UCTE Operation Handbook

union for the co-ordination of transmission of electricity
June 2004
Operation Handbook
I NTRODUCTI ON
I Introduction to the UCTE
Operation Handbook (OH) [E]

Chapters
A. UCTEs basic needs for the Operation Handbook
B. Target audience for the Operation Handbook
C. Main characteristics of the Operation Handbook
D. Main scope of the Operation Handbook
E. Basic structure of the Operation Handbook
F. Guide for handbook readers
G. Procedure for handbook development
H. Table of handbook policies and appendices
I. UCTE system overview
J. Contacts and links

History of changes
v2.5 draft 24.06.2004 UCTE Secretariat minor changes, OH development
procedure update
v2.4 draft 01.03.2004 OH Team minor changes

Current status
The "Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity" (UCTE) is the association of
transmission system operators in continental Europe, providing a reliable market base by
efficient and secure electric "power highways".
The UCTE (up to the 30
th
of June 1999 named UCPTE) has created a Survey of essential
UCPTE recommendations for the interconnected operation (dated 31
st
of December 1991)
and important additional rules and recommendations on specific subjects after that date. Up
to now (and if not already replaced by the Operation Handbook) these documents have been
in force in the UCTE.
The UCTE Operation Handbook (OH) is an up-to-date collection of operation principles
and rules for the transmission system operators in continental Europe. Additional references
to UCTE operation and security rules and recommendations as well as a list of publications,
public statistics and information about the members, organisation, structure and activities of
the UCTE in general can be found on the UCTE Web site:
!http://www.ucte.org

This introduction is the cover paper for the operation handbook policies and appendices. It
includes a general overview, the main characteristics and scopes of the handbook, a
description of the handbook structure with the table of contents as well as guides and
descriptions for readers. The glossary of terms is provided in a separate paper.
This version of the document (version 2.5, level E, dated 24.06.2004) has final status
1
.

This document and other chapters of the UCTE Operation Handbook as well as excerpts from
it may not be published, redistributed or modified in any technical means or used for any
other purpose outside of UCTE without written permission in advance.

1
: The version numbers of handbook documents currently reflect the developments only. As soon as a document is
approved and enforced for the first time, the version number may change.
UCTE Operation Handbook Introduction (final v2.5 E, 24.06.2004) "I2

[Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity Articles of Association, 2000]

The Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE) co-ordinates the
operational activities of transmission system operators in 22 European countries. Their
common objective is the security of operation of the interconnected power system. 50 years
of joint activities laid the basis for a leading position in the world which the UCTE holds in
terms of the quality of synchronous operation of interconnected power systems. Through the
networks of the UCTE, 450 million people are supplied with electric energy; annual electricity
consumption totals approx. 2100 TWh.

Close co-operation of member companies is required to make the best possible use of
benefits offered by interconnected operation. For this reason, the UCTE has developed a
number of technical and organisational rules and recommendations in the past that constitute
a common reference for smooth operation of the power system. The UCTE Operation
Handbook is the successor to these sets of rules and recommendations, that have been
continually developed during the decades of construction and extension of the power system
since 1950, reflecting the changes in the technical and political framework.

Only the consistent maintenance of the high demands on quality will permit in the future to set
standards in terms of security and reliability as in the past. Moreover, the strong
interconnections in the UCTE grid require common understandings for grid operation, control
and security in terms of fixed technical standards and procedures. They are comprised in this
UCTE Operation Handbook in an organised form to make consultation easier for members
and the general public.


C. UCTE System Overview

For the sake of general information and orientation, the following figures show maps of the
UCTE system in the overview:
the map of the complete UCTE interconnected network / transmission system of 2003
(available from UCTE at !http://www.ucte.org/),

UCTE Operation Handbook Introduction (final v2.5 E, 24.06.2004) !I4

the political map (by countries, membership, connection status) of the UCTE
SYNCHRONOUS ZONES as of 2004,

the structure and organisation of the CONTROL BLOCKS /AREAS of the UCTE
SYNCHRONOUS AREA by countries/companies

Acc.

Acc. Area
FEP
P
D
A
PL
CZ
CH
I
CENTREL
E
SLO
NL
B
F
7
E.ON

VEAG
BEWAG

RWE
UCTE
UCTE South
GR
RO BG
D

MOR
HR
BIH
JIEL
SR
CG
AL
EKC
MK
Acc.

Acc. Area
Acc.

Acc. Area
FEP
P
D
A H
PL
CZ
SK
CH
I
CENTREL
E
SLO
NL
B
F
7
E.ON

VE-T

RWE
UCTE
UCTE South
GR
RO BG
D

MOR
HR
BIH
JIEL
SR
CG
AL
EKC
MK

VKW
EnBW

CEGEDEL
TIRAG
UKR


The UCTE Operation Handbook shall support consultation and provide assistance to
different parties in issues of system operation, such as to

Transmission System Operators (TSOs) / Grid Operators, Co-ordination Centres.
Every TSO in the UCTE interconnected network (SYNCHRONOUS AREAS) has declared to
follow the technical standards and procedures that are comprised in this UCTE Operation
Handbook (main focus of the handbook). This Operation Handbook therefore serves as
the reference (legislation) for the grid operation by the TSOs and guarantees the
UCTEs quality and reliability standards.

Generation Companies (GENCOs). Every party operating a generating unit in the UCTE
interconnected network (SYNCHRONOUS AREAS) makes use of the transmission network
and may have to deliver products for the provision of system services that are
indispensable for secure and stable grid operation. The Operation Handbook sets
standards for the essential requirements and capabilities regarding generation that
contribute to the operation of the grid by the TSOs.

Other associations, traders, customers, politicians and decision makers. Operation
of an interconnected transmission system is bound to physical principles and technical
constraints, that differ significantly from other well-known technical or financial systems.
This Operation Handbook explains these differences and characteristics in a transparent
manner to the public for a better understanding. It can also serve as a general reference
document.

D. Main characteristics of the Operation Handbook

The following main characteristics of the UCTE Operation Handbook serve as a guideline
for the development and set-up of the handbook:
Transparency. Technical and physical principles of transmission grid operation in the
UCTE are clearly described and published in the Operation Handbook also for non-
experts.
Liability. Following the Articles of Association of the UCTE, as they have been signed by
all members, the standards and recommendations of the Operation Handbook were
developed as binding for all members (including associated members) of the UCTE and
their operation of the grid.
Unambiguousness. All standards and recommendations of the Operation Handbook are
written to be straightforward and unmistakable for the processes of secure operation of
the UCTE SYNCHRONOUS AREA(S). All terms used in the handbook are defined only once.
Relevance to the present. Standards and recommendations included in the Operation
Handbook are continually adapted to the changed technical and legislative environment. A
version history clearly shows the status of each part of the handbook.
Minor Redundancy. The Operation Handbook is written to have only the minimum of
redundancy that is required. For this purpose, references to other chapters within the
handbook are used instead.
Modularity. Each chapter, policy, rule and guideline of the Operation Handbook can be
seen as a separate document that may be revised independently of the other parts. All
chapters use a similar layout and internal structure.

E. Main scope of the Operation Handbook

The main objective of the UCTE Operation Handbook as a comprehensive collection of all
relevant technical standards and recommendations is to provide support to the technical
operation of the UCTE interconnected grid (SYNCHRONOUS AREAS), including operation
policies for generation control, performance monitoring and reporting, reserves, security
criteria and special operational measures. The basic subject of the Operation Handbook is to
ensure the interoperability among all TSOs connected to the SYNCHRONOUS AREAS.

Standards for network access of customers, network tariffs, accounting, the commercial part
of unintentional deviations, billing procedures and market rules as well as other standards
that may be set by national GridCodes, laws or contracts are not within the scope of this
Operation Handbook (see next figure).

UCTE Interconnected Network
UCTE Operation Handbook
! Rules for Interconnection
Transmission and
Distribution Network
GridCodes /
Laws /
Contracts
! Rules for
Grid Access
...


F. Basic structure of the Operation Handbook

The UCTE Operation Handbook clearly differentiates between policies, technical
appendices, training documents and data collections (in independent documents) and is
basically structured as follows:
Preface, general information (UCTE history, organisation,...)
Introduction, overview, table of contents, versions, basics, operational framework,
procedures
Glossary of terms, acronyms
Operating policies (common structure, list of policies for transmission and ANCILLARY
SERVICES)
Technical appendices (technical criteria, definitions)
Training documents (calculation methods, theory)
Collections of data

The formal structure of the operation handbook into policies and appendices, each
document with chapters and sections, is shown in the following figure.

...
...
Policy x
Chapter y
Sections z
...
...
Appendix x
Chapter y
Sections w
...
...

The policies themselves have a clear policy-internal structure of standards, rules, criteria,
requirements, rights and obligations. The table of all policies can be found in section #I.
The policies of the operation handbook themselves are organised in the following main
sections:
Criteria (C). Criteria introduce or define specific values or a specific naming as given
facts, that may be used or cited within the policy.
Requirements (R). Requirements are (technical or organisational) prerequisites that are
used within a policy. They have to be fulfilled in total before any standard can be applied.
Standards (S). Standards define rules that are fixed and binding for the addressees,
subject to the specific situation. Standards are usually the core part of a policy.
Guidelines (G). Guidelines describe practical ways for typical operation or usage as
recommendations, as they may be used by the addressees.
Procedures (P). Procedures introduce fixed methods and alternatives for operation or
usage as common practice.
Measures (M). Measures name the actions to be taken, e.g. if a requirement is not
fulfilled, a standard is violated by an addressee or a procedure is not used.


G. Guide for handbook readers

The operation handbook makes use of the following internal reference schemes:
$document [-chapter [-section]] #chapter [-section] "document page
The following examples show how to read the references in the documents:
$P1 and $A1 are used as references to the policy or appendix with number 1.
Other documents are usually referred to by a single letter, e.g. the introduction by $I.
$P1-A is used as reference to the chapter A of Policy 1 (within Policy 1 the
reference can also be #A only).
$P1-A-C1 is used as reference to the first criterion of section A in policy 1. The
same scheme is used for requirements, standards, guidelines, procedures and
measures.
Pages are numbered by the document identifier (P1 for Policy 1) followed by the
page number, e.g. "P1-8 is the reference to page 8 of Policy 1.
According to the basic structure of the UCTE Operation Handbook, the following rough guide
for readers can be given:
As a good starting point, it is recommended to start reading with this introduction
document ($I). Basic principles and frameworks for the complete handbook are
described here in detail. Moreover, the introduction includes the full table of operation
policies that are part of the handbook.
The glossary of terms ($G) needs to be consulted as a reference only. All terms that
are formatted in CAPITALISED letters can be found in the glossary of terms. In case of
unknown terms, acronyms or units please refer here for definitions and explanations.
For reading a policy (policies are numbered by #) it is recommended to start with the
introduction of the policy and to consult the corresponding appendices ($A#), before
reading the requirements, standards and guidelines. The appendices usually give a
general motivation and technical description of the subjects, that is required for
reading the policies.
The policies themselves ($P#) are organised in independent chapters (starting with
A), each of them in sections (identified by letters C, R, S, G, P and M, see above) with
numbered paragraphs. Before reading and understanding a policy it is necessary to
have background knowledge on the subjects. There is no definite way how to read a
policy, usually it is best to start at the beginning. Internal references may point to other
paragraphs of this policy before or after the current paragraph, external references
may point to other policies or appendices as well.
For easy reading, the first pages of policies and appendices are commonly organised in the
following layout:

P# Policy #: Title [Level]

Chapters
A. Chapter A
B. Chapter B
C. Chapter C

Introduction
Introduction

History of changes
v#.# draft 01.12.2003 developer changes

Current Status
Status information
General notices


H. Procedure for handbook development

Following is the description of the development process procedure with the flow chart
showing the procedure.

The Operation Handbook development process involves following steps:
1. Process initiation
2. Drafting stage
3. Internal consultation
4. Decisions on external consultation
5. External consultation
6. Final approval
7. Policy implementation

STEP 1
Process initiation
Requests to revise or develop the Policy are submitted to the Steering Committee by the
Working Group Operations and Security (WG OS) with a short description of the Policy to be
revised or drafted newly. Alternatively, the process is initiated by the Steering Committee. The
Steering Committee approves the Policy for development or revision or rejects the request.
For each Policy Steering Committee sets a clear deadline for the drafting and revision stage
of the process.

STEP 2
Drafting stage
Once the Policy is accepted for development or revision the WG OS then assigns the request
to a Drafting Team which prepares the table of contents and a 1st draft of new or revised
Policy. Then the Drafting Team presents the 1st draft for internal consultation.

STEP 3
Internal consultation
Comments on the 1st draft will be solicited only from UCTE Members (TSOs). Comments can
be sent only by using consultation forum on the UCTE website till the date announced by
UCTE Secretariat. The minimum period for internal consultation is 1 month. Based on the
comments, the Drafting Team prepares the 2nd draft of the Policy.

STEP 4
Decisions on external consultation
The 2nd draft is the subject of WG OS and corresponding Steering Committee approval for
presenting it for external consultation. The bodies can approve the draft Policy for the external
consultation or return it for further work to the Drafting Team with a clear statement on how to
proceed and what to adapt.

STEP 5
External consultation
Once the Policy is approved by the Steering Committee for the external consultation, it is
published on the UCTE website and the external consultation process starts. The
consultation period lasts 4 - 8 weeks with respect to the extent of the Policy. Duration of the
consultation process will be determined by the WG OS or UCTE Secretariat. Comments on
the 2nd draft will be actively solicited from all registered participants. Comments will be
accepted only on-line using an internet-based consultation forum. All UCTE members will
have to substantiate their position, i.e. that also those who do not want to comment will have

to state it. Based on its own review, the Drafting Team revises the draft Policy as needed and
presents it to the WG OS.

STEP 6
Final approval
WG OS approves the Policy and sends the final draft including change marks and for
information list of rejected comments to the Steering Committee for final approval. If the WG
OS does not approve the Policy, it may return the draft to the Drafting Team for further work
with a clear statement on how to proceed and what to adapt.
As a rule, the Steering Committee will put the proposed Policy at its next meetings agenda. If
the Policy is not approved, the Steering Committee may return the Policy to the Drafting
Team for further work with a clear statement on what to adapt or it may terminate the Policy
development.

STEP 7
Policy implementation
Once the Steering Committee approves a new or modified Policy all members are expected
to implement and follow the Policy in accordance with all accepted UCTE rule.

UCTE Secretariat&Drafting Team


Drafting Team

WG Operations & Security

UCTE Steering Committee

1st Draft of new Standard [B]
Internal consultation
2nd Draft of new Standard [C]
Decision
Decision
Decision
Final new UCTE Standard [E]
For external consultation
For development
Rejection
Rejection
Revision
Revision
2nd Draft of new Standard [C]
Requests, modifications
Table of contents / topics [A]
Development

UCTE Secretariat&Drafting Team
External consultation

Final Draft of new Standard [D]

Final Draft of new Standard [D]
Decision
Revision
STEP 1
STEP 2
STEP 4
STEP 5
STEP 6
STEP 7
STEP 3

Requests, modifications
Decision
Decision
For implementation

The status of policies and appendices during procedure is rated according to the following
legend:

Level Description
A Table of contents
B Preliminary internal draft
C Consultation draft
D Final draft ready for approval by the WG and SC
E Approved new UCTE Standard.

Process roles:

Steering Committee is the executive directing body of UCTE: It:
approves the Policy for development
approves the 2nd draft for external consultation
makes a final approval of the Policy

Working Group Operations&Security is the body responsible for overseeing the Operation
Handbook development process. It:
initiates the process of Policies development or revision
assigns the Drafting Team and nominates the DT leader
sets deadlines for development, revision and consultation periods
actively participate in the internal and external consultation process
approves and presents the 2nd draft to SC for approval for external consultation
approves the final draft and presents it for SC final approval

Drafting Team is a team of technical experts that develops the detail of the Policy. It:
prepares the table of contents and first draft of the Policy
presents the draft for internal consultation
considers and responds to comments (with UCTE Secretariat support)
revise the draft after internal consultation
presents the draft to WG OS for approval for external consultation
revise the draft after external consultation

UCTE Secretariat administers the OH development process. It:
" ensures the integrity of the development process
" ensures consistency of quality and completeness of the OH
" structures the consultation process
" monitors and guide the web-based consultation forum
" publish documents (including layouting according to corporate identity)
" supports the Drafting Teams
" reports to WG OS on the development progress


I. Table of Handbook Policies and Appendices

The following tables of contents list all existing and planned policies /appendices /
documents of the UCTE Operation Handbook with their individual table of contents.

General part:

ID Title, contents
I Introduction
C. Main characteristics of the Operation Handbook
D. Main scope of the Operation Handbook
E. Basic structure of the Operation Handbook
F. Guide for handbook readers
G. Procedure for handbook development
H. Table of handbook policies and appendices
I. UCTE system overview
J. Contacts and links
G Glossary
A. Glossary of Terms
B. List of Acronyms
C. List of Units

Policies:

ID Title, contents
P1 Load-Frequency-Control and Performance
A. Primary Control
B. Secondary Control
C. Tertiary Control
D. Time Control
E. Measures for Emergency Conditions
P2 Scheduling and Accounting
A. Scheduling
B. Online Observation
C. Accounting
P3 Operational Security
A. N-1 Security (operational planning and real-time operation)
B. Voltage control and reactive power management
C. Network faults clearing and short circuit currents
D. Stability
E. Outages scheduling
F. Information exchanges between TSOs for security of system operation
P4 Co-ordinated Operational Planning
A. Outage Scheduling

B. Capacity Assessment
C. Capacity Allocation
D. Day Ahead Congestion Forecast
E. Congestion Management
P5 Emergency Procedures

P6 Communication Infrastructure
A. The EH Network, Architecture and Operation
B. Real Time Data Collection and Exchange
C. File Transfer data Exchange
D. E-Mail on the Electronic Highway
E. Information Publication in Hyptertext on EH
F. Procedures for future Services on EH
G. Non-EH communication among TSOs
P7 Data Exchanges
A. Code of conduct and generic rules to handle the data

P8 Operational Training

Appendixes:

ID Title, contents
A1 Load-Frequency-Control and Performance
A. Primary Control
C. Tertiary Control
D. Time Control
A2 Scheduling and Accounting
A. Scheduling of Power Exchange
B. Online Observation of Power Exchange
C. Accounting of Unintentional Deviations


J. Contacts and Links
For questions concerning Operation Handbook development process and consultation
process please contact Jakub Fijalkowski at Jakub.Fijalkowski@ucte.org.
For all other information, please contact the UCTE-Secretariat:
15 Boulevard Saint-Michel
1040 Brussels
Belgium

Tel: +32 2 741 69 40
Fax: +32 2 741 69 49
E-mail: info@ucte.org

GLOSSARY
G Glossary [E]

Chapters
A. Glossary of terms
B. List of acronyms
C. List of units

History of changes
v2.2 draft 24.06.2004 UCTE Secreteriat glossary update
v2.1 draft 12.05.2004 UCTE Secretariat new terms added
v2.0 draft 01.03.2004 OpHB-Team minor changes, linguistic review

Current status
This glossary is a growing list of terms
1
, acronyms and units commonly used in the policies and
appendices of the Operation Handbook. In order to identify common terms of this glossary when used in
any document, all terms listed in this glossary shall be formatted in a CAPITALISED manner (but not
written in capital letters).
This version of the document (version 2.2, level E, dated 24.06.2004) has final status.

This document and other chapters of the UCTE Operation Handbook as well as excerpts from it may
not be published, redistributed or modified in any technical means or used for any other purpose
outside of UCTE without written permission in advance.

1
: Additional terms to be included shall be submitted to the UCTE secretariat (!Jakub.Fijalkowski@ucte.org) or to
the secretary of the UCTE WG Operations & Security (!jens.albrecht@rwe.com).
UCTE Operation Handbook Glossary (final v2.2 E, 24.06.2004) !G2

A. Glossary of terms
[UCTE ground rule for the co-ordination of the accounting and the organisation of the load-frequency control, 1999]
[Articles of association of the UCTE, 2001]
[NERC glossary of terms, 08.1996, ETSO Definitions of Transfer Capacities in liberalised Electricity Markets, 2001]

Term (Acronym) {Synonym} ("References)
Definition / explanation, CROSS-REFERENCE.

Accounting {Energy ~, ~ of Unintentional Deviations} ("P2)
After the EXCHANGE PROGRAMS have been validated during the scheduling phase, and taking into
account the real-time observation of UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS across a set of OBSERVATION LINES,
ACCOUNTING is the organisational process implemented in order to:
collect the provisional and the final values of the exchanged energy for each time interval;
determine the UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS of energy and set-up the corresponding COMPENSATION
PROGRAMS for their offsetting during the following week.

Accounting Co-ordination ("P2)
ACCOUNTING CO-ORDINATION means a co-ordination service provided to the CONTROL BLOCKS, by the
sites in charge of performing the ACCOUNTING CO-ORDINATION for the purpose of carrying out the
ACCOUNTING. It consists of the following phases:
acquisition and validation of the EXCHANGE PROGRAMS between the CONTROL BLOCKS during the
scheduling phase;
acquisition of the EMRs values of TIE-LINES
2
among CONTROL BLOCKS to compute the provisional
energy exchanges;
real-time observation across the previously defined OBSERVATION LINES;
computation of the provisional and final UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS;
computation of the COMPENSATION PROGRAMS for each CONTROL BLOCK.
If these tasks are performed at different locations, a very close co-operation must be ensured among the
centres responsible for these activities.
Responsibility for correct ACCOUNTING remains with the co-ordinators of the individual CONTROL
BLOCKS and CONTROL AREAS. Responsibility for this matter cannot be delegated to the ACCOUNTING CO-
ORDINATION. The CONTROL BLOCKS and CONTROL AREAS are responsible for the resources required to
provide the results of the ACCOUNTING. In order to be able to monitor and supervise the operation of their
CONTROL BLOCK or CONTROL AREA, they all need to be equipped with a real-time data acquisition
system.
The ACCOUNTING CO-ORDINATION is provided with the necessary data to enable some checking at a
global level and to give extra confirmation to the co-ordinators of the CONTROL BLOCKS and CONTROL
AREAS that no major mistake has gone undetected or that, if such an error should occur, it would not stay
undetected for a long time.

Active Power
ACTIVE POWER is a real component of the apparent power, usually expressed in kilowatts (kW) or
megawatts (MW), in contrast to REACTIVE POWER.

2
Including virtual TIE-LINES that may exist for the operation of jointly owned power plants.

Adjacent Control Area {Adjacent System} ("P1-B)
An ADJACENT CONTROL AREA (or ADJACENT SYSTEM) is any CONTROL AREA (or system) either directly
interconnected with or electrically close to (so as to be significantly affected by the existence of) another
CONTROL AREA (or system).

Ancillary Services ("P1)
ANCILLARY SERVICES are Interconnected Operations Services identified as necessary to effect a transfer
of electricity between purchasing and selling entities (TRANSMISSION) and which a provider of
TRANSMISSION services must include in an open access transmission tariff.

Apparent Power
APPARENT POWER is the product of voltage (in volts) and current (in amperes). It consists of a real
component (ACTIVE POWER) and an imaginary component (REACTIVE POWER), usually expressed in
kilovolt-amperes (kVA) or megavolt-amperes (MVA).

Already Allocated Capacity (AAC)
The ALREADY ALLOCATED CAPACITY is the total amount of allocated transmission rights, whether they
are capacity or EXCHANGE PROGRAMS depending on the allocation method.

Area Control Error (ACE) ("P1-B)
The AREA CONTROL ERROR is the instantaneous difference between the actual and the reference value
(measured total power value and scheduled CONTROL PROGRAM) for the power interchange of a
CONTROL AREA (UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATION), taking into account the effect of the FREQUENCY BIAS for
that CONTROL AREA according to the NETWORK POWER FREQUENCY CHARACTERISTIC of that CONTROL
AREA and the overall FREQUENCY DEVIATION.

Automatic Generation Control (AGC) ("P1-B)
AUTOMATIC GENERATION CONTROL is an equipment that automatically adjusts the generation to
maintain its generation dispatch, interchange schedule plus its share of frequency regulation. AGC is a
combination of SECONDARY CONTROL for a CONTROL AREA / BLOCK and real-time operation of the
generation dispatch function (based on generation scheduling). SECONDARY CONTROL is operated by the
TSO, generation scheduling is operated by the respective generation companies (GENCOs).

Availability
AVAILABILITY is a measure of time during which a generating unit, transmission line, ANCILLARY
SERVICE or another facility is capable of providing service, whether or not it actually is in service.
Typically, this measure is expressed as a percentage available for the period under consideration.

Available Transfer Capacity (ATC)
AVAILABLE TRANSFER CAPACITY is a measure of the transfer capability remaining in the physical
TRANSMISSION network for further commercial activity over and above already committed uses.
AVAILABLE TRANSMISSION CAPACITY is the part of NTC that remains available after each phase of the
allocation procedure for further commercial activity. ATC is defined by the following equation:
ATC = NTC- AAC


Black-start Capability ("P3, "P5)
BLACK-START CAPABILITY is the ability of a generating unit to go from a shutdown condition to an
operating condition and start delivering power without assistance from the electric system.

Capacity
CAPACITY is the rated continuous load-carrying ability of generation, transmission, or other electrical
equipment, expressed in megawatts (MW) for ACTIVE POWER or megavolt-amperes (MVA) for
APPARENT POWER.

Compensation program
Compensation of UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS is performed by exporting to / importing from the
interconnected system during the compensation period by means of schedules of constant power within
the same tariff periods as when they occurred (COMP).

Consumption
See: DEMAND

Contingency ("P3)
CONTINGENCY is the unexpected failure or outage of a system component, such as a generator,
transmission line, circuit breaker, switch, or other electrical element. A CONTINGENCY also may include
multiple components, which are related by situations leading to simultaneous component outages.

Control Area (CA) ("P1-B)
A CONTROL AREA is a coherent part of the UCTE INTERCONNECTED SYSTEM (usually coincident with
the territory of a company, a country or a geographical area, physically demarcated by the position of
points for measurement of the interchanged power and energy to the remaining interconnected network),
operated by a single TSO, with physical loads and controllable generation units connected within the
CONTROL AREA. A CONTROL AREA may be a coherent part of a CONTROL BLOCK that has its own
subordinate control in the hierarchy of SECONDARY CONTROL.

Control Block (CB) ("P1-B)
A CONTROL BLOCK comprises one or more CONTROL AREAS, working together in the SECONDARY
CONTROL function, with respect to the other CONTROL BLOCKS of the SYNCHRONOUS AREA it belongs to.

Control Area Operator ("P2)
A CONTROL AREA OPERATOR is the operator of a CONTROL AREA usually a TSO.

Control Block Operator ("P2)
The BLOCK OPERATOR is a single TSO that is responsible for SECONDARY CONTROL of the whole
CONTROL BLOCK towards its interconnected neighbours / blocks, for ACCOUNTING of all CONTROL
AREAS of that block, for organisation of the internal SECONDARY CONTROL within the block, and that
operates the overall control of that block.


Control Program (CP) ("P1-B, "P2)
A CONTROL PROGRAM constitutes the SCHEDULE of the total programmed exchange of a CONTROL AREA
/ BLOCK, the sum of all EXCHANGE PROGRAMS and the COMPENSATION PROGRAM, that is used for
SECONDARY CONTROL.

Co-ordination centre (CC)
The CO-ORDINATION CENTRE is responsible for acquiring and validating the EXCHANGE PROGRAMMES
among the CONTROL BLOCKS during the scheduling phase, acquiring the energy meter readings values of
TIE-LINES among the CONTROL BLOCKS to compute the UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS and the
COMPENSATION PROGRAM to be carried out the following week in order to offset said UNINTENTIONAL
DEVIATIONS. This task is shared among the CO-ORDINATION CENTRES UCTE North in Brauweiler and
UCTE South in Laufenburg.

Curtailment
CURTAILMENT means a reduction in the scheduled capacity or energy delivery.

Defence Plan ("P5)
The DEFENCE PLAN summarises all technical and organisational measures taken to prevent the
propagation or deterioration of a power system incident in order to avoid a collapse.

Demand {Consumption}
DEMAND is the rate at which electric power is delivered to or by a system or part of a system, generally
expressed in kilowatts (kW) or megawatts (MW), at a given instant or averaged over any designated
interval of time. DEMAND should not be confused with LOAD (a LOAD is usually a device).

Disturbance
DISTURBANCE is an unplanned event that produces an abnormal system condition.

Droop of a Generator ("P1-A, "A1-A)
The DROOP OF A GENERATOR is one of the parameters set on the primary speed controller of a
GENERATING SET (generator and turbine). It is equal to the quotient of the relative quasi-steady-state
FREQUENCY OFFSET on the network and the relative variation in power output from the generator
associated with the action of the PRIMARY CONTROLLER. This ratio without dimension is generally
expressed as a percentage.

Electrical Energy
ELECTRICAL ENERGY is a measure of the generation or use of electric power by a device integrated over a
period of time; it is expressed in kilowatt-hours (kWh), megawatt-hours (MWh), or gigawatt-hours
(GWh).

Electric System Losses
ELECTRIC SYSTEM LOSSES are total electric energy losses in the electric system. The losses consist of
TRANSMISSION, transformation, and distribution losses between supply sources and delivery points.
Electric energy is lost primarily due to heating of transmission and distribution elements.


Electronic Highway (EH) ("P6)
The ELECTRONIC HIGHWAY represents a secure, fast, reliable and highly available communication
infrastructure for real-time and non-real-time data exchanges between TSOs.

Energy Meter Readings (EMRs) ("P2)
ENERGY METER READINGS are performed (in addition to those for internal lines, transformers, generators
and LOADS) for actual energy exchanges on TIE-LINES
3
between CONTROL BLOCKS (of CONTROL AREAS)
to carry out the ACCOUNTING function (e.g.: to compute, together with scheduled exchanges, the
UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS for each time interval).

Exchange Program (CAX, CBX) ("P2)
An EXCHANGE PROGRAM represents the total scheduled energy interchange between two CONTROL
AREAS (CAX) OR BETWEEN CONTROL BLOCKS (CBX).

Exchange Schedule (CAS, CBS) ("P2)
An EXCHANGE SCHEDULE defines an agreed transaction with regard to its size (megawatts), start and end
time, RAMP PERIOD and type (e.g. firmness); it is required for delivery and receipt of power and energy
between the contracting parties and the CONTROL AREA(S) (CAS) or between control areas and control
blocks (CBS) involved in the transaction.

Frequency
see: SYSTEM FREQUENCY

Frequency Bias
see: NETWORK POWER FREQUENCY CHARACTERISTIC

Frequency Control
See: PRIMARY CONTROL.

Frequency Deviation ("P1)
FREQUENCY DEVIATION means a departure of the actual SYSTEM FREQUENCY from the set value
frequency.

Frequency Offset ("P1-D)
FREQUENCY OFFSET is the difference between the actual and the nominal value of the SYSTEM
FREQUENCY in order to correct the SYNCHRONOUS TIME (TIME CONTROL); it is not identical with
FREQUENCY DEVIATION.

Generation
GENERATION is the rate at which a GENERATION SET delivers electric power to a system or part of a
system, generally expressed in kilowatts (kW) or megawatts (MW), at a given instant or averaged over
any designated interval of time, see also: DEMAND.

3
Including virtual tie-lines that may exist for the operation of jointly owned power plants.

Generation Set ("P1)
A GENERATION SET is a set of machines consisting of a generator (and its driving apparatus) and a
turbine of a generation unit.

Inadvertent Deviation
see UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATION.

Interconnected System
An INTERCONNECTED SYSTEM is a system consisting of two or more individual electric systems that
normally operate in synchronism and are physically connected via TIE-LINES, see also: SYNCHRONOUS
AREA.

Interconnection
An INTERCONNECTION is a transmission link (e.g. TIE-LINE or transformer) which connects two
CONTROL AREAS.

Intra-Control-Area Transaction
An INTRA-CONTROL-AREA TRANSACTION is a transaction carried out from one or more generating
sources to one or more delivery points where all the sources and delivery points are entirely located within
the metered boundaries of the same CONTROL AREA.

Island ("P1)
An ISLAND represents a portion of a power system or of several power systems that is electrically
separated from the main INTERCONNECTED SYSTEM (separation resulting e.g. from the disconnection /
failure of transmission system elements).

K-Factor ("P1-B)
The K-FACTOR is a value, usually given in megawatts per Hertz (MW/Hz), which is normally determined
for a (single) CONTROL AREA / BLOCK; it defines the FREQUENCY BIAS of that CONTROL AREA for
SECONDARY CONTROL (especially to assure the functionality of the NETWORK CHARACTERISTIC
METHOD); it is not to be confused with the NETWORK POWER FREQUENCY CHARACTERISTIC.

Load
LOAD means an end-use device or customer that receives power from the electric system. LOAD should
not be confused with DEMAND, which is the measure of power that a load receives or requires. LOAD is
often wrongly used as a synonym for DEMAND.

Load-Frequency Control (LFC)
See: SECONDARY CONTROL

Load-Shedding ("P1, "P3)
LOAD-SHEDDING is the disconnection of LOAD from the synchronous electric system, usually performed
automatically, to control the SYSTEM FREQUENCY in emergency situations.


Loop Flows
See: PARALLEL PATH FLOWS.

Metering
METERING describes the methods of applying devices that measure and register the amount and direction
of electrical quantities with respect to time.

Minute Reserve {15 Minute Reserve}
See: TERTIARY CONTROL RESERVE

N-1 Criterion ("P3)
The N-1 CRITERION is a rule according to which elements remaining in operation after failure of a single
network element (such as transmission line / transformer or generating unit, or in certain instances a bus-
bar) must be capable of accommodating the change of flows in the network caused by that single failure.

Net Transfer Capacity (NTC)
The NET TRANSFER CAPACITY is defined as:
NTC = TTC-TRM
The NET TRANSFER CAPACITY is the maximum total EXCHANGE PROGRAM between two ADJACENT
CONTROL AREAS compatible with security standards applicable in all CONTROL AREAS of the
SYNCHRONOUS AREA, and taking into account the technical uncertainties on future network conditions.

Network Characteristic Method ("P1-B)
The properties required for SECONDARY CONTROL are produced by the NETWORK CHARACTERISTIC
METHOD. The purpose of SECONDARY CONTROL is to move the overall FREQUENCY DEVIATION and
POWER DEVIATION of the CONTROL AREA / BLOCK considered towards zero.
The NETWORK CHARACTERISTIC METHOD (to be applied to all CONTROL AREAS in the same way and at
the same time) assures the control of two variables at the same time with one set-point value, as long as
the NETWORK POWER FREQUENCY CHARACTERISTIC is used.

Network Power Frequency Characteristic ("P1-B, "A1-A)
The NETWORK POWER FREQUENCY CHARACTERISTIC defines the sensitivity, given in megawatts per
Hertz (MW/Hz), usually associated with a (single) CONTROL AREA / BLOCK or the entire SYNCHRONOUS
AREA, that relates the difference between scheduled and actual SYSTEM FREQUENCY to the amount of
generation required to correct the power imbalance for that CONTROL AREA / BLOCK (or, vice versa, the
stationary change of the SYSTEM FREQUENCY in case of a disturbance of the generation-load equilibrium
in the CONTROL AREA without being connected to other CONTROL AREAS); it is not to be confused with
the K-FACTOR. The NETWORK POWER FREQUENCY CHARACTERISTIC includes all active PRIMARY
CONTROL and SELF-REGULATION OF LOAD and changes due to modifications in the generation pattern
and the DEMAND.

