The First World War, 1914-1918 Author(s): Bernadotte E. Schmitt Source: Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol.

103, No. 3 (Jun. 15, 1959), pp. 321-331 Published by: American Philosophical Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/985472 . Accessed: 15/10/2013 10:09
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THE FIRST WORLD WAR, 1914-1918

BERNADOTTE E. SCHMITT
Andrew MacLeish Distinguished Service ProfessorEmeritus of Modern History, Universityof Chicago 14, 1958) (Read November

a Germanmarkwas worth23.8 FORTY years ago last Tuesday, on November worth19.5 cents, 11, 1918, the First World War was broughtto cents-and the value was constant. Raw matean end by the armisticesigned with Germany. rials were broughtfreelyfrom the ends of the The First World War is now almost forgotten. earth and made up into goods which were sold Yet the terrible age in which we live derives in all over the world. A Germancould buy or sell in the coloniesof the BritishEmpire as clear successionfromthe struggleof 1914-1918. as freely If the present"cold war" is the aftermath of the an Englishman. European controlof Africaand Second World War, that conflictarose from Asia, whichwas to no small degreethe secretof had not yet been challenged the refusalof Germanyto accept the defeat of European well-being, 1918 as conclusive, while,furthermore, the Com- seriously. Perhaps the best index of a peaceful munist menacewhichovershadows our lives dates Europe and an orderlyworld was that travel free,passportsbeingnecesfrom 1917. It is therefore appropriateto take was almostcompletely a look back to the years 1914-1918,which were sary onlyforRussia and Turkey. Free also was perhapsmoretortured to thosewho lived through the press. Even in Germanyand Russia, the them than were the even more rugged years of least liberalcountriesin Europe, censorshipwas 1939-1945. and erratic, and newspapers freintermittent of thegovernThe Second World War had longbeenexpected quently in savage criticism indulged the Kaiser himself, and men's mindswere hardenedto it in advance, ment. Even the All-Highest, whereas the catastrophe of 1914 came as an un- was not spared. Actually,this picture of a golden age, of an believable surprise to a generationwhich had not experienceda general European war for a ordered, stableand pacificEurope, was deceptive. hundredyears. In greateror less degree,social unrestwas wideIn retrospect, how wonderful the years before spread and growingmore and more active. The 1914 appear! Europe seemed politicallystable, workingclasses were persuaded that they were forin spiteof periodiccrises duringthe previous not receivinga fair share of the ever-increasing and in every decade, the will to peace had triumphed. In wealthproducedby modernindustry had formedpartieswhichadvocated SowesternEurope, governments were fairlydemo- country cratic, being responsibleto parliamentselected cialismas the cure forall the ills of society. Alby manhood suffrage. In centralEurope, con- thoughthe Socialistpartiesproposedto carryout methods,they stitutionalgovernmentprevailed, and even in their programs by constitutional and midRussia autocracy was temperedby the Duma. inspired muchfearamongthe governing The restless Balkans, and Turkey as well, had dle classes, not only because theireconomicand their parliaments. Kings were the rule-and social demandswere unwelcome, but also because in timeof war was questioned. generallypopular; republicswere the exception. theirloyalty By and large the rule of law was recognized; boding ill for the fuA second circumstance arbitrary tyranny was largelya thingof the past. ture was the situationin the Balkan Peninsula, Economically,Europe was generallyprosper- where war and revolution had been endemicfor ous, thanksto the universaladoptionof modern a century. To be sure, the great upheaval of and thewidespread technology offood 1912-1913,in whichthe small Balkan stateshad importation from the New World. The gold standard of driventhe Turks practically out of Europe, had moneyprevaileduniversally and currencies were been accomplished, withto expectations, contrary interchangeable, without restriction of amount. A out a general European war, and the restraint pound sterlingwas worth $4.86, a French or displayed by the Great Powers encouragedthe Belgian or Swiss franc or an Italian lira was hope that in the finalanalysisthe Powers would
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ratherthan fight. But the Balkan to requirethat it should not let France be overcompromise of 1913 had left many resent- poweredby Germany. peace settlement of an explosion could ments,and the possibility In 1914 the two groupsstood face to face,and of each group betweenthe members not be ruled out. the relations by weremoreintimate thantheyhad everbeen. The Next, the peace of Europe was threatened and naval power of the two groups was of Germany. Germanywas un- military the restlessness the mostadvanced nationin Europe so evenly balanced that during the prolonged questionably and it was expanding its com- crisis of the Balkan wars, from October 1912 technologically, merce and increasingits population at a rate to August 1913 neitherside dared challengethe which alarmed its neighbors. Millions of Ger- other to a showdown. But, if, for any reason, action, mans were obsessed by the idea that Germany one Power did move,thatis, take military provisions of did not enjoy its proper "place in the sun," as then-such were the interlocking the phrase went, for the German colonies were the alliances-all were bound to follow. For a whencomparedwiththe vast em- generationthe systemof alliances had kept the inconsequential and France, or even those of peace, but in 1914 its workingsproduceda genBritain of pires Belgiumand Portugal,and theywere not bashful eral war out of a local disputebetweenAustrialoudly and oftenthat a new Hungaryand Serbia. about proclaiming The Austro-Serbiandispute was not beyond deal was imperative. The Germanarmywas the At any rate there were men in both was navy solution. German strongestin the world; the a peaceand Serbia whothought being rapidlyexpanded to challengethe British Austria-Hungary fleet. IndividualGermanstalkedmuchabout the ful solution possible. But the ruling group in necessityor grandeurof war, while the official Austria did not desire such a solution. Rather too oftentook it had for years sought an excuse for war, bepolicy of the Germangovernment as in 1905 cause these men believedthat only by war could sabre-rattling, and form of threat the and again in-1911; while the Kaiser contributed the anomalous state Austria-Hungarybe preand flam- served and their own privilegedposition safenot a littleto uneasiness by frequent thisexcusewhentheArchboyantspeeches. It is perhapsnot easy for peo- guarded. Fate provided theheirto the Habsburg Ferdinand, Francis ago duke years fifty that ple in 1958 to remember to peace throne,was murderedat Sarajevo on June 28, the same threat seemedto offer Germany about that thatthe Soviet Union does todayto our security. 1914. There is still much mystery as NikitaKhrusch- crime. It is not clear how much the Serbian WilliamII was as incalculable knew of the plot in advance or what government chev. Finally, Europe was criss-crossedwith alli- it did or did not do to stop it. On the fatalday, ances. Germany,Austria-Hungary(how many when a firstattemptto kill the Archduke had people today understandwhat Austria-Hungary failed,the plans were changed,but the chauffeur of the changea Triple Alliance. This of the royalcar was not informed was?), and Italy formed he been properlyinHad known. is not and of France why, Alliance a Dual was opposed by Russia, which became a Triple Entente when structed,the assassins would not have had a quarrels second chance to shoot. Thus, chance was reGreat Britain patched up long-standing excuse. with those powers and joined with them diplo- sponsiblefor providingthe long-desired there at Sarajevo, murder no been dethere Had had been alliances both matically. Originally fensive,becomingoperativeonly in the event of would probablynot have been a European War attack by other powers, but time and circum- in 1914. Hardly had the war begun when the belligerthem. Germanyhad promstance had modified issued collectionsof diplomatic attacked ent governments ised to supportAustria if that power they were called, of various Alliance papers-"books" of the editions and later Triple Serbia, in Africaand even hues of color-designed to prove that the other recognizedItalian aspirations forthe war. These "books" in Europe. France and Russia came to agree that side was responsible amongscholars, controversy the balance of power in Europe must be main- exciteda tremendous the more theydebut and politicians, changes publicists, tained, which might involve territorial becomeconside did each more strongly the bated, peacefully. that mightor mightnot be effected the guilt of the and own innocence its of vinced comAlthoughGreat Britain was not formally in revolutions of the end war, the At enemy. seemed interests its nevertheless France, to mitted

