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Armisticein Korea one war.

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TEXAS

A&M LJNTVERSITY

MAY 291967
DOCUMENTS

June 67

UNITEII !WES ARMY IXIMM#ND/lND 6ENERAL STAFf tXlLtE6E, FORT LMWWOR?H, NANSAS

80MMAHDMI Major ASSSTARF General Michael S. Davhon

COMMANDANT ZMaadier General Robert C. Taber

The Military Review is published by the United States Army Command and Gener~ Staff College in close association with the United States Army War College. It provides i forum for the expression of military thought on national and military strategy, natiom security affairs, and on doctrine with emphasis at the division and higher levels of commati ,

Military Review

Professional Journal of the US Army

Neutrality and Armistica in Korea Soviet Aid to Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Martin Blumensort . . Albert Parry 3
13
23
30

. . . . .

Clausewiti on Limited War Forecast All. 2000 . .

. William D. Franklin

COL Richard S. Ware; Jr., USA

An MRSpecial Feature
6adsden Village . .

. .

. COL Mason J. Young, Jr., USA . . . . . . . Hoyt Lemons

and Leonard E. Wood

40

Environmental Research on Nigh Elevations

45
51
59
B4
72
82
89
97
103

The Commander and the Computer Thailand: Another Vietnam? . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . .

. . .

MAJ Daniel K. Malone, USA . Donald E. Nuechterlein

. . . . , .

Tribal Cttltures and Communism Nuclear Proliferation . , . . . . . . . . . .

COL Bernard B. Sapp, USA

MG W. G. F. Jackson, British Army . . . . . . . Victor Bator

One WarTwo Vietnams Tha Inner Soldier Miiitery Notes ~ilitary Books . .. . . . .

. . , . .

MAJ Eugene W. Massengale, USA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . .

. .

. .

. .

Iii

The VIEWS expressed in this ma eaine ASETHEAUTHORS and not neceaasrilythose of the f Staff Collage. Armyor the Command and Genera

E#t@iacikf COLW

J. Da18ney

AuuJate E$ttaf COLGewge S< Pappas Army war colleg13

Asaiatmt
Miter

LTC A. Leroy Covey

FMures Edltar LTC Charles A Gatzka
Prodnctios

Edttor

Helen M. Hall Spanlalt-AasaricarrEditor M&J Juan Horti%Merly BraItltstr Editors LTC Paulo A F. Viana LTC Samuel T. T. Primo Pubitc#ties (ltftcer MAJ Norman C. Murray Art and DaaJgo Charles A. Moore Donald L Thomas

MILITARY REVIFW-Publlsh8d monthly by the U. S. km Canmandand GeneralStaffCollege, FortLeav de for rhrtingof this publication hea :z:;2F$H3%zFs2?rEkY,iPhY Is& Sacamklass postage id at Fort Lqnwert& Kansas.subacriptionrak $4.00(UScurrencyi a r K22FkYa?u&Gi?;L%%$a?M f$-~ti&E?d2:G;: w eante. waaa s@srI@im mail to tfn B@ DeP*@ u. s. Am ~ WJ G~eml ~ff Collage,Fort LeavamvM, Kansas66027. r

.,. .

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The Military Review announces the selection REVIEW of the following AWARD article from the April 1967 issue as a MILITARY ARTICLE:

Ground Warfare in V]etnam

Anthony Harngan

the men, equipment, and the battles of the Viet The author describes namese War. He concludes that the essentials for victory are the age-old qualities of weil-traindd and worthy ground forces, familiarity with per sonal weapons, physical conditioning for combat, leadership at all levels, andthe will to win that is born of the proud traditions of an Army mind ful of the concepts of duty, honor, and country.

COMING:
Lieutenant Colonel Joseph K. Bratton, in <Regional War Strategy in the 1970s, writes that tbe 1970s will be a critical decade with the worldwide struggle for power accelerating to unpreeedented intensity. He expeets military strength to be employed more frequently in a threatening role in support of policy, with US policy continuing to be opposed by the philosophy of @orld communism. Robert D. Miewald, in Military Managerafl discusses military administrative thought and some of the great military writers. He expresses disappointment that relevant writings of US Army officers have not heen incorporated into the mainstream of administrative science, for he feels that officers have been at least 8s advanced in the management of men as their civilian counterparts.

IUeutrctlityand Armistice in Korea

Martin Blumenson

ONFRONTATION, the act of facing a hostile adversary, has been a constant factor in the postWorld War II period. The reality re mains present and threatening al though the loci have shifted, the is sues have changed, and the hostility has taken many forms, ranging over a wide spectrum of intensity. The threat operates on all nations, for the bipolarization of world power has created forcee that pull in various dlreetione. Although alignments move and groups split, the problem for smaller natione to remain neutral hae become more complicated. Their de sire. to remain uncommitted ia even more difficult, if not impossible, to attain. The pressuree, centrifugal and centripetal, are simply too strong to resist. Bipolarization and confrontation are old stories, but the major impulsee they generate tend to ohecure their effects on nations that have no wish to be caught up in tbe struggle. June1967

The arrangements made to restore some kind of peace in Korea and how they were carried out to preeerve an uneasy truce illuminate the problem faced not only by the smaller nations, but also by would-be neutrale. They foreshadow some of the complexities hampering negotiations today for a settlement in southeast Asia. On 27 JUIY 1953 the belligerents in Korea signed an armistice bringing an end to three yezre of fighting and two yeare of often frustrating nego tiation. On the same day, the 16 United Nation member natione that had cent combat forces to Korea is sued a joint declaration-they would tolerate, they said, no renewed Com munist aggression. The declaration reflected miegivinge over the ability of the agreement to keep the peace. Yet the provisioiie re flected, in large part, the United Na tione Command (UNC) demands. The, demarcation line corresponded to the battleline, a demilitarized zone existed, 3

KOKEAK MI!ISliCE ofthe armed forces in Korea was prohibited, reasonably aatiafaetory arrangements were de signed to insure iMpdiOII, and no priaonem of war were repatriated fomibty against their desire. One UNC position had failed to be accepted, and that was the curtdmerrt of the right to racanatmct and rehabilitate air tlelda. DlalIeeBat Sebariar Some UNC ol?icere doubted pri vately the eftieacy of the armistice agreement. Long-term frustrations at the conference table led them to ax fk?ct similar conditions during the pe riod of enforcing the truce. Incidents eecurring during the negotiation im plied a continuation of dishonest be havior on the part of the Communists. They had deliberately violated neutral sonss, faked evidence and coached witnesses. Furthermore, their general intransigence and their practice of launching bitter and irrational denun ciations were hardly conducive to co operation. And, finally, it appenred im passible for inspection teams to pre vent a Communist military buildup. According to the armiatice agree mentwhich epelled out in great da WI1 the composition of groupe, their functions, authorities, and procedures the senior military commander of Martin Blumsnmn, Staff Historian with the Ofie of the Chief of MiU tarII Hi.stor#, Department of the ATMII, Washington, holde advanced degreee in History from Bucknd and Harvard Universities. The authdr of numerous artfcles in miMaW a&his taricel jatwnale. his recant book Kae eerine Paae, is ~eviewed in the ~7i tmy Books Section of thie &zeue. His articla :TZOrI &rmaniee or @W?*l]~aS the MILXTARY REVIEW Award A&le for the April 1966 &ewe. 4
the rfdnforccment

the UNC and of the Cammunist com mand formed the Miiitary Armistice Commission. This body had the re sponsibility for carrying out the pro vision of tbe truce. Reporting to thh commission of bal ligerenta, and, therefo~ subordinate to them, was a Neutral Nations Su pervisory Commission (NNSC) .com posed of four senior ofiera-two ap pointed by the neutral nations nomi nated by the UNC and two by the nations named by the Communists. The central headquarter of the NNSC included commimioners, altar. nate conuniesionere, a secretariat, staff assistants, administrators, and interpreters. Drivera, clerks, commu. nicatiorre epecialiata, together with fa cilities and equipment, were to he fur. niched by the belligerents although the NNSC could provide additional pcr eonnel of the came neutral nationali ties Neutral Inspection Teams The principal tack of the NNSC was to supervise and inepect the ar rivale and departure of personnel and combat materiel in Korea in order to insure the continuing equilibrium of the military strength exieting on the date of the armistice agreement. Since the opposing aides had pledged that they would rotate trcmpe and ra place equipment only through certain designated ports of entry and depar ture, the NNSC would operate by means of Neutral Nations Inspection Taams (NNIT) etetioned at those ports-five in North Korea and the came number in South Korea. Ten additional mobile inspection teams would he held in reserve to in vestigate alleged violations elsewhere, violations reported by the belligerents. Each team would have no less than four members, two from each eide.
Military Review -. .. ... . .. . . ....-b.ti~

L-..

KOREAN ASMISTICE NNIT reports to the NNSC were to be submitted from the team ae a wholq but, in the absence of agreement among teem members, individuals could submit .reporte w~lch would have no official statue. The NNSC was to forward copies of all NNIT reports to the Militem Armistice Commission cation between the Swiss-Swedieh and Cmch-Polieh elements until they met in Korea. The binetional groups then discovered that their organizations were quite different, both in numbers and in concept. The Swedec and Swiss envisioned small inrmection teams usin= facili-

Confrontation at Panmunjom over s violation of the Koraen Armistice Agreement furnished by the Communist in North of evaluating all reports and forwarding ite own findinge to the commission. . Korea and by the UNC in South Korea. Each of their groups totaled 80 The Swedish and Swiss Govern pereone. The Cseche and Polce counted ment drew up eimilar organizetione, on receiving little support from the and both groups traveled together belligerence, and they had brought across the United States and Japan nearly self-sufficient gronps, each num to Korea. The Czech and Polish Gov bering 299 individuals. errunenta created contirtgenta which Tbe NNSC met on 1 Auguet 1953 traveled together acroae the USSR and Ch]na to Korea. in an atmosphere of great cordiality Swedieh and Swies members of the ,, which began to dissolve ae early as the eccond ec@ion, when the members NNSC had coneulted American au atartcd to argue, with incr~ing heat, thorities; Polish and Czech members over matters of security, transporta bed been in touch with Chinaee and, tion, communications, supply, and North Korean officials. There was no general procedures. prior coordination or even communiJme 1H7

KOREAN ARMISTICE

The Czechs and Poles disliked the arrangement made by the UNC and insisted on the right to carry weap ons, to drive their own vehicles, to take photographs as they wished, and to move without security guards. The Swiss and Swedes made no protest over Czech and Polish use of their own transportation and communications personnel and equipment, but insisted that all members of the NNSC take their meals together as a demonstra. tion and reminder of tbe corporate na ture of their task. Conditions Vasy The differing concepts of the neu tral nations stemmed, in part, from the very different conditions in North and South Korea. In the south, many Koreans in crowded cities publicly ex pressed hostility to the Czechs and Poles, held demonstrations against their presence, threatened violence, and made several attempts against the lives of team members who, they charged, were spies and eaboteurs, The strict seeurity measures im posed by the UNC to protect the neu tral nations members provoked re sentment from the Poles ,and Czechs who demanded full protection and, at the same time, the freedom of move ment and other privileges normally ac corded diplomatic personnel. In the north where war destruction was far more severe, and a sparse and disciplined, perhaps apathetic, civilian population made no hostile demonstra tions, the Communist command im pesed stringent aeeurity measures. In that land of primitive facilities and services where communications and transportation were uncertain and slow, the vehicles and drivers, radios and operators brought by the Czechs and Poles, while superfluous in South Korea, were advantageous. 6 L..-..-.

There were also procedural discrep ancies between the two parts of the country. In South Korea, the UNC submitted daily reports to the NNITs stationed at the designated ports. Made available at least 24 hours in advance of scheduled movements, these reports showed the personnel and combat materiel entering and leav ing Korea and made it possible for the teams to inspect and to make sur prise spot checks se they pleased. In North Korea, the NNITa had nothing to do for the first seven weeks after their arrival. The Communist command, perhaps because it lacked the administrative sophktkztion and machinery of the UNC, submitted no reports of entering or departing per sonnel or equipment. Subsequent re ports were patently incomplete, for it was obviously impossible to maintah and sustain the armed forces in North Korea with the small movements re ported, particularly in that area de void of war production capacity.
Constant Disagraemsnt

These differences soon developed into sharply contrasting outlooks aud attitudes that led to almost constant disagreement between the Swedea apd Swiss on the one hand and the Czechs and Poles on the other. Unable to agree on messages and reports, teem mem bers invariably filed separate infor mational dispatches that were widely different in context and often com pletely contradictory. The defection of a Polish interpreter in September 1953, at the beginning of the NNSC operations, did little to improve rela tions, patilcularly when the Poles and Czechs accused the UNC of kidnap ping. The Swedee and Swiss pointed out that the inspection teams in South Korea were receiving adequate inforMiliiry

Review &

KOREAN ARMISTICE

mation on shipments and had accese to records of movements while the teams in the north had no control over en tries and departures because they were kept in ignorrmce. When the Commu nist command refused or was unable to improve ite reporting procedures in North Korea, the Swedish and Swies members of the NNSC prevailed upen the UNC to change its methods in South Korea to conform with those in the north. Over the violent opposition of Czechs and Poles, the Swiss and Swedee accepted lessened control and supervision in Sonth Korea in the in terest of fairness-to secure approxi mately equal treatment and similar inspection procedures for both sides. Otherwise, they maintained, the die simila;lties gave advantage to the Communist command and imposed a handicap on the UNC. Escessive Oelays Additional difficulties coon arose. The mobile inspection teams could visit other than the designated ports only if all the neutral nationa agreed on the neeeasity for an inspection and only if the eide charged with the vio lation assisted and cooperated in the investigation. Thus, argument withh the NNSC often prevented inspection and usually resulted in, exceseive de lays in getting an investigation under way. During one period of 16 months, all the mobile teams were inactive be cause the NNSC, despite requests by both belligerence, was unable to agree on the need of an investigation of an alleged violation. The strong identification of Czechs an! Poles with the Communist com mand eventually produced strong leaninge on the part of Swedes and Swiee toward the UNC. An unbridge able gulf separated the two binational lone 1ss7

groupa. On at Ieaet foui occaeions, when the UNC requested investiga tions of alleged violations in North Korea, the Poles and Czeche rejected the requeste ae unreasonable, con trary to the proviaione of the Armis tice Agre~ent, and exceeding the scope of the Agreement. Opposite Sides In the conduct of inveatigationa, in the facta revealed, in the competency and thoroughness of the investigation, in the interpretation of the evidence considered, and in the findings, con clusions, and subsequent reporta ren dered, the Czechs and Poiee were on jJi;site sidea from the Swedes and

When the Communiet commander reported an alleged UNC violation, the Czeche and Poles were quick to agree that the complaint was justified and that the testimony of UNC witnesses to the contrary was untrustworthy. The Swedes and Swiss tended to con clude that Communist complaints of UNC behavior were greatly exagger ated, imprecise, or untrue. Investigation of an alleged UNC vi- elation of airapace in North Korea produced two dissimilar reports. The Czechs and Poles confirmed the viola .tion as charged; the Swedes and Swiss found thetestimony teo pat, the wit neseee coached, and the charge ludi crous on technical grounde. The CzechPolish report: On the bwa of thorerkgh inspection
. . . hearings of wtnesses and. . . a
mticulanalgaisof the whole mutcrial
presented. . . combat aircraft of the
VNC 8ide violated the a$rspace.
The Swedish-Swiss report: A coherent evaluation of tlLe whole material of both eidee showe thut the \ charge . . . not only must be CO?W{CL ered ae not proved, but there are aem- 1 .-.

-.

KOREM

ARMISTICE

oue reasons b befieve that the ae8er tioice of this [Communist] side are in contradiction with the truth. When the UNC acsuead the Commu nist eomraend of having illegally in troduced combat aircraft into North Ko~ it submitted what seemed like irrefutable evidence in support of the charge-photos taken by pilots, radar surveillance dosumenta, and informa @\:,L>w . :+1 .. * -,:.,,,.:. ., ;2?:*%-%.+ - ,.., ~ ,$,, ,,*G .k:>, ,.~L-. T*: ... *.!*.:.-,. .. f ,: ..: ,., ; v, :>,. , ., :, 1 , ~.1>,.. . ..$..< ,.. + ,,, ~ ? 1u?...:---:.-.. ; ..{.,: . ,:, :;..,, . ;. . it. - . .,!.3 $, .,,.4.*...:; .::,. ,J. ,. ; *4. .?. ., ,., ,,. ., . ... l,.,:+Y.,r. --~~;+me< :* -~f-L. ~.... ,.. ,.. - q ~.. ,r.:.,,, , , ,..,...,,

command and, deprived of direct ob servation, could eorvclude onfy that the investigation was incomplete and the resdta were inconclusive. Their investigations in North Korea hampered by rafueafa and denials, the Swedee and Swiss put themselves on record se being: . . . not in a position to conduct the inveatigativn in a eu#ioiently thorough

tion furnished by a defecting Commu nist pilot. The Czechs and Polae ignored the photos, took no notice of the radar dosumenta, dismissed the defecting pilot as unimportant and unreliable, and concluded that all the UNC evi dence was untrustworthy and the untrue. The obviously charge Swedes and Swiss, denied permission to inspeet certain areas, refused doc uments requested from the Communist 8 &..

manner which could huve allowed reaching a convincing judgment, whether the charge made . . . ie justi fied or not. The Czechs and Poles responded by charging the same deniafa and refus afs in South Korea. Unable to reach unanimous agree ment as required by the armistice agreement, the mobile teams-despitx strenuous, meticulous, and time-eon suming effort-never proved or disMilitwyRWiOW

---

.. ..

KOREAN ARMISTICE

proved a single violation charged by either side. Since the NNSC could only discuss, dkagree, and argue over dif ferent interpretations and contradic tory data, the only conclusion it could make was that, accordhg to reports received from the inspection teams, neither eide had violated the armist ice agreement. Although Swedish and Swiss mem bers wrote a joint letter to the UNC to point out what they called the re grettable loopholes in the armietice agreement and proposed that the belIigerente reexamine the supervisory problem, the belligerence could reach no agreement. They were still at war.
Political Efforts Fail

Political efforts to end the war had failed. The Foreign Ministere of France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States met in Berlin from 15 January to 18 Feb ruary 1954. They agreed to hold a conference of representatives from the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the Chhese Peoples Republic, the Republic of Korea, the Peoples Democratic Republic of Ko rea, and other countries that had armed forcee in Korea and wished to attend. Thk conference at Geneva from 26 April to 15 June was unable to discover a peaceful way to unify Korea and withdraw the troope of foreign powers. The following September, the New China News Agency announced a vol untary, patilal withdrawal of Chinese troops from Korea. Movements began lets that month and continued for more than a year. By October 1955, nineteen divisions had paesed through the port of Sinuiju, inspected by a neutral nations team. Meanwhile, in December 1954 the United States had explicitly informed Slse1SS7

the Political Committee of the UN General Assembly of the difficulties obstructing the work of the neutral nations-there was no activity at three of the designated porte in North Korez and extremely limited trzllic at the other two; authorities in North Korea were aided and abetted by the Czeche and Poles; no train timetables or shipping documents were avqilable;. four rail lines linkiug China and North Korea crossed the border at points where inspection wae not specifically authorized; and there was no way to supervise air and maritime traffic. In short, there wae no parity in the su pervisory operation in tbe two parta of Korea. The supervisory machinery was paralyzed and ineffective. The delegates of the Soviet Union and of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic claimed this was not eo. They insisted that the NNSC wae perform ing a useful function and needed no reform. The supervisory machinery was sub stantially reduced in 1955. What re mained in operation was a ekeleton and nominal force.
Violations Apparent

-By then, Communist violations of tbe agreement were more than appar ent. Although the Communist com mand had nev r reported introducing combat aircra !?t into North Korea, eight MiG-15..%rcraft attacked, on 5 February 1955, several UNC planes performing a training mission over in ternational waters of the Yellow Sea. When preesed for an explanation, the ~ senior Communiet commander ad mitted inadvertently that the MWS were baaed in North Korea. Deepite the baeic concept of holding the military balance in Kore% the Communists resorted, as a senior UNC said candidly, to every poeeible eub 9

KORfAN ARMISTICE

terfuj& to avoid compliance. Their figures on personnel and materiel ship ments were incredibly false; they had no syetem or established procedures; they failed to use the designated porta; and they utillized pretext to cir cumvent inspection. Witbdrswal Requested Firmly convinced that a large mil itary buildup wae taking place in North Kores and that the Czech and Polish members of the inspecting teems in South Korea were primarily engaged in espionage, the UNC in May 1966 euepended those provisions of the armietice agreement that regu lated the activities of the NNSC. In the following month, the UNC re qumted the NNSC to withdraw ite teams ,from South Korea on the basis that the supervisory inspection ma chinery, se then constituted, was un workable. At the same time, the UNC promieed to continue to report to the NNSC honestly and fully all move ments of personnel and shipments of materiel. In the following year, the UNC stated categorically that the Commu nieta had given no indication of will ingness ta seek a political settlement of the Korean iesues and had, inetead, increased the eize of the armed forces. Since the armistice agreement had be come the sole instrument for zhain taining peace, comparable military etrengthe on both sides of the line comprised the only effective bar to renewed war. Citing figuree to show a Communist buildup, the UNC renounced ita obli gation to that part of the agreement concerned with restricting the num bers of the forces committed. Until the Communicate demonstrated their inten tion to comply with the armietice agreement, the UNC would have to 10
&..

build up ita own forcez to restore the balance es a guarantee of the stability of the truce until a tinal peaceful set tlement could be reached. In December 1957, Kim H-sung, Pre mier of North Korea, announced the final withdrawal of all Chinese troops. He took the occasion to charge the United States and the Republic of Ko rea with %yatematicdy wreckhrg the armistice agreement. Suggesting that all foreign nations withdraw their armed forces from Korea, he then proposed free elections through out the country, to be supervised by an organization formed of neutral nations. The Chinese Communist Govern ment echoed these sentiments in Oc tober 1958 and charged that the Amer icans and South Koreane: . . weed every poaeible mearw to n~if y all the etipulatiena in the Ko rean amnietice . . . cmwtantlg ob strzwted and eabotaged the work of the Neutrai Nations Inspection Team8, subjecting ite members to humiliation and threatening a..?te . . . frequently introduced van-we En& of wenpona iUegally.
Siiation Publicized

Blandly stating that the UNC hsd violated the agreement 792 times, the Chinese publicized the situation in thie way: The Mil$taw Armistice Cmnmizeien and the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams have conducted man~ investi gatimw into US-Syngnmn Rhee [Pre8 idant of the Republic of Korea] viola tion of the Armiat$ce Agreement. On each and evwy occasbn, the repre sentatives of the Ammcan eide have bean reduced to eztrarne embamass mant bg the witneseea and the iwefu~ abk emdwwe. . . . The Korenn-Chine8e aide Ire-z from the beginning .qtric MiliteIy Review

~,
KOREAN ARMISTICE

.,
abided bg and camed out the ~ovi aims of the Agreement. In the same-way that the war failed to resolve the issues of the confllct, the armietice terms failed to settle the issues of the truce. The belligerents remained in opposition, and the bi polarization imposed a similar split among the neutral nations.
Open-Armed Hostility

The armistice agreement, while bringing open-armed hostility to a close, simply perpetuated the basic disagreements. Neither belligerent trusted the other sufficiently to turn over control of the truce to so-celled neutrals. Both belligerence were thue parties to withholding power from the NNSC. Keeping in their own hande the right to supervise the implemen tation of the Armistice Agreement and to settle through negotiations any violations: the belligerents gave the NNSC only an informational func tion, denied it an executive role, and deprived it of the authority to punieh violators. They limited the NNSC geograph ically to the designated ports of entry and gave it no freedom of movement or initiative, no power to investigate the possibility of shipments being re routed to other ports. They sur rounded insptilon team members with guards to insure their personal protaetion and safety and thus fur ther restricted their independence. Finally, the belligerence imposed a thoroughgoing immobilization on the NNSC by requiring unanimo ,S action and by failing to provide a ti I th mem ber to break deadlocke. If the belligerence had been able to agrea on selecting a fifth member, they would probably have bean able to eet tle more basic ieeuee. The claeeic tra dition of a neutral state disintegrated km leal

under the obligation of the neutral nationa to the aide appointing them. In accepting appointment to the NNSC, the Swiee Government pointed out to the United Statee that Switzer land considered herself tm be perma nently neutral, that ehe had renounced war as a meene of settling interna tional disputes, and wae impartial. Therefore, she could not be q repre sentative of either belligerent aide. Sweden had the same policy and view point.
Equality Maintained

The representatives of both these nations made continuous efforts to co. operate with the Poles and Csechs, trying to reach honest agreement and honest disagreement with them. Oc casionally differing between them selves and sometimes criticizing the UNC, the Swiss and Swedes found it noceasa~, in the face of the united and uncompromising stand of the Poles and Czechs, to take a strong op posing position in order to maintain some kind of parity of treatment ac corded to both eides. The Communist neutral nations were unable to be neutral, impartial, and objective. Precommitted, they could not judge. They had no pubSic doubts over their role. UNC accusa tion were, per ae, groundleee fab rications while Communist command chargee were, a priori, proved and true. UNC accusations, they said, were slanderous charges, propaganda designed to deceive the public opinion of the world. The Communist command was al ways and unquestionably innocent. Not a single disagreement marred the accord betwean the Czeche and Poles during the period of the armistice su pervision, and not a single criticism of the Communist command was eo 11

KOREAN ARMISTICE

much as intimated. They followed a consistent policy to annoy, irritate, embarrass, and discredit the UNC while following a collateral policy of collueion with the Communiet com mand to conceal incriminating evi dence in North Korea. To expressions of Swedish and Swiss indignation and resentment, they replied that the Swedes and Swiss were dupes of the United Statee. The binatfonal composition of the NNSC reflected the division between the belligerents in Korea. In the ab sence of a cleer-cut victory on the bat tlefield, the stalemate continuedin other terms. Agreement wss as diffi cult to reach during the truce as it had been during the war. The belligerents, not the neutral na

tions, held the power to regulate the armistice. The weapon they held was the implicit threat of using the mili tary forcee they controlled. Neither side hae choeen to make thbr decision thus far, apparently beeeuee of a tacit understanding that the relatke mili tary balance remains unchanged. The Korean Armistice Agreement and the responses it hae provoked and the preesuree it hae generated have been prompted and conditioned not only by local factors, but also by forces outeide the immediate framework of the Korean Conflict. The battleground for contending ideologies ie every where, and it is difficult to be neutral on a battlefield. It is difficult also to find agreement when reciprocal good faith may turn out to be an illusion.

The Repubfic ef Korea is making remarkable economic pregress both in dustrially and in agricultural production. At the same tima it continues to be a major contribute to the security ef free Asia. Its treofrs stand shoulder to shoulder with ours not only on the northern rampart of freedom but on the neutbern frent. SecretarV of State Dean Rwek

12

Milltary RwiW

Soviet Aid to Vietnam

Albert Parry

AST summer, Ivan Shchedrov of Pravda accompanied a Viet Cong unit es it made its way through the South Vk$mameee jungle some 35 miles northwest of Saigon. He wrote in Pr&vdQ about hie experience al though without revealing many vital feete. More recently, two Soviet mo , tion-picture eameremen, Oleg Artaeu-

Iov and Vledlmir Komarov, returned from South Vietnam where for weeks they lived and traveled with the guer rillas of the Mekong Deltas swamps and rice paddies. In September 1966, Komsorno18kaya Pravda ran four long ati]clee on Art seulovs adventures. In late October and early November, Komarov wrote 13

h lm7 &,.

