-65 is the ships bridge. Ships that have a second set normally mount it in Damage Control Central. The AN/PDR-65 measures the gamma exposure rate and the accumulated gamma exposure. The device has four operating ranges which cover from 0-10 R/hr, 0-100 R/hr, 0-1,000 R/hr, and 0-10,000 R/hr. It provides a read-out of total dose up to 10,000 Roentgens. It responds more slowly to rapid changes in intensity than the GM detectors. For early warning of the arrival and cessation of fallout, the detector unit should be mounted on the aft side of the main mast. It should be positioned as high as possible without being located in a radar beam. The cable to the detector unit should be run inside the mast from the control unit on the bridge. Mounted on the mast, the PDR-65 is not close to any large horizontal surface areas, so its readings are primarily indicative of the ships involvement in transit radiation. Transit radiation comes from particles or droplets in the surrounding atmosphere. Detectors in other locations primarily measure deposit radiation on weather surfaces, which remains after transit radiation ceases. A drawing of the AN/PDR-65 RADIAC meter is provided in Figure 070-3-3.

070-3.2.1.4 Precision of Measurements. Shipboard RADIACs are accurate within 10 to 20 percent if properly calibrated, so time should not be wasted trying to rene readings to within 1 percent. It is more important to take the best measurement possible at the specied time than to take extra time to discriminate between relatively small divisions. If the indicator is uctuating, try to quickly determine the average value.

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S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2

Figure 070-3-2. AN/PDR-43F RADIAC Meter (Top Panel View)

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S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 070-3.2.1.5 Coordination of Measurements from Different Instruments. The measurements taken at the same time by different instruments will vary because of differences in the shielding effect of the ships structure at the various locations, because of variations in the amount of contamination deposited on different parts of the ship and because of calibration differences among instruments. The calibration error on a given instrument should always be in the same direction. Therefore, it is essential to use the same portable instrument for all measurements at a given location during all surveys. This does not mean the same type of RADIAC but the same individual unit. Also, proper survey procedures must be used consistently on all surveys. Otherwise, variations due to calibration differences or improper survey procedures could be erroneously interpreted as uctuations in intensity. This could reduce the accuracy of radiological calculations. NOTE Dosimetry is the preferred method of determining the accumulated doses of personnel.

Figure 070-3-3. AN/PDR-65 RADIAC Meter (Front Panel View) 070-3.2.2 DOSIMETERS. Devices that measure total dose or exposure are called dosimeters. A personal dosimeter measures the accumulated dose of the wearer. This information is used to make decisions about each crew members involvement in actions that may involve additional radiological exposure. There are three types of dosimeters commonly used by the military. They are the thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD), the ionization chamber dosimeter and the radioluminescent dosimeter. They measure gamma radiation. The latter two types have been selected for shipboard use in nuclear warfare defense. The IM-143/PD is an ionization chamber pocket dosimeter. The DT-60 is a radioluminescent dosimeter that is worn like a pendant. While neither provides total dose as accurately as a TLD, they are more reliable than dose calculations based on exposure rate measurements. 70-62

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 If the shipboard allowance is sufficient, some type of dosimeter shall be issued to all hands. Self-reading dosimeters are preferred. If the allowance is insufficient, dosimeters shall be placed at each vital station, ready shelter and deep shelter location and issued to at least one person in each survey, monitoring and decon team.

WARNING

Some pocket dosimeters are subject to insulator soak-in when rst charged. The insulation may absorb as much as 40 percent of the initial charge, causing erroneous readings. Authorized RADIAC calibration facilities test pocket dosimeters for insulator soak-in during calibration and withdraw from service those that fail. However, as a precaution, ionization chamber dosimeters such as the IM-143/PD shall be charged at least 24 hours before use. Then they shall be recharged daily to compensate for other charge leakages. 070-3.2.2.1 IM-143/PD Series Self-Reading Dosimeter and PP-4276/PD Series Detector Charger. The IM-143/PD is a self-reading pocket type dosimeter for detecting and indicating exposures to X-ray and gamma radiation. It is about the size and shape of a ball point pen. When the capped end is pointed toward a light source, the accumulated dose can be read. The total amount of gamma or X-ray radiation to which the instrument has been exposed since it was last charged is indicated by a movable element on a scale from 0 to 600 Roentgens. The PP-4276/PD detector charger is used to charge the IM-143/PD. When the instrument is fully charged, it will indicate zero Roentgens. Each ship is allowed one IM-143/PD for each ten crew members.

WARNING

It takes 16 to 24 hours after exposure to radiation for the luminescence of the glass in the DT-60/PD to stabilize at the new level, so readings taken earlier than 24 hours after exposure may not be accurate. Therefore, this dosimeter shall not be used real time management of personnel rotation in a nuclear environment.

WARNING

If a DT-60 dosimeter is stored in humid conditions after the seal is broken on its original packaging, pigment from its casing may leech onto the radiophotoluminescent glass and interfere with accurate measurement of accumulated dose. Low readings can result. 070-3.2.2.2 DT-60/PD Series Non-Self-Reading Dosimeter and CP-95/PD Series Computer-Indicator. The DT-60/PD is a radioluminescent dosimeter of the photoluminescent type. It is small enough to be suspended from a key chain. It contains a piece of radiophotoluminescent glass. When exposed to X-ray or gamma radiation, the glass undergoes a change in its luminescing ability that is proportional to the amount of radiation to which it was 70-63

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 exposed. This change is measured by the CP-95 computer-indicator, which makes the glass luminesce by exposing it to ultraviolet light. Exposures between 10 and 600 Roentgens can be read in increments of 10 Roentgens. The changes are permanent and additive, so that a wearers total dose over a long period can be measured. The reading at the time of issue shall be recorded so it can be subtracted from subsequent readings to determine the cumulative dose. The DT-60 is useful in maintaining medical records but not in real time management of personnel rotation in a nuclear environment.

070-3.3

RADIOLOGICAL SURVEYS

070-3.3.1 GENERAL INFORMATION ON SURVEYS. Radiological surveys are taken to determine radiation levels and deposition patterns after the ship has been contaminated by nuclear fallout. There are several different types of surveys. It is essential that the exact time and location of each measurement is recorded and that the serial number of the RADIAC instrument used is indicated. A format that can be used to record measurements from any type of survey is provided in Figure 070-3-4. Uses of survey data include:

a. Detection of intrusion of radiological contamination into the interior of the ship. b. Calculation of safe stay times for personnel at vital stations and on decontamination or monitoring teams. c. Identication of topside locations that may require decontamination.

070-3.3.2 ON-STATION MONITORING. Prior to the cessation of fallout, all stations that have portable RADIACs shall monitor and report gamma intensities at time intervals directed by the Damage Control Assistant. This information is used in determining when fallout ceases and in estimating accumulated doses at these locations. See paragraph 070-2.2.1.2 for information on determining the time of cessation of fallout and paragraph 070-2.2.2 for information on estimating accumulated dose in a particular location. The same instrument shall be used for all measurements at a given location during on-station monitoring. The instrument shall be held at the same place and in the same position for each measurement. Beta checks shall also be conducted during on-station monitoring to determine if any contamination has inltrated into the ship. See paragraph 070-3.3.3.3 for information on beta monitoring.

NOTE Safe Stay time calculations are not valid if they are based on intensity levels measured before the fallout stops. The changes in intensity from that time on are due to radioactive decay and are therefore predictable.

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Figure 070-3-4. Radiological Survey Form

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S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 070-3.3.3 RAPID INTERNAL SURVEY. The rapid internal survey is performed immediately after the cessation of fallout to get an indication of the severity of the radiation hazard at specic locations, primarily action stations. Safe stay times for interior vital stations can be calculated based on the rapid internal survey.

070-3.3.3.1 Identication of Locations Included in the Rapid Internal Survey. These locations include vital stations inside the ship and the closest interior points to topside vital stations. The locations to be surveyed shall be designated in the ships CBR Defense Bill. They shall be precisely identied and marked to ensure uniformity among measurements taken at different times. Survey routes can be preprinted using the format provided in Figure 070-3-4 and as enclosures to the CBR Defense Bill. An example of such a form is shown in Figure 070-3-5.

a. Within each internal vital station, the watch stations located closest to the skin of the ship, or wherever there is the least shielding, shall be surveyed. This location will provide the most conservative safe stay time for personnel in that space. Measurements from areas infrequently occupied shall not be used. Other watch stations in the same space may have longer stay times but they are not calculated. If personnel are rotated through the watch stations within the space, a margin of safety will be provided. The survey location shall be marked with a label plate in the immediate area that identies the watch station. For example: RAPID INTERNAL SURVEY CIC SUPERVISOR CONSOLE b. During the rapid internal survey, intensity levels at external vital stations are taken from inside the ship at the closest possible weather boundary to selected topside vital stations . Measurements shall be taken from a compartment either directly below or adjacent to the weatherdeck of the topside area of interest. These survey locations shall be selected in advance and marked with a red circle of 1 in. diameter. On a bulkhead, the circle shall be in a location that corresponds to a height of 1 yd. above the deck or platform of the topside vital station. On an overhead, the circle shall be in an unobstructed area. Above the circle, the words, RAPID INTERNAL SURVEY and the name of the corresponding topside station shall be stencilled in 1 in. high black letters. If the transmission factor for that location is known, it shall be stencilled below the red circle in 1 in. black numerals. Additionally, the type of radiation for which the transmission factor is valid shall be stencilled there (initial gamma, transit gamma or deposit gamma). See paragraph 070-2.2.6 and its subparagraphs for information on transmission factors. Equipment, piping, or other obstructions on both sides of the bulkhead or overhead shall be avoided when selecting survey locations. These things could adversely affect the measurements by introducing additional shielding that is not included in the calculations or by creating places where contamination can collect (hot spots). This would result in inaccurate safe stay time estimates.

NOTE It is the responsibility of the Damage Control Assistant to select and mark all locations where measurements are to be taken during the rapid internal survey. The instructions in this paragraph are not included in General Specications for Naval Ships and these markings will not be applied by shipbuilders.

070-3.3.3.2 Rapid Internal Survey Gamma Monitoring Procedures. This survey is conducted to judge the feasibility of continued occupancy of vital stations or immediate reoccupancy of stations from which personnel were withdrawn. Adequate time is taken at each station to get an accurate measurement at the designated location but the monitors do not proceed to localize and mark hot spots during this survey. 70-66

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 a. At internal vital stations, the RADIAC is held waist high. The monitor shall sit or stand at that location in the normal position of the watchstander to take the measurement. b. For a topside vital station on the same level as the survey location, the RADIAC probe or instrument is held 1 in. from the red circle on the bulkhead. For a vital station on the level above the survey location, the instrument or probe is held 1 yd. directly below the circle on the overhead. In either case, the instrument is rotated through various orientations to nd the highest reading. The use of transmission factors to convert to estimated external intensities is described in paragraph 070-2.2.6.

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Figure 070-3-5. Sample Rapid Internal Survey Form

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S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 070-3.3.3.3 Rapid Internal Survey Beta Monitoring Procedures. Beta monitoring is performed during the rapid internal survey to detect intrusion of radioactive contamination into the interior of the ship. Since beta particles cannot penetrate into the ship from external sources, any indication of beta radiation is evidence of such intrusion. At each survey location, the monitor shall take two to four readings around the space with the beta shield open. It is necessary to observe the gamma measurement before each beta reading as explained in paragraph 070-3.2.1.2. 070-3.3.4 RAPID EXTERNAL SURVEY. The rapid external survey, sometimes referred to as the gross external survey, is conducted after the rapid internal survey to obtain more precise radiation levels at topside vital stations and at contaminated areas that are irradiating internal vital stations. As in the rapid internal survey, the focus is on getting an accurate measurement quickly at action stations and expeditiously reporting the results. Monitors do not take time to localize or mark hot spots. The team leader shall wear a self-reading pocket dosimeter on his outer clothing. Each monitoring team shall be given a predetermined route and a safe stay time based on the highest estimated topside intensity. Large masses of material, such as superstructure, boats and aircraft act as shields for gamma radiation from hot spots and should be used when planning routes for protection from hot spots. A waist high survey of the operating station is taken and the highest reading is recorded. Then, intensities are measured at each equipment operator station at the waist height level of the operator. Operator controls and seats shall be wipe tested in accordance with paragraph 070-3.3.7 if the safe stay time of the monitoring team permits. An example of a survey route recording form is provided in Figure 070-3-6. These routes and forms shall be established in advance and promulgated in the ships CBR Defense Bill. The preprinted forms may be used as enclosures to this bill. 070-3.3.5 SUPPLEMENTARY SURVEYS. Supplementary surveys are conducted to conrm or revise stay time calculations. They may also be ordered to localize hot spots for decontamination. Supplementary surveys of interior spaces shall include beta monitoring to detect intrusion of contamination. These checks shall be scheduled as needed for individual vital stations or other locations based on: a. Completion of decontamination or air purge. b. Dosimeter measurements that are at a variance with predicted doses. c. Watch section rotation. 070-3.3.5.1 Use of Posted Dosimeters in Supplementary Surveys. An effective way to verify that calculated stay times are correct is to place self-reading dosimeters in selected spaces. The dosimeters are put in vital spaces and other occupied areas such as work shops and berthing, and are read periodically (i.e., each watch or daily, as appropriate). The results are compared to the expected doses. Any major discrepancies are investigated. 070-3.3.5.2 Coverage of Berthing and Messing Spaces in Supplementary Surveys. Prior to releasing personnel from battle stations to berthing and messing spaces, living spaces shall be surveyed to locate hot spots. Fan rooms for supply systems shall be included to determine if the lters are heavily contaminated. Routes and monitoring points shall be established in advance in the ships CBR Defense Bill. An example of a preprinted supplementary survey form is provided in Figure 070-3-7. 070-3.3.6 DETAILED SURVEYS. In a detailed survey, accuracy is more important than speed. Monitors shall proceed slowly and carefully. A detailed survey of the entire exterior is required prior to arrival at a repair facility if industrial decontamination has been ordered. The Commanding Officer may order a detailed survey at any time if the tactical situation permits. He can order a shipwide detailed survey or limit it to specic areas in which relatively high radiation levels have been found. A detailed survey is recommended for any area in which mea70-69

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 sured dosages exceed predicted levels by more than 25 percent. An example of a detailed survey form is provided in Figure 070-3-8. The grid map method is used to record results of this survey. The grid map is formed by dividing the ship into grid squares measuring one square yard. Each square is surveyed in the center at waist height. The hot spots identied are then clearly marked as described in paragraph 070-3.3.8. The preparation of detailed survey forms is not required unless the ship is ordered to an industrial facility and a detailed survey is directed.

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Figure 070-3-6. Sample Rapid External Survey Form

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Figure 070-3-7. Sample Supplementary Survey Form

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Figure 070-3-8. Sample Detailed Survey Form

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S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 070-3.3.7 WIPE TESTS. Removable contamination is a transfer hazard because it can be moved by foot trafc or other physical contact from contaminated areas to clean areas of the ship. It is important to locate removable contamination for several reasons. a. determining if protective clothing is required. b. determining where decontamination is necessary. c. determining if contamination control measures are effective. Removable contamination can be detected by wiping a clean (uncontaminated) piece of absorbent material across the object or area of interest. Paper hand towels, toilet paper, gauze pads or terry cloth may be used. Each sample is placed in a separate envelope that is labelled with the location, time and date of the sample. The exact position at which the wipe sample was taken shall be noted, not simply the name of the station. The monitor shall exercise great care to ensure that his supply of sample paper does not become contaminated before use and that it does not become contaminated from his hands or gloves during use. Each sample shall be evaluated inside the ship, rst for the intensity of gamma radiation, then for the presence of beta radiation. This is done inside the ship to reduce interference from background radiation. Wipes shall be held at a uniform distance within 1 in. of the sensor for evaluation. There are two types of wipe test, which are described in the following paragraphs. NOTE In wet conditions, care must be taken to wipe, not simply blot, when taking samples. Also, some materials, such as toilet paper, are not suitable for use on wet or rough surfaces. 070-3.3.7.1 Uncontrolled Wipe Test. An uncontrolled wipe test is used when speed is more important than details. The objective is to quickly determine if there is any removable contamination at locations of interest. This information is important in deciding whether to decontaminate topside locations. The size of the area covered by an uncontrolled wipe test is not specied and the only guideline for technique is to wipe, not blot, to collect samples. The uncontrolled wipe is essentially a go-no-go test. A negative result indicates that there is probably no signicant removable contamination. A positive result indicates that there is some removable contamination but does not provide any information on the amount. An uncontrolled wipe test may be ordered as a part of the rapid external survey or a supplementary survey. 070-3.3.7.2 Controlled Wipe Test. A controlled wipe test is one in which the sample is taken carefully in accordance with standard procedures. This permits estimation of the amount of removable contamination and comparison of results from different locations. The standard procedure is to lightly wipe a 12 sq. in. surface area. It can be 3 in. x 4 in., 2 in. x 6 in., etc. Use as much pressure as possible without tearing the wipe paper. If this procedure is followed, the wipe sample can be taken to represent 10 percent of the removable contamination. Multiply the gamma reading by ten to get an estimate of the total gamma radiation from removable contamination. A controlled wipe test may be ordered as a part of any survey or monitoring evolution except a rapid internal or external survey. 070-3.3.8 HOT SPOTS. In order to decrease the risk to personnel and to identify areas for special attention during decontamination, monitors are required to identify and mark hot spots during supplementary or detailed surveys. The intensity of a hot spot is two or more times that of the surrounding area. Hot spots are normally caused by the nature of the material in a given location. Materials such as cordage, rust, scale, and pools of water are most likely to collect quantities of contamination that produce hot spots. When the location of a hot spot has been determined it is marked by hanging a rigid triangular sign near the hot spot. The signs can be made of plas70-74

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 tic, wood, or metal. The shape is an isosceles triangle with a base approximately 11.5 in. and the opposite sides 8 in. The triangles have holes or ears at opposite ends of the base that are used for hanging them above the deck. The signs are hung apex down. The triangle is white on both sides. The word ATOM, in black two inch block letters, is placed on the side of the marker facing away from the contaminated spot (front). In addition the dose rate, with the date and time of the reading, and the date and time of burst, if known, are written on the front of the marker with grease pencil. The inscriptions will be written parallel to the longer side of the marker underneath the word, ATOM. The radiation hazard shall be indicated by an R if radiation only and by R/C if both radiation and contamination are present. A drawing of one of these signs is provided in Figure 070-3-9 along with the other components of the Contamination Marking Kit. 070-3.3.9 POTABLE WATER MONITORING. Internal contamination of personnel from contaminated potable water is a serious threat. Surveys must include monitoring of potable water prior to drinking, or use in food preparation. Additional readings should be taken if the ship transits the radioactive pool. Monitoring is accomplished with the AN/PDR-27 RADIAC by placing 1 qt. of suspected water into an uncontaminated open top container which is about 4 in. in diameter and at least 4 in. deep. The water contamination is proportional to the open window reading when the probe is held 1 in. above the center of the sample container, minus the background reading. Damage Control Central shall maintain a record of the time and date of reading, background reading, contamination level, source of the sample and RADIAC equipment used in making the measurement. 070-3.3.10 PERSONNEL MONITORING. The same portable RADIACs used for surveys are also used for monitoring personnel, clothing and portable equipment. All personnel monitoring is conducted inside the ship. This makes it easier to determine if there is contamination on an individual, his clothing or portable equipment. The shielding effect of the ships structure reduces the intensity of the background gamma radiation. The background could still be high enough to interfere with personnel monitoring, however, especially near the skin of the ship. In that case, monitoring for beta radiation becomes very important. Since beta particles cannot penetrate the skin of the ship, any beta radiation detected during personnel monitoring must be coming from a source inside the ship. If care has been taken to keep the monitoring area clean, the source must be on the individual being monitored or his clothing or equipment. 070-3.3.10.1 General Personnel Monitoring Procedures. The AN/PDR-27 will be used if its range is not exceeded. There are two advantages to this. First, low levels of contamination can be more accurately determined with the AN/PDR-27. Second, it can be used with earphones, so the monitor can concentrate on where he is placing the RADIAC sensing surface, not on the meter. If the range of the AN/PDR-27 is exceeded, the AN/PDR-43 will be used. In either case, the instrument shall be moved over the subject at a uniform speed and distance. The sensing surface of the instrument will be held as close as possible to the subject but must not come in contact with any potentially contaminated surface. A distance of 1/2 in. to 1/4 in. is preferred. A greater distance may be necessary in rough weather to avoid contact between the instrument and a potentially contaminated surface. When the monitor detects an area of possible contamination, he shall move the instrument directly away from it, then directly towards it. If the intensity seems to vary inversely with the distance from the area (that is, as the distance increases, the dose rate decreases), it is considered to be contaminated. This is a useful procedure when monitoring against a high background. The monitor completes checking for gamma radiation rst, then repeats the procedure to check for beta. 070-3.3.10.2 Monitoring Outer Clothing, Battle Dress and Portable Equipment. The monitor shall start with battle dress items and portable equipment. These items are then removed and the individuals outer clothing is monitored, starting at the head and proceeding downward. The arms will be extended from the body so the undersides of the arms and the sides of the thorax can be checked. The legs will be spread so the inner sides can be monitored. The monitor shall pay particular attention to the head or headcover, shoulders, hands or handwear, 70-75

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 footwear, sleeves, the seat of the trousers, battle dress items and portable equipment. The soles of the footwear shall be monitored last with the individual seated. The disposal of each item after it is monitored is described in paragraph 070-5.5.4.7.