Observation Line ("P2)
An OBSERVATION LINE is a conventional border line separating a part of the SYNCHRONOUS ZONE from
the rest of the system for the purpose of real-time error detection and preliminary calculation of
UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS. It must run along the borders of CONTROL BLOCKS and must not split any
CONTROL BLOCK.


Offsetting of Unintentional Deviations ("P2)
OFFSETTING OF UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS describes a procedure applied to carry out the
compensation in energy of UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS through a corresponding energy EXCHANGE
SCHEDULE; the energy is to be delivered to (or imported from) the rest of the system during the following
week according to the standards.

Observation of Unintentional Deviations
The on-line OBSERVATION OF UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS is performed in an autonomous and
independent way by each CONTROL BLOCK according to the standards established.
A second level exists through real-time observation of UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS across previously
defined OBSERVATION LINES. This function allows to improve the detection, as early as possible, of any
error concerning on-line telemeasurements (TMs), any misunderstanding which may occur in setting the
EXCHANGE PROGRAMS, etc., in order to implement without delay the appropriate corrective actions. This
function may be performed in one or more locations which must then closely co-operate .

Operating Policies
OPERATING POLICIES constitute the doctrine developed for INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS operation; they
form the main part of the Operation Handbook. Each doctrine consists of criteria, standards,
requirements, guides, and instructions, and applies to all CONTROL AREAS / BLOCKS / TSOS.

Operating Procedures
OPERATING PROCEDURES are a set of policies, practices, or system adjustments that may be
automatically or manually implemented by the system operator within a specified time frame to maintain
the operational integrity of the INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS.

Parallel Path Flows {loop flows, circulating power flows, unscheduled
power flows}
PARALLEL PATH FLOWS describe the difference between the scheduled and actual power flow, assuming
zero inadvertent interchange, on a given transmission path in a meshed grid.

Power System
The POWER SYSTEM comprises all generation, consumption and network installations interconnected
through the network.

Power Deviation ("P1)
A POWER DEVIATION is a power deficit (negative value) or a surplus (positive value) in a CONTROL AREA
/ BLOCK of the SYNCHRONOUS AREA
4
, usually measured at the borders of the area, with respect to the
CONTROL PROGRAM.

Primary Control {Frequency Control, Primary Frequency Control}
("P1-A, "A1-A)
PRIMARY CONTROL maintains the balance between GENERATION and DEMAND in the network using
turbine speed governors. PRIMARY CONTROL is an automatic decentralised function of the turbine

4
Power exchanges over DC-connections are not included in the calculation of the power deviation, they are
considered to be either an injection or a load in the CONTROL AREA connected.

governor to adjust the generator output of a unit as a consequence of a FREQUENCY DEVIATION / OFFSET
in the SYNCHRONOUS AREA:
PRIMARY CONTROL should be distributed as evenly as possible over units in operation in the
SYNCHRONOUS AREA;
the global PRIMARY CONTROL behaviour of an interconnection partner (CONTROL AREA / BLOCK),
may be assessed by the calculation of the equivalent droop of the area (basically resulting from the
DROOP OF ALL GENERATORS and the SELF-REGULATION OF THE TOTAL DEMAND).
By the joint action of all interconnected undertakings, PRIMARY CONTROL ensures the operational
reliability for the power system of the SYNCHRONOUS AREA.

Primary Control Power ("P1-A)
PRIMARY CONTROL POWER is the power output of a GENERATION SET due to PRIMARY CONTROL.

Primary Control Range ("P1-A)
The PRIMARY CONTROL RANGE is the range of adjustment of PRIMARY CONTROL POWER, within which
PRIMARY CONTROLLERS can provide automatic control, in both directions, in response to a FREQUENCY
DEVIATION. The concept of the PRIMARY CONTROL RANGE applies to each generator, each CONTROL
AREA / BLOCK, and the entire SYNCHRONOUS AREA.

Primary Control Reserve ("P1-A)
The PRIMARY CONTROL RESERVE is the (positive / negative) part of the PRIMARY CONTROL RANGE
measured from the working point prior to the disturbance up to the maximum PRIMARY CONTROL POWER
(taking account of a limiter). The concept of the PRIMARY CONTROL RESERVE applies to each generator,
each CONTROL AREA / BLOCK, and the entire SYNCHRONOUS AREA.

Primary Controller ("P1-A)
The PRIMARY CONTROLLER is a decentralised / locally installed control equipment for a GENERATION
SET to control the valves of the turbine based on the speed of the generator (for synchronous generators
directly coupled to the electric SYSTEM FREQUENCY); see PRIMARY CONTROL.
The insensitivity of the PRIMARY CONTROLLER is defined by the limit frequencies between which the
controller does not respond. This concept applies to the complete primary controller-generator unit. A
distinction is drawn between unintentional insensitivity associated with structural inaccuracies in the unit
and a dead band set intentionally on the controller of a generator.

Primary Frequency Control
See: PRIMARY CONTROL

Pseudo-Tie-Line
See: VIRTUAL TIE-LINE.
Reactive Power
REACTIVE POWER is an imaginary component of the apparent power. It is usually expressed in kilo-vars
(kVAr) or mega-vars (MVAr). REACTIVE POWER is the portion of electricity that establishes and sustains
the electric and magnetic fields of alternating-current equipment. REACTIVE POWER must be supplied to
most types of magnetic equipment, such as motors and transformers and causes reactive losses on
transmission facilities. REACTIVE POWER is provided by generators, synchronous condensers, or
electrostatic equipment such as capacitors, and directly influences the electric system voltage. The
REACTIVE POWER is the imaginary part of the complex product of voltage and current.


Ramp Period ("P1-B)
The RAMP PERIOD is the time between ramp start and end times, usually expressed in minutes and applied
to SCHEDULES.

Reliability
5
("P3)
RELIABILITY describes the degree of performance of the elements of the bulk electric system that results
in electricity being delivered to customers within accepted standards and in the amount desired.
RELIABILITY on the transmission level may be measured by the frequency, duration, and magnitude (or
the probability) of adverse effects on the electric supply / transport / generation. Electric system
RELIABILITY can be addressed by considering two basic and functional aspects of the electric system:
Adequacy The ability of the electric system to supply the aggregate electrical demand and energy
requirements of the customers at all times, taking into account scheduled and reasonably expected
unscheduled outages of system elements.
Security The ability of the electric system to withstand sudden disturbances such as electric short
circuits or unanticipated loss of system elements.

Secondary Control {Load-Frequency-Control} ("P1-B, "A1-B)
SECONDARY CONTROL is a centralised automatic function to regulate the generation in a CONTROL AREA
based on SECONDARY CONTROL RESERVES in order
to maintain its interchange power flow at the CONTROL PROGRAM with all other CONTROL AREAS
(and to correct the loss of capacity in a CONTROL AREA affected by a loss of production) and, at the
same time,
(in case of a major FREQUENCY DEVIATION originating from the CONTROL AREA, particularly after
the loss of a large generation unit) to restore the frequency in case of a FREQUENCY DEVIATION
originating from the CONTROL AREA to its set value in order to free the capacity engaged by the
PRIMARY CONTROL (and to restore the PRIMARY CONTROL RESERVES).
In order to fulfil these functions, SECONDARY CONTROL operates by the NETWORK CHARACTERISTIC
METHOD. SECONDARY CONTROL is applied to selected generator sets in the power plants comprising this
control loop. SECONDARY CONTROL operates for periods of several minutes, and is therefore dissociated
from PRIMARY CONTROL. This behaviour over time is associated with the PI (proportional-integral)
characteristic of the SECONDARY CONTROLLER.

Secondary Control Range ("P1-B)
The SECONDARY CONTROL RANGE is the range of adjustment of the secondary control power, within
which the SECONDARY CONTROLLER can operate automatically, in both directions at the time concerned,
from the working point of the secondary control power.

Secondary Control Reserve ("P1-B)
The positive / negative SECONDARY CONTROL RESERVE is the part of the SECONDARY CONTROL RANGE
between the working point and the maximum / minimum value. The portion of the SECONDARY CONTROL
RANGE already activated at the working point is the SECONDARY CONTROL POWER.

Secondary Controller ("P1-B)
A SECONDARY CONTROLLER is the single centralised TSO-equipment per CONTROL AREA / BLOCK for
operation of SECONDARY CONTROL.

5
To a great extent, the overall RELIABILITY of the electric power supply (for customers being connected to the
distribution grid), that is usually measured, is defined by the RELIABILITY of the power distribution instead of the
transmission or generation.

Security Limits {Operating Security Limits} ("P3)
SECURITY LIMITS define the acceptable operating boundaries (thermal, voltage and stability limits). The
TSO must have defined SECURITY LIMITS for its own network. The TSO shall ensure adherence to these
SECURITY LIMITS. Violation of SECURITY LIMITS for prolonged time could cause damage and/or an
outage of another element that can cause further deterioration of system operating conditions.

Self-Regulation of Load ("P1-A)
The SELF-REGULATION OF LOAD is defined as the sensitivity of consumers demand to variations in the
SYSTEM FREQUENCY (a decrease of the SYSTEM FREQUENCY results in a decrease of the LOAD), generally
expressed in % / Hz.

Stability ("P3)
STABILITY is the ability of an electric system to maintain a state of equilibrium during normal and
abnormal system conditions or disturbances.
Small-Signal Stability The ability of the electric system to withstand small changes or
disturbances without the loss of synchronism among the synchronous machines in the system while
having a sufficient damping of system oscillations (sufficient margin to the border of stability).
Transient Stability The ability of an electric system to maintain synchronism between its parts
when subjected to a disturbance of specified severity and to regain a state of equilibrium following
that disturbance.

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
SUPERVISORY CONTROL AND DATA ACQUISITION is a system of remote control and telemetry used to
monitor and control the electric system.

Synchronous Area ("P1)
A SYNCHRONOUS AREA is an area covered by INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS whose CONTROL AREAS are
synchronously interconnected with CONTROL AREAS of members of the association. Within a
SYNCHRONOUS AREA the SYSTEM FREQUENCY is common on a steady state. A certain number of
SYNCHRONOUS AREAS may exist in parallel on a temporal or permanent basis. A SYNCHRONOUS AREA is
a set of synchronously INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS that has no synchronous interconnections to any other
INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS, see also: UCTE SYNCHRONOUS AREA.

Synchronous Time ("P1-D)
SYNCHRONOUS TIME is the fictive time based on the SYSTEM FREQUENCY in the SYNCHRONOUS AREA,
once initialised on UTC time and with the clock frequency being 60/50 of the SYSTEM FREQUENCY. If the
SYNCHRONOUS TIME is ahead / behind of the UTC time (TIME DEVIATION), the SYSTEM FREQUENCY has
on average been higher / lower than the nominal frequency of 50 Hz. TIME CONTROL action will return a
TIME DEVIATION to zero again.

System Frequency {Frequency} ("P1, "A1-A)
SYSTEM FREQUENCY is the electric frequency of the system that can be measured in all network areas of
the SYNCHRONOUS AREA under the assumption of a coherent value for the system in the time frame of
seconds (with minor differences between different measurement locations only).

Tertiary Control ("P1-C, "A1-C)
TERTIARY CONTROL is any (automatic or) manual change in the working points of generators (mainly by
re-scheduling), in order to restore an adequate SECONDARY CONTROL RESERVE at the right time.

Tertiary Control Reserve {Minute Reserve} ("P1-C)
The power which can be connected (automatically or) manually under TERTIARY CONTROL, in order to
provide an adequate SECONDARY CONTROL RESERVE, is known as the TERTIARY CONTROL RESERVE or
MINUTE RESERVE. This reserve must be used in such a way that it will contribute to the restoration of the
SECONDARY CONTROL RANGE when required.
The restoration of an adequate SECONDARY CONTROL RANGE may take, for example, up to 15 minutes,
whereas TERTIARY CONTROL for the optimisation of the network and generating system will not
necessarily be complete after this time.

Tie-Line ("P1)
A TIE-LINE is a circuit (e.g. a transmission line) connecting two or more CONTROL AREAS or systems of
an electric system.

Time Deviation ("P1-D)
The TIME DEVIATION normally is the time integral of the FREQUENCY DEVIATION. In practice, an
electrical clock that follows the SYSTEM FREQUENCY is compared with the astronomical time (UTC).

Time Control ("P1-D, "A1-D)
TIME CONTROL is a control action carried out to return an existing TIME DEVIATION between
SYNCHRONOUS TIME and UTC time to zero.

Total Transfer Capacity (TTC)
TOTAL TRANSFER CAPACITY is the maximum EXCHANGE PROGRAM between two ADJACENT CONTROL
AREAS that is compatible with operational security standards applied in each system (e.g. GridCodes) if
future network conditions, generation and load patterns are perfectly known in advance.

Transmission
TRANSMISSION is the transport of electricity on the extra-high or high-voltage network (transmission
system) for delivery to final customers or distributors. Operation of TRANSMISSION includes as well the
tasks of system operation concerning the management of energy flows, reliability of the system and
availability of all necessary system services / ANCILLARY SERVICES.

Transmission Reliability Margin (TRM)
The TRANSMISSION RELIABILITY MARGIN is a security margin that copes with uncertainties on the
computed TTC values arising from:
UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS of physical flows during operation due to the physical functioning of
SECONDARY CONTROL
Emergency exchanges between TSOs to cope with unexpected unbalanced situations in real-time
Inaccuracies, e. g. in data collection and measurements


Transmission System Operator (TSO)
A TRANSMISSION SYSTEM OPERATOR is an company that is responsible for operating, maintaining and
developing the transmission system for a CONTROL AREA and its INTERCONNECTIONS.

UCTE Synchronous Area ("P1)
A UCTE synchronous area is a part of a SYNCHRONOUS AREA covered by INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS /
TSOs which are members of the association. Different UCTE SYNCHRONOUS AREAS may exist in parallel
on a temporal or permanent basis.

Unintentional Deviation {Inadvertent Deviation} ("P1-B)
In the SECONDARY CONTROL function, the UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATION is the difference between the
actual energy exchange that has taken place in a given time interval (unintended physical power exchange
of a CONTROL AREA) and the scheduled CONTROL PROGRAM of a CONTROL AREA (or a CONTROL
BLOCK), without taking into account the effect of the frequency bias (see: AREA CONTROL ERROR),
following the sign convention.

Virtual Tie-Line {Pseudo-Tie-Line} ("P1-B)
A VIRTUAL TIE-LINE represents a telemetered reading or value that is updated in real-time and used as a
TIE-LINE flow in the AGC/ACE equation but for which no physical tie or energy metering actually exists.
The integrated value is used as a metered MWh value for interchange ACCOUNTING purposes.


B. List of Acronyms

AAC Already Allocated Capacity
ACE Area Control Error
AGC Automatic Generation Control
ATC Available Transmission Capacity
BRP Balance Responsible Party
CA Control Area
CAS Control Area Schedule
CAX Control Area Exchange
CB Control Block
CBS Control Block Schedule
CBX Control Block Exchange
CC Control Centre
CCS Co-ordination Centre Schedule
CoC Co-ordination Centre
CP Control Program
DACF Day Ahead Congestion Forecast
EH Electronic Highway
EIC ETSO Identification Code
EMR Energy Meter Reading
ESS European Scheduling System
ET Tie-line Flows
EVT Virtual Tie-line Flows
GENCO Generation Company
GMT Greenwich Mean Time
GPS Global Positioning System
HV High Voltage
LFC Load-Frequency Control
NTC Net Transfer Capacity
OpHB Operation Handbook
PI Proportional-Integral
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
SVC Static Var Compensator
TM Tele-measurement
TSO Transmission System Operator
TRM Transmission Reliability Margin
TTC Total Transfer Capacity
UCTE Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity
UD Unintentional Deviation
UHV Ultra High Voltage
UTC Universal Time Co-ordinated
WAMS Wide Inter-Area Measurement System

C. List of Units

A ampere
d day
GW gigawatt (1.000.000.000W)
GWh gigawatt-hour
h, hrs hour
Hz hertz (1/s)
kV kilovolt (1000V)
kVA kilovoltampere
kVAr kilovars
kW kilowatt (1000W)
kWh kilowatt-hour
mHz milli-hertz (1/1000 Hz)
min minute
ms milli-second (1/1000 s)
MVA megavolt-ampere
MVAr mega-vars
MW megawatt (1.000.000W)
MWh megawatt-hour
s, sec second
TW terawatt (1.000.000.000.000W)
V volt
W watt

LOAD- FREQUENCY CONTROL
AND PERFORMANCE
POLI CY 1
P1 Policy 1: Load-Frequency Control
and Performance [E]

Chapters
A. Primary Control
C. Tertiary Control
D. Time Control

Introduction
The GENERATION of power units connected to the UCTE network needs to be controlled and
monitored for secure and high-quality operation of the SYNCHRONOUS AREAS. The generation
control, the technical reserves and the corresponding performance measurements are
essential to allow TSOs to perform daily operational business. Control actions are performed
in different successive steps, each with different characteristics and qualities, and all
depending on each other:
PRIMARY CONTROL (see section !P1-A) starts within seconds as a joint action of all
undertakings involved.
SECONDARY CONTROL (see section !P1-B) replaces PRIMARY CONTROL after minutes and
is put into action by the responsible undertakings / TSOs only.
TERTIARY CONTROL (see subsection !P1-C) frees SECONDARY CONTROL by re-scheduling
generation and is put into action by the responsible undertakings / TSOs.
TIME CONTROL (see subsection !P1-D) corrects global TIME DEVIATIONS of the
SYNCHRONOUS TIME in the long term as a joint action of all undertakings / TSOs.
Please refer to the glossary of terms of the UCTE Operation Handbook (see !G) for detailed
definitions of terms used within this policy and to Appendix 1 (see !A1) for basics and
principles of load-frequency control and performance.

History of changes

v2.2 draft 20.07.2004 Final wording
v2.1 draft 17.06.2004 OH-Team Changes after consultation

Current status
This document summarises current UCTE rules and recommendations relating to load-
frequency control and performance issues in a new structure, with additional items describing
todays common practice.
This policy replaces previous UCTE ground rules and recommendations regarding PRIMARY
and SECONDARY frequency and active POWER CONTROL, regulation reserves and correction of
SYNCHRONOUS TIME. This version of the document (version 2.2, level E, dated 20.07.2004)
has final policy status.

UCTE OH Policy 1: Load-Frequency Control (final policy 2.2 E, 20.07.2004) "P12

A. Primary Control
[UCTE Operation Handbook Appendix 1 Chapter A: Primary Control, 2004]

Introduction
The objective of PRIMARY CONTROL is to maintain a balance between GENERATION and
consumption (DEMAND) within the SYNCHRONOUS AREA, using turbine speed or turbine
governors. By the joint action of all interconnected undertakings / TSOs, PRIMARY CONTROL
aims at the operational reliability of the power system of the SYNCHRONOUS AREA and
stabilises the SYSTEM FREQUENCY at a stationary value after a disturbance or incident in the
time-frame of seconds, but without restoring the reference values of SYSTEM FREQUENCY and
power exchanges (see !P1-B for SECONDARY CONTROL). Adequate PRIMARY CONTROL
depends on generation resources made available by generation companies to the TSOs.
Please refer to appendix 1 (see !A1-A) for basics and principles of PRIMARY CONTROL.
This policy section replaces the corresponding sections for primary control in the latest
UCPTE-Ground Rules concerning primary and secondary control of frequency and active
power within the UCPTE, dated 1998.

Criteria
C1. Nominal frequency. The set-point frequency (or scheduled frequency) f
0
(see !P1-
D) defines the target value of the SYSTEM FREQUENCY f for system operation. Outside
periods for the correction of SYNCHRONOUS TIME (see !P1-D), the nominal frequency
value in the SYNCHRONOUS AREA is 50 Hz.
C2. Frequency deviations. A FREQUENCY DEVIATION f (the departure ff
0
of the actual
SYSTEM FREQUENCY f from the scheduled frequency f
0
) results from a disturbance or
an incident and may occur during normal system operation. Different criteria are used
to distinguish the size of this deviation:
C2.1. Calling up of Primary Control. To avoid calling up of PRIMARY CONTROL in
undisturbed operation at or near nominal frequency, the FREQUENCY DEVIATION
should not exceed 20 mHz. PRIMARY CONTROL is activated if the FREQUENCY
DEVIATION exceeds 20 mHz (the sum of the accuracy of the local frequency
measurement and the insensitivity of the controller, see !P1-A-R1 and !P1-
A-R2).
C2.2. Maximum Quasi-Steady-State Frequency Deviation. The quasi-steady-state
FREQUENCY DEVIATION in the SYNCHRONOUS AREA must not exceed 180 mHz
(maximum permissible steady-state FREQUENCY DEVIATION; under the condition
of SELF-REGULATION OF THE LOAD according to !P1-A-C4).
C2.3. Minimum Instantaneous Frequency. The instantaneous frequency must not
fall below 49.2 Hz (that corresponds to -800 mHz as maximum permissible
dynamic FREQUENCY DEVIATION from the nominal frequency !P1-A-C1) in
response to a shortfall in generation capacity equal to or less than the
reference incident according to !P1-A-C3.
C2.4. Load-Shedding Frequency Criterion. LOAD-SHEDDING (automatic or manual,
including the possibility to shed pumping units) starts from a SYSTEM
FREQUENCY of 49.0 Hz (or below). The detailed step-plans for LOAD-SHEDDING
(in the responsibility of the TSOs, with the possibility to perform earlier
shedding of pumping units at higher frequency value as an operational
measure, with the lowest value of 47.5 Hz and the need of progressive stages
in between) define additional frequency criteria for further measures.
C2.5. Maximum Instantaneous Frequency. The instantaneous frequency must not
exceed 50.8 Hz (that corresponds to +800 mHz as maximum permissible
dynamic FREQUENCY DEVIATION from the nominal frequency !P1-A-C1) in
response to a loss of load or interruption of power exchanges equal to or less
than the reference incident according to !P1-A-C3.
UCTE OH Policy 1: Load-Frequency Control (final policy 2.2 E, 20.07.2004) !P13

C3. Reference Incident. The maximum instantaneous deviation between generation and
demand in the SYNCHRONOUS AREA (by the sudden loss of generation capacity, load-
shedding / loss of load or interruption of power exchanges) to be handled by PRIMARY
CONTROL starting from undisturbed operation depends on the size of the area / zone
1

and on the size of the largest generation unit or generation capacity connected to a
single bus bar located in that area
2
.
C3.1. First Synchronous Zone. For the first synchronous zone as in 2003 the
maximum power deviation to be handled is 3000 MW, assuming realistic
characteristics concerning system reliability and size of loads and generation
units.
C3.2. Second Synchronous Zone. For the second synchronous zone as in 2003,
the maximum power deviation to be handled is 540 MW.
C3.3. Other Synchronous Areas. For other SYNCHRONOUS AREAS (UCTE
SYNCHRONOUS AREAS), that are not connected to the main synchronous zone,
the size of the reference incident needs to be defined in each particular case
with respect to the size of the area and the size of the largest generation units
located in that area.
C3.4. Observation Incident. Incidents, such as the sudden loss of generation or
load, that exceed 1000 MW in the first synchronous zone or 250 MW in the
second synchronous zone are considered to be relevant for system
observation in that zone
3
.
C4. Frequency Characteristics. Key values of the frequency characteristics are defined
on the basis of system observation
4
.
C4.1. Self-Regulation of Load. The self-regulation of the load in all SYNCHRONOUS
AREAS is assumed to be 1 %/Hz, that means a load decrease of 1 % occurs in
case of a frequency drop of 1 Hz.
C4.2. Security Margin. For FREQUENCY CONTROL, a static security margin of 20 mHz
is defined, identical with the calling up of PRIMARY CONTROL (see "P1-A-C2.1).
C5. Deployment Times of Primary Control Reserve. The time for starting the action of
PRIMARY CONTROL is a few seconds starting from the incident, the deployment time for
50 % or less of the total PRIMARY CONTROL RESERVE is at most 15 seconds and from
50 % to 100 % the maximum deployment time rises linearly to 30 seconds.
C6. Frequency Change Indicators. For special use in a post-operation analysis, the
following criteria are defined to measure the characteristics of absolute changes of the
SYSTEM FREQUENCY within a short period of time.

C6.1. Periods of Time. Typical periods of time are 60 minutes, 15 minutes and
5 minutes around the time of an incident or the change of the hour.

1: The definitions of synchronous zones (first and second zone as existing today as a result of the
Balkan war) are temporal only due to the planned reconnection of the UCTE area. The reconnection is
scheduled for 2005. The system load for the first SYNCHRONOUS AREA typically varies between 150 GW
off-peak and 300 GW peak.
2: The final values used in the definition of the reference incidents are determined by the UCTE SG
TSO-Forum and finally confirmed by the UCTE WG Operations and Security and the UCTE SC. The
values given are under consideration.
3: The values have been adapted by the UCTE SG TSO-Forum in 2001 and are reviewed annually.
4: The final values used in the definition are determined by the UCTE SG TSO-Forum and finally
confirmed by the UCTE WG Operations and Security and the UCTE SC. The values given are under
consideration.

C6.1. Periods of Time. Typical periods of time are 60 minutes, 15 minutes and
5 minutes around the time of an incident or the change of the hour.
C6.2. Maximum Time Grid. The values used for frequency change indicators are
based on a maximum time grid of 10 seconds.
C6.3. Frequency Patterns. Typical patterns of the frequency within a short period of
time can be: constant with / without offset, decrease, increase, peak up, peak
down, peak up down and peak down up.
C6.4. Peak Frequency Range within Period. The peak frequency range is
calculated as the difference between the maximum and the minimum
frequency within the given period of time.
C6.5. Peak Frequency Derivative within Period. The peak frequency derivative is
determined as the maximum or minimum derivative of the frequency within the
given period of time.

Requirements
R1. Accuracy of Frequency Measurements. For PRIMARY CONTROL, the accuracy of local
frequency measurements used in the PRIMARY CONTROLLERS must be better than or
equal to 10 mHz.
R2. Insensitivity of Controllers. The insensitivity range of PRIMARY CONTROLLERS should
not exceed 10 mHz. Where dead bands exist in specific controllers, these must be
offset within the CONTROL AREA / BLOCK concerned.
R3. Primary Control Reserve. PRIMARY CONTROL RESERVE needs to have certain
characteristics to be usable for PRIMARY CONTROL.
R3.1. Reserve Distribution. In general, the PRIMARY CONTROL RESERVE must be
physically distributed as evenly as possible between the different regions
(usually between the CONTROL AREAS / BLOCKS) in the SYNCHRONOUS AREA
(see also !P1-B and the distribution procedure).
R3.2. Total Size of Reserve. The total PRIMARY CONTROL RESERVE (in MW) required
for operation of a SYNCHRONOUS AREA is of the same size as the reference
incident for that area (see !P1-A-C3).
R3.3. Availability of Reserves. In total and as a minimum, the full PRIMARY CONTROL
RESERVE for each area must be available continuously without interruption, not
depending on the unit commitment in detail.
R3.4. Operational Usability of Reserves. The entire PRIMARY CONTROL RESERVE
(and each share of it) must be fully activated in response to a quasi-steady-
state FREQUENCY DEVIATION of 200 mHz or more.
R4. Network Power Frequency Characteristic. The NETWORK POWER FREQUENCY
CHARACTERISTIC describes the real dependency between SYSTEM FREQUENCY and
POWER IMBALANCE with a linear approximation.
R4.1. Constant Network Power Frequency Characteristic. In order to ensure that
the principle of joint action is observed, the NETWORK POWER FREQUENCY
CHARACTERISTICS of the various CONTROL AREAS is taken to remain as
constant as possible. This applies particularly to small FREQUENCY DEVIATIONS,
where the "dead bands" of generators may have an unacceptable influence
upon the supply of PRIMARY CONTROL energy in the CONTROL AREAS
concerned.
R4.2. Share of Primary Control. The NETWORK POWER FREQUENCY CHARACTERISTIC
of PRIMARY CONTROL only for the first synchronous zone is calculated out of
!P1-A-R3.2 and !P1-A-C2.2 (including the security margin !P1-A-C4.2) to
15000 MW/Hz.

R4.3. Share of Self-Regulation. . The NETWORK POWER FREQUENCY
CHARACTERISTIC of SELF-REGULATION only for the first synchronous zone is
calculated out of !P1-A-C4.1 and !P1-A-C3 to 3000 MW/Hz.
R4.4. Overall Network Power Frequency Characteristic. The overall NETWORK
POWER FREQUENCY CHARACTERISTIC for the first synchronous zone is set to
18000 MW/Hz and for the second synchronous zone set to 3000 MW/Hz.

Standards
S1. System Reliability. In case of a first contingency or incident according to !P1-A-C3,
such as the loss of generation or load or interruption of power exchanges in an
undisturbed situation, PRIMARY CONTROL must maintain reliable system operation.
S2. Primary Control Action. The action of the individual generators performing PRIMARY
CONTROL must have the following characteristics, to be ensured by all TSOs:
S2.1. Adjustment of Generation. Power generation under PRIMARY CONTROL must
be constantly adjusted to follow changes of SYSTEM FREQUENCY.
S2.2. Deployment. Total PRIMARY CONTROL within the entire SYNCHRONOUS AREA (as
well as within each CONTROL AREA / BLOCK) must follow the deployment times
of PRIMARY CONTROL RESERVE (see !P1-A-C5). Each TSO must check the
deployment times within his CONTROL AREA / BLOCK on a regular basis.
S2.3. Duration of Delivery. PRIMARY CONTROL POWER must be delivered until the
power deviation is completely offset by the SECONDARY CONTROL RESERVE of
the CONTROL AREA / BLOCK in which the power deviation has occurred (the
minimum duration for the capability of delivery for primary control is 15
minutes, see !P1-B).
S3. Primary Control Target. Starting from undisturbed operation (see !P1-A-C2), a
reference incident (see !P1-A-C3) must be offset by PRIMARY CONTROL alone, without
the need for LOAD-SHEDDING in response to a FREQUENCY DEVIATION. In addition,
where the self-regulating effect of the load is assumed according to !P1-A-C4, the
FREQUENCY DEVIATION must not exceed the quasi-steady-state frequency deviation
(see !P1-A-C2).
S4. Principle of Joint Action. PRIMARY CONTROL is based on the principle of joint action
to ensure system reliability and interconnected operation. This includes an overall
distribution of reserves and control actions, as determined and decided by the UCTE
SG TSO-Forum on an annual basis for the next calendar year.
S4.1. Contributions to Primary Reserves. Each CONTROL AREA / BLOCK must
contribute to the PRIMARY CONTROL RESERVE as required. The respective
shares are defined by multiplying the calculated reserve for the entire
SYNCHRONOUS AREA (see !P1-A-R3 and !P1-B) and the contribution
coefficients c
i
of the various CONTROL AREAS / BLOCKS. The sum of all shares
must amount to the total PRIMARY CONTROL RESERVE.
S4.2. Contribution to Control. Each CONTROL AREA / BLOCK must contribute to the
correction of a disturbance in accordance with its respective contribution
coefficient c
i
for PRIMARY CONTROL.
S4.3. Contribution Coefficients. The contribution coefficients must be determined
and published annually for each CONTROL AREA / BLOCK. The contribution
coefficients are binding for the corresponding interconnection partner / TSO for
one calendar year. They are based on the share of the energy generated
within one year in relation to the entire SYNCHRONOUS AREA. The sum of all
contributions coefficients must amount to 1.


Procedures
P1. Contribution Coefficients. The UCTE SG TSO-Forum determines and decides
about the contribution coefficients of each CONTROL AREA / BLOCK for each
SYNCHRONOUS ZONE on an annual basis (published before the 1
st
of December) and
sets these values into operation on the 1
st
of January of the next year.
P2. Observation of Outages. Outages in production or consumption exceeding the size
of the observation incident (see !P1-A-C3) are recorded for analysis. The
corresponding information about location, time, size and type of the disturbance /
incident is recorded and made available to the members of the association.
P3. Frequency Analysis. The detailed analysis of the characteristics of the SYSTEM
FREQUENCY is made according to that of the following procedures.
P3.1. Frequency Change Analysis. The frequency change analysis
5
, see appendix,
uses the frequency change indicators (see !P1-A-C6) for evaluation and
comparison.
P4. Control Performance Measurement. The NETWORK POWER FREQUENCY
CHARACTERISTIC is calculated in response to a disturbance (such as an observation
incident), based on measurements of the SYSTEM FREQUENCY and other key values
and on a statistical analysis.
P4.1. Control Performance Report. UCTE publishes results of a control
performance analysis on a regular basis in the Regular Report of the
Performance of the Primary and Secondary Load Frequency Control,
prepared by the UCTE SG TSO-Forum.

Guidelines
G1. Measurement Cycle for Primary Control. Typically the cycle for measurements for
PRIMARY CONTROL action must be in the range of 0.1 seconds to 1 second.
G2. Measurement Cycle for Observation. The cycle for measurements of the SYSTEM
FREQUENCY for central system observation must be in the range of 1 second (strongly
recommended) to at most 10 seconds.

5: Also known as frequency measurement campaign.

[UCTE Operation Handbook Appendix 1 Chapter A: Secondary Control, 2004]
[UCPTE Rule 44: Control of active power in the grid of the UCPTE, 1990]
[UCPTE-Ground Rules concerning primary and secondary control of frequency and active power within
the UCPTE, 1998]

Introduction
SECONDARY CONTROL maintains a balance between GENERATION and consumption (DEMAND)
within each CONTROL AREA / BLOCK as well as the SYSTEM FREQUENCY within the
SYNCHRONOUS AREA, taking into account the CONTROL PROGRAM, without impairing the
PRIMARY CONTROL that is operated in the SYNCHRONOUS AREA in parallel but by a margin of
seconds (see !P1-A).
SECONDARY CONTROL makes use of a centralised AUTOMATIC GENERATION CONTROL,
modifying the active power set points / adjustments of GENERATION SETS in the time-frame of
seconds to typically 15 minutes. SECONDARY CONTROL is based on SECONDARY CONTROL
RESERVES that is under automatic control. Adequate SECONDARY CONTROL depends on
generation resources made available by generation companies to the TSOs. Please refer to
Appendix 1 (see !A1-B) for basics and principles of SECONDARY CONTROL.
This policy section replaces the corresponding sections for secondary control in the latest
UCPTE-Ground Rules concerning primary and secondary control of frequency and active
power within the UCPTE, dated 1998.

