3. TRANSPORTATION OF PASSENGERS NCC Art 1754-1763 b. Extraordinary Diligence (1755) PAL v. CA 275 SCRA 621, G.R. No.

120262, 17 July 1997. FACTS: On 23 October 1988, Leovigildo A. Pantejo, then City Fiscal of Surigao City, boarded a PAL plane in Manila and disembarked in Cebu City where he was supposed to take his connecting flight to Surigao City. However, due to typhoon Osang, the connecting flight to Surigao City was cancelled. To accommodate the needs of its stranded passengers, PAL initially gave out cash assistance of P 100.00 and, the next day, P200.00, for their expected stay of 2 days in Cebu. Pantejo requested instead that he be billeted in a hotel at the PALs expense because he did not have cash with him at that time, but PAL refused. Thus, Pantejo was forced to seek and accept the generosity of a co-passenger, an engineer named Andoni Dumlao, and he shared a room with the latter at Sky View Hotel with the promise to pay his share of the expenses upon reaching Surigao. On 25 October 1988 when the flight for Surigao was resumed, Pantejo came to know that the hotel expenses of his co-passengers, one Superintendent Ernesto Gonzales and a certain Mrs. Gloria Rocha, an Auditor of the Philippine National Bank, were reimbursed by PAL. At this point, Pantejo informed Oscar Jereza, PALs Manager for Departure Services at Mactan Airport and who was in charge of cancelled flights, that he was going to sue the airline for discriminating against him. It was only then that Jereza offered to pay Pantejo P300.00 which, due to the ordeal and anguish he had undergone, the latter declined. Pantejo filed a suit for damages against PAL with the RTC of Surigao City which, after trial, rendered judgment, ordering PAL to pay Pantejo P300.00 for actual damages, P150,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, P15,000.00 as attorneys fees, and 6% interest from the time of the filing of the complaint until said amounts shall have been fully paid, plus costs of suit. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the

decision of the court a quo, but with the exclusion of the award of attorneys fees and litigation expenses. The Supreme Court affirmed the challenged judgment of Court of Appeals, subject to the modification regarding the computation of the 6% legal rate of interest on the monetary awards granted therein to Pantejo. ISSUE: Whether petitioner airlines acted in bad faith when it failed and refused to provide hotel accommodations for respondent Pantejo or to reimburse him for hotel expenses incurred by reason of the cancellation of its connecting flight to Surigao City due to force majeur. HELD: A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation, and this is because of the relation which an air carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carriers employees naturally could give ground for an action for damages. The discriminatory act of PAL against Pantejo ineludibly makes the former liable for moral damages under Article 21 in relation to Article 2219 (10) of the Civil Code. As held in Alitalia Airways vs. CA, et al., such inattention to and lack of care by the airline for the interest of its passengers who are entitled to its utmost consideration, particularly as to their convenience, amount to bad faith which entitles the passenger to the award of moral damages. Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of the defendant. They are awarded only to allow the former to obtain means, diversion, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone due to the defendants culpable action and must, perforce, be proportional to the suffering

inflicted. However, substantial damages do not translate into excessive damages. Herein, except for attorneys fees and costs of suit, it will be noted that the Courts of Appeals affirmed point by point the factual findings of the lower court upon which the award of damages had been based. The interest of 6% imposed by the court should be computed from the date of rendition of judgment and not from the filing of the complaint. The rule has been laid down in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et. al. that when an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged. This is because at the time of the filling of the complaint, the amount of the damages to which Pantejo may be entitled remains unliquidated and not known, until it is definitely ascertained, assessed and determined by the court, and only after the presentation of proof thereon. Jesusa Vda. De Nuenca v. The Manila Railroad Company, Court of Appeals C.A. No. 31731, January 30, 1968 Calalas v. Court of Appeals 332 SCRA 356 Facts: Private respondent Eliza Sunga, then freshman at Siliman University , took a passenger

jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity, Sunga was given by the conductor an extension seat, a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. When the jeepney stopped to a let passenger off and Sunga was about to give way to the outgoing passenger, an Izuzu truck driven by Verena and owned by Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. Sunga sustained multiple injuries and remained on a cast for three months. Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, for breach of contract of carriage. Calalas, on the other hand,filed a third party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the truck. The lower court rendered judgment against Salva and absolved Calalas of liability. It took cognizance of other case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena ,for quasi-delict, in which branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney The CA reversed the lower courts ruling on the ground the ground that Sungas cause of action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-deplict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code. The appellate court dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga. Issue: Whether or not there was a breach of contract of carriage. Held: Iin quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. In case of death or injuries to passengers, Article 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or have acted negligently unless they proved that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision

necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in action for quasi- delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a preexisting contractual relation between parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. Japan Airlines v. Court of Appeals GR. No. 118864 Facts: Private respondents were passengers of Japan Airlines from California bound for Manila. The flights were to make an overnight stopover at Nairita, Japan as an incentive for traveling. However, due to the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo which rendered the NAIA inaccessible, respondents flight from Japan to Manila was indefinitely. JAL assumed the hotel expenses for their unexpected overnight stay on June 15, 1991. However, JAL no longer settled their hotel and accommodation expenses during stay at Nauta, Japan. Since NAIA was only reopened for airlines traffic on June 22, 1991, private respondent were forced to pay for their accommodations and meal expenses from their personal funds from June 16 to June 21, 1991. Hence, they commenced an action for damages against JAL for failing to provide care and comfort to its stranded passengers when it refused to pay for their hotel and accommodation expenses from June 16 to June 21, 1991. Issue: Whether or not JAL was liable for the hotel and meal expenses defrayed by private respondents while pending destination. Held: The Supreme Court held that JAL cannot be held liable. In the case at bar, there was absence of bad faith and negligence on the part of Japan Airlines. Such occurrence of the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo amounts to a force

majeure. When a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of force majeure, the general rule is that he cannot be held liable for damages for non-performance. Common carriers are not insurer of all risks. Airline passengers must take such risks incident to the mode of travel. However, JAL is not completely absolved from liability. It has the obligation to make the necessary arrangements to transport private respondents on its first available flight to Manila. c. Duration of Responsibility Dangwa v. CA, 202 SCRA 574, G.R. No. 95582 FACTS: Private respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners for the death of Pedrito Cudiamat as a result of a vehicular accident which occurred on March 25, 1985 at Marivic, Sapid, Mankayan, Benguet. Petitioner Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging to petitioner corporation in a reckless and imprudent manner and without due regard to traffic rules and regulations and safety to persons and property, it ran over its passenger, Pedrito Cudiamat. Petitioners alleged that they had observed and continued to observe the extraordinary diligence and that it was the victims own carelessness and negligence which gave rise to the subject incident. RTC pronounced that Pedrito Cudiamat was negligent, which negligence was the proximate cause of his death. However, Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the lower court, and ordered petitioners to pay private respondents damages due to negligence. ISSUE: WON the CA erred in reversing the decision of the trial court and in finding petitioners negligent and liable for the damages claimed. HELD: CA Decision AFFIRMED The testimonies of the witnesses show that that the bus was at full stop when the victim boarded the same. They further confirm the conclusion that the victim fell from the platform of the bus when it suddenly accelerated forward and was run over by the rear right tires of the vehicle. Under such circumstances, it

cannot be said that the deceased was guilty of negligence. It is not negligence per se, or as a matter of law, for one attempt to board a train or streetcar which is moving slowly. An ordinarily prudent person would have made the attempt board the moving conveyance under the same or similar circumstances. The fact that passengers board and alight from slowly moving vehicle is a matter of common experience both the driver and conductor in this case could not have been unaware of such an ordinary practice. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers transported by the according to all the circumstances of each case. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. It has also been repeatedly held that in an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the damages sought by the passenger. By contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier. This is an exception to the general rule that negligence must be proved, and it is therefore incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code.