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S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2

Figure 070-3-9. Contamination Marking Kit

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S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 070-3.3.10.3 Monitoring Inner Clothing and the Body. The individuals inner clothing is monitored, starting at the head and proceeding downward. The arms will be extended from the body so the undersides of the arms and the sides of the thorax can be checked. The legs will be spread so the inner sides can be monitored. The monitor shall pay special attention to areas that were not covered by protective clothing, such as the face, and areas where there are openings in outer clothing, i.e., neck, wrists, ankles. If any indication of contamination is found on the inner clothing, or exposed skin, the clothing is removed in accordance with the procedures in paragraph 070-5.5.4.9 and the body is monitored using the sequence described above in this paragraph. SECTION 4. VENTILATION SYSTEMS AND INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION 070-4.1 VENTILATION SYSTEMS CAPABILITY IN A RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT

070-4.1.1 FUNCTIONS. All Navy ships except submarines are ventilated with air that is continuously replenished to some degree from outside the ship. Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) systems bring in fresh air, lter it, condition the air by cooling or heating it and removing moisture, circulate it inside the ship and, nally, remove stale air. When a ship is enveloped in the base surge or fallout from a nuclear explosion, it is desirable to deny the entry of these radioactive particles into the interior of the ship. 070-4.1.1.1 Filtration Capability. One of the key functions in minimizing the entry of contamination is ltration of the incoming air supply. To completely remove all nuclear contamination from the incoming air, a ltration system needs the capability to deal with radioactive aerosols (base surge) and larger radioactive particles (fallout). 070-4.1.1.2 Minimizing the Entry of Contaminants. The other key function is restricting the entry of unltered air into the ship through accesses and structural defects. Tests have shown that a Navy ship cannot be made completely airtight. Leaks develop in the superstructure and around improperly sealed access ttings, and the problem worsens as the ship ages. 070-4.1.2 VENTILATION SYSTEMS. There are two types of ventilation systems on surface ships, the conventional ventilation system and the Collective Protection System (CPS). 070-4.1.2.1 Conventional Ventilation System. In a conventional ventilation system, supply fans bring in air from the weather and exhaust fans remove stale air. The only way to restrict the entry of contaminated air is to secure as many closures and shut down as much ventilation as possible before the ship is enveloped in a hazardous atmosphere. These actions slow the intrusion of nuclear contamination but do not completely stop it. Protective masks are required and full body coverage may be needed while the ship is enveloped in the base surge or receiving fallout. 070-4.1.2.2 Collective Protection System (CPS). A collective protection system uses fans for the same purposes as a conventional HVAC system. It also has CBR lters that have the capability to remove CBR agents in any form. CPS provides two levels of protection. In Total Protection (TP) zones, all CBR contaminants in any physical state are ltered from the incoming air supply and a slight positive pressure is maintained to keep airborne contamination from entering by other routes. Any leakage of air at the zone boundaries is from the inside out. The air pressure inside a TP zone is maintained slightly above atmospheric with high pressure fans that supply air to the zone, with devices that control the ow of exhaust air from the zone and with air locks that prevent 70-78

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 excessive pressure loss when someone enters or exits the zone. Total Protection (TP) zones provide a toxic free environment where it is not necessary to wear protective clothing or masks. Total protection may not be affordable in compartments with extremely high air ow requirements, such as machinery spaces. CPS provides a lower level of safety for these areas called Limited Protection (LP). Aerosols and larger airborne particles are removed from the incoming air supply to LP zones by High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) lters. The standard supply fans do not create a positive pressure. A protective mask and full body coverage is needed in LP zones only if there is evidence of radiological contamination inside the space. As explained in paragraphs 070-3.3.3.3, 070-3.3.5 and 070-3.3.10, the presence of beta radiation indicates that radioactive contamination is present.

070-4.1.2.3 CPS Protection Levels for New Construction Ships. The amount of CPS coverage designed into a new construction ship is specied by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). The extent of CPS coverage is related to the ships mission, operational requirements and the cost of the installation. Three levels of CPS protection (Levels I, II and III) have been dened for new construction ships. These levels of protection are dened broadly. It is not unusual to nd differences in the level of CPS coverage on different ights of the same class or even between individual ships of a class. There are areas on some CPS ships that are served by conventional ventilation. Typical coverage and zoning for a Level III ship design are shown in Figure 070-4-1.

a. Level I - Shelter Envelope - An area of TP coverage that provides protection for berthing, messing, sanitary and battle dressing facilities for 40 percent of the crew. This concept is sometimes called a safe haven. b. Level II - Minimum Operational Envelope - An expanded area of TP coverage that includes the Level I shelter envelope and key operational functions that can be economically integrated into the ship design. The emphasis is on surprise attack survival. c. Level III - Maximum Operational Envelope - Sufficient TP coverage of the ship for mission requirements except for ight deck and well deck operations.

070-4.1.2.4 Selected Area Collective Protection System (SACPS). A backt version, the Selected Area Collective Protection System (SACPS), has been developed for ships that were built before CPS was introduced. TP coverage for a small number of selected vital operational spaces and safe havens can be backtted onto existing ships. SACPS fans and CBR lters are added. Incoming air is ltered and pressurized, but at a lower positive pressure than new construction CPS. Recirculation systems that were already installed within the SACPS zones are retained. The system is generally used where a more extensive CPS is impractical or too costly to backt.

070-4.1.2.5 References on Ventilation System Conguration and Capabilities. General information on HVAC systems and components is provided in NSTM Chapter 510, Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning Systems for Surface Ships . Generic information on CPS conguration and components is available in a series of technical manuals listed in Appendix B. Information on the HVAC system for an individual ship is provided in selected records that are maintained for each ship, including the Ship Information Book (SIB), Damage Control (DC) Book, Damage Control Plates and HVAC manual.

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Figure 070-4-1. Typical Coverage and Zoning for a Level III Ship Design 070-4.2 CONVENTIONAL VENTILATION SYSTEM

WARNING

While a ship is enveloped in the base surge or is receiving fallout, it may be necessary to operate conventional ventilation systems to avoid heat stress or equipment overheating. In this case, the same protective clothing requirements apply inside the ship as outside until the absence of beta radiation in these areas inside the ship can be conrmed. Care shall be taken to avoid contaminating food, water, and medical supplies under these conditions. 070-4.2.1 CONVENTIONAL VENTILATION SYSTEM OPERATION IN A RADIOLOGICAL HAZARD ENVIRONMENT. A conventional HVAC system has no ability to create positive pressure or to lter radioactive contamination from the incoming air supply. A ship with conventional ventilation is vulnerable to penetration by airborne contamination when it is enveloped in the base surge and when it is receiving fallout. Exposure to the base surge is likely to be brief, i.e., a few minutes. However, fallout deposition can last for hours and cover hundreds of square miles. If the ship is unable to maneuver to avoid the deposition area, or at least get out of it quickly, a lengthy involvement in a hazardous atmosphere is the result. 070-4.2.1.1 Filtration Capability in a Conventional Ventilation System. The roughing lters in line with the supply fans have no capability to remove aerosols from the incoming air stream. They can collect dust so it is reasonable to expect that they can entrap some larger fallout particles as well. However, they let some fallout pass through, and it is not possible to predict how much. The Navy Standard Impingement Filter (NSIF) is used on recirculation systems. The NSIF can entrap particles in the upper end of the aerosol size range and anything larger. It has a metal lter element that requires regular cleaning and oiling. Tests have shown that the NSIF, if properly maintained, has a ltration efficiency of 90 percent or better for particles greater than 10 micrometers in diameter. It cannot lter out the smaller particles comprising the base surge but it can entrap most fallout particles if it has been cleaned and oiled as required. However, NSIFs are often installed on recirculation intakes 70-80

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 inside the compartments served by these systems. Therefore, if the ventilation system supplying replenishment air to these spaces is operated in the base surge or fallout, the air in these compartments is already contaminated by incoming air before it reaches these lters. Therefore, a conventional ventilation system has no capability to prevent the entry of radioactive contamination.

WARNING

Boilers, diesels and gas turbines require combustion air even when the surrounding atmosphere is contaminated. There could be some leakage of radiological contamination from their air casings or enclosures into the machinery room. 070-4.2.1.2 Minimizing the Entry of Airborne Contamination with a Conventional Ventilation System. Securing closures and ventilation systems is the only means available to slow the entry of airborne contaminants into compartments with conventional ventilation systems. When material condition ZEBRA is set, most accesses to the weather are closed and some conventional ventilation systems are secured. If Circle WILLIAM ttings are secured as well, the rest of the conventional ventilation fans are shut off and dampers in the ventilation ducting, if installed, are closed. These measures slow the inltration of airborne radioactive contamination into the ship but do not stop it. Contaminated air to gradually diffuses into the interior of the ship. Further, there are unique risks in the machinery spaces in a radiological hazard environment. a. Boilers, diesels and gas turbines require combustion air regardless of whether the surrounding atmosphere is hazardous and there could be some leakage from their casings into the machinery room. Therefore, even if machinery space ventilation is secured, intrusion of airborne radiological contamination is possible. b. Machinery space ventilation is designed with excess exhaust capability. More air is removed by the exhaust fans than is brought in by the supply fans to allow for expansion due to heat and leaks from steam equipment. Without this feature, hot air could be forced into other parts of the ship, making air conditioning more difficult. If negative pressure develops in a machinery space, make-up air enters as needed via natural supply ducts that are open to the weather. Contaminated air from the outside of the ship can be drawn into machinery spaces along with the make-up air. Even if the ventilation is not operating, contamination can enter by this route by diffusion. 070-4.2.1.3 Conventional Ventilation System Operation When the Ship is Enveloped in the Base Surge or Receiving Fallout. The recommended approach is to secure all conventional ventilation before the ship is exposed to the base surge or fallout deposition, secure as many accesses and ventilation ttings as possible and purge the interior when the ship reaches a clean atmosphere. This minimizes exposure to airborne radioactive contamination but it may also cause heat stress. If the operational situation permits, the ship should be maneuvered to minimize the time it is in the base surge or an area where fallout is being deposited. 070-4.2.1.4 Timing of Securing Conventional Ventilation with Respect to the Arrival of the Base Surge or Fallout. Even if the ship is already in material condition ZEBRA, it takes several minutes to close all Circle WILLIAM ttings, but the forced movement of air by the fans can be stopped very quickly. On most ships, the fans can be secured from central locations such as the DC console in the Central Control Station, electrical switchboards or electrical load centers. When a nuclear threat exists, watch standers at these locations shall be prepared to secure all ventilation fans with very little warning. Closing of open accesses and ttings shall begin simultaneously with stopping the fans and proceed until completed. 70-81

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2

WARNING

If possible, all ventilation, including recirculation systems and machinery space ventilation, shall be secured for the entire time the ship is enveloped in the base surge. The level of radioactivity of the base surge is likely to be much higher than that of fallout and, as an aerosol, it is a serious respiratory hazard. 070-4.2.1.5 Recirculation System Operation to Reduce Heat Stress. Recirculation systems serve air conditioned spaces. If the fans that supply replenishment air to these spaces are secured before the ship is exposed to airborne radioactive contamination, it is possible to restart the recirculation fans and retain the benets of air conditioning. Personnel in these spaces shall wear eye-respiratory protection and may need full body coverage. Comply with the personnel protection requirements in paragraphs 070-4.8.3.1 and 070-4.8.3.2. The spaces shall be monitored for beta radiation to detect inltration. If contamination does inltrate these areas, keep in mind that, when the ship departs the radiological hazard environment, it takes longer to purge compartments ventilated by recirculation systems than other areas. See paragraph 070-4.2.2.2 for guidance. This procedure may be used when the ship is receiving fallout but is not recommended while it is enveloped in the base surge. 070-4.2.1.6 Operation of Conventional Ventilation Systems While the Ship is Receiving Fallout to Reduce Heat Stress. It may not be possible to shut down ventilation in manned machinery spaces, especially in steam powered ships, for more than a few minutes. The heat load builds up quickly with ventilation secured and can cause heat stress in watch standers and overheating of machinery. Thus, it may be necessary to operate machinery space ventilation when the ship is exposed to an airborne radiological hazard. Surveillance for heat stress conditions and monitoring for beta radiation shall continue in these spaces. If respiratory protection and full body coverage is required, the number of individuals in affected spaces shall be minimized and watch standers shall be rotated to avoid heat stress. This guidance may also apply to other compartments served by conventional ventilation that are not air conditioned. The heat load may not build in these spaces up as quickly as it does in machinery spaces, but in a warm climate, it may be necessary to operate the ventilation in spite of airborne radioactive contamination. This procedure may be used if necessary when the ship is receiving fallout but is not recommended while it is enveloped in the base surge. 070-4.2.1.7 Operation of a Conventional Ventilation Systems After the Cessation of Fallout. When the ship is no longer receiving fallout, it is unlikely that any radioactive contamination that was deposited on the ship will be reaerosolized. Conventional ventilation systems can be restarted. These systems shall be reactivated one at a time and selected compartments served by each system shall be monitored for any increase in the level of radioactivity. Preference shall be given to monitoring in compartments in which there was no prior indication of beta activity. Secure conventional during any decontamination operations involving the use of rehoses.

WARNING

Airborne contamination that is deposited on surfaces inside the ship may not be removed by purging. 070-4.2.2 PURGING PROCEDURES. When a ship with one or more conventional ventilation zones has been enveloped in the base surge or fallout, it is likely that the some contamination has diffused into the ship even if 70-82

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 supply and exhaust fans were secured. When the ship is in a clean atmosphere, the ship can relax closures and operate its conventional ventilation systems at maximum rate to purge the interior of airborne radioactive contamination. The percentage of airborne contamination removed based on the number of air changes that have taken place is shown in Table 070-4-1. The time required to exchange one volume of air in each compartment can be determined from the ventilation volume in the Ships Information Book or from the HVAC technical manuals that have been issued for certain classes of ships. Six air changes should be achieved in all compartments if possible to reduce the concentration of airborne radioactive contaminants to negligible levels. Contamination that was deposited on interior surfaces may not be removed by purging. NOTE Purge procedures apply not only to spaces served by conventional ventilation systems, but also to CPS LP zones if beta radiation is detected in them. 070-4.2.2.1 Example of Calculating Purge Time. To nd the time it takes for one air exchange in a given compartment, divide the volume of the compartment by the fresh air ventilation rate. If the compartment has two supply terminals and each provides fresh air at a rate of 400 cubic feet per minute (cfm), the ventilation rate s 400+400=800 cfm. If the dimensions of the compartment are 8 ft. by 10 ft. by 20 ft., then the volume is the product 8 ft. x 10 ft. x 20 ft. = 1600 cu. ft. To nd the time required for one air exchange, the calculation is 1600 cu. ft./800 cfm = 2 minutes. Using Table 070-4-1, to get rid of 99.9 percent of any airborne contamination in the compartment takes six air changes. In this case, 6 x 2 minutes = 12 minutes are required. Table 070-4-1 ESTIMATES OF AIR CHANGES REQUIRED TO REDUCE AGENT CONCENTRATION
Number of Air Changes 1 2 3 4 5 6 Percentage of Agent Removed 65 87 95.5 98.3 99.8 99.9

070-4.2.2.2 Purging a Compartment Served by a Recirculation System. In a compartment with a recirculation system, the basis for the purge time calculation is the rate at which replenishment air is supplied. If the fresh air supply to the recirculation system was secured before the ship was enveloped in the base surge or fallout, the amount of airborne radioactive contamination in the space may be very small. Nonetheless, it takes longer to complete the purge than it would based on total air ow. 070-4.2.2.3 Post-Purge Survey. After the purge procedure is completed, conduct a survey for the presence of beta radiation before unmasking. 070-4.3 NEW CONSTRUCTION CPS TOTAL PROTECTION (TP) ZONES

070-4.3.1 TP ZONE DESIGN. Total Protection zones are referred to as pressure zones. On ships in which the CPS was installed during construction, positive pressure in TP zones is maintained at 2.0 0.5 inches water gauge (wg). CPS fans are designed to operate continuously in all material conditions of readiness. Their damage control classication is WILLIAM, not Circle WILLIAM. The HVAC system in a TP zone is designed for full 70-83

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 time pressurized operation. Operating the zone unpressurized will not harm personnel or equipment but normal airow patterns may be disrupted. Heating or cooling may be diverted from the areas for which it was intended. Drafts may be created as air rushes toward openings. Most important, CBR protection is compromised. Zone pressure can be restored and stabilized within two minutes after all accesses and dampers are realigned for pressurized operation. 070-4.3.1.1 Zone Boundaries. The ventilation system provides a route for the spread of re and smoke from one compartment to another. In order to limit the spread of re in this manner, shipboard ventilation systems are developed on a re zone basis. To keep smoke and ames from traveling throughout the ship in the ventilation ducting, no system can serve more than one re zone. Airborne radiological contamination can travel through these channels also. Thus, use of re zone bulkheads as pressure zone boundaries is a major consideration in selecting TP zone locations. Pressure zone boundaries are designed to coincide with the re zone boundaries whenever possible. Pressure zone boundaries are color coded in blue on DC Plates number two and three for some ship classes. 070-4.3.1.2 Zone Integrity. In order to maintain TP zone integrity, the boundaries are designed to be a minimum of airtight (AT). This does not mean that there is no leakage. The system design makes allowance for some leakage. However, leakage must be kept to a minimum. Proper maintenance of the boundary, including doors, hatches, scuttles, drainage traps, deck penetrations and bulkhead penetrations is necessary to maintain CPS zone integrity. If there is too much leakage of air from a pressure zone, the design positive pressure cannot be maintained. 070-4.3.1.3 TP Zone Access. Accesses to a TP zone are designed to maintain zone pressure. Air locks and pressure locks are small compartments with two doors, one into a TP zone and one to the weather or into an unpressurized part of the ship. Only one door is operated at a time to avoid the loss of the positive pressure in the TP zone. Air locks also have air sweeps that purge vapor contamination from the lock before the door to the TP zone is opened. Additional information on the design and operation of air locks and pressure locks is provided in paragraph 070-4.7.1 and its subordinate paragraphs. The other way to enter a pressure zone is through a CPS decontamination station. The standard design is a four-compartment layout adjacent to the pressure zone that provides a place for contaminated personnel to remove their clothing and cleanse their bodies. An air sweep through the four chambers purges vapor contamination and equalizes the pressure so individuals can enter the decon station from the weather at one end and enter the TP zone at the other. Additional information on the design and operation of a CPS decon station is provided in paragraph 070-4.7.1.6. 070-4.3.1.4 TP Zone Operating Modes. The design intent of the shipboard CPS is for TP zones to be operated in the pressurized mode at all times, regardless of the level of the CBR threat. However, ships with three-position exhaust dampers installed have the option to operate in the unpressurized mode at the discretion of the Commanding Officer. See paragraph 070-4.3.2.3 for a description of the settings on the three-position damper. 070-4.3.1.5 Conditional Spaces (OTP Zones). It may be necessary to open some compartments in a TP zone to the weather for operational reasons. Examples are the pilot house and hoist rooms for ASW equipment, such as NIXIE and TACTASS. Conditional protection is provided to such compartments, which means they can be isolated if necessary to protect the rest of the zone from contamination. This is accomplished by securing closures in the ventilation ducting serving these spaces. On some ships, they are called Optional Total Protection (OTP) zones. 070-4.3.1.6 Compressed Air Systems in TP Zones. Solid, liquid and gaseous contaminants are ltered from compressed air supplied to TP zones. The incoming air passes through a CBR lter before it enters the compres70-84

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 sor. This applies to both high pressure and low pressure systems regardless of whether the compressor is in the TP zone or elsewhere. All the air provided by a compressor that serves a TP zone is ltered, including that going to other parts of the ship that are outside of pressure zones.