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which mighthave caused Austria to led to the opening instruction Russia, Austria,and Germany of archivesof the fallenregimes, and presently it recede. (2) The stockGermandefense issued in 1914 has always been becameevidentthatthe documents had been "edited," that is, inconvenient of mediationwas spoiled by passages that the possibility had been omitted new the general mobilizationof the Russian army or changed,and sometimes documents had been invented. Ultimately, theau- which, according to German argumentation, and go to thentictexts of the 1914 papers were released forced Germanyto counter-mobilize and thousandsof them are now available. Al- war. But the decisionof the Germangovernment thoughsome pointsstillremainobscure,the main forwar was takenbeforethe news of the Russian generalmobilization lines are clear enough. was receivedand beforeany (1) When Austria-Hungary decided to take answer had been received from Vienna as to action against Serbia for the crime at Sarajevo, whetherAustria would negotiate. Furthermore, it asked Germany forsupport, forit contemplated in spite of the alleged danger to Germanyfrom military action and the partition of Serbia-steps the Russian mobilization,the German armies whichmight well bringRussia on the scene. The moved, not against Russia, but into France by Germangovernment approvedthe Austrianpro- way of Belgium, althoughthey had no quarrel gram and urged its immediateexecution. The with France and no pretextfor war except that Germanscalculatedthat since a royal personage France was the ally of Russia. Down to 1913 had been murdered,the Tsar of Russia would the Germanstaff had alternative plans forattackprobablynot go to the help of Serbia; but if he ing Russia or France,but it thendecidedthatthe did and war resulted, and Austriawould only road to victoryin a two-front war was to Germany be able to defeatRussia and France. The Ger- smash France first and then turn on Russia. man Emperor and his chancellorassumed that Whetheror not this was good strategy, it was Britainwould not take part in such a war. Why certainly bad politics. The Germangeneralstaff this remainsa mystery. For many was the onlyone whichinsistedthatmobilization theythought years the German ambassadors in London had necessarily meantwar. Both Austriaand Russia, reported thatifGermany attackedFrance,Britain the protagonists in the conflict, did not consider would come into the war. Furthermore, the that mobilizationprecluded negotiation. It is Germanplans involvedviolationof the neutrality on recordalso that the Germanminister of war of Belgium,and Britainwas knownto be pecul- was of the opinion that Germany could wait iarly sensitiveabout Belgium. Probablythe ex- several days beforereactingto the Russian genplanationof this German miscalculation is that eral mobilization. The truth seems to be that the German general staffdid not worry about the German staffhad decided on war and used as an excuse. Britishintervention, for it believedthat interven- the Russian mobilization Looking back fortyyears, the historianmust tion would come too late to be effective; or, if the Britisharmydid get to Belgium,it would be note that the three fatal decisions of the July easily annihilated. It is also established that 1914 crisis-the German decision to support Austria,the Austriandecisionto reject the conwhenthe Germanchancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, ciliatory Serbian replyto its ultimatum, and the accepted the Austrian plan, he expressed the Russian decision for mobilization-wereall sudopinionthat it would be betterto have war then den decisions, takenwithout reflection and damnrather than at a later date, when the Entente ingtheconsequences. But as theRussian decision powers would be stronger. Therefore, it can be was the understandable consequenceof the presaid that, while there is no evidence that the vious Germanand Austriandecisions, it is hardly Germangovernment deliberately plottedwar for fair to blame the Russians exclusivelyfor their the summerof 1914, when the possibility of war decision. was opened up by the Austrian program,this (3) But if the continental governments acted prospectwas acceptedwith completeequanimity. precipitately, the Britishgovernment went to the It is truethat somewhat later,when the prospect other extremeand could not make up its mind ofBritish intervention becamecertain, thechancel- what to do until war on the Continent was an lor went throughthe motionsof tryingto hold accomplishedfact and the German army had Austria back, but he was half-hearted about it enteredBelgium. Ever since 1914 the question and at the last momenthe cancelledthe decisive has been hotly debated whetherthe war might