SOVIET AIO

of his South Vietnam impressions in Zzve@@. Judging from the 16 pho tos in both papers, all interesting and some forceful despite their murky re production, the two Soviets brought back a notable pictorial haul. SoYirJt Pmssrlc9 It is from reports like these that one gets an impression of the growing Soviet presence in Vietnam. The pic ture can be tilled out by bita and pieces of information, some casual and scattered yet significant, in the Sdviet and other East European press; the monitored texts of tbe surprisingly frequent broadcasts on the subject emanating from sundry East Euro pean radio stations; and the reports on the topic reaching us from a wide range of non-Communist diplomata, soldiers, seamen, newsmen, travelers, and other observers in southeast Asia. And one thing is clear: the Sovieta are stepping up their aid to Vietnam. The cheer logistics of getting aid and supplies into the country is a problem for the Soviet Union. Increas ingly, she is sending them via the 7,500-mile sealanes from Eastern Eu rope instead of relying on dubious Chinese cooperation in allowing men and materiel to proceed overland. Thi8 article waa dige8ted from the on-gird, published in THE REPOItTEE, 1.9 January 1967. Copyrighted @ 1967 by The Re porter Magazine Company. Dr. P(tw ie PTOfS880Tof &8 dan (%iliration and Language and Chah-mun of the Department of Rue8ian Studies at Colgate Univer8itg, Hamilten, New York. He is the author of the books Ruesiae Rockets and Missiles and The New Claes Divided: Sci ence and Technology Veraus Com munism.

Until recently, while the bulk of Soviet aid still arrived by rail and truck via Communist China, each US raid on the Vietnamese made leading south fmm the Chinese border gave Peking one more excuse to halt or elow down the Soviet shipments, then to blame the Soviets for the sluggieh trickle. Chief among Peking>e aime was to force Moscow to increase its seaborne aid and thus cause a US blockade of tbe Soviet sea traffic se well ae US raids on the port of Hai phong. Such a development, the Chi nese hoped, would lead to a break be tween Moscow and Washington. No Blockade In spite of come angry insistence in the Congrese and elsewhere in the United States, there ia no blockade so far. But the United States did start bombing the outskirts of Haiphong, and her shell and shot have fallen close to the Soviet ships; a few Soviet sea men have been wounded or injured. Also, US naval units insistently fol low and query, by semaphore, Commu nist vessels en route to Vietnam. Nevertheless, despite a few angry notes of diplomatic protest, the Se vieta are relieved that the United States has not resorted to anything like the etringent sea-and-air meae. ures of the 1962 Cuban crisie, and they continue to increase supplies ti North Vietnam by sea. It is not so generally known thai the Chinese, too, are in this eea com merce with North Vietnam. In mid. August 1966, word from Hong Kona indicated that the so-celled SOcialid traffic coming into Haiphong consieted in an average month of 10 to 15 Red Chinese ships in addition to six tc eight Soviet vessele and five from other Eastern European nationa, cd ship bringing from 6,000 to 10,OM

Militers
asvkr

SOWET AIO

tone of cargo. The Soviet Government, however, claims a larger share of tbie sea trrdlic to Haiphong. Last August, it declsred that more than half of all the ships thert entering Haiphong were of Soviet regietry. Odessa-BfammaY as the Soviets fondly call the port, is the foremost source of s11 this traffic. An EnglishIanguage Imoadcaet from Moeeuw to southern Asia on 23 December 1965 exulted: Odessa ia the biggest port oa th8 Black Sea. It8 busiest rovte h the one leading to Haipheng. A conetant caravan of big merchant 8hip8 is pllI ing this lane. At tbe empires eastern end, Vladi vostok plays a role too. The local ste vedores morale is kept up by frequent rallies. Sevist Saiiors Assist Official Soviet statements praise So viet sailors for helping North Viet name Iongehoremen unload their ships in record time. It may be surmised, however, that part of the seamena eagerness to help eteme from a desire to cut short their own dangerous stay in North Vietnams ports. Unofficial accounts from Soviet ports tend to confirm this. Not only reasons of se curity but also of the seamens mo rale seem to be involved in the prac. tice whereby some Soviet ships are announced ae eailing for Letin-Amer ican deetinatione-until they reseh tbe Mediterranean, where the crewe are told that the course has been changed from Havana to Haiphong. The overland route acroes Cldna ie by no means abandoned even if it no longer carries se much of the So viet aid as before. The hletory of the dispute over Soviet arms has been Colorful. Early in 1965, Hanoi urgeritly asked

Moscow to help with antiaircraft de fenses. Ho Chi-minh wanted not only gune, but also surface-to-air missilee. In February 1965, the Soviets agreed tu send the first important shipments of weapone and groups of technicians, on the condition that China clear their passage. China demanded the right of inspection. The Soviets agreed, but began to complain that China took her time about the job. China c6untered that she was sending the Soviet mili tary loads and pereonnel across her soil with all paesible dispatch, but that the Soviet materiel sent to Vietnam was either obsolete or so damaged that it was useless.
Materiel Copied

The Soviets were accused of using this aid to Vietnam as a handy chance to clear damaged materiel from their warehouses. Moscow retorted that the Chinese often removed for themselves the best of the Soviet arms destined for Hanoi. A contact in Weebington said that much of the delay in Soviet shipments wae due to the Chhese practice of copying, rather than keep ing, certain piecee of Soviet equip ment. He said: In some caees the Soviet equipment -was indeed damaged, but it was dam aged by the Chineee experts, who werent too expert. Ths# didnt knew how to-reassemble the Soviet materiel after taking it apart for eop@ng. In March 1966, in reply to Chinese charges that the Soviet help to Hanoi was all too scant, the MOSCOW kders sent a confidential letter to all fra ternal Communist Partiee. Carefully Ieeked out to the world at large via the East German Connuuniete, the letter etressed that in 1965 North> Vietnam received from the Soviet Union arms and military equipment worth 556 mil lion dollars. The list included missile 15

.1

hae 1*7

; SO!fiET AID

installations and antiaircraft guns, MiGs and other aircraft, tanks, coastal atilllery, and small warships. On 21 April 1966, MarshaI Rodion Y. Malinovsky, the Soviet Defense Minister, delivered a public speech in which he again accused Communist China of obstructing Soviet aid on

The truth seems to be that the Chi nese railroads and truck roads are generally inadequate to the sudden burden of Soviet shipments. The freight cars are poorly ballasted; the trains are small and slow. Furtber more, the changes from the broad So viet and Outer Mongolian gauge of

The hrisieet route from Odessa, the largest port on the Blsck See, is the one leading to Iiaiphong her overland route to North Vietnam. In an indignant rejoinder of 3 May, Pekings Foreign Ministry claimed that, from February 1966 when the Vietnam conflict was firet seriously stepped up, to the end of that year, the Soviet Union shipped to Hanoi across China a total of 48,000 tons of war materiela pittance, in Pekbrgs scornful opinion. Peking insisted that it was helping, not hindering, Soviet aid. Furthermore, the Chinese claimed that in one period they provided 1,780 Chinese freight cars, of which the So viets used only 666.
16 ~-... . .. ---. . -.. .. . ,.

five feet to Chinas four feet eight and a half inches and then to North Viet nams even narrower roadbed involve a lot of lifting and shifting of the car bodies. Nevertheless, the Chinese have made an attempt to cope with the problems: it ie the well-disciplined and hard working railroad troops they sent to Ho Cbi-minh wbo keep the Vietnam ese part of the supply route going in the face of US raids. These are regu lar soldier-builders, In uniform, orga nized in divisions, but not armed, They repair tracke and brldgom nnd W&y A@s9 ...... -A

- -y
SOVIET Alll :

build alternative routes. Some have been reported to be laying out small airstrips near the border. A very few man the antiaircraft batteries guhrding North Vietnama main transport centers, but usually this teak is a jealously guarded pre rogative of the Vietnamese. Last July, officiale in Washington estimated the number of such Chinese roadbuild ers at from 30,000 to 40,000. In Au gust, the guese went up to 50,000 and in December to 100,000 (while the native Vietnamese busy on road work number a quarter million). Air Transport There is, of course, a third way of sending help to Hanoi: by air. But this would mean flying Soviet cargo planes over China, and. Pel@ng does not like this at all. It insists on clear ing each plane separately, rather than issuing a wholesale permit for over flight. And so the sea is more and more the answer. US reconnaissance planes flying over Haiphong have pho tographed more and more supplies be ing unloaded from Soviet ahipa-not only peaceful machinery, but also mis siles and launching equipment, as well as antiaircraft guns. Since the fall of 1965, the number of antiaircraft guns in North Viet nam has risen from 1,500 to at least 5,000; one unofficial estimate in Wash ington puts tbe figure at 7,000. In the fall of 1965, there were only four North Vietnamese batteries firing surface-to-air missilee. By early Oc tober 1966, this number had risen to 26 or 30, each with eix launchere. There were then some 130 sites from which the batteries could operate; 20 percent were occupied and active at any given time. An interesting domestic radio broadcast in Czech, devoted, in part, hne 1967

to the military problems. in Vietnam, wae monitored in the West as it came out of Prague Iaat 29 July. Czech offi cers were asked questions that ehowed dissatisfaction on the part of local Communists with the surface-to-air mieeile performance in Vietnam. One queetion wee:

Is there no more effective anti-air craft defenee in eziste?we that wonld pvevent U.S. aircraft from bombing North Vietnam, and ?tave the socialist states [meaning Czechoslovakia, of course] such meaws ? In reply, Lieutenant Colonel Vladi mir Novak of the Czech Military Acad emy reassured the listeners that, nat urally, Czech radar and missile de fenses were better. He explained:
Thie is because orw defense is harr dled by me?t who have had years of
training awd aleo. because we have a
perfect ground warning eystem of
long standing. This dues not eziet in
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
I wonld nut sag that the number of
Ameracan planes brought down is low.
Several dozew have been shot down.
Many more hnve been ehot dovnr by
artiUeW and some by aircraft. The
. reasmc is that Tockets demaud gears of expemence and tTaining. Inoiden taUg, it is wrong to assume that the introductiw of missiles means the end of anti-aircraft artilleqt. Missilee are too expeneive and costly to be ueed againet just any aircraft. They are used against aimv-af t that are camyr ing pmticukntll ohgeroue bombs or attacking veru impovtant targets. For this reaeon it cannot be expected even in the future that this would change subetantiatly-tkut ?niest7ee would bc- , come the eels defense against air raid-r. Theg ars rather the excep tion. . . . 11

SOViET NO Thus, via Prague, we gamer one more hht that the Sovieta do not want to escalate the Vietnam war if they eon help it-and surely not by sending in a substantially greater number of surface-to-air missiles than they al ready have there, nor hy training far larger numbers of North Vietnamese otllcers and soldiers to operate those computers and launchers.
Sorht Rocket Men

language all their own4 wondrous mixture of Russian and Vletnameae words with technical terms. Both componen~ of the group learned to understand one another very well, said the Kraarwya Zvezdu correspondent in Hanoi.
Training in USSR

It ia believed in Washington that some of the Soviet military personnel assigned to surfeee-to-air missile sites in North Vietnam may have been wounded or even killed eince they serve beside their native pupils in com bat conditions. The Soviet experts train their etudents in or near Hanoi, then go with them to the, actual battle stations to see how they do under fire. More coaching follows on the spot, so it ii almost inevitable that the Soviet officers and soldiers actually man the radar screens and the missile-launch ing devices, at least in the initial stages of instruction. According to Kraenaga Zvezdn, the Soviet rocket mens working day in Vietnam officially lasts 13 hoursun officially, far longer. The extra time is devoted to individual consulta tion between the Soviet teachers and their charges. The trouble at first was that some of the you,ng Vietnam ese soldiere turned out to be deficient not only in technical knowledge needed for radar operation and missile firing, but also in general education: as the Soviete gently put it. And so the spare hours were used to teach the Vletnameee their mathe matics, chemistry, and elements of electrotechnology. The group had native Vietnamese on the staff who spoke Russian, but many of the teach ers and their pupils %vorked out a 18

Much of the Soviet training of the Vletnameee goes on amid safer cir cumstances-in the Soviet Union. The sheer numerical record is impressive. Speaking in Mandarin te Chine on 16 March 1966, Radio Moscow boasted that at the time nearly 3,000 young Vietnamese men and women were studying in the Soviet Union, and that while a total of 2,300 Soviet experta worked in North Vietnam in the years 1965-64, some 4,500 Vietqamege ex perts had been trained in the Soviet colleges and universities by the spring of 1966. In the eummer and fall of 1966, these Vietnamese included enrollees in Odessas higher Maritime Engineer ing Scheel, training to be captilns and engineers of North Vietnams Fleet. Nor would the Soviet Union let China remain the sole patron of Viet nams railroad construction: anmng recent arrivals in Moscow are a group of North Vietnamese young men and women studying at the Inetitute of Railroad Transport Engineere. The full course lasts six years, and one might suppose that thk projett representa long-range Soviet plana of aid to Hanoi. But Communiet hietory is replete with eases of emergency graduation of experte long before the set dates. These young studenta may be flown back home any day. The most significant case of train ing involves the North Vietnamese air cadets now being taught by Soviet Air Force veterans to fly supersonic MilitwyReviM

SOVIET AIO

~iG-21 jets. One group of ~adets succcqds another at graduation ceremonies near Rostov-on-Don-at the Soviet Air Force School of Bataisk. Photos and motion pictures made public in the Soviet Union show wel1fed and smartly uniformed North Vietnamese cadets as they march or listen @ lacturee. The faces and fiu-

its unofficial estimate of the number of MiGs in Vietnam to 180 or even 200, the latest being some delta winged MiG-,l!lCs and MiG-ZID8. Also great is the need for interpreters to accompany the Soviet lacturers. A Soviet film recently released showed a Soviet military inatruator teaching North Vietnamese flying ca

Itemvi!l SA-2 (Gwdeline) missile. The number of surface.to-air missile batteries in North Viet nsm increased from four in the fall of 1985to 35 or 30 in October 1986. ures are youthful, but an official Soviet report reveals that at least a few of the trainees are seaeoned jungle fighters in their thirties. The need for flying cadets is urgent if we are to befieve tbe Western estimate of mid-October thst Ho Cbiminhs air force then conaistad of some 50 older MiG-15s and MiG-1 7s and 20 MiG-21s, but that the Sovieta were about to increase the number of the later modele. Indeed, in midDaeember, Western intelligence raised deta without any vieible aid from in terpreters. This apparently meant that either at least one of the Soviet in structors speaks fluent Vietnamese or some of the etudente learn Russian quickly. As Moscow sende its experts to Vietnam to help the natives in matters both military and peaceful, the gain is, of course, in the fact ,tbat such specialists return home with a vastly , expanded knowledge of Vietnam. Of an older yet very valuable vintage are 19

1 ho 1s7

SOVIET MO
those Soviete who leerned Vietnam and her ways and language in the 1940s and 1950s, and who, in fact, are veterans of the jungle warfare of that remote time.
Do$wters

Such a man is P1aton Skrzhinsky, 44 years old and a native of the Ukraine now residing in Moscow. After World War II he enlisted in the French Foreign Legion. But when the French shipped his unit to Saigon, Skrzhinsky made plans to desert. It took him a year to establish contacts with the guerrillas. In his new Viet minh ranks, he found other deserters from the French: one Austrian, two Germans, and several Algerians. He received a Vietnamese name, Than, meaning Ioyal One. He married a native girl, and they had a baby. By 1950 he commanded a guerrilla artil lery unit. He returned to Moscow in 1955 with his six-year-old Vietnamese daughter. For nearly 10 years he has been em ployed as an editor with Radio Mos cow, possibly helping with those broadcasts in Vietnamese to southeast Asia. Present-day survivors of such desertions from the French Foreign Legion include a Pole, a Czech, and an Eaat German. Most of this romantic group may still be used for whatever training, advising, or interpreting is required in their countries in connec tion with Vietnam. Of the peoples democracies con tributing to Ho Chi-minh today, East Germany is probably the most active. Military aid from Walter Ulbrichte government includes arms and elec tronic equipment specially made to stand up in tropical weather. Also in cluded are motorcycles and tilcycles which are so important for messenger service on North Vietnams war-torn

roads where automobiles cannot get through easily. Lest September, the writers union in Eeat Germany launched a fund drive to buy a thou sand bicycles as a gift to Hanoi. The money comes by setting aeide a per centage of the writers honoraria. The major part of Ho Chi-minhs medical supplies seems to come from East Germany, and a hundred East German doctors are reported to be serving in North Vietnam. In addi tion to the 800 Soviets reportedly al ready present in North Vietnam on air defense missions, some Eeet Ger. man officers and men are rumored to be employed in North Vietnams mis sile training. In goods and capital aid not directly of the war materiel kind, Ulbrichts government is thought to have delivered to Ho Chi-minh from June 1966 to October 1966 a total of four million dollars worth.
Economic Aid

But the blocs largest economic aid to and trade with Hanoi is, of course, ex tended by the Soviet Union. Gathered at a summit meeting in Moscow in mid-October 1966, the Soviet Union and her eight allies agreed to give about one billion dollars worth of add itional help to Hanoi in materiel and money, of which 800 million dollars are to come from the USSR. Contribu tions from the others are typified by the Polish pledge of 30 million dollars. Ingenious Soviet deals to help North Vietnam began in the middle 1950s, right after the Geneva division of the country, with the celebrated triangular deal. In this transaction, Burma, to pay for Soviet cement, de livered 150,000 tons of rice to Hai phong, thus, in Bernard B. Falls opin ion, saving North Vietnam from star. vation. The first Soviet engineer came to
hlilibwy Rsdew

.s

..
SOVIET AID
the Haiphong cement plant in Septem ber 1955, and it was he who showed the natives how tu dig up the ma chines buried by the retreating French. In November of that year, the first cement was produced, and by 1958 the output was twice as high as in the French era. In the summer of 1966, deepite US bombing raids, the Soviets claimed that production was three times as great. Although precise figures are diffi cult to obtain, it is eetimated that, in the 10 years through 1964, Soviet eeo nomic aid to North Vietnam totaled some 360 million dollars. It faltered somewhat in 1963 and 1964 when Ni kita S. Khrushchev apparently was reeigned to seeing the country in ChL nas orbh (in 1956-64, Chinas eco nomic aid to North Vietnam amounted to about 460 million dollars).
Sovist bstsrest Revived

trye power, mining, engineering, and technieel industries were all helped or run by the Soviet donors and advisors. From other Soviet sources we learn that the eeonomic division of the So viet Embassy in Hanoi is in charge of all this aid. It is claimed that the Hanoi machine-turd plant, severing 14 acres, is entirely fitted out with Soviet equipment. Forty Soviet engineers and technicians are aiding in the erection of a hydroelectric plant at Tkbak Ba.
A Dslicats Balance

However, Khrushchevs successors have revived the Soviet interest in Ho Chi-minh. Moscows exports to North Vietnam rose from 47.6 million dol lars in 1964 to more than 74.8 million in 1965-thk, of course, in addition to some 565 million dollars worth of arms sent in 1965 alone. The figures for 1966 promise to be stiii higher. In its German-1anguage broadcast to Germany on 21 June 1965, Radio Moscow declared that, of the funds that North Vietnam was then getting from all Soeiaiiet countries, nearly half -came from the Soviet Union. A third of this Soviet aid, the broadcast said, was given free of charge. Some 60 industrial enterprises had hy then been built or rebuilt with Soviet tech uieal aid. Such Soviet-assisted plants produced all of North Vietnams apa tite and superphosphates, about 90 percent of her coal, and more than half of her machine tools. The coun Jnne1S67

Whatever facts and figures the So viets officially reveal about their aid to North Vietnam are being made pub lic not in order to taunt tbe United States, but to impress Pekingand even more to refute to the rest of the Communist world the Chinese charges that Moscow is not helping Hanoi enough. Wherever possible, Moscow cites high-minded generalities rather than hard details. And this is not only for reasons of security, but also, most definitely, so as not to anger the United States too much. Yet Moscow is not equivocal about its part in the conflict, even if it al lote the quantities of arms it sends extremely gingerly. Obviously, the So viet Union wants neither the United States nor China to win. Still, she wants no third world war to result from tbe struggle in Vietnam. So her stream of arms is speeded up only after the United States escalates her involvement in one way or another, as sbe did in February 1965 by strik ing at North Vietnam, and last sum. mer by tdtting Haipbongs and Ha nois installations more direetly. The official word is that the Soviet Union and her East European alJies have offered to send volunteers to fight in North Vietnam, but that Hanoi bas 21

SOVETAID
politely and gratefully declined the offer. The chances are that, fearing still another escalation of the war, Moscow has, in fact, refrained from euch an offer, and that, for reasons of propaganda and diplomacy, it was agreed between Moscow and Hanoi that a fiction of offer and refusal would be maintained although not too loudly or repeatedly. An American colonel conversant with the situation put it this way: Hanoi wmdd like to get all thoee volunteers but doeent dare to a-sk for them. For were she to ask Rueeia and her allies, 8he WOUCW have to invite China, too, and this ehe wants to avoid. It8 one thing to tolerate those Chi neee railroad con8tnmtian m8n with no guns, but quite another to have a whole armg of Chine8e with weapons. No, not in North Vietnam. Informed US officiala feel that Ha noi does not fear the Soviets even if they come armed. And, perhaps, this is so, beesuse Hanoi knows that Mos cow is not eager to send armed men so far away to so many risks of greater conflicte. In fact, Moscow may yet return to its pre-October 1964 att itude even in economic matters. Its large and growing investment in North Vietnam may be curtailed if thinga calm down in southsaat Asia for instance, if China should relax in her pos&Mao Tee-tung phase and an accommodation with Maos more sensible successor became possible. . A Washington obeerver speculated: If thi8 happww, Khrushchev8 heir8 ~11 cOme to believe, as Khrushchev apparently did, that North Vietnam i8 after all too distnnt frO?tZRu88ia, and why not make a deal with Peking, 8xchanging, cay, that wonderful ma chine-tool plant in Hanoi for come far more de8ivable properties cloeer to home+n Shdciang, for instance?

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22 . .

Military Rwkll .*

CLAUSEWITZ

ON

LIMITED

WAR

William D. Franktin

HE strategic genius of Karl von Clausewitz is one that is often quoted, seldom read, and little understood. Many viewed classical strategy, aa interpreted by Claueewitz, as a Kaf kaesque landacape of violence and brutality, when, in actuality, it was a conscientious effort to tranelate the surrealistic tableau of war to the concrete reality of political intercourse. Clausewitz was eeeentially a student of war, and after his death his collected worke were pub lished in 10 volumes, the first three of which con tain his masterpiece Vent Kriege or On War. By the beginning of the 20th century, his influence had become so pervasive that his ideas, and aven hia phrases, had found their ww into the think ing and writhg of the general stzffe of all the great armiea of the world. The greateet contribution which he made to military thought was to show there can be no single, tactical pattern or strategic eyetem by which victory can be insured. Much of the blame for the misunderstanding of Clausewitz must rest with those individuals who read his startling sentences out of their context and without the qualification that invariably accompanied them. Karl von Clausewitz was born in 1780 and en tered the Prussian Army as an eneign in 1792. He served in the Rhine eamuaism of 1793-94 and then entered the Berlin Miiita;y Academy in 1801. He eerved in the Pruseian Army until the out break of the Russian campaign of 1812. He then transferred to the Russian Army, and, during Napoleon Bonapartee retreat from Moscow, he hna 1937 23

Cuusm negotiated the Convention of Taurog gen which led to the War of Libera tion. During his long military career, he was present at numerous historic battles whose raw material he distilled into his strategic theories. In 1=1 he died of cholera. Snalysis Unexcelled His penetrating analyeis of the rela tionship of war and policy has never been excelled and is, perhaps, more important today than when first ex pounded. Many are familiar with his statement that . . . war is an act of force, and to the application of the force there is no limit. The depreea ing result is that words like these have been construed as not only justifying ruthlessness in certain caaeq but ac tually advocating it ae the most nat ural form of warfare. This form of completely unre strained violence naturally fits into the theoretical framework of total thermonuclear conflict wherein de struction is the strategic object, but it is incompatible with a strategic con cept Of limited war. But was unre. strained violence the only alternative offered by Clausewitz ? It is interest ing to examine carefully exactly what Clausewitc meant when he indicated that war is a continuation of political intercourse, a carrying out of the same by other means. He actually drew an almost perfect blueprint of modernWiUiam D. Franklin is an Assistant Reeearch Ecmunniet in the Depart ment of Economise, Te$wa Transpor tation Institute, Texas A&M Vniver sitg, College Station, Texas. He. hokfa a B.S. degree in Hintorg and Econom ~ its, and an M.S. in Economice. He is ths author of Maokin&ra Heartland and Eaeafation Ratchet which ap peared in the November 1966 issue of the MILITAEYRmnaw. 24 day irregular operations, and his the ories have exerted tremendous influ ence on almost all major strategic thoughtboth that of tbe West and of the Communists. Clausewitz befieved that war is a serioue means to a serious end. It al ways arises from a political condition and is called forth by a political mo tive. It is, therefore, a political act. We have to think of war not as an independent thing, but as a political instrument. No war is begun, Clausewits thought, or at Ieaet no war should be begun if people acted wiselywithout first finding an answer to the question of what was to be a~lned by and in war. War never breaks out eudderdy, and its spreading is not the work of a moment. But we must sometimes choose war, and thus also make prep arations beforeband, because peace is not alwaye an acceptable answer. No Separation War can never be separated from political intercourse. It has, to be sure, its own grammar, but not its own logic. Wars are, in reality, only the manifestations of policy itself. Philosopher Immanuel Kant said that innocence is a splendid thing, only it baa the misfortune not to keep very well and to be easily misled. In an age like ours, states, classes, passions, and intereete clash in such confusion that war and not peace seems to be the natural order of things. nevertheless, War has, always caught Americans unprepared intel lectually, emotionally, and materially. This innocence, unfortunately, does not correlate with the harsh face of reality. Claueewitz goes out of his way to axplain that war is not made with an abstraction, but with a reality. The advantage of a neo-Clausewitzian

Military Review . ...--..=s

CI.AWWITZ\
type of analysis is a preservtilon of that elusive quality of reality. There is no doubt that Clausewitz was a reatist. AK civiliz~tione-the Greek city stetez no 1sss that the ItaSian cities of the Renaissance or the nationstates of Europe-have had the same task: to limit violence. The method the scope and character of the conflict until it would end in mutual nuclear destruction. Victory in limited war is not gained by putting the existence of the oP posing stat+-snd our own too-in is sue. It does not seek unconditional surrender. The aim of limited war is to stop the infringement upon our in tereeta. The aim of war, according to its inception, is always eupuosed to be the overtbrow of the enemy. Cbmse witz claimed that thk need not al ways imply the complete conquest of the enemys country. He felt that, if our opponent is to do our will, we must put him in a position more disadvan tageous to him than the eacrifice would be that we demanded.
Degrees of War

1
; ~

Karl von Clausewitz of the eecond half of the 20th cen tury is the differentiation between types of war. The fragmentation of the diplomatic field has a military equivalent in the diversity of wars possible in our time. Theory has, therefore, says Clausewitz, to con sider the nature of means and ends. Wkh the possession of thermonu clear weapons and means for their deliveW, victory, in one eense of tbe word, is no longer attahable. It is sometimas argued that limited war, which involves nuclear powere even indirectly, is impossible because each side, rather than loee, would expand IICB 1*7

If the aim of the military action is an equivalent for tbe political object, that action will, in general, diminish as the political object diminishes. The more the object comes to the front, the more this will be so. This explains how, according to Clausewitz, there csn be wars of all degrees from one of extermination down to a mere state of armed observation. Not every war admite of a complete decision and settlement. Discussion ,must contemplate a vaet spectrum of violence-et one end, the destruction which one thermonuclear power may hurl at another, to the hard and bitter fighting now involved in southeast Asia. War does not consiet in killing as many men as possible at the small est cost, nor is it merely reciprocal slaughter. Wars effect is more a kill ing of the enemys courage than of the enemys soldiers, but still blood is always its price. The aim of the West is not eimply to avoid war, but to do so without losing vital positions, without allow 25

CIAUSSWITZ ing the Communist giants to expand continuously into the rimlande. What combination of political and military meane will prevent total war and al low an effective conduct of diplomacy under thermonuclear condltione ? The conduct of the confllct in Vlet mun has followed a neo-Claueewitziap strategy patilcularly suited to condi tion of limited war. Clausewitz said that there were two thinge which, in practice, could take the place of the impossibility of further resistance ae motives for making pezca. The first was the improbability of success; the eeeond an excessive price to pay for it. A war need not, therefore, alwaye be fought out until one of the parties is overthrown.
Expenditure of Force

perative to find, a mode of operation and to create a psychological frame work in which our impetuosity does not transform time into an enemy ally. Henceforth, patience and subtlety must be ae important components of our strategy as power.
Tlrree-Part Strategy

Clausewitz apptied himself to the question of how to influence the en emys expenditure of strengththat is to say, how to raiee for him the price of euccess. He concluded there were three special ways of directly increasing the enemys expenditure of force. The first was invaeion; the see ond was to direct enterpriees prefer ably at thoee points which do the en emy the meet harm; and third, and by far the most important to Clauee witz, wae the wearing out of the en emy. The idea of wearing out in a struggle implies a gradual exhaustion of the physical powers and the will by the long continuance of action. Dr. Henry A. Kissingar has pointed out that no condition ehould be sought for which one is not willing to fight indefinitely, and that the eide which is willing to outwait its opponent which is Iese eager for a settlement -can tip the psychological balance whatever the outcome of the phyeical battle. In any concept of limited war, according to Dr. Kieeinger, it is im fs . ........ ., .