070-4.3.2 TP ZONE COMPONENTS. A number of standard ventilation system components are used in collective protection systems, including preheaters, prelters, humidistats, roughing lters, cooling coils and differential pressure gauges. See NSTM Chapter 510, Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning Systems for Surface Ships , for additional information on these items. CPS components are discussed in the following paragraphs and in SS200-AF-MMM-010, Technical Manual for Navy Shipboard Collective Protection System (CPS) - System Description, Operation and Maintenance. Both standard ventilation components and unique CPS components are shown in Figure 070-4-2.

070-4.3.2.1 CBR Filter System. Supply air for TP zones is drawn through CBR lter modules capable of removing solid, liquid, and gaseous contaminants. Each lter module contains a prelter and a CBR lter set. The prelter captures coarse particles, extending the life of the CBR lter set. In the CBR lter set, a High Efficiency Particulate Arresting (HEPA) lter removes solid particles and liquid droplets from the airstream, including those from the base surge and fallout. Three modules are mounted in a housing. Each housing has a rated airow capacity of 600 cfm. The number of housings in a system depends on the supply airow requirements of the TP zone. For information on operation and maintenance, see SS200-AG-MMM-010, Technical Manual for Navy Shipboard Collective Protection System (CPS) - Chemical, Biological and Radiological (CBR) Filter System.

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Figure 070-4-2. Typical CPS Total Protection (TP) Zone

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S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 070-4.3.2.2 TP Zone Supply and Exhaust Fans. High pressure vaneaxial fans are used in the supply side of the system to overcome the pressure drop across the CBR lters and to provide the desired positive pressure inside TP zones. There may be more than one supply fan in a TP zone. Standard centrifugal exhaust fans remove stale air from the TP zone and discharge it to the weather. On most ship classes with CPS, there is one exhaust fan for each supply fan in a zone. Exhaust fans are sized to discharge air at a rate that maintains positive pressure in the TP zone while allowing for leakage and designed losses due to air lock operation. There is an electrical interlock between each exhaust fan and its companion supply fan that prevents the exhaust fan from operating if the supply fan fails. This helps to prevent a low or negative pressure from developing in the TP zone. Also, there is a damper downstream of each supply and exhaust fan that closes the opening to the weather and isolates the fan when it is secured. DDGs have sets of two parallel supply fans that are matched with a single exhaust fan. If one of the supply fans fails, the interlock stops the exhaust fan and secures the damper on the supply fan. If the other supply fan fails also, the interlock secures the dampers on both the exhaust fan and the second supply fan.

070-4.3.2.3 Three-Position Exhaust Damper. The exhaust dampers on some ships are three-position exhaust dampers that can be adjusted to help maintain desired pressurization in TP zones. The damper is manually operated. It is placed in the fully open position when zone pressurization is not required. Since the ventilation system in the zone is designed for pressurized operation, placing the damper in this position may disrupt the normal pattern of airow. Air conditioning may be diverted from areas for which it is intended and odors may accumulate. The intermediate position (partially open) is the normal operating position when the zone is pressurized. The closed position is used in emergencies to help maintain positive pressure. These devices are not installed on DDGs and some LSDs and LHDs.

070-4.3.2.4 Pressure Control Valve (PCV). Pressure Control Valves (PCVs) prevent excessive pressurization of TP zones. A sufficient number of PCVs is installed to prevent the pressure in each pressure zone from exceeding the desired range. PCVs are closed until zone pressure rises to 2.0 0.2 inches wg. They continue to open as the pressure in the zone increases until they are fully open. When the pressure starts to decrease, PCVs begin to close. At 2.0 0.2 inches wg, they are fully closed. For information on operation and maintenance, see SS200-AJ-MMM-010, Technical Manual for Navy Shipboard Collective Protection System (CPS) - Pressure Control Valve, Operation and Maintenance.

070-4.3.2.5 CPS Alarm System. A master panel in DC Central shows the status of each CPS TP zone based on measurements from a zone sensor box with one or more static air probes. At or above 1.5 inches wg a green light indicates that the zone is pressurized. A yellow warning light means that pressure has dropped to between 1.5 inches and 0.4 inches wg. A ashing red light means that zone pressure has dropped below 0.4 inches wg. Some ships have an audible alarm upgrade to the master panel that sounds when the pressure falls below 0.4 inches wg. A slave panel on the bridge has one indicator light for each TP zone that is illuminated only when the pressure falls below 0.4 inches wg. The CPS Alarm on some ships is incorporated into the damage control alarm system at the Central Control Station. A message describing the alarm condition appears on a computer screen. For information on operation and maintenance of a standard design, see SS200-AH-MMM-010, Technical Manual for Navy Shipboard Collective Protection System (CPS) - Alarm System, Operation and Maintenance.

070-4.3.2.6 Zone Pressure Gauges. Pressure gauges are installed throughout each TP zone to provide a local indication of zone pressure. Their readings may vary widely within the same zone due to differences in wind speed and direction at the reference probes of different gauges. True zone pressure is shown only at the alarm panels on many ships. 70-87

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 070-4.3.2.7 Drain Traps in TP Zones. Traps for drains in pressure zones are four inch traps instead of standard two inch traps. The trap could be located outside the pressure zone. This larger size trap is necessary to allow for the differential between the positive pressure in the TP zone and atmospheric pressure. Water in a standard size trap would be forced out. This would allow air from the pressure zone to leak through the plumbing drains, reducing the positive pressure in the zone. When the zone is not pressurized, sewer gasses could leak into the compartments where the drains are located. If a four inch trap loses its water seal, it cannot be recharged while the TP zone is pressurized.

070-4.3.3 TP ZONE OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS. There are four operational conditions based on the pressure in the TP zone, normal operations, excessive pressurization, decient pressurization and casualty condition. They are briey described in the following subparagraphs and summarized, with casualty control procedures, in Table 070-4-2.

070-4.3.3.1 Normal Operations. CPS is designed for continuous operation. Incoming air is always ltered and the fans produce a positive pressure between 1.5 inches and 2.5 inches wg. The CPS Alarm System shows a green light in this condition.

070-4.3.3.2 Excessive Pressurization (High Zone Pressure). If the positive pressure in a TP zone exceeds 2.5 inches wg, it is considered to be in an excessive pressurization condition. Although pressure in this range does not harm personnel or equipment, some operational difficulties can develop. If TP zone pressure exceeds 3.0 inches wg, air lock and pressure lock doors may become difficult to operate. Water in plumbing drain traps may be pushed out, leading to a loss of pressure. The CPS Alarm System shows a green light in this condition, which is the same as in normal operations. Excessive pressure can be noted by observing the local zone pressure gauges.

070-4.3.3.3 Decient Pressurization (Low Zone Pressure). If TP zone positive pressure falls into the range from below 1.5 inches down to 0.4 inches wg, the zone is in a decient operational condition. This may occur suddenly as the result of an equipment casualty or over an extended period of time due to minor degradation of the zone boundary. The CPS Alarm System shows a yellow light in this condition.

070-4.3.3.4 Casualty Condition (Emergency Operation). If TP zone pressure drops below 0.4 inches wg, the system is operating in a casualty condition. Potential causes include those listed above for decient operations and a major breach of zone integrity, possibly from battle damage. The CPS Alarm System shows a red light in this condition.

070-4.3.4 TP ZONE TROUBLE SHOOTING AND CASUALTY CONTROL. When the pressure in a TP zone is outside the normal operating range as described in paragraph 070-4.3.3.1, action must be taken to bring the pressure back into this range. In conditions of excessive or decient pressurization, troubleshooting techniques are used to isolate the cause of the problem so it can be corrected. In a casualty condition, the rst concern is to restore zone pressure above the Minimum Functional Status (MFS) of 0.4 inches wg. Troubleshooting guidance is found in chapter seven of SS200-AG-MMM-010, Technical Manual for Navy Shipboard Collective Protection System (CPS), System Description, Operation and Maintenance and the technical manuals for various CPS components. Casualty control procedures for specic operating conditions are discussed in paragraphs 070-4.3.4.1 through 070-4.3.4.5 and summarized in Table 070-4-2. 70-88

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 NOTE The alarm indicator lights on the CPS Alarm System shall be checked once each watch by pressing the lamp test pushbutton on the front of the alarm panel. Bulbs shall be changed on any lights that fail to operate. If this does not restore the lights to proper operation, troubleshooting shall commence immediately to determine the cause and correct the problem. NOTE Normal operation of air locks and pressure locks can cause zone pressure to uctuate. Pressure should stabilize after such disruptions within two minutes.

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Table 070-4-2 OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS AND CASUALTY CONTROL Operational Condition Normal Operation Positive Pressure Range CPS 1.5 to 2.5 wg; SACPS 0.5 to 1.5 wg CPS >2.5 wg: SACPS >1.5 wg CPS <1.5 to 0.4 wg; (SACPS has no comparable operational condition.) Possible Causes of Malfunction Momentary, self-correcting variations may occur due to operation of air locks and pressure locks. PCV malfunction; Exhaust fan failure; accidental closure of damper or air sweep. Failure of a supply fan with interlock malfunction; loss of water seal in drain trap; improper operation of air lock or pressure lock; degraded gaskets on access ttings; minor deterioration of zone boundary Multiple casualties from list above for decient pressurization; major breach of zone boundary Casualty Control Options None required.

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S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2

Excessive Pressurization (High Zone Pressure) Decient Pressurization (Low Zone Pressure)

Locate and correct malfunction or accidental closure. 1. If this condition develops as a sudden pressure drop or a sustained decline in pressure, arrest loss of pressure by securing exhaust fans, dampers or air sweeps. 2. Locate and correct malfunction. 1. In base surge or fallout, pass word to don protective masks and full body coverage in affected zone. 2. Monitor for beta radiation. 3. Restore zone pressure to at least 0.4 wg (0.5 for SACPS) by securing exhaust fans, dampers, air sweeps; multi-zone ships implement zone boosting in accordance with para. 070-4.3.4.4. 4. If necessary, isolate casualties or breaches of zone integrity from rest of zone in accordance with para. 070-4.3.4.3. 5. Correct casualties or breaches. 6. In a radiological hazard environment, survey for contamination in accordance with para. 070-4.3.4.5. 7. Reconnect isolated areas only after beta monitoring conrm that no contamination is present.

Casualty Condition (Emer- CPS <0.4 wg; gency Operation) SACPS <0.5 wg

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 070-4.3.4.1 Casualty Control Procedures for Excessive Pressurization of TP Zone (High Zone Pressure). Attempt to lower zone pressure into the desired range by putting one or more three-position exhaust dampers in the fully open position. Check all exhaust dampers for proper operation. Monitor zone pressure while executing these procedures. It should fall but do not allow it to remain consistently low. If necessary, allow a high pressure condition to continue and warn all hands on the general announcing system that air lock and pressure lock doors may be difficult to operate. Perform trouble shooting and repairs in accordance with the following list and the applicable CPS technical manuals. 1. Check the air sweeps in air locks and CPS decon stations for proper operation. 2. Check each exhaust fan for proper operation. If an exhaust fan has failed, the companion supply fan can be secured to lower zone pressure unless it is the only operational supply fan in the affected TP zone. 3. Check to see that three-position exhaust dampers (if so outtted) are properly set. Ensure that standard exhaust dampers have not been closed accidentally. 4. Check Pressure Control Valves (PCVs) for proper operation. 5. Check exhaust ducting and discharge ports for blockage. 6. Ensure that dampers in the exhaust ducting are open.

WARNING

In a casualty condition when a TP zone is operating below the design pressure for normal operations, air lock purging times shall be increased to allow for the reduced ow through the air sweeps. It takes longer to achieve seven to nine air changes than it would under normal conditions. 070-4.3.4.2 Casualty Control Procedures for Decient Pressurization of TP Zone (Low Zone Pressure). Generally, no adjustments to restore zone pressure are necessary other than to nd and correct the cause of the pressure loss. Perform trouble shooting and repairs in accordance with the following list and the applicable CPS technical manuals. This could be considered a casualty situation if a sudden pressure drop occurs or a steady pressure drop continues. In this case, immediate steps should be taken to arrest the pressure drop. The emergency measures for restoring zone pressure provided in paragraph 070-4.3.4.3, step 2, are applicable. 1. In a radiologically contaminated environment, pass the word that additional time is required for purging air locks when entering or exiting the affected TP zone. Personnel who have been topside or otherwise exposed to radiological contamination may enter the zone only through a decontamination station. 2. Ensure that all zone boundaries are secure, rst accesses, then drain traps and cableways. 3. Check to see that three-position exhaust dampers (if so outtted) are properly set. 4. Check for obstructions in supply ductwork, including clogged lters and closed dampers. 5. Check each supply fan and its interlock with its companion exhaust fan. 6. Check Pressure Control Valves (PCVs) for proper operation. 7. Check deck drain traps to ensure that they are lled with water to the proper level. If the water seal is lost in 70-91

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 a contaminated environment, it may not be possible to restore it until the ship has reached a clean atmosphere. In this case, a DC plug may be used in the drain to temporarily stop the leakage of air. 070-4.3.4.3 Casualty Control Procedures for Casualty Condition of TP Zone (Emergency Operation). This condition may develop gradually as the conditions described in paragraph 070-4.3.4.2 worsen or it may be the result of a major breach of zone integrity, such as battle damage, or the loss of a set of fans. Even a slight positive pressure, less than 0.4 inches wg, provides some protection against radioactive contaminants if the ow of ltered air can be maintained. The rst priority is to restore and maintain zone pressure in the 0.4 to 1.5 inch wg range. The second is to make repairs and restore zone pressure to the design operating range. Perform trouble shooting and repairs in accordance with the following list and the applicable CPS technical manuals. 1. In a contaminated environment: a Pass the word for all personnel in the affected zone to don masks. b Pass the word that additional time is required for purging air locks when entering or exiting the affected TP zone. Personnel who have been topside or otherwise exposed to radiological contamination may enter the zone only through a decontamination station. c Monitor for a beta radiation to determine if the TP zone has been contaminated. d Don masks and protective clothing as needed in accordance with paragraphs 070-4.8.3 through 070-4.8.3.4. 2. To restore zone pressure, implement the following measures in the order given until the positive pressure is in the 0.4 - 1.5 inch wg range: a Ensure that the dampers are closed on any fans that have stopped or been secured. b Secure an exhaust fan and close its dampers. c Secure CPS decontamination station and close air sweep. d Secure selected air locks and secure their air sweeps. e Isolate damaged areas from the rest of the zone if possible. f Attempt to maintain some pressure in a damaged pressure zone with air from an adjacent pressure zone until the damage can be repaired. This is called zone boosting. Guidelines on the use of this procedure are found in paragraph 070-4.3.4.4. 3. If the pressure loss in the damaged zone cannot be controlled, the entire zone shall be isolated and manned by personnel wearing appropriate protective clothing.

WARNING

Under certain conditions, pressure from one TP zone may be used to boost the pressure in an adjacent TP zone in which a CPS casualty has occurred. The pressure in both zones is likely to remain below the design range for normal operations. In this case, air lock purging times shall be increased in both zones to allow for the reduced ow through the air sweeps. It takes longer to achieve seven to nine air changes than it would under normal conditions. 070-4.3.4.4 Zone Boosting. Some pressure can be maintained in a damaged TP zone with zone boosting. In this procedure, air from an adjacent, fully functional TP zone is used to pressurize the damaged TP zone until the 70-92

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 casualty can be repaired. In zone boosting, interconnecting doors between the damaged zone and the functional TP zone are opened. The following conditions must be satised to use zone boosting. a. The adjacent zone is at least as large the decient TP zone. b. Monitoring in the decient TP zone indicates no contamination is present (no beta radiation). c. The positive pressure in the combined zones can be maintained at or above 0.4 inches wg. 070-4.3.4.5 Isolating TP Zones or Areas Within TP Zones. If the pressure in a TP zone cannot be maintained 0.4 inches wg or more above atmospheric with zone boosting, it is necessary to isolate the TP zone, or an area within it, from the rest of the Collective Protection System. To isolate an area within a zone, close all accesses to the area and block all ventilation openings into it. To isolate a TP zone, open the air sweeps on type III air locks into the isolated zone. If the casualty can be restored, the isolated zone or area can be reconnected to the CPS only if beta monitoring determines that no contamination is present. 070-4.3.4.6 CPS Reset Procedure. In an uncontaminated environment, normal start-up procedures can be used to reset a CPS zone that has been operating in the unpressurized mode due to a casualty. In a contaminated environment, some added precautions are required. a. The zone shall be monitored to conrm that it is free of beta contamination. b. Check all drain traps before raising zone pressure. The loop seals cannot be restored under pressure. c. Air sweeps on Type I and II air locks and CPS decontamination stations shall not be reopened until zone pressure is at 0.4 inches wg or above. 070-4.4 NEW CONSTRUCTION CPS LIMITED PROTECTION (LP) ZONES

070-4.4.1 LP ZONE DESIGN AND COMPONENTS. Limited Protection (LP) zones are designed to provide protection against CBR contaminants in a solid or liquid form. Limited protection is achieved by passing incoming air through HEPA lters. The HEPA lters remove aerosols and larger particles from the air supply, so radioactive particles from the base surge and fallout cannot enter an LP zone through the ventilation system. LP zones are not pressurized, so it is possible for radiological contamination to enter by other routes. Normally, if machinery spaces are included in a CPS, they are covered by limited protection, with the possible exception of Engineering Operating Stations, which may be in TP zones. Machinery spaces are generally large compartments and the heat load may be fairly high. As a result, they require a very high ventilation rate. TP coverage is impractical because of the weight, space and power requirements of the additional fans that would be needed to pressurize these hot, large volume spaces. While the ship is exposed to airborne radioactive contamination, a mask-only posture is sufficient in LP zones if three conditions are met. a. No accesses to contaminated areas are opened, as explained in Table 070-4-3. b. The TP zone from which make-up air is provided is functioning properly. See paragraphs 070-4.2.1.2 and 070-4.4.1.2 for an explanation of makeup air to machinery spaces. c. Bulkhead and deck penetrations for piping and cabling are properly sealed. 70-93

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 070-4.4.1.1 LP Zone Access. Type II air locks provide access between LP zones and TP zones. Standard access ttings are used between LP zones and unprotected spaces but their use is restricted in a contaminated environment. See Table 070-4-3 for guidance.