Criteria
C1. K-Factor. The K-FACTOR defines the dependency between SYSTEM FREQUENCY and
deviation of power exchanges for SECONDARY CONTROL.
C1.1. Frequency Control Gain. The common gain defined for FREQUENCY CONTROL
within SECONDARY CONTROL is set to 1.1 (110 %), used to overcome the
uncertainty of the SELF-REGULATING effect.
C1.2. K-Factor Calculation. The K-FACTOR K
ri
of a CONTROL AREA / BLOCK for
SECONDARY CONTROL is calculated by the product of the frequency control gain
1.1 (see !P1-B-C1.1), the contribution coefficient c
i
of that area (see !P1-A-
S4.3) and the total NETWORK POWER FREQUENCY CHARACTERISTIC (see !P1-
A-R4.4).
C1.3. Total K-Factor for Secondary Control. The total K-FACTOR for SECONDARY
CONTROL in the FIRST SYNCHRONOUS ZONE amounts to 19801 MW/Hz for the
year 2004. The total K-FACTOR for SECONDARY CONTROL in the SECOND
SYNCHRONOUS ZONE comes to 3301 MW/Hz for the year 2004
6
.
C2. Area Control Error. Within each CONTROL AREA / BLOCK, the individual AREA CONTROL
ERROR G (ACE) needs to be controlled to zero on a continuous basis. The ACE is
calculated as the sum of the power control error and the frequency control error
(G=P+ K*f).
C2.1. Power Control Error. The power control error P of a CONTROL AREA / BLOCK
is the total POWER DEVIATION of that area in interconnected operation,
calculated as the difference between the total active power flow (sum of all
related measurements) and the CONTROL PROGRAM (sum of all related
exchange schedules and the compensation programs).
C2.2. Frequency Control Error. The frequency control error K*f of a CONTROL
AREA / BLOCK is the product of the FREQUENCY DEVIATION f (see !P1-A-C2)
and the K-FACTOR of the CONTROL AREA / BLOCK K
ri
(see !P1-B-C1.2).

6: The final values are determined by the UCTE SG TSO-Forum on a regular basis.

C3. Secondary Control Deviation. A disturbance or an incident (inside or outside of the
CONTROL AREA / BLOCK) will result in an AREA CONTROL ERROR. Different criteria are
used to distinguish the size of this deviation (see !A1 for further details, look for
Calling up of SECONDARY CONTROL).
C4. Island Operation. In contrast to interconnected operation, island operation is the
unusual operation mode, where all interconnections / TIE-LINES of a CONTROL AREA /
BLOCK are disconnected (e.g. after a disturbance the CONTROL AREA is not connected
to the SYNCHRONOUS AREA any more) and thus no EXCHANGE PROGRAMS are possible.
C5. ACE Change Indicators. For special use in a post-operation analysis, special criteria
are defined to measure the characteristics of absolute changes of the ACE of a
CONTROL AREA / BLOCK within a short period of time (see also !P1-A-C6).

Requirements
R1. Control Area / Block. The following preconditions are defined for CONTROL AREAS /
BLOCKS in the UCTE:
R1.1. Control program. A CONTROL AREA / BLOCK is capable to maintain the control
program towards all other CONTROL AREAS / BLOCKS of the SYNCHRONOUS AREA
at the scheduled value.
R1.2. Control Hierarchy and Organisation. Each CONTROL AREA / BLOCK may
divide up into sub-control areas that operate their own underlying generation
control. A CONTROL BLOCK organises the internal SECONDARY CONTROL
according to one of the following schemes (basically, the type of internal
organisation must not influence the behaviour or quality of SECONDARY
CONTROL between the CONTROL BLOCKS):
Centralised: SECONDARY CONTROL for the CONTROL BLOCK is performed
centrally by a single controller (as one CONTROL AREA); the operator of the
block has the same responsibilities as the operator of a CONTROL AREA.
Pluralistic: SECONDARY CONTROL is performed in a decentralised way with
more than one CONTROL AREA; a single TSO, the BLOCK CO-ORDINATOR,
regulates the whole block towards its neighbours with its own controller
and regulating capacity, while all the other TSOs of the block regulate their
own CONTROL AREAS in a decentralised way on their own.
Hierarchical: SECONDARY CONTROL is performed in a decentralised way
with more than one CONTROL AREA; a single TSO, the BLOCK CO-
ORDINATOR, operates the superposed block controller which directly
influences the subordinate controllers of all CONTROL AREAS of the
CONTROL BLOCK; the BLOCK CO-ORDINATOR may or may not have regulating
capacity on its own.
R1.3. Area Demarcation. Each CONTROL AREA / BLOCK is physically demarcated by
the position of the points for measurement of the interchanged power to the
remaining interconnected network.
R2. Responsible Operator. Each CONTROL AREA / BLOCK must be operated by an
individual TSO that has the responsibility for the transmission system operation of this
area (usually coincident with the territory of a company or a country), including the
responsibility for availability, operation and provision of PRIMARY CONTROL and
SECONDARY CONTROL within the CONTROL AREA / BLOCK to maintain the POWER
INTERCHANGE of his CONTROL AREA / BLOCK at the scheduled value and, consequently,
to support the restoration of FREQUENCY DEVIATIONS in the interconnected network.
The operator is also responsible for accounting within its territory (see !P2).
R3. Secondary Controller. In order to control the ACE (see !P1-B-C2) to zero,
SECONDARY CONTROL must be performed in the corresponding control centre by a
single automatic SECONDARY CONTROLLER, that needs to be operated in an on-line
and closed-loop manner.

R3.1. Controller Type and Characteristic. In order to have no residual error, the
SECONDARY CONTROLLER must be of PI (proportional-integral) type. The
integral term must be limited in order to have a non-windup control action, able
to react immediately in case of large changes or a change of the sign of the
ACE. Measurement cycle times, integration times and controller cycle time
must be co-ordinated.
R3.2. Availability and Reliability. The automatic SECONDARY CONTROLLER, operated
on-line and closed-loop, must have a high availability and must operate highly
reliable.
R3.3. Controller Cycle Time. The cycle time for the automatic SECONDARY
CONTROLLER should be between 1 second and 5 seconds, to minimise the
total time delay between occurrence, reaction and response in the scope of
the overall control performance of the control area
7
.
R3.4. Programmed Values. Programmed values for SECONDARY CONTROL (e.g. for
power exchanges and frequency set-points) must be entered into the controller
as time-dependant set-point values based on schedules. See !P2 for details
on scheduling.
R3.5. Frequency Control. The gain for FREQUENCY CONTROL within SECONDARY
CONTROL must be set to the K-FACTOR (see !P1-B-C1.2). In case of ISLAND
operation (see !P1-B-C4) the SECONDARY CONTROLLER of a CONTROL AREA /
BLOCK must perform automatic frequency control for the CONTROL AREA /
BLOCK.
R3.6. Power Exchange Set-Point Value. The algebraic sum of the programmed
power exchanges between a CONTROL AREA / BLOCK and ADJACENT CONTROL
AREAS / BLOCKS constitutes the POWER EXCHANGE set point of the CONTROL
AREAS / BLOCKS SECONDARY CONTROLLER.
R3.7. Ramping of Schedules. In order to prevent excessive FREQUENCY DEVIATIONS
when changes of CONTROL PROGRAMS occur, it is necessary that each change
be converted to a ramp with a ramp period of 10 minutes, starting 5 minutes
before the agreed time of change (the change of the hour or of the quarter,
see !P2 for definition of exchange schedules) and ending 5 minutes later. It is
required that the ramping be performed in the same way by all controllers of
the SYNCHRONOUS AREA.
R3.8. Manual Control Capability. In case of deficiency of the automatic SECONDARY
CONTROL, manual control action must be possible.
R4. Secondary Control Reserve. An adequate SECONDARY CONTROL RESERVE must be
available at all times to cover expected DEMAND fluctuations and the loss of a
generating unit. If the loss of the largest generating unit is not already covered by the
requisite SECONDARY CONTROL RESERVE, additional TERTIARY CONTROL RESERVE {15
MINUTE RESERVE} is required to offset the shortfall within a short time, see !P1-C.
R4.1. Availability of Resources. Adequate SECONDARY CONTROL depends on
generation resources made available by generation companies to the TSO.
R4.2. Sufficient Controllable Generation. In each CONTROL AREA / BLOCK, sufficient
controllable generation or load control (under automatic control) must be
available in order to be able to control the AREA CONTROL ERROR to zero.
R4.3. Backup by Tertiary Control Reserve. SECONDARY CONTROL keeps the
CONTROL AREAS / BLOCKS balance, in normal operating conditions, and
contributes to restore it, in case of a sudden unbalance due to an incident (see
also !P1-A-C3). In case of a sudden large unbalance or a sustained DEMAND

7: In order to reflect current practice of SECONDARY CONTROL and operational experiences, the target
value of 1 s to 2 s for the future of the former UCTE rule and recommendation has been replaced
accordingly.

variation, TERTIARY CONTROL RESERVE is required to restore the SECONDARY
CONTROL RESERVES (see !P1-C).
R5. Tie-Lines. Certain criteria / characteristics need to be matched by different types of
TIE-LINES that may be in use for SECONDARY CONTROL.
R5.1. Transmission Lines, Transformers. The list of TIE-LINES of the CONTROL
AREA / BLOCK in operation is maintained and updated on a regular basis.
R5.2. Radial Operation of Generating Units. In case of the radial operation of
generating units these are considered as internal generating units within the
CONTROL AREA / BLOCK (e.g. using VIRTUAL TIE-LINES).
R5.3. Jointly Owned Generating Units. Jointly owned generating (with GENERATION
shares belonging to different CONTROL AREAS) shall be equipped with metering
and measurement equipment providing function of VIRTUAL TIE-LINE between
two or more CONTROL AREAS, unless the share of the production is delivered
via SCHEDULE.
R5.4. Metering and Measurement. All TIE-LINES from a CONTROL AREA to adjacent
CONTROL AREAS (across the border) must have measurements and meters in
operation to record the actual active (and reactive) power flow in MW (MVAr)
in real-time and the energy in MWh in the time-frame for power exchanges that
is used (one hour at the maximum, see !P2).
R5.5. Transmission of Measurements. The measurements must be transmitted in
a reliable manner to the SECONDARY CONTROLLER.
R5.6. Accuracy of Measurements. The accuracy of the active power
measurements on each TIE-LINE must be better than 1.5 % of its rated value
(the complete measurement range, including discretisation). The
measurement cycle time should not exceed 5 seconds and the measurement
times of measurement values should not differ more than 5 seconds.
Measurement cycle times, controller cycle times and controller integration
times shall be coordinated.
R6. System Frequency. The following requirements are defined for the use of the SYSTEM
FREQUENCY for SECONDARY CONTROL:
R6.1. Accuracy of Measurement. For SECONDARY CONTROL, the accuracy of
frequency measurement must be between 1.0 mHz and 1.5 mHz (target value
for the future).
R6.2. Frequency Set-Point. The actual frequency set-point value (nominal value of
50 Hz, see !P1-A-C1) for TIME CONTROL (see !P1-D-S4) must be used
within the SECONDARY CONTROLLER for calculation of the FREQUENCY
DEVIATION, to be able to limit the deviation between SYNCHRONOUS TIME and
UTC.
R7. Data Recordings. Each TSO must be equipped with a recording of all values needed
for monitoring of the response of (PRIMARY and) SECONDARY CONTROLLERS and for
analysis of normal operation and incidents in the INTERCONNECTED SYSTEM.

Standards
S1. Operation of Secondary Control: Each TSO operates sufficient generating capacity
under automatic control by the SECONDARY CONTROLLER to meet its obligation to
continuously balance its generation and interchange schedules to its load for the
CONTROL AREA / BLOCK.
S2. Usage of Secondary Control. SECONDARY CONTROL must only be used in order to
correct an AREA CONTROL ERROR. SECONDARY CONTROL must not be used for other
purposes, e.g. to minimise unintentional power exchanges or to correct other
imbalances. SECONDARY CONTROL shall not counteract PRIMARY CONTROL under

emergency conditions, with possible impact on the usage of SECONDARY CONTROL in
such situations in a co-ordinated way.
S3. Control Target. One quality criterion for SECONDARY CONTROL is the time taken for a
CONTROL DEVIATION to return to zero, i.e. the time taken to restore the SYSTEM
FREQUENCY to its set point value and to restore power interchanges to their set point
(programmed) values. In practice, PRIMARY CONTROL action begins within a few
seconds of a FREQUENCY DEVIATION, and takes full effect not more than 30 seconds
later. Frequency and power interchanges must begin to return to their set point values
as a result of SECONDARY CONTROL after 30 seconds, with the process of correction
being completed after 15 minutes with a reasonable ramp rate and without overshoot.
S3.1. Compliance with large Program Changes. In order to prevent unintentional
FREQUENCY DEVIATIONS and major control deviations under normal operating
conditions (see !P1-E-C1.1), system operators are required to maintain
careful compliance with times for program changes, particularly where
changes in the interchange program of several hundred MW are involved. In
particular, care must be taken to ensure that generating capacity is brought on
line or disconnected on a staggered basis, e.g. for tariff changes at 6 a.m. and
10 p.m, and that the ramp (see !P1-B-R3.7) is followed accurately. A
substantial change in scheduling or the scheduled modification of power plant
operation must not have a negative impact upon system operation.
S4. K-Factor Settings. In order to ensure that SECONDARY CONTROL will only be called up
in the CONTROL AREA / BLOCK which is the source of the disturbance, all controller
values for K
ri
must match to the K-FACTORS (see !P1-B-C1). In this meaning,
SECONDARY CONTROL must help PRIMARY CONTROL and must not counteract it in any
case. Under no circumstances should K
ri
be modified during an incident, since this
action would go against the principle of SECONDARY CONTROL.

Guidelines
G1. Secondary Controller. The following recommendations and guidelines are given for
the setup of the SECONDARY CONTROLLER (see !P1-B-R3 for the complementary
requirements on the SECONDARY CONTROLLER):
G1.1. Controller Type and Characteristic. In case of a very large control deviation,
the control parameters
i
and T
n
of the SECONDARY CONTROLLER (for
proportional and integral part) may be adjusted automatically for a given period
of time. The control parameters
i
, and T
n
are closely linked. At present,
values ranging from 0 to 50% may be set for the proportional term
i
of the
area controller. The time constant represents the "tracking" speed of the
SECONDARY CONTROLLER with which the controller activates the control power
of participating generators. Values ranging from 50 seconds to 200 seconds
may be set for the time constant T
n
.
G2. Tie-Lines. The following recommendations are given for all TIE-LINES and related
equipment that may be in use for SECONDARY CONTROL (see !P1-B-R5 for the
complementary requirements on TIE-LINES):
G2.1. Metering and Measurement. All TIE-LINE measurements in MW and MWh
should be telemetered to both control centres affected (and in parallel to the
co-ordination centre, if necessary), using commonly agreed primary equipment
(e.g. the ELECTRONIC HIGHWAY, if applicable, see !P6).
G2.2. Transmission of Measurements. The measurements shall be transmitted in
a reliable manner to the SECONDARY CONTROLLER, at least two ways are
recommended, with an alarm in case of deficiency of a data transmission. The
largest transmission delay must not exceed 5 seconds; it must be as small as
possible and below the controller cycle time.

G2.3. Substitute Measurements. Substitute measurements and reserve equipment
should always be available in parallel to the primary measurement. Substitute
measurements are obligatory for all TIE-LINES with major operational impact.
Accuracy and cycle times for the substitute TIE-LINE measurements must fulfil
the same characteristics (see !P1-B-R5).
G3. Recommended Secondary Control Reserve. In CONTROL AREAS / BLOCKS of different
sizes, load variations of varying magnitude must be corrected within approximately
15 minutes. To this end, the following minimum value for the SECONDARY CONTROL
RESERVE related to load variations (derived from the empirical curve shown in the
figure below) is recommended for a CONTROL AREA / BLOCK:
b b L a R + =
2
max

R = the recommendation for SECONDARY CONTROL RESERVE in MW
L
max
= the maximum anticipated load in MW for the CONTROL AREA / BLOCK
The parameters a and b are established empirically with the following values for the
UCTE:
a = 10 MW and b = 150 MW
The following figure shows the recommended SECONDARY CONTROL RESERVE as a
function of the maximum anticipated load:

Procedures
P1. Trumpet Curve Method. The trumpet curve method for NETWORK POWER FREQUENCY
CHARACTERISTIC analysis is used after incidents, see description in detail in Appendix
1 (see !A1-B).

C. Tertiary Control
[UCTE Operation Handbook Appendix 1 Chapter C: Tertiary Control, 2004]

Introduction
TERTIARY CONTROL uses TERTIARY RESERVE {15 minute reserve} that is usually activated
manually by the TSOs after activation of SECONDARY CONTROL to free up the SECONDARY
RESERVES. TERTIARY CONTROL is typically operated in the responsibility of the TSO. Please
refer to Appendix 1 (see !A1-C) for further basics and principles of TERTIARY CONTROL.

Criteria
C1. Tertiary Control Deviation. In case of an incident (such as !P1-A-C3) that causes
permanent activation of SECONDARY CONTROL RESERVES, the permanent share of the
SECONDARY CONTROL is considered to be a deviation of TERTIARY CONTROL.

Requirements
R1. Tertiary Reserve. Each CONTROL AREA / BLOCK must have access to sufficient
TERTIARY RESERVE to follow up SECONDARY CONTROL within a short period of time after
an incident. An adequate control reserve must be available at all times to cover the
loss of a generating unit. If the loss of the largest generating unit is not already
covered by the requisite SECONDARY CONTROL RESERVE, a TERTIARY CONTROL
RESERVE (minute reserve) will be required to offset the shortfall.

Standards
S1. Activation of Tertiary Reserve: Each TSO must immediately activate TERTIARY
RESERVE in case insufficient free SECONDARY CONTROL RESERVE is available, in order
to free up SECONDARY CONTROL RESERVES again.

Procedures
P1. Activation of Tertiary Reserves. TERTIARY RESERVES are activated by either
updating the total EXCHANGES SCHEDULE of the CONTROL AREA / BLOCK (the CONTROL
PROGRAM) or by changing the generation schedules within the CONTROL AREA / BLOCK.


D. Time Control
[UCTE Operation Handbook Appendix 1 Chapter D: Time Control, 2004]

Introduction
The objective of TIME CONTROL is to monitor and limit discrepancies observed between
SYNCHRONOUS TIME and universal time co-ordinated (UTC) in the SYNCHRONOUS AREA (within
each zone of synchronous operation of the UCTE separately). Reasonably it is applied during
periods of uninterrupted interconnected operation, where the SYNCHRONOUS TIME is the same
in all areas. Please refer to Appendix 1 (see !A1-D) for basics and principles of TIME
CONTROL.
This policy section replaces the latest UCTE technical rule for the correction of synchronous
time (dated 01.06.1998).

Criteria
C1. Tolerated Range of Discrepancy. A discrepancy between SYNCHRONOUS TIME and
UTC time is tolerated within a range of 20 seconds.
C2. Target Range of Discrepancy. The discrepancy between SYNCHRONOUS TIME and
UTC time should be within a range of 30 seconds under normal conditions in case of
trouble-free operation of the interconnected network.
C3. Exceptional Range of Discrepancy. Under exceptional conditions in case of trouble-
free operation of the interconnected network the discrepancy between SYNCHRONOUS
TIME and UTC time should be within a range of 60 seconds.

Requirements
R1. Time Monitor. Each UCTE SYNCHRONOUS AREA appoints a central instance (Time
Monitor) that monitors continually the deviation between SYNCHRONOUS TIME (which is
derived from the integration of the common SYSTEM FREQUENCY in this zone of
synchronous operation) and the actual time (universal time co-ordinated, UTC).
R2. Frequency Set-Point for Secondary Control. For TIME CONTROL purposes in the
range of !P1-D-C3 it is required that each CONTROL AREA (see !P1-A) can involve a
displacement in the set-point frequency for SECONDARY CONTROL.
R3. Frequency Set-Point for Units. For time correction in the range of !P1-D-C3 the
set-point frequency of the units involved in PRIMARY CONTROL must not be changed.

Standards
S1. Mean Frequency Value. The mean value (as a result of PRIMARY CONTROL,
SECONDARY CONTROL and TIME CONTROL in co-operation) of the SYSTEM FREQUENCY
shall be the nominal frequency value of 50 Hz (see !P1-A-C1), so that on average
the TIME DEVIATION results to zero.
S2. Time Deviation Calculation. The TIME DEVIATION between SYNCHRONOUS TIME and
actual time is calculated for 8 a.m. each day. The relevant time zone is the Central
European Time (CET = GMT+1) with daylight saving.
S3. Time Correction Offset. If the TIME DEVIATION is within !P1-D-C1, the offset for time
correction is set to zero. If the deviation is out of !P1-D-C1 and SYNCHRONOUS TIME
is behind the actual time, the offset is set to +10 mHz. If the deviation is out of !P1-
D-C1 and SYNCHRONOUS TIME is ahead the actual time, the offset is set to 10 mHz.
S3.1. Exceptional Time Correction Offsets. Only under exceptional conditions out
of !P1-D-C3 offsets larger than 10 mHz (0.010 Hz) for the time correction of
the SYNCHRONOUS TIME may be used. They are set by the time monitor.

S4. Time Correction Standard. The time correction offset is applied by one of the
following values:
S4.1. Frequency set-point value. The frequency set-point value is calculated out of
the sum of the nominal frequency 50 Hz and the FREQUENCY OFFSET and valid
for all hours of the next day, starting at 0 a.m., and is relevant for the operation
of the SECONDARY CONTROL (see !P1-D-R2) and the calculation of
performance criteria for SECONDARY CONTROL. All TSOs apply the transmitted
frequency set-point value in their SECONDARY CONTROLLER for the full next day.
S5. Time Correction Notice. The information for the time correction is forwarded towards
all CONTROL AREAS / BLOCKS of the SYNCHRONOUS AREA every day at 10 a.m. by the
time monitor. The CONTROL AREAS / BLOCKS themselves forward this information
towards their sub-control areas without delay.
S5.1. Content of Notice. Each notice contains the time deviation, the time
correction offset, the time correction procedure and the date and duration for
the time correction.
S5.2. Notice Transmission. This notice is transmitted using secure and reliable
electronic communication that allows a half-automated procedure.
S6. Time Correction Serialisation. TIME DEVIATIONS and notifications on time error
corrections are serialised by the time monitor on a monthly basis.

Procedures
P1. UCTE Time Monitor. Under normal conditions of UCTE interconnection, the ETRANS
control centre in Laufenburg monitors continually the deviation between
SYNCHRONOUS TIME and the actual time.
P2. Time Correction Notice. Under normal conditions of UCTE interconnection, the
information on time correction is forwarded from Laufenburg (ETRANS) to the list of
TSOs directly concerned.
P3. Re-Connection of Asynchronous Areas. Before re-connecting asynchronous areas
of the UCTE network, the differences of TIME DEVIATIONS between the different
SYNCHRONOUS AREAS need to be in target range. The smaller grid area being re-
connected needs to limit this difference and to take over the synchronous time from
the larger grid area once the re-connection is in operation.
P4. Outstanding Notice. In case the TIME DEVIATION and correction notice is missing for a
TSO, the TSO applies the nominal frequency of 50 Hz (see !P1-A-C1) as frequency
set-point value for SECONDARY CONTROL until it receives the outstanding notice.


[UCPTE Rule 15: Measures for frequency control and precautions for the decrease of the frequency value,
1965]
[UCPTE Rule: Recommendations on frequency in UCPTE interconnected operation, 1996]

Introduction
EMERGENCY SITUATIONS in the interconnected UCTE system occur as a result of abnormal
operation caused by dropping of generating power, outages / OVERLOADING of transmission
lines that could not be covered by the operational reserve of affected TSOs and cause
imbalance of ACTIVE POWER or VOLTAGE decline. When disruptions occur, disturbances may
be propagated over a vast area within a very short time. In contrast to the Operational
Security in policy 3 (see !P3), the objective of this section is to specify possible direct
operational measures taken to maintain operation of the interconnected UCTE system.
The SYSTEM FREQUENCY is the main criterion for observation of normal operating conditions
(see !P1-A-C2). The NETWORK POWER FREQUENCY CHARACTERISTIC (see !P1-A-C4)
depends on the size of INTERCONNECTED NETWORKS. Considerable FREQUENCY DEVIATIONS
(caused by loss of generation capacity) is more probable in small isolated systems than in a
large SYNCHRONOUS AREA.

Criteria
C1. Operating Conditions. According to the actual SYSTEM FREQUENCY, the following
operating conditions and emergency conditions are defined:
C1.1. Normal Operating Condition / Undisturbed Operation. If the absolute
FREQUENCY DEVIATION (absolute deviation from the nominal SYSTEM
FREQUENCY of 50 Hz, see !P1-A-C1) does not exceed 50 mHz, operation
qualifies as undisturbed (normal operating condition).
C1.2. Impaired Operating Condition. If the absolute FREQUENCY DEVIATION is
greater than 50 mHz but less than 150 mHz, operating conditions are deemed
to be impaired, but with no major risk, provided that control facilities
(controllers and reserves) in the affected CONTROL AREAS / BLOCKS are for sure
ready for direct deployment.
C1.3. Severely Impaired Operating Condition. If the absolute FREQUENCY
DEVIATION is greater than 150 mHz, operating conditions are deemed to be
severely impaired, because there are significant operational risks for the
interconnected network.
C1.4. Critical Operating Condition. If the FREQUENCY DEVIATION reaches the critical
value of 2.5 Hz (that means that the SYSTEM FREQUENCY reaches 47.5 Hz, for
over-frequency the limit is 51.5 Hz), automatic disconnection of generators is
triggered and operation of the interconnected network is at its limit.

Requirements
R1. Load-Shedding Capabilities. For cases of a major frequency drop, automatic devices
for LOAD SHEDDING in response to a frequency criterion must be installed (see !P1-A-
C2.4).
R2. Emergency Situation Declaration. Each TSO has to declare the main characteristics
of an emergency situation, for information of all undertakings involved. There must be
clearly stated that emergency situation solving is a question of the highest priority at
all.
R3. Coordination. Neighboring TSOS shall declare in bilateral operational agreements
provisions for emergency assistance including provision to obtain emergency

assistance from remote systems. All TSOs must co-ordinate LOAD-SHEDDING and
action plans during emergency situations.
R4. Accuracy of Frequency Measurements for Load-Shedding. Frequency
measurements for LOAD-SHEDDING must be maintained at an accuracy of
approximately 5 to 10 mHz. In case that a wide triggering band will not cause severe
problems in the system, an accuracy of 50 to 100 mHz is sufficient. This has to be
observed and reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
R5. Tie-lines equipment. In order to maintain advantage and support of interconnection,
TIE-LINES shall be equipped with single pole rapid re-closing devices and AUTOMATIC
RECLOSING DEVICES for single phase fault.
R6. Overload indication. All TIE-LINES and large transformers must be equipped with
devices that indicate overloads.
R7. Equipment of Generating Units. Depending upon system characteristics (generation
mix, network requirements, etc.), a sufficient number of generating sets must be
equipped with devices for the isolation of units from the remainder of the system to
maintain their own auxiliaries in case of network separation, thereby allowing the more
rapid reconnection and resumption of generation by these plants, once network
conditions allow this. It should be avoided that the machines (after disconnection from
the network) reach the emergency shut-off speed due to loss of load.
R8. SCADA System Availability. In case of a general loss of voltage, control centers,
operating centers, substations, telecommunication systems and remote control
systems must remain in operational condition, in order to allow the reconstitution of
the network to be completed. Loss of a telecommunications link or an instrumentation
and link between control centers, operating centers and production/transmission
installations must not affect the system operation.

Standards
S1. Maintaining Synchronous Operation. In case of an emergency situation, the main
task is to maintain synchronous operation of the UCTE system. TSOs have to take
immediately all possible measures to restore normal operating conditions, subject to
the available means and resources available at that time. In order to allow the support
provided by TIE-LINES to be utilized as long as possible, the deliberate tripping of TIE-
LINES shall be avoided, as long as interconnected operation remains possible.
S2. Notifying Neighboring Systems. All TSOs have to notify the neighboring TSOs in
case of an emergency situation and ask for co-operation.

Guidelines
G1. Surplus of Power. In case of a critical increase of the SYSTEM FREQUENCY (significant
surplus of power generation), power generation has to be reduced (up to the
minimum) and pump operation shall be increased immediately. If the SYSTEM
FREQUENCY remains at a critical value, generation units should be disconnected.
G2. Lack of Power. In case of a significant lack of power causing a critical drop of the
SYSTEM FREQUENCY, the following actions should be performed immediately: Stop or
reduction of the pump operation, increase of all running generation (up to the
maximum) and connection of all possible quick-start reserves.

SCHEDULI NG AND ACCOUNTI NG
POLI CY 2
P2 Policy 2: Scheduling
and Accounting [E]

Policy Subsections

A. Scheduling
C. Accounting

Introduction
To operate a large power system like the one of UCTE and to create the suitable conditions
for commercial electricity trade it is necessary to schedule in advance the power to be
exchanged at the interconnection borders between the system operators. During daily
operation, the schedules are followed by means of the LOAD-FREQUENCY CONTROL installed in
each CONTROL AREA / CONTROL BLOCK. Notwithstanding LOAD-FREQUENCY CONTROL,
UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS invariably occur in energy exchanges. For this reason, it is
necessary to co-ordinate the SCHEDULE nomination between the system operators, to observe
in real-time UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS and to co-ordinate ACCOUNTING and computation of the
COMPENSATION PROGRAMS to balance UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS.

History of changes

v2.2 draft 20.07.2004 WGOS, OH team Final wording
v2.1 draft 17.06.2004 OH team Revision after consultation

Current status
This policy will cancel and replace all previous UCTE ground rules and recommendations
regarding the co-ordination of accounting and the organisation of load-frequency control
(1999) as well as the recording and offsetting of unintentional deviations in the interconnected
network of UCPTE (1988). This version of the document (version 2.2, level E, dated
20.07.2004) has final policy status.

The following UCPTE rules and recommendations are not used any longer:
UCPTE Ground Rule: Co-ordination of the accounting and organisation of the load-
frequency control, 1999
UCPTE Recommendation: Recording and offsetting of unintentional deviations in the
interconnected network of UCPTE, AR 1988
UCPTE Recommendation: General principles concerning the recording and offsetting of
unintentional deviations in the interconnected network of UCPTE, AR 1973-1974
UCPTE Recommendation: Automatic programmed value setters, AR 1960-1961

it may not be published, redistributed or modified in any technical means or used for any other
purpose outside of UCTE without written permission in advance.

UCTE OH Policy 2: Scheduling and Accounting (final policy 2.2 E, 20.07.2004) !P22

[UCTE Rule Co-ordination of the accounting and organisation of LFC]
[ETSO ESS Implementation guide Release 1]
[ETSO Guideline for FTP Data Exchange]

Introduction
The task of scheduling EXCHANGE PROGRAMS is performed during the operational planning
phase. It aims to guarantee agreed, unique border - crossing EXCHANGE PROGRAMS among all
CONTROL AREAS / CONTROL BLOCKS of UCTE. Scheduling of EXCHANGE PROGRAMS is an
important issue to check the UCTE-wide consistency of the input variables used by the single
parties involved in order to prevent systematic faults in the context of LOAD-FREQUENCY
CONTROL (see Policy 1). The scheduling phase starts with the day-ahead schedule nomination
of market participants and ends with the last intra-day schedule adaptations before system
operation.

Criteria
C1. EXCHANGE PROGRAM. The EXCHANGE PROGRAM must have the same value on both
sides of the border.
C2. Sum of the CONTROL PROGRAMS. The sum of the CONTROL PROGRAMS of all CONTROL
BLOCKS for each time unit of a SYNCHRONOUS AREA must be at any time equal to zero.
C3. Time frame is a time resolution used in EXCHANGE SCHEDULES.
C4. Definition of D , D-1, D+1
D : the day when the nominated EXCHANGE SCHEDULES are set into force.
D-1 : the day ahead (before) D
D+1: the day after D

Requirements
R1. Framework for an international Coding Scheme. A common model of an
international Coding Scheme is required as a basis for electronic exchange of
schedules within UCTE. This model consists out of the UCTE organisation with CO-
ORDINATION CENTRES (CC), CONTROL BLOCKS (CB) and CONTROL AREAS (CA). For the
CONTROL AREAS, a common naming in accordance with EIC (ETSO Identification
Code) is used.
R1.1. For CONTROL AREAS the following codes are used
R1.1.1. On CO-ORDINATION CENTRE level
- 10YCC-UCTE-NOK for CO-ORDINATION CENTRE North
- 10YCC-UCTE-SOW for CO-ORDINATION CENTRE South
R1.1.2. On CONTROL BLOCK level
- 10YCB-. for CONTROL BLOCKS
R1.1.3. On CONTROL AREA level
- 10YCA-. for CONTROL AREAS


R2. Data exchange among the operators of CONTROL AREAS, CONTROL BLOCKS and CO-
ORDINATION CENTRES.
R2.1. Electronic data exchange of EXCHANGE PROGRAMS is required (e.g.
ELECTRONIC HIGHWAY, ftp-dial in via ISDN-line, e-mail; phone and fax as back-
up if electronic communication is disturbed).
R2.2. The data exchange format for EXCHANGE PROGRAMS has to be agreed among
the operators.
R2.3. The identification scheme for market participants has to be agreed between the
operators.
R2.4. Standardisation. It is necessary to standardise the data exchange formats
within a CONTROL BLOCK, within a CO-ORDINATION CENTRE and between the CO-
ORDINATION CENTRES.
R3. Time Frame.
R3.1. The following time frames are allowed: t
i
= h, h or 1h.
R3.2. The time frame for EXCHANGE SCHEDULES must be agreed bilaterally between
adjacent operators. As a general rule, two neighbouring operators have to
choose the larger time frame for their bilateral EXCHANGE SCHEDULES.
R4. Resolution.
R4.1. The value of power in EXCHANGE SCHEDULES will be given in integer number of
MW with or without decimal digits for time frame t
i
= 1h
R4.2. The value of power in EXCHANGE SCHEDULES will be given in integer number
MW with 3 decimal digits for time frame ti = h or h.
R5. Availability. The function of a scheduling office must be available every day from
00:00. to 24:00.

