Memorandum: 21st July

To: Team 9
From: Gate Taylor
Geoff Brown
CC: Sam Caspersen
Re: Team questions & resources to date (NYC office)

Attached please find:

1) Team 9 questions - basic template;

2) Team 9 questions; and
3) Team 9 questions with documents draft 07.21.

Document 1 above serves as a basic topic guide.

Document 2 above serves as the topic and question outline.

Document 3 above contains the topic, questions and sources collected and reviewed thus
far.

We concentrated on the New York City sections of the first two topics, "The Buildings"
and "The Evacuations." We will expand to support the remaining New York sections of
"Consequence Management", and will assist the Pentagon sections as directed.

There are some changes from the original question outline, but all questions have been
integrated, and the document will receive ongoing refinement as the research progresses
and is catalogued.

Please review and send comments to Gate and Geoff.

Thank you.
 DRAFT 07.17.03
Basic Template
TEAM 9 QUESTIONS
- With Related Documents -

I) THE BUILDINGS
A) New York City
1) Pre-9/11
2) 9/11
B) Pentagon
1) Pre-9/11
2) 9/11

The Buildings: Lessons Learned

II) THE EVACUATIONS

A) New York City
1) Pre-9/11
2) 9/11
B) The Pentagon
1) Pre-9/11
2) 9/11

The Evacuations: Lessons Learned

III) CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

111.1) Command and Control

A) New York City
B) Pentagon

111.2) Communications
A) New York City
B) Pentagon

111.3) Securing the Scene

A) New York City
1) The Police
2) The Fire Fighters
3) The Emergency Medical Personnel
4) The National Guard
5) The Mayor's Office
B) The Pentagon

Consequence Management: Lessons Learned

 DRAFT 07.20.03

TEAM 9 QUESTIONS

I) THE BUILDINGS

A) New York City

1) Pre-9/11

i) Was any assessment done of the buildings' ability to withstand damage from
large-scale explosions and fires?

ii) Were the design and structure of the buildings reviewed periodically to determine
whether their safety features were antiquated?

iii) Given that the buildings lay in close proximity to existing flight paths, were the
buildings designed to withstand the potential impact of commercial aircraft and, if so,
what types of aircraft?

iv) What were the results of the structural reexaminations of the World Trade Center
after the 1993 bombing and the 1995 ten-story fire?

v) What recommendations were made by structural engineers and security experts

after the 1993 bombing to "harden" the World Trade Center as a target? Were those
recommendations implemented in whole or in part?

vi) Did the Port Authority ever test the structural integrity and general adequacy of
the World Trade Center to withstand a catastrophic explosion and fire?

2) 9/11

i) How familiar were first responders with the design and structure of the Trade
Center?

ii) When and why was the decision made not to fight the fire at all but to treat the
response as a rescue mission?

iii) Is there any evidence of sprinkler system, fireproofing or fire door

malfunctioning?

iv) Were any assurances given to first responders about the ability of the Trade
Center to withstand the attacks, at least until the evacuation could be completed?

v) Why were command centers established in the lobbies of burning buildings?

 DRAFT 07.20.03

vi) What was the basis of the intelligence that the first plane that hit was not a
commercial jetliner?

vii) Why was the NYPD helicopter pilot's warning that the buildings were about to
collapse not communicated to the FDNY or the Port Authority Police?

B) Pentagon
1) Pre-9/11

i) How recently had the structural integrity of the Pentagon been evaluated for its
ability to withstand an explosive attack or catastrophic accident?

2) 9/11

i) What accounts for the success of emergency responders in containing the effects
of the blast and fire?

The Buildings: Lessons Learned

i) What steps have been taken in New York City and Washington, D.C. to assure
coordination between first responders and structural engineers and architects in the event
of future catastrophic events?

ii) In analyzing the performance of the WTC and Pentagon buildings, what are the
most significant lessons to be learned regarding building design, fireproofing, fire
protection, and egress standards?