WARNING

Diesel and gas turbine enclosures cannot be isolated from outside air. If it is necessary to enter these spaces to take readings in a contaminated environment, airborne radiological contamination could enter and contaminate the machinery space. 070-4.4.1.2 LP Zone Excess Exhaust. As explained in paragraph 070-4.2.1.2, machinery space ventilation is designed with an excess of exhaust capacity over supply to allow for expansion of air due to heat. In LP zones, make-up air is provided from TP zones through the air sweeps in Type II air locks. Thus, air from the outside of the ship does not bypass the HEPA lters and enter the LP zones as make-up air. 070-4.4.1.3 Compressed Air Systems in LP Zones. Solid, liquid and gaseous contaminants are ltered from compressed air supplied to LP zones. The incoming air is ltered before it enters the compressor. 070-4.4.1.4 LP Zone HEPA Filter System. Supply air for LP zones is ltered through HEPA lters with a rated ow capacity of 2000 cfm. The number of lters in the system depends on the supply airow requirements of the LP zone. A Navy Standard Impingement Filter (NSIF) is installed upstream of each HEPA lter to remove large dust particles from the airstream and extend the life of the HEPA lter. 070-4.4.1.5 Other LP Zone Ventilation Components. There are no other special ventilation components or features for LP zones. Conventional ventilation equipment is used for standard applications. 070-4.4.2 VENTILATION CONTROL IN LP ZONES. As long as the conditions listed in paragraph 070-4.4.1 are maintained, it is unlikely that LP zones will become contaminated. If these conditions are not maintained, casualty control in LP zones consists of the same ventilation control measures and purging procedures that are prescribed for conventional ventilation systems in paragraphs 070-4.2.1.3 and 070-4.2.2, respectively. 070-4.5 SELECTED AREA COLLECTIVE PROTECTION SYSTEM (SACPS)

070-4.5.1 SACPS ZONE DESIGN. The Selected Area Collective Protection System is installed as a backt on selected ships that were built prior to the introduction of the Collective Protection System on new ship construction. SACPS provides ltered ventilation supply air to protected zones on demand. A slight positive pressure is maintained in each zone to prevent airborne CBR contaminants from entering through leaks at the zone boundary. Limited protection, dened in paragraph 070-4.1.2.2, is not included in an SACPS design. SACPS zone boundaries are watertight or airtight. SACPS designs make use of existing ventilation equipment to minimize modications to the ship during retrot. Some of the major differences in design between SACPS and CPS are described in the following paragraphs. 070-4.5.1.1 SACPS Coverage. SACPS is provided for selected operational and stand-down areas. Machinery spaces are not included. The number, size and arrangement of SACPS zones vary from ship to ship. The percent70-94

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 age of the ship to which protection is provided is likely to be lower with SACPS than with new construction CPS. It is harder and more expensive to add collective protection as a backt than integrating it in the original design and installing it during construction. 070-4.5.1.2 SACPS Positive Pressure. wg above atmospheric. Pressure in an SACPS TP zone is maintained between 0.5 and 1.5 inches

070-4.5.1.3 SACPS Zone Operating Modes. SACPS is normally operated in the unpressurized mode in current designs. It is operated in the pressurized mode when a CBR threat exists. 070-4.5.1.4 SACPS Zone Access. Air locks are provided for access to SACPS zones. Pressure locks are not normally included in SACPS designs. SACPS decontamination stations could also be included in future SACPS designs. The guidance in Table 070-4-3 applies to access to an activated SACPS zone for air locks and CPS decon stations, if installed. If a ship with SACPS does not have an SACPS decon station, personnel who have been topside or otherwise exposed to radioactive contamination shall go through the decontamination process in a conventional decon station. If they need to enter an SACPS zone, they shall proceed from the decon station to an air lock through a part of the ship that is not contaminated. Air lock procedures are similar to those provided for new construction CPS air locks in paragraph 070-4.7.1.3. Details are provided in the SACPS technical manual for the ship class. Purge times shall be posted outside both air lock doors. 070-4.5.2 SACPS ZONE COMPONENTS. Existing HVAC components are used in SACPS to the extent possible. Some unique SACPS equipment is added. 070-4.5.2.1 SACPS Supply Fans. High pressure centrifugal fans are added as a part of the backt to provide positive pressure in the SACPS zones. 070-4.5.2.2 SACPS Alarm System. An SACPS alarm panel somewhere in each TP zone alerts the crew when pressure has dropped below the Minimum Functional Status (MFS), 0.5 inches wg above atmospheric pressure. A green light on the panel indicates that the pressure in the zone is above MFS. If the pressure drops below this level, a red light comes on and an audible alarm sounds at the alarm panel. There is no yellow light on the SACPS alarm panel. 070-4.5.2.3 Drain Traps in SACPS Zones. inches deep. The plumbing drain traps in an SACPS zone shall be at least two

070-4.5.2.4 Other SACPS Components. The same CBR lters, prelters and lter housings used in new construction CPS are used in SACPS. Pressure control valves (PCVs) used in SACPS are similar to those used in new construction but they operate in the SACPS pressure range. The zone pressure gauges are also similar to their CPS counterparts but they are marked in accordance with the operating conditions of SACPS. Since SACPS is not designed for full time pressurized operation, there is no need for a three position exhaust damper. 070-4.5.3 SACPS OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS. There are three operational conditions based on the pressure in the SACPS zone, normal operations, excessive pressurization and casualty condition. There is no decient pressurization condition. They are briey described in the following subparagraphs. The casualty control procedures for excessive pressurization and casualty condition are summarized in Table 070-4-2, with differences 70-95

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 between CPS and SACPS noted. CPS procedures are described in paragraph 070-4.3.4 and its subordinate paragraphs. They should be used for guidance, with appropriate modications for SACPS differences. 070-4.5.3.1 Normal Operations. The pressure is .5 to 1.5 inches wg above atmospheric. The SACPS Alarm System shows a green light in this condition. 070-4.5.3.2 Excessive Pressurization (High Zone Pressure). If positive pressure in an SACPS zone exceeds 1.5 inches wg, it is considered to be in an excessive pressurization condition. Although positive pressures above this level do not harm personnel or equipment, some operational difficulties can develop. Air lock and pressure lock doors may become difficult to operate. Water in plumbing drain traps may be pushed out, leading to a loss of pressure. The SACPS Alarm System shows a green light in this condition. Excessive pressure can be noted by observing zone pressure gauges. 070-4.5.3.3 Casualty Condition. If SACPS zone positive pressure drops below 0.5 inches wg, the system is operating in a casualty condition. This may occur suddenly as a result of an equipment casualty or a major breach of zone integrity, possibly from battle damage. It may also occur gradually, over an extended period of time, due to minor degradation of the zone boundary. The SACPS Alarm System shows a red light in this condition. 070-4.6 CPS MAINTENANCE

070-4.6.1 ORGANIZATIONAL AND INTERMEDIATE LEVEL MAINTENANCE RESPONSIBILITIES. Replacement of CPS lters and prelters and leak tests on CBR lter systems are performed by an intermediate maintenance facility. Other troubleshooting and maintenance actions, including replacement of prelters, are performed by ships force. 070-4.6.2 CPS AND SACPS TECHNICAL DOCUMENTATION. Maintenance and operation of CPS, SACPS and their components are described in the technical manuals listed in Appendix B. 070-4.7 ACCESS TO CPS ZONES

070-4.7.1 ACCESS CONTROL. Air locks, pressure locks and CPS decontamination stations provide access to TP zones while maintaining the positive pressure and preventing the entry of contaminants. 070-4.7.1.1 Air Locks. An air lock is a small, two-door compartment. The inner door opens to a pressurized zone, the outer door to an unpressurized area or another TP zone. Air locks vary in size, depending on ship arrangements and the need for special congurations. A typical air lock is shown in Figure 070-4-3. When properly used, they allow personnel to enter and exit pressure zones without pressure loss or introduction of airborne contamination into the zone. To ensure that pressurization is not lost in transiting to and from the pressurized area, only one door is opened at a time. The air lock is swept diagonally from top to bottom with ltered air from the TP zone to purge airborne contamination that may enter when the outer door is opened in a CBR hazard environment. There are three types of air locks. a. Type I - An air lock that connects a TP zone with the weather. Air from the TP zone is swept continuously from top to bottom and across the air lock. In a contaminated environment, a type I air lock can be used only to exit, not to enter, the ship. 70-96

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 b. Type II - An air lock that connects a TP zone with an LP zone or other unpressurized internal areas of the ship. Air from the TP zone is swept continuously from top to bottom and across the air lock. Personnel in interior spaces in which the absence of beta radiation has been conrmed may use a Type II air lock to enter a TP zone.

CAUTION

Activating the air sweep in a Type III air lock may cause a reduction in pressure in the TP zone that is providing the air. It may be necessary to secure the air sweeps to some of the Type I or II air locks in that zone while a Type III air lock is in use. c. Type III - An air lock that is used to connect two pressure zones. This type of air lock is used as a damage control feature should pressure be lost in one of the zones. These air locks have ttings that allow purging in either direction. The air sweep ttings of the Type III air lock are normally closed. However, in the event that an adjacent zone is breached and loses pressure, the air sweeps of the type III air lock leading to that zone can be activated to establish a new CPS boundary. With the air sweeps operating, a Type III air lock can be used as a Type II air lock.

WARNING

In a casualty condition when a TP zone is operating below design pressure, air lock purging times shall be increased to allow for the reduced ow through the air sweeps. It takes longer to achieve seven to nine air changes than it would under normal conditions.

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S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2

Figure 070-4-3. Typical Air Lock Conguration

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S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 070-4.7.1.2 Purging Air Locks. After the outer door is closed, seven to nine air changes sufficiently reduce the concentration of any contamination in the air lock to a level at which the inner door can be opened with little risk of contaminating the TP zone. Purge times vary with size of air locks. A typical 4 ft x 4 ft x 7 ft air lock, swept with the design air ow of 420 cubic feet per minute (420 CFM), can be purged in two (seven air changes) to two and a half (nine air changes) minutes. Larger air locks take longer to purge. The procedure for calculating purge time is illustrated in paragraph 070-4.2.2.1. Purge times shall be posted outside both entrances to an air lock.

WARNING

An air lock on which the air sweeps have been secured for casualty control purposes or any other reason shall not be used in a CBR hazard environment.

WARNING

When using air locks, care shall be taken to prevent the doors from rapidly opening or closing and possibly causing personnel injury. This may occur when an air lock door is opened while the opposite door is open, or when both doors are opened simultaneously. To prevent injury, air locks are equipped with safety latches that prevent rapid opening or closing of doors. CAUTION

A viewing port is provided in air lock doors for safety. Before opening the door to enter an air lock, personnel shall look into the lock to ensure that it is unoccupied and that the other door is closed. 070-4.7.1.3 Entering and Exiting Air Locks. If there is no CBR threat, it is not necessary to wait for an air lock to purge but it is necessary to open only one door at a time to avoid losing pressurization. The following guidance is provided for entering or exiting an airlock in a radiological warfare environment in which airborne contamination is a hazard. More specic procedures may be provided for individual ships or classes in DC books, Ships Information Books or HVAC manuals. a. Entering the TP zone - Personnel within an enclosed area of the ship that has not been contaminated (no beta radiation) can enter a TP zone through a Type II air lock. The person shall close and dog the outer door and wait in the air lock for the specied period of time to allow purging of airborne contaminants (seven to nine air changes) that entered the air lock when the outside door was opened. When the purge cycle is complete, the individual opens the inner door and enters the TP zone. b. Exiting the TP zone - When exiting a CPS zone through any type of air lock, personnel shall don gas masks and, if required, protective clothing, before entering the air lock. Exiting personnel shall wait for one purge cycle (seven to nine air changes) before opening the inner door. This ensures that there are no airborne con70-99

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 taminants in the air lock when the inner door is opened. When the purge cycle is complete, the person then enters the air lock, closes and dogs the inner door, immediately exits and closes the outer door.

WARNING

A pressure lock shall not be used to enter or exit a TP zone in a contaminated environment.

WARNING

When using pressure locks, care shall be taken to prevent the doors from rapidly opening or closing and possibly causing personnel injury. This may occur when a pressure lock door is opened while the opposite door is open, or when both doors are opened simultaneously. To prevent injury, pressure lock doors are equipped with safety latches that prevent rapid opening or closing of doors.

WARNING

A viewing port is provided in pressure lock doors for safety. Before opening the door to enter a pressure lock, personnel shall look into the lock to ensure that it is unoccupied and that the other door is closed. 070-4.7.1.4 Pressure Locks. Pressure locks are similar to air locks in conguration but do not have air sweep ttings for purging. Pressure locks provide routine access to a TP zone in an uncontaminated environment while maintaining positive pressure. The procedures for using a pressure lock are the same as those for an air lock in an uncontaminated environment. Like air locks, only one door is opened at a time. The rst door opened shall be dogged before opening the second. 070-4.7.1.5 Revolving Pressure Doors. Some LHD 1 class ships have a revolving pressure door between TP Zone 2 and the messing areas for the crew and embarked troops. It facilitates access between these spaces when the ship is operating in the pressurized mode in an uncontaminated environment. To reduce wear and tear on the gaskets, the revolving pressure doors shall not be used when the ship is operating in the unpressurized mode. 070-4.7.1.6 CPS Decontamination Station. Personnel in compartments where beta radiation has been detected and all personnel whose duties require them to be on the weather decks in a radiological hazard environment, shall enter a CPS zone only through a CPS decontamination station. These single purpose installations are activated only in a chemical, biological or radiological hazard environment. They are not used as heads or for any other purpose other than CBR decontamination. The standard design is a four-compartment layout adjacent to a pressure zone. Personnel enter from the weather through the Outer Clothing Undressing Area (OCUA), proceed to the Inner Clothing Undressing Area (ICUA), then into the shower and, nally, into the Contamination Purge Lock (CPL) before entering the TP zone. As an individual is processed through a CPS decon station, the door to 70-100

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 each compartment is closed before opening the door to the next compartment. This prevents loss of pressurization in the TP zone. The positive pressure from the zone is stepped down in each of the four compartments to create an air sweep from the CPL into the shower, then the ICUA and, lastly, the OCUA, from which it is exhausted to the weather. A more detailed description of the standard layout is provided in paragraph 070-5.5.3.4. Personnel decontamination procedures in a CPS decon station are described in paragraph 070-5.5.4.7 through 070-5.5.4.11 alongside the procedures in a conventional decon station. 070-4.7.1.7 TP Zone Access. The types of accesses that may be used to enter and exit CPS zones in contaminated and uncontaminated environments are summarized in Table 070-4-3. 070-4.8 INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION

070-4.8.1 FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR INDIVIDUAL PROTECTIVE CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT. Protective clothing and equipment is worn to keep radiological contamination from reaching and entering the body. If contamination is taken into the body by ingestion or inhalation, it can be deposited close to vital organs where continuous exposure to radiation can cause injury or illness. It also provides shielding against beta radiation from external sources, but it cannot stop gamma radiation or neutrons. The next four paragraphs describe specic functions that protective clothing and equipment perform. 070-4.8.1.1 Respiratory Protection. Respiratory protection is required in certain situations in a radiological environment to ensure that no contamination is inhaled. The base surge is particularly dangerous because its particles are small enough to be inhaled and retained in the lungs.

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Table 070-4-3 CPS ZONE ENTRY AND EXIT (ALL PROTECTED ZONES INTACT, TP ZONES PRESSURIZED) From TP Zone TP Zone TP Zone LP Zone LP Zone TP Zone Unpressurized space (Note 1) Weather Deck TP Zone Interior Space with conventional ventilation To Uncontaminated Environment Type III Air Lock or Pressure Lock Air Lock or Pressure Lock Type I Air Lock or Pressure Lock Type II Air Lock or Pressure Lock In current ship congurations, machinery space escape trunks are the only accesses of this type. They are intended for use in emergencies, not routine access. In current ship congurations, machinery space escape trunks are the only accesses of this type. They are intended for use in emergencies, not routine access. Type II Air Lock or Pressure Lock Contaminated Environment Pressure Lock (if zone pressure is at MFS or above) or Type III Air Lock. Air Lock (Note 2) Type I Air Lock Type II Air Lock LP zone can be contaminated with airborne radioactive contamination if these accesses are opened. They are intended for emergency egress only. LP zone can be contaminated with airborne radioactive contamination if these accesses are opened. They are intended for emergency egress only.

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LP Zone

Weather Deck

Interior Space with conventional ventilation (Note 3) Interior Space with conventional ventilation

If no beta radiation is detected in the unprotected space, Type II Air Lock. If presence of beta radiation indicates inltration has occurred, CPS Decon Station. LP Zone In current ship congurations, machinery space LP zone can be contaminated with aerosols if these escape trunks are the only accesses of this type. accesses are opened. LP zone can be contaminated with liquid or solid agent if these accesses are used for entry. They are intended for use in emergencies, not They are intended for emergency egress only. routine access. Weather Deck TP Zone Type I Air Lock or Pressure Lock CPS Decon Station Weather Deck LP Zone In current ship congurations, machinery space LP zone can be contaminated with airborne or deposited escape trunks are the only accesses of this type. radioactive contamination if these accesses are opened They are intended for use in emergencies, not or used for entry. They are intended for emergency routine access. egress only. Note 1. Includes LP zones, spaces with conventional ventilation and conditional spaces (OTP zones) that have been isolated from the rest of the TP zone for operational reasons. Note 2. Direct access from a TP zone to an adjacent conditional space that has been isolated is not permitted except through an airlock in a contaminated environment. Note 3. Includes conditional spaces (OTP zones) that have been isolated from the TP zone.

TP Zone

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 070-4.8.1.2 Shielding Against Beta Radiation. Although beta radiation cannot penetrate to vital organs from outside the body, it can damage the skin. Beta particles can be stopped by layered clothing. Full face protection may be required as well. 070-4.8.1.3 Protection of the Body from Contact With Contamination. If contamination is allowed to come in contact with the body, it is dangerous for three reasons. First, at close range, the intensity of the radiation from the contamination is more intense. Second, the contamination can be transferred through the mouth or nose into the lungs or stomach, or through breaks in the skin into the bloodstream. Third, it can cause beta burns, which are skin lesions that begin to develop two weeks after contact. Protective clothing minimizes these problems. 070-4.8.1.4 Facilitation of Personnel Decontamination. The personnel decontamination process is simplied if most or all radiological contamination can be removed by doffing outer garments. Special procedures for removal of contaminated clothing are provided in paragraph 070-5.5.4.7.