General William C. Westmoreland, US commander of military forces in Vietnam, says that our strategy in that conflict consists of three parts: eustained. operations against V]et Cong main-force and North Vietnam ese Army unite in South Vietnam; support of the government of %iet nams nationbuilding process, and the bombing campaign against militery targete in North Vietnam. According to General Westrnore land, The enemy thinks in terms of protracted conflict. He givee a fur ther indication of neo-C1aueewitzian concepts of a wearing out of the en emy by adding, . . . I am confident that we must gear ourselves for the long pull. The first eerioue attempt to blue print the characteristics of irregular operations was undertaken by Clause witz. An inner front was added h the outer front. He pointe out that, al though the influence on war of a sin gle inhabitant is barely perceptible the total influence of the inhabitants of a country in war is anything but imperceptible. Claueewitz believed that a resistance so widely distributed is not suited to great blowe requiring concentrated so tion in time and epace. Its action, like the process of evaporation, depends on the extent of the eurface exposed; the greater this ie, the greater the con tact. The condition under which Claueewitz thought insurgency could become effective were that: ,. Militerg Rsvkl . .. ..........-d

Ct.mmmz . The war is carried on. in the in terior of the country. It is not decided by a single ca tastrophe. . The theater of war embraces a considerable extent of country. The national character supports the measures. The country is of a broken and inaccessible nature either from being mountainous, or by reason of woods and marshes, or from the peculiar mode of culth+ation in use. Operational Limitations In sketching the operational limita tion of the insurgent, Clausewitz ob served that a poor population accus tomed to hard ~ork and privation usu ally chows itself more vigorous and better suited to war. He draws a picture that could almost be viewed whole cloth as that existing in south east Asia today, He illustrates the ad vantages and limitations of what he calls tbe peoples war conducted within the inner boundaries of a na tion. He felt that: Masses of armed peaaants cannot, and 8hould not, be employed against the main body of the enemye army, or even - againet any considerable farcee; theg must not attempt to crunch the core; theu must mdu nib ble at the surface awd the edges. It was Clausewitz belief that armed peasanta muet seize the enemys lines of communication and prey upon the vital fbread by which hia existence ie supparted. Armed inaurgente make the march of every small body of troops in a mountainous, thinly wooded, or other wise ditlicult country become very dan gerous, for at any moment the march may became an engagement. They should, like a kind of nebulous vapory @eeencqnowhere condense into a eolid body; otherwise an adequate force can be sent to crush it. But it is necessary that this mist should according to Clausewitz: . . . gatheT at some painte into deweeT maesee and form threatening chafe from which now and again a formidable flush of ltghtning may

/i&v New,F.mcwm, General William C. Weetmoreland buret forth, and serve to create a feeZ ,ing of uneaeimee and dTead. The enemy has no means to prevent
this action except the dataehment of
numeroue troopa to furnish escorts
for convoys and to OCCUPY military
stations, defiles, and bridges. For ex ample, the magnitude of such opera tions can be illustrated by the situa tion in South Vietnam. BY July, 120
South Vietnamese infantry battalions
are slated to fan out into the country side in small unite to prot@ some
S,000 hamlets from guerrillas in areas
that US troops have cleared of major
enemy foreee. The eaeieet way to sup port insurgency activities is to eend
27

CIAUSEWITZ small datachmente from the army. Without such support of a few regular troops as an encouragement: said Clausewitz, the inhabitants gen. erally lack the impulse and the con. fidenceto take up arms. This is the thinkhg hehind the military opera tions in Vietnam; if the support of the regular army units from North Vietnam can be curtailed, the inner conflict will gradually abate, and eventual cessation of overt military operations in South Vietnam will oc cur. Decisive Engagamenta For insurgency to succeed, situa tions must never develop into decisive engagements. Clausewitz beiieved that the insurgents should, therefore, de. fend the approaches to mountains, the dikes of a swamp, and the passagea over a river, as long as possible. But when an engagement was broken, he felt that they should disperse, and con tinuetheir defense by unexpected at tacks rather than concentrate and al low themselves to be shut up in some narrow, last refuge in a regular de fensive positicm. The psychological and organiza. % tional characteristics of armed civilian groupesuggest to Clausewitz that, al though they form aweapon of stra tegic defense, they generally or even alwaye must be tactically on the offen sive. As Mao Tse-tung was to write a century later, The ability to run away is the very characteristic of the guerrilla. The influence of Clausewitz on Com munist miiitary thought ie profound. War is not a laat resort to he invoked if all else faile; rather, it is one form of a continuing struggle. Karl Marx wrote that Communists everywhere movement revolutionary euppert againet the exiettng eoeial and pcdit. n m-a.. . ical order. According to him, the Com munists openly deeiare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of exieting social condi. tions. Soviet military doctrine rejects the notion that there is such a thing as purely military consideration. War~ wrote Nikolai Lenin, is part of the whole. The whole is politilcs. . . . Ap. pearances are not reality. Wars are meet political when they seem most military. Lenin, like Friedrich Engels and Marx, was fascinated by Clausewitz war theories; he not only studied them with insight, but annot@ed his books extensively. That Engele, Marx, Mao, and Lenin, the most noted exponents of the Communist philosophy, acknowl edged their debt to Clausewitz, who was a non-Communist thinker, is un doubtedly the highest compliment ever paid to his insight on the nature of war. Sialectic Quelity The dialectic quality of Clausewitz argumentation attracted Lenin to him. The passage which most appealed to him concerned the relationship of war to politics. This wae emphasized by Joseph Stalin in 1946 as a cardinai tenet of Marxist thought. It has also been subjected to typical verbal inver sion by a leading Soviet military au thority who said that, if war ie a continuation of politics by other means, so also is peace a continuation of struggle by other means. Communiet statecraft turns in peacetime to what are, in effeet, lesser points on the conflict spectrum namely, subversion, eabotage, colonial rebellion, and satellite aggression. They have become masters in combin ing and operating various nonmilitary forme of warpolitical, economic, and Military RevkIv ... ... . .. -4

CLAUSEWITZ

psychological. Mao Tse-tung has said tbatj without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail. in mobilization for insurgency, Marxists, perhaps, derive an advan tage from their philosophy. To the tra ditional motives for popular action of patriotism and self-interest, the Corn. munists have joined an aggressive, supranational political theory incorpu mting a view of history that claims inevitable success for ita policies. There is, however, a major differ ence between the theeries of Clause witz and those of the Communist prac titioners. Whereas Clausewitz never questioned that morality, as under-

stood by civilized society, was a fatter in social life, Comnmnista such as Lenin eschewed it and thereby reduced war to a purely animal struggle. KarI von Clausewitz was a profonnd military intellectual who applied him self to the pure theory of war. He vis ualized a spectrum of conflict that moved all the way from simple, un armed belligerence through the bru tality of total war. Further study in dicatea that he offered another alter native to unrestrained violenc%that of limited war. His work was an early blueprint for insurgency and counter. insurgency of the type being conducted today in Vietnam.

L.

,. ,.

FORECAST

/7

A.D.2000

Colonel Richard S. Ware, Jr. Um#ed Statea Armv

T NO other time in the 10,000 years of men% recorded Metory A bae tbe future offered sreater rewarde for sueceee or great8r pens~iee for failure. Many would etreee tbe dengers inti~ the perils are ,sjrsa+ -and,

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but msn bee emlured sevsre ~als in tbe pest and bse not only I@wivsd, but .pt@M&EHi. Witbem (@m tbeee Wii .ffret $jj+ brqught SW ~ tbe cam~~were dsmn@ for inipmting dfee@j@,imd ---... .: . . tbsmewboused di3mii@ls tv &iXkW3

Militery Rsvk

1
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i ~ ~ 1 r f j :, ;
a Major Trends

Mt. 2atlo peripheral ekirmishee whether they are nuclear or not. In factj the proba bility of deliberate uee of nuclear weapons may decrease with prolifera tion. As weapons and countries which possess them become more numerous, worldwide concern over massive de struction and the overwhelming de structive forces from all djrtilons which can be exerted on violators are apt to result in international agree ments to suppress their use. For these reasons, mass destruction by nuclear weapons will not be considered a rea sonable probability for the future.
Population Espanslon

An industrial revolution sired by the release of nuclear and thermonu dear energy ia in the making. It ie so significant that only a small por tion of it can be pareeived and under stood. By the end of the century, the vision will have cleared. The fear of nueSear annihilation will have abated, and, although more aeleetive, inge nious means of force will have been developed, man will fete the future with greeter confidence.

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l%o major trends must be noted before discussing the conditions ex peeted by the year A.I). 2000 since how they develop will largely shape the direction and timing of future sventq. One of these is the effect of thermonuclear militsry power and its possible application during the next 99 years, Even now it appears reasonable to assume that proliferation of nuclear weapons will continue. Considering the fact that many of the countries we now claseify as developing will be . capable of producing weaponsand a number of nations probably will do so t. ,, -it ap~re reasonable t~ assume ~ that, through poor judgment, miscal culation, or accident, some weapons, , }, in fact, will be used. 2Z It dose not appear logical to as mme, h~wever, that superpowers will we them arsenal of almost complete ~. .. destruction on each other because of ;. f Cokmcl Richurd S. Ware, Jr., is < m-tit Hcadqwwtcrs, US Armu, Viet wm. He nerved with tit-r 71st Zafan by Diviuien in World War II and with 7M Army in Gcrmang from 1963to 1985. He hohfa a Madd.c degree in #eclutfiieal Enginem%g f~em th8 Uni wr8it# of Sewthern Ca.tifornti at Los AWelte and is a 1986 graduate of the 1 US A~u War College. ,

The aeeond major trendand the meet eignillcent in terms of ita effect on the next three or four deeadee is uncontrcilled population expaneion. United Nations demographer report that, if the current trends in growth continue, the world population will grow from the pr=ent %S billion pee ple to 7.4 bilSion by the year 2000. Over 85 percent of tbie incresee will be in tha high birth rate, developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Letin America. In many of these areas, the lot of the average individual has worsened appreciably in recent years. Although the economies of most of the countries chow some rise, the relentless pres sure of population increases continues to suppreee the per capita ehare of food and goods. There is near-unanim ity among scholars of the interna tional scene that action must be taken soen if crisis conditions are to be avoided later in the century. Probably the greatest single driv ing force in progress is abundant en ergy. Electricity consumption will tre ble by 198S, with nuclear fission plants accounting for about 10 percent of c 91

Lo. ma
production. The subsequent rate of growth of conventional power sources and fission plants will be affected largely by progreee in the develop ment of fusion power, fuel cells, and other methods of power generation and storage. The development of fusion power will be infinitely the most impertant. If protons collected from hydrogen in ... .

...
limitation of natural fuel resources forgotten. The future of other power sourcw is similarly predicated on improve ments, but euccess can be foreeaet with a much higher degree of assurance. Heat pumps which utilize thermionic and thermeeketric generaters for con. verting solar heat to electricity are on the verge of economic practicability. -l...-?

water could be assembled with neu trons to produce helium nuclei, the re lease of energy would be 10 times that of fiseion power, and would have none of its radioactive properties or the critical mase limitation which will continue to reetrict fission power to large applications. Experta hope to have developed the baeic principles by 1986. If small fusion enginee can then be developed which can be produced at reasonable coet, the worlds power problem will be solved, the force of gravity largely overcome, and the 32 ,,..,-. .G.

Within the next decade, these devices will be used in tropical countries for boilers, irrigation pumps, and other low-power uses. In moderate climates, wholesale use of solar energy will be initiated when new and more efficient means of stor ing electricity are developed. These are expected to appear before 1985, and, by the end of the century, moat mod ern homee will uWise thie source of en ergy for year-round air conditioning. Fuel cells operating from a car tridge of gaseous fuel soon will power Military Rovhw

,
A.D.fOMl

portable radios and other small appli rmtes. Larger, more powerful cells will follow, and their arrival promieee rad ical changes in transportation and other fields before the end of the wntury. Other power sources will pro iuee energy in novel forms. For ex imple, the recently developed lasers, concentrated beams of light energy, will soon be used for cutting and weld ing, and ultrasonic energy will be used for shaping preciee designe in .@id objects.
Miniaturization

The subject of miniaturization also deserves special notice. During the 1950s, electronic experts could put 100,000 components in one cubic foot snd at the beginning of the 1960s me tnillion. When todays experi mental techniques of microscopic en gineering have been perfected in the 1970s, 100 million components may be reached. It is fairly certain, there fore, that most electronic devices in wldch size ie important will be one one-hundredth of their present size by the end of the century. During the coming 33 years, sciefi tiste will produce thousande of times as many heW substances as they have made thus far. Furthermore, the ma terials of the near future will have many new properties which will rev olutionize entire industries. Man, for example, has known for some time that internuclear forces are in tlie region of a thousand tons per square inch while strengths encoun tered in nature are only in the tens of tons per square inch. Strengths which more closely approach the bigher theoretical values soon will be achieved. A tenfold increase in strength will render almost every thing now being manufactured obso lescent either in eize or weight. hai 1367

In the electrical field, the materiale of today are only a crude beginning. New superconducting materials will enable very high magnetic fields to be generated without dissipation of large quantities of electric power. These ma terials, in conjunction with fuel cells or improved electrical storage devices, will permit great increases in power capabilities. The new materials will also have improved cbaratteristics of a less r~volutionary nature such as eurfaces which show an almost total absence of friction, without lubrica. tion, at any temperature.
Computers

Computers of all kinds will be part of everyday life by the end of the century. Master computers will be on call for a multitude of businees and personal uses, and automatic machines or robots, with built-in memory de vicee, will accomplish many routine mechanical and domestic chores. Computers will be capable of re sponding to dial coding, and printed or verbal requests for information. They will be capable of providing translation from one language to an other in script or voice and, if desired, will record, print, or direct transmis sion of data through satellite relay to any desired location. Memory banks of computers will render many other sources of infor mation obsolete. Newspapers, books, and dramatic presentations will be on call through computers for display on electronic panels in the o~ce or home. In addition, computers will continue to be used, in a greatly expanded faeh io~, for solving intricate probleme and correlating complicated statistics for scientific and research purposes. The timetable for the exploration of space in the. next decade or so ie com mon knowledge. However, develop 3a

M.

2ma

m nta toward the end of the century , st be considered since their im a ct on the environtnent will be sig n cant. By A.D. 2000, a permanent Y base will be eetabfiahed on the moon, and small research etations probably will be operating on near planets. Re usable rocket epaceeraft will service them on a routine basis. Orbital space Iaboratoriw will have become common place, and electrical propulsion en ginen powered by nuclear generators will be etandard for flights in deep epaee. Scientific tlkcoverlm By the end of the century, signit3 cnnt scientific achievement will have been uccompliebed through epace rlc tivity. In all probability, alien or ex traterrestrial intelligence will have been discovered; tbeoriee concerning the nature, origin, and ai~ of the uni veree will be validatid; and the beeic etructure of matter understood. To the average man, however, these discov eries will not be ae meaningful ae the commercial application of technolog ical advances in epace engineering, Hovercraft, vertical lift vehlclcs, and flying eul@ developed for apace expl- ration will find wide commercial une as prtvate traneport.ntion, and cnrgo and peasenger rockete will be com monplace. Where sp~ce servee to etimulate the imagination in scientific possjbilMe@, the weans will be ueed increasingly to aatiefy mane phycdcal needs. In food production, the ocoarre hava unlimited maourwe which are largely untnpped.
Psldable food will be processed from the billions of tone of plankton and

!3

deposits are known to be found on the ocean floor in the form of nodules which probably were concentrated by living organiems. These and other de posits of natural origin will be eco nomically mined by undersea f ron tieremen by the end of tbe century. The population of the United States will have increnaed. from 216 million to about 380 million by the year A.D 2000, and massive city complexee will have developed. New approaches to urban development will form elemente of the expanded complex; however, in the older seetione, modernization is likely to be fragmentary, incoherent, and contradictory. New meane of in terurban transportation will be in use, new typea of superhighways wjll have been built, and computers will main tnln the most effective traflic flow, but the increaee in trafIlc density will re sult in conditions more frustrating than ever before.
Erpanslon ol Indusby In the past, modernicetlon and ex. paneion of industry created more jobs

small fish awdlnble in most mean mean. In the arm of mlnhrtr, the undersea fertile fmntlam regioue will kome for eaploltation. Alrmdy, vast mlrmml

than they destroyed. A crossover point, brougbt about by automation, will be reached in the United States well before the end of the century. By A,D. 2000, tbe rntio of people to jobs will have caused a considerable change In mrmy aspectn of American lifti Meeeuree to mjnimlr,e the sim of the labor force will have keen adopted. Educational requirements wIII be raised to keep the youth occupied un til es late in life as peeelble, and EW tirementa will become mandatory at an earlier nge. Birth control meaeums in the form of tax Incentives or other preferential treatment for emrdl fnmi. II= will be in eUecL and mom leiuure time In the form of a shortar work W* or fomert vacetlonn will be normnl. MiwtuyRwn

Am

2MHI

Since many Americans still will pre fer added income to more leisure time, legislation will make a second job un profitable. The excese labor pool will make a substantial contribution to the military semcee mid to the large num ber of US personnel who will be re quired . . by assistance programs in de

of population will gain a greater yearning for outdoor life, such activ ity will become more and more ra. etricted. The use of chemical and electronic tranquilizers will be widespread, but, in general, man will be outwardly more conformist, but inwardly more tense. When disorder does break out,

States will continue to rise in cOm psriaon to $he coat of living, with the standard of living of the average fam ily tripling by the year 2000. New .. . . personal tensions will be heaped upon those already plaguing urban society. The combination of a higher etandard of living, more Ieieure time, and smaller families will accentuate the ancient search for creative outlets for human energy. While the great mass lene 1967

violent. Physically, the population will be heaklder while individually the American male will lack stamina and the ability to withstand hardship. Predictions of world environment are less certain than predictions in scientific or technological areas. How ever, excluding catastrophic mistakes on the part of the powerful nations, tbe world of the year 2000 can be fore seen reasonably WCS. 35

Am ml Population hrcreaeee which outetrip economic ridvanc~ in the countries of Asia, Africa, and South America will keep most of the countriee in thmqe areaa deproeeed, On the other hand, the Industrlallzod nations of North Americn; Europe, to hrcludo the and a few USSR; Japan; Auntmlia: other countrien will experience a wm. tinued rine in per capita income. The dinpnrity between the haven and the have note will become common knowledge through th~ medium of worldwide tetcvinirm and will rcnult in widenpreed turmoil in the lm~ developed areas. Udmtt Centerc
Ae in the United Steten, the pnpu. Iation in thene arena will gravitate to urtxtm centers, The overcrowding, un mrdoytrrent. and uenerd conditions of poverty will result in an inflammable $wcinl atmonphcre which, in gencrnl, will ctmcentrats the unrest and vio lence in these arcn.n. The fro-t that the cleavage betw,een the two types of nations dlvlden the world twwernlly skxng tha Iinw! dencrlbcd by Chine-c Cmmmuninl Idenlogy m city and country will rmult in n cwmirtcrnhlp advanteuc to China In exporting her COncxrptof worl[J communism. The renult}ng inrucct~ into thr nrrwly emxmglnet nrrw by Chinn, r,r the rfevehrpment af sc]me utber cohe. niw force In the rankn Qf thr h~~c not nmtlons, vrlll mnvince tho rich wt. tkmxthat corrfftlve action moml be taken. The dwlsimr to ntts.k tbe prvb. Iem on s mwive Knle In plitical, ~MoIodcAl ~knt ilk. and erormmir tmvrw drmxkt ornir bvf.m 1976. I& magrrl[uds nmt asrimmnmrn .f the prdrlem will rvdt in n joint ef. fart try rnmxt of tlw indudrhdiw+.d rm. tierw hi m nWerrpt. ftrut. la prmwnt tvhokaab ntnrvnt km and. m-and, I-

improve economic conditions in the countrke throuuh the reimlation of population hrcreneee nnd the develop. mcnt of a eeurxd industrial baee. By the year 2000, tha population crieia tvill have paesed. However, lim ited ware, rcbcllione, and riote in the developing ureas will continue to be a major problem, In many areas of AEin and Africa, new nations with greater ethnic nnd economic viability will hava emerged through led warn, Political instability will be common since preseuree to accolorate economic development will tend to l-d to un. ntable eutwratic reglmee. Even though the aid mxd developmimt progr8m will be at its peak+ bittemem and restmt ment will characterlw the nttltude of tho recipients.
Military Impact Military concepte and dectrlne of the yurr 2000 wili be t.ailorod w two mllitnry nxirwirms, widely divergent

The firnt will b-a to maln@in world order during t.be perhxd of minor wnm, revnl!x, nnd vkdmrcu that will chamc. tmixe the developing nrens of the world before n mhdmum Iovol of ~w mrmic inability h nchioved, Tho svc mrd wjli be tn maintain mllitnry m. poriority nmong the highly ndvancrd nationri through a period of acct.]. mating erlmtific and twhnological &chicvemrnt, wbon unexpr.rtmt brrsk. thrm:gh* in either dcfwwlve or Qffm. sivc wenpmr qwtemn rrrny upset tho tmlnnce uf pmrar. Kwri if * mrieeiw nicl and papulm timr rcmtrol progrnrn i~ Itwtltutd { nn cw)y dints to relieve tho imtxntanem trtrfrwen tk rich m$d the pwr rrntkmx. widwpmad hmbili{y in, snd amowr. the tett*r will r%qulre thu malnwnxrm of ln~, mreiw.gimdt~ rrmbilri ~mmd fWer4a. l-tw rer@rltW!? X4We W@ Wiu traweemf W r~~btllt> e!td will me.

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ccasitatc agreements among the ~ad vanced nations to insure military par ticipation by all. Tbie could be through divieion of responsibility on an arcs basis or by providing a pro rata share of troops to some central control agency or head quarters. In eithei case, US military psrsonnel can expect to be deeply com mitted to police, internal defense ac tions, and othe; forms of conventional conflict at the end of the century. The over-all military objective in this area will be to prevent coordinated action by developing nations.
Weapon Development ~ In the maintenance of military su periority over other advanced nations, the development of ,new weaponry is

likely to be the most critical factor. Research and development will be of primary importance, and great care will be exercised to insure that the most probable breakthrough areas are fully inveetigated. All scientific devel opment will be monitored to insure that timely action is taken if one or a combination of discoveries open up new possibilities. Because of the eize and diversity of tbe scientific effort and the incraased possibility that discoveries in widely dispersed areas may prove to be crit ical to weapon development, a na tional computer center will have been established and all scientific compu ters standardized to provide compat ible .inpute on a continuous basis. Military organization will undergo drastic changes before tbe end of the century, particularly in the number of control and eupport headquarters. Ad vanced computer systems, worldwide communications, and long-range rocket transport will extend the span of con trol and shrink time and dietance to such an extent that most successive Jon@ 1S67

command baedquarters above a basic combined-arms organization will be unnecessary. For example, in a projection to the year 2000, Supreme Headquarters, AIlied Powers, Europe, could control all of the North Atlantic Treaty Organi zation divisione. Therefore, interme diate headquarters at army group, army, and corps level could be elimi nated. Administrative and Iogjstic sup port of tbe divisions could be accom plished from a central command in the United States, with computers han dling the bulk of the administrative load and rocket transport accomplish. ing resupply and evacuation of men and material. If this requires too great a stretch of the imagination, one ehould recall that even now the Strategic Air Com mand controls individual aircraft on a worldwide baeie, and, with the de. velopment of the C-5 aircraft, the cost of airfreight will be competitive with surface shipping. Additionally, the supply problem will be eased with the introduction of new sources of power which will eliminate the re quirement to transport large quanti ties of fuel, and by the use of new materials which will reduce tonnages in many other types of buJk supply. will con and materiel tinue to cause other organizational changes, and, altbougb particulars cannot be cited, it ie fairly certain that most personnel performing ad ministrative duties will be replaced by computers. Those in operational communications jobs will he replaced by automatic systems, and, khose per forming routine mechanical, duties will sea their jobs taken over by computer J programed maehinee. Changes in the field of personnel 31
Other Changes New weapons

As a general rule, they will be older, better edueeted, and more highly in specialized skills. Skilled trained

technicians and thoee with higher ed ucations still will be hard to keep for the same reasons ae today-the higher pay and shorter hours available in ci vilian life. The druge and hormones which will have become available to alter phys icsl and mentnl reactlorrs will hnve a al

In cams where discipline ie neeemary, a greater understanding of the origins of crime and disorder will permit more rational preventive meaeuree and treetrnent. The expected development of new materksls and improved IIourcee of en ergy preaagee radical changeri In roilNary materiel, In the fteld of military transpo~ tbe shift to n[r vehlelee for ground forme h apt to be an great am ktlltttty Rf?ieu

:, T---

A.D. 2DiM the. pest change from animal transport to the motor vehicle. Fuel cells will be adapted for individual air rnotdlity, nnd light combat vehicles are iikely to be of the vertical iift and hover craft type. The development of more efficient storage devices for electrical energy and new superconducting materials may weli result in the widespread use of electricity ae the prime mover in thie field, as well se for other lowpower appketione. In any eeee, in creseed strength of materials will rsiee payload capacities, and lowered surface friction promises increaeed Jife with reduced msintemmce. As noted before, long-range tranePOrt of troops and supplies normally will be by rocket. In caaes where ee crecy ie important, covert movement will be accomplished through the uee of barge undereee craft powered by nuclear reactors. In addition to pro viding transport, these vehicles will serve as weapon platforme and bases of operation for combat forces. In the communications area, one can get a general impreeeion of future developments if present equipment ie reduced iii sise by a factor of nearly 100 and computers having almoet un limited capabilities are integrated into the systeme. Tactical transmitters will be designed as emall se a cube of sugar, and receivers will be emall enough to be placed in earpluge. Small computers that accept voice commands will take care of the rou tine administrative work done witbin a command. These computers will con tain a memory bank of directives and

other reference information now con tained in written form. Tactical op eration centere will he equipped with electronic penele which, by means of automatic monitoring devicw, wili dis play real-time information required for command deeieione. Predictions of weapons for the year 2000 cannot he made with any degree of accuracy, but it ie likely that they will be of new types which can only be imagined. Ae an example, it is an established fact that the brain oper ates on electrochemical energy and controls the movement of the body through electrical impulses. It should he possible, therefore, to jam, confuse, or immobilise it, or the nervous sys tem, by come type of broadeaet elec trical energy. If eo, a weapon could be produced to operate on an area basic through most types of cover. Another possihiJity might be an ex teneion of the radar principle. Radar beame are now harmful to humans at short range, and, with refinements in beam projection, it may be poseible to convert them to offensive wespone. The same ie true for laeere and sonics. None of thece may develop into weap ons, but, with the scientific level of . ~cbievement expected in 33 yeare, it M inconceivable that man will not have come upon new and better ways to incapacitate an enemy or render him defenseleee. In any case, it is probable that, by the end of the century, tbe military forces on one side or the other, through bitter experience, will be more acutaly aware that it is important to expect the unexpected.