II) THE EVACUATIONS

A) New York City

1) Pre-9/11

i) What lessons were learned and what changes in evacuation protocols were made
as a consequence of the World Trade Center bombing in 1993?

2) 9/11

i) Were building evacuations conducted in accordance with existing plans?

ii) Were the evacuations successful?

iii) Who supervised the evacuations at the Trade Center site and in the financial
district?
 DRAFT 07.20.03

iv) Why were employees at the Trade Center told to remain at their work stations?

v) Why was there no rooftop evacuation capability?

B) The Pentagon
1) Pre-9/11

i) What evacuation protocols existed prior to 9/11 ?

ii) How long had they been in place, and how often rehearsed?

2) 9/11

i) What steps were taken to evacuate the Pentagon and other federal and city
buildings?

ii) Who made the decisions to evacuate, and on what basis?

iii) Were the evacuations conducted according to plan?

The Evacuations: Lessons Learned

i) Should rooftop evacuation capabilities be mandated for all high rise buildings (as
it is in Los Angeles but not in New York)?

Ill) CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

III.l) Command and Control

A) New York City

i) Who was "in charge" at the World Trade Center site? Was a clear command
structure established?

ii) How did the command structure adapt to changing conditions?

iii) Did the command structure provide strategic direction to response efforts?

iv) What accounts for the widely noted lack of a unified command structure at the
site?

v) How effective was the command structure at the Office of Emergency

Management in directing operations at the Trade Center site?
 DRAFT 07.20.03

vi) When was command and control leadership briefed on the scale of the attack, and
what decisions were taken in response to this information?

vii) Who assumed command of the FDNY and the Port Authority Police after their
respective chiefs were killed? How long were these agencies without a commander?

viii) What were the respective roles of FEMA, the New York State Emergency
Management Office (SEMO), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)?

B) Pentagon

i) Who was in charge of Pentagon C2 on 9/11? Was there a clear command

structure?

ii) To what extent were command and control efforts hampered by the lack of a
mobile command center?

iii) How was the decision made to invoke area mutual aid agreements?

III.2) Communications

A) New York City

i) Did first responders experience significant communications failures?

ii) Were communications failures the result of faulty infrastructure, protocols, or

both?

iii) Why was there so little communication among the police, FBI, fire, Port
Authority, and emergency medical first responders, and between the upper ranks of each
agency, and between city government and the private sector?

iv) Was there any communication with federal authorities in Washington, DC?

v) What means were employed to account for personnel and to discourage self-
reporting by law enforcement and firefighters from throughout the city?

vi) How effective were intra-agency communications at the scene?

vii) How effective was the city's 911 call-in network on 9/11?

viii) To what extent did first responders and command and control decision makers
rely on television and other commercial media for reliable intelligence and
communications?
 DRAFT 07.20.03

ix) What accounts for the failure of the Port Authority, which operated both the Twin
Towers and metropolitan area airports, to communicate news of the second (and third and
fourth) hijacked airliner to the Trade Center site?

x) How effective were private sector telecommunications and power providers in

assisting the emergency response effort?

B) Pentagon

i) What degree of interoperability existed among the Arlington County Fire

Department and other area first responders such as the Washington D.C. Police and Fire
Departments, the Capitol Hill Police, the Arlington County Police, and area EMS
providers?

ii) How was communication facilitated in the absence of interoperability?

III.3) Securing the Scene

Overall: How successfully were differing institutional perspectives of first

responders (law enforcement, fire fighting, and emergency medical) integrated in the
actual response?

A) New York City

1) The Police

i) What steps were taken to treat the Trade Center site as a crime scene?

ii) How was the Port Authority's police force deployed on 9/11 ?

2) The Fire Fighters

i) Why did the FDNY lose track of its personnel to such an extent on 9/11?

3) The Emergency Medical Personnel

i) Is it true that EMS had no ambulances for more than 400 calls from throughout
New York City on 9/11?

ii) What steps did the Chief of EMS within the FDNY take to discourage self-
deployment of EMS units to the scene?

iii) How was emergency room capacity taxed on 9/11 ?

iv) When did the city decide to invoke its mutual aid agreements with surrounding
counties and the State of New Jersey?
 DRAFT 07.20.03

v) How effective was the deployment of EMS units from other jurisdictions?