WARNING

These protective clothing requirements apply only to sources of residual radiation from a nuclear explosion. Separate requirements are established for contamination from nuclear weapon accidents or incidents and nuclear propulsion casualty control. 070-4.8.2 INDIVIDUAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT. Several different types of clothing can satisfy the functional requirements for individual protection against radiological contamination. 070-4.8.2.1 Respiratory Protection Equipment. To satisfy the functional requirements in the preceding paragraphs, the following characteristics are needed: full-face coverage, the capability to maintain a good seal on the face and either mechanical ltration or a self-contained atmosphere. The MCU-2/P and the MCU-2A/P ChemicalBiological Protective masks can be used for radiological protection. The capabilities, use and maintenance of these masks are discussed in NAVSHIPS 0910-LP-251-4200, Technical Manual for Operation and Maintenance Instructions with Illustrated Parts Breakdown, Chemical-Biological Mask Type MCU-2/P, MCU-2A/P. The use of the Audio Projection Set (APS) with the MCU-2/P series mask is discussed in NSTM Chapter 470, Shipboard BW/CW Defense and Countermeasures , Section 5. The lters for these masks contain a High Efficiency Particulate Arresting Filter (HEPA) to remove solid and liquid contaminants and activated charcoal to absorb chemical agent vapor. The HEPA lter alone is sufficient to stop the penetration of radiological contamination. Other types of breathing devices, such as the oxygen breathing apparatus (OBA), also satisfy the requirements. NOTE If there is no chemical warfare threat, C2 training canisters can be used with the MCU-2/P and MCU-2A/P masks for radiological protection until they become clogged. C2 training canisters are discussed in NSTM Chapter 470, Shipboard BW/CW Defense and Countermeasures , paragraph 470-5.2.6.2. 070-4.8.2.2 Protective Clothing. Durable clothing made from ne weave cloth or a plastic or rubber material shall be worn for protection in a radiological environment. Shipboard work uniforms, utility clothing, foul 70-103

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 weather gear and battle dress items that satisfy this requirement can be used. Garments shall be easy to remove to minimize the risk of transfer of contamination to the wearer. The degree of protection required determines the amount of body coverage. When full body coverage is specied, no exposed skin is allowed. It includes gloves and a head covering. Respiratory protection equipment provides some coverage for the head, but it may be necessary to use it in combination with a hood, hat or helmet and a collar to achieve full body coverage. Cuffs at the wrists and ankles shall be secure. Elastic cuffs are adequate for this purpose. If the clothing does not have elastic cuffs, rubber bands or masking tape may be used. Sleeves shall overlap gloves at the wrists and trousers shall overlap boots at the ankles. Layered clothing provides better shielding against beta radiation. Several combinations of clothing available aboard ship satisfy these requirements, including the Chemical Protective Ensemble (CPE). However, the Chemical Protective Overgarment (CPO) and the Advanced Chemical Protective Overgarment (ACPG) should not be used unless there is a chemical threat. The components of the CPE are described in NSTM Chapter 470, Shipboard BW/CW Defense and Countermeasures . 070-4.8.3 INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS. The degree of protection should be compatible with the contamination potential. The most stringent requirements apply when the ship is in the base surge, during the arrival of fallout and during topside decontamination. Otherwise, the efficiency of personnel shall not be unnecessarily restricted by requiring more protective clothing than is necessary. 070-4.8.3.1 Individual Protection When the Ship Is Enveloped in the Base Surge. The base surge is a radioactive aerosol. It is composed of very small water droplets or very ne dust particles. Particles or droplets in an aerosol range in diameter from 1-20 microns. The nose hairs are very efficient at ltering particles above ve microns in diameter but some of the smaller ones can get through to the lungs. Therefore, the following requirements are established for respiratory protection when the ship is exposed to the base surge. a. If possible, no one shall be allowed topside while the ship is enveloped in the base surge. In an operational emergency, full body coverage and respiratory protection are required for topside personnel. b. In a space with conventional ventilation, even if Circle William ttings are closed and the supply and exhaust systems serving the compartment are secured, all personnel in that space shall wear full body coverage and respiratory protection until the absence of beta radiation is conrmed. Full body coverage may be relaxed if no beta activity is detected but the mask shall be worn. c. If it becomes necessary to operate the ventilation to avoid heat stress on personnel or overheating of equipment, full body coverage and respiratory protection are required for all personnel in that space until the absence of beta radiation can be reconrmed. Full body coverage may be relaxed if no beta activity is detected, but the mask shall be worn. 070-4.8.3.2 Individual Protection During Deposition of Fallout. As stated in paragraph 070-1.3.9.3, only early fallout is of tactical signicance. Most of the smaller particles that could be retained by the lungs can take months or years to settle as worldwide fallout. Early fallout, that which arrives in the rst 24 hours after the burst, does not pose a signicant respiratory hazard. Most of the fallout particles that fall to the surface during this period are large enough that they can be ltered by conventional ventilation systems or even the nose hairs. However, beta burns can result from contact with fallout particles. This is a hazard to the skin and nasal passages. Therefore, the following requirements are established for individual protection when the ship is receiving fallout. a. If possible, no one shall be allowed topside while the ship is receiving fallout. In an operational emergency, full body coverage and respiratory protection are required for topside personnel. b. In a space with conventional ventilation, even if Circle William ttings are closed and the supply and exhaust 70-104

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 systems serving the compartment are secured, all personnel in that space shall wear full body coverage and respiratory protection until the absence of beta radiation is conrmed. c. If it becomes necessary to operate the ventilation to avoid heat stress on personnel or overheating of equipment, full body coverage and respiratory protection are required for all personnel in that space until the absence of beta radiation can be reconrmed. 070-4.8.3.3 Protective Clothing Required Under Wet Spray Conditions. Wet spray conditions include rain, sea spray, operation of the countermeasure washdown system and topside decontamination. They do not apply if the deck is simply wet. Some special requirements apply to topside personnel under these conditions. a. Protective clothing requirements for any personnel who must be topside during the arrival of fallout under wet weather conditions are full body coverage and respiratory protection. Rain gear shall be used as the outer layer. b. Protective clothing requirements for decontamination teams are full body coverage and respiratory protection. Rain gear shall be used as the outer layer. 070-4.8.3.4 Protective Clothing Required for Contact Hazard. Reaerosolization is unlikely to produce a respiratory hazard after the cessation of fallout. The level of beta radiation normally decreases faster than that of gamma, so if the level of gamma radiation is acceptable, full skin coverage is most likely not needed. Therefore, normal work clothing with gloves is adequate in most situations after fallout ceases. There are two exceptions. In the vicinity of hot spots, full body coverage and respiratory protection are required. Also, Contamination Control Area (CCA) personnel shall wear full body coverage and respiratory protection if there is any indication of beta radiation. SECTION 5. RADIOLOGICAL EXPOSURE CONTROL 070-5.1 INTRODUCTION

070-5.1.1 RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION. Radiological contamination is simply radioactive material in an area where it is not desired. It is not the radiation but the source of it. The radiation from nuclear fallout consists primarily of gamma rays and beta particles that are emitted from unstable nuclei as they decay. 070-5.1.2 RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL. Radiological control is the employment of systems, equipment and procedures that minimize the irradiation or contamination of personnel and the shipboard environment. The objective is to limit the total dose received by individuals from both internal and external sources and to minimize the transfer of contamination into the interior of the ship and from outside to inside the body of any individual. There are four basic types of radiological control measures. a. Contamination Avoidance. These procedures employ systems, equipment and tactics that prevent or minimize the deposition of fallout on a ship, inside it or on personnel. b. Radiation Mitigation. These methods use shielding and distance to reduce the intensity of radiation to which personnel are exposed and keep accumulated exposure as low as possible. c. Ship Decontamination. These measures remove contamination from ship surfaces and topside equipment. 70-105

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 d. Decontamination of Personnel, Clothing and Portable Equipment. These techniques minimize the transfer of contamination from the protective clothing to the body and the spread of contamination inside the ship. Procedures are provided for removal of contamination from an individuals skin, outer garments, battle dress items, work clothing and tools.

070-5.2

CONTAMINATION AVOIDANCE

070-5.2.1 INTRODUCTION. Several advantages result from limiting the amount of contamination that is deposited on the ship. The penetrating hazard of gamma radiation is reduced. The likelihood of a contact hazard that can be transferred to other locations is diminished, so the necessity to wear protective clothing is minimized and heat stress is thereby reduced. The amount of decontamination necessary is decreased. When signicant amounts of radioactive material are present, there are contamination control measures to limit access to these contaminated locations and the areas irradiated by them. Thus, the impact on the ships operational capability can be lowered by effective use of contamination avoidance measures.

070-5.2.2 COUNTERMEASURES WASHDOWN SYSTEM. The countermeasures washdown system consists of a dry pipe sprinkler system that provides a moving screen of sea water over the weather surfaces of the ship. The owing water prevents most of the fallout particles from adhering. The system is classied as a contamination avoidance system rather than a decontamination system because it is most effective when activated in advance of and during the arrival of fallout. When employed in this manner, it can remove more than 90 percent of the fallout that lands on the ship. It is much less effective when activated after fallout has been deposited.

070-5.2.3 COVERS. Temporary covers may be used to prevent deck loaded cargo, boats, aircraft and vehicles from becoming contaminated. Care must be taken when removing contaminated covers to avoid transferring contamination to the items underneath. Covers of impermeable material are preferable because they are easier to decontaminate. Plastic sheeting is an excellent choice if it is strong enough that it cannot be torn by wind. Canvas is acceptable. If sufficient material is not available to cover the object completely, exterior seats, controls, handles and air intakes should be covered.

070-5.2.4 MATERIAL CONDITIONS OF READINESS. Material Condition Zebra restricts the entry of airborne contamination into the ship by closing most accesses. Closing Circle William ttings also helps, but the ship cannot be made airtight by these measures and it may be more important to keep the ventilation in operation. Probably the most important benet of Material Condition Zebra to contamination avoidance is that it restricts traffic in and out of the ship.

070-5.2.5 READY SHELTER. If the ship is warned enough in advance, topside personnel shall be ordered to ready shelter before the arrival of the base surge or fallout. Taking ready shelter is both a contamination avoidance measure and a radiation mitigation technique. The locations are generally not deep enough within the ships structure to result in much reduction of gamma radiation. However, alpha and beta radiation cannot penetrate into the ship.

070-5.2.6 MARKING HOT SPOTS. Access to the most highly contaminated or irradiated areas of the ship is restricted by the marking procedures described in paragraph 070-3.3.8. This is both a contamination avoidance measure and a radiation mitigation technique. 70-106

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 070-5.3 RADIATION MITIGATION

070-5.3.1 GENERAL. Radiation mitigation techniques make use of distance from the source of radioactivity and shielding by the ships structure to reduce the intensity of the radiation to which personnel are exposed. Thus, the doses they accumulate are smaller than they would be in less protected areas. 070-5.3.2 DEEP SHELTER. Deep shelter locations are compartments in the innermost parts of the ship. Because of the distance and the structural material between these compartments and weather decks where fallout might collect, the gamma exposure rate is signicantly lower than in less protected locations. All except essential personnel at the most vital stations are sent to deep shelter to minimize exposure to initial radiation, if there is sufficient warning before the burst, and while the ship is enveloped in the base surge and fallout. Each ship shall designate deep shelter for each battle station in the ships CBR defense bill. There are three primary considerations in the selection of deep shelter locations. 070-5.3.2.1 Initial Radiation. Initial radiation can arrive from any angle upwards from the horizon. Deep shelter locations should be selected that maximize the distance and the amount of structural material between these spaces and the exterior of the ship. 070-5.3.2.2 Fallout Deposition. Fallout will collect primarily on horizontal surfaces. Deep shelter locations should be selected to maximize the distance and the amount of structural material between these spaces and weather decks. Transmission factors, if available, may be used in the selection process. However, this is not necessary. Transmission factors are discussed in more detail in paragraph 070-2.2.6. 070-5.3.2.3 Proximity to Battle Stations. The other consideration is proximity to battle stations. Since it may be necessary to reman these battle stations or to rotate personnel through them, deep shelter must be designated with this in mind. 070-5.3.3 ROTATION OF PERSONNEL. It may be necessary to man some battle stations continuously in spite of high radiation levels. In these cases, personnel are rotated on a schedule that is intended to prevent any individual from receiving an inordinately high dose. 070-5.3.3.1 Cumulative Nature of Acute Exposure to Nuclear Radiation. When ionizing radiation passes through living tissue, it damages some of the cells, altering or destroying their ability to perform normal functions. It also inhibits the growth of new cells. The effects of acute exposure to ionizing radiation are cumulative. That is, several exposures over a relatively short period of time must be totaled to determine the accumulated dose an individual has absorbed. The same dose over a longer time frame (chronic exposure) would not produce the same physiological effects because the body could partially recover between exposures. For the purpose of wartime exposure management, no allowance is made for recovery in estimating physiological results. Exposure is totalled over the entire mission.

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Table 070-5-1 BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR RADIATION Dose Range (rads) 0 to 70 Onset and Duration of Initial Symptoms Performance (Mid-Range Dose) From 6 to 12 hours: none to slight incidence of transient headache and nausea; vomiting in up to 5 percent of personnel in upper part of dose range. From 2 to 20 hours: transient mild nausea and vomiting in 5 to 30 percent of personnel. From 2 hours to 2 days: transient mild to moderate nausea and vomiting in 20 to 70 percent, mild to moderate fatigability and weakness in 25 to 60 percent of personnel. From 2 hours to 3 days: transient moderate nausea and vomiting in 50 to 90 percent; moderate fatigability in 50 to 90 percent of personnel. Combat-effective. Medical Care and Disposition No medical care; return to duty.

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70 to 150

Combat-effective.

No medical care; return to duty; no deaths anticipated.

150 to 300

DT: PD from 4 hours until recovery. UT: PD from 6 to 19 hours. PD from 6 weeks until recovery.

At 3 to 5 weeks: medical care for 10 to 50 percent. At low end of range less than 5 percent deaths; at high end, death may occur for more than 50 percent; survivors return to duty. At 2 to 5 weeks: medical care for 10 to 80 percent. At low end of range less than 10 percent deaths; at high end, death may occur for more than 50 percent; survivors return to duty. At 10 days to 5 weeks: medical care for 50 to 100 percent. At low end of range, death may occur for more than 50 percent at 6 weeks; at high end, death may occur for 99 percent at 3 1/2 weeks.

300 to 530

530 to 830

830 to3,000

3,000 to 8,000

Greater than 8,000

DT: PD from 3 hours until death or recovery. UT: PD from 4 to 40 hours and from 2 weeks until death or recovery DT: PD from 2 hours to 3 weeks; From 2 hours to 2 days: moderate to CI from 3 weeks until death. severe nausea and vomiting in 80 to 100 percent of personnel. UT: PD from 2 hours to 2 days From 2 hours to 6 weeks: moderate to and from 7 days to 4 weeks; CI severe fatigability and weakness in 90 from 4 weeks until death. to 100 percent of personnel. From 30 minutes to 2 days: severe DT: PD from 45 minutes to 3 nausea, vomiting, fatigability, weakhours; CI from 3 hours until ness, dizziness and disorientation; death. moderate to severe uid imbalance UT: PD from 1 to 7 hours; CI and headache. from 7 hours to 1 day; PD from 1 to 4 days; CI until death. From 30 minutes to 5 days: severe DT and UT: CI from 3 to 30 minnausea, vomiting, fatigability, weakutes. ness, dizziness, disorientation, uid PD from 30 to 90 minutes; CI imbalance, and headache. from 90 minutes until death. From 30 minutes to 1 day: severe and DT and UT: CI from 3 minutes prolonged nausea, vomiting, fatigabil- until death. ity, weakness, dizziness, disorientation, uid imbalance, and headache.

1000 rads: at 4 to 6 days, medical care for 100 percent; 100 percent deaths at 2 to 3 weeks. 3000 rads: at 3 to 4 days, medical care for 100 percent; 100 percent deaths at 5 to 10 days.

4500 rads: at 6 hours to 1 to 2 days, medical care for 100 percent; 100 percent deaths at 2 to 3 days.

8000 rads: medical care needed immediately to 1 day; 100 percent deaths at 1 day.

Table 070-5-1 BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR RADIATION - Continued

Onset and Duration of Initial Symptoms Performance (Mid-Range Dose)

Dose Range (rads) LEGEND: WARNINGS:

Medical Care and Disposition

CI - combat-ineffective (less than 25 percent performance) DT - demanding task PD - performance-degraded (25 to 75 percent performance) UT - undemanding task 1. This data is based on accumulated whole body acute exposure to neutron and gamma radiation over a 24 hour period. The skin dose from beta radiation on unprotected skin is not included. 2. This information is provided for planning. It shall not be used for the management of health care for individual patients.

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2

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S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 070-5.3.3.2 Biological Effects of Exposure to Nuclear Radiation. The physiological effects and prognoses that are likely to result from different levels of acute exposure are summarized in Table 070-5-1. The data is based on whole body neutron and gamma radiation received within a 24 hour period. The skin dose from beta radiation is not considered. The ability of a group of individuals to perform their duties is assessed as combat effective, performance degraded or combat ineffective for each dose range. There may be a latent period between initial and delayed symptoms when victims are symptom free. This information is provided to support planning. The symptoms in this table associated with each dose range are based on the physiological responses of groups of individuals. The response of a given individual may vary from the norm. Therefore, this information shall not be used for the management of the health care of individual patients.

WARNING

The Maximum Permissible Exposure (MPE) is based on gamma exposure only. Personnel who have been directly exposed to sources of residual radiation without full face protection and full body coverage may accumulate a signicant beta dose. Also, if radiological contamination is allowed to remain on the skin for a period of hours, beta burns may result. These skin lesions appear about two weeks after exposure. 070-5.3.3.3 Maximum Permissible Exposure (MPE). The basis of personnel rotation is the Maximum Permissible Exposure (MPE). The MPE is the total radiation exposure that the Commanding Officer (CO) will allow any individual to accumulate. Exceptions require command approval. Sometimes it is necessary for certain individuals to exceed the MPE because of the tactical situation. The CO may also raise the MPE for the entire crew, if necessary. The CO may also establish a casualty exposure. Personnel who have exceeded the casualty exposure are not available for duty involving additional radiological exposure. 070-5.3.3.4 Determining Accumulated Exposure. The preferred source for personnel exposure data is selfreading personal dosimeters. Dose calculations for past exposure, described in Section 2, can be used if the number of self-reading dosimeters is insufficient. 070-5.3.3.5 Estimating Future Exposure. Section 2. 070-5.4 SHIP DECONTAMINATION The techniques for estimating future exposure are described in

070-5.4.1 INTRODUCTION. In the context of decontamination procedures, it is useful to think of fallout as radioactive dirt. Just like dirt, radioactive particles contaminate by a. lying loosely on a surface where it is subject to movement by tracking b. being absorbed in porous material such as rope or cloth c. being adsorbed into a surface in a chemical bonding process d. being mechanically bonded to a surface by oil or grease lms 70-110

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 Like dirt, some fallout particles are water soluble and some are not. In general, the same techniques are used in decontamination as in cleaning. Two important facts must be kept in mind. First, decontamination does not destroy the radioactivity. Therefore, one objective is to remove the contamination from the ship. Second, common sense must be used. Remember that the goal of decontamination is to restore the object to use. Always choose a decontamination technique that will not damage the area or object being decontaminated. 070-5.4.2 TOPSIDE DECONTAMINATION. The basic technique for topside decontamination is rehosing and scrubbing. First, the area is wetted down with the hose. Then, detergent is applied and the area is scrubbed to suspend the radioactive dirt in solution until it can be washed overboard. It is important to rinse the soap solution off before it dries. Take care not to contaminate clean areas in the process of decontamination. 070-5.4.2.1 Sequence of Decontamination. Due to the tactical situation, it may not be possible to conduct a complete topside decontamination. If this is the case, areas can be selected based on need. Whether performing selected area decontamination or general topside decontamination, the general rule is top to bottom, forward to aft, windward to leeward. Remote areas, such as masts, need not be decontaminated. 070-5.4.2.2 Quality Control. Topside decontamination is a manpower intensive, physically demanding task that involves exposing crew members to the hazard of radioactivity. It is not worth doing unless it is done correctly. Personnel assigned to decontamination teams shall be rotated between hosing and scrubbing so they do not become fatigued by the more strenuous activity of scrubbing. If the scrubbing does not achieve complete coverage of each area required for operations, the overall effectiveness of the effort is compromised. Coordination between decontamination teams is necessary to ensure that their efforts are not counterproductive. 070-5.4.3 INTERIOR DECONTAMINATION. If monitoring indicates that internal decontamination of the ship is necessary, the basic technique is washing, rinsing and wiping, top to bottom. Detergent may be used if needed. The materials used to wash and wipe, such as rags, shall be monitored frequently to determine when they have become contaminated to the same level as the surfaces being decontaminated so they can be discarded. Containers for water used in washing and rinsing shall be emptied and relled frequently. 070-5.5 DECONTAMINATION OF PERSONNEL, CLOTHING AND PORTABLE EQUIPMENT

070-5.5.1 INTRODUCTION. Radiological decontamination is the physical removal of the contamination that results from a nuclear weapon detonation. Much of it can be removed easily with soap and water or by brushing or using a sticky surface such as masking tape. That which remains must be removed either by abrasion (vigorous scrubbing) or by chemical means. The latter method includes using solvents other than water, such as a degreasing hand cleaner. This section establishes a technical basis and describes procedures for shipboard decontamination of personnel, clothing and tools that have been exposed to radiological fallout. Every possible situation cannot be covered in this text. General guidance is provided that can be applied to a variety of ship arrangements. 070-5.5.1.1 Purpose. The objective is to remove external contamination from personnel, clothing and tools. Not only does this reduce the hazard to the individuals by removing sources that are irradiating them at close range, it also prevents them from taking the contamination into their bodies or spreading it throughout the ship. It is important to remember that the objective is to prevent injury to personnel and to restore clothing and equipment to use. Decontamination efforts should not be pursued to the point of injury to the skin or damage to equipment or clothing. The focus is on reducing contamination on personnel, clothing and equipment to an operationally 70-111