JmB 1337

39

A$lu:s#u&d%A-

Colonel Mawm J. Young, Jr., ia with Headquartw8, US Amnu, Vietnam. He ie a graduate of the US Militwr# Academy and the Command and Sta# Course of the Naval Ww College. He awved with the f36th Infantry Division in World War 11 and with the Sd Infantru Division in Kwea. Pnw to hie preeent aeeigwmewt, Cobnet Young wfw with the US Army Combat Develop nwnta Ckwamund at Fort Leavenworth 40 h.

MllltwyRovlcw

. . --.-..--.. %3
SADSDEN VILLAGE

B
I I

ESIDE a picturesque country road leading into the small town of Phu Loi, in Ginh Duong f$ovince, Vietnam, stand treat whita houses and a central dispensary. This is the Gadsden Refugee Village. it is an outstanding exampla of the typa of civic action project, sup : ported by US forces, which help to improve the life of the Vietnamese peasant.. The idea of the bustling project goes back to May 1966 whan residents of Gsdsden, I Alabama,wrote the 23d ArtilIary Group, and asked to becoms the groups sponsor. Mayor lesley Gilliland undoubtedly had in mind sending boxes and comfort items for tha groups ~ members. However, after considering that the men were well supplied, Colonel Thomas H. ~ Ssyes,the group commander, suggasted that the people of Gadsden sponsor a ~efugee [ village in the vicinity of his headquarters.

ViUagers can turn out up to 400 bricks a day with this brick-making machhw. The Wagers conetruct the buildings, and volunteers from the SSd Artillery Group provide technical assistance.
I

I?

s7

41

6ADSDEN VILLAGE I

us Aml
Lieutenant Colonel SSS, Binh Duong Province chief, snd Colonel Thomas H. Ssyes at UM

dedication of the dispensary in December 196S lhe response in Gadsden was overwhelming, Committees met to establish policies and work out 8 program, and the newspapers and radio stations publicized the proj~ A Vietnam Week was held, featuring Vietnam and the Z3d MiIlary Group in all civic cl~ and functions. The week terminated with a parade. The sergaanta major of the group wart flown from Vietnam to Gadsr%, and their wives joined them in a busy week of meetingb luncheons, and banquets. More than $7,0DtI has been received from donations of civic organizations of Gad$d@ This money i! wgmenfed by supplies furnished from US Government sources thrwgft @# US Agency for international Development (W@). The projects basic concept is to pf$ vide financial assistance and technical advice to help the villagers help themselves. lhe Vietnamese Army also wpports the project by providing troops for local securf$ and, on request, a bulldozer for earthmoving.

Ii

6ADSDEN VILLAGE

The project has not easaped the attention of the Wet Cong. However,pamphletethreat ening the villegers for participatingin this imperialistic plot for the WY have not deterred the villagers enthusiasm.

Unlike the average Viatnamase home, which is constmcted of light wood and has a thatched roof and dirt floor, the homes in Gedaden Village are constructed of concrete blocks, have an eluminum roof, a cement floor; and are paintad white. A toilet and kitchen are Im%ted outside of each house. The 10&home village is plenned es a model for other villages which the Vietnamese could construct in other places in Vietnam. Each family provides workers according to the skills available in the family. Workers are paid a subsistence wage from the Gadsden, Alabama, Fund. An observer visiting the village immediately notes that the majority of the workers are women. This is partly because many of the families in the village are widows whose husbands have been killad by the Viat Cong, and partly because it is e Vietnamese custom for women to do manual labor. USAKJ furnishes aluminum roofing and cemenf for tha floors, the building bricks, and tha mortar. An allowance of about $30 is given to each refugee family by the Rapublic of Viatnam for rasettlament. This amount almost covara the cost of tha lumber neaded for each housa. Lumber from ammunition boxes is used for doors and windows. The money from Gadsdan is used to purchase additional lumber, nails, and paint. The lions Clubs of Gadsdan, Alabama, contributed $500 toward tha construction of the dispmwary and its equipment. The dispensirry is operated by a midwifa selected by tha district chiaf and is used three mornings a week by the 23d Artillery Group surgecna to treat the villagers. The mambers of Headquarters Battery, 23d Artillary Group, are making a childrens playground their special project. Other projects being planned for tha vlllega includa three wallq e school; a handicraft workshop, currently being constructed by USAID; and pig and chickmwaising projects.

kuutaryneda!l

Environmental Researchon High

Elevations
Hoyt
Lemons and Leonard E. Wood

HE history of military campaigns is replete with accounts of mountain warfare, and one cannot doubt the significance of mountains and Klgh plateaus to military actions of the future. Despite the new and growing air mobility eapabilitiee of the US Army, mountainous and high plateau areas con tinue to constitute special environment with which ground troops and their materiel must contend. In recent times, this wcs demonstrated most dramatL cslly in 1962 by the border skirmishes in India. The extreme elevations up to 26,000feet produced problems for men and materiel not present in conventional mountah or other warfare below 10,000 feet. From the standpoint of stress produced on both men and materiel, those 4s

,JID81967

HIGH ELEVATIONS world areae of 10,000-feet elevation and over are of primary military concern. Of the 57.5 million square miles of land surface in the world, 2.7 million square miles, or about five percen~ is above 10,000 feet. Nearly half of this is in Antarctica. Despite the relatively small land area involved, the strategic locations of many of these high-elevation areas, together with their severe environ ments, give them an exaggerated and lasting military significance. More than a million square miles of the total above 10,000 feet are in the Himalayas and Tibet; 336,000 square mibm are in the Andeen Mountain system of South America; and 75,000 equare miles are in the Rockies and associated rangea of the United States, including Alaska. Hoyt Lomorw i-r Chief, Geoph~eical Sciences Branch, Environmental Sci. ences Dithion, Ofie of the Chief of Research and Development, in Waeh ingtcn, D. C. He hofde M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from the Universitti of Ne braska. He h a member of the ArmII Re8earch Council and the Ferum on Environment of the Department of Defcmve. He repreeenta the Armg on the Naticnul Academy of Scimwee National Committee for the Interna tional Geographical Union and on the Reeearch Committee of th.c Arctic Inetitute of North Amemca. Leonard E. Wood ia Program Man ager of the Environmental Science8 Division, Advanced Research Projecte Agency8 Re8earch and Development Field Unit, in Bangkok, Thai/and. He hold8 B.S. and M.S. degree8 in GeoL ogv from the Univereitv of Kentucky and a Ph. D. from Mtehigan State University. He k 8erved ae a Geol ogist with companiee in the United State8, Canada, Veneauela, and Libya, and with the Envirennwntn.1 Science8 Division in Washington. 4s The enviromnente found in these areas are highly complex, both es to atrnoephere and terrain. The areas are not totally rugged mountilna, ss ie sometimes popularly belfeved. The principal plain of Tibet bae an aver age elevation of 15,000 feet, and daiIy temperatures may range from zero to 100 degrees Fahrenheit. The Alti plano of Bolivia, with an average elevation of come 12,000 feet, is char acterized by conetant etrong winds and 50 degrees Fahrenheit average temperatures. It is a broad, flat pleh 500 miles long and 80 miles wide. One of the major plaine of At. ghanieten hae an elavation of ll,O@ feat where temperatures range from minus 15 to 115 degreea Fahrenheit The large plateau of Kirgiz in the USSR has an alevation averaging 10,000 feet and is 124 miles wide, ex tending into perpetually snow-covered foothills at 11,000 feet which rise tc peaks of 24,000 feet. Problem Areaa There are many elements of the atrnoaphere and terrain which, either eingly or in combination, can produce probleme. Low, ambient air tempero turea alone reduce the efficiency of men and equipment, but low tempera ture combined with wind produce windchill that greatly accelerates the reduction of etliciency. Two of the meet important factors are the reduc tion in atrnoepheric preesure and the reduction of atmospheric oxygen con tent with altitude. There ia an in crease in the content of some con. stituante of the atmosphere, euch oc ozone, which causes difficulties. With increase in altitude, the air becomes prograwively thinner, and the preeeure dcereeeee exponentially, averaging one inch of mercury per 1,000 feet at lower IdtftUdc38.At 10,000

Military
now

H16H ELEVATIONS
feet the average pressure is only 20.? inches, whereas at see level, it is

approximately 29.9 inchee. A direct result of the deeresse of pressure is a. deerease in the boiling point of water and an increaee in the rate of evaporation. At 1,* feet, the baling point of water is 2~0 degrees Fahrenheit and, at 10,000 fee~ 194 degrees Fahrenheit. At 6,000 feet, the

except in windy conditions. Tempera tures at high elevations are character ized by great diurnal and annual ranges. A diurnal range of 60 degrees Fahrenhei&from minus 30 to plue 30 degrees Fahrenhei&le common and those upto 100 degrees Falnen heit occur. On the average, temperatures de creaee with altitude at rates varfing

The high elevations in Kashmir produced ProbIems for men and materieI not present in warfare at lower elevations oxygen content is decreased by 25 pertent and, at 18,000 feet, by 60 percent. The combination of reduced pessure and oxygen content adversely stkcte the functioning of men and OIZteriel above 10,000 feet. The thermal conductivity of air at
high altitudes ie less than Clothing ia consequently at sea level. more effee-

from one degree to 4.5 degrees Fahr enbeit per 1,000 feet at the lower altitudes. Abrupt changes in tempera ture are common, and there is a great shade-to-sun differential in temperature. Solar radiation is intense, and
glare, especially hazardous. With over ice and snow, is

the, and body heat 10SS ie decreased 1911267 I&L%:=.

sun-plus-sky

clear skies, the total radiation increases ap. 47

tllGtl ELEVATIONS

proximately one percent per 100-yard increaee in elevation. With overcaet skies, it ie approximately four percent per 100 yards because of the diffueed radiation. When the combination of low temperature and moisture pro duces numbers of ice cryetale, a con dition of whiteout develops, oblit erating the horizon and making air and surf ace movement hazardous. Snow blindnees can result. Winde tend to be guety and high. Windspeeds well above 100 miles per hour occur, and gueta up to 76 miles per hour commonly accompany winde of lower velocities. The world record is 232 miles per hour recorded at
Mount. Washington, New Hampshire.

Air s!enerally ie very dry at high elevuti&e, both relativ~ and absol{te humidities being quite low. water requirement for men operating at high elevations are high, being twice m more than those of lower eleva. tions. Tbie posee a problem both in acquiring and transporting the large qumrtitiee of water required for troops and equipment. Topographic Roughness From the standpoint of terrain, the most important strese is created by topographic roughness, The following factors hamper movement acroea ter rain: absolute elevation; degree and natu r.e of slope; vegetative cover; soii or rubble cover; snow or ice; visibil ity; and atmospheric conditions. Blow ing dust and enow create hazards, se do landslides, mudalidea, and snow. alidee. Glaciers, glacial deposite, and talus slopes all cause special stres6 situations for foot and vehicular move ment. Mountainous ,terrain creatac heavy workloade for both troops and vehicles, particularly because of steep slopes, loose material underfoot, nnd the heavy expenditure of energy re quired b traverse it. Psychological etresece are included among the et7ecta on men. These may be created by the severe and unusual environment, by tbe dit%culty of exint ing and operating in it, and by the adverse physiological effects created in new and unacclimatized pereonnel. The environmental strezaaz of high elevation must be taken into acoount by the Array in the design and de velopment of materiel, ae well ea in ita etorage and uee and In the employ ment of ~monnel in order to aaaura their maximum well Ming and af?w. tivenm.s. Some Indhmtion of anvtron mantal dealgn eritmis standards for high elevqtlong cm be found in Army MI* AfdR

Winde above 16 miles per hour, to gether with low temperatures, create severe windchill and accelerate Iom of body heat. Blowing Oust and Snow Blowing snow is a haserd to both visibility and mobility, and winds begin at about 16 milee per hour to pick up loose enow and whip it about. Blowing duet and eand constitute hazerda in Afghanistan, the Pamirs, the northern and northwestern Ti betan Highlands, and the Altipkmo of Boiivia. Deruie cloude may cover mountains for extended periode, creating visibil ity and moieture problems. Thunder sbmrns, often accompanied by severe lightning, present haserde, including psychological hazards, to pereonnel. Precipitation in the higher elevation areae is light because meet of it is deposited weli below 10,000 feet. How ever, in spatial situatlone, euch as on the southern SIOPCZ of the Himalsyae, heavy precipi~tion may wcur during the moneoen. Lhaaa at 12,000 feet baa recaivad 11.7 incbae in 24 hours and MI incbee in onu month.

,
tl1611 ELEVATIONS

Regulation 705-15, Operation of Matwel Vndkr Extreme Conditions of Environment. Army aircraft, both rotary and dxed-wing types, have reduced lift. ing pOwer in the thin air of these altitudes, and design must take this into account. Military equipment muet withstand the wide ranges of tempera ture, including the freezing and thaw-

Low oxygen content, causing hy poxia, and reduced atmospheric pres eure are the principal factore ad versely atfectilng the well being and the effective performance of men. The effects are eerious above 10,000 feet, particularly to men brought to these elevations with little or no acclimati zation. The resulting physical dkor ders are commonly known as mountain

U.1A$IW Extremee of terrain and atmosphere are important to humzn effectiveness ing action, and the low oxygen content together with the low preesures and boiling pointe. Clothing, footgear, and transport equipment must be designed to with stand the abraeive qualities of steep, rocky elopee, looee eurface rubble, blowing sand and snow, and extremes of atmospheric conditions. Metal, fab rice, and finishes must be designed to withstand the intense solar radiation, including the deteriorating effccte of sctinic rays. .. fme 1$67 , sickness, more precisely consisting of insomnia, severe headache, shortness of breath, pounding of the heart, naueea, fatigue, and loss of appetite. These disorders last four to seven days and sometimes longer, during which time the men are not capable of efficient military operations. Concentration ie difficult, and there is severe fatigue, resulting in an inability to perform either mental or physical tasks efficiently. The dry air cauees severe dehydration in men, 49

HIM

UEVATIOMS

snd the requirement for water intake more than doubles. Night vision is diminished, The most eerious aickneea is lung corrgeation and requiroa rwac ustion to lower altitudea to prevent deeth in some wee, Certain phenomena produce exag tferstad ek%e on mens attitudea and performance. Among the~e are high winds, elertrieal ntmnm, and the lack of troea and shrubs which breeds fear and feelings of isolation. Painful nunburrr rrxwlta from the brtnrr.ee nolrw radiation with itn high ultraviolet content. Thi8 ia further accentuste(i by reflection from anmv, ice, and reck au rfacee, Considerable information of a gen crrd nature in available on these rm vironmentn. IIowever, mountnins and high plateaus sr~ highly complex and irrwcenaible, Also, there iII a paucity of sccurate, definite knowledgo and data on the frmtora nnd conditiorm of atmmqrhem and terrnin thnt will per mit precine calculation of ntrens, ~nd that arc suitable for immertinto sp plicntkm to mnteriel rtenign problcmn rmd t~ mltltnry phrnn{ng Same rwmiirrh pmjcwfa nro umirr.

way in tbs Army addretured to prob. lane of ttrie nature. The US Army Natick Laberatorien In ?daesachuoette sre producing an atlaa of mountftin glaciere of the %eetorn Wmrinph
jnctudhrg analyses of environmental factom associated with threw glaoiere. fho hdxmat.rtri~ are aleo analyzing

rmd evaluating factora and ntrmee of the totai phyalcrd =envirenmrmt of high mountain arene. In the latter ntudy, emphrmin is placed on conditions abova 10,000 feet, and the first report concerns central A818 and deele with the etrestren affecting both mrm and materiel. However, there in noed for u corn. preherudve raeenrch plan oriented toward preduc!ng all tho information needed for fir-my purpwwe, A eeries of map# snd ntudien should be pre pared on the mountain and high pla teau arean of tbe world, The objective of thaee ~tud!en tihould be te set forth the fnctore and condltiorrs of rrnviron ment which rme aigniftcnnt to humnn cffectivmrem mrd which gowrn equip. mcnt dmi~ nnd amploymont, Both Isrrain and ntmmphcrk phases should be crmnidere#.

THE COMMANDER AND THE COMPUTER

Major Daniel K. Malone, United Stafee Armv

ANY 05cers have voired their concern about the apparent in flexibility of computers when it comae to their use in the army in the field, and about the apparent trend of eom putere to cause centralisation in or ganisations. These questions probably revolve around the often subconscious far about who will control whom commander or computerwhen a com putar for command and controj is put into the field. The challenge of the computer is not the popularised notion that the com puter can replace the commander in the field or elsewhere, but, rather, the challenge is to the commandar- and daaigner to find the means of getting the moat out of this powerful new tool. The computers sigaificence lies

hl 1W7 .*.,

51

COMPUTER

with its precise formulation of deci sions once thought to be the invio lable realm of human judgment. This ie also the cause of the controversy when tbe computer is considered for use in command, control, and manage ment in the field. Application Mot New The application of computer tech nology to command, control, and man agement in the field is not new. Even though the machine pofllon of the computer will be a new item on a commendere table of organization and equipment, the types of decieions, the methods of arriving at these de cisions, and the formulation of many of the required strategies have al ready heen .achleved and applied with pencil and paper. To illustrate this etatement we may examine the three phases that com puter logic has experienced thus far. Significantly, these three phases of logic development rather than devel opments in the machhe itself have paced the phenomenal growth of com puter technology in both business and the military cervices, Phase I began when the worlds first electronic digital computer came upon the scene during World War II. This computer, now in the SmitJrMajor Daniel K. Malone i8 aasigned to the Combat Developments Com mand .4rtiUerg Agencu at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He received hia Master of Bueirwse Adnrinietration degree frera Sgracuse Uniuersitv, Nero York, and ia a 9radImte of the US Armg Com mand and General Staff College. His s-ee ha% inclwfed dutg with the 7th Azfantr# Division in Korea, and with the ArmII Ballistic Missile Com mand at Redstone Areenal, Alabama. Thi6 a?ttcb ie based on a treatise pre parad bw the author while a etadent at the tisACGSC. 52 b:.+ov==. .. ... ... ... .. .... . . . .-.......-..L. =--

sonian Institution, was developed al the US Armys Ballistic Itesearct Laboratory with a particular purpoet in mind. It was to take hver the Iabo rioue task of solving complex mathe matical relationships involved in ar. tillerY fire control and ballistics. This first computer wae eesentiall) a giant calculator which amazed th( technical world by doing many yean of calculation in the wink of an eye Of no particular significance then but of overpowering importance it computer technology today, is the fad that the logic for theee ballistic solu. tions already exieted in tbe mathe matica invoIved, Mathematics and Statistics Subsequent industrial and militars aPPlicatiOne reflected these came a~ tributes. Computers were installed in the Iaboratoriee of the Nation to tak! over the tedious mathematical calculi+. tions that diverted scientists and en. gineers from their primary creatiw tasks. Computers were aleo put ti work in the guidance and control oi missilee. The logic, bowever, remained in the realm of mathematics and sta tisticg. The mathematical nature of early computer technology and the fact that the logic already existed bo fore the machine was applied are th[ characteristic that identify this phase I of computer application. Phaee II of computer application began when military and busines! managers alike realized that the elco tronic digital computer had potential uses other than the solution of com plex mathematics. The computer wae applied to suck iteme as payroll preparation, tax corn putation, and maintenance of stool records which, at tlret glance, mn~ actually eecm to have degraded th( computer from supermarket mattw MllltarfMa

 -
COMPUTER

: ..

matics to grocery store arithm&lc. However, while the computer was used in the laboratory to perform extremely kmgthy solutions to diverse compii sated problems, it was used in these initial management applica~lons to prepare an enormous number of solu tions to a few, simple problems. Also, in the logic of phase II, the

an indWidual, to one in whkh the computer functioned as part of a man agement system or process, perform ing the simple but voluminous corn putation that was involved. The term decision rule is the new notion of computer logic that cbsrac terized phase II. It is the choice of a course of action in a situation that is not necessarily mathematical. Corn-

The first elikonic

digital computer which was installed at Aberdeen Prov+ng Groundsj

Msryland
puters experienced a definite pause waiting for phase II. One reason wee that people could readily accept that a computer could subtract 10 items from total on hand and arrive at a new total, but they could not see how a computer could tell an issue from a turn-in, check credit references before accepting an order at all, or place orders for additional parts. Too much of this seemed to be a function, of humfm judgment. The decision rule? by which the 59

In the laboratory, the stimulus was the insertion of formulas, as needed, by the individual user at the console. In management applications, the stim ulus was the insertion of data, per haps from a requisition, ~hlch prob ably occurred in come remote part of the organization. The formula or de cision rule would already be present in the machine. Thus, the approach to computer ap plication had changed from one of purely mathematical usage assiating Juno19S7

COMPUTER cbmputer makes such determinations, is the same method a human being uses when he exercises judgment. Once the idea of reducing procedural judgmente to decision rules took hold, phase II applications of computers grew rapidly into the mammoth inven tory syetems in the Army, and into systems of similar scale in merchan dising, banking, airline reservation, and maintenance management. In spite of the amazing results, these phase II applications still lim ited the computer to use as a klng sized calculator with typewriter at tached. The decision logic was primar ily arithmetic or empirical, and the computer iteelf made no decisions that we would dignify with the term man agement or command decision today. The computer would post inventory records, but would not attempt to sense changes in demand or decide to change minimum or maximum stockage levels. Human Impreasirma Many human impressions were cre

placations expanded into more and more areas, however, flexibility be came a desirable characteristic. In initial phaee II applications, the same machine that performed com plex calculation in the laboratory was given a new logic system to apply it to payroll. Now, the job was to find a way to restructure logic easily so that the same machine could work with payrolls, stock records, and per sonnei records, or with all of them at once. Also, with the need to de velop system logic for use in an enOr mous system such as the modem army supply system, the need for flexibility expanded concurrently. software The intensive effort required to de velop such logic networks, the special languages used, and the fact that the logic network rather than the ma chine was the dominating factor in systems design, together became so predominant and preoccupying that the word software evolved to de scribe the concept. By use of dWerent software, the same computer is used for a multitude of purposes-from monitoring a patients heart in a hos pital to sorthg logs in a sawmill in choosing between their subsequent processing into planks or plywood. The second impression of computers which remains current is the belief that computers cause centralization. Some of this is real. Much of it, how ever, comes from fascination with the size of such systems es military stand ard requisitioning and issue proce dures or that of the Itiernal Revenue Service. . There is an assumption here that the abstract notion of centralization is in itself an evii. Such is not tbe case, and the Army baa gone on record MililaIY Rwiow

at+d as tbeee phase II applications epreed. These impreesione were due primariiy to fascination with the sped and voracity for data that the computer displayed. The giant brain syndrome of the technological revo lution had replaced the mechanical man syndrome of the industrial rev olution. Two of these impressions which are no longer necessarily true have, none theless, carried over into todays de liberations of computer application to the army in the !leld. The first is the belief that computers are always inflexible. In phase II, this ie largely true. In fact, since the computers were applied to indexible situations such as payroll computation, SlexihiIity was neither required nor desired. As ap 54

COMPUTER

IISrejecting such a generalization by getting the brigade and corps out of the logistics business so they can con centrate on tactics. Likewise, trans portation and. petroleum are theater interfactional selvices-eentralized services-because it is more effective and efficient to do it that way. Clearly, the question of centralization muet be answered on a eaee-by-case basis

artillery batteriss should operate alone and times when transportation serv ices should be decentralized as far ae possible, With phase II computer logic, a commander would be unable to change the degree of centralization to fit the situation at hand. But this impression derived from phase 11 corn. puter applications no longer appliee. Just as the need for flexibility waz

rather than ae an abetract proposi tion. The queetion of degree of central ization is not predestined by the com puter. .Rather, it ie selected in the first step by the human designer in deter roining what decisions are to be made and by whom. Naturally, like the he liograph, steamboat, telegraph, air plane, and radio, the computer will have increasing centralization as a contemporary. But the computer is not the cause; it ie the servant. There are, of course, timee when * ho 1967 s..

recognized in phaee II and provided for by the software development lead ing to phase III, so, too, wae the need to vary the degree of centralization recognized in phase II and provided for in phase III. In phase HI, many jud~ent deei sione are made by the computer. For example, the computer will determine by various analyses that demand for an item of inventory is changing, and will increase minimum or deereaee maximum stock levele accordingly. Or it may determine the best echedule 55

COMPUTER for the operation of a fleet of trucks or helicopters makhg deliveries from and expeditious order quantities and

several eupply points to varioue delivery pointe. One fixed route is not always the beat. Tbe mathematics and tbe logic for these typee of decisions are relatively new developments. Many judgment decisione on

frequencies are measurable and may be calculated mathematically. To do so manually is hardly feasi ble, however. In addition to the effort involved in learning the mathematical solution, there are too many variables for tbe average man to juggle in his

This computer in a aix.ton mobile van is one of 18 overseae mobile centers for inventorf centrol at all, but estimates or even gueeses about the mathematical realities that underlie tbe judgment decision. For example, an inventory manager keeps one eye on demand and the other on his bins. When be feels that the rate of demand is about to require a re placement order, be makes a judgment of when and how many to order. How ever, we know tfiat the actual demand, the lead time, and the meet economic 56 manager did decide to use the math. ematical methods, it would be highly impractical to perform the neceesary computation for more than a few items. One of the characteristic applico tions of computere in phase III bei been to these somewhat involved non routine decisione by the applicetior of the newer techniques of operatiolu reeeerch. These techniques assure bet MllitwyRevlo .-A

- --- -----q
COMPUTER

ter solutions more frequently. The re sultant effective use of resources con tributes its own increment of improvqd tlexibllity of operation for the com mander or manager involved. A military man might eay at this point that the approach, while valid in civilian industry where situation are static, is not so valid in the army in the field where situations constantly change. Yet these methods have been applied with marked euccess even to the procurement of commodities whose prices change hourly due to weather, cowp8 detat in dietant lands, and speeches of public figures. The Estimate This is not to imply that these meth ods are immediately applicable to every phase of tactical planning and operations. However, the selection of a course of action is baeed on an esti mate of the situation. The estimate is always comprieed of certain specific considerations. Much of this repeti tive portion of the estimation pr~ess can probably be given over to the computer, allowing the commander to concentrate on those iteme that are unique to the particular situation and which are really judgment. In artillery fire planning, the plan ner lays out a schedule, minute by minute, ehowing whicli sire unit is to fire at which target with how many rounds and of what type. Time is al lowed between targets to change the lay of the battiry, and varioue altera tions such ae ammunition reetrictione are considered. Thle ia ae much tedium as creativity, and certainly follows rather fixed rules of decision makhg. Would it not be better to have a com puter do it? In phase 11 application, the anawer would be no. The program would only have provided for some thing like a duty roster without con

sideration of such matters as tactical missions. With a phase III application, how ever, the anawer would be yee, and the planning sequence would follow a regular pattern. The computer would know at the start the units, tactical missions, range capabilities, and target Iiete. The compnter would list the targete to be considered. The hu man planner would then annotate any special considerations such as time on target and groups of targets for si multaneous engagement.