Standards
S1. Day-ahead verification of EXCHANGE PROGRAMS between CONTROL AREAS (D-1 for
D) (see"P2-A-G1).
S1.1. CONTROL AREA verification. The CONTROL AREA OPERATORS have to agree
with the neighbouring CONTROL AREA OPERATORS the EXCHANGE PROGRAMS per
border (CAX) for every time unit. (see"P2-A-P1)
S1.2. Detail of exchange data. For each time unit, the CONTROL AREA OPERATORS
have to exchange the aggregated EXCHANGE PROGRAMS per CONTROL AREA
border.
S2. Day-ahead CONTROL BLOCK verification (D-1 for D) (see"P2-A-G2).
S2.1. Data exchange CONTROL AREA CONTROL BLOCK. Every day (D-1), the
CONTROL AREA OPERATORS have to submit to their corresponding CONTROL
BLOCK OPERATOR the following days (D) agreed bilateral EXCHANGE PROGRAM
per border (CAX) concerning their borders.
S2.2. Details of exchange data. For each time unit, the CONTROL AREA OPERATOR
has to submit the bilateral EXCHANGE PROGRAM per CONTROL AREA per border
(CAX) to the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR.
S2.3. CONTROL BLOCK validation. The CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR has to validate
the scheduling data received from the CONTROL AREAS (see"P2-A-P2).
S2.4. CONTROL BLOCK verification. The CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR has to submit
the bilateral EXCHANGE PROGRAM of all affected CONTROL AREAS (CBS) and
agree with the neighbouring CONTROL BLOCK OPERATORS the bilateral

EXCHANGE PROGRAMS for the corresponding CONTROL AREAS for every time
unit. (see"P2-A-P3)
S3. Day-ahead CO-ORDINATION CENTRE verification (D-1 for D) (see"P2-A-G3).
S3.1. Data exchange CONTROL BLOCK CO-ORDINATION CENTRE. Every day (D-1),
the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATORS have to submit to their corresponding CO-
ORDINATION CENTRE the following days (D) agreed EXCHANGE PROGRAMS
concerning their borders.
S3.2. Details of exchange data. For each time unit, the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR
has to submit the bilateral EXCHANGE PROGRAMS of all affected CONTROL AREA
borders (CBS) to the CO-ORDINATION CENTRE.
S3.3. CO-ORDINATION CENTRE validation. The CO-ORDINATION CENTRE has to validate
the scheduling data received from the CONTROL BLOCKS. (see"P2-A-P4)
S3.4. CO-ORDINATION CENTRE verification. The CO-ORDINATION CENTRE has to verify
and agree with the neighbouring CO-ORDINATION CENTRE the bilateral
EXCHANGE PROGRAMS for the corresponding CONTROL AREAS (CCT) for every
time unit. (see"P2-A-P5)
S4. Modification of EXCHANGE SCHEDULES.
S4.1. In case of a change of the EXCHANGE PROGRAM scheduled with another
neighbouring CONTROL AREA, the operator of the relevant CONTROL AREA has to
transmit in due time the information to the corresponding operator of the
CONTROL BLOCK.
S4.2. In case of a change of the hourly EXCHANGE PROGRAM scheduled with another
neighbouring CONTROL BLOCK, the operator of the relevant CONTROL BLOCK has
to transmit in due time the information to the corresponding CO-ORDINATION
CENTRE.
S5. Confirmation of verified EXCHANGE PROGRAMS.
S5.1. CO-ORDINATION CENTRE verification. After completion of the CO-ORDINATION
CENTRE verification, the CO-ORDINATION CENTRES have to confirm within 30
minutes the agreed EXCHANGE PROGRAMS to the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATORS
electronically by a confirmation report.
S5.2. CONTROL BLOCK verification. After receipt of the CO-ORDINATION CENTRE
confirmation, the completion of the CONTROL BLOCK verification has to be
confirmed within 30 minutes by the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATORS to the
CONTROL AREA OPERATORS electronically by a confirmation report.
S6. Transparency. The EXCHANGE PROGRAMS between CONTROL BLOCKS (CBX) and
between CONTROL AREAS (CAX) shall be published by CO-ORDINATION CENTRES on the
common information system for TSOs (VULCANUS) within 30 minutes after
completion of the verification of EXCHANGE PROGRAMS.
S7. Confidentiality. The data used for scheduling may not be transmitted to third parties
without authorisation.

Guidelines
G1. Day-ahead verification of EXCHANGE PROGRAMS between CONTROL AREAS (D-1 for
D).
G1.1. Latest exchange of EXCHANGE PROGRAMS. Exchange of EXCHANGE PROGRAMS
(CAX) between CONTROL AREAS shall be completed till 14:45 .
G1.2. CONTROL AREA verification closure. The CONTROL AREA verification shall be
completed by the CONTROL AREA OPERATORS till (D-1), 15:45

G2. Day-ahead CONTROL BLOCK verification (D-1 for D).
G2.1. Data exchange CONTROL AREA CONTROL BLOCK. Every day (D-1), the
CONTROL AREA OPERATORS shall submit by 15:45 to their corresponding
CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR the following days (D) agreed bilateral EXCHANGE
PROGRAM per border (CAX) concerning their borders.
G2.2. CONTROL BLOCK verification closure. The CONTROL BLOCK verification shall
be completed by the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR till (D-1), 16:30.
G3. Day-ahead CO-ORDINATION CENTRE verification (D-1 for D).
G3.1. Data exchange CONTROL BLOCK CO-ORDINATION CENTRE. Every day (D-1),
the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATORS shall submit by 16:30 to their corresponding
CO-ORDINATION CENTRE the following days (D) agreed EXCHANGE PROGRAMS
concerning their borders.
G3.2. CO-ORDINATION CENTRE verification closure. The CO-ORDINATION CENTRE
verification has to be completed by the CO-ORDINATION CENTRES till (D-1),
17:00.
G4. Intra-day control area verification (during D).
G4.1. CONTROL AREA verification. The CONTROL AREA OPERATORS have to agree
with the neighbouring CONTROL AREA OPERATORS the bilateral exchanges per
border (CAS) for every time unit.
G4.2. CONTROL AREA verification closure. The CONTROL AREA verification has to be
completed by the CONTROL AREA OPERATORS not later than 45 minutes before
setting a schedule into force.
G5. Intra-day CONTROL BLOCK verification (during D).
G5.1. Data exchange CONTROL AREA CONTROL BLOCK. In case of intraday
changes of the EXCHANGE SCHEDULES, the CONTROL AREA OPERATORS have to
submit at least 45 minutes before setting a schedule into force the agreed valid
EXCHANGE SCHEDULES concerning their borders to their corresponding
CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR.
G5.2. Details of exchange data. For each time unit, the CONTROL AREA OPERATOR
has to submit the total bilateral exchange per CONTROL AREA border (CAX) to
the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR.
G5.3. CONTROL BLOCK validation. The CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR has to validate
the scheduling data received from the CONTROL AREAS. Schedules having any
changes in a time unit not allowed (out of the past) will be rejected.
G5.4. CONTROL BLOCK verification. The CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR has to submit
the bilateral exchange schedules of all affected control areas (CBS) and agree
with the neighbouring CONTROL BLOCK OPERATORS the bilateral EXCHANGE
SCHEDULES for the corresponding CONTROL AREAS for every time unit
G5.5. CONTROL BLOCK verification closure. The CONTROL BLOCK verification has to
be completed by the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR not later than 30 minutes
before setting a schedule into force.
G6. Intra-day CO-ORDINATION CENTRE verification (during D).
G6.1. Data exchange CONTROL BLOCK CO-ORDINATION CENTRE. In case of intra
day changes of exchange schedules, the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATORS have to
submit at least 30 minutes before setting a schedule into force the agreed valid
EXCHANGE SCHEDULES concerning their borders to their corresponding CO-
ORDINATION CENTRE.

G6.2. Details of exchange data. For each time unit, the CONTROL BLOCK operator
has to submit bilateral exchange schedules per CONTROL AREA border (CBS) to
the CO-ORDINATION CENTRE.
G6.3. CO-ORDINATION CENTRE validation. The CO-ORDINATION CENTRE has to validate
the scheduling data received from the CONTROL BLOCKS. Schedules having any
changes in a time unit not allowed (out of the past) will be rejected.
G6.4. CO-ORDINATION CENTRE verification. The CO-ORDINATION CENTRE has to verify
and agree with the neighbouring CO-ORDINATION CENTRE the bilateral
EXCHANGE SCHEDULES for the corresponding CONTROL AREAS (CCT) for every
time unit.
G6.5. CO-ORDINATION CENTRE verification closure. The CO-ORDINATION CENTRE
verification has to be completed by the CO-ORDINATION CENTRES not later than
15 minutes before setting a schedule into force.
G7. Confirmation of verified EXCHANGE SCHEDULES.
G7.1. CO-ORDINATION CENTRE verification. After completion of the CO-ORDINATION
CENTRE verification, the CO-ORDINATION CENTRES have to confirm the agreed
EXCHANGE SCHEDULES to the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATORS by a confirmation
report.
G7.2. CONTROL BLOCK verification. After receipt of the CO-ORDINATION CENTRE
confirmation, the completion of the CONTROL BLOCK verification has to be
confirmed by the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATORS to the CONTROL AREA
OPERATORS by a confirmation report.
G8. Nomination. It is recommended to use unambiguous identification procedures for the
market participants involved in the case of nomination for exchange schedules
crossing control area borders.
G9. ELECTRONIC HIGHWAY. For data exchange, the ELECTRONIC HIGHWAY shall be used
with FTP protocol.
G10. Data exchange.
G10.1. For data exchange, the procedures defined in the ETSO ESS are
recommended
G10.2. For the identification of market participants, the EIC or EAN standard is
recommended
G11. Schedule registration at the CONTROL AREA by market participants. The market
participants schedules are registered until 14:30 of D-1 at the CONTROL AREA. The
CONTROL AREA OPERATOR verifies the correctness of the EXCHANGE SCHEDULES and
informs the parties involved as soon as possible (acknowledgement-, anomaly-,
confirmation report).
G12. Gate closure for schedule verification between market participants. In case the
EXCHANGE PROGRAMS do not have the same value on both sides of the border by
15:45 of D-1, the following rules shall be applied:
G12.1. Where no previous EXCHANGE SCHEDULE is available and the registered
EXCHANGE SCHEDULES do not have the same delivery direction, the EXCHANGE
SCHEDULE is set to zero.
G12.2. Where no previous EXCHANGE SCHEDULE is available and the registered
EXCHANGE SCHEDULES have the same delivery direction, the EXCHANGE
SCHEDULE is set to the lower absolute value.
G12.3. CONTROL AREA OPERATORS in the same CONTROL BLOCK may define other rules
with market participants. These rules have to be agreed with all the CONTROL
AREA OPERATORS within this CONTROL BLOCK

G13. Gate closure for intra-day schedule. In case the EXCHANGE PROGRAMS do not have
the same value on both sides of the border in intra-day scheduling, the EXCHANGE
SCHEDULE previously nominated (if any) will stay valid.

Procedures
P1. CONTROL AREA verification (see "P2-A-S1).
P1.1. Verification routines.
P1.1.1. The verification routines are performed by the CONTROL AREA
OPERATOR together with the neighbouring CONTROL AREAS in order to
ensure clear scheduling data.
P1.1.2. The CONTROL AREA OPERATORS verify per time unit if the EXCHANGE
SCHEDULES per border are equal for both CONTROL AREA OPERATORS. If
an error is detected by the verification routines, troubleshooting is
applied between the CONTROL AREA OPERATORS concerned.
P1.2. Troubleshooting.
P1.2.1. The CONTROL AREA exchange per market participant (CAS) is
necessary.
P1.2.2. Identification of faulty time unit.
P1.2.3. Identification of the faulty individual border crossing market participant
schedule and corresponding information of the market participant
concerned.
P1.2.4. The affected market participant sends the corrected EXCHANGE
SCHEDULE to relevant CONTROL AREAS.
P1.3. Fault correction. Market participant agree with affected CONTROL AREA on a
corrected common value.
P2. CONTROL BLOCK validation (see "P2-A-S2.3).
P2.1. Checking routines.
P2.1.1. The checking routines are performed by the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR
himself in order to ensure the validity of the complete data set
concerning the CONTROL BLOCK.
P2.1.2. The CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR validates whether the data related to
the internal borders of the underlying CONTROL AREAS in comparison to
the corresponding CONTROL AREAS sum up to zero. If the checking
routines fail, troubleshooting is applied.
P2.2. Troubleshooting
P2.2.1. Identification of the bilateral border (s) between CONTROL AREAS where
the fault applies.
P2.2.2. Identification of the faulty time unit.
EXCHANGE SCHEDULE by affected CONTROL AREA (STEP P1.2)
P2.3. Fault correction. Ask the corresponding CONTROL AREA OPERATORS to agree on
a corrected common value with the respective market participant.
P3. CONTROL BLOCK verification (see"P2-A-S2.4).

P3.1.1. The verification routines are performed by the CONTROL BLOCK
OPERATOR together with the neighbouring CONTROL BLOCKS in order to
P3.1.2. The CONTROL BLOCK OPERATORS verify per time unit whether the total
EXCHANGE PROGRAM per CONTROL AREA border is equal for both
CONTROL BLOCK OPERATORS. If the verification routines fail,
troubleshooting is applied between the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATORS
concerned.
P3.2.1. Identification of the bilateral border (s) between CONTROL AREAS where
the fault appears.
P3.2.3. Identification of the faulty CONTROL AREA border.
schedule by affected CONTROL AREA (STEP P1.2.)
P3.3. Fault correction. Ask the corresponding CONTROL AREA OPERATORS to agree on
a corrected common value with the respective market participant.
P4. CO-ORDINATION CENTRE validation (see "P2-A-S3.3).
P4.1.1. The checking routines are performed by the CO-ORDINATION CENTRE
itself in order to ensure the validity of the complete data set concerning
P4.1.2. The CO-ORDINATION CENTRE validates whether the data related to the
internal borders of the underlying CONTROL BLOCKS sum up to zero. If
the checking routines fail, troubleshooting is applied.
P4.2.1. Identification the bilateral border (s) between CONTROL BLOCKS where
the fault appears.
P4.2.2. Identification the faulty time unit.
P4.2.3. Identification of the faulty individual CONTROL AREA border.
P4.3. Fault correction. Ask the corresponding CONTROL BLOCK OPERATORS to clear
the fault.
P5. CO-ORDINATION CENTRE verification (see "P2-A-S3.4).
P5.1.1. The verification routines are performed by the CO-ORDINATION CENTRE
together with the neighbouring CO-ORDINATION CENTRE in order to
P5.1.2. The CO-ORDINATION CENTRES verify per time unit whether the bilateral
EXCHANGE PROGRAM per CONTROL AREA border is equal for both CO-
ORDINATION CENTRES. If the verification routines fail, troubleshooting is
applied between the CO-ORDINATION CENTRES concerned.
P5.2.1. The CO-ORDINATION CENTRES exchange the bilateral EXCHANGE
PROGRAMS for the CONTROL AREAS (CCT) at the border between the
CO-ORDINATION CENTRES for every time unit.

P5.2.3. Identification of the faulty CONTROL BLOCK border.
P5.2.4. Identification the faulty individual CONTROL AREA border.
P5.3. Fault correction. Ask the corresponding CONTROL BLOCK and CONTROL AREA
OPERATORS to clear the fault.

Measures
M1. Data exchange.
M1.1. Day ahead (D-1 for D)
M1.1.1. CONTROL AREA. If the CONTROL AREA OPERATOR (s) does (do) not
submit the data to the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR in time (see "P2-A-
S2.1) and can not find a common solution with the control block
operator, the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR shall set these data to zero
and inform the CONTROL AREA OPERATOR accordingly. The CONTROL
AREA OPERATOR has to arrange the setting with the market participants.
M1.1.2. CONTROL BLOCK. If the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR (s) does (do) not
submit the data to the CO-ORDINATION CENTRE in time (see "P2-A-
S3.1), and can not find a common solution with the co-ordination
centre, the CO-ORDINATION CENTRE shall set these data to zero and
inform the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR accordingly. The CONTROL BLOCK
OPERATOR shall inform the CONTROL AREA OPERATOR, and the CONTROL
M1.2. Intra-day (during D)
M1.2.1. CONTROL AREA. If the CONTROL AREA OPERATOR (s) does (do) not
submit the data to the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR in time, the CONTROL
BLOCK OPERATOR shall validate the data previously agreed and inform
the CONTROL AREA OPERATOR accordingly. The CONTROL AREA
OPERATOR has to arrange the setting with the market participants.
M1.2.2. CONTROL BLOCK. If the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR (s) does (do) not
submit the data to the CO-ORDINATION CENTRE in time, the CO-
ORDINATION CENTRE shall validate the data previously agreed and
inform the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR accordingly. The CONTROL BLOCK
operator will inform the CONTROL AREA OPERATOR, and the CONTROL
M2. Data validation.
M2.1. Day ahead (D-1 for D)
M2.1.1. CONTROL BLOCK. If the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR is not able to
validate in due time the scheduling data with the CONTROL AREAS
concerned and can not find a common solution with CONTROL AREA
OPERATORS, (see "P2-A-S2.3), the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR shall
decide which CONTROL AREA data are relevant for scheduling and
inform the CONTROL AREA OPERATOR accordingly. The CONTROL AREA
OPERATOR has to arrange the setting with the market participants.
M2.1.2. CO-ORDINATION CENTRE. If the CO-ORDINATION CENTRE is not able to
validate in due time the scheduling data with the CONTROL BLOCKS
concerned and cannot find a common solution with control block
operators, (see "P2-A-S3.3) the CO-ORDINATION CENTRE shall decide
which CONTROL BLOCK data are relevant for scheduling, and inform the
CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR accordingly. The CONTROL BLOCK
OPERATOR will inform the CONTROL AREA OPERATOR, and the CONTROL

M2.2. Intra-day (during D)
M2.2.1. CONTROL BLOCK. If the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR is not able to
validate in due time the scheduling data with the CONTROL AREAS
concerned, the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR shall decide which CONTROL
AREA data are relevant for scheduling, and inform the CONTROL AREA
OPERATOR accordingly. The CONTROL AREA OPERATOR has to arrange
the setting with the market participants.
M2.2.2. CO-ORDINATION CENTRE. If the CO-ORDINATION CENTRE is not able to
validate in due time the scheduling data with the CONTROL BLOCKS
concerned, the CO-ORDINATION CENTRE shall decide which CONTROL
BLOCK data are relevant for scheduling, and inform the CONTROL BLOCK
OPERATOR accordingly. The CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR shall inform the
CONTROL AREA OPERATOR, and the CONTROL AREA OPERATOR has to
arrange the setting with the market participants.
M3. Data verification.
M3.1. CONTROL AREA. If the CONTROL AREA OPERATOR is not able to verify in due time
with a neighbouring CONTROL AREA the EXCHANGE PROGRAM per border (see
"P2-A-S1.1) he should seek guidance from the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATORS.
Follow STEP M2.1.1 / M2.2.1.
M3.2. CONTROL BLOCK. If the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR is not able to verify in due
time with a neighbouring CONTROL BLOCK the EXCHANGE PROGRAM per border
(see "P2-A-S2.4) he should seek guidance from the CO-ORDINATION CENTRE
(s). Follow STEP M2.1.2 / M2.2.2.
M3.3. CO-ORDINATION CENTRE. If the CO-ORDINATION CENTRE is not able to verify in
due time with a neighbouring CO-ORDINATION CENTRE the EXCHANGE PROGRAM
per border (see "P2-A-S3.4) the two CO-ORDINATION CENTRES shall jointly
decide which data are relevant for scheduling and inform the CONTROL BLOCK
OPERATOR accordingly. The CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR shall inform the
CONTROL AREA OPERATOR, and the CONTROL AREA OPERATOR has to arrange
the setting with the market participants.



This policy section replaces the corresponding sections for online observation in the latest
UCPTE-Ground Rules concerning the Co-ordination of the accounting and organisation of
LFC within the UCPTE, dated 1999.

Introduction
The task of online observation is performed during the system operation phase. In order to
prevent systematic faults in the context of LOAD FREQUENCY CONTROL (see Policy 1) it is
essential to check the UCTE-wide consistency of the input variables for online operation used
by the single parties involved. This comprises the control deviation used as an input value for
LOAD FREQUENCY CONTROL as well as the real-time observation of border-crossing exchange
power flows and EXCHANGE PROGRAMS among all CONTROL AREAS / CONTROL BLOCKS of
UCTE.

Criteria
C1. CONTROL PROGRAMS. The sum of CONTROL PROGRAMS of all CONTROL BLOCKS of a
SYNCHRONOUS AREA must be equal to zero at any time.
C2. Physical Exchange. The sum of the measurements of the physical exchange of all
CONTROL BLOCKS of a SYNCHRONOUS AREA must be equal to zero at any time (taking
account of the measurements range of accuracy).
C3. POWER DEVIATION.
C4. The sum of POWER DEVIATIONs of all CONTROL AREAS of a CONTROL BLOCK must
be equal to the POWER DEVIATION of the CONTROL BLOCK concerned (taking
C5. The sum of POWER DEVIATIONs of all CONTROL BLOCKS in the area of a CO-
ORDINATION CENTRE must be equal to the POWER DEVIATION calculated with
respect to the external border of the CO-ORDINATION CENTRE concerned (taking
C6. The sum of POWER DEVIATIONS of all CONTROL BLOCKS of a SYNCHRONOUS
AREA must be equal to zero at any time.
C7. Calculated power deviations are those power deviations which could be generated
independently by the control block using the control programs and the transmitted
measurements

Requirements
R1. Accuracy of power measurements. The accuracy of ACTIVE POWER measurement on
the OBSERVATION LINE is determined by the accuracy of the measurement chain. The
sampling rate of measurements must not exceed 10 seconds.
R2. Transmission of measurements.
R2.1. The measurements of the TIE-LINE power flows crossing the border of a
CONTROL AREA must be transmitted in a reliable manner to the corresponding
operator of a CONTROL BLOCK by each CONTROL AREA (with an alarm in case of
deficiency of a data transmission). The transmission delay must be shorter
than 15 seconds.
R2.2. The measurements of the TIE-LINE power flows crossing the border of a
CONTROL BLOCK must be transmitted in a reliable manner to the corresponding
CO-ORDINATION CENTRE by each CONTROL BLOCK (with an alarm in case of

deficiency of a data transmission). The transmission delay must be shorter
than 15 seconds.
R3. Transmission of POWER DEVIATIONS.
R3.1. The measurements of POWER DEVIATIONS of the CONTROL AREAS must be
transmitted in a reliable manner to the corresponding operator of the CONTROL
BLOCK by each CONTROL AREA (with an alarm in case of deficiency of a data
transmission). The transmission delay must be shorter than 15 seconds.
R3.2. The measurements of the POWER DEVIATIONS of the CONTROL BLOCKS must be
transmitted in a reliable manner to the corresponding CO-ORDINATION CENTRE
by each CONTROL BLOCK (with an alarm in case of deficiency of a data
transmission). The transmission delay must be shorter than 15 seconds.

Standards
S1. Perturbation of measurement equipment.
S1.1. The operator of the relevant CONTROL AREA has to inform the neighbouring
CONTROL AREA OPERATORS and the corresponding operator of the CONTROL
BLOCK on any perturbation in the measurement equipment with regard to the
physical exchange crossing the borders with other neighbouring CONTROL
AREAS.
S1.2. The operator of the relevant CONTROL BLOCK has to inform the neighbouring
CONTROL BLOCK OPERATORS and the corresponding CO-ORDINATION CENTRE
about any perturbation in the measurement equipment with regard to the
physical exchange crossing the borders with other neighbouring CONTROL
BLOCKS.
S2. Detection of abnormal operation. The OBSERVATION OF UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS by
the CO-ORDINATION CENTRES allows to identify and to correct as soon as possible
abnormal operating and ACCOUNTING situations (e.g.: abnormal values of TIE-LINE
telemeasurements (TMs), misunderstanding in setting the EXCHANGE SCHEDULE of a
CONTROL BLOCK, etc.).

Guidelines
G1. Data Transmission of the CONTROL AREA. The responsible of each CONTROL AREA
shall transmit to the corresponding CONTROL BLOCK the CONTROL PROGRAM set on its
load-frequency controller after any modification of this program.
G2. Data Transmission of the CONTROL BLOCK. The responsible party of each CONTROL
BLOCK shall transmit in real time to the corresponding CO-ORDINATION CENTRE the
CONTROL PROGRAM set on its load-frequency controller after any modification of this
program.
G3. Should the transmitted POWER DEVIATION of a CONTROL AREA differ from the POWER
DEVIATION calculated by the CONTROL BLOCK, the operator of the relevant CONTROL
BLOCK has to contact immediately the corresponding operators of the CONTROL AREAS
in order to solve the problem.
G4. Should the transmitted POWER DEVIATION of a CONTROL BLOCK differ from the POWER
DEVIATION calculated by the CO-ORDINATION CENTRE, the operator of the relevant CO-
ORDINATION CENTRE has to contact immediately the corresponding operator of the
relevant CONTROL BLOCK in order to solve the problem.
G5. Acquisition of TIE-LINE metering. The CONTROL BLOCK OPERATORS shall acquire the
provisional metering data of the TIE-LINES to ADJACENT CONTROL BLOCKS to record the
energy in the time-frame used for power exchanges.

G3. Exchange of metered data. The CO-ORDINATION CENTRE shall be provided with data
of total hourly scheduled exchanges for each CONTROL BLOCK and real-time ACTIVE
POWER TMs of each TIE-LINE
1
crossing the border of the CO-ORDINATION CENTRE area.

Measures
M1. In case that the sum of the of POWER DEVIATIONS of the CONTROL AREAS in a CONTROL
BLOCK is not equal to the POWER DEVIATION of the CONTROL BLOCK, the operator of the
relevant CONTROL BLOCK shall immediately contact the corresponding operators of the
CONTROL AREAS in order to solve the problem.
M2. In case that the sum of the of POWER DEVIATIONS of the CONTROL BLOCKS in the area
of a CO-ORDINATION CENTRE is not equal to the POWER DEVIATION calculated with
respect to the external border of the CO-ORDINATION CENTRE concerned, the CO-
ORDINATION CENTRE shall immediately contact the corresponding operator of the
CONTROL BLOCKS in order to solve the problem.
M3. In case that the sum of the CONTROL PROGRAMS of the CONTROL AREAS in a CONTROL
BLOCK is not equal to CONTROL PROGRAM of the CONTROL BLOCK, the operator of the
relevant CONTROL BLOCK shall immediately inform automatically the corresponding
operator of the CONTROL AREAS.
M4. In case that the sum of the CONTROL PROGRAMS of all CONTROL BLOCKS in the
SYNCHRONOUS AREA is not equal to zero, the responsible CO-ORDINATION CENTRE shall
immediately inform automatically the corresponding operators of the CONTROL BLOCKS.

(
1
)
Including virtual tie-lines that may exist for the operation of jointly owned power plants.

C. Accounting of unintentional deviations
[UCTE Ground Rule 99 Co-ordination of the accounting and organisation of LFC]
[UCTE Recommendation 88 Recording and offsetting of unintentional deviations]
This policy section replaces the corresponding sections for accounting of inadvertent
exchange in the latest UCPTE-Ground Rules concerning the Co-ordination of the accounting
and organisation of LFC, dated 1999.

Introduction

The task of accounting of UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS is performed "after the fact", i.e. at the
next working day following the system operation. It comprises the settlement of the account of
UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS of each CONTROL AREA / CONTROL BLOCK with reference to a
recording period. The COMPENSATION OF UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS is performed by using a
program of compensation "in kind" within the compensation period - as an import / export of
the corresponding amount of energy per tariff period, that was accumulated in the recording
period. Accounting is an important issue to check the UCTE-wide consistency of the input
variable "COMPENSATION PROGRAM" used by the single parties involved in order to prevent
systematic faults in the context of LOAD FREQUENCY CONTROL (see Policy 1). The
COMPENSATION PROGRAMSof all CONTROL BLOCKS within UCTE must sum up to zero.

Criteria
C1. EXCHANGE PROGRAMS. The EXCHANGE PROGRAMS must have the same value on both
sides of the border.
C2. Types of physical energy exchange
C2.1. TIE-LINE Flows ET. The sum of the tie line flows on a border between two
CONTROL AREAS / CONTROL BLOCKS must have the same value on both sides of
the border.
C2.2. VIRTUAL TIE-LINE Flows EVT. The sum of the virtual tie line flows between two
CONTROL AREAS / CONTROL BLOCKS must have the same value on both sides of
the border.
C3. UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATION. Calculation of UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS of a CONTROL
AREA / CONTROL BLOCK for ACCOUNTING purposes: UD = ET (CAS + EVT). The sum
of all UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS of a SYNCHRONOUS AREA must be equal to zero.
C4. Compensation of UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS. The sum of all COMPENSATION
PROGRAMS for each time unit of a SYNCHRONOUS AREA must be equal to zero.
C5. Accounting point. One side of a TIE-LINE representing an interconnection point is
defined as accounting point, if it is used as unique basis for accounting of both
adjacent TSOs.
C6. Virtual accounting point represents a point, associated to a TIE-LINE, for which
energy exchange is calculated, using the meters on both sides of the TIE-LINE. That
energy exchange is used as unique basis for accounting of both adjacent TSOs. The
algorithm for this calculation is agreed between adjacent TSOs
C7. Tariff period is the time interval (e.g. season, holiday, working day, etc.) during which
UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS are attributed the same value for offsetting by
compensation in kind (see Appendix). The accumulation of UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS
within the recording period is performed separately for each tariff period.
C8. Working day is the calendar day except Saturday, Sunday and 4 holidays: Christmas,
New Year, Easter Monday and Ascension.
C9. Recording period is the time interval for which UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS for specific
CONTROL AREA should be summed up separately for each tariff period.

C10. Compensation period is the time interval during which the CONTROL AREA / CONTRTOL
BLOCK is clearing the balance of UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS according to the calculated
COMPENSATION PROGRAM.

Requirements
R1. Time Basis. The UTC (universal time co-ordinated) is the time reference.
R2. Time Frame. The time frame for ACCOUNTING of UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS has to
correspond with the time frame of the EXCHANGE PROGRAM (1h, h, h); this time
frame applies to the figures ET, EVT, UD and COMP.
R3. Resolution. The operators of neighbouring CONTROL AREAS have to agree on the
resolution for the validation of the energy exchange on their common border. The
resolution for the validation of the EXCHANGE PROGRAM is the integer value of MWh for
the time frame t
i
= 1h and the integer MWh value with 3 decimal digits for the time
frame t
i
= h or h.
R4. Physical energy exchange
R4.1. Data. The physical energy exchange is represented by electricity meter values
per accounting point and time unit. The time frame and the energy unit must be
the same on a common border between two CONTROL AREAS.
R4.2. The electricity meter values from the accounting point should be used by all
partners involved as unique representation of the physical energy exchange
concerning the interconnection point.
R5. Accounting point.
R5.1. The partners at a common border have to agree on a common accounting
point or virtual accounting point.
R5.2. The location of the accounting point has to be bilaterally determined. Usually it
is located within the substation close to the border between two partners.
R6. Physical energy exchange metering.
R6.1. Voltage and current transformer. Voltage and current transformers have to
be operated at each accounting point. Voltage and current transformers at the
accounting points should have an accuracy class rating of 0.2. Current
transformers should have 2 cores for measurement purposes.
R6.2. Electricity metering. On the basis of the current and voltage values measured
by the transformers, the electricity meters determine the active energy flow in
both directions related to a given time frame. The electricity meters at the
accounting points should have an accuracy class rating of 0.2.
R6.3. Redundancy. Accounting points should be equipped with main and check
meters at each TIE-LINE. Main and check meter should be connected each to a
separate core of the current transformer.
R6.4. Transformer cables. Due to the accuracy of the whole metering, voltage
transformer cables should be designed in such a way that a voltage drop is
reduced to 0.1% or less of the nominal voltage.
R6.5. Telecounter. The task of a telecounter is the acquisition of metered values
from the electricity meters at the accounting point and the teletransmission of
this data to the central accounting office of each partner concerned (remote
meter reading). The counters at an accounting point should be doubled. For
the sake of uniqueness, the data-flow from the electricity meters to the
accounting offices has to be agreed unanimously between the partners sharing
the accounting point.

R6.6. Availability. Every working day (D+1), metered values of the past working day
(D) have to be available at the accounting office by 09:00; after a weekend /
holidays, data for additional days have to be made available accordingly.
R7. Data exchange among partners.
R7.1. Electronic data exchange is required (e.g. ELECTRONIC HIGHWAY, ftp-dial-in via
ISDN-line, e-mail; phone and fax as back-up if electronic communication is
disturbed).
R7.2. The data exchange format has to be agreed among the partners.
R7.3. Standardisation. It is necessary to standardise the data exchange formats
within a CONTROL BLOCK, within a CO-ORDINATION CENTRE and between the CO-
ORDINATION CENTRES.
R8. Rounding. The operators of CONTROL AREAS and CONTROL BLOCKS have to agree on
the rounding rules for the calculation of the UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATION and the
COMPENSATION PROGRAMS.
R9. Availability. Accounting offices should be available on working days from 08:00. to
16:00.

Standards
S1. Scheduled energy exchange. The highest valid version of the data exchange sheets
CAX / CBX has to be used by the CO-ORDINATION CENTRES for ACCOUNTING.
S2. Physical energy exchange ET / EVT.
S2.1. TSOs operating a common TIELINE or VIRTUAL TIELINE have to agree on
unique meter values for every time unit.
S2.2. In case of problems concerning metering or telecounting equipment the TSOs
operating a common TIELINE or VIRTUAL TIELINE have to agree on unique
substitute meter values for every time unit.
S3. CONTROL BLOCK settlement per workday (D+1 for D).
S3.1. Data exchange between CONTROL BLOCK CO-ORDINATION CENTRE. Every
working day (D+1), the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATORS have to submit by 11:00
the past working days (D) metered values of their TIE LINES / VIRTUAL TIE
LINES to their corresponding CO-ORDINATION CENTRE; after the weekend /
holidays, additional data for additional days have to be made available
accordingly.
S3.2. Details of exchange data. For each time unit, the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR
has to submit at least the bilateral sum of metered values per CONTROL BLOCK
border to the CO-ORDINATION CENTRE.
S3.3. CONTROL BLOCK validation. The CO-ORDINATION CENTRE has to validate the
accounting data received from the CONTROL BLOCKS until 14:00.
S3.4. CONTROL BLOCK settlement. The CO-ORDINATION CENTRE has to calculate the
single CONTROL BLOCKS account of UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS for every tariff
period for the day before (D), 24:00 and submit the result to the CONTROL
BLOCK OPERATOR concerned. The data has to be confirmed by the CONTROL
BLOCK OPERATOR.
S3.5. CONTROL BLOCK settlement closure. The CONTROL BLOCK validation and the
CONTROL BLOCK settlement have to be completed as soon as possible, but not
later than (D+1), 16:00.
S4. CO-ORDINATION CENTRE settlement per workday (D+1 for D).

S4.1. CO-ORDINATION CENTRE validation. The CO-ORDINATION CENTREs have to
calculate the sum of the CONTROL BLOCKS account of UNINTENTIONAL
DEVIATIONS for every tariff period for the day before (D), 24:00 and validate the
result vice-versa not later than (D+1), 16:00.
S4.2. Confirmation of the settlement per workday. The CO-ORDINATION CENTRES
have to submit to the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATORS the account of
UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS for every tariff period for the day before (D), 24:00
after the completion of the CO-ORDINATION CENTRE validation.
S5. Final CONTROL AREA settlement of a recording period.
S5.1. Data exchange CONTROL AREA CONTROL BLOCK. Corrections concerning the
data exchanged during the daily settlement on working days have to be taken
into account for the final CONTROL AREA settlement of a recording period if they
are submitted from the CONTROL AREA OPERATORS to their corresponding
CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR by 10:00 two working days before the start of the
compensation period.
S5.2. CONTROL AREA validation. The CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR has to validate the
accounting data received from the CONTROL AREAS.
S5.3. CONTROL AREA settlement. The CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR shall calculate the
single CONTROL AREAS final account of UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS for every
tariff period for the last day of the recording period by 24:00 as well as the
resulting COMPENSATION PROGRAMS of the recording period, and submit the
result to the CONTROL AREA OPERATOR concerned; the data has to be
confirmed by the CONTROL AREA OPERATOR.
S5.4. CONTROL AREA settlement closure. The final CONTROL AREA validation and
the final CONTROL AREA settlement have to be completed by 12:00, at the
latest, two working days before the start of the compensation period.
S6. Final CONTROL BLOCK settlement of a recording period.
S6.1. Data exchange between CONTROL BLOCK CO-ORDINATION CENTRE.
Corrections concerning the data exchanged during the daily settlement on
working days have to be taken into account for the final CONTROL BLOCK
settlement of a recording period if they are submitted from the CONTROL BLOCK
OPERATORS to their corresponding CO-ORDINATION CENTRE by 12:00, at the
S6.2. CONTROL BLOCK validation. The CO-ORDINATION CENTRE has to validate the
accounting data received from the CONTROL BLOCKS.
S6.3. CONTROL BLOCK settlement. The CO-ORDINATION CENTRE shall calculate the
single CONTROL BLOCKS final account of UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS for every
tariff period for the last day of the recording period, 24:00, as well as the
resulting COMPENSATION PROGRAMS of the recording period, and submit these
results to the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR concerned; the data has to be
confirmed by the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR.
S6.4. CONTROL BLOCK settlement closure. The final CONTROL BLOCK validation and
the final CONTROL BLOCK settlement have to be completed by 16:00, at the
S7. Final CO-ORDINATION CENTRE settlement of a recording period.
S7.1. CO-ORDINATION CENTRE validation. The CO-ORDINATION CENTRES shall
calculate the sum of the CONTROL BLOCKS final account of UNINTENTIONAL
DEVIATIONS for every tariff period for the last day of the recording period, 24:00,
as well as the resulting COMPENSATION PROGRAMS of the recording period, and
validate the result vice-versa by 9:00 one working day before the start of the
compensation period.