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 acceptable level, as dened by command, so the ship can continue its mission. These are wartime procedures for use after a nuclear attack. Nuclear warfare can be expected to produce situations in which peacetime allowable exposures to radiation will have to be exceeded. 070-5.5.1.2 Importance of Good Hygiene and Housekeeping. Personal sanitation and general house keeping are very important after a ship has been exposed to fallout. It is extremely difficult to keep all contamination out of the interior of the ship. The ship is not airtight and, unless it has a collective protection system, some airborne particles will enter either through the ventilation system, through accesses or through leaks. Monitoring and decontamination techniques are not perfect and some contamination will be allowed in on personnel who have been topside. It is very difficult to delineate the location of all contamination. However, the hazard can be minimized simply by preventing it from building up. Maintaining clean conditions in living and working spaces is one part of the solution. The other is personal cleanliness. A simple practice such as washing ones hands before eating will reduce the ingestion of contamination. 070-5.5.1.3 Interface with Operations. For maximum effectiveness, decontamination of personnel, clothing and portable tools should not commence until fallout has ceased. There are three reasons for this. First, the arriving fallout would interfere with the monitoring process. It would be difficult to accurately determine contamination levels on personnel and clothing because of the intensity and variation of the radiation from the fallout. Second, there is a greater risk of allowing contamination inside the ship. Third, the pattern of fallout deposition on the ship will inuence the choice of which decon station(s) is to be used. It is difficult to make this determination while fallout is still arriving. However, for reasons of operational necessity, a command decision may be made to send personnel topside prior to the cessation of fallout. These procedures are rst presented under the assumption that they are not implemented until fallout has ceased. Then, modications are discussed that may be necessary when it is not possible to wait until fallout has stopped. NOTE It may be difficult in any case to measure radiation from contamination on personnel, clothing and portable equipment against the levels of background radiation that are likely after a nuclear attack. However, uctuating background intensity caused by the arrival of fallout will certainly compound the difficulty. 070-5.5.1.4 Recording Accumulated Exposure. Accumulated exposure to radiation, or absorbed dose, must be recorded for each individual who is assigned duties outside the skin of the ship in a radiological environment. This includes monitoring and decon teams and other personnel who must exit for mission essential tasks. This data is then used to rotate personnel so that no individual receives an inordinately high dose. Recording accumulated dose ts within the decon process, through which all these individuals must go when they reenter the ship. 070-5.5.2 THE BASIC FUNCTIONS IN THE PERSONNEL DECONTAMINATION PROCESS. All personnel exposed to the weather while a ship is receiving fallout from a nuclear detonation shall reenter through a decontamination station or a contamination control area (CCA). Those who must perform duties topside after the deposition of fallout has ceased are considered to be potentially contaminated and may be required to reenter through a decontamination station or CCA, depending on the intensity of the radiation from the fallout remaining and its location on the ship. The basic procedures are the same for all ships. Variations from ship to ship are due to differences in the design and location of decontamination stations. The basic functions are listed below and are discussed in the following paragraphs. a. Gross decontamination of portable equipment and outer garments 70-112

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 b. Monitoring, removal and disposal of outer garments c. Monitoring, removal and disposal of inner clothing d. Decontamination of inner clothing e. Body cleansing f. Recording accumulated exposure 070-5.5.2.1 Gross Decontamination of Portable Equipment and Outer Garments. Gross decontamination is the removal of as much contamination as possible from exterior clothing, shoes, battle dress items and portable equipment prior to reentry into the interior of the ship. It is expected that most of the contamination on a person will be on the outer garments and battle dress equipment. Footwear shall receive special attention. Gross decontamination is accomplished prior to any monitoring of personnel, their clothing and equipment. NOTE Although the term gross decon is used to describe this process, decontamination of items that are not launderable must be as complete as possible, because this is the only decontamination they will receive. 070-5.5.2.2 Monitoring, Removal and Disposal of Outer Garments and Portable Equipment. If monitoring indicates that these items have been decontaminated to an acceptable level as dened by command, they may be placed back in service immediately. Otherwise, if they cannot be discarded because of the lack of a replacement, they must be stored in an isolated area to allow the radiation to decay to an operationally acceptable level. Special care is taken during the removal of outer garments to avoid transferring contamination to inner clothing and skin. Any portable equipment being brought inside the ship is also monitored. The purpose of monitoring at this point is to evaluate the effectiveness of gross decontamination of outer clothing and equipment. Those people and items that are sent through decontamination are monitored afterwards to conrm the effectiveness of decontamination. 070-5.5.2.3 Monitoring of Inner Clothing and the Body. If monitoring indicates that the inner clothing is not contaminated and the individual has no contamination on exposed skin, he is released from the personnel decontamination process at this point. If contamination is found on either or if high background radiation prevents effective monitoring, neither the individual nor the clothing shall be released at this point. 070-5.5.2.4 Removal and Decontamination of Inner Clothing. Great care is taken during the removal of contaminated inner clothing to avoid transferring contamination to the skin. Contaminated shirts, trousers, socks and underwear are sent to the ships laundry for decontamination. Since fallout is basically radioactive dirt, the laundry is effective in removing most of it. To minimize contamination of the laundry and interior passageways along the route, contaminated clothing is bagged and stored in an isolated compartment or topside location for at least 24 hours before laundering. 070-5.5.2.5 Body Cleansing. Body cleansing is performed in two steps. First, spot cleansing is accomplished, then, a shower. The reasons for this approach are to avoid spreading contamination to clean parts of the body and to ensure that adequate time is devoted to removing contamination. Since unheated sea water is normally used for the shower, personnel may not be disposed to spending much time there in cold weather. 70-113

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 070-5.5.2.6 Monitoring and Radiological Clearance. Monitoring is performed at several points in the process. There are two purposes. The rst is to locate contamination on an individuals skin, clothing and equipment. The monitor will inform each individual of areas that need special attention. The second is to ensure that the commands criteria for operational radiological clearance are met before releasing an individual or equipment from the decontamination process. Whenever an individual is found to meet the criteria, he is released without completing the remaining stages in the decon procedure. 070-5.5.3 SHIPBOARD DECONTAMINATION INSTALLATIONS. There are two types of decontamination stations. Those that are not associated with a Collective Protection System (CPS) are referred to as conventional decontamination (or decon) stations. Specic washrooms and showers designated in the ships plans are set up for this purpose when needed. Ships that have a Collective Protection System (CPS) with Total Protection (TP) zones have a dedicated four-compartment decon station with access to the weather in each TP zone. This type of facility is referred to as a CPS decontamination station. There are differences in the extent of CPS coverage on different classes or ights of ships, and even among ships of the same class or ight. It is possible for a ship with partial CPS coverage to have both CPS and conventional decon stations. 070-5.5.3.1 Gross Decontamination Areas. Gross decontamination of portable equipment and outer garments is performed outside the CCA. All that is required is a rehose equipped with a vari-nozzle. Permanent installations are not required. Outtting and manning for gross decontamination is included with the associated decon station. If possible, the gross decon area should be located directly outside the area marked as the decontamination station entrance. 070-5.5.3.2 Contamination Control Area (CCA). Conventional decontamination stations may or may not be directly accessible from the weather. If they are not, separate contamination control areas (CCAs) must be established in compartments with a weather access. These areas are basically hot lines where outer clothing is removed. Outer clothing is monitored and removed in the CCA and portable equipment is monitored. Each CCA is located inside the ship as close to the skin of the ship as possible. The CCA may be collocated with the decontamination station if the station has a weather access and there is room available. CCAs can be set up at several locations. In fact, each decon station can have more than one CCA. It is also possible for a single CCA to serve more than one decon station. The size of a CCA for radiological decontamination is the same as for chemical decontamination, as described in NSTM Chapter 470, Shipboard BW/CW Defense and Countermeasures , Section 7. CCAs are not intended to be permanent facilities. Spaces with other functions are used when decontamination capability is needed. The same spaces can be used for either radiological or chemical decontamination but the markings on the deck for these two purposes are different. Therefore, if both sets of markings are painted on the deck, the radiological decon markings shall be red. Each ship shall identify primary and secondary CCAs in accordance with the following criteria: a. CCA spaces should be approximately 6 ft x 8 ft (larger if space allows; 5 ft x 7 ft minimum) adjacent to or as near as possible to an access to the weather. If possible, the CCA should be located immediately inside the area marked as the decontamination station entrance. If suitable interior space is unavailable, a designated deck area outside the superstructure, preferably with at least overhead cover, will work. Hangar bays of CV/CVN, LHA, and LPH are excellent locations for CCAs. Helo hangars of smaller ship classes are also good locations. NOTE Some ships do not have a space with these dimensions available; a space with approximately the same square footage will suffice as long as there is room for the procedures described later to be performed. 70-114

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 b. The CCA should have access directly from the weather deck and must have a separate exit into the ship. c. If possible, the CCA should have a deck drain to facilitate cleaning. This is an important feature for radiological monitoring and decontamination. d. When the CCA is set up, lines shall be marked on the deck with paint or tape, similar to Figure 070-5-1, to delineate functional areas within the CCA. If it is necessary to conduct personnel decontamination prior to the cessation of fallout, it may be necessary to conduct gross decontamination inside the CCA. In this case, 6 ft x 8 ft is the minimum size compartment that can be used. The markings to be used in this situation are shown in Figure 070-5-2. e. If possible, establish a communications system to be used between the CCA and the gross decon area outside the CCA. This will enable the CCA crew to know when the next person is ready to step into the CCA. 070-5.5.3.3 Conventional Decontamination Station. In the decontamination stations, personnel monitoring is conducted, inner clothing is removed, and body cleansing takes place. Specic heads are designated in ships plans as decontamination stations. Normally, a ship that does not have a CPS will have at least two conventional decontamination stations, one forward and one aft. Smaller ships may have only one. Large ships may have two additional stations amidships, one port and one starboard. Conventional decontamination stations generally have salt water nozzles in the shower stalls in addition to potable water service. Large ships may have separate salt water decontamination stations in addition to the designated heads. Multiple decontamination stations and parallel salt and potable water service are installed to provide redundancy for working around hot spots and battle damage. The availability of salt water service also provides the exibility to support potable water conservation when necessary. It is desirable to have two accesses to decon stations to permit designation of one as the entrance, or dirty side , and one as the exit, or clean side . In a typical head, the entrance should be in the sink area and the exit in the shower area. Where variations from this arrangement are necessary, masking tape will be used to mark traffic lanes to separate the clean and dirty areas. 070-5.5.3.4 Collective Protection System (CPS) Decontamination Installations. The functions that are performed in both the CCA and the conventional decon station are performed within the CPS decon station. Gross decon is performed outside the entrance in the same manner as described for the CCA of a conventional decon station. Unlike the conventional facilities, the CPS decon station is a dedicated, full time installation. Its compartments are smooth-sided and have no sharp corners. This eliminates pockets where contamination can collect, thus making decon of the station easier. The CPS decon station contains four areas. a. Outer Clothing Undressing Area (OCUA). This is the entry point from the outside atmosphere. Outer garments are monitored and removed here, as in the CCA of a non-CPS decon station. A grab rail is installed which allows the individual to swing up onto a raised platform after his footwear is removed. This prevents him from picking up contamination from the deck on his socks. b. Inner Clothing Undressing Area (ICUA). Inner garments are monitored and, if contaminated, they are removed and bagged for delivery to the laundry. c. Shower. A multi-nozzle shower discharges salt water at a high rate of ow. The shower is a four-legged bird cage structure with 28 nozzles. There is a fresh water faucet installed in the shower. It is used for spot cleaning prior to showering. The shower is operated by an attendant who can observe and direct the process using a window or viewport. d. Contamination Purge Lock (CPL). The CPL provides an air sweep to remove any airborne contamination that has entered the decon station and to dry personnel. Monitoring is performed at the exit from this area. 70-115

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2

Figure 070-5-1. Generic Contamination Control Area (CCA) (Gross decontamination performed outside.)

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S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2

Figure 070-5-2. Generic Contamination Control Area (CCA) (Gross decontamination performed inside.)

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S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 070-5.5.3.5 Storage. Contaminated items are stored in an isolated area to allow the level of radioactivity to decay. Storage areas for contaminated clothing and portable equipment cannot be adjacent to manned stations or living spaces. A space that is manned for certain evolutions (or adjacent to such a space) but is not expected to be needed for at least the next 24 hours may be used. An example would be the focsle area. It is a good choice if the ship is not expected to drop or weigh anchor in the near future. The ideal situation is to establish a CCA near the storage area. This limits the need to transport contaminated items. 070-5.5.3.6 Laundry. The ships laundry is used for decontaminating launderable items that are not excessively contaminated. Washers and dryers with the most direct drain piping and exhaust ventilation to the exterior of the ship shall be identied for use in decontamination. This minimizes the amount of piping and ducting that may entrap contamination. Drains from washing machines shall not be routed to the CHT system while being used in decontamination. 070-5.5.3.7 Outtting. The outtting requirements for the various decontamination facilities described are listed in Table 070-5-2. CCA outtting is included with the associated decon station. The quantities specied for each item are the amount required to process 100 individuals. Consumable materials that are commonly used on board ship are specied where possible. This will permit rotation of stocks to ensure that decontamination supplies have not deteriorated in storage. Type Commanders may adjust these requirements to accommodate the needs of individual ship types or classes. 070-5.5.4 PROCEDURES. The procedures for personnel decontamination are basically the same in either a conventional or a CPS decontamination station. In most cases, only the locations at which the various functions are performed will differ. Where there are variations due to differences between the two types of decon stations, the following paragraphs will provide clarication. 070-5.5.4.1 Establish Need. Conduct personnel monitoring in accordance with paragraph 070-3.3.10.

070-5.5.4.2 Selection of Decon Location. The primary criteria for selecting the decon facilities that will be activated are the results of the internal and external surveys and battle damage. Facilities will be selected that are not directly exposed to radiation or contamination from hot spots and are still accessible and operable. If fallout has not ceased and a rapid internal survey has not been conducted, survey the decon stations and make the best decision possible. For maximum consistency of measurements, use a single RADIAC instrument to survey all the decon stations if possible. 070-5.5.4.3 Equipment Readiness. activated. The following actions shall be performed when a decontamination station is

a. All materials shall be broken out and stations shall be manned and set up. Communications equipment shall be manned and checked. Plastic bags shall be placed inside the metal trash cans. b. RADIAC pre-operational checks shall be conducted. Background radiation levels shall be determined at each decon station and CCA that is activated. c. Drains from the selected decontamination and laundry facilities shall be routed over the side, not into the CHT system.

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Table 070-5-2 OUTFITTING FOR RADIOLOGICAL DECONTAMINATION OF 100 INDIVIDUALS Item Metal Trash Cans 35 gal Plastic Bags 55 gal Utility Pails (5 gal) Deck Brush, Scrub Handle, Deck Brush Boot Wash Brush Gen. Purpose Detergent or Detergent Wetting Agent Measuring Cup (8 oz) Bench or Stool Twine 1 lb. Ball Bags, Plastic 10 gal Towels Soap, Bars or Liquid Dispensers Hose Assembly, 3/4 ID Nozzle, Hose Adjustable, 3/4 Coarse Sandpaper 2 Masking Tape CP-95 Computer/Indicator Degreasing Hand Cleaner Abrasive Soap, Bars Cleanser AN/PDR-27 RADIAC AN/PDR-43 RADIAC Blank Tags Stock Number (NSN) 8105-01-183-9764 7240-01-094-4305 7920-00-240-7171 7920-00-141-5452 7920-00-255-7536 7930-00-282-9699 6850-00-644-2008 7240-00-138-7983 4020-00-231-5870 8105-01-183-9765 Unit of Issue each 100 each each each each gal 50 lb each each each each each each each sheet roll each can each can each each 100 100 10 10 1 1 200 25 1 5 5 3 1 1 3 100 100 10 10 1 1 200 25 1 5 5 6 1 1 500 Conv. Station 1 CCA 4 25 bags 2 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 CPS Station 2 25 bags 2 3 3 2 1 1 1 1

4720-00-230-6577 4730-00-223-6731

500

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2

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S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 070-5.5.4.4 Gross Decontamination Procedures After Cessation of Fallout. If fallout has ceased, gross decon is conducted on the weather deck, at the entrance to the decontamination station or CCA if possible. Each individual is responsible for his own portable equipment and battle dress items. The buddy system is used for gross decontamination of outer clothing. Buckets of soapy water and scrub brushes shall be provided for washing, buckets of clean water for rinsing. Either salt or fresh water may be used. a. Impermeable clothing and portable equipment that will not be harmed by getting wet are scrubbed with soapy water and rinsed with clean water. Semi-permeable items, such as leather shoes and web belts for equipment, can be treated like impermeable items but may require more use of abrasives and should not become soaked. b. Permeable clothing and equipment that would be damaged by water is decontaminated with dry 2 masking tape wrapped around the ngers, sticky side out. The ngers are curled inward and the back side of the ngers is used to pat contaminated areas. Gloves must be worn and must be decontaminated before and after use. Gross decon is not performed on permeable clothing that is wet. It is stored for at least 24 hours and then sent to the laundry. c. Footwear receives special attention to prevent tracking of contamination through out the ship. Shoes that are made of permeable material may be difficult to decontaminate, especially if wet. It may be necessary to use coarse sandpaper on the soles. d. Protective masks can be removed and decontaminated after fallout has ceased. Care must be taken to prevent water from entering the canisters. e. The gross decon area shall be swabbed with soapy water and hosed frequently to prevent contamination from accumulating. 070-5.5.4.5 Gross Decontamination Prior to Cessation of Fallout. The desirability of waiting for fallout to cease before commencing decontamination is discussed in paragraph 070-5.5.1.3. However, this may not be possible. It may be necessary because of the tactical situation to send personnel topside to perform essential functions. They may complete their tasks and be ready to return inside the ship while fallout is still arriving. It is also possible that additional fallout could arrive after personnel have been sent topside. Gross decontamination is the function most affected by this situation. The procedures are the same as after the cessation of fallout except that the protective mask cannot be removed outside the ship and the location may differ . a. If possible, conduct gross decon under an overhang outside a CCA or in a hangar bay when fallout is arriving. If not, it shall be performed inside a CCA, but never in a CCA that is incorporated into a conventional decon station. If possible, a CCA with a deck drain shall be designated for this purpose. In a CPS decon station, gross decon is performed in the OCUA if fallout is still arriving. If no overhang is available and gross decon is performed inside the ship, individuals shall dust off their outer garments with their hands before entering, taking care not to move contamination toward the face. The buddy system shall be used to dust each others back. Gloves shall be worn for dusting. b. When it is necessary because of arriving fallout to perform gross decontamination in a CCA or OCUA, the area shall be decontaminated frequently. If a CCA without a deck drain is being used, the difficulty of keeping it clean may cause a delay. In this case it is permissible to isolate and mark it as a hot spot and shift to another CCA. In any case, shift to a new CCA after the cessation of fallout. This is not necessary with an OCUA, which has a deck drain and air sweep to facilitate keeping it clean. 070-5.5.4.6 Entrance Monitoring. Entrance monitoring is conducted in accordance with the procedures described in paragraphs 070-3.3.10.1 and 070-3.3.10.2. The purpose of entrance monitoring is to check on the effectiveness of gross decontamination of outer clothing, battle dress items and portable equipment and to iden70-120