Special Elements With the human planner having thue asaured that pafilcular circum stance of the tactical eituation are in the planning criteria, the computer could then prepare the details. Not only has the computer in this typical phase III application acted, in part, as an instant pencil: it has also con sidered all of the special elemente of the particular situation that the hu man planner wanted to have consid ered. Further, if a unit in the plan was suddenly dispatched to another miesioti whzle the schedule wae being tired, the planner could just as quickly obtain a revised fire plan. Obviouely, too, as one leaves the purely tactical environment and moves further into logistic areae, the ability of a computer to come to grips with the command and control problems encountered increases in di ect pro potilon. Logic, operations ! reeearch models, statistical models, emulation models, and numerous formulations of decision strategies. have already been applied to most of the typical logietic operations as they are found in mili tary and civilian practice. There are, then, two distinct facete of military significance about phaee 111 computer applications:

I am law

CDMPUTER Q Modern, proved techniques are ueed in the eohetion process. . The man and the machine have a carefully conceived relationship by which information ie put out by the computer, and direction is fed back into the computer by the commander when and how he seee fit. Ae a further example, suppose the compute! has prepared a detailed movement table for a division, based on minimizing time, maximizing unit tactical integrity, or some eimilar cri teria previously eelccted by the com mander. However, the commander now has a suepicion of an impending enemy attack and has a new require ment to withhold a number of trucks to move the reserve, The commander can interpose between the computers recommendation and the order of ex. , eeution. He can modify the computers recommendation at will. However, the commander would also want to know the effect of hie decision to withhold theee trucks so far as the reet of hie plan ie concerned. Time might well prohibit reevaluation un der a manual scheme. By uee of the computer to achieve an optimum eolution, the commander can recompute the echedule and re evaluate hie plan with enough rapid ity to know immediately the conse quence of his decision. It might, then, be important to him to give priority to a particular unit, substitute heli cqptere for the reserve movement, or use combieratione of both. The com puter, by allowing the commander to try a number of alternative and to compute such thinge ae movement
echedulee by faster methods, provides in planning and more more rapidity

b In either
ganization, the tactical or logistic or

. flexibility

in execution.

in a phaee HI computer environment it is the commander who ie calling the moves, directing the utilization of his reeourcea, and chang ing his objectives ae the missjon re quiree. In the phase 111 type of com puter application, the commander or his staff oi3cer doee thie at the con. S016 cc the need arises. The inflexibil ity and rigidly programed centraliza tion of plkaee 11 application have been met and overcome. These three phases of computer application are not, of course, entirely distinct from one another, nor do they necessarily reflect a sequence of time. Neith& should one think that juet be cause pheee III application are now poesihlc-thanka to the development of both hardware and the neceseery logicthat there ie no longer a place for the phaee I or phase 11 type of application. The application to artillery gunnery problems, essentially a phase I appli cation to mathematical computation, is obviously daairable until come eystem incorporating the other aspects of ar tillery fire control ie put into the field. Automatic date processing applica tions to reeordkeeping and report generation ae now exist in the admin istration company within the division are of great valuq and they can be considerably expanded to encompass many other areae of phase H corn. puter technology. However, when ii comes to command and control, the phase 111 type of application .with ite extensive man-machine relationshlpe will be used. Their. advantage only await the translation of ideee into systeme suitable to the field.

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From Asian Surveu

nmullvfkANOTHER VIETNAM?

Donald E. Nuechterlein OMMUNIST insurgency besame a rsality in Thailand during 1966. Consequently, a vital question for the Thai Govermnent and for ita Southeaet Aeia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliee was whether this threat to internal seeurity could be contained witbh certain geographical araas and solved with the help of only aquipment and advisors from Thai kmds allies. At the end of the year, there was reason for optimism that the Thais would be able to solve this problem themselves, provided the war in Vietnam did not result in a Viet Cong victory. Thailand possesses many advantages in daaling with her internal sacurity threat that neither South Vietnam nor Malaya had in the 1950s in coping with eimilar problems: Thailand has a strong and effes tive government that has sxercised firm authority throughout the country for more than eight yaars. During 1966, the Revolutionary Government hsaded by Field Marshal Thanom Kib tikacbom continued to provide ra markeble political stability, and, unIike most of the authoritarian regimes that have run the country since World 59

THAILAND War II, this one appears to be gaining in public acceptance and internal co hesion. Thailand is enjoying unprece dented beonomic prosperity, resulting from the governmente aetute finan cial policies and from a record volume of ~foreign investment, both govern ment and private. With a growth rate in the gross national product of nearly seven percent and with large foreign reserves supporting the currency, the country continued an economic trans formation that began when the Revo lutionary Government came to power in 1968. Ttiailand possesses a higher de gree of national unity than, perhaps, any other country in southeast Asia. A long tradition of monarchy, the dom inance of Buddhism as a national re ligion, and the absence of a colonial heritage have contributed enormously to the relatively high degree of na tional identity that currently prevails. Thailand has the most experi enced and efficient civil eervice in southeast Asia. The rapid economic development, however, has not spread ite benefits evenly over the country. The north east, for example, hae not received eimilar material rewards from the prosperity as have other areas, par ticularly the urban centere. Although progress is being made to bring irriThie article was digestsd from the otigiual, publtzhed in ASIAN SUSVN, Febrmw 1967. ASIAN StmvEY is pwblished monthly by the Inetitute of Intevwational Stvkdie8, Univer8itv of California. Dr. Nuechterlein i8 with the Department of Defevwe and au thor of the book, Thailand and the Struggle for Southeaet Aeia. 66 gation, health facilities, agricultural improvements, and other benefits to the northeaet, the question is whether the progress ie rapid enough to give villagers there increaeed confidence in the government. At the end of 1966, despite consid erable efforte by the government to overcome the basic economic problems of the area, it was uncertain how much headway it had actually made to win the support of the peasants in the northeast. In fact, it would he difficult for any government in Bangkok to reverse the long years of neglect and indifference that have traditionally characterized the attitude of the central government toward thie area. To eeek to accom plish in a few years what other re gimes have failed to do in a century probably ie beyond the reach of the Thanom government; however, it is making a rather remarkable e ort now to reach the people in the n f rth eaet and to show enough progress to prevent the Communist from making deep penetrations there.
ln8u~ency lncrea8e

The serioue and deteriorating eecu rity situation in the northeast results both from the elow progrees in im proving the economic and eocial con ditions of the area and from the de termined efforts of Hanoi and Peking to undermine the position of the Bang kok Government. It is eetimated that up to a thousand armed ineurgente are now operating in certain areas of the northeaet, and information gained from a defector and recently made public reveals that a ,training camp is functioning in North Vietnam to produce additional Thai guerrilla cad res. By November, more than 80 assse einations, mainly of local officiale, had Military RevieIV

. ---~
TNAIIANO been committed in 1966, and there wae that the insurgency was diminishing in intensity. On the con trary, the Communiet terrorists acted with increasing boldness against the defenseless villagere, and the number of attacks on government police units was rising. Some observers believed at the end of 1965, when the Communists first
no indication

east, and come army units have been moved into the ares to support the police efforts. On the economic eide, a Rural Develop~ent Program has been started to supplement the Mobile Development Unita that have been op erating in certain critical areas since 1962, On the political side, township coun cils have been set. up in 60 areas of

President and Mrs. Lyndon B. Johnsen and King Bhumibol Adulyadej and Queen Sirikit
ef Thailand. During his October 19S6 visit, President Johnsen snnounced an increase in miIitary sid to Thailand.

shift in tactics probably resulted from more vigorous government police ac tion in the northeast. By the end of 1966, however, few were in doubt that word had gone out from Hanoi and PeKng for the Thai Patriotic Front totake the offensive against thegov ernment. The Thanom regimes response to the insurgency has been swift and generally impressive. On the security side, the government has substantially increased the number of police sta tione and police personnel in the northJana 1s67 .

there are plans to raise the number of these democratically elected coun cils to 132. In Bangkok, the government has established the Countereubversion Op erations Center to coordinate the ef forts of all government agencies oper ating in the north~st. Good progress is being made to get more agricultural spwialiste, doctors, nurees, teachers, and eanitetion workers into the crit ical and long-negle-@ed districts along the Mekong. The caliber of district and provincial officials is being im 31

.,.
TNAII.AND proved, and provincial governors now have more funds at their dieposal to carry out needed projects. To help meet the growing insur. gency in the northeast, the Thai Gov ernment asked the United States to provide it with additional military ae eistance. During his visit to Thailand in October, President Lyndon B. John son announced an increase in US mil t. ltary aid from 45 million dollars in Fiscal Year 1966 to 60 million dollars in Fiscal Year 1967. The United States also sent epeeial unita of the US Army to train the Thai Army in counterinsurgency techniques. . A small number of unarmed US hel icopters and crews were assigned on a temporary basis to provide training for the Thai Air Force and transport for Thai Army and police units on operations againet insurgents in the northeast. These helicopter did not engage in actual combat, however, and they were withdrawn early in 1967 when Thailand received additional helicopter of her own which were manned by Thai crews. provided the United States with vital military fa cilities. This involved a substantial buildup of US forces in Thailand to some 35,000, meet of whom were Air Force personnel. The United States also built in Thailand eeveral of the largest military installations in south east Aeia, the most notable being at Sattahip on the Gulf of Siam. Many Western observers wondered how it was possible that there could be eo little opposition within Thailand to thie large increase in foreign pres ence. The answer lice in the pragmatic way in which the Thais have tradL tionally viewed their position vis-a vie powerful neighbore. n
US Facilities On her side, Thailand

Today, Thai elite groups are con. vinced that the major long-term thgeat to national security is from an aggres sive China, working in league with Hanoi. They also believe that the only greet power with the resources and the will to prevent China from domi nating southeast Asia is the United States. Therefore, the Thais are pre pared to accept the inconvenience and the cultural impact of large US forces on their soil. Ae one official put it: We have worked with the Americans long enough to know that when we ask them to leave our country, they will do so. One danger that ariees from the remarkable way in which the Tbais have accepted the US buildup is the possibility that they may wish to have the US forcee aeeept a larger role in
the counterinsurgency effort than tbe Unitad States believee ie desirable, or

warranted, by the magnitude internal eeeurity threat.

of the

larger Role US policy regarding noninvolve ment of US forces in combat opera ,tione against Thai insurgentsa pol icy endorsed by the Thai Government
was reiterated when the increase. in
military assistance was announced in
October. Nevertheless, fears were ex pressed in Congress and in the press that the United Statee would even tually become involved in direct op erations against Thai insurgents, as had occurred in South Vietnam when the efforts of the Saigon Government failed. US treaty commitments under SE ATO are clear on what the US rw sponse would be if the Communist powers launched a conventional attack against Thailand. Also, in the event of a massive buildup of Communist ineurgente in the northeast, the Thai

RdOW Military

Government may, according to the treaty, consult with its SEATO allies on what assistance may be required to meet the threat. At present, only limited areas of the country are threatened hy insurgency, and there does not appear to be widespread dieeff~lon among the peasantry. There is little reaeon, therefore, to doubt the Thai Governmente capability of dealing with the situation. The key question is whether Bangkoks new emphasis on economic and social reform in the northeast, plus

THAILAND

more effective police work there, will produce results soon enough to persuade the villagere that their aspira tions for an improved standard of living can better be met by the current Thai Government than by. the Communists. In the opinion of thie writer, the situation in Thailand ia far more hopeful than was ever the case in South Vietnam, principally because of Thailands long tradition of nationhood, and there is every reason to believe that the Thaia will be able to solve their internal security prob lem themselves. ).

*
You have shown here in Thailend that prosperity and pregress in Asia sre attainable goals. You have shown by your leadership tbst regienal efforts can gather momentum throughout Asis. Mest important, yeu have shown that freedom and independence are the best environment for progress.

President

Lvndon B. JohnsW

I
lulls 19s7

TRIBAL CULTURES COMMUNISM

Colonel Bernard B. Sapp, United $tetee Anng ITHIN the past 10 years, the. vast and varied region of the tropical African Continent has sud denly and dramatically shaken off its status as a colonial preserve and emerged as a complex of free, inde pendent, and sovereign nations. Al thongh many of them lack even the minimum attributes of viable state hood, they have been accepted into the world community ae sovereign and equal. The grsst strategic eigniticance and economic potential of Africa, and par ticularly tropical Africa, bscame fully apparent during World War II. It was the campaigns in North Africa thst marked the turning point which in sured the eventual defeat of the Axis Poweqs, and it was out of the heart of the Congo that the United States obtained the uranium that made devel opment of nuclear weapons possible. Since World War II, the discovery of rich deposits of such other strategic qinerals as copper, chrome, and man ganese has resulted in a continuing growth 1%the economic ties between the United States and a number of the tropical African nations.

MilitmyRWIEVI i

TRIBAL CULTURES Neither the strategic significance nor the eeonomic potential of tropical Africa hae been overlooked by the two great proponents of Communist ide ology. In thoke nations where their in terference in purely internal affairs has mot led to the expulsion of the dip lomatic and trade missions, the Soviet Union and Communist China compete with the West, and with each other, for economic advantage and political influence. To the Soviet Union, the n~ nations of tropical .Africa offer unkmited possibilities both as a source of strategic materials and as a region in which wars of national liberation may he fermented. Vulnerable to Penetration To Communist China, all of tropical Africa represents one of the vast de veloping rural areas which must be captured to carry out Chairman Mao Tse-tungs plan of encircling North America and Western Europe, thus forcing their eventual capitulation without the neeessity of a direct mili tary confrontation. Since the traditional ways of life in tropical Africa have been largely social or communal it is not sur: pricing that in the new African na~ tions there are a number of political, eocial, economic, and cultural factors which make them particularly vulner- able to Communist penetration and subversion. If the cold war wtilch al ready swirls about these weak na tions is to be won, and their political inclination in world affairs, as well as their internal eeeial-economic SYSterns, are tQ remain oriented to the West, these fhctore and their under lying motivations must be thoroughly understood,

Heed Warning G. Bfennen Williame, former US As sistant Secretary of State, speakhg of the necessity and the urgency of this requirement, warned the United States that: We had bettev be cordly realistic about Communist-bloc. i@uence in Af mca. The new mztione there do not emerge into a one-eided wwkt. They eee it whole, and they are not going to 81am the dow on another great power which cemnnwufe Zarge political and economic reeources. . . . This is one more reaaon, and a weightu one, fw uc to get busg learming all we can about Afmca, understanding the ae Colwwl B~rnard B. Sarw is Chief, zdratioue of it8 people and 8uppwting Taetid Air Suvpwt Elem-ent, US Mil- ite new leader8 in the great enterprise itarg Assiata~e Command Vietnam. of cwwtruction that lice bef we them. He recsived hia M.S. degree in Inter Despite tbe fact that more than 10 national Rekttione from George Wash percent of the citizens of tbe United ington Univereitg, and is a graduate Statee have dir&t ancestral tiee with of the US ArmII Command and Gew tropical Africa, knowledge of the area end Staff CoUege; the Armed Forces and of its people is so limited that pop Stafl College, Norfolk, Virginia; and the US ArmII War CoUege, Carliele ular American attitudes and actions Barracke, Penna@vania. He served in are based more upon prejudice, myth, Europe during World War II and in and misconception than upon facts. Korea during the conflict there. Other A newly arriving visitor to any.of meigtimante include dvtg with the ?th the chief citiee of tropical Africa Arnui in Gwvnmw; DepntV Chief of would probably agree with Peter Mar: Staff of the A@ Defwws Ceatm, Fort rie view that: B1/ee, Texas; and with Allied Land Afrtka lme changed from eelf-euflt Foi-tee, Ceatral Europe, in France.
blue las7

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TRIBAL CULTURES Gient communities of fiWWCeF8into countriee with eophieticated con8titu tione, modern cities, indtwtmee: and moneg economie8. Such an impreaaion would certainly be juatitied by the modern airport where he arrived;, the noiee and bustle of the paved streets filled with people and vehicles; the concrete and glaes buildings that house the offices of Eu ropean and American companiea; the bu8y,civi] servants, briefcases in hand, hurrying into buildings wlhch house modern government ministries and de partments; and political leadera and government officials driving past in shiny, expensive cars. Serious Misconceptions Unfortunately, this view gives rise to the serioue misconceptions about the extent to which African arxieties have already been transformed. What the visitor will not see, and from the city cannot perceive, ia that in the rural area, which ie the home of 90 percent of the Africans, life is gov erned by the traditional institutions and subsistence economy. This is the true picture of Africa today-an Africa trying to find new forms of expreeeion for the ,enduring values of the paat. It is an Africa in aesrch of a new set of values that will enable her people to span the gap bs tween tribaliam and nationalism, and to croes the chasm which separates traditional cultures from the realities of a modern world. It will be the re sults of tiis searchthe selection that is made in the new forms of expres sion-that will establieh the pattern of Africa tomorrow. One of the most enduring popular misconceptions about Africa is the idea that the lack of technical devel opment, the absence of .a written lan guage, and the division of the popula 68 . . . . . . . . .. . tion hrto a multitude of small tribal unite is the result of a long ieolation from the remainder of the world. This myth persists deepi e the vieible land link between Egypt L and tropical Af. rica. Contact and commerce bet(veen the Arab and Negro ethnic groups are readily evident from tbe liberal infu sion of Hamitic and Nilotic blood in the Negroid tribes which live .in the northern and eastern sectione of trop. ical Africa. Evideqce of suth contact can be found in the frequent mention of black warriors, servants, and slaves in Egyptian hieroglyphics which pre date the Christian era. Just when the first Europeans came into contact with the central region of the African Continent cannot be def initely atsted. It bas been continuous since early in the 15th century, and it is probable that exploratory visits were made to all of the Atlantic coasts of Africa a hundred or more years prior to that time. Dissimilarities Another favorite American myth ,about Africa ia the belief that all Af rican Negroid tribes are alike. Ac tually, it would be more nearly cor rect to say that none of the African tribes is like another, for the diesimiIaritiee in feature, stature, and cul ture far. exceed the similarities. As examples of the physical dissimilari ties, skin color varies from the true Negro blue-black of the Guinea ~oaat area to the mulatto bronae of the Mo8si who live in the Somali Republic. Stature ranges from the four-foot Pygmies of the Congo to the seven-. foot Watusi of Rwanda and Burundi. In culture, the differences are equally as etriking. In fact, anthropologists have identified at least 1,500 distinct tribal culture patterns in Africa. A

&lA&.

.,
TRIBAL CULTURES few patterns, with slight variations, aPPearin abhost all tribal cultures. It ie also widely believed that the colonization of Africa led to her frag mentation into small countries totally lacking in viability. The truth is that colonization contributed far more to unification in tropical Africa than it did to fragmentation. Even Gambia, the smallest of the African nations, c.ontaine the lands of more than three reasonably large tribal units. Nigeria, a much larger nation, is made up of nearly 300 tribal unite speaking over 250 different languages. Mb@ary Boundaries What colonization did do was to create arbitrary boundaries which made no sense geograpldca]ly, econom ically, culturally, or ethnically. The re sult is that the eize, shape, and com ponents of the new African nations of today are irrational. These arbL trarily established Sines of demarca tionwhich separate family groups, tribes, and claris-have alreedy led to friction between come of the new na tions. They will continue to be the source of instability in tropical Africa until loyalty to nation replaces the present loyalty to tribe. Finally, there is the mistaken be lief that tribal cultures are lacking in inner logic and coherehce. Therefore, the African will readily adopt the su perior culture of a more advanced so ciety when he is exposed to ita obvious advantages. This belief was shared by tbe colonial administrators who came to role the tropical empires and the missionaries who came to cave pagan souls. Despite the long and persistent efforts of these two groups, and the long exposure of the African to the white mans culture, there has been only a limited adoption of foreign in novations. Only of the cities of Africa can it be said that the- prevailing culture patterns are more Western than African. Even here, the change is more apparent than reel, for it is not at all unusual for the African to prac tice Weetem culture in pubSic and

tribal culture at home. While tbe in troduction of teehnical changes and the presence of 750,000 Europeans and 400,000 Asians have caused some changes in the over-all culture pat terns, the culture base remains de cidedly oriented to tbe mores of the traditional social order. Although the African tribal CUI turee of today defy generalization, they posseee patterne of thought and action which reflect a type of pure 67 a

TRIBAL CULTLIRES communism. Among these patterne there is the communal nature of tribal life which involves not only the subor dination of the individual to the group, but a completely different idea of the meaning of freedom. The concept of individual freedom, held precious by Americane, is not shared by most Af ricans, nor is it likely to be desired which the members of the tribe graze their cattle or raise their crops. In some casee, the tribe believes that the land belongs to everyone and that no individual or group has the right to divert it to his exclusive use. In others, ownership ie veeted in the extended family. Each member of the familywhich includes the epirita of

by many of them. However, freedom for the larger social group of which he is a member is valued highly by the African. Closely associated with the allencompassing. ties of khehlp and the tribal group is the practice of com munal ownership of land. The degree of individual control and individual right of land tenure differa among the various tribal cultures. In virtually all tribes, however, some. type of group control is exercieed over the land upon w

the deceased ancestore, the living, and the yet to be horn-hae an equal right to the use of the land. Some smaller tribal units, such aa the Wolof of the Central African Republic, practice not only communal ownership of the land, but organize themselves into work groups to plant, weed, and harveet the fields. An essential element of the eecial and communal pattern of tribal life is a well-defined and highly inflexible system of rank and precedence. Under MilitetyReview , ,..

TRIBAL CULTURES the various systems used, which ~n. elude age grouping, heredity, and elec tion, the status of the individual is firmly estab~ished in the group to which he belongs. A naturally associated element of tribal culture is the absolute nature of the authority of the head of the group. Whether a single chief who acquires hk poeition through birth, election, or competition, or a council holding authority on the basis of se niority or selection, the titular head of the social group holds the power of life and death over all membere of the group. Two impeding Factors From theee few examples of the cul ture patterns and the institutions of tribal life, it can readily be seen that a degree of natural affinity exists be tween tribaliem and theoretical com munism. Fortunately, there ie also found in these patterns two factors which would impede any effort to im plement leftist goals. These factors are first, the inherent resistance of the tribal cultures to change and to out side control,. and second, the tradi tional dii%inct~ons of rank and caete which permit acceptance of eocial and economic inequalities. Aside from any affinity between its culture patterns and the ideology of communism, tribalismby the mere fact that it existe and that, to achieve any significant degree of economic de velopment, it must be destroyedposes a serioue threat to stability in tropicaI Africa. To the African policymaker and the Weetern advisor afike, the ap parent central problem of African de velopment is usually thought of as how to obtain the economic resources and technical skills necessary to achieve an adequate rate of growth. Underlying this apparent problem is
amElee7

the less obvious but more important question of how to maintain the in tegrity of the rural eeciety while, at the same time, transforming its fun damental institutions from tribal to national orientation. Social Unrest Africas leaders might recognize in advance that the forced detribaliza tion cannot be accomplished without creating the same type of social un rest which forced the colonial powers to grant independence. They are not likely, however, to be willing to sacri fice the time required for social trans formation by the slow Mlstorical proc ess the West has experienced. In their eagerness to improve the economy of their new states and to es tablish their own identities as pro gressive leaders, they are inclined to ignore the example of the Republic of the Congo. Here, detribalization of three million natives in a 50-year pe. riod created the tensions leading to the bloody revolution and cessionist movement which toppled the govern ment only five days after independence wae granted. Thie eituation remaine, even after the passage of seven years, a matter of continuing concern to the United States and to the United Na tions. The destruction of tribalism is not the only manifestation of nationalism which creates condition favorable for Communist penetration. The necessity to transform their nations rapidly from basically rural to basically indus trialized urban societies poses many probIems for the new African statee and their leadere. Even though they are essentially oriented toward the West, the men who face these tasks cannot ignore the effectiveness of the Soviet blueprint for the controlled single-party state.

TRIBAL CUL?URES This recommends the Marxian eco nomic philosophy as the prime instru ment for mobilizing resources and for maximizing scarce means to attain se cially desired ends. These men cannot fail to see the advantages in the ChG neee Communist techniques for inten sive channeling of the energies of the people into planned production. The desperate and ever-increasing need for capital investment and for the development of the infrastructure of the new nations also affords the Communist an entree into tropical Af rica. Convinced that their policy of poeitive neutrality will protect them from the red menace, and that their insistence that all aid be granted without strings attached frees them from future political liability, most African leaders have followed Kwame Nkrumahs philosophy that: It doesnt matter where you get your aid. If you can get it, get it. Authoritative Government Another facet of African national ism which makes the new countries vulnerable to communism is the need, recognized by African leaders and Western observers alike, for some type of authoritative governm~nt during the transitional period. At the present stage of their development, a govern inent based on popular referendum does not appear practical. The chances, at beet, do not favor parliamentary democracy when religious rivalries, cultural antagonism, vast illiteracy, a wide belief that w~rldly evente are controlled by occult forces, rootless urban proMarians, and traditionbound rural masses are added to trib alism. Most of the stable African Govern ments of today reflect thk fact and are based upon authoritarian forme. while none of these ;e Communist in 70 the sense that this term applies to governmental processes, they are types of government which can be trans formed easily from one of guided de mocracy to totalitarian communism. The existence of this type of govern ment, combined with the perceived need for Sosialist economic palicies, form a potentially ynfhvorable situa tion for the Weetern democracies. To at least some degree, the dys- functional aepacts of African nation alism which may cause a drift toward communism are offset by the continued awsal of Weetern ideals and technol ogy and by the fact that most of the currgnt leaders of the new nations have been educated in coileges and uni versities in the United States, France, or Great Britain.

us Policy
In spite of their strong opposition to. colonialism as an institution, the leaders of Africa today are men who recognize and respest the humanitar ian motivations which underlie West ern policies. Wbether:or not the men who will ultimately rephwe the cur rent leadership will maintain this rap proch.smsnt with the West will depend, to a large degree, upon the policies pursued toward tropical Africa by the Western democracies and, more ire-. portant, by the actions and attitudes of the representatives of the West who are in contact with the Africans on a day-to-day basis. The Department of State has de fined the US policy toward the nations of Africa as being aimed at three main objcstives: . To help Africa develop stable and . independent nations able to make their own unique contributions to the world community. To help the governments of AfAca work to meet the legitimate as-

MMteiy itWiSW

TfllBAL CULTURES pirations of their peoples for a better life. To help the peoples of Africa develop free societies and institutions in harmony with their own beliefs and culturee. These objectives, and the programs which have been pursued te achieve them, reflect the continuing concern of the United States in the develop ment and maintenance of a global at mosphere of freedom and cooperation in which independent nations may pur sue their own destinies and free peo ples seek their own version of ulti mate salvation. Certainly, nothing the objectives imply could serve to lessen the trust and confidence of tropical

Africans in the policies and ohjecttves of the United States. Ultimately, the degree of success achieved by US policy toward the new nations of tropical Africa will be de termined by what is done and not by what is eaid. What is done will, in large measure, be determined by what is known. Thue, it would appear much to the benefit of the United States that we ehould follow former Secretary Wil liams advice and: . . . get busy learning all we can about A fmca, understanding the asps rations of fte people and supporting its new leadere in the great enterprise of construction that lies bef or-e them.

Shsken by missionary efforts-both Christian snd Islsmichatlled and often broken by colenial sdministrators, and finally penetrated by modern communicationfrom press te transistor radioe-tribslism is frequently sble to resist change but it ie rarely able to previde sn enduring alternative. Hence, it hns usually hampered rather than helped Africsns in their task of nation building. While tribal virtues snd IeysWles are frequently ef vslue te the in dividual in his personal life, collectively they tend to be resistimt to the in tegrative imperatives of tbe medern natinn atate. Nevertheless progress ia being made. . . .