S8. Confirmation of the final settlement.
S8.1. Within 30 minutes after the final CO-ORDINATION CENTRE settlement of a
recording period, the CO-ORDINATION CENTRES have to confirm the CONTROL
BLOCK OPERATORS the agreed COMPENSATION PROGRAMS.
S8.2. Within 30 minutes after the confirmation of the CO-ORDINATION CENTRES, the
CONTROL BLOCK OPERATORS have to confirm the CONTROL AREA OPERATORS
the agreed COMPENSATION PROGRAMS accordingly.
S9. Transparency. The EXCHANGE PROGRAMS and the physical exchange between
CONTROL BLOCKS have to be published according to a common information system for
TSOs (VULCANUS) within 30 minutes after final settlement.
S10. Confidentiality. The data used for accounting may not be transmitted to third parties
without authorisation.

Guidelines
G1. CONTROL AREA settlement per working day (D+1 for D).
G1.1. Data exchange between CONTROL AREA CONTROL BLOCK. Every working day
(D+1), the CONTROL AREA OPERATORS have to submit by 11:00 the metered
values of the past working day (D) of their tie-lines / virtual tie-lines to their
corresponding CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR; after the weekend / holidays, data
for additional days have to be made available accordingly.
G1.2. Details of exchange data. For each time unit, the CONTROL AREA OPERATOR
has to submit at least the bilateral sum of metered values per CONTROL AREA
border to the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR.
G1.3. CONTROL AREA validation. The CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR has to validate the
accounting data received from the CONTROL AREAS by 14:00.
G1.4. CONTROL AREA settlement. The CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR shall calculate the
single CONTROL AREAS account of UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS for every tariff
period for the day before (D), 24:00, and submit the result to the CONTROL AREA
OPERATOR concerned. The data has to be confirmed by the CONTROL AREA
OPERATOR.
G1.5. CONTROL AREA settlement closure. The CONTROL AREA validation and the
CONTROL AREA settlement have to be completed as soon as possible, but not
later than (D+1), 16:00.
G2. Accounting point location. The location of the accounting points shall be the same
as the location of the measurement values used for load frequency control (see "P1-
A-R1.3).
G3. Physical energy exchange ET / EVT. TSOs operating a common TIE-LINE OR VIRTUAL
TIE-LINE should read the same agreed meter value via telecounter which ensures that
always unique meter values are used for every time unit by all partners involved.
G4. Data exchange between partners.
G4.1. ELECTRONIC HIGHWAY. For data exchanges, the ELECTRONIC HIGHWAY should
be used.
G4.2. Details of data exchange between CONTROL AREA CONTROL BLOCK. It is
recommended that the CONTROL AREA OPERATOR submits for each time unit
the single meter values of the TIE-LINES / VIRTUAL TIE-LINES to the CONTROL
BLOCK OPERATOR.
G4.3. Details of data exchange between CONTROL BLOCK CO-ORDINATION CENTRE.
It is recommended, that the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR submits for each time

unit the single meter values of the TIE-LINES / VIRTUAL TIE-LINES to the CO-
ORDINATION CENTRE.
G5. Quality of on-line observation and accounting. It is recommended that every partner
regularly compares the measured values and the corresponding metered values of TIE-
LINE flows (including virtual TIE-LINES) in order to detect early errors.
G6. Unique definition of the data flow from the electricity meters to the accounting
offices. If each partner uses an own telecounter with data from both main and check
meter, one telecounter has to be declared as reference for accounting. Alternatively,
each partner at the accounting point is connected to both telecounters and gets the
main meter data from one telecounter and the check meter data from the other one.
Both variants proposed provide unique values for all partners.
G7. Maximum values of UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS
G7.1. Maximum values of hourly values of UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS: If the value
of UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS during one hour within a CONTROL AREA
considerably exceeds a reasonable value, compensation can be treated
separately by the CO-ORDINATION CENTRES on request of the partners.
G7.2. Maximum values of the account of UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS: If the
absolute value of the account of UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONs in a recording
period of a CONTROL AREA considerably exceeds a reasonable value,
compensation can be treated separately by the CO-ORDINATION CENTRES on
request of partners concerned.

Procedures
P1. Recording period.
P1.1. The standard recording period is defined to comprise 7 days (one week), from
Monday, 0:00 to Sunday 24:00.
P1.2. In case of bank holidays or change of tariff seasons, exceptions to this rule
may occur. The CO-ORDINATION CENTRES agree on exceptions to the definition
of the recording period and inform the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATORS 4 weeks
before the start of the recording period accordingly.
P1.3. A recording period should last at least 4 days.
P2. Compensation period.
P2.1. The standard compensation period is defined to comprise 7 days (one week),
from Thursday, 0:00 to Wednesday 24:00 , the standard compensation period
starts with a delay of three days off the end of the corresponding recording
period.
P2.2. In case of holidays or change of tariff seasons, exceptions to this rule may
occur. The CO-ORDINATION CENTRES agree on exceptions to the definition of the
compensation period and inform the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATORS 4 weeks
before the start of the corresponding recording period accordingly.
P2.3. A compensation period should last at least 4 days.
P2.4. A compensation period has to start always with a delay of three working days
off the end of the corresponding recording period.
P3. CONTROL AREA validation (see "P2-C-G1.3, "P2-C-S5.2 ).
the CONTROL BLOCK.

P3.1.2. The CONTROL BLOCK OPERATORS validate whether the data related to
the internal borders of the underlying CONTROL AREAS sum up to zero.
These routines are applied for the figures (CAS, ET and EVT). If the
checking routines fail, troubleshooting is applied.
P3.2.1. Identify whether the fault applies to the EXCHANGE PROGRAM or the
physical energy exchange on TIE-LINES ET or virtual TIE-LINES EVT.
P3.2.2. Identify the bilateral border (s) between CONTROL AREAS where the fault
occurs.
P3.2.3. If the single (virtual) TIE-LINE flows are available: identify the (virtual)
single TIE-LINE (s) between CONTROL AREAS where the fault occurs
P3.3. Fault correction. The CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR asks the corresponding
neighbouring CONTROL AREA OPERATORS to agree on a corrected common
value.
P4. CONTROL AREA settlement (see "P2-C-S5.3).
together with the underlying CONTROL AREAS in order to ensure the
validity of the accounting results.
P4.1.2. The CONTROL AREA OPERATORS validate whether the calculated
account of UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS per tariff period and in case of
the final settlement - the resulting Compensation Programs of the
recording period is identical with the results submitted by the CONTROL
BLOCK OPERATOR. If the checking routines fail, troubleshooting is
applied between CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR and CONTROL AREA
OPERATOR.
P4.2.1. Identify the faulty tariff period(s) on the basis of the CONTROL AREAS
account of UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS for every tariff period
P4.2.2. Identify the faulty time unit(s) on the basis of the CONTROL AREAS
account of UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS for every time unit
P4.2.3. Follow STEP P3.2.1.
P4.3. Fault correction. The CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR asks the corresponding
CONTROL AREA OPERATOR to agree on the corrected value.
P5. CONTROL BLOCK validation (see "P2-C-S3.3, "P2-C-S6.2).
P5.1.2. The CO-ORDINATION CENTRE validates whether the data related to the
internal borders of the underlying CONTROL BLOCKS sum up to zero.
These routines are applied for the figures (CAS, ET and EVT). If the
checking routines fail, troubleshooting is applied.
P5.2.1. Identify whether the fault applies to the EXCHANGE PROGRAM or the
physical energy exchange on TIE-LINES ET or virtual TIE-LINES EVT

P5.2.2. Identify the bilateral border(s) between CONTROL BLOCKS where the fault
occurs
P5.2.3. If the bilateral sums of (virtual) TIE-LINE flows per CONTROL AREA border
are available: identify the bilateral border (s) between CONTROL AREAS
where the fault occurs; otherwise STEP P3.2.2
P5.2.4. If the single (virtual) TIE-LINE flows are available: identify the (virtual)
single TIE-LINE (s) between CONTROL AREAS where the fault occurs;
otherwise STEP P3.2.3
P5.3. Fault correction. The CO-ORDINATION CENTRE asks the corresponding
neighbouring CONTROL BLOCK OPERATORS to agree on a corrected common
value.
P6. CONTROL BLOCK settlement (see "P2-C-S3.4, "P2-C-S6.3).
together with the underlying CONTROL BLOCKS in order to ensure the
validity of the accounting results.
P6.1.2. The CONTROL BLOCK OPERATORS validate whether the calculated
account of UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS per tariff period and in case of
the final settlement - the resulting Compensation Programs of the
recording period are identical with the results submitted by the CO-
ORDINATION CENTRE. If the checking routines fail, troubleshooting is
applied between CO-ORDINATION CENTRE and CONTROL BLOCK
OPERATOR.
P6.2.1. Identify the faulty tariff period (s) on the basis of THE CONTROL AREAS
account of UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS for every price rating time
bracket
P6.2.2. Identify the faulty time unit (s) on the basis of the CONTROL AREAS
account of UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS for every time unit
P6.2.3. Follow STEP P5.2.1
CONTROL AREA OPERATOR to correct the value.
P7. CO-ORDINATION CENTRE validation (see "P2-C-S4.1, "P2-C-S7.1).
P7.1.1. The checking routines are performed by the CO-ORDINATION CENTRES in
order to ensure the validity of the complete UCTE data set.
P7.1.2. The CO-ORDINATION CENTRES validate whether the data related to their
external borders between the CO-ORDINATION CENTRES sum up to zero.
These routines are applied for the figures (CAS, ET, EVT, UD and in
the case of final settlement - COMP). If the checking routines fail,
troubleshooting is applied.
P7.2. Troubleshooting. Follow STEP P5.2.1
neighbouring CONTROL BLOCK OPERATORS to agree on a corrected common
value.

Measures

M1. Substitute meter values. In case of S2.2 the following procedure is recommended:
M1.1. If available, use the check meter values from the accounting point substation.
M1.2. If available, use the main meter values from the adjacent substation.
M1.3. If available, use the check meter values from the adjacent substation.
M1.4. If available, use the integrated measurement values from the on-line
observation (see subsection on-line observation).
M1.5. Otherwise, the partners involved agree on the methodology to determine
substitutes.
M2. Data exchange.
M2.1. If the CONTROL AREA OPERATOR(s) does (do) not submit the data to the
CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR in due time (see "P2-C-S3.1), the CONTROL BLOCK
OPERATOR shall estimate substitute values.
M2.2. If the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR(s) does (do) not submit the data to the CO-
ORDINATION CENTRE in due time (see "P2-C-S3.1), the CO-ORDINATION CENTRE
shall estimate substitute values.
M3. Data validation.
M3.1. If the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR is not in a position to validate the accounting
data with the CONTROL AREAS concerned in due time (see "P2-C-S5.2 ), the
CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR shall decide which CONTROL AREA data are relevant
for accounting.
M3.2. If the CO-ORDINATION CENTRE is not in a position to validate the accounting data
with the CONTROL BLOCKS concerned in due time (see "P2-C-S6.2), the CO-
ORDINATION CENTRE shall decide which CONTROL BLOCK data are relevant for
accounting.
M3.3. If the CO-ORDINATION CENTRES are not in a position to validate the accounting
data vice-versa in due time (see "P2-C-S7.1), the CO-ORDINATION CENTRES
agree upon CO-ORDINATION CENTRE data relevant for accounting.
M4. Corrections of metered data. Corrections of metered data have to be performed
within 4 weeks after the day they correspond to.
M5. Settlement.
M5.1. If the CONTROL AREA OPERATOR is not in a position to confirm the account of
UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS and the resulting COMPENSATION PROGRAM in due
time (see "P2-C-S5.3), the result of the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR shall be
valid.
M5.2. If the CONTROL BLOCK OPERATOR is not in a position to confirm the account of
UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS and the resulting COMPENSATION PROGRAM in due
time (see "P2-C-S6.3), the result of the CO-ORDINATION CENTRE shall be valid.

OPERATI ONAL SECURI TY
POLI CY 3
P3 Policy 3: Operational Security [E]

Policy Subsections

A. N-1 Security (operational planning and real-time operation)
B. Voltage control and reactive power management
C. Network faults clearing and short-circuit currents
D. Stability
E. Outages scheduling
F. Information exchanges between TSOs for security of system operation

Introduction
System safety is the primary goal of the operation of the interconnected network. In an
interconnected system there exist numerous inter-dependencies of the networks forming part
of the system. In addition, there are impacts attributable to the usage of the system by market
players. In an unbundled environment, network operators are not allowed to interfere with
market forces unless system safety is at stake. The operation of the interconnected network
is founded on the principle that each partner is responsible for its own network. In order to
give practical application to the basic principle of the interconnection that each TSO is
responsible for its control area, one of the purposes of the Operation Handbook is to define
the methods of co-operation also in operational situations when factors outside of the control
area can reduce the ability of a TSO to operate its system within the security limits, according
to the UCTE rules. To harmonise the operating methods for the interconnected network,
UCTE has since the beginning worked out rules, instructions and suggestions, to which the
operation of each network has to make reference in order to ease inter-operability.
TSOs are in charge of managing the security of operation of their own networks in a
subsidiary way. The most relevant rules for the security of interconnected operation are
related mainly to the functioning of interconnections. TSOs cooperatively adapt continuously
such common rules for inter-operability to be applied mainly at the borders of their CONTROL
AREAS and consequently at the borders of countries / blocks. These rules create favourable
conditions for cross-border exchanges at destination of network users and of TSOs
themselves. All these co-ordinating rules complement any other existing national
commitments for network access (legal and contractual) for the transmission networks when
they exist. The control of performances of facilities connected to networks remains under the
responsibility of TSOs to the extent of their national commitments.
This policy specifies the requirements for operating the TRANSMISSION system to maintain
security. Each CONTROL AREA and TRANSMISSION SYSTEM OPERATOR - TSO - is responsible of
procedures for reliable operation over a reasonable future time period in view of real-time
conditions, with CONTINGENCY and emergency conditions, and of their preparation. Co-
ordination between TSOs contributes to enhance the common solidarity (to cope with risks)
resulting from the operation of interconnected networks, to prevent disturbances, to provide
assistance in the event of failures with a view to reducing their impact and to provide resetting
strategies after a collapse. This co-ordination is intensively developed covering today new
aspects related to market mechanisms.

History of changes

v1.3 final draft 20.07.2004 OH team Final wording
v1.2 final draft 18.06.2004 OH team revision after consultation

Current status
This policy focuses only on security aspects in operation and does not deal with long-term
planning. The commercial rules are out of the scope accordingly (see section I-D in the
introduction of the handbook). It is to be linked with Policy 5 emergency procedures in
UCTE OH Policy 3: Operational Security (final policy 1.3 E, 20.07.2004) P32

preparation.

This policy will cancel and replace previous UCTE ground rules and recommendations related
to operational security. This version of the document (version 1.3, level E, dated 20.07.2004)
has final policy status.


A. N-1 Security (operational planning and real-time
operation)

Introduction
The N-1 SECURITY section refers to the requirements placed upon the operation of the POWER
SYSTEM of the SYNCHRONOUS AREA with a view to maintaining the security of the entire
interconnected network at any time in operational planning and in real-time conditions. Long-
term planning requirements are not dealt with in this context. Secure operation of the
interconnected network has made it possible to attain such a good quality of service that in
the large majority of cases the outage of any power station or TRANSMISSION element has no
influence on the supply of consumers. The N-1CRITERION is of major importance to prevent
disturbances. This rule applied by all TSOs is combined with an appropriate choice of
generation and TRANSMISSION facilities, and the determination of a sufficient reserve.
With an organisation of operation based on anticipation, dangerous situations can be
identified in due time, and it is possible to take preventive action. Different CONTINGENCIES
can occur:
loss of interconnecting elements without any impact on network users or with
consequences on commercial power exchanges;
loss of load with immediate consequences for consumers;
loss of interconnected operation, with possible worse consequences.
According to the safety, operational and planning standards used by TSOs, the highest
importance is attached to the calculation of the TOTAL TRANSFER CAPACITY and the
TRANSMISSION RELIABILITY MARGIN based upon the electrical and physical realities of the
network.

Criteria
C1. "N-1" CRITERION: Any probable single event leading to a loss of POWER SYSTEM
elements should not endanger the security of interconnected operation, that is, trigger
a cascade of trippings or the loss of a significant amount of CONSUMPTION. The
remaining network elements, which are still in operation should be able to
accommodate the additional load or change of generation, voltage deviation or
transient stability regime caused by the initial failure.
It is acceptable that in some cases TSOs allow a loss of CONSUMPTION in their own
area on condition that its amount is compatible with a secure operation, predictable
and locally limited.
C1.1. Loss of an element. The loss of any POWER SYSTEM element (generating set,
compensating installation or any TRANSMISSION circuit, transformer) must not
jeopardise the security of operation of interconnected networks as a result of
limits being reached or exceeded for current, VOLTAGE magnitude, STABILITY,
etc., and accordingly cannot cause cascade tripping of installations with
interruptions in supply. These harmful consequences must be avoided in the
system directly supervised by the TSO and also in ADJACENT SYSTEMS.
Particular attention is required for TIE-LINES or in the vicinity of borders
between different TSOs.
The loss of any element according to this N-1 CRITERION, however, could
affect radially supplied areas (and the output of their local power plants) and
as such these areas are excluded from this rule.
C1.1.1. Frequency deviations. The loss of elements in the POWER SYSTEM
must not cause a FREQUENCY DEVIATION outside acceptable limits
according to those referred to in Policy 1 (see !P1-A-C2).
C1.1.2. VOLTAGE deviation. The loss of elements in the POWER SYSTEM must
not cause a VOLTAGE drop which may lead to VOLTAGE instability.

C1.1.3. INTERCONNECTED SYSTEM STABILITY. The loss of an element in the
POWER SYSTEM must not cause a loss of INTERCONNECTED SYSTEM
STABILITY.
C1.1.4. Cascading outages. A loss of an element in the POWER SYSTEM must
not cause cascading outages of other elements in the CONTROL AREA
as a result of exceeded operation SECURITY LIMITS.

Requirements
R1. Monitoring of the N-1 CRITERION
R1.1. Monitoring: TSOs monitor at any time the N-1 CRITERION for their own system
through observation of the interconnected system (their own system and some
defined parts of ADJACENT SYSTEMS) and carry out security computations for
risk analysis.
R1.2. Violation of the N-1 CRITERION: In real time, after a CONTINGENCY, each TSO
returns its POWER SYSTEM to N-1 compliant condition as soon as possible, and
in case of a possible delay, it will immediately inform other TSOs affected.
R2. Most probable contingencies
R2.1. TSOs define the set of most probable CONTINGENCIES in operational planning
and in real-time conditions and implement measures to comply with the N-1
CRITERION. Each TSO is directly responsible for coping with the N-1 CRITERION
by taking account of the loss of one or multiple network elements (N-k
elements when such situations can occur with a sufficient probability to
threaten the security of operation: e.g. N-2 lines for some double-circuit lines
when appropriate). The specific case of a loss of bus-bars is considered by
taking into account an acceptable level of loss of CONSUMPTION predicted and
locally limited or not taken into account (due to the extremely low probability of
fault and due to the necessity of topology switching by coupling or separating
the bus-bars).
R2.2. The screening of situations with CONTINGENCIES covers the loss of single or
multiple elements of generation or TRANSMISSION equipment at any time. This
screening takes also account of temporary weather conditions or weakness of
a single network equipment.
R3. Bottlenecks. In normal conditions, no restrictions of the TRANSMISSION capacity
should occur on the network. If a network operating element fails, necessary
measures are taken in the internal network to limit the consequences of such
BOTTLENECKs that may adversely affect interconnected operation. In normal operation,
any ancillary equipment associated with a TRANSMISSION line, a fortiori with a TIE-LINE,
are designed to match the TOTAL TRANSFER CAPACITY so that TSOs do not face
capacity limitation. TSOs agree between themselves on a common TOTAL TRANSFER
CAPACITY limit for common borders.
R3.1. All ancillary equipment associated with a transmission line or a transformer,
such as current transformers, disconnectors, power circuit breakers, high
frequency chokes, intensity and voltage measurement devices, are designed
to match the maximum transmission capacity of the line or transformer, so that
they do not represent a bottleneck.
R4. Operational Network Reserve. TSOs estimate their operational reserve, i.e. ACTIVE
POWER reserve, REACTIVE POWER reserve, acceptable VOLTAGE profile, line loads
within acceptable limits, STABILITY margins etc, depending on operating conditions, to
securely withstand a first CONTINGENCY. Following the first CONTINGENCY in the
network causing a lack of operational network reserve, this immediate deterioration
does not lead to rapid deterioration of system operating conditions and is predicted.


Standards
S1. Application of the N-1 SECURITY POLICY. Each TSO initially applies the N-1 security
policy to its own network on its own responsibility; adjacent TSOs shall be informed
about potential problems in the application of this rule. The TSOs concerned jointly
verify the respect of the N-1 rule in consideration of cross-border power transfers. The
tripping of TIE-LINES at other borders is also considered when appropriate.
S2. Network margin at boundary. The entire network, including TIE-LINES, is operated in
such a way that sufficient transmission capacity is available for the delivery of reserve
power for PRIMARY CONTROL towards the areas which respectively may be affected by
the most severe single CONTINGENCY, in the scope of the TRM.
S3. Data Exchanges.
S3.1. Completion of real-time and forecast calculations of network security.
TSOs exchange all useful information and data related to network topology,
active and reactive flows, sums of country EXCHANGE PROGRAMS and to some
extent the pattern of generation in compliance with the national legal
framework in use for confidentiality only when the pattern is relevant for
operation at boundary, etc and required for calculations of network security.
These data will be used for the completion of real-time and forecast
calculations for network security and then for congestion forecasts week and
day ahead (P4-A1).
S3.2. Day-Ahead Congestion Forecast. With a view to completing the most
accurate studies to relieve network congestions, TSOs exchange specific
relevant provisional data (see also section F).

Procedures
P1. Procedures for the N-1 CRITERION. TSOs individually and jointly develop, maintain
and implement procedures to comply with the N-1 CRITERION.
P2. Types of analysis. Two types of analysis are used for the verification of operational
security by members:
forecast analyses based upon network data and various hypotheses for electricity
exchanges, generation pattern, incoming power flows and system topology;
real-time analyses based upon network data supplied by a given TSO, together
with data on those parts of ADJACENT SYSTEMS which will have a significant
influence upon the system of the TSO concerned.
TSOs within the SYNCHRONOUS AREA complete forecast calculations for the
synchronous network as a whole, using a simulation of N-1 criterion cases. The
provision of a uniform set of data hypotheses for incoming power flows allows each
TSO to complete individual calculations (forecast and real time) for the verification of
the security of their own networks. This will involve the calculation of:
the effects of power plant failures upon power flows, both in national networks and
on TIE-LINES, taking account of the PRIMARY CONTROL power supplied by other
networks;
power flow transfers associated with the tripping of lines or other elements of
national networks, taking account of the influence of other networks.
P3. Online calculations for network security. This method involves the representation
of the actual condition of networks in the areas concerned, referred to as adjacent
zones. To this end, measurements and the signalling of the status of switching
devices on the circuits concerned will be elaborated and transmitted in order to allow
effective observation of these circuits. Equivalent representation is deemed sufficient
for remote zones. Adjacent zones will be limited to the first loop linking the system
node points which are directly adjacent to frontier node points. The reduction of

external networks will therefore be completed beyond the scope of adjacent zones.
This method allows members to apply their algorithms for the real-time verification of
network security to a cross-border model which takes account the actual situation at
any given time.

Guidelines
G1. Inter-linked double bus bar operation. It is advisable to provide inter-linked double
bus-bar operation in a transformer substation if the number of branches exceeds a
given number. An operation with multiple electric nodes can be requested at some
boundary substations for security reasons.
G2. Support from an ADJACENT SYSTEM. The N-1 CRITERION may be assured with the
support of an ADJACENT SYSTEM, subject to the prior agreement of the latter. This
assumes that scheduled outages for the performance of work affecting ADJACENT
SYSTEMS have been agreed in advance by the TSOs concerned.
G3. Operational switching for periodical maintenance. In order to ensure the
permanent manoeuvrability of TRANSMISSION circuit isolators and breakers at any time,
TSOs organise periodical switching of such elements. This must be done without
endangering the security of operation.
G4. Overload indicators. All TIE-LINES, and the important internal TRANSMISSION lines and
large transformers are equipped with devices which enable overloads to be indicated
and information to be transmitted to National Control Centres, in order to alert TSOs
of a close risk of violating the N-1 CRITERION.

Measures
M1. Tripping of interconnecting lines. In order to allow the support by INTERCONNECTION
to be provided as long as possible, deliberate tripping of TIE-LINES should be avoided,
as long as interconnected operation remains possible, except when defined and
agreed between neighbouring TSOs.

Bibliography :
[Review of UCPTE recommendations on interconnected operation 31/07/1991 ( Network security (42))]
[Network protection devices against faults, QR 1974/75]
[UCPTE 37: Operation of the UCPTE interconnected network in normal operation and during disruptions, AR 1985-1986 (1, 2)]
[UCPTE 13 : Measures to prevent or limit major disruptions, AR 1962-1963 ( 2, 3, et 5)]
[UCPTE 15 : Measures to maintain a stable frequency and precautions against falls in frequency, QR I-1965 ( 2, 3)]
[UCPTE 16 : Measures to counteract major disruptions in interconnected network operation, QR IV-1966 ( 3.2, 3.4, 4, 5(other
references)) + Revision of 31/10/1990]
[UCPTE 42 : Measures to counteract major disruptions in interconnection and to re-establish normal operating conditions, HR I-
1990 ( 3.2, 3.4, 4)]
[UCPTE 37 : Operation of the UCPTE interconnected network in normal operation and during disruptions, AR 1985-1986 ( 3)]
[Recommendation UCTE regarding plans of network restoration 1/12/1999 ( 2, 4, 5)]
[ETSO Web-site]


B. Voltage Control and Reactive Power Management

Introduction
VOLTAGE is a measured physical quantity, which fluctuates as a function of network load,
generation programmes, POWER SYSTEM operator decisions and POWER SYSTEM
contingencies (tripping of generators or TRANSMISSION components). The VOLTAGE levels are
maintained by REACTIVE POWER generation assured by different facilities. Nevertheless, for
network security reasons, and in accordance with operational VOLTAGE limits of equipment
(insulation of network elements, functioning limits of automatic transformer tap changers), a
control of VOLTAGE is locally needed to maintain the VOLTAGE deviations within pre-
determined limits.
VOLTAGE conditions in a high-VOLTAGE grid are directly related to the REACTIVE POWER
balance at the system nodes. Depending on their operational state, all generators, LOADs and
system components (lines, transformers) are either REACTIVE POWER consumers or
producers. The network by itself produces or absorbs REACTIVE POWER depending on the load
level through the line and their surge impedance loading sometimes called the natural
power. To compensate for an excessive CONSUMPTION of REACTIVE POWER, TSOs have to
make sure that efficient producers feed sufficient reactive power into the networks in addition
to the one produced by other devices installed in the networks or in consumers installations.
Unlike ACTIVE POWER, REACTIVE POWER cannot be transmitted over long distances, since the
TRANSMISSION of REACTIVE POWER leads to an additional demand for REACTIVE POWER in the
system components, thereby causing VOLTAGE drops. In order to obtain an acceptable
VOLTAGE level, REACTIVE POWER generation and CONSUMPTION have to be situated as close
to each other as possible to avoid excessive REACTIVE POWER TRANSMISSION. This REACTIVE
POWER can nevertheless be produced in their CONTROL AREA or in the vicinity to those of
neighbouring TSOs. In this last case, specific bilateral agreements should be made to
transfer REACTIVE POWER through TIE-LINES.
VOLTAGE control is thus primarily a regional problem, which may involve several TSOs in an
INTERCONNECTED SYSTEM.
The operating VOLTAGE reference values are : 380 kV or 400 kV and 220kV or 225 kV. These
nominal VOLTAGE values 380kV or 400kV and 220kV or 225kV are slightly different depending
on country equipment design ; 750 kV is an accepted operating VOLTAGE reference level, too.
They do not introduce significant differences on the synchronously interconnected system
operation.

Requirements
R1. Providing reactive resources.
R1.1. REACTIVE POWER resources. Each TSO arranges for providing reactive
resources for its requirements and to maintain its control VOLTAGE capability.
R1.2. Information. Each TSO shall have information of the main REACTIVE POWER
resources available for use in the TRANSMISSION network of its own CONTROL
AREA.
R1.3. Location. Reactive resources are dispersed and located, whenever possible,
close to loads in order to avoid REACTIVE POWER transport and to be
applied effectively during normal conditions and when CONTINGENCY occurs.
R1.4. REACTIVE POWER Generation/absorption resources. A sufficient number of
generators and/or capacitors and/or inductors connected to 380kV/400 kV and
220 kV/225 kV contribute to REACTIVE POWER generation or absorption. All
main power plants connected to 380kV/400 kV and 220 kV/225 kV are able to
contribute to REACTIVE POWER. Other sources at lower voltage levels can also
be used where relevant for operation.
R2. Continuous VOLTAGE control. For operation security reasons and respect of mutual
commitments for operational conditions, a continuous VOLTAGE control is needed and

co-ordinated by each TSO in order to maintain VOLTAGE variations within pre-
determined limits in their CONTROL AREAS.
R3. REACTIVE POWER demand and reserve.
R3.1. Each TSO shall be able to cover its REACTIVE POWER demand of the own
transmission system.
R3.2. In order to establish a proper value of the REACTIVE POWER reserve within
CONTROL AREAS, TRANSMISSION network nodes are operated at VOLTAGE levels
with a sufficient margin as to the VOLTAGE critical point. In this respect, it is
advisable to provide a proper REACTIVE POWER reserve.
R4. Monitoring and controlling VOLTAGE and Mvar flows.
R4.1. On TIE-LINES.
REACTIVE POWER flows on TIE-LINES are maintained at a minimum level and if
possible not beyond the natural demand of the TIE-LINE in order to limit
VOLTAGE drops and to allocate the TOTAL TRANSFER CAPACITY mainly to ACTIVE
POWER.
In order to ensure a safe operation of the SYNCHRONOUS AREA, the VOLTAGE
levels at boundaries need to be optimised with regard to the specific nodes of
TIE-LINES at the points of exchange with neighbouring CONTROL AREAS. The
pre-set VOLTAGE levels need to be compatible with and not to be far from the
corresponding VOLTAGE value at the other side of the border.
R4.2. VOLTAGE and REACTIVE POWER control devices. Devices used to control
TRANSMISSION VOLTAGE and REACTIVE POWER flows are available on decision
or under the lead of the TSO.
R4.3. Within boundaries. Policies and procedures for VOLTAGE control are
developed and implemented within boundaries in a subsidiary way by TSOs.
R5. Operating reactive resources. In case of a high system load, the system operator
shall make sure that, in case of a loss of generation, VOLTAGE control facilities are
able to deliver sufficient REACTIVE POWER to maintain the VOLTAGE within the required
range. The same applies to the converse situation, where the system load is low and
REACTIVE POWER needs to be absorbed.
R6. General loss of VOLTAGE. In case of a general loss of VOLTAGE, control centres,
operating centres, and the substation personnel shall be in a position to allow the
reconstitution of the network.
R7. Availability and performance of devices used for VOLTAGE control shall be taken
into account for operational planning under real-time conditions.

Standards
S1. Providing reactive resources: Each TSO operates its capacitive and inductive
reactive resources and reserves to maintain the system and TIE-LINES within
established limits and to protect VOLTAGE levels under CONTINGENCY conditions.
S1.1. At the beginning of peak-LOAD periods, the operators shall make sure that a
sufficient level of REACTIVE POWER is available and the VOLTAGE level is close
to upper values.
S2. Lack of single CONTINGENCY coverage. The TRANSMISSION lines loads and
VOLTAGE/reactive levels are such that a single CONTINGENCY of a REACTIVE POWER
device could not threaten the RELIABILITY of the INTERCONNECTION.
S3. Preventing a VOLTAGE collapse. The TSO takes corrective action, including LOAD
reduction, LOAD SHEDDING, necessary to prevent a VOLTAGE COLLAPSE when reactive
resources are insufficient.
S4. Joint action at boundaries between TSOs. The VOLTAGE range for boundary
substations has to be jointly agreed and designed to suit particular situations.

Neighbouring TSOs shall jointly seek to optimize the implementation of voltage control
facilities. If existing installations are not sufficient, the requisite compensation facilities
are installed. Effective management of the voltage level needs co-ordination and
contributions of neighboring TSOs involved.
S4.1. Pre-set values at boundaries. VOLTAGE levels are kept as close as possible
to pre-set values agreed between neighbouring TSOs.
S4.2. REACTIVE POWER flows on TIE-LINES.
Any VOLTAGE values at boundaries are agreed and controlled bilaterally
between neighbouring TSOs depending on the VOLTAGE level agreed at the
boundary substations or on specific situations (potential case of REACTIVE
POWER purchase from another CONTROL AREA).
Depending on operational conditions which could jeopardise the
INTERCONNECTED SYSTEM operation, adjacent TSOs can agree on the amount
of REACTIVE POWER that may be exchanged during normal operation or when
CONTINGENCY occurs.
S4.3. Bilateral policies. Bilateral policies are set up between neighbouring TSOs to
manage VOLTAGE levels at boundaries in case of disturbances.
S4.4. Data to be exchanged. At boundaries, TSOs exchange data on VOLTAGE
values and profile and REACTIVE POWER data at boundary substations and TIE-
LINES for the network security analysis and for real-time operation.
S5. Use of VOLTAGE reduction and load shedding close to borders
S5.1. The TSO operates appropriate settings of the VOLTAGE levels on the
transformers to reduce loads.
S5.2. When a TSO uses VOLTAGE reduction (3% or 5% in some countries) or LOAD
SHEDDING, it shall inform its neighbouring TSOs involved when using such
dispositions.