3) The National Guard

i) When was the National Guard deployed, and for what missions?

ii) How long did it take to secure the perimeter of the Trade Center site?

iii) Based on what intelligence was the National Guard deployment made?

5) The Mayor's Office

i) When was the Mayor briefed on the nature and severity of the attacks, and of
steps taken in response at the federal level?

ii) When was the Mayor informed that the financial markets were closed
indefinitely?

iii) When did the Mayor decide to cancel the election scheduled for 9/11?

iv) Did OEM relocate to a redundant site or was it necessary to improvise a new
center after the collapse of Building 7?

v) What steps did the Mayor or his Office of Emergency Management take to try to
facilitate communication and coordination among responding agencies?

B) The Pentagon

i) What accounts for the fact that not a single first responder was killed or seriously
injured?

ii) What steps were taken to treat the Pentagon as a crime scene and to secure its
perimeter?

Consequence Management: Lessons Learned

i) How has emergency and continuity of government and business operations

planning been adjusted since September 11?

ii) What steps have been taken to implement the recommendations of after-action
reports such as the McKinsey Reports on the NYPD and the FDNY and the Arlington
County Fire Department's After-Action Study?

iii) What steps have been taken to achieve interoperability and to develop a clearly
defined Incident Command Structure?
 DRAFT 07.20.03

iv) How effective has the new Department of Homeland Security been in improving
communication between federal intelligence agencies and state and local governments?

v) To what extent do budgetary constraints jeopardize reform measures?

 DRAFT 07.21.03

TEAM 9 QUESTIONS
With related documents as of 16 July

I) THE BUILDINGS

A) New York City

1) Pre-9/11

i) Was any assessment done of the buildings' ability to withstand damage from
large-scale explosions and fires?
> "Progress Report on the Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the
WTC Disaster," NIST Special Publication 1000-3. May 2003.
> Rayman, Graham. "Disaster Foreshadowed: Deputy warned of high-rise fires in
1995 article," Newsday.com. 10.31.01.
> Corley, W. Gene. "What we learned: building performance study of the WTC
collapse," Structural Engineer. August 2002.
> Dunn, Vincent. "Why can't the fire service extinguish fires in high-rise
buildings," Fire-engineering Magazine. 1995.
> "World Trade Center Building Performance Study," FEMA. May 2002.
> "Enhancing Evacuation Simulation EXIT89" Flame Retardancy News. November
1995.

ii) Were the design and structure of the buildings reviewed periodically to determine
whether their safety features were antiquated?
> Cauchon, Dennis. "For many of Sept. 11, survival was no accident," USA Today.
12.20.01.
> "Progress Report on the Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the
WTC Disaster," NIST Special Publication 1000-3. May 2003.

iii) Given that the buildings lay in close proximity to existing flight paths, were the
buildings designed to withstand the potential impact of commercial aircraft and, if so,
what types of aircraft?
> "Progress Report on the Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the
WTC Disaster," NIST Special Publication 1000-3. May 2003.
> Scheuerman, Arthur. "It was the fire, caused the Twin Tower collapse," Fire-
engineering Magazine. 03-12-2002.

iv) What were the results of the structural reexaminations of the World Trade Center
after the 1993 bombing and the 1995 ten-story fire?
> Rayman, Graham."Disaster Foreshadowed: Deputy warned of high-rise fires in
1995 article," Newsday.com. 10.31.01.
> Dunn, Vincent. "Why can't the fire service extinguish fires in high-rise
buildings," Fire-engineering Magazine. 1995.
> Cauchon, Dennis. "For many of Sept. 11, survival was no accident," USA Today.
12.20.01.
 DRAFT 07.21.03