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 tify contamination on exposed skin. It is conducted in the CCA of a conventional decon station or in the OCUA of a CPS decon station. Impermeable outer clothing, battle dress items and portable equipment should have been thoroughly decontaminated by gross decon. If this is conrmed by entrance monitoring, these items can be replaced by the division or individual responsible. If there is any indication of contamination on impermeable or semi-permeable items, an uncontrolled wipe test shall be performed in accordance with paragraph 070-3.3.7.1 to determine if there is any removable contamination on them. If the result of the wipe test is positive, the individual may be sent back outside and required to make another attempt to decontaminate the item. Whether he is required to do this depends on several factors including a. the individuals accumulated exposure, b. the availability of replacement items, c. the tactical situation, d. the number of people awaiting decontamination. 070-5.5.4.6.1 An alternative to a second attempt at gross decontamination is to place the item in a designated stowage area to allow the radioactivity to decay. More detail on contaminated stowage is provided in paragraph 070-5.5.4.8. If there is an indication of contamination on an impermeable or semi-permeable item, but the wipe test is negative (indicating that the contamination is not removable) the item may be used inside the ship based on several factors including a. radiological exposure planning, b. the availability of replacement items, c. the importance of the item in the current tactical situation. 070-5.5.4.6.2 Contaminated permeable outer garments can be sent to the laundry or they may be stowed for up to 24 hours to allow the radioactivity to decay and then laundered if monitoring indicates this is necessary. NOTE Heavy emphasis during entrance monitoring shall be placed on indications of beta radiation. Since background radiation may make it difficult to obtain an accurate measurement of gamma radiation, the presence or absence of beta radiation may be the best indicator of the effectiveness of gross decontamination. Since entrance monitoring is conducted inside the ship, and since beta radiation cannot penetrate the skin of the ship, any indication of beta radiation is likely to be coming from contamination on the individual or item being monitored. The only other possibilities are contamination on the deck or on contaminated items awaiting removal to stowage. If the beta indication is strongest when the RADIAC instrument is held close to the subject being monitored, the subject is the source. 070-5.5.4.7 Removal of Outer Garments. This is accomplished in the CCA of a conventional decon station or in the OCUA of a CPS decon station after entrance monitoring. 70-121

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 a. If monitoring shows that there is contamination either on exposed skin or on outer clothing or battle dress items, CCA personnel shall assist in the removal of outer clothing and battle dress to minimize transfer of contamination. b. The sequence is from top to bottom, i.e., headcovering rst, then the jacket, nally shoes and trousers. c. Items are separated as shown in Figure 070-5-1 and Figure 070-5-2 into metal trash cans lined with plastic bags. The size of the cans and bags depends on the space available. d. A stool or bench shall be used to remove the shoes and trousers. The trousers shall be dropped to the thighs before the individual sits on the bench. Then the shoes are monitored and, if contaminated, are removed before the trousers and placed in the temporary stowage area shown in Figure 070-5-1 and Figure 070-5-2. The bench or stool shall be positioned so that the individual can swing his feet over the hot line after the removal of his shoes and trousers. e. Uncontaminated outer clothing is passed to a nearby compartment where the individual can claim it after he is released from the decon procedure. f. Uncontaminated shoes need not be removed, but care must be taken to avoid transferring any contamination to them while removing trousers, coveralls or overshoes. g. No one is released from the decontamination process at this point, even if no contamination is found on the outer clothing. h. Each individual retains his protective mask, even if it is still contaminated. It shall be decontaminated during body cleansing. 070-5.5.4.8 Stowage of Contaminated Outer Garments, Battle Dress Items and Portable Equipment. Clothing and equipment that cannot be decontaminated shall be tagged and retained in an area designated for stowage of contaminated items. Stowage areas shall be selected that will not create a radiation hazard to personnel at vital stations or in living spaces. When the pace of operations permits, further decontamination can be attempted or the radioactivity can simply be allowed to dissipate over time, at least 24 hours. Tags will specify the date, time and intensity of the reading. The tags will identify the division responsible for organizational clothing and portable equipment. Individual issue items, such as protective masks, shall be tagged with the time and dose rate of the measurement and the name of the individual. If the designated stowage area is not adjacent to the CCA, contaminated items will be bagged for delivery to it. 070-5.5.4.9 Monitoring and Removal of Inner Clothing. Monitoring of inner clothing is performed in accordance with the procedures described in paragraphs 070-3.3.10.1 and 070-3.3.10.3. This takes place in the sink area of a non-CPS decon station and in the ICUA of a CPS decon station. a. Individuals shall be monitored with inner clothing on. Uncontaminated personnel will be released at this point. b. Contaminated clothing shall be sorted into metal trash cans lined with plastic bags using the same criteria described earlier for outer garments. c. After inner clothing is removed the person shall be monitored again to locate contamination on the skin before body cleansing. d. Even if no contamination is found on the skin, if there was contamination on the inner clothing, the individual shall proceed to body cleansing. e. Clothing is sent to the laundry for cleaning. 70-122

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 070-5.5.4.10 Body Cleansing Procedures in a Conventional Decontamination Station. use of the sinks, the showers and exit monitoring. The procedures include

a. Sinks shall be used to wash hot spots with warm water and soap and to decontaminate the mask. Luke warm fresh water should be used if available. b. While in the shower, each individual shall take care to thoroughly clean hairy parts of the body and body crevices, where contamination is likely to collect. c. Blowing the nose is also part of the shower procedure to remove any particles of fallout that have been collected by the nose hairs . d. Each individual is monitored again after the shower. If he has been unable to remove all contamination, he shall be given an abrasive soap or detergent and will shower with warm fresh water. e. As a last resort, he shall apply a degreasing hand cleaner to hot spots. If monitoring indicates contamination is still present, the individual shall be sent to sick bay for treatment and observation in accordance with NAVMEDCOMINST 6470.10. f. Masks, after decontamination, are retained by each individual. Masks that cannot be decontaminated shall be tagged and stowed with other contaminated clothing and equipment. 070-5.5.4.11 Body Cleansing Procedures in a CPS Decon Station. The differences between body cleansing in a CPS decon station and a conventional decon station are due to differences in conguration. A CPS decon station has no sink area, so hand-held bottles of liquid soap will be available in the ICUA to pre-wet hot spots on the skin and contaminated masks. There is a fresh water faucet in the shower that can be used for spot cleansing the body and decontaminating the mask prior to the shower. No warm water is available in a CPS decon station so individuals who need a second shower will be sent to a head near the decon station. 070-5.5.4.12 Laundry Operation with Contaminated Clothing. the addition of special precautionary measures. Normal laundry procedures shall be used with

a. After a batch of contaminated clothing is loaded into a washing machine, the area shall be monitored and decontaminated, if necessary, prior to removing the clothing from the washer. Monitoring functions in the laundry shall be performed by personnel from a decontamination station or a repair locker. b. The laundry crew shall wear protective gloves and long sleeved garments. The gloves and garments shall be monitored prior to removing clothing from a washer to determine if they need to be changed. c. The laundry crew shall be monitored at the end of their shift to determine if they need to go through personnel decontamination. 070-5.5.4.13 Periodic Monitoring and Cleaning of Decontamination Locations. Decon Facilities shall be monitored periodically, at least twice an hour. Particular attention shall be paid to the deck along the traffic pattern inside and between decon facilities and to ttings operated by potentially contaminated personnel. Areas that cannot be decontaminated shall be marked with standard portable signs in accordance with guidance in paragraph 070-3.3.8. 070-5.5.4.14 Securing from Decon. All locations used in the decontamination of personnel, clothing and equipment, including drain piping and exhaust vents coming from these spaces, shall be monitored. Hot spots shall be 70-123

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 marked in accordance with paragraph 070-3.3.8. All equipment and clothing used by assigned personnel shall be monitored and, if necessary, decontaminated in accordance with the procedures described earlier. SECTION 6. TECHNICAL SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS IN A RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT 070-6.1 BALANCING MISSION REQUIREMENTS AND PROTECTIVE POSTURE

070-6.1.1 RISK MANAGEMENT. Radiological warfare defense is not a function that a ship performs in isolation from other tasks. Ships are expected to operate in hazardous environments. A radiological environment should be viewed as a potential overlay on any warfare task. It may impair the ability of a ship to perform its assigned mission. Commanding Officers face the difficult task of choosing a defensive posture that is appropriate to both the level of the threat and the requirements of the mission. In some situations, the risk of radiological casualties must be accepted to permit accomplishment of a high priority mission, but this risk should always be minimized. Risk management is making informed tradeoffs. It is important to understand, not only the capabilities of nuclear weapons, but their limitations as well. This knowledge will provide the ability to make informed decisions about the level of protection required. Protective measures can then be limited to those that are necessary and their use can be suspended as soon as possible. In this way, the negative impact on operational capability can be minimized. 070-6.1.2 MISSION ORIENTED PROTECTIVE POSTURE (MOPP). MOPP is the management tool that is used to coordinate the use of the systems, equipment and procedures described in this chapter of Naval Ships Technical Manual. It provides for incremental levels of individual and collective countermeasures against CBR attacks. Full protective clothing and equipment will not be necessary in all nuclear threat scenarios. Also, full individual protection may result in unacceptable personnel performance degradation. MOPP procedures are a means of establishing levels of radiological protection consistent with the threat environment, mission requirements and acceptable risks. Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-20.31 is the authoritative source of information on the denition of MOPP levels and their use in shipboard CBR Defense. Key radiological defense actions and equipment dened for each MOPP level in NWP 3-20.31D, are summarized here for convenience. Refer to the NWP for more complete guidance. a. MOPP-1 1 Conduct an operational inspection of all radiological detection and monitoring systems. 2 Equip all personnel with protective masks in carriers. 3 Inventory stowed radiological defense equipment and decontamination supplies and draw replacement items from Supply Department as required. 4 Check calibration and operationally test RADIACs. 5 Review CBR Defense Bill, verify personnel assignments. 6 Set readiness Condition III and material condition Yoke, if not already set. b. MOPP-2 1 Protective mask is in carrier and worn on person. Issue personal dosimeters to all hands, 2 Pre-position decontamination supplies in decon stations and at repair lockers; and pre-position stowed detection and monitoring equipment, supplies and empty canteens as specied in the ships CBR Defense Bill. 3 Operationally test Countermeasures Washdown System and nuclear alarm. 70-124

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 4 Get material condition ZEBRA (modied). c. MOPP-3 1 Go to general quarters (readiness Condition I may be relaxed and readiness Condition II set at COs discretion); set material condition ZEBRA. 2 Strike below nonessential porous, absorbent and ammable material. 3 All non-essential personnel proceed to ready shelter. 4 Fill pre-positioned canteens with potable water. 5 Activate primary decontamination stations and Contamination Control Areas (CCAs) and assure operability. 6 Post and monitor detection equipment and materials as designated by the ships CBR Defense Bill. 7 Activate countermeasures washdown system intermittently to keep decks wet. d. MOPP-4 1 Don protective mask. 2 Go to general quarters and set Readiness Condition I if not already in effect. Ensure Material Condition Zebra is set and secure Circle William ttings. 3 Send as many individuals as possible to deep or ready shelter. 4 Initiate continuous monitoring and operation of detection equipment. 5 Activate countermeasures washdown system to operate continuously. 6 Secure non-essential equipment and sea suctions if appropriate. 070-6.2 MENT SUPPORT OF OPERATIONAL DECISION MAKING IN A RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRON-

070-6.2.1 USE OF RADIOLOGICAL MEASUREMENTS AND CALCULATIONS IN RISK MANAGEMENT. Intensities are measured and calculations are performed after a nuclear attack to support risk management, that is, accomplishing the mission while keeping exposure to ionizing radiation as low as possible. The information provided by measurements and calculations is used with operational exposure guidance to make operational decisions in a radiological environment. This information assists the commander in balancing the requirements of his mission with the need to protect the crew and preserve his resources for future operational assignments. The implementation of protective measures always imposes a cost to operational efficiency. The impact will be in terms of time, physical stress, restraints on certain activities or some combination of these. Operations should always be planned to minimize exposure, not simply to remain below a prescribed limit. Calculations and measurements provide the commanding officer with an estimate of previous exposure and the predicted exposure for a possible course of action. On this basis, the commanding officer can evaluate a. which protective measures must be used and which ones can be held in abeyance, b. the tactical gains from risking additional exposure versus the reduction in future operational capability, c. personnel rotation to minimize the total radiological dose of each individual. 070-6.2.2 TIMING OF TOPSIDE EVOLUTIONS AND RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE ACTIONS BASED ON RADIOLOGICAL INFORMATION. The timing of a number of actions depends on radiological information. A summary is provided in Table 070-6-1.

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Table 070-6-1 DECISIONS INFLUENCED BY RADIOLOGICAL MEASUREMENTS AND CALCULATIONS Action Ship Maneuvering Radiological Information on Which Decision is Based * Source of Radiological Information Remarks

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S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2

Schedule Topside Evolutions

Setting MOPP Level

Relax MOPP Level

Order Personnel to Deep or Ready Shelter Activate Counter Measures Washdown System

Secure Counter Measures Washdown System

Activate Secondary Decontamination Station

The objective is to avoid fallout or, if this is not possible, to minimize the time the ship is exposed to it. It may be possible to delay some evolutions Cessation of fallout; Current and pro- Exposure rate measurements; Calculajected topside exposure rate; Safe tion of TC ; Decay projections; Safe stay until the dose rate is lower or to avoid time calculations; Accumulated dose remanning stations near hot spots. stay time; Location of hot spots based on intensity averaging or dosimetry; Results of radiological surveys Projection of downwind deposition of RADFO messages; ATP 45 procedures; It is important to remember the difference fallout; Arrival of fallout; Cessation Dose rate measurements; Results of between contamination and radiation. Protecof fallout; Pattern of fallout deposiradiological surveys tive clothing can keep contaminated matter tion on weather surfaces. from coming in contact with the body. It can prevent penetration of alpha and beta radiation. It cannot shield a person from gamma radiation or neutrons. Cessation of fallout; Decay of radia- Exposure rate measurements; Calculation intensity tion of TC ; Results of radiological surveys Projections of downwind deposition RADFO messages; ATP 45 procedures; of fallout; Arrival of fallout; ImmiExposure rate measurements nent involvement in base surge Arrival of fallout or base surge (con- Exposure rate measurements; RADFO tinuous operation); Projection of messages; ATP 45 procedures downwind deposition of fallout (prewetting or intermittent operation) Although projections of downwind deposition Cessation of fallout or cessation of Exposure rate measurements; Calculaof fallout may be helpful in this determination, base surge involvement tion of TC the action should be based on measured intensities. Current and projected exposure rate Exposure rate measurements; Decay proin primary decon stations; Safe stay jections; Safe stay time calculations; time; Location of hot spots Results of radiological surveys

Projection of downwind deposition of RADFO messages from Fleet Weather fallout Central; ATP 45 procedures

Table 070-6-1 DECISIONS INFLUENCED BY RADIOLOGICAL MEASUREMENTS AND CALCULATIONS - Continued

Radiological Information on Which Decision is Based * Current and projected dose rates; Location of hot spots Source of Radiological Information Exposure rate measurements; Decay projections; Safe stay time calculations; Accumulated dose based on intensity averaging or dosimetry; Results of radiological surveys Monitoring; Safe stay time calculations

Action Rotation of Personnel

Remarks Personnel can be rotated through essential tasks or vital watch stations to prevent any individual or group from absorbing an inordinately high dose. Although projections of downwind deposition of fallout may be helpful in scheduling this evolution, the action should be based on measured intensities. An effective survey cannot be conducted until fallout has ceased. Survey locations should be in close proximity to vital stations. Survey of external vital stations. Results of rapid internal survey should be used to set priorities for locations to be monitored. Detailed survey of entire exterior of ship, conducted if time and tactical situation permit. Concentrate on hot spots near vital stations. Tests have shown that closing Circle William Fittings is not totally effective in excluding contaminated particulate matter. It may not be practical to wait until TC to perform this action due to heat stress.

Conduct Rapid Internal Survey

Cessation of fallout

Conduct Rapid External Completion of Rapid Internal Survey; Monitoring; Safe stay time calculations Survey Safe stay time Conduct Detailed Survey Conduct Decontamination Close Circle William Fittings Secure Conven- tional Ventilation Open Circle William Fittings, Activate Conven- tional Ventilation Change Maximum Permissible Exposure Completion of Rapid External SurMonitoring; Safe stay time calculations vey; Safe stay time Completion of Rapid External Survey Monitoring; Safe stay time calculations; Survey results Arrival of fallout or base surge Exposure rate measurements

Cessation of fallout or cessation of base surge involvement

Exposure rate measurements; Calculation of TC

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2

70-127 / (70-128 Blank)

Cumulative exposure of individuals, Accumulated dose based on intensity May be based on Nuclear Planning Dose teams; Current and projected dose averaging or dosimetry issued by higher authority. rates * Radiological information is not the only consideration on which these decisions are based but it is a crucial element in decision making in radiological environment.

70-128 @@FIpgtype@@BLANK@@!FIpgtype@@

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 APPENDIX A. GLOSSARY Acute Radiation Dose - A dose of ionizing radiation that is received over a period of time that is too short for biological recovery to occur. Air Blast - A pulse of air that moves rapidly outward from the reball created by a nuclear weapon explosion. It produces an overpressure as it passes and is accompanied by winds. The overpressure is experienced as a crushing force and the wind as a drag force. See also Drag Force, Dynamic Overpressure and Static Overpressure . - A nuclear weapon detonation that is high enough in the air that the reball does not touch the surface of the ground or water. - The process of introducing a volume of air into a compartment that is equal to the volume of the compartment while simultaneously removing an equal volume. Due to mixing, only 65 percent of the air originally in the compartment is removed in one air change. - A shipboard passageway with a quick acting watertight (QAWT) door on either end. Only one door is opened at a time to prevent the ow of air from a pressurized part of the ship to an unpressurized area. Airlocks are also equipped with ttings to allow purging of contaminated air. - A form of ionizing nuclear radiation consisting of positively charged subatomic particles emitted by some radioactive materials. An alpha particle is identical to the nucleus of a Helium atom in mass, structure and electrical charge but an alpha particles energy level is higher due to its speed. Also called alpha radiation . Atom - The smallest part into which a chemical element can be divided that retains the characteristics of that element. Every atom is composed of subatomic particles called protons, neutrons and electrons. The protons and neutrons are found in the central region, called the nucleus. The electrons are arranged in shells, or layers, around it. - The reduction in the intensity of nuclear radiation as it passes through a substance.

Air Burst Air Change

Air Lock

Alpha Particles

Attenuation

Background Radiation - Low-level radiation from natural sources in the environment that is always present. The intensity varies in different regions of the world. Base Surge - A radioactive aerosol that is formed when water thrown into the air by an underwater burst falls back to the surface or dust thrown up by a shallow underground burst falls back to the ground. The aerosol cloud moves rapidly outward from surface zero (underwater burst) or ground zero (shallow underground burst). - A form of ionizing nuclear radiation consisting of negatively charged subatomic particles emitted by some radioactive materials. A beta particle is a high speed electron. The mass and electrical charge of a beta particle are the same as those of an electron but a beta particles energy level is higher due to its speed. Also called beta radiation . - Disruption of electronic emissions from radio and radar after a nuclear weapon explosion. It is caused by changes in atmospheric ionization. - Acoustic reverberation (echoes) from underwater explosions (nuclear and conventional weapons) that masks the sounds a sonar is supposed to detect. A-1

Beta Particles

Blackout Blueout

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 Casualty - A person unavailable for duty because of injuries; also referred to as Combat Ineffective . Casualty Exposure - The total gamma exposure that the Commanding Officer has established to identify radiological casualties; once an individuals accumulated exposure has reached this level, that person cannot be assigned duties involving additional radiological exposure without command approval. See also Maximum Permissible Exposure (MPE) . The casualty exposure is initially set higher than the MPE. CentiGray (cGy) - An international unit of measure for absorbed radiological dose, used by other US military services and allies; equivalent to a rad. One Roentgen of exposure to gamma radiation results in an absorbed dose of approximately one cGy. Circle William - The material classication of openings and ventilation systems between the interior of the ship and the outside atmosphere that are secured to minimize the penetration of nuclear fallout. Collective Protection System (CPS) - A system of lters, fans and airlocks providing air to protected spaces. The air in some zones is also pressurized. Contamination - Radioactive material in places where it is not desired. The deposition or absorption of radioactive material on or by shipboard structures, areas, personnel, or equipment; the presence of nuclear fallout in the air. Contamination Control - Procedures to avoid, reduce, remove or control the spread of radiological contamination for the purpose of minimizing the exposure of personnel to radiation. Countermeasure Washdown System - A topside dry-pipe sprinkler system equipped with nozzles that spray weather surfaces to minimize deposition of and remove nuclear fallout. Water is supplied from the ships remain. Decay (Radiological) - The decrease in the level of radioactivity from nuclear fallout as ssion fragments decompose to a more stable state. Decontamination - The process of removing radiological contaminants from a person, equipment, or structure. Decontamination Effectiveness - The degree to which decontamination reduces a radiation hazard. The ratio of the radiation intensity after decontamination to what it would have been without decontamination. Deep Shelter - Compartments inside the ship that provide the most shielding against radiation. Delayed Fallout - Fallout from a nuclear explosion that does not fall to the surface until 24 or more hours after the explosion. Depth of Burst (DOB) - The distance beneath the surface of the center of an underground or underwater nuclear explosion. A-2

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 Detergent - A synthetic cleaning and emulsifying substance usable in either fresh water or sea water for decontamination. A surfactant.