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if Britainhad promptly For one thing,it was oftenargued that modern not have been prevented to announced that it would stand by Russia and war would be too expensivefor governments are wage for a long time. This view derivedfrom nor diplomatists France. Neitherhistorians inclineto the NormanAngell'sfamousbook The GreatIllusion agreed on the answer. I personally at the very outset published in 1910. Angell did not say, as is view thata Britishdeclaration but, sometimesalleged, that economics would make of the crisis mighthave saved the situation, since neither the British parliament nor the war impossible. What he did say was that war British public would have sanctioned such a would be ruinousto both victorand vanquished, for this reason that banking and it was precisely the view remains academic. declaration, in July 1914 liftedtheirvoices against In the years before the war, sometimesthe interests catastrophe. hope was expressed that the Socialists of the the oncoming More positiveevidenceof beliefin a shortwar would heed the Marxistdoctrine variouscountries had made serious and is the factthat no government and refuseto obey the order of mobilization, had forwar. In no country preparation it is a fact that in July 1914 some German economic been materials raw or fuel, Socialiststriedto get in touch withtheirFrench reserves of food, believed colleagues. But whentheday came,everySocial- accumulated. The Germangeneralstaff of Holland were respected, thesisthatits country that,if the neutrality acceptedtheofficial istparty through would be able to importfreely attackand votedfor Germany was the victimof unjustified the war credits. The German Social Democrats, the Dutch ports. It was not untilafterthe war to whom the Russian autocracywas anathema, had begun that the general staffaddressed itself resources Germany's of organizing asked no questionsabout the conductof German to theproblem policyand readilyacceptedthe Russian mobiliza- forwar. Britainneverhad on hand foodsupplies for more than a few months,yet relied on the casus belli. tionas a sufficient inabilityof the navy to controlthe seas and allow Others expressed the hope that business country pressureon govern- supplies to come in. In no belligerent terestswould exert sufficient ments to stop them from war, and the record did the rationingof food begin until long after shows that in both Germanyand England there the openingof hostilities. On the militaryside, it was the same story. was oppositionto war in business circles. But German general staff expected to defeat The were loud, not very were which their protests, ignored. Churches,too, were generallylooked France in six or seven weeks-and they jolly !-and thenturnon Russia, upon as forcesfor peace, but they also did not well nearlysucceeded collapse in a few months. to expected whichwas countin July1914. of the Germans was optimism pre-war This of the United At the presenttime,the policy that if we are matchedon the Allied side afterthe war started, States is based on the assumption will whentherewas muchtalk of the Russian "steam the Communists strongmilitarily, sufficiently not attack us. The same idea was constantly roller" gettingto Berlin by Christmas. Lord propoundedbefore 1914. In fact, this was the Kitchener,the famous British soldier who was for war on the outbreakof to per- appointedsecretary invariableargumentof all governments was not taken too seriouslywhen he for hostilities, suade theirpeoplesto pay the taxes necessary great armies and navies. Yet the said thatthe war would last at least threeyears. maintaining of all, no general staffhad the far from creatinga feeling Most interesting bloated armaments, of ammunithe consumption of conception least The of insecurity. of security,bred a feeling only a few weeks afterthe the greaterthe insecurity, tion. By September, greaterthe armaments, had begun, the generals on both sides hesitated fighting and whenthe day came, no government of the shortageof shells, alfromfear of possible defeat or from reluctance were complaining been assumed that there were had it though is to face the horrorsand miseryof war. This of campaigning. Apparentlv months for supplies arthat sometimes is done, as not to argue, had planned in advance to make caused the war. My point is that they no government maments consumed of ammunition this,I do not- the enormousquantities did not preventit. Remembering feel so certainas do our presentrulersthat our by the war. By the end of 1914, instead of the Germans our enemies. intimidate will forever super-bombs So we come to the war itself. The expectation gettingto Paris or the Russians to Berlin, the would be brief. war had reached a stalemate in Belgium and was widespreadthatthe struggle