Guidelines
G1. Range of VOLTAGE values in normal conditions. For ultra-high VOLTAGE networks,
the ranges of observed VOLTAGE values in normal condition are respectively close to
380 kV 420 kV for 380kV/400 kV level and 200 kV 240 kV for 220kV/225 kV level.
Values below 365 kV and 200 kV or above 420 kV and 250 kV can be reached in
some circumstances for a short duration. 750 kV is also an existing voltage level the
use of which is very limited. For high VOLTAGE networks, these ranges are maintained
at around 10% of nominal VOLTAGE values.
G2. Policies and procedures for boundary substations and installations are
developed with neighbouring TSOs.
G3. VOLTAGE control (adjustment of REACTIVE POWER generation). In order to ensure safe
operation of the SYNCHRONOUS AREA, the VOLTAGE levels need to be optimised with
regard to the specific nodes of the TIE-LINES at the points of exchange with
neighbouring CONTROL AREAS.
G4. VOLTAGE control facilities. Different kinds of facilities to maintain the VOLTAGE levels
are allowed: REACTIVE POWER production by generators, synchronous compensators,
fixed capacitor banks, inductors, fixed reactors, SVCs (Static Var Compensators),
generators coupling transformer taps, transformer tap controllers etc.
G5. Switching TRANSMISSION elements. A manual opening/disconnection of transmission
lines is used to maintain the VOLTAGE level in normal operating conditions during off-
peak periods with low load flows.
G6. TSOs support for voltage level at borders. Adjacent TSOs can agree on mutual
voltage support.
G7. Remote control of on-load tap changers. In networks including transformers

equipped with on-load tap changers, the security of operation may be endangered by
these devices in case of serious VOLTAGE drops due to the high LOAD and the a
REACTIVE POWER deficit. The resulting increase in REACTIVE POWER demand may
cause a VOLTAGE collapse. Therefore, it is recommended to use remote control
devices to stop the action of on-load tap changers.
G8. Emergency strategy. If due to an unforeseen event, the network functioning point
approaches a critical VOLTAGE level, an adequate emergency strategy shall be agreed
by the TSOs at the boundary.

Procedures
P1. Primary VOLTAGE control is implemented and is active in operation by the VOLTAGE
regulators of generating units, which initiate a rapid variation in the excitation of
generators when they detect a variation in VOLTAGE across the generator terminals.
Other controllable devices, such as SVCs (Static Var Compensators) may also be
involved in primary VOLTAGE control.
P2. Secondary VOLTAGE control co-ordinates the action of VOLTAGE and REACTIVE
POWER control devices within a given zone of the network in order to maintain the
required VOLTAGE level at a key node point in the system.
P3. Tertiary VOLTAGE control involves a process of optimisation, using calculations
based upon real-time measurements, in order to adjust the settings of devices which
influence the distribution of REACTIVE POWER (generating set controllers, transformer
load controllers and compensating devices, such as inductances and capacitors).
P4. Implementation of secondary and tertiary VOLTAGE control. Each TSO implements
secondary and/or tertiary VOLTAGE control in a subsidiary way.

Measures
M1. VOLTAGE reduction. TSOs reduce the VOLTAGE at customer levels to reduce LOAD
(3% or 5%) as preventive measure.
M2. (Automatic load) shedding. LOAD SHEDDING is initiated at the time when the VOLTAGE
has decreased at an abnormal level.
M3. Contribution of power plants to the safeguard measures and to BLACK START.
Power plants are able to accommodate variations in VOLTAGE (and frequency) outside
of the normal range of operation as long as this is technically feasible before
automatic disconnection from the network. Power plants are able to operate under
impaired (frequency and VOLTAGE) conditions with reduced performances for a limited
period of time accordingly. A number of generating units are equipped for start-up with
no external VOLTAGE supply (BLACK START CAPABILITY). These plants should be
suitably distributed throughout the network. It is recommended to locate these plants
on sites comprising several generating units.

Bibliography :
[UCPTE 9 : Voltage stability and reactive power flow in the European interconnected network QR I-1959, III-1961, III-1962, I-1964,
IV 1967]
[UCPTE 38 : Summary of the study Behaviour in hazardous situations maintaining the voltage and stability , QR III-1986 ]
[UCPTE 43 : Reactive power and voltage control in the UCPTE system, AR 1990 ( 6) ]


C. Network Faults Clearing and Short-Circuit Currents

Introduction
The network is subject to short circuits between cables or with earth mainly due to critical
atmospheric conditions (thunderstorms, heavy fog in polluted areas) which can cause
numerous short-circuits. Perturbations can also be caused by other external sources: to some
extent for example by blows of excavators in underground cables or by the starting of fishing
canes with overhead lines, by planes flying close to the ground, etc.
Short-circuit protective devices for all items of equipment (generators, transformers, bus-bars,
TRANSMISSION lines) promptly and effectively disconnect any occurring fault with selectivity.
Such equipment is backed-up. Its functioning does not result in premature tripping with
overloads or loss of synchronism. An effective mutually compatible adjustment of all individual
protective devices is very important. Speed and selectivity when disconnecting lines are
facilitated by the use of signal links between both ends of the lines.
The setting and function of the protective equipment are checked regularly. The best way of
doing this is by including it in the maintenance schedule.
If there are any changes in operating conditions, the settings of protective devices are
immediately adjusted to suit to the new conditions. The protective equipment is also
readjusted by remote control via the network management where possible.

Criteria
C1. Network fault clearing. Whatever the type of power network fault, it is due to be
eliminated. That means to disconnect the network element concerned (generators,
transformers, bus-bars, TRANSMISSION lines) as quickly as possible and within a
specified clearing time, with selectivity and reliability, in order to prevent impairing or
jeopardising the rest of the networks, mainly because of safety concerns: Damages to
network elements when the fault duration is too long and risk of losing synchronism of
power networks.
This criterion is applicable to faults located in the interconnecting elements with
distribution and generation systems.

Requirements
R1. Efficiency of protection devices. The protective devices for generators,
transformers, bus-bars and lines eliminate all faults selectively and reliably and with
the requisite speed.
R2. Requisite speed of devices. The requisite speed of protective devices is designed to
satisfy STABILITY requirements or to keep equipment within its construction limits.
R3. Protection system design.
R3.1. Redundant Protection devices. The ultra-high VOLTAGE network protection
devices are of a redundant design and equipped with a main and a back-up
clearing system (possibly with two protections of the same hierarchical level).
R3.2. Proper operation. Protection systems should normally not operate for minor
system disturbances, recoverable system power swings or transient overloads.
R3.3. Selectivity. The only affected network element has to be automatically
disconnected.
R3.4. High speed equipment. High speed relays, high speed circuit breakers, and
automatic reclosing are used where appropriate.
R3.5. Phase reclosing devices. All major lines, and in particular TIE-LINES, are
operated with single-phase rapid reclosing devices and, normally, with three-
phase slow reclosing devices. Automatic three-phase reclosing systems are

commonly used at the ends of the circuits at suitable locations of
interconnecting lines. Manual reclosing is done by means of synchronising
equipment.
R3.6. Automatic reclosing. Automatic reclosing during out-of-step conditions is
prevented with appropriate internal protection functions. TSOs should avoid
undesired tripping during out-of-step conditions. If tripping occurs, specific out-
of-step detection for reclosure blocking is not provided as a standard.
R3.7. Reviewing applications (equipment, installation). Protection system
applications, settings, and co-ordination are reviewed periodically and in case
of major changes in generating resources, TRANSMISSION, load or operating
conditions.
R3.8. Protection scheme co-ordination. Protection scheme co-ordination is
guaranteed with generation and distribution systems and between separately
owned transmission systems.
R4. Synchronising equipment for switching supervision has to be installed in all major
substations, in particular in those involving cross-border or CONTROL AREAs
interconnecting lines.
R5. Facilities short-circuit capability. The facilities and devices connected to networks
are designed to operate up to given current limits. Therefore, the POWER SYSTEM is to
be operated within construction limits. Technical requirements upon generator
connection are defined in order to guarantee that short-circuit currents stay below the
established limits. Sound operation requires that, at any node on the POWER SYSTEM,
short-circuit currents do not exceed the breaking CAPACITY of devices installed on that
node.
R6. Efficiency of short-circuit protection. The protection devices are adequately sized
for TRANSMISSION equipment, and in particular for frontier substations, to prevent
major damage and loss of operating facilities for an unreasonable length of time.
R7. TSO Calculation. Each TSO has to calculate where appropriate the short-circuit
currents at each node of its system.

Standards
S1. Co-ordination between TSOs at the boundary. Protection systems for cross-border
lines are co-ordinated between TSOs. Each TSO shall inform in advance
neighbouring TSOs of setting and changes in operating conditions of protective relays
and systems and exchange information on the evaluation of protection system
functioning.
S2. Basic reliability requirement regarding single contingencies. All TSOs plan and
operate their system so that network faults clearing does not lead to cascading
outages or to more severe CONTINGENCIES according to the N-1 CRITERION.
S2.1. Single contingencies elimination. Any short-circuit current is correctly
eliminated and does not impair any TRANSMISSION element.
S3. Preventive and corrective actions (repair, maintenance). If a protective relay or
equipment failure reduces system RELIABILITY, the responsible personnel is notified,
and corrective action is undertaken as soon as possible. Preventive action is taken to
guarantee the required reliability indices of protective systems (including circuit
breakers, auxiliary power supplies, communication and current and voltage and
measuring transformers).
S4. Short-circuit calculations are systematically carried out for studying and planning
TRANSMISSION networks taking account of the contributions of adjacent systems to
short-circuit power.
S4.1. Required data. The data needed for experts of different countries jointly

operating the synchronously interconnected POWER SYSTEM shall be made
available. These data are used by everyone to calculate ex-ante short-circuit
currents at each node of its own network, once data contributions of
neighbouring countries have been provided.
S4.2. Periodicity of a complete calculation. In order to provide a basis for
assessment by each TSO of the contribution of ADJACENT SYSTEMS in the
calculation of short-circuit currents, the UCTE uses its network model to carry
out a calculation for the entire synchronously interconnected system every five
years, and to get a consistent set of data.
S5. Bus-bar operation at boundary sub-stations. Neighbouring TSOs inform each other
about specific operation of sub-stations with separated bus-bars.

Guidelines
G1. Bus-bar protection system. The bus-bar protection system is based on a longitudinal
differential or differential protection The recommended response-time limit is lower
than 30 ms.
G2. Fault locators. Fault locators are provided to ensure rapid fault location. Such
devices are installed where they are relevant for operation. They help to save time in
locating the origin of faults on affected lines in order to return as soon as possible to
normal operation.
G3. Fault current limiters. In order to limit the short-circuit currents within the
interconnected networks, fault current limiters can be used by TSOs.

Procedures
P1. Method to limit short-circuit currents.
P1.1. Network opening. In order to limit the short-circuit currents within the
interconnected networks, some network loop opening can be achieved at
different VOLTAGE levels in putting lines out of operation, with the risk of
creating partial networks connected only through a limited number of lines. In
case of bus-bar maintenance, manual opening of lines can be achieved for
short-circuit current limitations. Choices are done depending on operating
conditions.
P1.2. Separated bus-bars operation. TSOs operate sub-stations with different
nodes (separated bus-bars) depending on the level of short-circuit currents.

Bibliography :
[UCPTE 12 : Short circuit reclosure AR 1961-1962 (table 1 & 2) ]
[UCPTE 23 : Reserve protection, AR 1970-1971 ( philosophy, particular measures)]
[UCPTE 25 : Operational measures for limiting short circuit currents in the operation of interconnected network, AR 1972-1973 ( 3)
]
[UCPTE 28 : Behaviour of electrical protection in the interconnection network, AR 1979-1980]
[UCPTE 41 Short circuit current at UCPTE frontier nodes, 17
th
January 1990, AR 1989]
[UCPTE : Review of UCPTE recommendations on interconnected operation 31/07/1991 ( Network security (42)) ]
[Network protection devices against faults, QR 1974/75]


D. Stability

Introduction
This sub-policy deals with STABILITY issues from the point of view of preserving the
synchronous operation of generators, i.e. VOLTAGE STABILITY is not addressed here even if it
can be related to the former one.
POWER SYSTEM STABILITY consists in the ability of the system to withstand changes in the grid
(for example: changes in VOLTAGE, load, frequency) and to survive transition to a normal or at
least acceptable operating condition. In absolutely steady conditions, all generating units run
synchronously. In case of a change or a large disturbance, some machines can immediately
start swinging with respect to each other. This instability phenomenon can lead the POWER
SYSTEM to a loss of synchronism and, consequently, can cause tripping of generating units,
which jeopardizes the electric energy delivery to customers. Therefore, TSOs carry out
computer simulations to check if instability problem will not endanger the secure operation of
the system They determine themselves the frequency for the implementation of such
simulations. To be able to perform computer simulations and operation, it is essential to get
data from producers, although it is increasingly difficult to obtain these data in a liberalized
environment.

Criteria
C1. Preservation of synchronous operation under normal conditions and after loss
of an element. Each TSO is responsible for maintaining synchronous operation with
other TSOs.
C2. Operation security. All TSOs operate their networks in such a way that a loss of
STABILITY should not occur or spread to adjacent TSOs after loss of a system element.

Requirements
R1. Loss of element. The loss of any element, according to chapter A, due to any type of
failure, eliminated pursuant to chapter C, must not lead to a loss of STABILITY of the
connected generators or to operating constraints in adjacent areas, and does not
cause the intervention of the line protection devices.
R2. Stability calculation. Each TSO is able to verify operational STABILITY with selected
failures in the POWER SYSTEM. Calculation of STABILITY is carried out for planning of
the TRANSMISSION system or prior to a substantial change in the TSOs network.
R3. Damping of network oscillations. Network oscillatory phenomena have to be either
of sufficiently low amplitude, or need to be damped to a sufficient extent so that they
will not impair or jeopardise system operation. Oscillations must not last inadequate
period of time nor cause induced swinging of other remote generators which are not
directly involved in the origin of this network oscillation.

Standards
S1. Application of the stability policy. Each TSO shall apply the STABILITY policy to its
own network on its own responsibility. Adjacent TSOs jointly apply the STABILITY policy
with due account to affected TIE-LINES and border parts of networks.

S2. Co-ordinated analyses. In case of STABILITY problems affecting several TSOs, co-
ordinated analyses are required at UCTE level when appropriate to check the small
signal stability of the whole power system. Each TSO shall take part in STABILITY
studies if STABILITY problems concern its CONTROL AREA.

Guidelines
G1. Studies. Each TSO has to implement software models suitable for carrying out
STABILITY calculations. Furthermore, each TSO shall make available all data
necessary for these calculations, especially data about generators, and exchange all
information and data required for the completion of real-time and forecast calculations
for network STABILITY with other TSOs.
G2. Circuit breaking devices. TSOs can provide automatic devices at appropriate
junctions (international or within the internal networks), which in the case of frequency
drop, overloading or loss of synchronism break the circuit at predetermined points in
the network. If points of disconnection are provided, they should be selected where
appropriate so that in each of the isolated network sections a good balance between
generation and CONSUMPTION is attained so that each network section can continue to
operate under acceptable frequency and STABILITY conditions.
G3. Power swing detectors. Power swing detectors provide a power swing blocking
function to prevent false tripping by distance measuring elements during power swing.
These relays should be installed in the 380 - 400 kV network.
G4. POWER SYSTEM stabilisers. Parts of the excitation control system are used for
damping network oscillations in the POWER SYSTEM. In the limits of the national
transmission rules and requirements, each TSO shall ensure as far as possible that
newly built power station units connected to the TRANSMISSION grid with large nominal
power are equipped with power system stabilisers which are able to damp inter-area
oscillations.
G5. Power unit fast valving. Fast valving consists in a fast reduction of the mechanical
power supplied to the electrical machine by the turbine in order to enhance the system
STABILITY. Large thermal generating units connected to the TRANSMISSION network
should be able to perform fast valving.
G6. Emergency automatics. If it is not possible to ensure the system STABILITY with
common devices, also in view of events of low probability but with serious impact on
POWER SYSTEM operation, appropriate emergency automatics should be introduced.
Emergency automatics can be used to prevent loss of STABILITY of a generator group
in unfavourable conditions.
G7. Setting of excitation controllers. The TSO shall ensure that AVR (Automatic
VOLTAGE Regulators,) and POWER SYSTEM stabilisers settings on units within its
CONTROL AREA meet its requirements. Special care is taken of the co-ordination of
network protection devices.
G8. Power units operation during network failures. TSOs supervise in accordance with
their national regulations that power units meet the requirements of resistance against
network failures when their STABILITY is threatened. In case of threatened STABILITY,
which has been found by calculations, POWER SYSTEMS can be equipped with relevant
protections (leading to power plant tripping). In case of loss of synchronism, power
units are equipped with respective protections to trip under predetermined conditions.

Measures
M1. Assurance of stability. If operational experience or computational results show that
there is a risk of STABILITY loss according to the N-1 CRITERION fault or another failure
with a high probability of occurrence, the TSO shall solve this problem in order to

bring its network in line with the requirements of this chapter. Measures can include
setting of excitation control systems and power system stabilizers, installation of
special automatics or protection and coordinated studies and action with adjacent
TSOs.
M2. Reducing the risk of instability. TSOs can operate the networks close to the upper
value of each voltage range before reaching the peak of load, and reduce the fault
clearing time in order to reduce the risk of instability.

Bibliography :
[UCPTE 9 : Voltage stability and reactive power flow in the European interconnected network QR I-1959, III-1961, III-1962, I-1964,
IV 1967]
[UCPTE 38 : Summary of the study Behaviour in hazardous situations maintaining the voltage and stability , QR III-1986 ]


E. Outage Scheduling

Introduction
The European electric POWER SYSTEM, initially interconnected for RELIABILITY reasons, then
used also for commercial purposes through well-defined exchange contracts (mostly long-
term contracts), is now the scene for a more complex European market.
Potential restrictions of electricity exchanges are mostly due to limits OF THE TOTAL TRANSFER
CAPACITY. TRANSMISSION congestion occurs when the TRANSMISSION system cannot be
operated securely in the light of a requested pattern of generation, DEMAND and
TRANSMISSION. As an absolute minimum, procedures relieve congestion before physical or
SECURITY LIMITS are reached.
This is particularly true given the meshed nature of the European network.
For the purpose of national and international connection, the TSOs of the interconnected
network are responsible for ensuring that operational security in accordance with the N-1
CRITERION, network STABILITY and short-circuit current will be maintained within the system as
a whole, taking account of existing TIE-LINES and scheduled outages.
TSOs mutually determine the most suitable dates for scheduled outages to carry out
maintenance work on transport installations such as the main interconnecting lines, other
relevant installations close to the borders or installations with a substantial impact on internal
lines. These scheduled outages enable TSOs to carry out maintenance work on their
installations at regular intervals with a view to ensuring reliability. Unavailability of one TIE-LINE
may have immediate consequences on NTC. Outage scheduling is carried out to be able to
calculate and publish ATC..
As a result of companies unbundling, it is increasingly difficult to TSOs to obtain from
producers well in advance information about planning of scheduled outages of their main
production installations located close to the borders which have a direct impact on the level
of load on tie-lines. Any delay in the knowledge of power plant outages can impede TSOs to
publish the summer NTC and the winter NTC in due time (six months ahead).
Provided that the aforementioned delays do not occur, TSOs are able to determine on a
yearly basis the planning of scheduled outages of transport facilities by the end of the
previous year or at the beginning of the forthcoming year, at the latest.

Criteria
C1. Planned outages of power plants. The outage of a power plant must not jeopardise
the security of operation of the INTERCONNECTED NETWORK. Particular attention has to
be paid to large-capacity power plants (more than 300 MW) and those in the vicinity of
borders between different TSOs.
C2. Planned outages of TRANSMISSION lines. The outage of a TRANSMISSION line must
not jeopardise the security of operation of the INTERCONNECTED NETWORK. Particular
attention has to be paid to TRANSMISSION lines crossing borders or in the vicinity of
borders between different TSOs.

Requirements
R1. Exchange of information about planned outages at the border.
R1.1. Planned outages of power plants. Each TSO has to collect information on
scheduled outages of power plants and transmit them to the neighbouring
TSOs for what is relevant.
R1.2. Planned outages of TRANSMISSION lines. Each TSO has to provide
information in advance on the planned OUTAGES of TRANSMISSION lines in its
system and co-ordinate its planning with the neighbouring TSOs.


Standards
S1. Forecast analyses. The provision of a uniform set of data of the TRANSMISSION
networks and hypotheses for scheduled power exchange allows each TSO to carry
out individual calculations (medium-term and short-term forecast) for the simulation of
the effects of power plant OUTAGES upon power flows, both in national
networks and on INTERCONNECTIONS;
flux transfers associated with the outage of lines or other elements of national
networks, taking account of the influence of other networks.
S2. Co-ordination of scheduled outages planning.
S2.1. Medium-term planning. At least once a year, at the end of the preceding year
(but not later than at the very beginning of the forthcoming year), the TSOs of
neighbouring regions will meet to agree a joint schedule of outages on
international lines for which they are responsible. This schedule will take
account of overhaul programs for major generating facilities in the vicinity of
frontiers, together with the unavailability of lines in these areas.
S2.2. Short-term planning. If necessary, this schedule has to be reviewed in the
course of the year and any amendments will be notified to each TSO in the
region concerned.
S3. Confirmation of planned outages. Each TSO will confirm on a weekly basis (and
daily when relevant in case of changes) the outages of important power plants (where
necessary) and TRANSMISSION lines to neighbouring TSOs involved. The set of these
system elements that may affect interconnection, has to be previously agreed among
the TSOs involved.

Procedures
P1. Division in regions. For the purpose of outage co-ordination, the SYNCHRONOUS AREA
may be divided into a number of large regions.

Bibliography :
[see also: ETSO paper: Co-ordinated Auctioning; a market based method for TRANSMISSION capacity allocation in meshed
networks, final report April 2001]
[see also: ETSO paper: Definition of Transfer Capacities in liberalized electricity markets, final report April 2001]
re-establish normal operating conditions, HR I-1990]
[see: UCPTE-Recommendation: Co-ordination of work on lines of importance in the interconnected network, AR 1980-1981]


F. Information Exchanges between TSOs for Operation

Introduction
Co-ordination and information exchange mechanisms are put in place by TRANSMISSION
system operators to ensure the security of the networks in normal and contingency conditions
and in the context of congestion management.
TSOs are continuously in contact for reasons of security of power network operation, for
planning and related data (e.g. NTC) needed by the network users. The monitoring of load
flows and the control of power balance for the whole system are carried out in regional and
interregional load dispatching centres. Data transfer and data processing systems ensure that
these centres are continuously supplied with up-to the minute information on the operating
condition of the power stations and of the switching status in the TRANSMISSION network, as
well as on the condition of transformer and compensation equipment. Moreover, the current
values of active and REACTIVE POWER and the VOLTAGE on TRANSMISSION lines and
transformers are continuously known. SCADA systems allow to display such requested
information to operators of these dispatching centres whatever the operating conditions of
installations. Back-up systems are always operated in reserve. With respect to
telecommunication equipment, the transfer of important information to the dispatching centres
and between them is still continuously guaranteed with a sufficient number of routes with
back-up. These routes are not only used for providing information about any event occurring
on networks but also for giving remote orders for switching directives. The supply in electricity
of such dispatching centres is guaranteed.
TSOs manage continuously available communications even during a loss of communication
facilities and set-up suitable procedures between each other. These contacts are mainly
managed through telecom channels with private or confidential links. TSOs keep data
available for possible exchange of information on system planning, system representation for
studies and real-time operation, and for cross-border exchanges.
This sub-policy provides a survey of technical aspects of facilities and the main kind of
information exchanged through telecom channels for the security of power system operation.
It does not enter into details of common datasets to be exchanged in accordance with
confidentiality issues.

Criteria
C1. Responsibility. TSOs are responsible for maintaining continuously available
communication with their neighbouring TSOs.
C2. System data availability. Each TSO shall always have at its disposal reliable power
system data for operational planning and real-time operation.

Requirements
R1. Prevention of a loss of telecommunications. TSOs are due to be continuously in an
on-line liaison with each other whatever CONTINGENCY conditions of
telecommunications may occur. Loss of telecommunications links or instrumentation
and control links between control centres, operating centres and TRANSMISSION
installations must not paralyze the operation of the interconnected network.
R2. Reliable and secure telecommunications network. Each TSO shall provide an
adequate, reliable, secure, fast and highly available communications infrastructure to
assure permanent exchange of information between TSOs.
R3. Facilities redundancy. Whenever possible, telecommunication facilities are
redundant and diversely routed.
R4. Back-up facilities. In order to face any CONTINGENCY in telecommunication facilities
and to ensure communication between operators during emergency conditions, any
route will be backed-up by other ones. Backup voices/routes for telecommunication

facilities including alternate telecommunications channels should be provided to
assure co-ordinated control of operations during normal and
CONTINGENCY/EMERGENCY SITUATIONs.
R5. Effective procedures for operation communication. Procedures for communication
between TSOs have to be consistent, efficient and effective during normal and
emergency conditions.
R6. Co-ordination and information exchange mechanisms. They are put in place by
TSOs in order to ensure the security of the networks, also in the context of congestion
management.
R7. Case of general loss of VOLTAGE. In case of general loss of VOLTAGE,
telecommunication systems and remote control systems remain in operation to allow
the reconstitution of the network to be completed.
R8. System data exchange. TSOs are involved in system planning and study processes
in order to make clear the operators perspectives and TRANSMISSION limits; therefore,
TSOs elaborate reliable data of system representation for their networks.

Standards
S1. General provisions. Information is provided either by voice, fax, e-mail or by other
private or confidential routes.
S2. Information exchange for power system computation.
S2.1. TSOs inform each other about the main evolution of their POWER SYSTEM when
planning or commissioning a new equipment.
S2.2. TSOs yearly provide to each other a provisional data-set including network,
generation, load and exchange programmes for the preparation of a reference
case, the so called UCTE base case which serve to calculate NTC.
Two data-sets are provided: One for winter delivered in April/May, one for
summer delivered in October/November. These NTC values are published six-
months ahead (ETSO web): In December for summer NTC, in July for winter
NTC.
S2.3. TSOs yearly provide to each other data sets for a full representation of their
network in real-time conditions (the so-called snapshots). Two data-sets are
provided: One file for the following winter delivered in July, one file for the
following summer delivered in January. Other snapshots can be exchanged
when relevant.
S2.4. Day-Ahead Congestion Forecast. With a view to completing the most
accurate studies and to help appreciating congestions ex-ante, TSOs
exchange specific relevant provisional data for the day-ahead congestion
forecast.
S2.5. All these data-sets are merged into consistent files, which are used as
reference files (UCTE base case and a whole snapshot) for further studies
and calculations.
S3. Cross-border transfer capacity. With respect to borders where capacities are not
auctioned, TSOs determine their cross-border transfer capacities six-months ahead,
one month ahead, week and day ahead, when appropriate, and publish some of them
on their Web-site at different time intervals.
S4. Outages planning. Each TSO confirms in advance the planned OUTAGEs to other
TSOs (see section E).
S5. Exchange programmes. The scheduled energy exchanges aggregated per time unit
for each relevant specific CONTROL BLOCK are made available to all TSOs. (see P2-A).
S6. Data on real-time conditions. Each TSO determines with neighboring TSOs
concerned the suitable set of real-time data to be exchanged on-line such as data at

boundary sub-stations and at the agreed other stations such as topology, VOLTAGE,
LOAD MW and MVAr on tie-lines and at boundary sub-stations.
S7. Information on new installations to be commissioned. Each TSO shall inform its
neighbouring TSO about planning and commissioning of any new significant
installation (power plant, substation) located near the border. This new installation can
change the level of short-circuit power to be faced by TRANSMISSION equipment.
Verifications or reinforcements of such equipment are carried out accordingly.

Guidelines
G1. Electronic Highway EH (exclusively for TSOs). Since opening of markets and
unbundling of TSOs from other market actors, confidential channels for information
exchange have been developed. In addition to the classic telecommunication
channels mentioned above, a specific Electronic Highway between TSOs with
encoded data [currently data interchanged over EH are not encoded (confidential)] is
implemented for any energy information related to network operational security and, to
some extent, to relevant market aggregated data:
G1.1. Each TSO will take measures to be connected to EH.
G1.2. A wide use of EH is assured by TSOs.
G1.3. TSOs are responsible for maintaining their channels of EH.
G2. Data on operational planning. Wherever necessary, TSOs shall exchange data on a
bilateral basis or among one another for planning purposes and studies, concerning
for example:
The results of POWER SYSTEM studies pertinent to operation
OUTAGE scheduling of TRANSMISSION elements at different time intervals: year
ahead and more frequently when appropriate.
Assumptions of generation patterns for power plants having a main influence on
system operation, when appropriate at the boundary
Aggregated cross-border exchange programmes between CONTROL AREAs and
countries
Cross-border transfer capacities (Net Transfer capacities - NTC, Available
Transfer Capacities - ATC and TRANSMISSION reliability Margin TRM) (Cf.
ETSO web-site)
Changes in operating conditions and limits.
G3. Campaign of measurements. TSOs exchange data in the context of measurement
campaigns in the light of security of operation (Cf. Policy 1 for frequency/power
response of the system).
G4. WAMS (Wide Inter-area Measurement System). TSOs exchange data in case of
measurements following phenomena of low-frequency oscillations between UCTE
areas.
G5. Data and procedures for emergency operation. In order to withstand fast
emergency operation, pre-requested procedures and data should be prepared and
exchanged between TSOs to improve the knowledge of bordering networks and to
limit transits trough INTERCONNECTIONs for security reasons or to face any major
CONTINGENCY.
G6. Language. TSOs agree on the language used for any communication issue in
operation. English is the official common language. All inter-TSO procedures will be
written down in English or in another language agreed with neighbouring TSOs.

Bibliography :
[UCPTE 29 : Recommendations on a data transmission network between the control centres of the UCPTE, AR 1980-1981]
[UCPTE 30 : Co-ordination of work on lines of importance in the interconnected network, AR 1980-1981]
[UCPTE 32 : Recommendations relating to the method of real time data exchange between computers in control centres, AR
1982-1983 ( 1, 5, 6)]
[UCPTE 36 : Co-operation in the UCPTE via the interconnected networks, AR 1985-1986 ( 3, 4)]
[UCTE regarding a method for the co-ordinated exchange of operating experience within the UCTE system (MESU) 1/12/1999 (
5 + annexes)]
[UCPTE 37 : Operation of the UCPTE interconnected network in normal operation and during disruptions, AR 1985-1986 ( 1, 2)]
[UCPTE 39 : Generating and failure simulation of effects on the load flows in the UCPTE interconnected network, QR IV-1986]
LOAD- FREQUENCY CONTROL
AND PERFORMANCE
APPENDI X 1
A1 Appendix 1: Load-Frequency
Control and Performance [E]

Chapters
A. Primary Control
C. Tertiary Control
D. Time Control

Introduction
This appendix to Policy 1 Load-Frequency Control and Performance (!P1) explains and
motivates the basic technical and organisational principles of LOAD-FREQUENCY CONTROL and
other relevant control mechanisms for the UCTE, as it is applied in the SYNCHRONOUS AREA
by the TSOs of the various CONTROL AREAS / BLOCKS. This appendix, organised as a
collection of separate topics, shall be used as a covering paper for Policy 1.
Please refer to the introduction of the UCTE Operation Handbook (see !I) for a general
overview and to the glossary of terms of the UCTE Operation Handbook (see !G) for
detailed definitions of terms used within this appendix.

History of Changes
v1.9 draft 16.06.2004 OpHB-Team update after consultation
period
v1.8 draft 01.03.2004 OpHB-Team minor changes

Current Status
This document summarises technical descriptions and backgrounds of a subset of current
UCTE rules and recommendations related to generation control and performance issues, with
additional items.
This appendix replaces previous UCTE ground rules and recommendations regarding
PRIMARY and SECONDARY frequency and active POWER CONTROL, regulation reserves and
correction of SYNCHRONOUS TIME. This version of the document (version 1.9, level E, dated
16.06.2004) has final status.


UCTE OH Appendix 1: Load-Frequency Control (final 1.9 E, 16.06.2004) "A12

A. Primary Control
[UCTE Operation Handbook Policy 1 Chapter A: Primary Control, 2004]
[UCTE-Ground Rule for the co-ordination of the accounting and the organisation of the load-frequency
control, 1999]
the UCPTE, 1998]
[UCPTE Rule 31: Control characteristics of the UCPTE interconnected grid, 1982]
[UCTE-Ground Rules Supervision of the application of rules concerning primary and secondary control
of frequency and active power in the UCTE, 1999]

1. Power Equilibrium
In any electric system, the ACTIVE POWER has to be generated at the same time as it is
consumed. Power generated must be maintained in constant equilibrium with power
consumed / demanded, otherwise a POWER DEVIATION occurs. Disturbances in this balance,
causing a deviation of the SYSTEM FREQUENCY from its set-point values, will be offset initially
by the kinetic energy of the rotating generating sets and motors connected.
There is only very limited possibility of storing electric energy as such. It has to be stored as a
reservoir (coal, oil, water) for large power systems, and as chemical energy (battery packs)
for small systems. This is insufficient for controlling the power equilibrium in real-time, so that
the production system must have sufficient flexibility in changing its generation level. It must
be able instantly to handle both changes in demand and outages in generation and
transmission, which preferably should not become noticeable to network users.

2. System Frequency
The electric frequency in the network (the SYSTEM FREQUENCY f) is a measure for the rotation
speed of the synchronised generators. By increase in the total DEMAND the SYSTEM
FREQUENCY (speed of generators) will decrease, and by decrease in the DEMAND the SYSTEM
FREQUENCY will increase. Regulating units will then perform automatic PRIMARY CONTROL
action and the balance between demand and generation will be re-established. The
FREQUENCY DEVIATION is influenced by both the total inertia in the system, and the speed of
PRIMARY CONTROL. Under undisturbed conditions, the SYSTEM FREQUENCY must be maintained
within strict limits in order to ensure the full and rapid deployment of control facilities in
response to a disturbance. Out of periods for the correction of SYNCHRONOUS TIME, the set-
point frequency is 50 Hz.


Even in case of a major FREQUENCY DEVIATION / OFFSET, each CONTROL AREA / BLOCK will
maintain its interconnections with ADJOINING CONTROL AREAS, provided that the secure
operation of its own system is not jeopardised.

3. Droop of a Generator
The DROOP OF A GENERATOR s
G
is a ratio (without dimension) and is generally expressed as a
percentage:
Gn G
n
G
P P
f f
s
/
/

in %
The variation in SYSTEM FREQUENCY is defined as follows, with f
n
being the rated frequency:
n
f f f
The relative variation in power output is defined as the quotient of the variation in power
output P
G
of a generator (in steady-state operation, provided that the PRIMARY CONTROL
RANGE is not completely used up) and its rated active power output P
Gn
.
The contribution of a generator to the correction of a disturbance on the network depends
mainly upon the DROOP OF THE GENERATOR and the PRIMARY CONTROL RESERVE of the
generator concerned. The following figure shows a diagram of variations in the generating
output of two generators a and b of different droop under equilibrium conditions, but with
identical PRIMARY CONTROL RESERVES.
Primary control reserve
Generated power
Frequency
f = set frequency
0
b
f
a
f
0
f
b
a
max
P

In case of a minor disturbance (FREQUENCY OFFSET < f
b
), the contribution of generator a
(which has the controller with the smaller droop) to the correction of the disturbance will be
greater than that of generator b, which has the controller with the greater droop. The
FREQUENCY OFFSET (f
a
) at which the PRIMARY CONTROL RESERVE of generator a will be
exhausted (i.e. where the power generating output reaches its maximum value P
max
) will be
smaller than that of generator b (f
b
), even where both generators have identical PRIMARY
CONTROL RESERVES.
In case of a major disturbance (frequency offset > f
b
), the contributions of both generators to
PRIMARY CONTROL under quasi-steady-state conditions will be equal.