Aeeietant

Secretar# of State Joseph Palmer II (Foreign Affairs)

km 1987

AS

@!tV~

From

Journul of the RUSI

(Great

Britain)

IWclear Proliferation and the Great Powers

Major General W. G. F. Jackson, Brih8hArm~

T FIRST sight, the proliferation of nuclear weapons seems as inevitable as war itself. Their appearance at this moment in history fits neatly i@o the evolutionary pattern of war, and the scale of their destructive power can be co-related ominously with the worlds exploding population. In confirmation of thk thesis,, there is the cold fact that the United Kingdom, France, and China have forced their way into the nuclear club at vast capital coet which they can ill afford. There is, however, another train of thought which this article will explore. There has always been something illogical about war, and now, in the nuclear era, its contradictions stand out in such sharp contrast that we should bs able to discern wars of ending this waste of the worlds waalth. What could be more irrational than rich nations squandering their resources, on weapone whose destructive power renders them almost unusable while two thigds of the worlds people live in abjest poverty for want of the very capital used for bombs? Surely, we ehould be able to iaolats the catalyst in the worlds equ,ation of forces which makes thk unhappy reaction possible and, having done so, find the antidote. 72 . Miliity Review

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION The basic contradiction which we have to solve is simply stated: Pro liferation is both wasteful and danger ous, and yet nations which need all their resources to improve the stand ard of living of their people are driven to make great sacrifices to join the nuclear club. The equation setting out thk contradiction is equally sim ple to formulate. It consists of one constant and two variables. The Equation The conetant ia a broad enough in dustrial base to develop and manufac ture nuclear weapons and their dtilv ery syetems. The first variable is the intensity of nationalist feeling which drives a nation to put guns before butter. The second is the strength of a natiins desire for a higher standard of living. A country which has the neceseary industrial base and in which the dic kates of nationalism are stronger than its desire for prosperity will strive to make and to keep the bomb. Con versely, if its desire-for prosperity out weighs ite nationalist tendencies, or if its industrial base ie inadequate, then euch a country must either adopt a neutrali@ posture-as India did un der Jawaharlal Nehru-or accept the etetus of a nuclear protectorate. Col lective security treaties such as the This article waa digested frene the original which wae the Gold Me& and Trench Gewcoigns Prize E8eay for 1965, publiehed in the JOURNALOF THE ROYAL
UNITEO SERVICE INSTITUTION

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Central Treaty Organization, and the Sontheeet Asia Treaty Organiza tion may, however, be used to eoften the indignity of protectorate status. A quasi-mathematical rendering of the eqnation might be: Industrial base + (nationalism= prosperity) = the bomb. Industrial baee + (prosperity nationalism) = neutrality or protec torate status.
The solntion to thie equation lies in
the relationship between nationalism
and the desire for prosperity. Let us
consider the relative valuee of these
two variables in the policies of present
and prospective members of the nu clear club.
L%arsor Butter A superficial assessment of the, US equation suggeste that ehe can afford both grins and butter and still go ahead faeter than the rest of the world. This is probably true, but the driving forces of US policy go deeper than thie. The United States ie, in spite of her appearance to the contrary, one of the most nationalist statee in the world. She etill feele the urge of all revolu tionary powers to export the fruite of her success. Not only did she throw off . the cramping yoke of Britieh colonial rule, but ehe has also been more suc cessful than any other country in har nessing the forces of nature for the good of her people. The deereet deeire of the United States is to establieh a Pax Americana which will go down in h]story as su perior to the Pax Bmtmmica which she hae always admired. She hae, how ever, three phobias which tend to cloud her judgment: anticolonialism, born of her own colonial past; bitter hatred of communism, the antithesis of her free enterprise syetem; and antiap

(Great Britain) November 1966. Copyrighted @ 1966 by the JOUR NAL OFME ROYALUNITEOSERV
1(55INSTITUTION. Genwd Jewkeen is Direetw

of the Chief of Defeaee Staff e (70m memwealth Studg UNISON 67.

hoelW

13

NUCLEAN PROLIFERATION peasement, stemming from her convic tion that British proneness to this sin led to the two World Wars and the de cline of Britieh power. The United States would have liked to eetablieh a world rule of law through US.sponeored international bodies such as the United Nations and hy generous aid programs like the Marahall plan. Unfortunately, her deaiings with the Communist powers have eoured her enlightenment. In con sequence, she has, in effect, rewritten the traditional directive to the British Admiralty in nuclear te~s: The United Statea must have a second stilke capability superior to any com I$nationof nuclear powers. Thus, in spite of her desire to aban don old-fashioned British power poli tice, the United States haa been forced by fear of world communism to adopt a policy of deterring with nuclear guns whlie trying to buy friends with aid butter. Fear is the catalyst in the US equation-fear of the im placable nature of communism and fear that, without nucledr weapons, she and her Western allies could he swamped by the growing populations of the Communist world.. feneive in purpose and aimed at pro. testing Mother Russia with a glaeis of Communist states. It ie usualiy suggestsd that Nikita S. Khrushcheve policy of coexistence stemmed from his realization of the meaning of a nuclear exchange in terms of destruction of Soviet cities. The reverse may well be a truer ex

~em.i..&

,.66

et

dhfowmtim

General Charles de Gaulle Soviet Unions growing stockpiie of nuclear weapons enabled the Soviets to adopt a less truculent and more co operative attitude toward the West. Difficulties with China may have helped to soften the Soviets Western face, but the eesential factor in the USSRs poiicy of coexistence appears to have been increased confidence in the safety of the Soviet homelands from a US nuclear attack. In other words, fear of the West rather than aggressive intent is probably the cat alyst wtilch has made the Soviet Union squander scarce reeources and great scientific effort on nnclear weapons. Great BrilAna position is very dif ferent. As a great trading nation with few natural resourcee of her own, she knows that she must export to iive Milii Revise

SovietPolioy
The Weetern view of Soviet Poiicy is undergoing radical change. It used to be assumed without question that the Marxist doctrine of world revolu tion made the Soviet Union an ag greasor state. Certahly, her behavior under Joseph Stalin supported this contention, but there is another expla nation for her intransigence which is gaining ground. It now seems more likely that her actions were due to deep-seated fear and distrust of the Weat, and that, although the Staiinist ag~eaeiona were dffensive in outward appearance, they wele essentially de 74

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION and cannot allow the dictates of na tionalism to gain the upper hand. Any excessive government expenditure, particularly on defenee, hae an ad verse effect on her competitive posi tion in world markete. She has, how ever, learned over the centuriee that trade ie unprofitable without stability and that atabllity depends on main taining the balance of power. Except for her recent and ehortof the Vic Iived imperial interlude terian and Edwardian erae, the United Kingdom has been a small country making her way in the world by her astute manipulation of alli ances and commercial treaties. Her armed forces have alwaye been emall wmpared with thoee of her rivale, but they have been feered by foes and respected by allies for their crucial influence on the balance of power. UnIiie the United States, Britain ia not gripped by an unreasoning hatred of eoarnruniem; ehe knowe its dogmas will mature and mellow like those of all other revolutionary creeds. No Trust
On the other hand, Britaine long experience in world politics has taught [ her to trost no one. The pendulum of history e~inga to and fro remorse lessly and hae tipped the balance of power against her so often. She haa usually been able to rebuild her forces behind her seawalls in time to win the last battle, but at times it has been cloee. British Prime Ministers have reit erated the United Kingdome deter mination not to place the ultimate eafety of the British Isles in the hande of an alien power, however friendly that power may seem today. A com promise hae had to be struck between the United Kingdoma economic poei. tion and her strategic requirernersta. kae la67

She has had to accept US Polaris de livery systems to save development and production costs, but ahe hae re tained her own nuclear warheads, thus keeping the ultimate decision to launch the British deterrent in her own hands. In the United Kingdoms equati~n, it is not fear of the Soviet Union or the United States which makes her waete valuable resources on deter rence; it ia fear that, unleee ahe has her own emall nuclear capability, she will not be able to redress the balance of power in her favor if it is upset by come unforeseen twiet of fate, nor will she ever be able to rebuild her strength once she hae loet her nu clear know-how. Frances Position Francee position is eimilar to Brit ains with one outstanding difference. She is, like Britain, an old and worldly wise power, but she is smarting under four humiliating experiences: Water 100, 1816; Sedan, 1870; mutiny on the Western Front, 1917; and the blitz krieg, 1940. General Charles de Gaulle mirrors the deep-seated resentment of the French people againet the indig nity of being rescued after 1917 and 1940 by the Anglo-Saxons. No catalyst ia needed in the French equation; nationalism of the most rabid type overshadow economic con siderations. La Gloire is stirring the minds of Frenchmen once more. France fears that, unless she acquires nuclear etatua, -her interests will be ignored by her frienda as well as her enemies. The aseeesment of Conmmniat Chi nae motives is crucial to thie study beceuae China ie the Sirat Asian and first developing country to force her way into the nuclear club. If logic dominated mene councils, China would 7s

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

, Afro-Asian coin. She is faced with the same grinding poverty, but, by re. ligion, culture, and inclination, she is pacific although not pacifist. Nehrus policy of nonalignment suited Indias personality and waa the classic exam ple of the second half of the equation of forces. She has the industrial base, but her deeire for improved standards of living was strong enough to subdue the urgings of nationalism; hence, she accepted neutralism as a .nationa} policy. Indiapa conflict with China and Pak istan and the detonation of the Chi nese nuclear devices have now made it difficult for her liberal politicians and more level-headed economists to resist preseures from her armed forces and her own nationalists to enter the nuclear field. Other Powers The lesser powers who might ac quire nuclear weapons fall into three groups. First come Germany and Ja pan wbo have adequate industrial basee, but are both trying to work their way back into world society. They would like a finger on a deterrent trigger, but neither is keen to cripple ite resurgent economy with a costly nuclear weapons program. Canada and Australia form tbe sac ond group. They have the potential to deveIop nuclear weapons, but are content to accept the United StatesUnited Kingdom nuclear umbrella. The third group comprises states which do not poseess the necessary indus trial base, but which have an overpow ering motive to acquire weapone by fair means or foul from other nuclear powers. The United Arab Republic and Israel are prominent in this group. In the first two groups, the catalyst of fear ia, for the time being, absent and so these nations are not pressing Military Rovivw

be ploughing back her savings into development projects and squeezing every possible ounce of aid out of East and West alike. Revolutionary powers rarely adopt such rational policies, and China is no exception. She has three reasons for wasting precious scientific and in dustrial effort on nuclear weapons: her orthodox Communist belief in the inevitability of war with the Capital ist world; her deep-seated fear of the United States; an~, most important of all, ber determination to lead the Afro-Asivm and, perhaps, Latin-Amer ican have nets against the Western haves. Revolution China can see no means of redress ing the balance between the overrich sections of the world and the pitifully poor without violent revolution. In ber view, the world is in Frances position before tbe French Revolution. Tbe rich are growing richer while tbe poor grow poorer. The United Nations ie no more effective than the French States-General, and, although the rich countries are as well intentioned as the French aristocracy, they are too pre occupied with their own problems to right the wrongs of tbe rest of tbe world. China has cast herself in the role of an international Robespierre, lead ing the Afro-Asian and Latin-Ameri can Jacobin club. In this guise, she needs nuclear weapons to give her the mantle of power with which to win have not confidence and support. Thus, in C~inas case, fear of the West plays a part, but the real driving force is her determination to win a fairer share of the worlds wealth for herself and, at the same time, for the poorer nations. India presente the other side of the
Violent

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION to join the nuclear club. In the third group, however, fear is at work and may well lead to unscrupulous at tbmpte to acquire a nuclear status. world opinion against disturbers of the peace. We have thus no precedent to guide us in our search for the for mula which would enable states to make a partial surrender of sover eignty. History does, however, abound with examples of political unions on a smaller scale.

The Catalyst Fear is the common thread which runs through all these case histories: the United States and the Soviets fear of each others intention; fears of Three Principles I.aoking back over history, it is pos middle powers like Britain and France sible.to generalize the forces needed that their interests will not be re spected; and fear of the newly devel ~ for successful political union into three elements: an external unifying oping states that a fair share of the force to drive the parties together; a worlds wealth will not be theirs with out a fight. The antonym of fear is practicable system of political checks confidence, and, in national affairs, the and balances tocement the union; and antidote for fear has been found to be the obvious economic benefits which must accrue from the union. If these the establishment of confidence in the rule of law, forces become weaker than the disrup On the international level, there tive influences of national eentiment and self-interes$ then the union will seems little reason to doubt that the break up. establishment of confidence in the rule of law and in the fairer diatributilon The application of these three prin ciples varies with different types of of wealth should have similar results. union and, inparticular, between corn Unfortunately, this would mean the pulsory unions such as empires and surrender of an unprecedented degree voluntary unions such as federations of national sovereignty to some form and confederations. We have fought of supranational authority with the two World Wars to prevent the com power to centralize nuclear weapons pulsory union of the world under the and to impose a system of interna unifying force of one imperial power, tional development taxation to level the gap between the rich and poor , so we can discard one-power hegem ony as a method of establishhg a states. world authority. We need only consider So far, no one has been able to de voluntary unions, of which the cre vise a meana of making the surrender ation of the United States is the out of sufficient sovereignty palatable to standing example. the nations of the world, but it is in Projecting these three principles such a device that the key to success onto the world stage, the unifying must ultimately lie, force would be provided by mans hor There have been three attempts so ror of nuclear destruction and his ab far to create a world authority Czar horrence of the inequalities of wealth Alexander Is Holy Alliance, the and opportunity between peoples. The League of Nations, and the United political bonds would need to be some Nationsbut none of these organiza form of constitution freely negotiated tions infringed national sovereignty. in much the came way as that of the All three lacked teeth and have de United States. The mutual benefit pended for their authority on rallying June1967 17

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION would be the end of wasting pfecious resources on nuclear weapons and a beginning of more equitable eharing of the worlds wealth. The queetion we now have to an swer ie whether there ie any chance of such a unifying force becoming strong enough, of any system of cheeks and balances becoming ualatIL It seems to take the exhaustion and disillusion of a world conilict to soften the hard crust of nationalism effic iently to let liberal humaniet forces break through. Even then their break through hae, eo far, proved short lived. The only encouraging sign is the progressive improvement of the League over the Holy Alliance and of

able enough, and of the mutual benefite becoming obvioue enough for nations to eurrender voluntarily the degree of sovereignty needed to make the world rule of law a practicable poeeibility. The worlde attempts to create a supranational authority have a dis couraging and alarming ring about them. The Holy Alliance was born after the Napoleonic Ware, the League of Nations after World War I, and the United Nations after World War
78

the United Nations over the League, but this encouragement ie clouded by the disturbing thought that progress has only been made after a world war. Waiting for the third world war in the nuclear era ia unthinkable. We must find some other way of taking progressive steps toward the world rule of law. Unfortunately, surrender of sovereignty only becomes attractive when the alternative is something approaching national suicide. Little

RWiOW Militafy

J,.. -Ada

NuCLEAR PROLIFERATION progress is likely to be made uness nations are thoroughly frightened, and so, paradoxically, it may be through fear that we find a way out of this impaese. Brinkmanship has become part of the political way of life in the nuclear era. Each aseay in this dangerous. game affords an opportunity to per suade nations to take a further short step forward toward the rule of law. The abuse of the veto led to the lUnit ing for Peace resolution which en abled the General Assembly of the United Nations to outflank the Seeu rity Council. The Cuban crisis led to the hot line between Washington and Moscow. The Congo and Cyprus led to perceptible improvement in the UN peace-keeping organization. As each fresh crisis cmcurs and fear rises in mens hearte, a new effort should be made to bring the rule of law one step nearer. This evolutionary process may be slow and at times dis couraging, hut it is better than wait ing for world war III. Voting System The negotiation of a constitution for a supranational authority is fraught with even greater difficulties. One look at the distribution of the worlds peculations shows how diffi cult it would be to devise a voting sYs tem which would inspire confidence. The rich, developed nations of the West can muster only 762 million peo ple. The Afro-Asian bloc without China has 1,237 million, and the Com munist bloc, including Communist Chi nas 686 million, has 1,151 million. Whether voting were to be based on the present General Aseembly syetem of one government equale one vote or on a card vote taking account of sizes of population, the richer and militarily stronger West could be hopeSsoe1937 Iesely outvoted on crucial ieeuee by the more populous, but poorer and weaker, East. The Western Powers would find it dMicult to accept the mandate of a world authority whose votilnq system was eo clearly able to work against their intereste. Univsrsal Franchise Conversely, the Communist and newly developed states would aleo he unlikely to accept any system nut based on universal franchke bacauee this, in their eyes, is the only way to offset the power and wealth of the Weet. One man equale one vote ie, after all, the system lauded so much by the Western Powere as true democracy. Is the konetitutional picture really as gloomy as the voting problem would suggeet ? The same situation existed in the United Kingdom hefore the Re form Bills in the laet century and in most other democracies as they ap proached universal franchiee. The addition of a large workingclass vote did not destroy, as was feared, the traditional parties or make England the prey of irresponsible dem agogues. On the contrary, politicians found that they had to work harder and argue more persuasively in order to win power. Dependence on patron age wae no longer sufficient to ensure a political career, and swaying the floating vote by well-founded argu ments became crucial to political suc cese. Is it not possible that the same thing may prove to be true in a world forum ? The smaller and newer states are gaining political experience. There is less inclination to vote blindly with one or other of the extreme blocs. A healthy floating vote is already appear ing as nations find that neither Eaet nor West can provide the panacea for their troubles. 79

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

* tential: time to develou international poiitical responeibllity~ and time to create world fiecal machinery for the fairer distribution of wealth. Unhap pily, tbe march of eventa ie unlikely to allow such a well-ordered evolution unleee we take active eteps to buy the time which we need. Buying Time Wholehearted support of the world disarmament negotiations is probably one of the best waye of buying time. Progrees hae not been spectacular, but such agreements ae tbe test ban treaty and the negotiations for a nonprolifer. ation agreement do keep both eidee in touch with each other and help to damp down the nuclear arms race. Looked at from the point of view of quantita tive disarmament, the resulte, so far, have been disappointing. However, looked at as a means of buying time for the evolution of an effective world authority, they are more encouraging. Armaments are, after all, only the symptom and not the cause of the dieeaee which arnlcts the world. The cause ia the deep-seated fear of the intentions of othere bred by a lack of confidence in the rule of law. Dis armament negotiation eerve ae a pal liative to keep the disease in check until a permanent cure can be found. Unfortunately, we are dealing with a cancer for which there is, at preeent, no known cure. The ruthleee behavior of Communist China showe that disarmament nego tiation alone are not enough to keep the disease in check. We must also use the old-fashioned remediee of power politics and their modern derivative, deterrence, to keep the world in bal ance until an effective cure can be found. The turning point in the hietory of the nuclear era may come when

The great powers are having to work harder to win votes by the at trtilveness of their prdicies while the emaller natione are finding more op. portunity to sway events by withhold ing their support. The growth of in ternational pelitical responsibility will take time to develop and may appear hopelessly utopian today, but what bas proved possible on a national scale may well be poeeible on a world scale in due course. Economic Benefits The third ingredient for success ful union-mutual economic henefi~ should be readily apparent to the newly developing etates which have everything to gain from a suprana tional authority whose aim would be to narrow the gap between rich and poor by fiscal means. It ie the devel oped states who are more likely to op pose such schemes. Fortunately for the world, meet of the really rich coun tries are the meet enlightened and are already trying to find waye for the channeling of aid through interna tional organizations. Both the United States and Great Britain have found that international charity only breeds jealouey among the recipients and disillusion among the donors. International taxation of the rich to provide development cap ital for the poor would probably be. welcomed by the West which fully ap preciates the danger of tbe widening gap between the rich and poor coun tries. It might, however, be more dif ficult, although not impossible, to per suade the Communist countriee to etop using aid programs as weapone of the cold war. The key to all these steps toward the rule of law ie tire-time to gather small but cumulative improvement to the United Natione peace-keeping po eo

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NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION China accepts, as the Soviet Union has done already, that nuclear war ie un thinkable and that coexistence is the only practicable policy. Once this hap pens, we may be able to make real progress toward the rule of law. In the meantime, negotiation from strength, while at the same time pressing for partial disarmament, must remain the basic Western policy for buying time. What form should British policy take in dealing with the problem of proliferation ? As a greet trading na tion, Britains concern is world sta bility and the rule of law which she tried to impose singlehanded upon the world in the last century. Britain should not subscribe to the theory that nuclear weapons are part of the balance of nature and, hence, that proliferation is inevitable. Her aim should be to help in the evolution of a world authority able to inspire enough confidence for the nations to make a voluntary surrender of sov ereignty. Thk will take time, and so, in the meanwhile, Britah must look to her own interests. Britaii should adopt a boxers stance. With her left, she should keep jabbing away at the creation of an effective supranational authority and at pafilal dk4armament measureil as each fleeting opportunity occurs. With her right, Britain should hold in re serve a strong and well-balanced mili tary punch to protect her own inter ests until the rule of law is estab lished. The title of Britakte Minister for Disarmament should be changed to Minister for Development of World Government. It would then be clear that he is responsible for directing British policy toward the cause, as well as the effect, of proJiferation of nuclear weapons.

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June 1SS7

years old. Until 1950 it was simply Frances more or leee unsuccessful campaign against local, insurrection to cave her colonial rule. After 1950 it became a confrontation in Indo&na I between bipolariaed elements-the . eolid Communist camp and tbe alliance :.: of the Free World. I Until tbe Geneva Conference of ~ 1954 produced a cease-fire, France did~ the fighting for the alliance, of which the United States was a part. When the truce was broken in 1960, the anti.

TWO VIETSAMS Vietnam assumed the role of pro tagonist, helped as France had been helped from 1952 by US financing and US advisory and military personnel. Principal Belligerent Beginning in 1965, however, the United States became, in ever-increas ing measure, the principal belligerent heading a coalition of allies. But many people in the Free World find the armed conflict repugnant, and the un avoidable destruction and suffering among civiiians make headline news. As a result, Red Cbha and the North Vietnam Communist Government daily exploit pacifist hopes by interpreting the Geneva Conference documents in terms which could, except for details and semantics, clearly amount to the defeat of the United States and her partners, What could be a Commu nist conquest in Vietnam, followed promptly by the subjugation of Laos, Cambodia, and maybe Thailand, is being claimed by pacifists and the dis enchanted as a return to tbe essence of Geneva. Scarcely anybody in the Free World alliance Jikes the war in Vietnam. Some even appear willing to acquiesce in an interpretation of the Geneva agreement that would entail abandon ment, or some form of it, of allies, Victor Bator was bom in Hungarg, and studied at the Universities of Bmiapeet, Berlin, and Paria. During World War I, he served ae an ofier in the Hungarian ArmsI. He eubseqwmtly practiced law and beeame a Lmding eontnbutw to Wemture of Hungarian law, legal hietoqi, and ecmomice. He came to the United States in 19s9. Sitwe then, he ha been a neuqpaper editor, publiqhed, and distributed mu sical works, and lectured at vamorw coUeges. He is the authw of Vietnam: A Diplomatic Tragedy, The Origine of the U&d States Involvement. June 1367 . nonaligned nations, and neutrals alike in eoutheest Asia. Yet nottilng in the Geneva docu ments, despite contradictions in the text of some highly circumspect lan guage, supPorts such abandonment as the Geneva easencel Even such deter mined neutralists ae Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia, whoee intract able positions exclude empathy for the United States, has been unable to give aid and comfort to tbe back to Ge neva peaceseekers. In May 1965, he wrote: I have never had the elighte8t iUu .sion on the fate that awaits me at the hand8 of the Communist8 after having removed from our region the influence and eepecidly the preeence of the free world and the U.S.A. in partioulw. . . . I muself and th8 Peo ple8 SOcialiet Community that I have created would inevitably dieappeav from th8 scene. Testing Ground In two white papere published by the government of Malaysia, there ia unhesitant assefilon that South Viet nam is the testing ground for Mao Te~tungs theories of peoples war and wars of liberation, and that vic tory for. the Viet Cong will vindicate Pekings advccacy of aggression and revolution in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The struggle of the South Vietnamese people and their govern ment, helped by the presence of US military personnel in South Vietnam, stands solidly in the way of Pekings aspiration. Another historical fact of more com mon knowledge, since it was more re cently expressed, wae a visit paid early this year by the United Natione Ambaesadora of eeven Asian countries to Secretary General U Thant after the latter declared that the United 83

TWO VIETNAMS Eh@es had no vital interests in Indo china. The Ambassador in cloeed ses sion reported a frank meeting with the Secretary General, during which they made it clear tixey wanted US military troops in Asia. It wae not known whether the Am basaadore supported every aspect of US policy, but they did support the main asuectmotection from Com . munist armed aggreeaion in their own lands which US military policy in South Vietnam has, thus far, pre vented. Knowledge Sap revulsion The understandable against tbe inequities and suffering of war on the part of vocal and often well-intentioned people takee little cognizance of the, realities as seen clearly by governments standing in tbe path of the Communist forces. TM.q knowledge gap in pacifist dia logue also overlooks the real essence of Geneva which, rather than build ing any foundation for a unified Viet nam, established two separate Viet nama while appearing to deny the fact. Communist North Vietnam, was in tended to house the Vletminh ruled by the government of Ho Chi:minh and serve as a buffer state separating Red China from the US military presence in the south. The anti-Communist ~ South Vietnam was saved from the ~ Vietminh to provide a home and coun try for the non-Communists already there and to more than a million refu : gees from the north. The South Viet ; nam buffer state was to serve ae a ~.cork in the Communiet bottle, block ! ing the outflow into southeast Asia. * ~ Had thie not been the underlying ~ ac.bievement of Geneva, an unbisected ; Vietnam would have immediately be come an area of intismecine war be tween two irreconcilabl$hoatile groups 1
,Miliify Review

TWO VIEWiAMS of Vletnames-ne aided by China to protest her buffer, and the other aided by the United States, equally deter mined to hold the cork in the bottle. The war would have begun at once in 1954 in one Vietnam, and it would have been a war not much different from the one that began after the shattered truce of 1960. Thus it was, as it remains, the same war with the same protegonists-ths Free World and China, tbe Commu nist and the anti-Communists. The interim disaffection of the Chinese Communists for the Soviet Union al ters the degree, but not the nature, of the confrontation. Reaaona for Separation The opponenta separated by the 17th Parallel could not conceivably be ex pected to live in peaceful coexistence, and the nations patilcipating at Ge neva knew they could not, which ie why the wall of separation wae estabIiehed. In order to make any kind of a truce a reality, it was mandatory to establish two states separated by a demilitarized zone. Familiarity with the history of the negotiations at Ge neva is essential to any understanding of the agreements essence. It is even necessary to study the texts in dif ferent languages to find the nuances to which the patilcipants did or did not agree. As early as March 1954, the secre tary .of the Soviet Embassy in km. don sounded out the Foreign Office on whether a settlement by pafiltion was acceptable. Within a month, the Briti sh Ambassador in Waeldngton made similar explorations there. After the Geneva Conference opened in April of that year, the world press came out with comments arguing that, without partition. peace could not be achieved. Unanimous agreement on
Ama 1ss7

this conclusion came from the London Times, the Manchester Guardian, The Nsw York Timss, the Christinn Sci ence Monitor, the Nation, the New Republic, Ths Economist (London), Walter Lippmann, Joseph W. and Stewart J. Alsop, James B. Reston, and Hanson W. Baldwin.
Against Partition

With little regard for the realities involved, Vietnamese patriots werd against partition and showed their hostility both in diplomatic intrigue and in public demonstrations. The Bao DaiNgo-dinh-Diem government refused even to send a delegation to Geneva until French Foreign Minister Georgee Bidault signed a written un derstanding that no parWion proposal would be introduced. Thk was the reason that neither Bidault nor An thony Eden ceuld raise the issue. But when the Vietminh did so on 10 June, jubilation was immediate. Patiltion opened up the road to peace. At a seeret meeting on the same day, delegate Ta Quang Bnu put his hand on the kp of North Vietnam and shouted in French: We must have this. . . . We nesd a state. We need a capital city for our state. We need a harbor for our capital city. . . . The interim between this break through and the end of the conference has been called by Professor Bernard B. Fall the Battle of the Parallels: meaning that all that was left to de cide was the line of separation. When Sir Winston S. Churchill and Anthony Eden agreed with President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dullee on the terms of a settlement they would support, they were flexible on the exact hcation of the demarcation line between the 16th and 18th Parallels. They did, however, insiet that the agreement must not
85

other were free to do so. &fore than one million North Vietnamese surged in a great trek to the anticommunist south. The record of haggling over the demarcation line, the EisenhowerChureWlll agreement preventing the lose of South V1etn~m, and the pre vision for the mi@ion of anti-Com munists from the no,ti make it evi dent that the mnea were not meant to 86 !.

zatione-includhg delivering a capital city and a etate to Ho Chi-minh. Could anybody believe that either of theee two governments and admin istrations would ever respeet a plural ity of votes and consent to go into limbo, diseolve themselves, and ic quiesce in the fate forece$t by Prince Sihanouk of Cmnbdla? We should not impute that much naivete to the Ge neva Conference. ,
Mllitery Reviau ...-J.