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of the French and France. The rival offensives Germanarmies had both failed,and trenchwarfarehad set in. This trenchwarfarelasted from November 1914 to March 1918. For more than three years millionsof men on both sides lived in trenchesfortified with concreteand dein the front fendedby machineguns and mortars line and by heavy artilleryat the rear. The Britishand Frenchgenerals, and to a considerable extentthe Germangeneralsas well, managed to convince themselvesthat, if only enough shells were firedat the enemytrenches, these footholds could be demolished and then the infantry could go forward to seize the rubble that was left. The mirageof "break-through" fascinated equally Joffre and Haig and Falkenhayn,the principal French,British, and Germancommanders during the firsttwo years of the war, and, in spite of repeatedfailuresand enormouslosses, theynever admittedto themselves that the thingcould not be done. In severalinstances cavalrywas massed behind the lines to dash throughinto the open of theprofessional country. The inability soldiers to finda way out of this deadlock reflects rather sadly on theirimagination. It is no wonderthat a famous Frenchman,Georges Clemenceau, is reportedto have said, afterhe became premier in 1917,thatwar was muchtoo seriousa business to be entrusted to generals. If our Civil War was the first in which conflict railroads were used on a large scale, the First World War witnessedthe debut of the internal combustion engine. In land warfare, the gasoline engine was applied in three ways. First, from the beginningof operationsmotor trucks were used to transport troops,guns, ammunition, and suppliesbeyondthe railheads,and sometimes, as at Verdun,this was the only means of transport to the immediate fighting zone. Second,the airplanewas used forthe first time in war. At the beginning, it was used only for reconnaissance, forit was an untriedweapon and therewere only about fivehundredplanes in all the armies put together. Graduallyit began to be used for locating trenches and "spotting" artilleryfire. Then troops were bombed from low-flying planes,and ultimately high-flying planes were employedfor general bombing. Not only this,but planes fought each otherfor the control of the air, whichslowlybut surelypassed to the Allies, who were able to make more planes, thousands of them, than the Germans. This superiority did not,however,enable the Allies to

overcomethe advantage possessed by the Gerto remain mans,who were,on the whole,content and let the Allies exhaust themon the defensive selves in fruitlessassaults against the trenches. These assaults did yield the Allies a few square but in March 1918, the line miles of territory, had changedlittlefromNovember1914, and the in entrenched German armies were still firmly Belgium and France. The deadlock on the western front was in the end broken by the mechanical contraption which we call the tank. The conceptionof a vehiclewhichcould cross trenches self-propelling and also shoot came from the brain of a subserving in France; this ordinate British officer was the thirdapplicationof the gasoline engine of warfare. But it was to the revolutionizing long resistedby the generalsand it was carried to executionlargelyby civilianinitiative. through Even afterthey had been convertedto the idea and had begun to use the tanks in France, the generalsrefusedto employthe tacticsprescribed and it was not until November by the inventor, 1917 that the tank came into its own at the battleof Cambrai. Even then,the top German was not imthe famousLudendorff, commander, pressed and failed to build German tanks in or to devise adequate defenses adequate quantities withthe great returned againstit. Open warfare Germanattackin the West in March 1918, and, thanksto superiornumbersat the outset and to the use of liquid fire,they were able to break through. But when the Allies, now reinforced by the Americanarmies, rallied,they possessed in the tank the weapon which enabled them to defeat theGermans. The Germansprovedunable to improvise sufficient resistance, and beingunable to defendtheirpositions, theylost the war. The war on the Eastern frontwas quite differentfrom that in the West-"the unknown has called it. The war," Sir Winston Churchill territory foughtover was vastly larger than the compact area of the West, and trenchwarfare never developed. The Russian army was large but afterthe first few weeks,shortof munitions. The Austro-Hungarian armywas a hodge-podge of rival nationalities, some of which were not to the enemyin large numbers. loyaland deserted Generally speaking,the Russians were able to beaten defeatthe Austrians,but were themselves by theGermans. By theend of 1915 theRussians had been defeatedand drivenout of Poland and, althoughthey made a brief comeback in 1916,