La Mallorca v. Court of Appeals17 SCRA 739 Facts: Plaintiffs husband and wife, together with their minor children, boarded a La Mallorca bus. Upon arrival at their destination, plaintiffs and their children alighted from the bus and the father led them to a shaded spot about 5

meters from the vehicle. The father returned to the bus to get a piece of baggage which was not unloaded. He was followed by her daughter Raquel. While the father was still on the running board awaiting for the conductor to give his baggage, the bus started to run so that the father had to jump. Raquel, who was near the bus, was run over and killed. Lower court rendered judgment for the plaintiff which was affirmed by CA, holding La Mallorca liable for quasi-delict and ordering it to pay P6,000 plus P400. La Mallorco contended that when the child was killed, she was no longer a passenger and therefore the contract of carriage terminated. Issue: Whether or not the contractual obligation between the parties ceases the moment the passenger alighted form the vehicle. Held: On the question whether the liability of the carrier, as to the child who was already led a place 5 meters from the bus under the contract of carrier, still persists, we rule in the affirmative. It is a recognized rules that the relation between carrier and passengers does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the carriers premises, to be determined from the circumstances. In this case, there was no utmost diligence. Firstly, the driver, although stopping the bus, did not put off the engine. Secondly, he started to run the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the signal and while the latter was unloading cargo. Here, the presence of said passenger near the bus was not unreasonable and the duration of responsibility still exists. Averment of quasi-delict is permissible under the Rules of Court, although incompatible with the contract of carriage. The Rules of Court allows the plaintiffs to allege causes of action in the alternative, be they compatible with each other or not (Sec. 2, Rule 1). Even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already terminated, herein petitioner can be held liable for the negligence of its driver pursuant to Art. 2180 of NCC. Decision MODIFIED. Only question raised in the briefs can be passed upon, and as plaintiffs did not appeals the award of P3,000.00 the increase by the CA of the award to P6,000.00 cannot be sustained.

Aboitiz Shipping Corporation vs. Court of Appeals 188 SCRA 387 Facts: Anacleto Viana was a passenger of M/V Antonia bound for Manila which was owned by defendant Aboitiz. After the said vessel has landed, the Pioneer Stevedoring Corp., as the arrastre operator, took over the exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on it. One hour after the passengers had disembarked, Pioneer Stevedoring started operation by unloading the cargoes using its crane. Viana who had already disembarked remembered that some of his cargoes were still inside the vessel. While pointing to the crew of the vessel the place where his cargoes were, the crane hit him, pinning him between the side of the vessel and the crane which resulted to his death. Vianas wife filed a complaint for damages against Aboitiz for breach of contract f carriage. Aboitiz, however filed a third party complaint against Pioneer since it had control completely over the vessel during the incident. Furthermore, petitioner contends that one hour has already elapsed from the time Viana disembarked, thus he has already ceased to be a passenger. Issue: Whether or not Aboitiz is liable for the death of Viana. Held: The Supreme Court held that the failure of Aboitiz to exercise extraordinary diligence for the safety of its passengers makes Aboitiz liable. It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of the carrier and passenger does not cease the moment the passenger alights from the carriers vehicle, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carriers premises. A reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances. The primary factor to be considered is the existence of a reasonable cause as will justify the presence of the victim on or near the petitioners vessel. In the case at bar, such justifiable cause exists because he had to come back for his cargo. Aboitiz has failed to safeguard its passenger with extraordinary diligence in requiring or seeing to it that precautionary measures were strictly and

actually enforced to subserve their purpose of preventing entry into a forbidden area. d. Presumption of Negligence (1756) Pestao vs. Spouses SumayangG.R. No. 139875 Facts: On August 9, 1986, Ananias Sumayang along with his friend Manuel Romagos was riding a motorcycle along the National highway in Cebu. Upon a junction where the highway was connected, they were hit by a passenger bus driven by Gregorio Pestao and owned by Metro Cebu Auto Bus Corp. Such bus tried to overtake them sending the motorcycle upon the pavement, resulting to the death pf the passengers of the motorcycle. Actions were filed by the heirs of Sumayang against the driver and the owner of Metro Cubu and its insurer. Issue: Whether or not Metro Cebu and Pestao are liable for the death of the passengers of the motorcycle. Held: The Supreme Court held that Metro Cebu and Pesta are liable for the death of Sumayang and Romagos. As a professional driver operating a public transport bus, he should have anticipated that overtaking at a junction was a perilous maneuver and thus should have exercised extreme caution. The vehicular collision was caused by Pestaos negligence when he attempted to overtake the motorcycle. In addition, Articles 2180 and 2176 of the Civil Code provide that owners and managers are responsible for damages caused by their employees. The employer is presumed to be negligent in the selection or supervision of its employees when an injury is caused by the latters negligence. As evidence has shown that the bus operated with a defective speedometer, it further proved that Metro Cebu was negligent in the supervision over its driver. It thus failed to conduct its business with the diligence required by law. Ludo v. CA, 351 SCRA 35, G.R. No. 125483 February 01, 2001. See full text.

Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court 189 SCRA 158 Facts: Several people boarded a jeepney owned by the spouses Isidro Mangue and Guillermo Carreon. Said jeepney was driven by Manalo and was travelling to Pampanga to Pangasinan. The passengers wre on their way home to spend Christmas together with their families. On its way to Pangasinan, one of the rear tires of the jeepney was detached and it prompted the driver to step on the brakes. Upon applying the brakes the jeepney made a sudden u-turn and it stopped on the opposite lane of the highway. Subsequent to the unexpected u-turn a Philippine Rabbit bus bumped the jeepney from behind. As a result of the collision, three passengers died and the others sustained physical injuries. The heirs of the passengers filed a case to claim for damages. The lower court held that Manalo, the driver of the jeep, was negligent. On appeal the Court of Appeals reversed the decision with regard to the payment of damages to Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines. Hence this petition. Issue: 1.Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable in this case. 2.Whether or not Manalo is solely liable for the death and physical injuries of the victims. Held: The Court held that the doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable in this case. This doctrine shall only apply to suits between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. The case at bar is a case where the passengers are demanding indemnity from the carrier due to the contract of common carriage. It is clear from the evidence that it is Manalo and the owners of the jeepney who are negligent in this case. There was no proper explanation as to why the rear wheel of the vehicle suddenly became detached. Therefore the Court affirms the decision of the lower court and holds Manalo and the owners liable to pay damages. Juntilla v. Fontanar, 136 SCRA 624, G.R. No. L-45637, May 31, 1985 JUNTILLA V. FONTANAR Facts:

Roberto Juntilla was a passenger of a jeepney driven by Berfol Camoro, which was registered under the franchise of Clemente Fontanar and owned by Fernando Banzon. The right rear tire exploded causing the vehicle to turn turtle. Juntilla was seated in the front and he was thrown out of the vehicle and lost consciousness. When he came to his senses, he found that he had a lacerated wound on his right palm, injuries on his left arm, right thigh and back, and his Omega wristwatch was lost. He filed a case with the City Court of Cebu where judgment was rendered in favor of Juntilla, ordering defendants to pay him damages and reimbursement. The CFI reversed the decision, finding the accident a fortuitous incident and pronouncing them without liability. Issue: W/N the Court committed GAD in failing to take cognizance of the fact that defendants failed to exercise utmost and/or extraordinary diligence required of common carriers contemplated under Art. 1755. Held: There are specific acts of negligence on the part of the respondents. The passenger jeepney turned turtle and jumped into a ditch immediately after its rear tire exploded which shows that the jeepney was running at a very fast speed. It was also overloaded at the time of the accident. The sudden blow-up of the tire could have been caused by too much air pressure injected into the tire coupled by the fact that it was overloaded and speeding at the time of the accident. The accident was caused either through the negligence of the driver or because of the mechanical defects of the tire. The rationale of the carriers liability is the fact that the passenger has neither choice nor control over the carrier in the selection and use of the equipment and appliances in use by the carrier. Having no privity whatever with the manufacturer or vendor of the defective equipment, the passenger has no remedy against him, while the carrier usually has. It is but logical, therefore, that the carrier, while not an insurer of the safety of his passengers, should nevertheless be held to answer for the flaws of his equipment if such flaws were at all discoverable. The source of a common

carriers legal liability is the contract of carriage, and by entering into said contract, it binds itself to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with a due regard for all circumstances. A caso fortuito :(1)The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, orof the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation,must be independent of the human will. (2) It must be impossible to foresee the event constituting the caso fortuito , or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible toavoid.(3)The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible forthe debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner.(4)The obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation inthe aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.