> Leon Harris interviewing Dennis Cauchon. "Inside the World Trade Center after
the attacks," CNN. 12.19.01.
> Corley, W. Gene. "What we learned: building performance study of the WTC
collapse," Structural Engineer. August 2002.
> "World Trade Center Building Performance Study," FEMA. May 2002.
> "Enhancing Evacuation Simulation EXIT89" Flame Retardancy News. November
1995.

v) What recommendations were made by structural engineers and security experts

after the 1993 bombing to "harden" the World Trade Center as a target? Were those
recommendations implemented in whole or in part?
> Guart, Al. "FDNY's 9/11 Woes Echoed '93 Attack," The New York Post.,
September 29, 2002.
> Rayman, Graham. "Disaster Foreshadowed: Deputy warned of high-rise fires in
1995 article," Newsday.com. 10.31.01.
> Dunn, Vincent. "Why can't the fire service extinguish fires in high-rise
buildings," Fire-engineering Magazine. 1995.
> "What we learned: building performance study of the WTC collapse," Structural
Engineer. August 2002.
> "Progress Report on the Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the
WTC Disaster," NIST Special Publication 1000-3. May 2003.
> "World Trade Center Building Performance Study," FEMA. May 2002.

vi) Did the Port Authority ever test the structural integrity and general adequacy of
the World Trade Center to withstand a catastrophic explosion and fire?

2) 9/11

i) How familiar were first responders with the design and structure of the Trade
Center?
> "Improving NYPD Emergency Preparedness and Response," McKinsey & Co.
8.19.02.
> "Improving FDNY Emergency Preparedness and Response," McKinsey & Co.
August 2002.
> Smith, Dennis. Report from Ground Zero. 2003.
> Cauchon, Dennis. "For many of Sept. 11, survival was no accident," USA Today.
12.20.01.

ii) When and why was the decision made not to fight the fire at all but to treat the
response as a rescue mission?
> "Improving NYPD Emergency Preparedness and Response," McKinsey & Co.
8.19.02.
 DRAFT 07.21.03

> "Improving FDNY Emergency Preparedness and Response," McKinsey & Co.
August 2002.
> Smith, Dennis. Report from Ground Zero. 2003.

iii) Is there any evidence of sprinkler system, fireproofing or fire door

malfunctioning?
> Cauchon, Dennis. "For many of Sept. 11, survival was no accident," USA Today.
12.20.01.
> Leon Harris interviewing Dennis Cauchon. "Inside the World Trade Center after
the attacks," CNN. 12.19.01.
> "What we learned: building performance study of the WTC collapse," Structural
Engineer. August 2002.
> "Progress Report on the Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the
WTC Disaster," NIST Special Publication 1000-3. May 2003.
> Debaise, Colleen. "Port Authority Sued Over WTC Tanks," Associated Press
Online. 9.10.02

iv) Were any assurances given to first responders about the ability of the Trade
Center to withstand the attacks, at least until the evacuation could be completed?
> "FDNY wants review of 9-11 procedures," Associated Press. 1-30-02.
> "Improving NYPD Emergency Preparedness and Response," McKinsey & Co.
8.19.02.
> "Improving FDNY Emergency Preparedness and Response," McKinsey & Co.
August 2002.
> Smith, Dennis. Report from Ground Zero. 2003.

v) Why were command centers established in the lobbies of burning buildings?

> Usdin, Glenn D. "Command or Collapse," Fire Chief, February 2003.
> "FDNY Prepares to Change Procedures in Response to 9/11," Associated Press.
07.22.02.
> "Eyes Tracing System; Bids Taken for Unit to Track Firefighters," Newsday.
03.28.03.
> Testimony of Fire Officers Association before the New York City Council
Committees on Public Safety and Fire and Criminal Justice. 10.08.02.
> Excerpt from Strong of Heart. Life and Death in the Fire Department of New
York by Thomas Von Essen.
> "Improving NYPD Emergency Preparedness and Response," McKinsey & Co.
8.19.02.
> "Improving FDNY Emergency Preparedness and Response," McKinsey & Co.
August 2002.
> Smith, Dennis. Report from Ground Zero. 2003.

vi) What was the basis of the intelligence that the first plane that hit was not a
commercial jetliner?
 DRAFT 07.21.03

vii) Why was the NYPD helicopter pilot's warning that the buildings were about to
collapse not communicated to the FDNY or the Port Authority Police?
> Haberman, Maggie. "FDNY Has to Open WTC Records," New York Daily News.
02.06.02.