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in 1905; on the other so greatlythat by 1917 they and alreadyonce attempted, they had suffered the war. continuing against a protest was it hand, were ripe for revolution. it and reform, to achieve liberty the part played As a movement Yet we mustnot underestimate by the Russian armyin the war. In the opening was hailed by the Allies-"heartening news" invadedEast Woodrow Wilson called it-who had always been the Russians chivalrously campaign, about the Russian auPrussia, in orderto help theirFrenchallies, and, somewhatuncomfortable echoes scared would find so that upheaval they hoped and defeated, badly tocracy were they although peoples of the Central the German general staffthat it detached two among the discontented corps fromthe Germanarmies in the West and Powers, as indeed it did. The new orderforced the Austrian to summon sent them eastwards. Had these troops been theAustriangovernment since 1914, in which eclipse been had which the Marne, of parliament, available for the battle stoppedthe GermanarmybeforeParis, the result and in Prussia loud demandsbegan to be heard franchise. three-class of the antiquated mighthave been different.Later, even afterthe forreform the Germangeneral The new Russia was, to quote Wilson again, "a Russians had been defeated, fora League of Honor." staffnever dared denude the Russian frontand fitpartner as a protestagainst continuing I revolution The in France. battle the into forces its all throw have oftenwonderedwhat would have happened the war was not understoodin the West. The if in 1914 Germanyhad stood on the defensive Britishand French were being hard pressed on against the Western frontand they refusedto face the in theWest and launchedits big offensive fromthe war; have possibility of Russia's withdrawal could army German the Russia. Probably and certainly,if they even believed that the revolutionwould stopped the French offensive, forthe war. The Russian enthusiasm Belgium had been left alone, Britain would not strengthen demandsof the Russian radicalsforpeace on the have enteredthe war at the start. were of the war was basis of no annexationsand no indemnities The most spectacularincident GovProvisional the when and resented, arose deeply This Dardanelles. the at the campaign out of a Russian request to have the Turkish ernmentset up in March, which was keenly callingfor peace, asked pressure in the Caucasus relieved,which came aware of the groundswell aims, no replywas war of reconsideration were for a at the moment when the Allied leaders the Allies, the from pressure the Under returned. in warfare trench of the out seekinga way staged an offensivein the conceptwas sound, for provisional government West. Strategically, success would not only have put Turkey out of the summerof 1917, which,thoughmomentarily was soon beaten back, and the failure the war but would have opened up a route to successful, the demoralizationof the to completed only not voyage Russia far easier than the difficult of thegovernment deprived also the but army Russian list to too long take would It Archangel. numerousmistakesby whichthe expeditionwas reliabletroopswithwhichto resistthe Bolshevist bungledfromthe start. In spite of these errors, attackof November7. Whethergreaterunderof theRussian by theAllied governments success was narrowlymissed. After the great standing Bolshevist the have prevented amwould situation the Turkish 1915, March of 18, naval attack no one can say, but theiractual policy munitionwas exhausted and plans were made triumph, intothe hands of the Communists. when playeddirectly and Constantinople to evacuatethepeninsula it is only fair to remember other hand, the the On the attack was renewed the next day; but had Allies agreed to discuss peace on if the and that losses his by Allied admiralhad been scared the the Russian terms,the Germansmighthave felt failed to go on. During the land fighting, Britishalmostcapturedthe criticalheightswhich it safe to shifttroops from the Eastern to the dominated Gallipoli; but bad generalship and Western front,whereas actually they did not bad luck were too muchforthem. It is generally begin to shifttroops untilmuch later,until they withthe Bolshevistgovagreedthatif the Allies had been able to open the had opened negotiations ernment. needed, it what with Russia and supply Straits quicklyrealizedthat The Germangeneralstaff mightnot have happened. the Russian revolution the affected had profoundly of March 1917 had a the firstrevolution The Russian revolution and attacks from it refrained so double aspect. On the one hand,it was a revolt Russian army; to Lenin himself, including of the sent it own agitators, against the corruptionand inefficiency Undoubtedly the troops. among agitation up stir forhalfa century a revoltbrewing tsaristregime,

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the German maneuverscontributed considerably to the breakdown of the Russian army, and at firstfromthis. Not only Germanyprofited was it safe to begin transferring troops to the West, but,at the end of 1917, Germany was able to open negotiations with the Bolshevistgovernmentwhichresulted in thePeace of Brest-Litovsk. By this treatyRussia was forced to surrender to the Central Powers vast areas of its territory and to acceptharsheconomic terms. The triumph of Germanyseemed complete. Yet, in the end, the Germans were hoist with their own petard, for,after of diplomatic relations the establishment between Germanyand the Communistgovernment, the Russians were able to launch their Communistpropaganda in Germany and this helped undermine the German will to resist in the autumnof 1918. So the Allies had no monopolyon not knowing how to deal properly with the situation createdby theRussian revolution. What were the war aims of the Allies which the Russians wishedto discuss? Americanswill immediately thinkof the secrettreatiesof 19151917,by whichthe Allies plannedto cut back the frontiers of Germanyand distributed the overseas possessions of Germanyamong themselves, promisedparts of Austria-Hungary to Italy and Romania, awarded Constantinople to Russia and partitioned most of the OttomanEmpire. These agreements, not secretly negotiated and carefully published,were certainlynot in harmonywith theprofessions of disinterestedness and respect for the principle of self-determination which the Allies publicly proclaimed. But, in fact, they werein largemeasuretheconsequences of military situations. The promise of Constantinople to Russia was made when the Allies were trying to forcethe Dardanelles; if theyhad succeededand capturedthe city,theywould have aroused deep suspicionin Russia had theytried to hold it for themselves. Was it unreasonable to partition the Ottoman Empire? The Allies had offeredto guaranteeits integrity in return forTurkishneutrality; but Turkey had joined the enemy and vastlyextendedthe scope of the war. The promises made to Italy and Romania were exaggerated and unjustified, but here again it seemed that the tide of battle mightbe turned if these new armies enteredthe conflict. To some extentthe Allies were in the position of parents who had to ransomkidnappedchildren-theydid not haggle too much over what they had to pay. The secret treaties contained many unjustifiedpro-