4. Network Power Frequency Characteristic
The NETWORK POWER FREQUENCY CHARACTERISTIC of a SYNCHRONOUS AREA / BLOCK is the
quotient of the POWER DEVIATION P
a
responsible for the disturbance and the quasi-steady-
state FREQUENCY DEVIATION f caused by the disturbance (power deficits are considered as
negative values):
f
P
a
u
in MW/Hz

The NETWORK POWER FREQUENCY CHARACTERISTIC
i
is measured for a given CONTROL AREA /
BLOCK i. This corresponds to the quotient of P
i
(the POWER DEVIATION measured at the TIE-
LINES of the CONTROL AREA / BLOCK i) and the FREQUENCY DEVIATION f in response to the
disturbance (in the CONTROL AREA / BLOCK where the disturbance originates, it will be
necessary to add the power surplus, or subtract the power deficit, responsible for the
disturbance concerned).
f
P
i
i

in MW/Hz

The contribution of each CONTROL AREA / BLOCK to the NETWORK POWER FREQUENCY
CHARACTERISTIC is based upon the set point value
io
for the NETWORK POWER FREQUENCY
CHARACTERISTIC in the CONTROL AREA / BLOCK concerned. This set-point value is obtained by
the multiplication of the set-point NETWORK POWER FREQUENCY CHARACTERISTIC
uo
for the
entire SYNCHRONOUS AREA and the contribution coefficients C
i
of the various CONTROL AREAS /
BLOCKS:
uo i io
C
This formula is used to determine the requested contribution C
i
of a CONTROL AREA / BLOCK to
PRIMARY CONTROL.
The NETWORK POWER FREQUENCY CHARACTERISTIC of a given CONTROL AREA / BLOCK should
remain as constant as possible, within the frequency range applied. This being so, the
insensitivity range of controllers should be as small as possible, and in any case should not
exceed 10mHz. Where dead bands exist in specific controllers, these must be offset within
the CONTROL AREA / BLOCK concerned.
The set-point value
uo
for the overall NETWORK POWER FREQUENCY CHARACTERISTIC is
defined by the UCTE on the basis of the conditions described in the policy, taking account of
measurements, experience and theoretical considerations.

5. Primary Control Basics
Various disturbances or random deviations which impair the equilibrium of generation and
demand will cause a FREQUENCY DEVIATION, to which the PRIMARY CONTROLLER of generating
sets involved in PRIMARY CONTROL will react at any time.

The proportionality of PRIMARY CONTROL and the collective involvement of all interconnection
partners is such that the equilibrium between power generated and power consumed will be

immediately restored, thereby ensuring that the SYSTEM FREQUENCY is maintained within
permissible limits. In case that the frequency exceeds the permissible limits, additional
measures out of the scope of PRIMARY CONTROL, such as (automatic) LOAD-SHEDDING, are
required and carried out in order to maintain interconnected operation.

f = Dynamic frequency deviation
f = Quasi-steady-state deviation
dyn. max.
f
t
f
. dyn. max
f

This deviation in the SYSTEM FREQUENCY will cause the PRIMARY CONTROLLERS of all
generators subject to PRIMARY CONTROL to respond within a few seconds. The controllers
alter the power delivered by the generators until a balance between power output and
consumption is re-established. As soon as the balance is re-established, the SYSTEM
FREQUENCY stabilises and remains at a quasi-steady-state value, but differs from the
frequency set-point because of the DROOP OF THE GENERATORS which provide proportional
type of action. Consequently, power cross-border exchanges in the interconnected system
will differ from values agreed between companies. SECONDARY CONTROL (see !A1-B) will
take over the remaining FREQUENCY and POWER DEVIATION after 15 to 30 seconds. The
function of SECONDARY CONTROL is to restore power cross-border exchanges to their
(programmed) set-point values and to restore the SYSTEM FREQUENCY to its set-point value at
the same time.
The magnitude f
dyn.max
of the dynamic FREQUENCY DEVIATION is governed mainly by the
following:
the amplitude and development over time of the disturbance affecting the balance
between power output and consumption;
the kinetic energy of rotating machines in the system;
the number of generators subject to PRIMARY CONTROL, the PRIMARY CONTROL RESERVE
and its distribution between these generators;
the dynamic characteristics of the machines (including controllers);
the dynamic characteristics of loads, particularly the self-regulating effect of loads.
The quasi-steady-state FREQUENCY DEVIATION f is governed by the amplitude of the
disturbance and the NETWORK POWER FREQUENCY CHARACTERISTIC, which is influenced
mainly by the following:
the droop of all generators subject to PRIMARY CONTROL in the SYNCHRONOUS AREA;
the sensitivity of consumption to variations in SYSTEM FREQUENCY.

6. Principle of Joint Action
Each TRANSMISSION SYSTEM OPERATOR (TSO) must contribute to the correction of a
disturbance in accordance with its respective contribution coefficient to PRIMARY CONTROL.
These contribution coefficients C
i
are calculated on a regular basis for each CONTROL AREA /
BLOCK or interconnection partner / TSO using the following formula:

u
i
i
E
E
C
with
E
i
being the electricity generated in CONTROL AREA / BLOCK i (including electricity
production for export and scheduled electricity production from jointly operated units)
and
E
u
being the total (sum of) electricity production in all N CONTROL AREAS / BLOCKS of
the SYNCHRONOUS AREA.
In order to ensure that the principle of joint action is observed, the NETWORK POWER
FREQUENCY CHARACTERISTICS of the various CONTROL AREAS should remain as constant as
possible. This applies particularly to small FREQUENCY DEVIATIONS f, where the "dead bands"
of generators may have an unacceptable influence upon the supply of PRIMARY CONTROL
energy in the CONTROL AREAS concerned.

7. Target Performance
Defining conditions for the target efficiency of PRIMARY CONTROL are based upon the following
parameters:
the simultaneous loss of two power plant units, or the loss of a line section or busbar;
experience has shown that incidents leading to an even greater loss of power are
extremely rare;
the control of such incidents by the activation of far greater control power than is
necessary may lead to the overloading of the transmission system, thereby jeopardising
the interconnected network.
The design hypothesis applied is based upon unfavourable parameters which provide a
margin of safety in estimated values. Consequently, it is probable that even more serious
incidents could be accommodated in practice without the need for LOAD-SHEDDING. Based on
the parameters above, the reference incident was defined to be 3000 MW for the entire
SYNCHRONOUS AREA (see !P1-A-C3).
Starting from undisturbed operation of the interconnected network, a sudden loss of
3000 MW generating capacity must be offset by PRIMARY CONTROL alone, without the need for
customer LOAD-SHEDDING in response to a FREQUENCY DEVIATION. In addition, where the self-
regulating effect of the system load is assumed according to be 1 %/Hz, the absolute
FREQUENCY DEVIATION must not exceed 180 mHz. Likewise, sudden load-shedding of
3000 MW in total must not lead to a FREQUENCY DEVIATION exceeding 180 mHz. Where the
self-regulating effect of the load is not taken into account, the absolute FREQUENCY DEVIATION
must not exceed 200 mHz.
The following figure shows movements in the SYSTEM FREQUENCY for a given design
hypothesis (case A), where dynamic requirements for the activation of control power are
fulfilled in accordance with the requirements for deployment time. Unfavourable assumptions
have been selected for all model parameters. The maximum absolute FREQUENCY DEVIATION
is 800 mHz - this means that the threshold for LOAD-SHEDDING will not be reached by some
margin.

A Loss in generating capacity: P = 3000 MW, P = 150 GW, self-regulating effect of load: 1% / Hz
B1 Loss in generating capacity: P = 1300 MW, P = 200 GW, self-regulating effect of load: 2 % / Hz
B2 Loss in generating capacity: P = 1300 MW, P = 200 GW, self-regulating effect of load: 1% / Hz

network
network
network

1 stage of automatic load shedding
st
B1
B2
Typical movements in network
frequency following losses
in generating capacity
Design hypothesis
}
Time [s]
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
d
e
v
i
a
t
i
o
n
[
m
H
z
]
0
-200
-400
-600
-800
-1000
-1200
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
B1
B2
A
}

For comparative purposes, simulations have also been undertaken using realistic model
parameters (case B), in order to allow the typical FREQUENCY DEVIATION associated with
customary losses in generating capacity to be plotted in parallel. These simulations show
that, for a loss of capacity up to 1300 MW, the absolute FREQUENCY DEVIATION will remain
below 200 mHz.
If the target performance described above is to be achieved, the system must be operated in
such a way, depending upon the system load, that the NETWORK POWER FREQUENCY
CHARACTERISTIC for the entire SYNCHRONOUS AREA falls within a relatively narrow band.
Taking account of the self-regulating effect of load, this gives the following table:

Self-regulating effect Network power Network power
frequency characteristic
1 %/Hz 150 GW 16500 MW/Hz
1 %/Hz 300 GW 18000 MW/Hz
2 %/Hz 150 GW 18000 MW/Hz
2 %/Hz 300 GW 21000 MW/Hz

The following assumptions have been applied for the definition of marginal conditions for the
operation of PRIMARY CONTROL
1
:
Design basis / reference incident: Sudden deviation of 3000 MW in the balance of
production and consumption; system off-peak load about 150 GW and peak load about
300 GW
System start time constant: 10 to 12 seconds
Self-regulating effect of load: 1 %/Hz
Maximum permissible FREQUENCY DEVIATION quasi-steady-state: t180 mHz and dynamic:
t800 mHz
The maximum dynamic FREQUENCY DEVIATION of t800 mHz includes a safety margin. This
margin of 200 mHz in total is intended to cover the following influences and elements of
uncertainty:
Possible stationary FREQUENCY DEVIATION before an incident (50 mHz)
Insensitivity of turbine controller (20 mHz)
Larger dynamic FREQUENCY DEVIATION at the site of the incident, not taken into account in
the specific network model used for simulations (50 mHz)

1: The value of 3000 MW used here as the reference incident depends on the size of the SYNCHRONOUS AREA and is
subject to change in case of extension of the SYNCHRONOUS AREA (or disconnection of an area).

Other elements of uncertainty in the model (approximately 10 %, 80 mHz)
In case of LOAD-SHEDDING, accuracy of 50 to 100 mHz will generally suffice for relay trip
thresholds.

8. Primary Control Reserve
The total PRIMARY CONTROL RESERVE for the entire SYNCHRONOUS AREA P
pu
is determined by
the UCTE on the basis of the conditions set out in the previous subsections, taking account of
measurements, experience and theoretical considerations.
The shares P
pi
of the CONTROL AREAS / BLOCKS are defined by multiplying the calculated
reserve for the SYNCHRONOUS AREA and the contribution coefficients C
i
of the various
CONTROL AREAS / BLOCKS:
i pu pi
C P P
The entire PRIMARY CONTROL RESERVE is activated in response to a quasi-steady-state
FREQUENCY DEVIATION of 200 mHz or more. Likewise, in response to a FREQUENCY
DEVIATION of +200 mHz or more, power generation must be reduced by the value of the entire
PRIMARY CONTROL RESERVE.
In order to restrict the calling up of the PRIMARY CONTROL RESERVE to unscheduled power
unbalances, the SYSTEM FREQUENCY should not exceed or fall below a range of 20 mHz for
long periods under undisturbed conditions.

9. Deployment Time of Primary Control Reserve
The deployment time of the PRIMARY CONTROL RESERVES of the various CONTROL AREAS /
BLOCKS should be as similar as possible, in order to minimise dynamic interaction between
CONTROL AREAS / BLOCKS. In this instance, we are concerned with anticipated performance,
rather than with the logic of controllers.
For the following, a reference incident of 3000 MW (loss of generation or load, see !P1-A-
C3) for the SYNCHRONOUS AREA is considered. The PRIMARY CONTROL RESERVE of each
CONTROL AREA / BLOCK (determined in accordance with the corresponding contribution
coefficient) must be fully activated within 15 seconds in response to disturbances P of less
than 1500 MW (it has been assumed that, where values for reserve power to be activated are
smaller, deployment times of less than 15 seconds will be difficult to achieve), or within a
linear time limit of 15 to 30 seconds in response to a P of 1500 to 3000 MW. As a minimum
requirement, the deployment time of the PRIMARY CONTROL RESERVE must be consistent with
the curves plotted in the following figure, which represent the overall behaviour of the system.
The activated power will lie on or above the plotted curves, until the balance between power
generation and consumption has been restored. For each CONTROL AREA / BLOCK, the figures
for power indicated are multiplied by the relevant contribution coefficient C
i
. The following
figure illustrates the minimum deployment of PRIMARY CONTROL POWER as a function of time
and the size of the disturbance P.


P
r
i
m
a
r
y
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
p
o
w
e
r
[
M
W
]
Deployment time [s]
3000
2000
1000
0
0 0 0 10 2 3 40
P = 3000 MW
P = 1500 MW
P = 1000 MW
P = 500 MW
P = 2000 MW

10.Performance Measurement
A distinction is drawn between the quality of control in the entire SYNCHRONOUS AREA (overall
quality) and the quality of control in each CONTROL AREA / BLOCK (local quality). Each
interconnected undertaking / TSO must act to provide effective PRIMARY CONTROL, in order to
ensure that a high overall level of quality is maintained.
The main purpose of an overall quality check is to evaluate the performance of the PRIMARY
CONTROL of the entire SYNCHRONOUS AREA. This evaluation is carried out by analysing the
SYSTEM FREQUENCY of the network during disturbances. The main purpose of this frequency
analysis is to estimate the operational reliability of the interconnected network.
u
of the entire SYNCHRONOUS AREA is
calculated by the following relationship:
f
P
a
u

with
P
a
being the variation in power causing a disturbance and
f being the quasi-steady-state FREQUENCY DEVIATION in response to a disturbance.
This is determined from a "smoothing line" drawn between 10 and 30 seconds after the
disturbance, such that the sum of the FREQUENCY DEVIATIONS
i
in respect of this line is zero
(the line must be drawn so that the sum of the absolute deviations is a minimum, see next
figure).

Beginning of a disturbance
Smoothing line
0
30 10
f
2
f f
f
20 s
50.01
50.00
49.99
49.98
49.97
49.96
49.95
49.94
0 10 20 30 40 50
t [s]
f [Hz]
f
0
f
30
f
10
f
10
f
30
10 s
30 s
i

It is assumed that the main part of the PRIMARY CONTROL RESERVE is activated after 20
seconds, while the contribution of SECONDARY CONTROL to the correction of the disturbance
will not yet be perceptible.
A local quality check will allow each party to ascertain whether their respective contribution to
PRIMARY CONTROL is consistent with the requirements.
An interconnected undertaking / TSO can check the quality of its PRIMARY CONTROL by
evaluating the NETWORK POWER FREQUENCY CHARACTERISTIC in its CONTROL AREA / BLOCK
each time a disturbance occurs, and comparing it with the NETWORK POWER FREQUENCY
CHARACTERISTIC of the entire SYNCHRONOUS AREA.
i
in a CONTROL AREA / BLOCK is calculated
by the following relationship:
f
P
i
i

with
P
i
being the variation in power generated in a CONTROL AREA / BLOCK in response to
a disturbance, measured at interconnecting points / TIE-LINES (in the CONTROL AREA /
BLOCK where the disturbance occurs, the power deficit/surplus must be
added/subtracted) and
f being the quasi-steady-state FREQUENCY DEVIATION in response to a disturbance of
P
a
.
These two measurements must be simultaneous (the time stamps of all measurements need
to be synchronous). It must be possible to estimate measurement errors.
In CONTROL AREAS / BLOCKS, where fast random changes in total cross-border exchange
power are comparable with variations in the cross-border exchange power for the area P
i
,
the latter may be determined from smoothing lines representing the cross-border exchange
power before and after a disturbance.

In order to allow the quality of control to be monitored, it is advisable to record and
continuously analyse outages in production or consumption exceeding 1000 MW
2
. The
following information is required for this purpose:
the location of the disturbance,
date and time of the disturbance,
the amount of production/consumption lost during the disturbance,
the type of the disturbance.
The affected interconnected undertaking / TSO will make this information available to all other
interconnection partners / TSOs.
Even if the SYSTEM FREQUENCY measurement and power cross-border exchange
measurements taken during a disturbance are inaccurate, they will allow each interconnected
undertaking / TSO to carry out a statistical analysis of the NETWORK POWER FREQUENCY
CHARACTERISTICS and PRIMARY CONTROL POWER being activated, and to compare the results
of this analysis with corresponding values for the entire SYNCHRONOUS AREA.
Each interconnected undertaking / TSO needs to complete regular checks in order to ensure
that deployment times for their PRIMARY CONTROL RESERVE are consistent with the
requirements of PRIMARY CONTROL.

2
: The value depends on the size of the SYNCHRONOUS AREA, the value of 1000 MW holds for the first
SYNCHRONOUS AREA of 2004 only, for the second SYNCHRONOUS AREA of 2004 the value is 250 MW instead.

[UCTE Operation Handbook Policy 1 Chapter B: Secondary Control, 2004]
[UCPTE Rule 18: Terminology of interconnected operation, 1968]
[UCPTE Rule 44: Control of active power in the grid of the UCPTE, 1990]
[UCPTE Rule 1: The practical application of load-frequency control in western Europe, 1955]
[UCPTE Rule 24: Control equipment for load-frequency control, 1971]
[UCPTE Rule 26: General aspects about the registration and the balance of unintended deviation in the
interconnected grid, 1974]
the UCPTE, 1998]

1. Introduction
Any imbalance between electric power generation and consumption will result (in real-time) in
a frequency change within the complete network of the SYNCHRONOUS AREA. As a result over
time, a FREQUENCY DEVIATION occurs. At SYSTEM FREQUENCIES below 50 Hz, the total DEMAND
has been larger than the total generation, at frequencies above 50 Hz the total DEMAND has
been less than the total generation. In practise, the DEMAND varies continuously, even without
having forecast errors, so that SECONDARY CONTROL on a real-time basis is required on a
continuous basis. A deviation f of SYSTEM FREQUENCY from its set-point value of 50 Hz will
activate PRIMARY CONTROL power throughout the SYNCHRONOUS AREA:
f P
u u

with
u
= the POWER SYSTEM FREQUENCY CHARACTERISTIC of the whole SYNCHRONOUS
AREA, i.e. the sum of the POWER SYSTEM FREQUENCY CHARACTERISTICS of all CONTROL
AREAS / BLOCKS.
PRIMARY CONTROL (see !A1-A) allows a balance to be re-established at a SYSTEM
FREQUENCY other than the frequency set-point value (at a quasi-steady-state FREQUENCY
DEVIATION f), in response to a sudden imbalance between power generation and
consumption (incident) or random deviations from the power equilibrium. Since all CONTROL
AREAS / BLOCKS contribute to the control process in the interconnected system, with
associated changes in the balance of generation and consumption in these CONTROL AREAS,
an imbalance between power generation and consumption in any CONTROL AREA will cause
power interchanges between individual CONTROL AREAS to deviate from the agreed /
scheduled values (power interchange deviations P
i
).
The function of SECONDARY CONTROL (also known as load-frequency control or frequency-
power-control, see !A1-B) is to keep or to restore the power balance in each CONTROL AREA
/ BLOCK and, consequently, to keep or to restore the SYSTEM FREQUENCY f to its set-point
value of 50 Hz and the power interchanges with ADJACENT CONTROL AREAS to their
programmed scheduled values, thus ensuring that the full reserve of PRIMARY CONTROL
POWER activated will be made available again. In addition, SECONDARY CONTROL may not
impair the action of the PRIMARY CONTROL. These actions of SECONDARY CONTROL will take
place simultaneously and continually, both in response to minor deviations (which will
inevitably occur in the course of normal operation) and in response to a major discrepancy
between production and consumption (associated e.g. with the tripping of a generating unit or
network disconnection). In order to fulfil these requirements in parallel, SECONDARY CONTROL
needs to be operated by the NETWORK CHARACTERISTIC METHOD (see !A1-B-2).


Whereas all CONTROL AREAS provide mutual support by the supply of PRIMARY CONTROL
POWER during the PRIMARY CONTROL process, only the CONTROL AREA / BLOCK affected by a
power unbalance is required to undertake SECONDARY CONTROL action for the correction.
Consequently, only the controller of the CONTROL AREA / BLOCK, in which the imbalance
between generation and consumption has occurred, will activate the corresponding
SECONDARY CONTROL POWER within its CONTROL AREA / BLOCK. Parameters for the
SECONDARY CONTROLLERS of all CONTROL AREAS need to be set such that, ideally, only the
controller in the zone affected by the disturbance concerned will respond and initiate the
deployment of the requisite SECONDARY CONTROL POWER.
Within a given CONTROL AREA / BLOCK, the DEMAND should be covered at all times by
electricity produced in that area, together with electricity imports (under purchase contracts
and/or electricity production from jointly operated plants outside the zone concerned). In order
to maintain this balance, generation capacity for use as SECONDARY CONTROL RESERVE must
be available to cover power plant outages and any disturbances affecting production,
consumption and transmission. SECONDARY CONTROL is applied to selected generator sets in
the power plants comprising the control loop.
SECONDARY CONTROL operates for periods of several minutes, and is therefore timely
dissociated from PRIMARY CONTROL. This behaviour over time is associated with the PI
(proportional-integral) characteristic of the SECONDARY CONTROLLER. SECONDARY CONTROL
makes use of measurements of the SYSTEM FREQUENCY and ACTIVE POWER flows on the TIE-
LINES of the CONTROL AREA / BLOCK, a SECONDARY CONTROLLER, that computes power set-
point values of selected generation sets for control (see !A1-B-4), and the transmission of
these set-point values to the respective generation sets.
When consumption exceeds production on a continuous basis, immediate action must be
taken to restore the balance between the two (by the use of standby supplies, contractual
load variation or LOAD-SHEDDING or the shedding of a proportion of customer load as a last
resort). Sufficient transmission capacity must be maintained at all times to accommodate
reserve control capacity and standby supplies.
Since it is technically impossible to guard against all random variables affecting production,
consumption or transmission, the volume of reserve capacity will depend upon the level of
risk which is deemed acceptable. These principles will apply, regardless of the division of
responsibilities between the parties involved in the supply of electricity to consumers.

2. Principle of the Network Characteristic Method

In order to determine, whether power INTERCHANGE DEVIATIONS are associated with an
imbalance in the CONTROL AREA / BLOCK concerned or with the activation of PRIMARY CONTROL
POWER, the NETWORK CHARACTERISTIC METHOD needs to be applied for SECONDARY CONTROL
of all CONTROL AREAS / BLOCKS in the SYNCHRONOUS AREA.
According to this method, each CONTROL AREA / BLOCK is equipped with one SECONDARY
CONTROLLER to minimise the AREA CONTROL ERROR (ACE) G in real-time:
( )
0
f f K P P G
meas ri prog meas
+
with
P
meas
being the sum of the instantaneous measured active power transfers on the tie-
lines,
P
prog
being the resulting exchange program with all the neighbouring / ADJACENT
CONTROL AREAS,
K
ri
being the K-FACTOR of the CONTROL AREA, a constant (MW/Hz) set on the
SECONDARY CONTROLLER, and
f
means
-f
0
being the difference between the instantaneous measured SYSTEM
FREQUENCY and the set-point frequency.
The ACE is the CONTROL AREAs unbalance P
meas
-P
prog
minus its contribution to the PRIMARY
CONTROL, if K
ri
is equal to the CONTROL AREAs POWER SYSTEM FREQUENCY CHARACTERISTIC.
The power transits are considered positive for export and negative for import (see !I-J).
Hence, a positive (respectively a negative) ACE requires a reduction (resp. an increase) of
the SECONDARY CONTROL POWER.
The ACE must be kept close to zero in each CONTROL AREA / BLOCK. The purpose is twofold:
Control area / block balance. If the measured SYSTEM FREQUENCY f
meas
is equal to the
set-point frequency f
0
, the ACE is the unbalance of the CONTROL AREA / BLOCK, i.e. the
difference between the measured power exchanges P
meas
and the scheduled exchanges
P
sched
.
Non detrimental effect on primary control. The power developed by PRIMARY CONTROL
in the CONTROL AREA / BLOCK under consideration is given by ) (
0
f f
meas i
. This
amount of power has to be subtracted from the power unbalance in order not to neutralise
the PRIMARY CONTROL action. This is true if K
ri
=
i
. Due to the uncertainty on the self
regulating effect of the load, K
ri
may be chosen slightly higher than
i
such that the
SECONDARY CONTROL will accentuate the effect of the PRIMARY CONTROL and not
counteract it.
When 0
0
f f f
means
, under balanced conditions (
prog meas
P P ), the ACE will also be
equal to zero.

For reasons of simplicity, the NETWORK CHARACTERISTIC METHOD will be explained on the
basis of an interconnected system comprising of two CONTROL AREAS only.

a) Before a disturbance:
The situation before the disturbance is assumed to be the following:
f = 0 (actual frequency f = set point frequency f
o
)
P
12
= 0 (actual exchange capacity = set point exchange capacity)

b) Disturbance and PRIMARY CONTROL:
Let us suppose that, in network 2, a generated power P
a
is lost. PRIMARY CONTROL
stabilises the frequency at f
o
+f . The following relationship will apply to the entire
system: f = P
a
/
u
, where
u
is the NETWORK POWER FREQUENCY CHARACTERISTIC.
Since generating capacity is lost, P
a
will have a negative value. Hence, f will also be
negative.
In response to the FREQUENCY DEVIATION f, and on the basis of the NETWORK POWER
FREQUENCY CHARACTERISTICS
1
and
2
of the two separate networks, the following
power values will be activated by PRIMARY CONTROL:

f P
1 1

f P
2 2

The loss of power P
a
will be offset by the power values P
1
and P
2
:
a
P P P +
2 1
, and the frequency will be stabilised at a lower value, reduced by f.

c) Behaviour of SECONDARY CONTROL
The exchange power P between the two CONTROL AREAS will no longer be zero, but
becomes P
12
= P
1
, considered from CONTROL AREA 1, is an exported power, i.e. has
a positive value, P
21
(= -P
12
), considered from CONTROL AREA 2, is an imported
power, i.e. has a negative value.
Under the condition that the value of K
r1
is set at
1
on controller 1, and the value of
K
r2
is set at
2
on controller 2, this will give the following relationship for the overall
control deviations G
1
and G
2
:
( ) 0
1 1 1 12 1
+ + P P f K P G
r

i.e. controller 1 does not react, and PRIMARY CONTROL in CONTROL AREA 1 will be
maintained as long as a f persists; no SECONDARY CONTROL will be activated in
CONTROL AREA 1. For area 2, the AREA CONTROL ERROR is given by:
( )
a r
P P P f K P G + +
2 1 2 21 2

i.e. controller 2 activates SECONDARY CONTROL, and PRIMARY CONTROL in CONTROL
AREA 2 will be maintained as long as a f persists; the loss of power P
a
will be offset
by the action of the SECONDARY CONTROLLER in area 2, such that the deviation
associated with the loss of power P
a
will be restored to zero.
Power interchange
deviation
Characteristic
of network 2
G ( f) seen
from network 1
2

Characteristic
of network 1
G ( f)
1

Frequency
deviation
Network 1 Network 2
~
12 21
12

2
f
P = - P
P
a
P
a
1
f
f
f
P

If SECONDARY CONTROL is to behave as described above, the following conditions need to be
fulfilled:
Power plants involved in SECONDARY CONTROL must have sufficient SECONDARY CONTROL
POWER available at all times, thereby ensuring that a change in the setting of the
SECONDARY CONTROLLER will produce an actual change in power produced by generating
sets (SECONDARY CONTROL RESERVE), see !A1-B-6.
G
i
may not include any additional term, e.g. a corrective term for the automatic
minimisation of an involuntary hourly exchange or any other form of compensation.

3. K-Factor
In order to ensure that SECONDARY CONTROL will only be called up in the CONTROL AREA /
BLOCK which is the source of the disturbance, all values for K-FACTORS K
ri
set on the

SECONDARY CONTROLLERS should, in theory, be equal to the CONTROL AREAs POWER SYSTEM
FREQUENCY CHARACTERISTIC
1
(if the Darrieus equation is to be satisfied).
The NETWORK POWER FREQUENCY CHARACTERISTIC of a CONTROL AREA will change in
accordance with the rated load of generator sets in service at any given time. Consequently, it
might be envisaged that K
ri
should be adjusted regularly to take account of generators in
service. However, this is to be avoided, since the uncoordinated adjustment of K
ri
by the
various interconnection partners will produce greater discrepancies in their respective
SECONDARY CONTROL behavior than those associated with the preservation of the various K
ri

at constant values.
Due to the uncertainty on the self regulating effect of the load, the K-FACTOR K
ri
may be
chosen slightly higher than the rated value of the POWER SYSTEM FREQUENCY CHARACTERISTIC
such that the SECONDARY CONTROL will accentuate the effect of the PRIMARY CONTROL and not
counteract it.

4. Secondary Controller
The desired behaviour of the SECONDARY CONTROLLER over time will be obtained by assigning
a proportional-integral characteristic (PI) to control circuits, in accordance with the following
equation:
dt G
T
G P
i
ri
i i di
1

where:
P
di
= the correcting variable of the SECONDARY CONTROLLER governing control
generators in the CONTROL AREA i ;
i
= the proportional factor (gain) of the SECONDARY CONTROLLER in CONTROL AREA i ;
T
r
= the integration time constant of the SECONDARY CONTROLLER in CONTROL AREA i ;
G
i
= the AREA CONTROL ERROR (ACE) in CONTROL AREA i.

As SYSTEM FREQUENCY and POWER DEVIATIONS are to return to their set point values within
the required time (without additional control needed), an appropriate integral term needs to be
applied. An excessively large proportional term may have a detrimental effect upon the
stability of interconnected operation. In particular, where hydroelectric plants are used for
SECONDARY CONTROL, there is a risk that an increase in the proportional term will initiate
network oscillations. This natural period of oscillation may range from 3 to 5 seconds, and
may be subject to change as the SYNCHRONOUS AREA is extended.
In case of a persisting positive or negative ACE, leading to a saturation of the SECONDARY
CONTROL RESERVES, the integral term should be limited. The non-windup character of the
SECONDARY CONTROLLER allows to recover control as soon as the ACE returns to zero.
Parameter settings for SECONDARY CONTROLLERS of all CONTROL AREAS / BLOCKS need to
follow a common guideline to ensure co-operative SECONDARY CONTROL within the
SYNCHRONOUS AREA.

5. Control Hierarchy and Organisation
The SYNCHRONOUS AREA consists of multiple interconnected CONTROL AREAS / BLOCKS, each
of them with centralised SECONDARY CONTROL. Each CONTROL AREA / BLOCK may divide up
into sub-control areas that operate their own underlying SECONDARY CONTROL, as long as this
does not jeopardise the interconnected operation. The hierarchy of SECONDARY CONTROL
consists of the SYNCHRONOUS AREA, with CONTROL BLOCKS and (optionally) included CONTROL
AREAS, see the following figure:


If a CONTROL BLOCK has internal CONTROL AREAS, the CONTROL BLOCK organises the internal
SECONDARY CONTROL according to one of the following schemes (basically, the type of
internal organisation must not influence the behaviour or quality of SECONDARY CONTROL
between the CONTROL BLOCKS):
Centralised: SECONDARY CONTROL for the CONTROL BLOCK is performed centrally by a
single controller (as one CONTROL AREA); the operator of the CONTROL BLOCK has the
same responsibilities as the operator of a CONTROL AREA.
Pluralistic: SECONDARY CONTROL is performed in a decentralised way with more than one
CONTROL AREA; a single TSO, the BLOCK CO-ORDINATOR, regulates the whole block
towards its neighbours with its own controller and regulating capacity, while all the other
TSOs of the block regulate their own CONTROL AREAS in a decentralised way by their own;
Hierarchical: SECONDARY CONTROL is performed in a decentralised way with more than
one CONTROL AREA; a single TSO, the BLOCK CO-ORDINATOR, operates the superposed
block controller which directly influences the subordinate controllers of all CONTROL AREAS
of the CONTROL BLOCK; the BLOCK CO-ORDINATOR may or may not have regulating capacity
on its own.

6. Secondary Control Range and Reserve
The SECONDARY CONTROL RANGE is the range of adjustment of the SECONDARY CONTROL
POWER, within which the SECONDARY CONTROLLER can operate automatically, in both
directions (positive and negative) at the time concerned, from the working point of the
SECONDARY CONTROL POWER.
The SECONDARY CONTROL RESERVE is the positive part of the SECONDARY CONTROL RANGE
between the working point and the maximum value. The portion of the SECONDARY CONTROL
RANGE already activated at the working point is the SECONDARY CONTROL POWER.
The size of the SECONDARY CONTROL RESERVE that is required typically depends on the size of
typical load variations, schedule changes and generating units. The recommended minimum
reserve related to load variations is given in the following figure:


M1
control
range
M1
working
point
M2
working
point
M1
instantaneous
output
Values resulting from
the two generators
Working points and control ranges in the case
of a proportional distribution of control power
from the two generators M1 and M2
Generators participating in secondary control
M2
instantaneous
output
M1+M2
instantaneous
output
Secondary
control
power Secondary
control
range
Secondary
control
reserve
Working point
Non-adjustable
output
M2
control
range
Non-adjustable
output
M1 M2

If the consumption exceeds production on a continuous basis, notwithstanding the availability
of this reserve capacity, immediate action must be taken to restore the balance between the
two (by the use of TERTIARY CONTROL, standby supplies, contractual load variation / LOAD-
SHEDDING (some countries refer to load interruption) or the LOAD-SHEDDING of a proportion
of customer load as a last resort). Sufficient transmission capacity must be maintained at all
times to accommodate reserve control capacity and standby supplies (see !A1-C).

Recommended
secondary
control reserve
in MW
L in MW
max.
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
0
1
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
0
7
0
0
0
0
8
0
0
0
0
9
0
0
0
0

The rate of change in the power output of generators used for SECONDARY CONTROL must in
total be sufficient for SECONDARY CONTROL purposes. It is defined as a percentage of the
rated output of the control generator per unit of time, and strongly depends upon the type of
generator
3
. Typically, for oil- or gas-fired power stations, this rate is of the order of 8% per
minute. In the case of reservoir power stations, the rate of continuous power change ranges
from 1.5 to 2.5% of the rated plant output per second. In hard coal- and lignite-fired plants,
this rate ranges from 2 to 4% per minute and 1 to 2% per minute respectively. The maximum
rate of change in output of nuclear power plants is approximately 1 to 5% per minute. These
sample figures for customary rates of change in SECONDARY CONTROL action will be used as
an aid to the definition of an optimum offset correction time.

7. Exchange Programs
The algebraic sum of the agreed hourly EXCHANGE PROGRAMS of cross-border exchange
transfers between CONTROL AREAS / BLOCKS and the ADJACENT CONTROL AREAS constitutes

3: The type of generators that may be used for SECONDARY CONTROL within a CONTROL AREA depends on the
generation mix / primary energies available in that geographical area and is therefore not evenly distributed in the
SYNCHRONOUS AREA.

the power interchange set point for the CONTROL AREAS SECONDARY CONTROLLER. In order to
prevent excessive fluctuations on interconnections when program changes occur, it is
necessary that this jump is converted to a ramp lasting 10 minutes in total, starting 5 minutes
before the agreed change of the EXCHANGE PROGRAM and ending 5 minutes later (see
example in figure below), regardless of the time-step (one hour, 30 minutes or 15 minutes) or
the step size of the schedule (see !P2 and !A2 for further details of scheduling and
accounting).