TwoVIETEUMS
This interpretation brings out tbe true essence of Geneva, regardless of the t?empe loeil verbiage of the Final Declaration. Paragraph 6 of that doc ument explicitly denies that the de marcation constituted a political or territorial boundary. But why, one wonders, deny sometidng uneaid? Paragraph 14 asserts that the civii atilnistrations were to end with the elections of 1956 and the presumed reunification of Vietnam. Yet para graph 7 of the Final Declaration men tions no such result or outcome of the electione.
Elections

The English text of this document declsres that the Vietnamese were to be permitted to enjoy the funda mental freedoms guaranteed by dem ocratic institutions which were to be tbe (result of the elections. The French text prescribe the guarantee of freedom and democratic institu tions after the elections. No text cites such guarantee as an immediate concomitant of the elections. And it would have been foolish to do so. Three times the Final Declaration mentions respect for the principle of unity as the basis of a future political system to be established at some un specified time when full unification may be realized. There is no doubt that the cited texte are in direct conflict with por tions of the same documents which recognized two eeparate states and two hostile governments with diver gent political adminietratione. The repetitious protestations in the docu ments that everything was temporary and military only, that nothing was political or permanent, served to pla cate the diehards withhr the opposing delegation who wanted victory more than peace. June1S67

Nevertheless, the contradictions be tween reeiity and the language of the text support conflicting arguable views. These views are held by both those who want one unified Vietnam, in which irreconcilable protagoniete would try to exterminate each other, and by those who prefer two separate buffer statee at peace which is what did, in fact, evolve after the Geneva agreement. In any case, the direct iqference that the future of Vietnam wtk to be entrueted to the outcome of an elec tion was certahly not appropriate. In this respeet, Professor Robert Al Scalapino, Editor of Asian Survey, bse called the Geneva text fraud lent. Elections can, indeed, deci e eeeondary problems of coexistence \i circumstances where come measurable minimum basis for political agreement exiets. But they are incapable of ac ceptance by two opposing etates, or parts of a state, when diametrically Opposite philosop~les are involved.
Historical Esamplss

History is etudded with examples of grave conflicts which war, separation, outaide force, or long-range evolution might ameliorate or resolve, but which eketiona could not help. Two euch ex amples are worth .remembering. One is the period before, and the inteneity of the conflict prevailing in, tbe US Civil War. Another is the Irieh re bellion early in thie century. what is at stake in Vietnam is at Ieset as baeic as the issuee in tbeee memorable his torical eventa, in which a decision ac ceptable to a majority of possible vot ers would not have affected a minor. itye insistence upon redress. It ie a truiem of political theory that divided states, whether inhabited by people of identical or divergent na- , tonalities, are the result of hietory 87

TWO VIETNAMS orif patiition separates them-of imperfect agreements. In the case of Vietnam, to enforce @itical unifica tion after nearly 100 years of repara tion before 1954, and the 13 years eince then, ia a challenge to the po litical equilibrium of southesst Asia. If such an iesue is to be resolved, it must be accomplished either by war, or by reparation and a laborious give and-take process. Peking and Hanoi have tried war since 1960. But victory by the attacking Com munist alliance-which would resolve the conflict, to be sur-is intolerable to the vital interests of the non-Com munist world. Defeat, on the other hand, which would reassert the in terim balance of two separate buffer states, will save tbe only eeeence of Geneva that has a future acceptable to tbe Free World. With the defeat of the Communists in war, in which admittedly all ieaues are not neatly or visibly drawn, the etatue of separation will remain until at some point in tbe unforeseeable fu ture a change in the realities of the Asian political and military eituation makes unification more rational than it is now. Until that unpredictable time, tbe Vietnamese on both sides of the 17tb Parallel will have to live in separa tion. Through the process of give-and take, coexistence, and possibly even cooperation, a scheme of unification may evolve. If it does not, the alter native is two states, with ethnically connected peoples.

We seek to assure to the people of South Vietnam the affirmative exereise of the right of self-rfeterminstiom the right to decide their own political deetiny free of external. interference sad force srrd through democratic processes. In keeping with the announced South Vietnamese Govemments poffcy of national recmrclfiation, we do nat seek te exclude eny aegnrent of the South Vietrranreee people from peaceful participation in their countrye future. We are prepared to accept the results of that decision, whatever it msy he.

We befieve the reunification of Vietnam ehordd be decided upon thrdugb a free choice by the peoples of both tbe North and the South without sny out side interference; snd th~ results of that choice also will have our full support.

Ambu88edor Arthur

J. Gofdberg

M
.,

MiHfary Revlaw

SOIDIEIZ
ale,
United Statea Armu

INCE the beginning of organized warfare, commanders have rec ognized that their ability to feed the troops often determined whether they won or lost. Hunger has not only de stroyed morale and discipline of ar mies, it has also caueed the collapse of natione. An adequate food program planned in advance is all the more important today to prevent an imbal ance between the requirement of a nations fighting forces and the civil ian labor force supporthg them. In the ancient world and during the Middle Agee, want brought war, and war alwaye brought pillage. The cam paigns of this era were pillaging ex peditions. Armiee lacked the transpor tation to carry provisions for extended campaigns and subsieted almost en tirely from resources along the route of march. Ramses II organized trains to ac company him on his campaigne. These appear to have been usad to traneport plunder rather than provision, how ever, for it is known that the Egyp tians lived off the countriee overran. The Persiane fed themselves by seiz ing supplies whenever and wherever found. The Greeks iikewiee lived off 8B

INNER SOLOIER the land for the most part, However, it waa not uncommon for them to carry mtions for several daye in baggage trains following the main army, or brought by aea to predesignated points. Philip of Macedonia included large numbere of slavea and pack an imals in his army to transport pro visions. Alexander the Great Alexander the Great, more than any other ancient commander, was con scious of the need for an effective food supply. Although he used pack animala and slaves to traneport subeietence re serves, the hoplite continued to carry meet of hia ration. This consisted Of salt meat, cheeee, olives, onions, and grain, and was repleniehed and sup plemented along the route of march. It appeara that this was accomplished by a combination of purchaeee and confiscation. During the Pereian campaign, Al ennder fed hia army by seizing lecal stueke as he advanced. When he landed in Aeia Minor, however, he issued strict orders forbidding the devasta tion of the country. This indicates that collection of food and forage was by a regularly organized commieeariat. The ancient Roman ration of wheat, rye, barley, cheese, pork, beane, Ien tils, and other vegetables, when avail able, was normally carried by the sol dier and wae the eubjcct of much dis content. Marcue Cicero said that bis Major Eugene W. Mas8engate is with the Defense Fuel SupplZI Center of the Defetwe Supplw Agency, Alex andria, Virgin&z. A graduate of the US ArmsI Command and General Staff CoUege in 1965, he @s held various logistic aa.signmente. Pm-or to hi8 pree ent aseignmsnt, he .wae with the Armg of the Republic of Vietnam oa G4 Ad visor, %$th Infantrg Divieion. , 80 Lti.. . ~ troops carried a 16-day supply, while Julius Caeear complained that Scipio Africanus took along a 22-day supply when eta~lng for Leuda. Titus LWius haa written that aokiiers were forced to carry rations for an entire month on occasion. These were supplemented along the route of march to assure that a full load was on hand. when the ar mies arrived on the battlefield. This probably accounts for the pe$iod of . rest and recuperation required by the Romane before they engaged in battle. During the Middle Ages, cavalry replaced infantry as the dominant force on the battlefield. The introduc tion of large numbers of horeea into the armies of the day wae accompanied by the problem of finding sutScient forage. This problem, ae well as that of obtaining feed for the aokiiere, wae solved by seizing supplies when and where found. The beginning of a ao phieticated food euppiy eyetem wae not to be introduced untill the 17th century. Magazine System The 11th-century commanders rec ognized that the main difficulty in feeding an army in the fieId did not lie so much in the collection of ,pro visiona, as in placing them in reach of the troops wbo coneumed them. Moreover, European Ieadere were be ginning to acknowledge that pillage, with its attendant cruelty and loss of manpower to the task, was becoming diataeteful. Both conditions were cor rected with the introduction of the magazine system. Governments sup pIied thefr armies from a eeriee of depots in fortresses or well-fortified towns along a secured line of commti nications. These were kept filled by shipments from the home base, by lo cal purchaee, or by confiscating locally available stocks. Self-eufficiency wae
Miliiry RevIow

._J. . .. . . .. . . .

,. .--~
INNER SQLDIER desired and obtilned; however, it wae at the expense of reduced mobility. Gustavus Adolphus was among the first to realize that pillage not only cost him eseential mznpower, but that it also cost him the goodwill and friendship of the countries in which he campaigned. He, therefore, used the magazine syetem fully and with excellent resulte. Albreeht E. von Wall enstein, on the other hand, freely per mitted his troops to pillage and plun der. Without these methods, they might never have been paid or fed. In this respect, Wallensteins army became noted #or being barbaroue and rapacious. Devastation, zrson, rapine, and murder followed in their wake.
M. de Louvois, War Minister during the reign of Louie XIV, saw clearly that the mag azine restricted mobility, and, to over come the defect, initiated the concept of rolling maga~hee. He required that vast storehouses be placed along the borders at strategic points and that they be stocked with efficient re sources to permit offensive action in any direction. These were used ae rear basee from which hie wagon trains would be resupplied. The French Army marched into Holland in 1672 with both a eeige train and a trans port train, one of the most far-reach ing innovations of the period. Rolling magazines were adopted in due couree by most of the European arndea, and a period ensued during which troops were always accompanied by their food. Although the system wae an improvement over earlier prac tice, it had ehortcominge which ham pered military operations consider ably. Beeause of the dlficulties cre ated by inadequate roads, and the slowness of the transport itself, an Mobility Restricted Marquis Fran$ois

army could not afford to move more than from five to seven days beyond its base. The movement of troops wae thus subordinated to that of the pro vision colnmne. Revolutionary War Despite the advances made in Eu rope, the Americane entered the Rev olutionary War totally unprepared for the task of eubaisting their Army. No effective central government existed, there was no military establishment, and, indeed, very little except will power and determination. General George Washington frequently re sorted to placing requisitions on local communities. The chaotic conditions of the forces at Boston in the summer of 177b composed as they were of volunteers from Massachusetts Bay and neigh boring colonies, repo~lng for duty with their own arms, their own cloth ing, and their own provieionsim pressed upen Washington the need for a regularly established commissariats under a single head. He had to cor respond and negotiate not only with the several colonial governments in an attempt to raiae food for his forces, but also with the committees of all the important towne. Joseph Trumbull wae appointed Commissary General of Stores and Provisions for the continental army by a resolution of Congreea on 19 July 1775. Due largely to hie efforts, and with the exception of a brief pe riod when flour became scarce, sub sistence wae plentiful for the conti nentals blockading Boston by tbe fall of 1775. The lack of serious com plaint, and the consequent healthy etate of troops, made it poeeible for General Washington to put togettier an army which forced the British from the port town in March 1776. St k

Ium 1s7

.
INNER SOLOIER Congress, despite its splendid be ginning, placed numerous restriction on the purchasing power of the com missaries in the field, rendering them al[ but ineffective. Fhally, congres sional effort broke down completely, and it reinstituted the practice of hav ing individual states provide for their militia. As a consequence, such states major portion of its food. To com plicate matters further, the trains turned back on 25 November with the bulk of the remaining stocks. As tbe emaciated force pressed on toward its objective, soap, boiled moc casins, hair grease, shot pouches, and leather breeches became a delicacy to be fought over. After covering 350

An immediate task of a nation at war ie that of providing arms, equipment, and rations for its armed forces

as New Jersey provided abundantly for their troops, while others either completely ignored the need, or were powerlese to assist. The lack of an effective food supply program was especially felt by Gen eral Benedict Arnold during his wil derness march to Quebec which, had it been successful, might have short ened the war considerably. His prin cipal route through the wilderness was a waterway. Because of unsound boats, untrained boatmen, and nu merous falls, Arnolds force lost a 32 >..

miles in 45 days, 600 of the remain ing 1,100 men finally arrived at the St. Lawrence River. They were so un dernourished that it was inconceiv able that an attack could be launched without extensive rest and recupera tion. Thus, the colonials lost an oppor tunity to seize Quebec and all of Can ada. By the time Arnold was capable of attacking, the British had been re- inforced. The turning point in the war came with the surrender of John Burgoyne at-Saratoga on 17 October 1777, a deMilitary Review .

INNER SOLDIER feat which was caused, in part, by an inadequate food supply. Hia force of 7,000 wae greater than he could feed, yet too small to garrison out posts and guard his lines of communi cation with Canada. The growing shortage of food forced Burgoyne to attack and led to his subsequent en circlement at Saratoga. With Bur goynes defeat, the French entered the war on the side of the colonials, and it was only a matter of, time before the British abandoned their American venture.
Napoleonic Wars Although the magazine feeding troops prevailed syetem of

Portugal and Spain suffered im mensely for want of food. The French attempted to live off the land as they had in Italy, and foraged, plundered, and pillaged extensively. The local populace became so incensed at the French practiceof driving off animals and appropriating foodstuffs that it was not safe for small parties to ven ture far from the lines for food. The French, therefore, had to commit ad ditional troops to guard foraghg par ties, and strength became so dissipated that the French were unable to drive the outnumbered English from their Portuguese baee. Depot system During hk Russian Campaign, Na poleon recognized that food was going to be his principal difficulty. He issued orderswhich were never fully com plied withfor the establishment of a depot system along hk lines of ad vance, for the collection of sufficient food to suPport the operation, and for the organization of a powerful trans port system. In an attempt to overtake the en emy at Vilnius, Napoleon outran hia supply columns and was forced to halt. Thk. wasrepeated many times during the campaign. Once the march re . sumed, the French found that the Rus sians had destroyed everything that cordd assist the invaders. Nonetheless, the Emperor determined to continue the attack on Moscow. By the time he reached Smolensk, he had lost at Ieaet one-fourthof his army to deser tion, starvation, and dysentery, and the country was yielding less daily. Ithad been turned into a vast desert by the retreating Russians. The French entered Moscow on 15 Sep tember, but were, for all practical pur poses, a broken army. Dnringthe retreat forced upon Na 9s

in the Eu rope of Napoleon Bonapartes era, the period is a history of pillaging, plun dering, and privation. Armies starved because of inadequate leadership and planning. Local populations suffered as much as the marauding armies which appear to have heen determined to destroy forever the countrysides through which they passed. Napoleon began his career as an army commander by informing his troops that he would lead them to the most fefille plains in the world where they would find cities and rich prov inces. He then swept aside the notion of sustaining his army from depots, and although he regained essential mobility, openly invited the pillage and plunder of Italy. His troops committed such lamentable excesses that oncefriendly natives were turned into the bitterest of enemies. Later, because the French Government continued to fail to provide for the needs of this army, many of its ranks were forced to beg for food on the roads of the Apennines or starve. During the Peninsular Wars, tbe English and French Armies, as well as the armies and citizenry of both June 1967

INNER SOLOIER

I
poleon by the seveke shortage of food in the face of the Russian winter, the French Army disinte rated com pletely. At Smolensk, thl 7 mob, com pletely disregarding Napoleons or ders, broke into the storehouses and helped themselves to the scant stock; the same disorderly process was rethe chief difficulty of the Confederates was not one of the production of food supplies, but, rather, one of transpor tation. Major decieione were fre quently directed by the need to obtain or deny access to food and other sup pIies. In the closing months of tbe war,

USATWW Pko@ An adequate food supply program sssured flour for an Army bakery on Guadalcanid peated at ViInius where the army was subsequently routed. In retrospect, Napoleons failure to follow through on his orders for the supplying of hls army must remain as the principal cause for its ultimate collapse. He made the fatal mistake ef aesuming that orders, once issued, would be executed. The US Civil War was tbe first conflict of the Industrial Revolution to approach the intensity of future wars in weapons, tactics, and destruc tion. Food supply, aa in earIier wars, played a decisive role. In tbe South, S6 Major General William T. Sherman cut a swath from 50 to 60 milee wide through the unconquered section of the South, subsisting his army of 65,000 almost entirely off the land. His purpose was to inflict the greatest possible damage to Confederate re sources, to destroy the supply syetem at its soimce, and to cut the iines of communication which fed Lee in Vir ginia. He accomplished his purpose., The hopeless plight of Lees army was revealed when he surrendered at Ap pomattox Court Houee. In World War I, the Allied blockade Military Review

,.
INNER SOLDIER of Germany was the ultimate weapon which overcame the stalemate of trench warfare and led to the collapse of Germany in 1918. It quickly de stroyed Germanye overseas com merce, and left her alone in an en circlement of hostile forces. Germany wae probably better prepared militar ily than any of the Allies, but she had never considered the need to husband her raw materiale and food. PoliticalStruggle By the end of August 1914, Ger manys merchant tieet wae no longer capable of gaining access to the worlde food markets. Gradually, the Allies tightened their encirclement, and it soon spread beyond immediate naval and economic objectives to be come a political struggle involving belligerents and neutrals alike. Ger many was even denied acceas to her own ports. On the German homefront, short ages became apparent so slowly that their first effects passed virtually un noticed. By and by, however, the mo notony of hunger wore away mans resistance, and food became an obses sion with the population. The winter of 1916. was, perhaps, the turning point in the war. An early frost spoiled the potato crop, the basic food in the Gertnan diet, and the German state was on the verge of collapse. It has been estimated that, during the last two years of the blockade, 800,000 noncombatants died in Germany from starvation or diseases directly attrib utable to undernourisbment. Japans failure to initiate a system of food control until the closing days of World War 11 was a major con tributing factor to her ultimate col lapse. She entered the war heavily de pendent on imports of rice from Ko rea and Taiwan, and of soybeans from Jone1967 Manchukuo. Fish, a primary item in,
the Japanese dietary, was abundant in
readily accessible fishing grounds.
Moreover, Japan had the third largest
merchant fleet in the world in 1941.
Theee factors, combined as they were
with Japans practice of feeding her
overseas armies from conquered as sets, made Japan virtually self-suffi cient and, perhaps, overly confident
with reepect to food supply.
Self-sufficiency was rapidly replaced
by increasing want once the Allies be gan to recover from Japans rapid in vasion of the South Pacific. Steadily
mounting requirements for military
manpower drew heavily on her agri cultural pool, for which there were no
replacements. Thk seriously reduced
efficiency and output. Simultaneously,
her merchant fleet was taken under
attack by Allied submarine and air
forces, and an intensified sea blockade
of Japan proper waa placed into effect.
Japanese Economy Food supply began to fail in 1943, and hy early 1945 the situation was critical. The shortage struck at every aspect of the Japanese economy. Ab senteeism from factories producing war materials soared under the neces sity of workers foraging in the coun . try for potatoes, vegetables, and fruit. Overseas, the rations for the armed forces were reduced several times. In final desperation in early 1945, Japans leaders reserved remaining shipping for the import of foodstuffs. Their efforte were fruitless, however, for the defeat of Japan was already assured. Land-1ocked Germany again suffered in World War II from a severe short age of food as she had during World War I. However, the shortage was not caused by a want of preparation. Re membering the consequences of the shortages of World War I, the gov 95

INNER SOLOIER ernment took steps to increase the domestic ,production of food by about 20 percent from 1932 to 1939. They implemented a food rationing prc grem just prior to the invasion of Poland, and, during tie ar, imposed + heavy quotes on occupied countries for agricultural product$. Nonetheless, there was a severe shortage of food in Germany from 1942 to the end of the war. The major causes were the shortage of farm labor and the disruption of internal transportation. Heavy bombing of rail way facilities caused an immediate and drastic curtdlrnent of rail move ments. ~en transportation stopped, practically all industrial and agricul tural production and distribution , stopped with it. By the wars end, there was widespread hunger. Starvation was averted only by the intervention of the occupying armies. In the modern army, food is but a small potilon of the total supplies re quired to sustain a force in combat. Nonetheless, it is one of the most im portant, for it directly affects the stamina, morale, and effectiveness of the soldier. The feeding of an army in combat is, even under the best of conditions, a complicated and dblieult process, but one on which the results of a campaign will frequently depend. The lack of an effective food supply has Ied to decisive defeat on the bat tlefield, as well as the collapse of na tions otherwise well prepared for the conflict at hand. In the event of a nucIear contlict, the supply of food to meet both mili tary and civilian requirements will be come even more difficult. Damage to interna~ transportation mechanisms and to lines of communication in the tactical zones of operations, in addi tion to the loss of labor fleeing before the prospect of a nuclear attack, will complicate the food supply immensely. In the final analysis, food will remain a primary concern of commanders tm til such time as civilization progresses to the point that it can settle disputes without resorting to war.

The MILITARY RE%~W is particularly interested in receiv ing manuscripts covering leesons learned by US units in Vietnam. Problems of organization, command and control, equipment, tactics, and fire eupport merit informed discus sion. After complying with appropriate local regulations, authors may submit manuscripts direct to the MILITARY REvmw..We will obtain the necessary security review on those accepted.

96

Milii Review

.,.=

UNITED STATES HH.53B Helicopter Mapping Teat Ranga The largest and fasteet helicopter The Army Corps of Engi:eera ie developing a test range for the De scheduled for use by the US Alr Force lms made its first flight. partment of Defense in a 90,000 The helicopter, an HH-58B, is the square-mile area of Arizona and New first of a quantity being produced for Mexico, It is to be utilized in the eval operation by the Air Forcee Aero uation of automatic mapmaking equip. space Rescue and Recovery Service. An ment. earlier version of the helicopter, the The BAR XC test range extends over an area approximately S00 by 300 miles and includes most of the state of Arizona and a strip of western New Mexico. In this exteneion of test ranges, the acquisition of additional land and construction of photographic targets will be held to a bare minimum. In these cases where it will be necessary Air For.c/S@ee Dine.t to lease land, the District Engineer in HH-58B Los Angeles, California, will negoti ate directly with the individual land CH-Z?A, recently entered service with owner. the US Marine Corps in Vietnam as a Army Map Service civilians and sol. heavy lift transport. diers of tbe 30th Engineer Battalion The HH-5sB, with its greater speed (Base Topographic), Fort Belvoir, and size, will significantly enhance the l.%ginia, will conduct the survey op rescue and recovery services ability erations. The advance military par$y to perform rescues by helicopter. It has established its headquarters in has a top speed of 169 knots and ~ Globe, Arizona. range in excess of 250 miles without The BAR XC project is scheduled refueling. for completion within the next 15 The new helicopter can be refueled months.DOD release. in flight ftom a HC-1.SOP tanker so that ite flight endurance will be lim The tiLxTA8Y IUIVIEW and Nm u. s. ited only hy crew endurance. Drop ArmyCommand and Gmertl Stiff College w pable auxiliary fuel tanks, a rescue mum me responsibility fer emr.er of Mm. matkm emttahud in the MllATAaY NOTKS hoist, and all-weather avionics equip c.eetimn ef fhls Pmblleatfon. Ztemn w xUIfed m . .ewlee ta the readem. N. .M c?at en ment are among its other features. dc.rsmment ef the ,Iws, WI&imu, or factual .tatemenfs da Intmded.-TbeEduQr. Newe rekmee. June 1337 97

MILITARY NOTES

man8 arms and pronglike hands would carry the load. As the Hardiman project ie nres ently conceived, the m-eeh-anical struc ture would multiply the strength of the soldier-operator through a mechan ical hydraulic system in a ratio up to 26 to one. Thus, to lift 1,500 pounds, the operator would actually apply a force of 60 pounds. A research prototype unit ie sched uled for machine and human factor design studies in 1968.Army News Features. OeepOiving Sub An. entirely new deep-diving sub marine, capable of operating to a depth in excess of any known subma rine now operational, ie under con struction at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in New Hampahire. Named the Dolphin, the Navys new vehicle is echeduled for completion in December. It will have one torpedo tube designed for weapon evaluation and other uses. At present, tbe Dolphins mission ie primarily military. However, offi cials eay it will serve as a platform for underwater research, particular acoustice. The Dolphin, estimated to cost 37 million dollara, will he 152 feet long and be capable of submerged speeds in excess of 12 knots. Its displacement will be 900 tone, with the capability of suppotilng a scientific payload of 12 tons. The L30tphin will he manned by three officers, 15 enlisted men, and four acientistw. During eurface operations, the Doll pltin is diesel-electric propelled. WMle submerged, it will be propelled by electrical power from silver-zinc bat teriee.DOD release. Militarv Review

menting with Hardiman, a mechanical muecle device which resembles the general human configuration. A soldier, standing inside the struc ture, would make Hardiman mimic his movements by manipulating mechan ical circuitry linked with sensors. The device would enable }he soldier to lift, lower, and walk with 1,500-pound weights tinder field condition. Hardi

The Army will inactivate Davv Crockett elements in all units wldch have nuclear-capable, 155-millimeter howitzer atilllery unite assigned. This action-expected to be com pleted by 30 June 1967will eliminate all Davy Crockett units except those which might be required to eupport airborne ,or airmob]le divisions and other such units that do not have or ganic 155-millimeter howitzer unite. The Davy Crockett waa added to the US nuclear arsenal in 1961. Al though it met existing requirements at that time aa a light, mobile, rapid ree~nse weapon capable of delivering low-yield nuclear fires close-in to

friendly troops, it was more vulner able to enemy counterdre than desired. Due to improvement and refine ments which increase the effectiveness of the nuclear round for the 155-milli meter howitzer, it now is possible for 155-millimeter atilllery units to as sume the role previously assigned to the Davg Crockett. The 155-millimeter howitzer, with . its greater range, will meet this re quirement with less vulnerability and greater tactical capability. Flexibility is also improved because this weapon can be used in a dual role to provide either conventional or nuclear fires. DOD release.

Casaless Ammunition The Armys research is in an early The Army is researching a new stage, but thoueands of such rounda type of ammunition for small arme have been fired. Studies will continue and automatic cannon. The ammuni for improving production methods, re tion hae no metal caee to be ejected; ducing fire hazards, and developing tbe only metal is in the projectile. The new weapons to use the new ammuni propellant and primer aesembly burn tion.DOD release. up when tbe round ie fired.