visions,provisions which,when the time came to put themintoeffect, provedimpracticable.Actually, the treatieswere of less consequencethan is often alleged,and since theywere publishedby of Russia at the end the Bolshevistgovernment of 1917,theyhad to facethetestof publicopinion. If the Allies in 1917 lost one ally,Russia, they gained another, the United States. The outbreak of war in 1914 took the United States by surprise,for Americanopinion had littlenotion of the politicalproblemsof Europe and accepted at face value the surfaceindicationsof a stable and peacefulEurope. For more than two years, Americanopinionfavoredneutrality, and Woodrow Wilson was reelectedPresidentin 1916 because he had keptthecountry out of war. Nevertheless, the great majority of Americans had early in the struggledecided that Germanywas primarily responsible for the war, and when the German army marched into Belgium and committedatrocities(which were no doubt exaggerated), Germanyappeared to be the Beast of the Book of Revelation. This bitterhostility to Germanywas perhapsthe decisivefactor in American policy. As soon as the war started, the United States was affected by the Britishblockadeof Germany, and early in 1915 it was affectedby the submarinewarfareinauguratedby Germany. Both sets of measures were regarded by the United States as contrary to international law, and our governmentconstantlyprotested against both. But the protests against the British blockade never had teethin them,whereas in the case of submarinewarfarethe United States announced that it would hold Germany to "a strictaccountability." In otherwords,the United States government set up two standardsof conduct, a much sterner one for Germanythan for Britain. We took the view that goods stopped or seized by the British could be paid for, but human lives lost by submarine action were irreparable. This discrimination was approvedby the vast majority of the Americanpeople. In passing, it may be noted that the submarinewas the fourthway in which the gasoline engine was applied to the revolutionizing of warfare,the others being, as already noted, the truck,the airplane, and the tank. The Germansargued that the use of the submarine was a legitimate reprisalfortheBritish blockade,but the United States government refused to admit a connectionbetween the two illegalities.

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PHIL.

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Wilson hoped that his threatto break off re- States was in the grip of a business depression, lationswith the GermanEmpire would persuade and that we owed a lot of money to Europe. in was revelling to give up the submarine By the end of 1916 the country the Germangovernment were prosperity, thanksto the enormouspurchasesof warfare,and the German civil authorities by the military, foodand war suppliesby the Allies; notonlyhad willing; but theywere overborne who insistedthat by no othermeans could Ger- we paid offour debts,but Europe had becomeour many win the war. Because of the controversy debtor. Therefore,it was argued, in order to Wilson was reluctant insure the paymentof these debts and to keep aroused by the submarine, to makeits use a casus belliforthe United States, up the floodof war orders,Wall Street maneuand he did notgo to war untilAmericanlives had vered us into the war. I have never seen the thisview, which evidenceto substantiate been lost in Americanships sunk by submarines. slightest In Wilson's eyes,the real issue was muchlarger. I neverheard expressedin 1916-1917. Such an would, I am sure, have had no appeal He was persuaded that the peace of the world argument could be safeguardedin the futureonly by the for Woodrow Wilson. It is, indeed, ridiculous of a League of Nations and thatthe to contendthat the United States went to war organization militaryand despotic regime of Hohenzollern forthe sake of economicgain. Quite apart from a soundpeace the fact that it would have been cheaper for us before had to be destroyed Germany could be made or a League of Nations organized. to keep out of the war, personswhose memories agree thatwe A more immediateand practical consideration go back to 1917 will, I am certain, Maymotives. idealistic by largely interest, own animated in its States, were was that the United as Wilson asserted, could notallow Britainand France,who had been be we were not so unselfish that to our nationalinterest for it was certainly to go under. unable to defeatGermany, in Germanyshould be defeated,but we were not During the 'thirtiesit became fashionable, in termsof dollars and cents. I recall to say thatthe United States had thinking some quarters, been trickedinto the war by Allied, more par- thatwhenthe chargeof Wall Streetmanipulation ticularlyBritish,propaganda. I do not believe was aired, Thomas W. Lamont, of the firmof it was nottrueofWilson. The record J. P. Morgan & Company,wrote an indignant it. Certainly the leaves no doubt that at the end of 1916 he was letterto the New York Times repudiating had he that out He pointed because suggestion. partly very greatlyannoyedwith the British, and age and it was preposterous trading sons of military of Americanfirms of the Britishblacklist with the inhumanto suggestthat he would be willingto with Germany and the interference mails, partlybecause theyhad not taken kindly risktheirlives forthe sake of gain thatmightalto his peace move of December 18. The record legedlycome to him fromAmericanparticipation also shows that if Germany had not double- in thewar. It is possibleto arguethattheUnited crossed him with its peace maneuvers,if Ger- States made a mistakein going to war (although many had met him half way in the matterof I do not thinkso), but not that we did so for peace, Wilson was preparedto exert pressureon sordid motives. by the entryof the The war was transformed Britain to discuss peace with Germany; all he a betweentwo rival conflict from States had to do was to stop American credits for United a strugglebeinto powers of acquisitive groups were about British forthe Britishwar purchases, peoples and peace-loving democratic the tween American the were Nor at the end of theirrope. regime military reactionary, the and world of the Allied propaganda. anti-German by made people and of Germany. Wilson's war address of April 2, That was done by the German government withthe idea of self-determinathe German army. What British propaganda 1917,was implicit theirown did do, I suggest,was to dispel the anti-British tion,the rightof peoples to determine When of form government. and allegiance feelingmore or less latentin the United States political end the at Russia of the Bolshevistgovernment ever since the Revolution. realready treaties secret the Another version that enjoyed some currency of 1917 published in his program Wilson particularized ferred to, duringtheyearsof the GreatDepressionwas that which, a program Fourteen Points, famous the Big Business, more especially the munitions makers,took us into the war. It is a fact that whatevermay be thoughtof its details, made when the war broke out in 1914, the United Wilson's name one to conjure with throughout