Set point value of power interchange Agreed hourly schedule
7 8 9 10 h 6
Export
10 min
Import
t

In order to prevent unintentional FREQUENCY DEVIATIONS and major control actions under
undisturbed conditions, TRANSMISSION SYSTEM OPERATORS (TSOs) are required to maintain
careful compliance with times for programme changes, particularly where changes in the
EXCHANGE PROGRAMS of several hundred MW are involved. In particular, care must be taken
to ensure that generating capacity is brought on line or disconnected on a staggered basis,
particularly for tariff changes at 6 a.m. and 10 p.m.
A substantial change in SCHEDULING of he scheduled modification of power plant operation
must not have a negative impact upon system operation of the type which might be
associated e.g. with a disturbance.

8. Quality of Control during Normal Operation
In order to allow the continuous monitoring of the quality of SECONDARY CONTROL, the
FREQUENCY DEVIATION is evaluated statistically each month by determining the standard
deviation :
( )

n
i
i
f f
n
1
2
0
1
(n is the number of average values over 15 minutes)
and the number and duration of frequency corrections. FREQUENCY DEVIATIONS f >
50 mHz must also be monitored with respect to the frequency set-point, and the proportion of
time during which f exceeds 50 mHz must also be measured.

9. Quality of Control during Large Deviations

The quality of SECONDARY CONTROL must be monitored by measuring and analysing control in
individual CONTROL AREAS / BLOCKS after losses of generating capacity or load exceeding
1000 MW
4
(observation incident).
The necessary data will be provided by the TSOs / interconnected undertaking concerned.
Measurements of SYSTEM FREQUENCY and power interchanges behaviour during an incident
allows a statistical analysis of PRIMARY and SECONDARY CONTROL performance.
The reaction or response of the SYNCHRONOUS AREA to a major disturbance P
a
(generator
shutdown or loss of load) in a CONTROL AREA / BLOCK and the return of the SYSTEM
FREQUENCY f to its initial value (quality of SECONDARY CONTROL) are monitored by using the
trumpet method, described here after.
In order to assess the quality of SECONDARY CONTROL in CONTROL AREAS / BLOCKS,
trumpet-shaped curves of the type ( )
T t
e A f t H

t
0
have been defined on the basis of
values obtained from experience and the monitoring of SYSTEM FREQUENCY over a period of
years. When the SYSTEM FREQUENCY is maintained within the trumpet during the SECONDARY
CONTROL process, the completion of the latter is deemed to be satisfactory, in terms of
technical control.
The trumpet curve for a given incident will be plotted using the following values (see figure
below):
the set-point frequency
0
f (on the figure below,
0
f = 50.01 Hz)
the actual frequency
1
f before the incident (on the figure below,
1
f is different from
0
f )
the maximum frequency deviation
2
f after the incident, with respect to the set-point
0
f
the loss of generating capacity
a
P responsible for the incident.
The following relationship between the above mentioned parameters do apply (see next
figure):
0 1 0 2 2
f f f f f +

t [s]
-100 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100
f [Hz]
49.750
49.850
49.950
50.050
50.150
50.250

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`
`
`
`
`
`
` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `
d
f
o
= 50.010
f
1
f
2
f
o
f
1
f
2
f
50

The following relationship will apply to the trumpet curve (envelope curve) ( ) t H
( )
T t
e A f t H

t
0

4
The value of 1000 MW holds for the first synchronous zone only, for the second synchronous zone the value
currently is 250 MW instead.

The value A is established on the basis of frequency monitoring over a period of years for
2
2 . 1 f A
The SYSTEM FREQUENCY must be restored to a margin of mHz d 20 t of the set point
frequency 900 seconds (15 minutes) after the start of an incident. Hence, the time constant T
of the trumpet curve is determined by the following formula:
d
A
T
ln
900
for s T 900 and mHz d 20
The series of curves described hereafter and shown on the figure below indicate the SYSTEM
FREQUENCY response required after a given loss of power
a
P .
The following relationship will apply after the loss of
a
P :
1
f
P
a
u
or
u
a
P
f

1

For each loss of power, this relationship gives the corresponding frequency deviation
1
f .
Frequency monitoring over many years has shown that the FREQUENCY DEVIATION
0
f is often
greater (up to 30 mHz) before an incident than after the secondary control process (up to
20 mHz). This is due to the insensitivity of PRIMARY and SECONDARY CONTROL and the
inaccuracy of the measurements. In the series of curves, this is taken into account by a
general increase of 30 mHz in factor A
*
:
*
A ( ) mHz f 30 2 . 1
1
+ t
+ t mHz P
a
u
30
1
2 . 1

All other initial values will remain the same. This gives the following for the series of curves
( ) t H
*

with
a
P as parameter:
( )
T t
a
e A f P t H

t
*
0
*
, , ( )
T t
a
u
a
e mHz P f P t H

+ t 30
1
2 . 1 ,
0
*

P (parameter)
a
t [s]
-100 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100
f [Hz]
49.8
49.9
50.0
50.1
50.2
-1600 MW
-1200 MW
-800 MW
-400 MW
1200 MW
800 MW
400 MW
d
-3200 MW
-2800 MW
-2400 MW
-2000 MW
2000 MW
2800 MW
3200 MW
1600 MW
4 0 2 0 MW

The SYSTEM FREQUENCY itself depends on a lot of other circumstances, physical effects and
underlying control mechanisms (see !A1-A), that cannot be clearly distinguished in all cases.
Therefore, the analysis is usually made on a case-by-case basis.

C. Tertiary Control
[UCTE Operation Handbook Policy 1 Chapter C: Tertiary Control, 2004]
the UCPTE, 1998]

1. Introduction
TERTIARY CONTROL is any automatic or manual change in the working points of generators or
loads participating, in order to:
guarantee the provision of an adequate SECONDARY CONTROL RESERVE at the right time,
distribute the SECONDARY CONTROL POWER to the various generators in the best possible
way, in terms of economic considerations.
Changes may be achieved by:
connection and tripping of power (gas turbines, reservoir and pumped storage power
stations, increasing or reducing the output of generators in service);
redistributing the output from generators participating in secondary control;
changing the power interchange programme between interconnected undertakings;
load control (e.g. centralised telecontrol or controlled LOAD-SCHEDDING).

Typically, operation of TERTIARY CONTROL (in succession or as a supplement to SECONDARY
CONTROL) is bound to the time-frame of SCHEDULING, but has on principle the same impact on
interconnected operation as SECONDARY CONTROL.

2. Tertiary Control Reserve
The power which can be connected automatically or manually under TERTIARY CONTROL, in
order to provide / restore an adequate SECONDARY CONTROL RESERVE, is known as the
TERTIARY CONTROL RESERVE / 15 minute reserve
5
. This TERTIARY CONTROL RESERVE must be
used in such a way that it will contribute to the restoration of the SECONDARY CONTROL RANGE
when required (see !A1-B for details on SECONDARY CONTROL).

5: Because of the typical time-frame for SCHEDULING of 15 minutes.

Secondary
control
power
Working point
Secondary control
reserve
Increase in secondary control reserve
by starting up the non-adjustable generator M3
as tertiary reserve (minute reserve)
Working point
M1+M2
instantaneous
output
Secondary
control range
M3 tertiary
(minute)
reserve
Secondary
control
power
M2 non-
adjustable
output
Secondary
control reserve
New working
points
Non-
adjustable
output
M1+M2+M3
instantaneous
output
Secondary
control
range
the two generators
M1 and M2
all the generators
M1 M1 M2 M2 M3 M3

The restoration of an adequate SECONDARY CONTROL RANGE may take, for example, up to 15
minutes, whereas TERTIARY CONTROL for the optimisation of the network and generating
system will not necessarily be complete after this time. The timing of the various (partially
overlapping) ranges of action of PRIMARY, SECONDARY and TERTIARY CONTROL are shown in
the following figure.

Range of optimisation
Range of primary control Range of secondary control
Type of
control
Time from beginning of
overall system deviation
Range of tertiary reserve
(minute reserve)
manual
and/or
automatic
Tertiary
control
Secondary
control
Primary
control
Range where primary control is
still operative. It is
replaced by secondary control action
progressively
30 s 15 min

3. Capacity Constraints
The following non-usable capacity must be taken into account in the calculation of capacity
needed to meet power requirements:
units subject to long-term shutdown;
units shut down for repair and maintenance;
limits on capacity associated with restrictions in fuel supplies (e.g. restrictions on gas
supplies during the peak winter months);

limits on capacity associated with environmental restrictions (e.g. temperature of waste
water in summer, pollution, etc.);
limits on the capacity of hydroelectric plants associated with hydraulic and environmental
constraints (e.g. output restrictions, etc.);
the primary control reserve;
reserves to cover variations in production and consumption (secondary and tertiary
reserves).
In addition to these factors, which are directly associated with production, account must also
be taken of system conditions, given that network constraints may reduce scope for the
transmission of power produced.


D. Time Control
[UCTE Operation Handbook Policy 1 Chapter D: Time Control, 2004]
[UCPTE Rule: Technical rule for the correction of synchronous time, 1998]
[UCPTE Rule: Recommendations for the frequency in the interconnected operation of the UCPTE, 1996]

1. Summary
If the mean SYSTEM FREQUENCY in the SYNCHRONOUS ZONE deviates from the nominal
frequency of 50 Hz, this results in a discrepancy between SYNCHRONOUS TIME and universal
coordinated time (UTC). This time offset serves as a performance indicator for PRIMARY,
SECONDARY and TERTIARY CONTROL (power equilibrium) and must not exceed 30 seconds.
The Laufenburg control centre in Switzerland is responsible for the calculation of
SYNCHRONOUS TIME and the organisation of its correction. Correction involves the setting of
the set-point frequency for SECONDARY CONTROL in each CONTROL AREA / BLOCK at 49.99 Hz
or 50.01 Hz, depending upon the direction of correction, for full periods of one day (from 0 to
24 hours).

The quality of SYSTEM FREQUENCY will be regarded as satisfactory over a one month period:
where the standard deviation for 90% and 99% of measurement intervals is less than
40 mHz and 60 mHz respectively for the whole month considered;
where the number of days operation at a set point frequency of 49.99 Hz or 50.01 Hz
does not exceed eight days per month respectively (to be confirmed by experience).


[UCTE Operation Handbook Policy 1 Chapter E: Measures for Emergency Conditions, 2004]
[UCPTE Rule 15: Measures for frequency control and precautions for the decrease of the frequency value,
1965]
[UCPTE Rule 33: Recommendations for measures for frequency control and large disturbances, 1983]
[UCPTE Rule: Recommendations for the frequency in the interconnected operation of the UCPTE, 1996]

1. Introduction
The direct measures for emergency conditions are based to a certain extent on the
philosophy that in the event of a major disruption (short-term and where possible), selective
restrictions in the energy supply are more acceptable then the consequences of an extended
network breakdown resulting in a power cut lasting for several hours. The main principles of
Operational Security are described in policy 3 (see !P3).
The SYSTEM FREQUENCY as a global parameter is the main criterion that signalises emergency
situations in the system. Due to its equal value in the interconnected system, all partners are
automatically participating at problem solving by the automatic action of the PRIMARY
CONTROLLERS (see !A1-A). Local indicators, that inform about possible emergency
situations, are overloading of the interconnecting TIE-LINES that can result in action of
automatic protection devices and isolating of some part of the system. Important local signals
of the emergency situation are also decreasing of the transmission voltage that can cause
voltage collapse due to abnormally high flow of reactive power in the transmission system.
Counteraction of the SECONDARY CONTROLLER and the measures for emergency conditions
(e.g. in the scope of system defence during a big drop of frequency) shall be avoided in a co-
ordinated way.

2. Recommendations for Load-Shedding
Frequency thresholds must be defined for LOAD-SHEDDING. The UCTE recommends that its
members should initiate the first stage of automatic load-shedding in response to a frequency
threshold not lower than 49 Hz.
Sudden failure of 3000 MW of the generating capacity in normal operation without other
disruptions have to be corrected solely by the action of the PRIMARY CONTROLLER without
frequency sensitive action triggering of LOAD-SHEDDING.
In case of a frequency drop of 49 Hz the automatic LOAD-SHEDDING begins with a
minimum of 10 to 20% of the load. Each TSO determines shedding plans on his own. In
case of lower SYSTEM FREQUENCIES, the synchronously interconnected network may be
divided into partial networks. In this case, far more difficult conditions will arise in those
partial networks affected by a shortfall in capacity. For this reason, the staggered
operation of relays for LOAD-SHEDDING in response to a frequency criterion will allow the
system load to be reduced to a sufficient extent for the restoration of balanced conditions
in these partial networks, before the threshold for the isolation of plants for the supply of
auxiliaries or the tripping of generators is reached.
LOAD-SHEDDING should be performed at trigger frequencies of 48.7 Hz and 48.4 Hz (or as in
France at 48.5 Hz and 48.0 Hz) to the amount of about 10 to 15% of the load. The partners
accept LOAD-SHEDDING also if the failure occurs outside the CONTROL AREA of the respective
TSO. Triggering frequencies should be modified by the competent TSO - slight dissipation of
the triggers will cause gradual increasing of the load.
LOAD-SHEDDING in each stage shall be established to minimize the risk of further
uncontrolled separation, loss of generation, or system shutdown.

3. Recommendations for Power Plants
The following possible measures for emergency conditions are related to power plants:
At 49.8 Hz, quick-start power plants should be connected to the grid.
Under emergency conditions and if applicable, the operating mode of (thermal) generating
units should/may be changed from power pressure into speed control. A very fast rate of
change can be possible within the whole operating range, yet being very uneconomic.

Power stations automatically disconnect at 47.5 Hz
6
without time delay, and shall
safeguard auxiliary service supply. Operation of power plants below this frequency is
endangered (loss of capacity in the auxiliary gear, danger vibration, damage of the blade
and foundations).

4. Recommendations for power plants regarding U/Q control
Measures for emergency conditions regarding U/Q control can be supported by:
transformers with regulation on-load tap changing device
static compensation
Measures must be taken to maintain reactive power near to the point of consumption to
ensure minimal transfer of reactive power through the network.

6: The critical negative limit of the SYSTEM FREQUENCY of 47.5 HZ (and the positive limit of 52.5 Hz as well) are
known to be critical for generation sets, because this may trigger automatic disconnection of generators for safety
reasons.
SCHEDULI NG AND ACCOUNTI NG
APPENDI X 2
A2 Appendix 2: Scheduling
and Accounting

Appendix Chapters

C. Accounting of Unintentional Deviations

Introduction
This Appendix to Policy 2 explains and motivates the basic technical and organisational prin-
ciples of Scheduling, Online Observation and Accounting mechanism for the UCTE, as it is
applied in the SYNCHRONOUS AREA by the TSOs of the various CONTROL AREAS/BLOCKS.

In order to prevent systematic faults in the context of LOAD FREQUENCY CONTROL (see Policy
1) it is an important issue to check the UCTE wide consistency of the input variables used by
the single parties involved. For this purpose the task of co-ordination is performed, which
takes into account the exchange schedules (Process: Schedule Management), the real
time measurements (Process: Online Observation) and the compensation programs (Proc-
ess: Accounting). The task of UCTE co-ordination is organised on the basis of the three hier-
archical levels CO-ORDINATION CENTRE, CONTROL BLOCK and CONTROL AREA (see figure 1).

Figure 1: Hierarchical Levels of UCTE Co-ordination
1

1
Situation after re-synchronisation of the second synchronous zone
Acc. Block
Acc. Area
FE
P
P
D
A
PL
CZ
CH
I
CENTREL
E
SLO
NL
B
F
7
E.ON

VEAG
BEWA
G

RWE
UCTE
North
UCTE
South
GR
RO BG
DK
MO
R
HR
BIH
JIEL
SR
CG
AL
EKC
MK
Acc. Block
Acc. Area
Acc. Block
Acc. Area
FE
P
P
D
A H
PL
CZ
S
K
CH
I
CENTREL
E
SLO
NL
B
F
7
E.ON

VE-T

RWE
UCTE
North
UCTE
South
GR
RO BG
DK
MO
R
HR
BIH
JIEL
SR
CG
AL
EKC
MK

VKW
EnBW

CEGEDEL
TIRAG
UKR
UCTE OH Appendix 2: Scheduling and Accounting (final 0.4 E, 16.06.2004) !A22

History of changes

v0.4 draft 5.04.2004 OH Team draft for internal consultation
v0.3 draft 12.03.04 OH Team comments RWE

Current Status
This document summarises technical descriptions and backgrounds of a subset of current
UCTE rules and recommendations related to scheduling and accounting issues, with addi-
tional items.

This document and other chapters of the UCTE Operation Handbook as well as excerpts
from it may not be published, redistributed or modified in any technical means or used for
any other purpose outside of UCTE without written permission in advance.

control, 1999]
[ETSO ESS Implementation guide, R2V2]
[ETSO EIC]

1. Definitions
In the operational planning phase the market participants have to nominate their border -
crossing trades by the use of an exchange schedule to the control area operator. The ex-
change schedule counts positive in export direction and negative in import direction. For
each time unit t the market participant has to declare within the Control Area k a cross -
border trade with the market participant in the Control Area l by means of the exchange
schedule ES
kl
.
The market participant declares a corresponding exchange schedule ES
kl
within the Con-
trol Area l. The following equation applies:

(1) t lk t kl
ES ES

=

Each Control Area operator k accumulates the declared exchange schedules per time unit t
and per border to an adjoining Control Area l to the total exchange schedule ES
klt
. For each
border between two Control Areas k and l the following equation applies.

(2)
lkt klt
ES ES =

The exchange schedules form an essential input quantity for the LOAD-FREQUENCY CONTROL.
Thus the validity of the equations (1) and (2) has to be checked for every time unit and for
every border. Equation (2) has to be checked on the different levels of co-ordination, i.e.
CONTROL AREA, CONTROL BLOCK and CO-ORDINATION CENTRE.

2. Procedure
To prove the validity of the equations introduced above an information exchange has to be
set up among the parties involved. In figure 2 five types of information exchanges are intro-
duced (Market Party Responsible Schedule, CAS, CAX, CBS, CCT) including a description
of sender and receiver of the information. Obviously, the Market Party Responsible Schedule
has to include the detail of exchange schedules between market participants and . Since
the data exchange between CONTROL AREAS has the purpose to prove equation (1) the CAS
has to provide the same degree of detail. The following data exchanges are all needed to
prove equation (2) at different hierarchical levels of co-ordination. Thus the CAX, CBS and
CCT has to include the detail of exchange schedules between CONTROL AREAS k and l.

(Market) Party Responsible schedule
CAS
CAX
CBS
CCT
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
A
r
e
a
M
a
r
k
e
t
P
a
r
t
y
C
o
-
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
C
e
n
t
r
e
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
A
r
e
a
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
B
l
o
c
k
C
o
-
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
C
e
n
t
r
e
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
B
l
o
c
k
Sender Receiver
(Market) Party Responsible schedule
CAS CAS
CAX CAX
CBS CBS
CCT CCT
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
A
r
e
a
M
a
r
k
e
t
P
a
r
t
y
C
o
-
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
C
e
n
t
r
e
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
A
r
e
a
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
B
l
o
c
k
C
o
-
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
C
e
n
t
r
e
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
B
l
o
c
k
Sender Receiver

Figure 2: Information Exchange Type at different hierarchical Levels of UCTE Co-ordination

The hierarchical procedure of the schedule management co-ordination starts with the verifi-
cation of exchange schedules between control areas. After the receipt of the final exchange
schedules from the Market Party Responsibles the Control Area Operators exchange a CAS
and check the validity of equation (1). In case of any discrepancies the affected market par-
ticipants and time units are identified and the Market Party Responsibles are asked for clari-
fication. If the discrepanncy can not be solved before a pre-defined gate closure time (see
Chapter 3) the exchange schedule is rejected.

The co-ordination procedure continues with the control block verification. The control block
verification starts after completion of the control area verification by the submitting of CAX
from the control area operators to the control block operator concerned. First the control
block operator validates the complete data set received by checking equation (2) for the in-
ternal control area borders of its control block. Second the control block operators exchange
CBS and validate the external control area borders of its control block by checking equation
(2).

The last step of the co-ordination procedure is the co-ordination centre verification. The co-
ordination centre verification starts after completion of the control block verification by the
submitting of CBS from the control block operators to the co-ordination centre concerned.
First the co-ordination centre operator validates the complete data set received by checking
equation (2) for the internal control area borders of its co-ordination centre. Second the co-
ordination centre operators exchange CCT and validate the external control area borders of
its co-ordination centre by checking equation (2).

Taking into account the significant number of participants in the scheduling process, as well
as the different verification levels, common procedure and methodology must be applied in
order to enable automation of the process. First of all common ETSO Exchange Scheduling
System (ESS) shall be used for scheduling. Second, all participants in the scheduling proc-
ess shall be recognised by the ETSO Exchange Identification Code (EIC). Third, all the data
exchange shall be executed via Electronic Highway.

3. Gate Closure (Day - Ahead D-1 and Intra-Day D)
Due to different market models and regulatory framework there are different rules and gate
closure times for the nomination of exchange schedules by market participants in the UCTE
countries. To enable an orderly procedure of the UCTE co-ordination common gate closure
times have to be defined for the different hierarchical levels of co-ordination. As a pre-
condition, these gate closure times have to be after the latest gate closure time in any coun-
try involved. On the other hand they must allow sufficient time for the execution of the data
exchange, validation, verification and troubleshooting at each level of the co-ordination.

Figure 3 and 4 give an overview on the co-ordination process and point out the common gate
closure times for both the day ahead process and the intra day process.


CC
CB Data Validation 6
CC Verification
CCT
7
17:00
CB
3
CA data validation
CA CA
5
Submit
Exchange
Schedules
CBS
16:30
2
CB
4
CB
Verification
CBS
1 CA Verification CAS
Submit
Exchange
Schedules
CAX
15:45
CC
CB Data Validation 6 6
CC Verification
CCT
7 7
17:00
CB
3 3
CA data validation
CA CA
5 5
Submit
Exchange
Schedules
CBS
16:30
2 2
CB
4 4
CB
Verification
CBS
1 1 CA Verification CAS
Submit
Exchange
Schedules
CAX
15:45
CC
CC Verification CCT
7
17:00
CB
3 CA data validation
CA CA
5
Submit
Exchange
Schedules
CBS
16:30
2
CB
4
CB Verification
CBS
Submit
Exchange
Schedules
CAX
15:45
CC
CC Verification CCT
77
17:00
CB
CA CA
55
Submit
Exchange
Schedules
CBS
16:30
22
CB
44
CB Verification
CBS
Submit
Exchange
Schedules
CAX
15:45

Figure 3: Gate Closure Times for the Day - Ahead Process (D-1)

CC
CC Verification CCT
7
H - 15
CB
CA CA
5
Submit
Exchange
Schedules
CBS
H - 30
2
CB
4
CB Verification
CBS
Submit
Exchange
Schedules
CAX
H - 45
CC
CC Verification CCT
77
H - 15
CB
CA CA
55
Submit
Exchange
Schedules
CBS
H - 30
22
CB
44
CB Verification
CBS
Submit
Exchange
Schedules
CAX
H - 45

Figure 4: Gate Closure Times for the Intra - Day Process (D)

control, 1999]

1. Definitions
During online operation each control area operator k calculates the control program CP
kt

from the total exchange schedules agreed during the schedule management process and its
compensation program COMP
kt
for each time unit t:

(3)
+ =
l
kt klt kt
COMP ES CP

The control program CP
kt
represents the planned total exchange of the control area. For the
sum of compensation programs the following equation applies:

(4)
=
k
kt
COMP 0

The real exchange of control area is represented by the physical tie - line flows crossing
each border. The physical flow between control area k and control area l at each intercon-
nection line measured for the time unit t is called ET
klt
. The following equation applies in
the range of accuracy of the measurement:

(5) t lk t kl
ET ET

=

Each Control Area operator k accumulates the physical flows per time unit t and per border
to an adjoining Control Area l to the total exchange schedule ET
klt
. For each border between
two Control Areas k and l the following equation applies in the range of accuracy of the
measurement:

(6)
lkt klt
ET ET =

During online operation each control area operator k calculates its total real exchange ET
kt
:

(7)
=
l
klt kt
ET ET

The load frequency controller uses the control deviation CD
kt
:

(8)
kt kt kt
CP ET CD =

The same equations apply for the operation of a control block.
2. Procedure
To avoid a systematic, UCTE wide fault in the load frequency control, resultion in a perma-
nent frequency deviation, the following equation has to apply in the range of accuracy of the
measurement:

(9)
=
k
kt
CD 0

The validity of this equation can be proven by equations (2), (3), (4), (6), (7) and (8).

In real time operation different fault scenarios can occur deteriorating the validity of equation
(9). Such fault scenarios comprise wrong exchange schedules or on-line telemeasurement
as well as faulty calculations of the control deviation.

In order to improve detecting, as early as possible, any error concerning on-line telemeas-
urements, any misunderstanding which may occur in setting the exchange programs, etc.
and in order to implement without delay the appropriate corrective actions the online obser-
vation of a set of pre-defined figures is performed at the different levels of co-ordination.

On the control block level each control area operator k provides the on-line telemeasurement
values per tie line ET
klt
and its control deviation CD
kt
to the control block operator con-
cerned. With this information the control block operator receives a global overview about the
situation within his control block and is in the position to validate the tie - line measurement at
the internal borders in its control block.

On the co-ordination centre level each control block operator k provides the on-line tele-
measurement values per tie line ET
klt
and its control deviation CD
kt
to the co-ordination
centre concerned. With this information the co-ordination centre receives a global overview
about the situation within the co-ordination centre and is in the position to validate the tie -
line measurement at the internal borders. In close co-operation the two UCTE co-ordination
centres check the validity of equation (9).
D. Accounting of Unintentional Deviations

control, 1999]
[UCTE-Ground rule for the recording and offsetting of unintentional deviations in the interconnected net-
work of UCPTE, 1988]

1. Definitions
Due to operational reasons of intermeshed systems it cannot be avoided that UNINTENTIONAL
DEVIATIONS occur in such interconnected networks, i.e. difference between the agreed or
scheduled values and the actual values of power deliveries made. These UNINTENTIONAL DE-
VIATIONS can be dealt with by various methods. UC(P)TE has been applying certain methods
since 1958 for compensation by offsetting such difference in kind, separated by tariff periods
and agreed by all participating countries.

The unintentional deviations UD
kt
of a control area k and time unit t are calculated ex - ante
as difference BETWEEN physical and programmed exchange:

(10)
kt kt kt
ES ET UD =

In this equation the total executed schedules ES
kt
are used. The physical exchange ET
kt
is
calculated on the basis of meter values. The following equation has to be applied for the
physical exchange for each border between two Control Areas k and l:

(11)
lkt klt
ET ET =

Although in the context of measurement values (equation (6)) the accuracy of the measure-
ment equipment has to be taken into account, dealing with meter values the equation has to
apply absolutely. This aim is reached by using a single meter value from one side of the tie -
line (Accounting Point) for the accounting of both control areas at the border.

For the sum of the unintentional deviations the following equation applies:

(12)
=
k
kt
UD 0

The validity of this equation can be proven by equations (2), (10) and (11).

The unintentional deviations of each control area k are accumulated to an account ACC
kt
(T) -
under consideration of a pre-defined set of tariff periods T:

(13)
kt t k kt
UD T ACC T ACC + =

) ( ) (
) 1 (

The tariff period is the time interval fixed by UCTE agreement, during which UNINTENTIONAL
DEVIATIONS are attributed the same value for offsetting by compensation in kind. The valid
tariff periods of UCTE are indicated in figure 5. The tariff periods consist of NT, HT, HHT1
and HHT2 and distinguish between the summer period and the winter period. Four UCTE
wide common holidays are taken into account.

0 6 12 18 24
HHT Winter* Monday - Saturday
Sunday / Holiday
HT Winter* Monday - Saturday
Sunday / Holiday
NT Winter* Monday - Saturday
Sunday / Holiday
HHT 1 Summer** Monday - Friday
Saturdaye
Sunday / Holiday
HHT 2 Summer** Monday - Friday
Saturdaye
Sunday / Holiday
HT Summer** Monday - Friday
Saturdaye
Sunday / Holiday
NT Summer** Monday - Friday
Saturdaye
Sunday / Holiday
*: Winter: 01.10. - 31.03.; Holidays: 25.12. und 01.01.
**: Summer: 01.04. - 30.09.; Holidays: Easter Monday and Ascension

Figure 5: UCTE Tariff Periods used for the Accounting of Unintentional Deviations

For each control area k the account of unintentional deviations ACC
km
(T) is settled with ref-
erence to a recording period m. The compensation of unintentional deviations is performed
in kind within the compensation period as an import / export of the corresponding amount
of energy per tariff period T, that was accumulated in the recording period. Figure 6 gives an
overview to this procedure.

0:00 24:00 0:00 24:00 0:00
Fr Sa Su Mo Tu We Th Fr Sa Su Mo Tu We Th Fr Sa Su Mo Tu We Th Fr Sa Su
0:00 24:00 0:00 24:00 0:00
Fr Sa Su Mo Tu We Th Fr Sa Su Mo Tu We Th Fr Sa Su Mo Tu We Th Fr Sa Su
Mo Tu Mo Tu Mo Tu
Final Accounting m
Compensation Period m
Recording Period (m+1) Recording Period (m+2) Recording Period m

Figure 6: Definition of Recording Period and Compensation Period

The standard recording period is defined to comprise 7 days (one week), from Monday, 0:00
to Sunday 24:00 whereas the standard compensation period is defined to comprise 7 days
(one week), from Thursday, 0:00 to Wednesday 24:00.
In case of bank holidays or the change of tariff seasons exceptions to the standard recording
and compensation periods may occur. The co-ordination centres agree on exceptions to the
definition of the recording period / compensation period and inform the control block / area
operators 4 weeks before the start of the recording period accordingly. The following rules
have to be taken into account:
A recording period should last at minimum 4 days
A compensation period should last at minimum 4 days
The compensation period has to start always with a delay of three days off the end of
the corresponding recording period. Two day difference between the end of an re-
cording period and the start of the corresponding compensation period are needed for
the performance of the final accounting; one additional day has to be taken into ac-
count to enable the control area operators to buy / sell their compensation program at
the market.

With reference to the recording period m the compensation program COMP
km
(T) is calcu-
lated for each control area k and tariff period T during final accounting:

(14)
) (
) (
) (
T Count
T ACC
T COMP
km
km
=

In this equation Count(T) represents the number of hours referring to the tariff period T in the
compensation period m.

With equation (12), (13) and (14) follows for each compensation period m and tariff period T:

(15)
=
k
km
T COMP ) ( 0

For the execution of the compensation program the figure COMP
km
(T) referring to compensa-
tion period m and tariff period T is transferred to COMP
kt
for each time unit t of the compen-
sation period m. Equation (15) warrants the validity of equation (4).

During the accounting procedure the control deviation CD
kt
can be calculated on the basis of
the accounting data. Equations (8) and (10) result to:

(16)
kt kt kt
COMP UD CD =

The resulting CD
kt
is usually taken for the statistic evaluation of the performance of load - fre-
quency control (see Policy 1).

The same equations apply for the accounting of a control block.

2. Procedure
At first glance the compensation of any UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS occurring between CON-
TROL AREAS/BLOCKS participating in the interconnected operation could be accounted entirely
independent from one another. In practice, however, the likelihood of errors in the computa-
tions made for the determination relating to the programs for compensation by one or several
participating CONTROL AREAS/BLOCKS cannot be ruled out entirely. Such errors might entail
inconveniencies for practical operation and for final compensation for any deviations.

Consequently, the process of compensation of UNINTENTIONAL DEVIATIONS is organised, con-
trolled and checked following the same procedure and hierarchical levels as the procedure
for scheduling: CONTROL BLOCK operator checks and harmonises compensations among
CONTROL AREAS under its jurisdiction, and CO-ORDINATION CENTRES do the same among CON-
TROL BLOCKS in their area of responsibility. In addition to that, CO-ORDINATION CENTRES North
(Brauweiller) and South (Laufenburg) harmonise COMPENSATION PROGRAM among them,
bringing such total COMPENSATION PROGRAM of UCTE interconnected power systems by de-
fault to zero. Figure 7 gives an overview of the different steps of accounting co-ordination
and the corresponding gate closure times.

CC
CB data validation 6
CC settlement
8
15:00
CB
CA CA
5
Submit meter values
12:00 7 CB settlement
14:00
2
Submit meter values
CB
10:00
4
Control
area settlement
12:00
1 Agreement on meter values
CC
CB data validation 66
CC settlement
88
15:00
CB
CA CA
55
Submit meter values
12:00 77 CB settlement
14:00
22
Submit meter values
CB
10:00
44
Control
area settlement
12:00
11 Agreement on meter values

Figure 7: Process of Accounting Co-ordination at (D+1) including Gate Closure Times

The hierarchical procedure of the accounting co-ordination starts with the agreement of me-
ter values among the control area operators joining one border. This step has to be com-
pleted until (D+1) 10:00. In case of problems concerning the metering or telecounting equip-
ment the TSOs operating a common tie line have to agree on unique substitute meter val-
ues.
The co-ordination procedure continues with the control area validation and settlement. The
control area validation and settlement starts after completion of the verification of the meter
values by the submitting of at least the total physical flow per control area border and time
unit from the control area operators to the control block operator concerned. It is recom-
mended to submit the single meter values per tie line and time unit to enable a faster pro-
cedure of fault detection. First the control block operator validates the complete data set re-
ceived by checking equation (2) and (11) for the internal control area borders of its control
block. Second the control block operator calculates the single control areas account of unin-
tentional deviations for every tariff period for the day before (D), 24:00 and in case of final
accounting the corresponding compensation program and submits the result to the control
area operator concerned. The data has to be confirmed by the control area operator until
(D+1) 12:00.

The next step of the co-ordination procedure is the control block validation and settlement.
The control block validation and settlement starts after completion of the control block valida-
tion and settlement by the submitting of at least the total physical flow per control block bor-
der and time unit from the control block operators to the co-ordination centre concerned. It is
recommended to submit the single meter values per tie line and time unit to enable a faster
procedure of fault detection. First the co-ordination centre validates the complete data set
received by checking equation (2) and (11) for the internal control area borders of its area.
Second the co-ordination centre calculates the single control blocks account of unintentional
deviations for every tariff period for the day before (D), 24:00 and in case of final account-
ing the corresponding compensation program and submits the result to the control block
operator concerned. The data has to be confirmed by the control block operator until (D+1)
14:00.

The last step of the co-ordination procedure is the co-ordination centre settlement. The co-
ordination centres calculate the sum of the control blocks account of unintentional deviations
for every tariff period for the day before (D), 24:00 and in case of final accounting the
corresponding compensation program and validate the result vice - versa latest until (D+1),
15:00. The co-ordination centres submit to the control block operators the account of unin-
tentional deviations for every tariff period for the day before (D), 24:00 after the completion
of the co-ordination centre validation. The control block operators inform the control area op-
erators accordingly.

Contact
Boulevard Saint-Michel, 15
B-1040 Brussels Belgium
Tel +3227416940 Fax +3227416949
info
@
ucte.org
www.ucte.org

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