B) Pentagon
1) Pre-9/11

i) How recently had the structural integrity of the Pentagon been evaluated for its
ability to withstand an explosive attack or catastrophic accident?

2) 9/11

i) What accounts for the success of emergency responders in containing the effects
of the blast and fire?

The Buildings: Lessons Learned

i) What steps have been taken in New York City and Washington, D.C. to assure
coordination between first responders and structural engineers and architects in the event
of future catastrophic events?
> "Progress Report on the Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the
WTC Disaster," NIST Special Publication 1000-3. May 2003.
> Testimony (as written) Joe M. Allbaugh, Director, FEMA, Before the Committee
on Environmental and Public Works, US Senate. 10.16.01.
^ Corley, W. Gene. "What we learned: building performance study of the WTC
collapse," Structural Engineer. August 2002.
> "Boone, NC: Technological Hazards Annex." 03.13.02
> The Century Foundation's Homeland Security Project
> Rudman Homeland Defense Report
> "Rudman Task Force Says Critical Aid on a Slow Drip." Congressional
Quarterly.
> "Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared" Report of the Independent
Task Force on Emergency Responders, Sponsored by the Council on Foreign
Relations.
> "DHS Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response," DHS News. June
2003.
> "New-rules proposed to help high-rises withstand attacks," New York Times.
03.06.02.
^ Cauchon, Dennis. "For many of Sept. 11, survival was no accident," USA Today.
12.20.01.

ii) In analyzing the performance of the WTC and Pentagon buildings, what are the
most significant lessons to be learned regarding building design, fireproofing, fire
protection, and egress standards?
 DRAFT 07.21.03

> "9/11: One Year Later; Tragic Lessons Leaves City Better Prepared," The New
York Post. 09.08.02.
> Corley, W. Gene. "What we learned: building performance study of the WTC
collapse," Structural Engineer. August 2002.
> Progress Report on the Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the WTC
Disaster," NIST Special Publication 1000-3. May 2003.
> "New-rules proposed to help high-rises withstand attacks," New York Times.
03.06.02.
> "World Trade Center Building Performance Study," FEMA. May 2002.
 DRAFT 07.21.03

II) THE EVACUATIONS

A) New York City

1) Pre-9/11

i) What lessons were learned and what changes in evacuation protocols were made
as a consequence of the World Trade Center bombing in 1993?
> Cauchon, Dennis. "For many of Sept. 11, survival was no accident," USA Today.
12.20.01.
> Leon Harris interviewing Dennis Cauchon. "Inside the World Trade Center after
the attacks," CNN. 12.19.01.
> "Study of Occupant Behavior during the WTC Evacuation- Preliminary Report of
Results of Results," NFPA (report on '93 Bombing).
> "Enhancing Evacuation Simulation EXIT89" Flame Retardancy News. November
1995.
> "World Trade Center Building Performance Study," FEMA. May 2002.

2) 9/11

i) Were building evacuations conducted in accordance with existing plans?

> "ResQline Building Evacuation Summary 2003".
> Corley, W. Gene. "What we learned: building performance study of the WTC
collapse," Structural Engineer. August 2002.
> Cauchon, Dennis. "For many on Sept. 11, survival was no Accident," USA Today.
12.20.01.
> "World Trade Center Building Performance Study," FEMA. May 2002.

ii) Were the evacuations successful?