Damage (due to EMP or TREE) - System degradation in electrical or electronic equipment that requires repair or replacement of damaged components. It can be caused by Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) or Transient Radiation Electronic Effects (TREE). Deposit Radiation - Radiation from radioactive particles that have landed on the ship. See also Residual Radiation . Dose (Radiological) - The total amount of ionizing nuclear radiation that is absorbed by a person, an object or a system over a specied time interval. Dose Rate (Radiological) - The rate at which a radiological dose is absorbed. Dose Rate Meter Dosimeter Drag Force - A RADIAC instrument used to measure dose rate. - A RADIAC instrument used to measure the total dose received from exposure to radiation.

- The dynamic force of wind that tends to pull down and displace structures and personnel. Drag is a directional force. See also Dynamic Overpressure . Dynamic Overpressure - The strong winds that accompany the air blast front that expands outward from a nuclear burst. They exert a directional force that tends to drag exposed objects and personnel along with it. See also Drag Force and Static Overpressure . Early Fallout - Fallout from a nuclear explosion that falls to the surface within the rst 24 hours after the explosion. Electron - A subatomic particle that has a negative electrical charge. See also Subatomic Particle . Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) - An intense electromagnetic eld that builds up to maximum strength within fractions of a second after a nuclear explosion. It can damage unprotected electrical and electronic equipment by inducing strong electric currents in its circuitry. Exposure (Radiological) - The total amount of ionizing nuclear radiation to which a person, an object or a system is subjected over a specied time interval. Exposure Rate (Radiological) - The amount of ionizing nuclear radiation per unit of time to which a person, an object or a system is subjected; the intensity of the radiation. Exposure Rate Meter - A RADIAC instrument used to measure radioactive intensity, or exposure rate. External Hazard - Radiation from a source outside the body that can penetrate the body and pose a health risk to internal organs. See also Internal Hazard . Fallout - Radiological contamination formed in a nuclear surface burst consisting of radioactive particles and droplets that fall to the surface after the explosion, sometimes many miles away from the location of the detonation. A-3

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 Fireball Fission - A brilliantly glowing sphere of extremely hot gasses formed by a nuclear explosion. - A nuclear reaction in which the nucleus of an atom of a heavy element splits into the nuclei of lighter elements, releasing a tremendous amount of energy. Fission is caused by free neutrons impacting the nucleus of an atom of a heavy element. - A product of nuclear ssion. The nucleus of a lighter element or one of its isotopes, often radioactive, that is left over when the nucleus of a heavy element decomposes in a ssion reaction. Fissionable Material - Unstable isotopes of heavy elements such as Uranium and Plutonium. They can be caused to ssion, or split, when impacted by free neutrons. They are radioactive, giving off alpha particles as they decay. Flash Free Electron Fusion - The initial extremely bright pulse of light produced by a nuclear explosion. - An electron that is not part of an atom, molecule or ion; one that has been released from an atom or molecule during the process of ionization. - A nuclear reaction in which the nuclei of atoms of a light element are combined to form the nucleus of an atom of a heavier element, releasing a tremendous amount of energy. Fusion is caused by extreme heat.

Fission Fragment

Gamma Radiation - A type of nuclear radiation in the form of electromagnetic energy similar to x-rays. Ground Zero Half Life Half Thickness - The thickness of shielding material necessary to reduce the intensity of gamma radiation that passes through it by half. Height of Burst (HOB) - The altitude at which a nuclear weapon is detonated. HEPA Filter - An acronym from High Efficiency Particulate Air lter. HEPA lters remove solid particles and liquid droplets from an air stream. - The point of detonation of a nuclear surface burst on land. - The amount of time it takes for the level of radiation from any specied amount of a particular radioactive material to decrease by one half.

High Altitude Burst - A nuclear detonation that takes place at an altitude where the atmosphere is so thin that the interaction of the explosion with the atmosphere is drastically different from that of bursts at lower altitudes; nominally, a burst at an altitude above 100,000 feet. Hot Spot Initial Radiation - The nuclear radiation that is released in the nuclear reaction that occurs in a nuclear explosion and in the interaction of this radiation with the atmosphere in and near the reball and radioactive cloud; nominally, the radiation that is released in the rst minute after the burst. Interference Internal Hazard - Radioactive material that is taken into the body by respiration, ingestion or absorption through open wounds into the bloodstream. The material remains a hazard until it either A-4 - Electromagnetic energy that decreases clear reception of radio or radar signals. - A localized area of a ship where the level of radioactivity is considerably above the intensity measured in the surrounding area.

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 decays or is eliminated by normal body functions. However, some of this material may be deposited in close proximity to vital organs, where it can pose a long term health hazard. See also External Hazard . Ion - An atom or molecule that has lost an electron and taken on a positive electrical charge or one that has gained an electron and become negatively charged. - A process in which electrically neutral atoms or molecules are changed into charged particles by the loss or addition of electrons.

Ionization

Ionizing Radiation - Energy in the form of electromagnetic emissions or subatomic particles that interact with electrically neutral atoms or molecules, changing them into charged particles (ions). Isotopes Kiloton - Different forms of a chemical element that have the same chemical characteristics but different atomic masses due to variations in the number of neutrons. - Nuclear weapon yield equivalent to the explosive energy released by 1000 tons of TNT.

Limited Protection (LP) Zone - A zone within a collective protection system that provides protection against liquid and solid CBR agents but not agents in vapor form. It uses High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) lters to remove liquid droplets and solid particles. Maximum Permissible Exposure (MPE) - The total radiological exposure that the Commanding Officer will allow any individual to accumulate without command approval; personnel are rotated through vital stations near hot spots to prevent any individuals from exceeding this total. See also Casualty Exposure . Megaton Missile Hazard - An object that could become dislodged by a sudden shock or ship motion and cause injury to personnel. Molecule Monitoring MOPP - A combination of atoms of the same or different elements in which electrons are shared but the nuclei remain separate and distinct. - The continued or periodic act of seeking to determine whether radiological contamination is present. - The acronym for Mission-Oriented Protective Posture; a exible system for establishing graduated shipboard readiness levels through the use of various elements of collective and individual protection consistent with the threat, work rates imposed by the mission and by environmental conditions. - The central region of an atom, composed of protons and neutrons. - Nuclear weapon yield equivalent to the explosive energy released by 1,000,000 tons of TNT.

Nucleus

Nuclear Radiation - Ionizing emissions released from the nuclei of atoms during nuclear ssion or during the decay of radioactive materials. The emissions are in the form of electromagnetic energy or high speed subatomic particles. Neutron Overpressure - A subatomic particle that is electrically neutral. See also Subatomic Particle . - Air pressure above normal atmospheric pressure, measured in pounds per square inch (psi), also called positive pressure. In the Collective Protection System (CPS), an overpressure is constantly maintained to keep contaminants from entering the ship. An explosion creates a sudden overpressure which is a non-directional, crushing force. A-5

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 Plastic Deformation - Permanent distortion of an object or structure into a new shape. Pressure Lock - A shipboard passageway with a quick acting watertight (QAWT) door on either end. Only one door is opened at a time to prevent the ow of air from a pressurized part of the ship to an unpressurized area. Unlike an air lock, a pressure lock does not have air sweep ttings for purging contaminated air. Therefore, it is not used in a contaminated environment. - Activation of the Countermeasure Washdown System prior to the arrival of nuclear fallout.

Pre-wetting

Protection Factor - The reciprocal of a transmission (or shielding) factor. A radiation measurement at an interior location can be multiplied by the protection factor for that space to estimate the radiation level at the corresponding exterior location. A protection factor is always greater than one. The term is used in some texts but is not used in this manual. Multiplying by a protection factor is mathematically equivalent to dividing by a transmission factor, which is the technique used in this manual for estimating topside radiation levels. Proton - A subatomic particle that has a positive electrical charge. See also Subatomic Particle . Rad - A unit of absorbed radiation dose, equivalent to a centiGray (cGy). For gamma radiation only, an exposure of one Roentgen results in an absorbed dose of approximately one rad (or one cGy). RADIAC - An acronym from RA diation D etection, I ndication A nd C omputation. Devices used to measure radioactivity. Radiation Intensity - The exposure rate or dose rate of nuclear radiation. Radiation Sickness - The disease resulting from excessive exposure of the body to ionizing radiation; also known as radiation sickness syndrome or radiation injury . Radioactive Pool - A pool of radioactive material that remains at surface zero after an underwater burst or a surface burst at sea. It gradually spreads outward into a ring-like shape. Radioactive Cloud - A cloud formed from the material that was vaporized in the reball. As the reball rises and expands, it cools and the cloud forms from condensation of water vapor, dust, weapon residue and debris. Radioactivity - The release of nuclear radiation from a nuclear reaction or nuclear decay. See also Radioactive Decay . Radioactive Decay - A decrease in the level of radioactivity from a radioisotope as it decomposes to a more stable condition. Also called Radiological Decay . See also Radioactivity . Radiological - Pertaining to radioactivity or materials that are radioactive. Radiological Assessment - Prediction of radiation intensity based on the decay of radioactive substances. Radiological Contamination - Undesirable radioactive material. Radiological Delineation - Determination of the location of radioactive contamination and the radioactive intensity of the radiation in the surrounding area. A-6

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 Radiological Control - Minimization of exposure to nuclear radiation and radioactive contamination. Rainout - Radioactive rain that results when the cloud from a nuclear burst joins a rain cloud. Residual Radiation - Nuclear radiation released after a nuclear explosion from ssion products in fallout, rainout, the base surge and the radioactive pool. Its source is radiological decay, not the nuclear reaction that produced the explosion. See also Transit Radiation and Deposit Radiation . Roentgen (R) - A unit of exposure to gamma or X radiation. An exposure of one Roentgen results in an absorbed dose of approximately one rad (or one centiGray). The terms, Roentgen and centiGray (cGy), are used interchangeably by other US military services and NATO allies in some radiological calculations. - The time personnel can remain in the vicinity of a radioactive hot spot without exceeding their maximum permissible exposure (MPE). Scintillation - The distortion of a very high frequency electromagnetic signal as it passes through layers of beta particles from a nuclear explosion at altitudes above 35 miles. Satellite communications are particularly vulnerable. - A fraction, always less than one, that represents the proportion by which shielding attenuates gamma radiation. Also called Transmission Factor . Skin Dose - Radiation from a source outside the body, possibly on the skin, that can damage the skin.

Safe Stay Time

Shielding Factor

Static Overpressure - A sudden, non-directional increase in air pressure caused by the passage of the air blast wave from a nuclear burst. See also Dynamic Overpressure . Subatomic Particle - One of the components of which all atoms are composed. See also Electron, Proton and Neutron . Surface Burst Surface Zero Survey - A nuclear detonation in which the reball is in contact with the surface of land or water. - The point of detonation of a nuclear surface burst on water. - The effort to determine the location and nature of the radiological contamination and radiation on or in a ship.

Thermal Radiation - Electromagnetic emissions in the form of light and heat. A major distinction between conventional and nuclear explosions is that a large percentage of the energy released in a nuclear explosion is in the form of thermal radiation. In a conventional explosion, the proportion of thermal energy to other forms is small. Thermonuclear Weapon - A device in which nuclear ssion is used to create the extremely high temperatures needed to cause nuclear fusion. Total Protection (TP) Zone - A zone within a collective protection system that provides protection against liquid, solid and gaseous CBR agents. It uses High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) lters to remove A-7

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 liquid droplets and solid particles. It also uses charcoal lters to remove toxic vapors from the incoming airstream and overpressure to exclude them from entering through air leaks. Transfer Hazard - Radioactive contamination that can be spread from a contaminated area to a clean area by foot traffic or some other form of physical contact. Transient Dose - A term used in some texts to describe the radiological dose received from the time of arrival of fallout or the base surge to the time of cessation of fallout. Transit Radiation - Radiation from radioactive particles or droplets in the environment around the ship. See also Residual Radiation . Transmission Factor - A fraction, always less than one, that represents the proportion by which shielding attenuates gamma radiation. Also called Shielding Factor . TREE - An acronym from Transient R adiation Effects On Electronics; temporary upsets or permanent damage to electronic equipment that is a result of exposure to initial radiation. Underground Burst - A nuclear explosion centered below the surface of the ground. Underwater Burst - A nuclear burst centered below the surface of a body of water. Underwater Shock - A pressure wave that travels outward in water from an explosion at or under the surface. When it strikes an object like a ship, it produces a sudden jolt that is transmitted throughout the structure dislodging or deforming its contents. Upset (EMP, TREE) - Temporary degradation in an electrical or electronic system caused by Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) or Transient Radiological Effects on Equipment (TREE). Normal operation is quickly restored after a self-recoverable upset without operator involvement. Recovery from a non-self-recoverable upset requires operator intervention. Weathering - The process by which radiological contamination is removed from the ships surface areas by the natural action of the environment, especially wind and rain. Yield - The energy released in a nuclear explosion stated in terms of the tonnage of TNT required to release an equivalent amount of energy. The total does not include nuclear energy released as residual radiation.

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S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 APPENDIX B. TECHNICAL MANUAL LISTING FOR RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE EQUIPMENT

B-1

Table 070-B-1 TECHNICAL MANUAL LISTING FOR RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE EQUIPMENT Installed Equipment Ship Information Book, Piping Volume SS200-AF-MMM-010 Technical Manual for Navy Shipboard Collective Protection System (CPS), System Description, Operation and Maintenance SS200-AG-MMM-010 Technical Manual for Navy Shipboard Collective Protection System (CPS), Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Filter System Operation and Maintenance SS200-AH-MMM-010 Technical Manual for Navy Shipboard Collective Protection System (CPS), Alarm System Operation and Maintenance SS200-AJ-MMM-010 Technical Manual for Navy Shipboard Collective Protection System (CPS), Pressure Control Valve (PCV) Operation and Maintenance Portable Detection Equipment AN/PDR-27 Series RADIAC NSN 0367-LP-008-2010 Technical Manual AN/PDR-27J RADIAC Set NSN 0280-LP-817-8000 Technical Manual AN/PDR-27P RADIAC Set NSN 0967-LP-899-0010 Technical Manual AN/PDR-27Q RADIAC Set NSN 0913-LP-000-7200 Technical Manual AN/PDR-27R RADIAC Set NSN 0913-LP-000-0400 Technical Manual AN/PDR-27S RADIAC Set AN/PDR-43 Series RADIAC NSN 0967-LP-871-4010 Technical Manual AN/PDR-43A,B,C RADIAC Set NSN 0967-LP 190-8010 Technical Manual AN/PDR-43D RADIAC Set NSN 0913-LP-009-1900 Technical Manual AN/PDR-43E RADIAC Set NSN 0913-LP-010-2800 Technical Manual AN/PDR-43F RADIAC Set NSN 0910-LP-237-8600 Technical Manual AN/PDR-43G RADIAC Set Portable and Installed Detection Equipment AN/PDR-65 Series RADIAC NSN 0967-LP-424-2010 Technical Manual AN/PDR-65 RADIAC Set NSN 0910-LP-534-3600 Technical Manual AN/PDR-65A RADIAC Set Dosimetry Equipment DT-60/PD Series Personal Dosimeter NSN 0967-LP-891-7010 Technical Manual DT-60D/PD Personal Dosimeter CP-95 Series Computer-Indicator NSN 0967-LP-088-4010 Technical Manual CP-95 Computer-Indicator NSN 0967-LP-109-8010 Technical Manual CP-95A Computer-Indicator NSN 0910-LP-439-6600 Technical Manual CP-95B Computer-Indicator PP-4276/PD Series Detector Charger NSN 0969-LP-005-4000 Technical Manual PP-4276/PD Detector Charger NSN 0967-LP-871-3490 Technical Manual PP-4276A/PD Detector Charger NSN 0967-LP-303-8070 Technical Manual PP-4276B/PD Detector Charger NSN 0960-LP-130-8010 Technical Manual PP-4276C/PD Detector Charger IM-107/PD Self-Reading Pocket Dosimeter NSN 0969-LP-077-6010 Technical Manual IM-107/PD Computer-Indicator IM-143/PD Self-Reading Pocket Dosimeter NSN 0969-LP-094-4010 Technical Manual IM-143A/PD Computer-Indicator RADIAC Allowances, Calibration and Maintenance Manuals

B-2

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2

Countermeasure Washdown System Collective Protection System (CPS)

Table 070-B-1 TECHNICAL MANUAL LISTING FOR RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE EQUIPMENT Continued
RADIAC Policies and Procedures Manual, Volume 1, Navy RADIAC Program Users Manual MCU-2/P and MCU-2A/P CB Masks AN/PNT-2 Audio Projection Set SE700-AA-MAN-100/RADIAC

Individual Protection S6740-AB-MMO-010 Technical Manual for Operation and Maintenance Instructions with Illustrated Parts Breakdown, Chemical-Biological Mask, Type MCU-2/P, MCU-2A/P SE101-B3-OMI-010 Operation and Maintenance Instructions for Audio Projection Sets AN/PNT-2 REFER TO NAVSUP P-2002 FOR INFORMATION ON LATEST PUBLICATION CHANGES AND REVISIONS.

S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2

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S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2 APPENDIX C. FALLOUT DECAY NOMOGRAMS AND TOTAL DOSE (FALLOUT) NOMOGRAMS FOR N = 0.2 THROUGH 2.0

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Figure 070-C-1. Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 0.2)

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Figure 070-C-2. Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 0.3)

C-3

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Figure 070-C-3. Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 0.4)

C-4

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Figure 070-C-4. Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 0.5)

C-5

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Figure 070-C-5. Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 0.6)

C-6

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Figure 070-C-6. Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 0.7)

C-7

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Figure 070-C-7. Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 0.8)

C-8

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Figure 070-C-8. Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 0.9)

C-9

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Figure 070-C-9. Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 1.0)

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Figure 070-C-10. Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 1.1)

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Figure 070-C-11. Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 1.2)

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Figure 070-C-12. Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 1.3)

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Figure 070-C-13. Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 1.4)

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Figure 070-C-14. Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 1.5)

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Figure 070-C-15. Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 1.6)

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Figure 070-C-16. Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 1.7)

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Figure 070-C-17. Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 1.8)

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Figure 070-C-18. Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 1.9)

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Figure 070-C-19. Fallout Decay Nomogram (n = 2.0)

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Figure 070-C-20. Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 0.2)

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Figure 070-C-21. Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 0.3)

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Figure 070-C-22. Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 0.4)

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Figure 070-C-23. Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 0.5)

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Figure 070-C-24. Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 0.6)

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Figure 070-C-25. Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 0.7)

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Figure 070-C-26. Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 0.8)

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Figure 070-C-27. Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 0.9)

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Figure 070-C-28. Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 1.0)

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Figure 070-C-29. Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 1.1)

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Figure 070-C-30. Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 1.2)

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Figure 070-C-31. Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 1.3)

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Figure 070-C-32. Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 1.4)

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Figure 070-C-33. Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 1.5)

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Figure 070-C-34. Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 1.6)

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Figure 070-C-35. Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 1.7)

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Figure 070-C-36. Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 1.8)

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Figure 070-C-37. Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 1.9)

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S9086-CD-STM-010/CH-070R2

Figure 070-C-38. Total Dose (fallout) Nomogram (n = 2.0) REAR SECTION NOTE TECHNICAL MANUAL DEFICIENCY/EVALUATION EVALUATION REPORT (TMDER) Forms can be found at the bottom of the CD list of books. Click on the TMDER form to display the form.

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