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the world. Althoughthe Fourteen Points were Poles, the three most importantminoritiesof notat thatmoment formally acceptedbytheAllied Austria-Hungary.This was the beginning of the governments, our Associates in the war, their end. At the beginning of September, the Austroappeal to the peoples of the CentralPowers and Hungarian government, now in extremis,apto neutralswas very great and obtainedfor him pealed to Wilson fortheopeningof peace negotiaa position of moral authoritynever before or tions on the basis of the Ninth Point, only to be since enjoyed by any statesman. It is well to told thatthe Ninth Point had been overtaken by remember that,in additionto Wilsonian idealism events. In other words, the United States no or federalization and German militarism, a third ideology was longerstoodforautonomy within but sanctionedits destruction. competing for the favor of mankind-the call of Austria-Hungary CommunistRussia. The Bolshevist leaders of This was the signal for which the nationalities 1917 were persuadedthatthe masses throughout had been waiting,and when the Austrian army Europe and especially in Germany were only was defeatedby the Italians at VittorioVeneto, waitingforthe chanceto overthrow theirgovern- first the Czechs and then the Jugoslavs, and ments and usher in the Communist millennium, finally even the Magyars declared theirindepenand theydid theirbest to excite the workersto dence. When the armistice withItaly was signed revolution. But theirpropagandaevidently made on November3, the Austro-Hungarian state had small appeal, forwhen the collapse of 1918 came, ceased to exist. The Czechs honoredtheirliberfor Communism, and ator by naming the principalrailway stationin therewas littleenthusiasm whatlittle therewas was easilybeatendown. For Praha forWilson. thisthe preachments of Woodrow Wilson had no On October 4, after the Allied armies had smallpart of thecredit. broken the Hindenburg Line in France, the The Americancontribution win- German government to the military appealed to Wilson for an ning of the war was very great. In France the armistice, this to be the preliminary to a peace tired British and French armies almost broke based on the Fourteen Points. Justpreviousto under the heavy Germanattacksin March 1918; thisthe Kaiser, by a strokeof the pen, had taken it was the fresh,huge Americanarmy that pro- the revolutionary step of making the imperial vided the superiority necessaryfor victory. No chancellor responsible to the Reichstag. The doubtour raw troopsmade manymistakeswhich proposalforan armistice emanatedfromthe genthe seasoned Britishand French had learned to eral staff, not fromthe civil government, which avoid, but once our troops went into action on realized that peace on the basis of the Fourteen a grand scale, the Germans,althoughthey con- Points would signifydefeat for Germany,and tinuedto fight well, knew that the war was lost. thenew chancellor, PrinceMax of Baden, opposed At sea we introduced new methods whichproved the move. Ludendorff, however,was adamant, successfulin beating the submarine. While it and the appeal was made. But Ludendorff was would be untrueto claim that we won the war, not sincere. He was playingfortime,in hope of clearlythe war could not have been won without reconstituting the Germanarmiesand fighting on. us. Wilson sensed this and acted accordingly. In a Americanpolicycontributed enormously to the series of notes, about which he did not consult endingofthewar in 1918. From themoment that the Allies, he demandedthat the Germanarmies the United States enteredthe war, the discon- evacuate all Allied territory and stop the subtented nationalities of Austria-Hungary had looked marinewarfare;he also challengedthe authority of the German government to Wilson as the prophetof self-determination, and declared that and they were disappointedwhen in the Ninth the Allies could negotiate only witha democratic oftheFourteenPoints,he talkedonlyofautonomy regime. Finally he stated that, if he had to withinthe Habsburg state. At that moment, it negotiatewith the military rulers and the monhe mustinsistnot seemed possible that the Emperor Charles might archicalautocratsof Germany, but on surrender. Pushed from be willing to negotiatefor a separate peace, so on negotiations Wilson had to be cautious. But the negotiations one positionto anotherand realizing the hopethe United States lessnessof a leve'een masse as urged by Ludencame to naught,and presently recognizedpubliclythe claims for independence dorff,the German government accepted all of and unity of the Czechoslovaks,Jugoslavs,and Wilson's conditions. This masterlydiplomatic

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330

BERNADOTTE

E. SCHMITT

[PROC. AMER.