Whether or not PAL acted with gross negligence so as to entitle petitioner to an award of moral and exemplary damages. Held: PAL did not act in bad faith. It was the duty of PAL to look for petitioners luggage which had been miscarried. PAL exerted diligent efforts to locate the plaintiffs baggage. Petitioner is neither entitled to exemplary damages. Exemplary damages can only be granted if the defendant asked in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner, which loss, in accordance with the stipulation written at the back of the ticket is limited to P100 per luggage plaintiff not having declared a greater value and not having called the attention of the defendant on its value ad paid the tariff thereon. Wherefore, for lack of merit, the instant petition is hereby denied, and judgment sought to be reviewed is hereby affirmed. Sevellano v. Northeast, 405 SCRA 416, G.R. No. 151783, July 08, 2003. See full text. f. Limited Liability and Defence (1757-1758) Yobido v. Court of Appeals 281 SCRA 1 Facts: The spouses Tumboy and their minor children boarded a bus operated by the Yobido Bus Liner to Davao City. On the way to their destination, the front left tire of the bus exploded which led to the bus falling into a ravine and causing the death of Tito Tumboy and physical injuries to the other passengers. The defendants then filed a case against the petitioner for breach of the contract of carriage. The petitioner claims that it is not liable because the tire explosion is a caso fortuito. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is liable for the accident. Held: The Court held that the tire explosion cannot be considered as a fortuitous event. The reason is that the common carrier has the burden of proof that it exercised extraordinary diligence in the carriage of the passengers. There is always a presumption of negligence on the common carrier in cases of death or

e. Non-Exemption from Liability (17561760) Augusto Ong Yiu v. Court of Appeals 91 SCRA 223 Facts: Petitioner was paying passenger of respondent Philippine Airlines on board flight No. 946R from Mactan Cebu bound for Butuan City. He was scheduled to attend the trial in the Court of First instance , Br. II thereat. As a passenger, he checked in one piece of luggage, a bull maleta. The plane left Mactan Airport, Cebu City at about 1pm and arrived at Bacasi Airport, Butuan City at past 2pm of the same day. Upon arrival, petitioner claimed his luggage but it could not be found. According to petitioner, it was only after reacting indignantly to the loss that the matter was attended by the porter clerk which however, the later denied. When the luggage was delivered to the petitioner with the information that the lock was open, he found out that the folder containing documents and transcripts were missing, aside from the two gift items for his parents-inlaw. Petitioner refused to accept the luggage. Issue:

injury and that the carrier needs to present contrary evidence that it was not negligent and that it exercised the required diligence of the law. The carrier cannot rely on the defense that the tire was brand new or that it had daily check ups regarding the parts of the bus. Bayasen v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. L25785 Facts: Petitioner Saturnino Bayasen, the Rural Health Physician in Sagada, Mountain Province, went to barrio Ambasing to visit a patient. Two nurses from the Saint Theodores Hospital in Sagada, Elena Awichen and Dolores Balcita, rode with him in the jeep assigned for the use of the Rural Health Unit. Later, at Ambasing, the girls, who wanted to gather flowers, again asked if they could ride with him up to a certain place on the way to barrio Suyo which he intended to visit anyway. Dr. Bayasen again allowed them to ride, Elena sitting herself between him and Dolores. On the way, the jeep went over a precipice. About 8 feet below the road, it was blocked by a pine tree. The three, were thrown out of the jeep. Elena was found lying in a creek further below. She suffered a skull fracture which caused her death. Saturnino Bayasen was charged by with Homicide Thru Reckless Imprudence. Trial Court found Bayasen sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of 4 Months and 1 Day of arresto mayor as minimum, to 1 Year, 7 Months and 10 Days of prision correccional, as maximum, indemnify the heirs Elena Awichen P3,000.00 as compensatory damages, P1,000.00 as attorneys fees and P1,886.00 for burial expenses of the deceased, and to pay the costs. On Appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the trial court with the modifications that the indemnity was increased to P6,000.00; the award of attorneys fees was set aside; and that the maximum of the prison term was raised to 1 Year, 7 Months, and 17 Days of prision correccional. The motion for reconsideration of Bayasen was denied. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari. Issue: Whether or not the reckless driving of accusedpetitioner was the proximate cause of the death of the victim.