> Fire Department to Release Recommendations for Sweeping Changes" Associated
Press. 08.19.02.
> "FDNY Prepares to Change Procedures in Response to 9/11," Associated Press.
07.22.02.
> Corley, W. Gene. "What we learned: building performance study of the WTC
collapse," Structural Engineer. August 2002.
> Cauchon, Dennis. "For many on Sept. 11, survival was no Accident," USA Today.
10.20.01
> "World Trade Center Building Performance Study," FEMA. May 2002.

iii) Who supervised the evacuations at the Trade Center site and in the financial
district?
> "N.Y.C. begins changes within Fire Department; High command reorganized in
wake of 9/11," The Record. 08.08.02.
> Griscom, Amanda, "The Man Behind the Mayor," Newyorkmetro.com.
 DRAFT 07.21.03

> "Improving NYPD Emergency Preparedness and Response," McKinsey & Co.
8.19.02.
> "Improving FDNY Emergency Preparedness and Response," McKinsey & Co.
August 2002.
> Smith, Dennis. Report from Ground Zero. 2003.

iv) Why were employees at the Trade Center told to remain at their work stations?

v) Why was there no rooftop evacuation capability?

> "FDNY Prepares to Change Procedures in Response to 9/11," Associated Press.
07.22.02.

B) The Pentagon
1) Pre-9/11

i) What evacuation protocols existed prior to 9/11 ?

ii) How long had they been in place, and how often rehearsed?

2) 9/11

i) What steps were taken to evacuate the Pentagon and other federal and city
buildings?

ii) Who made the decisions to evacuate, and on what basis?

iii) Were the evacuations conducted according to plan?

The Evacuations: Lessons Learned

i) Should rooftop evacuation capabilities be mandated for all high rise buildings (as
it is in Los Angeles but not in New York)?
 DRAFT 07.21.03

III) CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

III.l) Command and Control

A) New York City

i) Who was "in charge" at the World Trade Center site? Was a clear command
structure established?
> "Better Communications Might have Helped FDNY," CNN Live. 09.1102.
> "Their Finest Effort: Stung by 9/11 Report, Cops Launch 'Coordination' Effort,"
The New York Post. 07.28.02
> "Improving NYPD Emergency Preparedness and Response," McKinsey & Co.
8.19.02.
> "Improving FDNY Emergency Preparedness and Response," McKinsey & Co.
August 2002.
> Smith, Dennis. Report from Ground Zero. 2003.

ii) How did the command structure adapt to changing conditions?

iii) Did the command structure provide strategic direction to response efforts?
> "Better Communications Might have Helped FDNY," CNN Live. 09.11.02.

iv) What accounts for the widely noted lack of a unified command structure at the
site?
> "FDNY Union: Investigate Radio Failure," Newsday. 07.20.02.
> "We're in Charge at Disasters, say Kelly, Scopetta," New York Daily News.
10.09.02.

v) How effective was the command structure at the Office of Emergency

Management in directing operations at the Trade Center site?
> Griscom, Amanda, "The Man Behind the Mayor," Newyorkmetro.com.

vi) When was command and control leadership briefed on the scale of the attack, and
what decisions were taken in response to this information?

vii) Who assumed command of the FDNY and the Port Authority Police after their
respective chiefs were killed? How long were these agencies without a commander?

viii) What were the respective roles of FEMA, the New York State Emergency
Management Office (SEMO), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)?
> Testimony (as written) Joe M. Allbaugh, Director, FEMA, Before the Committee
on Environmental and Public Works, US Senate. 10.16.01.
> "World Trade Center Building Performance Study," FEMA. May 2002.

B) Pentagon
 DRAFT 07.21.03

i) Who was in charge of Pentagon C2 on 9/11? Was there a clear command

structure?

ii) To what extent were command and control efforts hampered by the lack of a
mobile command center?

iii) How was the decision made to invoke area mutual aid agreements?

III.2) Communications

A) New York City

i) Did first responders experience significant communications failures?