PHIL.

SOC.

in like twentymillionwere wounded,and another was accomplished done publicly, achievement, in and at home criticism the face of considerable six or seven millionwere listed as prisonersor as the Allied countries,where it was feared that missing. The moneycost has been estimated Wilson would let the Germansofftoo easily. All in excess of two hundred billion dollars. In Wilson's addition, vast areas in Belgium and northern thismustbe reckoned thingsconsidered, performance. most brilliant France, Poland, Russia, and the Balkans were in devastatedand millionsof tons of shippingwere American diplomacywas equally effective countries dealing with the Allies. When Wilson com- lostat sea. The peopleof all thewarring with the in Europe suffered hardshipson a scale hitherto municatedto them his correspondence to ac- unknown. Until the greaterlosses and suffering they were reluctant German government, cept the Fourteen Points, but Wilson's repre- of the Second World War had to be endured,it that, was believedthathumanpatience had beenpushed in Paris, ColonelHouse, threatened sentative and the United States mightnegoti- to the limit. In the minds of governments in case of refusal, were ate a separate peace with Germany. Whether people alike the losses and the sufferings by the belief,or at least the hope, that to say this or did it on his justified House was authorized was the necessary preliminariesto the were they the effect but clear; not is responsibility own magical: the Allies acceptedthe FourteenPoints, New and BetterWorld thatwas to emergefrom whether with two reservations. The American com- thewar. When,later,it becamedoubtful mander, General Pershing,was opposed to an a better world had emerged, many asked the but the Britishand Frenchcommanders question whetherit would not have been wiser, armistice, to have the war to a finish, favoredit, and Marshal Foch, the commander-in- instead of fighting peace. That was Wila compromise chief,asserted that if the Germansaccepted his negotiated conditions,they would be rendered powerless. son's originalidea, the explanationof his phrase victory." It was only afterGerWilson,forthe onlytime,did not back up Persh- "peace without him at the beginning double-crossed had many accept did The Germans Foch. ing and followed and the war came to an end on of 1917 that he swung over to the view that the Allied terms, Germanyhad to be beaten down. When the November11, 1918. proposedpeace negotiations Or ratherit came almost to an end. During Germangovernment Habsburg,and Hohenzollern, of the end 1916, at 1918 Allied troops had landed on Russian soil and the thrones their upon sat still Romanov Siberia. at Archangel,in the Caucasus and in been not had society European of framework to was expeditions these of The alleged object had notyetcometo power Communism but the shattered; against Germany, Allied interests protect as made known regardedthemas directed in Russia. But theGermanterms, government Bolshevist termsof comnot the were to Wilson, secretly against itselfand it broke off relationswith the as publicly terms, Allied were the Nor promise. Allies. In October, however,as the war was What Wilson of the terms compromise. stated, adnearing its end, the Bolshevist government had he been able to mighthave accomplished, dressed itselfto Wilson and proposed negotia- play his hand, no one can say. So it came about tions. No answerwas sentto thiscommunication. thatthe war was fought to a finish. The Central But the armisticedid require Germanyto de- Powers were overwhelmed, and, when the Allied and to with- governments nouncethe Treaty of Brest-Litovsk assembledat Paris in January1919, draw its troopsfromRussia. The Allies hoped to makepeace and to createthe New World,they that the Bolshevistregimewould be overthrown had pretty mucha freehand. (for civil war was already raging in Russia) The world in which we live derives directly to safeguardtheirrelations fromthe First World War. In the firstplace, and theywere trying with a future"white" regime. Thus at the end the peace treatiesconcludedafterthe war redrew of the war, the positionof Russia remainedun- the map of Europe west of Russia in revolutionary style. Whether this was wisely done has certain. except in The war of 1914-1918 was the bloodiestand been disputedever since; nevertheless, War. World the Second it survived Exact a fewdetails, most costlyyet foughtin moderntimes. set of the states most Eastern in Europe, Even and, figuresof the casualties are not obtainable boundtheir even 1919 still though exist, after to up is safe It matter. not on so vast a scale, do say thatabout ten millionwere killed,something arieshave beenmuchchangedby the SovietUnion

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since 1945. Secondly, the First World War destroyed the balance of power as it had existed in Europe since the Congress of Vienna, and neitherin the twentyyears between the First and Second World Wars nor after the latter strugglehas a real balance been set up. In the twenties and thirties no balance was possible because Soviet Russia had in large measureretired from European affairs; no balance is possible todaybecause Soviet Russia is now more power-

ful than the rest of Europe combined. Thirdly, the tsaristregime the First World War destroyed in Russia and paved the way for the establishment of Communism, which today presentsthe greatest problem to Europe and thewholeWestern world. It is for these reasons that I have ventured today to recall to you some of the most important aspectsof the war of 1914-1918 which, conflict that up to thattime,was the mostterrible the modernworld had witnessed.

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