Held: The proximate cause of the tragedy was the skidding of the rear wheels of the jeep and not the unreasonable speed of the petitioner because there was no evidence on record to prove or support the finding that the petitioner was driving at an unreasonable speed. The star witness of the prosecution, Dolores Balcita who was one of the passengers in the jeep, testified that Saturnino Bayasen was driving his jeep moderately just before the accident and categorically stated that she did not know what caused the jeep to fall into the precipice. It is a well-known physical fact that cars may skid on greasy or slippery roads, as in the instant case, without fault on account of the manner of handling the car. Skidding means partial or complete loss of control of the car under circumstances not necessarily implying negligence. It may occur without fault. Herein, under the particular circumstances, Bayasen who skidded could not be regarded as negligent, the skidding being an unforeseen event, so that Bayasen had a valid excuse for his departure from his regular course. The negligence of Bayasen has not having been sufficiently established, his guilt of the crime charged has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He is, therefore, entitled to acquittal. The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed, and acquitted Bayasen of the crime charged in the information in Criminal Case 1056 of the CFI of Mountain Province, with costs de oficio. Gatchalian v. Delim 203 SCRA 126 Facts: Reynalda Gatchalian boarded a minibus owned and operated by respondent herein. She boarded the bus at La Union and it was bound for Bauang. While the bus was running, one of the passengers noticed a snapping sound. She was alarmed and asked the driver about it, he then replied that it was normal. Subsequently, the minibus hit a flower pot on the side of the road which caused the bus to turn turtle and it fell into a ditch. Several passengers were injured in the accident. Gatchalian suffered injuries on her leg, arm and face specifically the forehead.

The injured passengers were brought to the hospital for treatment of their injuries. While the passengers were confined in the hospital, Mrs. Delim, wife of the respondent visited them and paid for the medical expenses of the victims. Before leaving the hospital, she made the injured passengers sign a prepared affidavit which stated that they were no longer interested in filing a complaint whether criminal or civil against the driver and owner of the minibus. Gatchalian also signed the said document. Subsequently, Gatchalian filed a complaint for damages even though she had already signed the affidavit prepared by Mrs. Delim. The lower court dismissed the complaint of Gatchalian and held that there was a valid waiver of the right to file a complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision that there was a valid waiver but denied petitioners claim for damages. Hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not Gatchalian is entitled to the award of damages in lieu of the injuries that she suffered. Held: he Court held that there was no valid waiver and that Gatchalian is entitled to the award of damages. A waiver, in order to be valid, must be couched in clear and equivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of relinquishing a right that is legally his or hers. A waiver must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy or good customs. The waiver in this case is not valid because the terms in the affidavit did not clearly state the intention of giving up the right to file a complaint. The words no longer interested do not manifestly show such intention. Also, such waiver is against public policy because it would weaken the standard of utmost diligence required of common carriers in bringing their passengers safely to their destination. It was established through evidence that the common carrier is guilty of negligence. The reply of the driver when asked about the snapping sound is sufficient proof to indicate that such sound had been there for a while and that the common carrier did not look after the roadworthiness of the vehicle to assure the safety of the passengers. There was gross negligence on the part of the driver because

there was wanton disregard for the passengers safety when he did not stop the minibus after hearing the snapping sound and the remark of one of the passengers. Therefore the petitioner in this case is entitled to receive actual or compensatory damages which include 15,000 pesos for the cost of plastic surgery to remove the scar on Gatchalians face. Fortune Express vs. Court of Appeals 305 SCRA 14 Facts: A bus of petitioner Fortune Express, Inc. figured an accident with a jeepney in Lanao del Norte which resulted to the death of several passengers of the jeepney including two Maranaos. A Constabulary agent investigated that the jeepney was owned by a Maranao and certain Maranaos were planning to take revenge on petitioner by burning some of its buses. Subsequently, the Operations Manager of Fortune Express was advised to take precautionary measures. Four days after the accident, three armed Maranaos pretended to be passengers of a bus of petitioner. They seized such bus and set it on fire. The passengers of the bus were asked to get off, but one passenger, Atty. Talib Caorong went back to retrieve something. He was shot and killed during the incident. Petitioner contends that the seizure by the armed assailants was a fortuitous event thus it cannot be held liable. Issue: Whether or not Fortune Express is liable for the death of Atty. Caorong. Held: The Supreme Court held that the seizure of the bus by the armed Maranaos cannot be assailed as a fortuitous event. The requisite of unforseeability to be considered forced majeure is lacking. Fortune Express knew that Maranaos were planning to burn some of its passenger buses and yet petitioner did nothing to protect the safety of its passengers. Petitioners employees failed to prevent the attack on one of its passengers because they did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family. Hence, petitioner should be held liable for the death of Atty. Caorong. Art. 1763 of the New Civil Code provides that the common carrier is responsible for injuries