> "FDNY Boss Wants a 'Concrete' Radio Plan," The New York Post. 08.06.02.
> Radioheads: First Responders Get Their Own Bandwidth."
> "FEMA Begins Awarding Grants to Local Firefighters."
> "Army Wants to Link Police, Fire, Military Radios."

ii) Were communications failures the result of faulty infrastructure, protocols, or

both?

iii) Why was there so little communication among the police, FBI, fire, Port
Authority, and emergency medical first responders, and between the upper ranks of each
agency, and between city government and the private sector?
> "New FDNY Communication System May Take Years," Associated Press.
09.19.02.
> "Too Hot to Handle," Salon.com. 08.20.02.

iv) Was there any communication with federal authorities in Washington, DC?

v) What means were employed to account for personnel and to discourage self-
reporting by law enforcement and firefighters from throughout the city?

vi) How effective were intra-agency communications at the scene?

vii) How effective was the city's 911 call-in network on 9/11?

viii) To what extent did first responders and command and control decision makers
rely on television and other commercial media for reliable intelligence and
communications?

ix) What accounts for the failure of the Port Authority, which operated both the Twin
Towers and metropolitan area airports, to communicate news of the second (and third and
fourth) hijacked airliner to the Trade Center site?
 DRAFT 07.21.03

x) How effective were private sector telecommunications and power providers in

assisting the emergency response effort?

B) Pentagon

i) What degree of interoperability existed among the Arlington County Fire

Department and other area first responders such as the Washington B.C. Police and Fire
Departments, the Capitol Hill Police, the Arlington County Police, and area EMS
providers?

ii) How was communication facilitated in the absence of interoperability?

III.3) Securing the Scene

Overall: How successfully were differing institutional perspectives of first

responders (law enforcement, fire fighting, and emergency medical) integrated in the
actual response?

A) New York City

1) The Police

i) What steps were taken to treat the Trade Center site as a crime scene?

ii) How was the Port Authority's police force deployed on 9/11?

2) The Fire Fighters

i) Why did the FDNY lose track of its personnel to such an extent on 9/11?

3) The Emergency Medical Personnel

i) Is it true that EMS had no ambulances for more than 400 calls from throughout
New York City on 9/11?

ii) What steps did the Chief of EMS within the FDNY take to discourage self-
deployment of EMS units to the scene?

iii) How was emergency room capacity taxed on 9/11 ?

iv) When did the city decide to invoke its mutual aid agreements with surrounding
counties and the State of New Jersey?

v) How effective was the deployment of EMS units from other jurisdictions?

3) The National Guard

10
 DRAFT 07.21.03

i) When was the National Guard deployed, and for what missions?

ii) How long did it take to secure the perimeter of the Trade Center site?

iii) Based on what intelligence was the National Guard deployment made?

5) The Mayor's Office

i) When was the Mayor briefed on the nature and severity of the attacks, and of
steps taken in response at the federal level?

ii) When was the Mayor informed that the financial markets were closed
indefinitely?

iii) When did the Mayor decide to cancel the election scheduled for 9/11?

iv) Did OEM relocate to a redundant site or was it necessary to improvise a new
center after the collapse of Building 7?

v) What steps did the Mayor or his Office of Emergency Management take to try to
facilitate communication and coordination among responding agencies?

B) The Pentagon

i) What accounts for the fact that not a single first responder was killed or seriously
injured?

ii) What steps were taken to treat the Pentagon as a crime scene and to secure its
perimeter?

Consequence Management: Lessons Learned

i) How has emergency and continuity of government and business operations

planning been adjusted since September 11?
> Alden, Edward. "Companies ignore terror risk," Financial Times. 07.10.03.

ii) What steps have been taken to implement the recommendations of after-action
reports such as the McKinsey Reports on the NYPD and the FDNY and the Arlington
County Fire Department's After-Action Study?

iii) What steps have been taken to achieve interoperability and to develop a clearly
defined Incident Command Structure?

iv) How effective has the new Department of Homeland Security been in improving
communication between federal intelligence agencies and state and local governments?

11
 DRAFT 07.21.03

> "CIA Poised for New Relations With Local Police," Congressional Quarterly.
06.27.03.

v) To what extent do budgetary constraints jeopardize reform measures?

12