I MILITARY NOTES fJSACSSC Refresher Course Graduation from the US Army Com mand and General Staff College (US ACGSC) marks the end of formal mil itary education for many officers. (Rbers selected to attend ijiiher level schools or specialized courses of in struction find that the Army has changed in the years since their grad ation. Even a recent graduate of the USACGSC can find himself completely out of date in specific areaa. lnatruc ticdn iz contiguously revised, to reflect changes in Army doctrine and organi zation. Each officer needa to keep himself current and requires continuous up dating of his military education, no , matter how long ago or recently he attended the College. The USACGSC has a program to meet that needthe Special Extension Course-Graduate. Refresher. A cor respondence course presented in two parts, with each part consisting of several lessons from the most current College instruction, it ie designed to bring former atudente up-to-date on the latest College instruction in Army doctrine, organization, and ppcedures. Retirement point credits are awarded Reserve component officers for the completion of each part of the grad uate refresher course. Any officer who has aucceesfully completed a reeident or nonresident career course offered by the College may apply for the couree. Application can be made by submitting a copy of Department of the Army Form 145 (Army Extension Course enrollment application) or by letter direct to the Commandant, US Army Command and General Staff College, Attention: ChLef of Nonresident Instruction, Fort Kansas 66027.US Leavenworth, Army release. 106 SR-71 Ffi@ts Supersonic training fiighte by the Strategic Air Commands Si?-72 re connaissance aircraft are being flown twice weekly from Besle Air Force

Air

F.rw/S?m.e

2X9-I

Base, .California, over the western and southern Pofilons of the United States. The SR-71 operates at altitudes above 80,000 feet at speeds UP to Mach 8, which ia about 1,700 knots. DOD release. lHA Assault Ship Two shipbuilding firms and two aeroapace companiee have been in vited by the Naval Ship Systems Com mand to submit proposals for develop ing the new large, general purpose, amphibious assault ship (LHA ). LHA aesault ships were described by the Secretary of Defense in his January posture statement to Con gress as part of the Department of Defenses mobility concept for the 1970s which includes Air Force C-5A airlift giants and the Navys fast de ployment logistics (FDL) ships.. The general characteristics of these LHA vessels will be large eize-about 40,000 tons with a cruising epeed of about 20 knots. The projected LHA fleet will be de: signed to carry a Marine expedition ary force and a half. A Marine ex peditionary force comprises a division and an air wing.DOD release.

Retiiew Military

MILITARY NOTE3 Heat-ReflectingPaint A new eolar heat-reflecting paint has been developed by the US Army Coating and Chemical Laboratory at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. The new paint, which will be ueed in the Hawk surface-te-air missile sys tem, minimizes heat buildup through its display of infrared reflectance. With ite olive-drab color, tbe paint also providee camouflage for weapon systems.Army News Features. Language Training to Inarease The Defense Language Institute hae been requested to train more than 10,000 students during Fiecal Year 1968, an increase of 1,900 over the current years requirements. The increaee is attributed to larger inputs in training in the Vietnamese bmguage, the largest single language area. The complete schedule chows that 63 languages and dialeete, will be taught during the year.DOD release.

km 19S7

101

MILITARY NOTES hrcreasad Production Requirements in Vietnam have caused the Army to double the pro duction rate of the i?fll~ armored per sonnel carrier family. The Army has also reopened standby ammunition plank, nearly tripling the ammuni tion production deliveries since Fiscal Year 1966.DOD release. Officars Obligated Tours Army officers incur epeeific eervice obligations as a result of attendance at precommissioning service or civil ian schools. These obligations are: . Initial obligated tour incurred for precommiesioning education: Of ficer Candidate School, two years; Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) nonscholarehip, two years; ROTC flight trainee, three yeare; ROTCs new program for scholarship reeipieuts, four yeare; US Military Academy (USMA), tlirough class of 1967, four years; and USMA, begin ning with class of 1968, five years. Service obligations for military schooling: senior service college, two years; US Army Command and Gen eral Staff College, two years; Armed Forcee Staff ColIege, two years; Advanced Course (Branch Career Course) , one year; and ekill courses, as epecified in the US Amy Formal Schools Catalogfor example, guidedmissile eyetems otlicer, four years, and subsistence officer, one year. Service obligation for civilian schooling: advanced degree training, two years for each year of schooling or fraction, with a minimum of three yeara to insure a complete utilization tour for each patilcipant; Advanced Management Couree (Harvard Uni vereity, ~ambridge, Maseachueetts, or the University of PMeburgh in Peun eylvania), two years; degree comple 16s tion program, two years after comple tion of degree reqtiiremente; and fel lowships, scholarships, or grants, at leaet three times tbe length of the period of education or training. Army News Features, HueyCobra Slated for Vietaam The Army has oilicially assigned the name Hue@obra to its newest armed helicopter, the AH-lG, which ie the first rotary-wing aircraft specifically deeigned and developed for tbe armed role. One prototype ie undergoing weapons teeting, and fl~ght teste on a eecond were begun in February. The Secretary of the Army referred to the. Cobra in his receut annual POS. ture stitement. He eaid it will be introduced into Vietnam along with

Bell l161i..rJ#ef Cmn.nv

AH-IG Ilue#Cobra other new items, including the OH-6A Carwse light observation helicopter. The Hue@obra carriee tbe XM-28 weapone eubsystem, featuring a flex ible turret which mounte an inter changeable combination of 7.62-milli meter, high rate-of-fire Mittigww and 40-millimeter grenade launchers. It is also armed with the 2.75-inch aerial rocket and can carry 76 in four XM 159 rocket pode.-DOD releaee. . Military Re*ien

MILITARY NOTES Airlift laboratory

Hwhea

Aircrajt

CmmPmw

Artists d;awing depicts helicopter airlift of a compact laboratory deeigned for the Army for field maintenance of military communication equipment in combat zones. The two-ton uni~transportable by land, sea, or airwere de signed and built for the Armys Electronics Command at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. The units are designed for use in on-the-spot maintenance of electronic equipment in arctic or tropical environments. Eight units have been delivered. Additional unite are being constructed which will be capable of handling larger sophisticated electronics equipment in support of avionics and weapon eystems. News release. Contamination-ProofShelter logical agents. It is scheduled for field A field shelter allowing personnel uee in 1969. to work in contaminated areae withEach ehelter can house 10 men who out individual protective equipment is may work without the usual protective being developed at the Armys Edgemasks, hoods, and gloves. It takes wood Arsenal in Maryland. about 20 minutes to set up the shelter, The air-inflated, self-supporting and tw=o or more may be connected shelter is designed for protection for greater capacity.DOD release. against all types of chemical and- bloJune1967

103

MILITARY NOTES Orbitiirg Manna Huge orbMing antennas may serve as communication relays for deep space probee to the region of the planet Jupiter in the next decade when heightened space activity will saturate radio links between the Earth and spacecraft. The feasibility of such antenna aat

seconda bandwidth frequency impos sible to use from Earth becauae of the interference of the atmosphere. The antenna satellite would operate for one year and would be in orbit at about 1,000 miles altitude.News item. Laser Memory System A laser beam device to eerve ae the memory for experimental electronic syeteme that could someday fly an air craft or control satellite miseions has been developed by the Alr Force. CalIed an 0@ica2 Maze Runner, it is one of several efforts by the Air Force. to apply knowledge gained of living thhsga to the solution of engi neering probleme. The maze runner is modeled after biological nerve pat terns that store huge amounts of in formation for learning and decision. In theory, it could be compared to a glorified game of Parcheeei, with the sole piayer being a laser beam and with the path from start to home printed on a crystal about the size of a matchbook. To make sure the laser alwaye wbts~ scientiete have stored 40,000 pieces of information, coded as right or wrong moves, on the purple-colored cryetal. The storage crystal is divided into four equal sectione, Coded on one of these is the mace which offers four directional choices: left, right, UMand down. Searching for correct information or ways out: the laser scans these choices much as a person walks through hallwaye to get out of a build; ing. Two other sections of the crystal record successful paths; the fourth ie a history of ail points that have been encountered.US Alr Force release. . MilitsryReview

Aeroj.t-&mrd

Beoater

Drawing shows configuration of orbiting antenna satellite concept the National Aeronautics and Space Adminiatrations Ames Research Cen.

ter. Such an antenna satellite would weigh about 16,000 pounds. It could be put into orbit by a Saturn, f B rocket and automatically erected to its proper configuration, 30 feet in diameter. The eystem would have a nuclear power supply from three canistershaped, radioisotope, thermoelectric generators five feet in diameter and five feet long. The power source would be a departute from the more com monly used eolar cells. When launched into polar orbit, the satellite would permit line of eight communication with. spacecraft out as far as Jupiter. Of greatest importance, it would operate at 100 megacycles a

104 . . . . .

,W..

...

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...-.,-q

MILITARY NOTES YUGOSLAVIA AR51 Truck A Yugoslavian automobile manu facturer has produced a cross-country vehkle for the army which has been

BRAZIL
Missiles for Ure Armed Forces A special joint commission haa been created to study Brazilian ArmY, Navy, and Air Force missile require ments. The commiaeion ie to deter mine which types of missilee tire beat for each service. The new body, which has a general officer as its chairman, reports to the ermed forces general staff_Newe item. More C-13(IE Hercules Aircraft The Brazilian Air Force and a US manufacturer have eigned a 15 mil lion-dollar contract for the purchaee of five C-L90E transport aircraft. In

AOgemaiw

Schw&e&che

Milit.ineitaeknft Zaetom AR51 truck designated the Zastava AR51. The vehicle has a maximum speed of about 72 milee per hour. In addition to the driver, the new truck carries six pas sengers and 110 pounds of cargo. News item. AUSTRALIA Supersonic Jet An Australian aircraft manufac turer has designed a supersonic jet for poseible use as a trainer or light ground attack aircraft which will be offered to the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). A epokeeman for the manufacturer said the delta-winged jet aa a trainer could be the step between the eubeonic Italian M.B. .926, which enters the RAAF next year, and supersonic air craft euch ae the French Mirage. The jet haa been in the deeign etage for three years. The new aircraft could be converted to a light ground attack plane and used for gunnery, recketry, bombing, and guided-weapon training.Newe re kaee. Jane 1C87

Air Fowa/5zaoe Oimut

C.130 lferculee trenepert addition, the contract includes spare parts and the ground maintenance equipment. The new aircraft will double the C-190E Hercules fleet of the Brazilian Air Transport Command.News item. BULGARIA Military Service and Underground Mining Underground mining counts as roil itary service in Bulgaria. According to a directive which wae iesued in Feb ruary 1962, continuous work for three yeare in an underground mine wae equal to eerving the regular term of military service. This wortilme haa , been reduced to two years.News item.

lee

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! MILITARY NOTES 6REAT BRITAIN : Comment . bj B. It. Liddell Hart which it conducted during the later The fOUOW@l ?@t? i8 an f3XCf7pt from an articte titled Comment by years of the war. Indeed, the term Capta$n Sir Basil Liddell Hart etwvngeechiitz, translated into Eng which has been reproduced from the lish as assault gun: was tactically December 1.966 Lwue of The British a mienomer for this type of armored Army Review with permission of fighting vehicle which, on balance, the Controller, Her Majeetys Sta proved much more valuable in defenee tioner 0f7iee. United Kingdom than in attack. By 1945 the propor Crown Copgright is re8erved.Ed tion of such vehicles in the German itor. Army was larger than that of turreted tanks with all-round gun traverse, and In reply to the question !What is they had the advantage of being able your opinion of the effectiveness of a

[ profited greatly from its development ; of and use of etrwmgeechiitz, especially ~ in the-predominantl y defensive actions !
k 1~ k

In sum, it became evident that

there wae much to be gained by blend ing such turretless tanke with nor

Miliiry Review .1

...

-- ---=?

MILITARY NOTES mal type turreted tanks in the armored forces of an army. The Russians also developed the type extensively during the last two years of the war and after the waralthough the Western coun tries did not do so except in a amall experimental way and have still con tinued to adhere to the orthodox spec ification and stipulation that the main armament of a tank must be capable of all-round traverse of fire. As a result of my own operational studies, I became favorable to the idea of developing turretless tanka long be fore the new Swedish tank wae de signed and produced although I pre ferred a combination of the two types rather than exclusive or predominant reliance on one alone. Speaking broadly, I would advocate that the larger proportion should be turreted tanka with all-round traveree in an army or force that is likely to have offensive or counteroffensive miesions but would approve a reversal of these proportions in the case of an army or force that, in the main, is likely to be required to fight defensive actione be cause of its, and its countrys, stra tegic circumatancee. For the sum of these reasons, I was particularly disposed to favor the concept embodied in the new Swedish turretless tank. Moreover, I welcomed it ae a radically new breakaway from the general trend of tank design which has become d~preaaingly stereotyped and stagnant for many years past. So I was very interested, during my visit to Sweden in 1963, to aee models of the new S tank and also a film showing its performance, ae well ae to have an opportunity of discuss ing it with the constructor, Mr. Sven Berge. The design impressed me in several important respects-and, not least, the combination of low silhouette June1S37 with the internal roominese that ie essential to the effective functioning of the crew under battle conditions. The performance of the tank in the film was also very impressive, espe cially in regard to agility which is more important than maximum apeed. fh the other hand, the relative short ness of the chassis required for such agility left a donbt abont the obstaclecrossing capacity and the practicable speed off the road. In general, I thought that this new S tank was a great advance on pre vious designs and likely to be of high value in the delaying and defensive roles that are most probable in Swe dens strategic eituation. For more all purpoee use, however, I think that a combination of such turretless tanks with turreted tanks of similar or lesser weight, remains deeirable and would be the best blend. CN-t7BHelicopters Ordered Great Britain has eigned an agree ment to purchase 15 CH-47B Chinook transport helicopters from the United States for service with the Royal Air Force. An improved version of the Chinook now in service, ,thie model will have a substantially higher pay load and speed capability. Delivery will begin in early 1969. Production to meet the British pur chase will not affect deliveries to the US Army. Chinook helicopter have been in service with the US ArmY since Sep tember 1963. As of 1 March 1967, they had logged more than 135,000 flight hours. Half of these hours were flown in combat where the Chirzooks have been ueed to transport artillery, troops, ammunition, food, medical sup plies, and civilian refugees.News re lease. 107

MILITARY BOOKS
KASBERINE PASS. By Martin Bbrrnanson. 341 ~##9:@ton MifftinCo., Boston, Mass., . . BY LTC JOSEPH D. HYNES, USA At Kasserine Pass in Tunisia in early 1943, the Axis forces-mainly Germans-achieved a tactical success, but not a major victory, over the Al lies, principally the US 2d Corps, This was the first real combat test of a lmge US force against veteran and battlewise Axis formations. The author, utilizing official records of the North African campaignunit journals, messages, and reporte-sup plemented by manuscripts written shortly after the war by senior com manders of both sides, has brought to life this atory that has never been told before in its entirety. Objectively and clearly portrayed are the problems which were faced by inexperienced US units in this climac tic battle. Major. problems in command, as well as personal feelings and bicker ing between commanders, influenced actions on both sidea of the front and weighed heavify on the final outcome. The absence of mutual understanding and confidence among coalition forces wae apparent on both sides. The lessonq learned from this battle were invaluable to the Americans at the time, and the passing years have not detracted from their value. The book is recommended reading for the military professional as well as for the history buff. loa $. THE WRONS MAN IN UNIFORM. Our Unfair and Obsolete Draft-and Now Wa Can Ra place It. By Bruce K. Chapman, 143 Pages. Trident Prass, Naw York, 1BB7. $3$5. ,OBYLTC ANTHONY P. DE LUCA, USA
In this indictment of the Selective Service System, the a~thor presents for consideration some of the inequi ties in the present archaic draft procedures. Operating under the premise that the draft. is ineSicient and obsolete, Mr. Chapman exsmines the alterna tives in the allocation of our draft-age manpower between military and civil ian requirements. Among the alternatives considered are the current system, a lottery, uni versal military training, and nationaI service such as the Peace Corps. All of the alternatives are rejected in favor of an ultimate, volunteer mili tary force-a goal arrived at through a transitional system which lowers the average draft age and utilizes a lottery-type draft. The newspaper headSines afforded Preeident Lyndon B. Johnsons an nouncement of the revised policies which are to be implemented within the next two years highlight the na tional concern over this complex prob lem area. Although shallow in its treatment of the subject, the book does provide worthwhile information and statistics of interest to military manpower pol icymakers and draft-age youths and their familiea.

MiritwyReview

,.
MILtTARY BOOKS THE TRIUMPH OF BOLSHEVISM. Revolution or ~eaction? By Stsrart Ramaay Tompkins. S91 Pages. 7he University ef Oklahoma Press, Norman, Okla., 1961.$5.65. BY MAJ CH&LES L. MCNEILL, USA A general thesis of scholars and historians has been that the Russian Revolution wae a temporary aberra tion initiated by a downtrodden mass of backward people. Once their rage and violence had run its course, it was anticipated that the people would reject the dlctatorahip of the prole tariat and revert to political and so cial order by meane of the proved Western method. Professor Tomp kins rejeets this theeis. It is the authors contention that the Russian Revolution is a misnomer. Rather than a revolution, he labels this uphsaval as a violent reaction to oppression and states that it should have been anticipated if the Russian national character had been examined and understood. To gain this under standing, it isnecessary to review the policies and techniques employed by the regimes, of czarist Russia. Professor Tompkins shows that the Communist government utilizes the same ech6mes. intrigues, economic PoI icies, and dictatorial practices that were the legacy of the czars. In fact, he maintains that it is part of the Ruszian makeup to alter the meaning of words, to be compartmentalized in thinking, and to offer contradictory opinions on the same subject. The au thoreoncludes that theso-zalled Rus eian Revolution was simply a strug gle for naked power~btsined by any means, right or wrong. This provocative treatment of the Russian Revolution of 1917 is highly recommended for military strategists and planners.
tune 1s87

WAR, POLITICS, ANO OIPLOMACY. Selected Essays. By 6erden A. Craig. 267 Pagas. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 16S6. $7.50. BY MAJ FSANCIS A. IANNI, USA War, Politics, and Diplomacy is a collection of 15 essays written over the past two decades by Dr. Craig, an eminent historian. More than half deal with German military, political, and diplomatic affairs reflecting his interest in Germany history. In the first two parts of the hook, Dr. Craig examines such topics as tbe interrelation between the military in stitutions of a society and its political organization, the problems of coalition warfare, and the role of military his tory in the study of the art of war. One of the essays, concerning the causes of the defeats of the Austrian Army in 1859 and 1866, adds an in teresting perspective on military edu cation. Austrias tradition of military prowess was undermined by two fac tors: a mortal degree of distrust and misunderstandhg between the civil and military segment of the society; and the corrosion of the Austrian General Staff by intellectual slack ness and a deliberate flight from , intelligence. Thk anti-intellectual at titude wae reflected in the War Col lege where emphasis was placed on rote learning and gallantry rather than a systematic study of war. The third section explores the changing nature of the technical as pects of diplomacy and international relations in an age of revolution where quiet diplomacy and limited centers of diplomatic contact have given way to forensic diplomacy and multiple loca tions for diplomatic intercourse. Also included is a study of totalitarian ap proaches to negotiation. 10s

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MILITARY BOOKS TffE TRIAL OF TJJEGERMANS. An Account of the Twontj-lwo Befendantt Before tha International fAilifarY Tribunal at Nuram berg. By Eugene tJa~dson. 6S6 Pages. The MacmillanCo., Jfew York, 1966.$12.50.
BY EUGENEH. MILLEE

THE ROAD TO DELHI. By M. Sivaram. 2S4. Pages. Charles E. Tuttle Co., Inc., Jfutland, Vt., and Tokyo. JaBan,19BB.S3.50. BY LTC- CbR~ F. BASWELL,USA This is a story of the Indian inde. pendence movement from Pearl Har. bor to V-J Day, as reconstructed from the authors diary. While it is an excelIent, readable saga of the portion of the turmoil during World War II, the book bas limited, contemporary military value. A SHOWER OF STARS. Tbe Medal of Honor and tha 27th Maine. BY John J. Psrllen.269 Pages. J. B. Lfppirwott Co., Ptdladalpfda, Pa.,and New York, 19B0.$5.95. ErY COL GEORGE S. PAPPAS, flSA Once in a great while, one finds a book which is sheer pleasure to read. Such is true of A Shower of Stars, even though it cannot he termed a profound work nor a great clasaic. The fact that Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton gave a barrel full of Medals of Honor to men of the 27th Maine for volunteering to stay in serv ice past the expiration of their enlist ment is not the important part of thk book. The fact that the regiment ,was on guard in Washington while Gettys burg was being fought, that the medals were unearned, and that only a portion of the regiment was eligible while others had already departed for Maine are only sidelights to the pri mary story told: the search made by the author for the missing Medals of Honor. This search is a Sherlock Holmes tale without a solution being reached. The attitude of Maine natives, their help in the authors efforts, and the dead end finally reached all combine to provide an intriguing narrative. This book is highly recommended. NiliirJ Review . .

Th# Trial of the Germans presents a case history of each of the 22 de fendants in the Nuremberg triak, 1945-46. An additional chapter is de voted to the six organizationsthe Reichskabirzett, the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the SS, and SD, the SA, the Gestapo, and the general staff and high commandwhich were indicted as criminal. The author, president of the Foun dation for Foreign Affairs in Chicago, hased his work on documentary re search in Germany, London, Washing ton, and Jerusalem, and in extensive interviews, The final chapter ie patilcularly val uable. In evaluating the evidence gathered in the case studies, he makes the point that racism is not a German monopoly, that the Germans suffered both political and economic frustra tion following World War I, and that the Soviets had heen guilty of extermi nations such as the Katyn massacre in Poland. Fortunately, thk objectk ity does not lead Mr. Davidson down the garden path of rationalizing Ger man innocence on the grounds of others guilt. The military reader will take special interest in the case studies of Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, General Al fred Jodl, and Admirals Erich Raeder and Karl Doenitz. Likewise, the sec tions on the general staff and the high command point up the dilemma of the professional soldier confronted by an irrational and immoral political su peiior. 110

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MILITARY BOOKS THE U. S. AIR FORCE IN SPACE. Edited by lieutenant Celenal Elderr W. Dewns, United States Air Ferce. 150 Pages. Fradarick K Praager,Inc., New Yerk, 1966.$5.95. BY LTC HABOLDC. KINNE, JR., USA A collection of 16 articlee from the Air Vniver8itrr Review, thie volume contains topics of intereet to the gen eral reader and technical articlee on the phyeics of epace operations. Included is material on the Gemini, Apollo, and Manned Orbital Labora tory programs which ia extremely timely in light of current criticism of the moon-landing program. It is shown that the manned lunar landing is not an end in itself, as has been charged, but that it is a part of a continuing program to assure IX! supremacy in space and is the starting point for lunar exploration. For the technically minded reader with an interest in space, the schol arly articles on lunar charting, sate] lite launchhg and maneuvering, com munication satellite, propulsion sys tems, and the phyeics involved in space operations can serve as a good begin ning text and reference book, THE MODERN UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS.By Celenel Jehn A. Oe Chantj United States Marine Cerps Reserve.230 Pages. D. Van Nestrand Co., inc., Princeton, N. J., 1666.$6.95. BY LTC GLEN D. THOMPSON, USA This volume is a comprehensive but conc~ee history of the Marine Corps from 1775 to the present. It contains information on doctrinal developments in the fields of amphibious operations, dive-bombing techniques, close air support, and vetilcal envelopment. The a%thor also looks into the future to discuse the Marine Corpe of the 1980s, to include training, doctrine, and equipment that probably will be used. lame1967
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THE HUMAN OIMENSION: Espariencas in Peiicy Research. By Hadlay Cantril. 202 Pages. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, N. J., 1967.$7.50. BY MAJ VLAOIMIR A. POSPISIL,USA A social psychologist, Dr. Cantril has been an advisor to four of the last five administrations. Iu this volume, the author describes rapid sampling methods; how, where, and why used; and techniques which show how to predict human reactione. THE POLITICS OF STRUGGLE: Tha Cem munist Frent and Political Warfare (1966). By James 0. Atkbrsen.192 Pages.Tha Nenry Regnery Co., Chicage,Ill., 1966.$6.50. BY COL DOUGLAS P. HARPER,USA Dr. Atkinson traces the origin and development of political warfare termed non-traditional warfare in the bookin a. scholarly manner, us ing a largely historical approach. He describes its development and the So viet application from Nikolai Lenin to the worldwide proxy tactics of Com munist f rents in the cold war. The author deplores the apparent success of Communist fronts and proxy forces to deceive and therehy enlist support of men of good will to the end that society is divided, disrupted, and fragmented inside rionCommunist countries. He points out that a few hundred etudent peace marchers in Washington, London, and Ottawa mayin the long runbe more effective for Communist pur poses than several battalions of Viet Cong in Vietnam. This book ie not light reading be cause of ita scholarly format. It is thought provoking, however, and crammed with background on Corn-, munist methodology which should be known by military personnel. 111

MIJJ7ARY BOORS 7NE FRENCH ARMY IN PQU7JCS, 1S4549S2. Sy John Steward Ambler. 427 Psgm. Mer shon Canter, OMO State IJniversity Press, Columbus, Ohio, 1966,$8.50. BY COL HEBMANW. W. LANGE,USA This book wiii help military lead ers and students of comparative gov ernment in reflecting on the stature of their own armed forces witbin the netion and on the relationship which senior officers must have with the non military departments in national gov ernment. It pointe to the nature and limitations of civilian control and dis cipline at times of national stress. Many will find the comments on psy chological warfare and the difference between Waging and winning a war highly interesting. SINO.SOVJET MILiTARY RELATIONS. Edited by Raymond L 6arthoff. 285 Pages. FrerJ erick A. Praegsr,Inc.,New,YorkjlCBS. $7.50. BY MAJ CSIAalmSL. McNErLL, USA This volume is an attempt to develop the military and political considera tions that have influenced and led to the current Moscow-Peking disen chantment. Thla compilation of essays written by such personalities as US Foreign Service officers, academicians, and military officers traces the history of Sine-Soviet military relations to include the current dispute. The implications of this current antagonism betwean the Soviet brand of communism and tbe Chinese version can best be summed up in Mr. Garth oR% own words: I would not predict a Sine-Soviet war. But such a war is conceivable, even while both sidea have Communist rule. This book is a definitive and com prehensive effort to evaluate tbe im pact of Sine-Soviet. military relations on the rest of the world. 112
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TNE 8A77LE FOR TNE PACiFiC. BY Donald Macintyra.240 Pages.W, W. Norton& Co, Inc., Naw Ye& 19SS. $0.00. BY JOHN R. CAMERON Tlds naval history starte with the attack on Pearl Harbor. Although the psychological impact of the Japanese attack was great, tbe military value was 1sss than it could have been. It was a clear defeat which was echoed at the battle of the Java Sea, but by the engagements of Coral St% and ~ldway eeveral months later, the naval tide of battle was turned. The book allows the reader to note faults in battle, the opportunities missed by commanders, and the prob leme of control of sbipe and aircraft. The press of actual combat revealed unrecognized weaknesses in training and materiel. Time corrected most of these, but only after great cost. Mr. Macintyre depicts each of the major navsl actions with clarity and decisiveness. ROBERT f.. LEE. A Portraik 1807-1SS1.BY Margarat Sanbom. 353 Pages. J. B. Lippin. cott Co., Philadaiphia,Pa,, and Naw York, lBOO. $B.95. BY LTC GrmuoE M. RooGEsS, USA The author develops many new and interesting features about the life of Robert E. Lee that have not previ ously been diecussed in other biogra phka. She has accomplished this by the use of unpublished diaries of Lees immediate family and from hk own worda in numerous personal letters to his family and friends. This is a warm, absorbing, and in timate study of Lse from his birth until he decided to fight for the Con bis eder% fa dy, IN hls friends, Fe hraia and other f minteresting sketches, some by Lee.
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