suffered by a passenger on account of willful acts of other passengers, if the employees of the common carrier could have prevented the act through proper diligence. Because of Fortune Expresss negligence, the seizure of the bus by the armed Maranaos was made possible. Singson v. CA. 282 SCRA 149, G.R. No. 119995, November 18, 1997. FACTS: Petitioner CARLOS SINGSON and his cousin Crescentino Tiongson bought from respondent Cathay Pacific Airways two (2) open-dated, identically routed, round trip plane tickets (Manila to LA and vice versa). Each ticket consisted of six (6) flight coupons, each would be detached at the start of each leg of the trip. Singson failed to obtain a booking in LA for their to Manila; apparently, the coupon corresponding to the 5th leg of the trip was missing and instead the 3rd was still attached. It was not until few days later that the defendant finally was able to arrange for his return to Manila. Singson commenced an action for damages based on breach of contract of carriage against CATHAY before the Regional Trial Court. CATHAY alleged that there was no contract of carriage yet existing such that CATHAYs refusal to immediately book him could not be construed as breach of contract of carriage. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner herein holding that CATHAY was guilty of gross negligence amounting to malice and bad faith for which it was adjudged to pay petitioner P20,000.00 for actual damages with interest at the legal rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from 26 August 1988 when the complaint was filed until fully paid, P500,000.00 for moral damages, P400,000.00 for exemplary damages, P100,000.00 for attorneys fees, and, to pay the costs. On appeal by CATHAY, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts finding that there was gross negligence amounting to bad faith or

fraud and, accordingly, modified its judgment by deleting the awards for moral and exemplary damages, and the attorneys fees as well. ISSUES: 1.) whether a breach of contract was committed by CATHAY when it failed to confirm the booking of petitioner. 2.) whether the carrier was liable not only for actual damages but also for moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees. HELD: 1.) Yes. x x x the round trip ticket issued by the carrier to the passenger was in itself a complete written contract by and between the carrier and the passenger. It had all the elements of a complete written contract, to wit: (a) the consent of the contracting parties manifested by the fact that the passenger agreed to be transported by the carrier to and from Los Angeles via San Francisco and Hong Kong back to the Philippines, and the carriers acceptance to bring him to his destination and then back home; (b) cause or consideration, which was the fare paid by the passenger as stated in his ticket; and, (c) object, which was the transportation of the passenger from the place of departure to the place of destination and back, which are also stated in his ticket. In fact, the contract of carriage in the instant case was already partially executed as the carrier complied with its obligation to transport the passenger to his destination, i.e., Los Angeles. , x x x the loss of the coupon was attributable to the negligence of CATHAYs agents and was the proximate cause of the nonconfirmation of petitioner's return flight. 2.) Yes. x x x Although the rule is that moral damages predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage may only be recoverable in instances where the mishap results in the death of a passenger, or where the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, there are situations where the negligence of the carrier is so gross and reckless as to virtually amount to bad faith,

in which case, the passenger likewise becomes entitled to recover moral damages. x x x these circumstances reflect the carriers utter lack of care and sensitivity to the needs of its passengers, clearly constitutive of gross negligence, recklessness and wanton disregard of the rights of the latter, acts evidently indistinguishable or no different from fraud, malice and bad faith. As the rule now stands, where in breaching the contract of carriage the defendant airline is shown to have acted fraudulently, with malice or in bad faith, the award of moral and exemplary damages, in addition to actual damages, is proper. However, the P500,000.00 moral damages and P400,000.00 exemplary damages awarded by the trial court have to be reduced. The wellentrenched principle is that the grant of moral damages depends upon the discretion of the court based on the circumstances of each case. This discretion is limited by the principle that the "amount awarded should not be palpably and scandalously excessive" as to indicate that it was the result of prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court. Damages are not intended to enrich the complainant at the expense of the defendant. They are awarded only to alleviate the moral suffering that the injured party had undergone by reason of the defendant's culpable action. There is no hard-and-fast rule in the determination of what would be a fair amount of moral damages since each case must be governed by its own peculiar facts. In the instant case, the injury suffered by petitioner is not so serious or extensive as to warrant an award amounting to P900,000.00. The assessment of P200,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages in his favor is, in our view, reasonable and realistic. On the issue of actual damages, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the amount of P20,000.00 granted by the trial court to petitioner should not be disturbed. As regards attorney's fees, they may be awarded when the defendant's act or omission

has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest. It was therefore erroneous for the Court of Appeals to delete the award made by the trial court; consequently, petitioner should be awarded attorney's fees and the amount of P25,000.00, instead of P100,000.00 earlier awarded, may be considered rational, fair and reasonable. g. Acts of Passengers and Others (17611763) Manila Railroad v. Ballesteros, 16 SCRA 641, G.R.No. L-19161 April 29, 1966. See full text. Bachelor Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 85691 Facts: Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were passengers of a bus belonging to petitioner Bachelor Express, Inc. While the bus was on its way to Cagayan de Oro, a passenger at the rear portion suddenly stabbed another passenger. The stabbing cause commotion and panic amount the passengers such that the passengers started running to the sole exit shoving each other resulting in the falling off the bus by passengers Beter and Rautraut causing them fatal injuries. The heirs of the deceased sued the bus company Evidence adduced showed that the bus driver did not immediately stop the bus at the height of the commotion; the bus was speeding from a full stop; and the victims fell from the bus door when it was opened or gave way while the bus was still running. Petitioner denied liability on the ground that the death of its two passengers was caused by a force majeure as it was due to the act of a third person who was beyond its control and supervision. In line with this, petitioner also argued that it is not an insurer of its passengers. Issue: 1.Whether or not the case at bar is within the context of force majeure. 2.Whether or not the petitioner should be absolved from liability for the death of its passengers. Held:

The sudden act o the passenger who stabbed another passenger in the bus is within the context of force majeure. However, in order that a common carrier may be absolved from liability in case of force majeure, it is not enough that the accident was caused by force majeure. The common carrier must still proves that it was not negligent in causing the injuries resulting from such accident. Considering the factual findings in this case, it is clear that petitioner has failed to overcome the presumption of fault and negligence found in the law governing common carriers. The argument that the petitioners are not insurers of their passengers deserves no merit in view of the failure of the petitioners to observe extraordinary diligence in transporting safely the passengers to their destination as warranted by law. Smith Bell v Borja 383 SCRA 341, G.R. No. 143008, June 10, 2002. See full text. 4. RECOVERABLE DAMAGES(See NCC Part XVIII Damages) Regional Container Lines v. Netherlands Insurance, 598 SCRA 304, G.R. No. 168151, September 4, 2009. See full text. Sulpicio Lines v.Curso, 615 SCRA 575, G.R. No. 157009. March 17, 2010. See full text. Air Frances v. Gillego, 638 SCRA 472, G.R. No. 165266, December 15, 2010. See full text. Northwest Airlines v. Catapang, 594 SCRA 401, G.R. No. 174364, July 30, 2009. See full text. Cathay Pacific v. Spouses Vasquez, G.R. 150843, March 14, 2003, 399 SCRA 207. The Vazquezes had every right to decline the upgrade and insist on the Business Class accommodation they had booked for and which was designated in their boarding passes. It should not have been imposed on them over their vehement objection. By insisting on the

upgrade, Cathay breached its contract of carriage with the Vazquezes. Respondents-spouses Dr. Daniel Earnshaw Vazquez and Maria Luisa Madrigal Vazquez with two friends went to Hongkong for pleasure and business. For their return flight to Manila, they were booked on Cathays Flight CX-905. Upon boarding, Dr. Vazquez presented his boarding pass to the ground stewardess, who in turn inserted it into a computer at the gate. The ground stewardess was assisted by a ground attendant by the name of Clara Chiu. When Ms. Chiu glanced at the computer monitor, she saw a message that there was a seat change from Business Class to First Class for the Vazquezes. Ms. Chiu approached Dr. Vazquez and told him that the Vazquezes accommodations were upgraded to First Class. Dr. Vazquez refused the upgrade, reasoning that it would not look nice for them as hosts to travel in First Class and their guests, in the Business Class. Moreover, they were going to discuss business matters during the flight. He also told Ms. Chiu that she could have other passengers instead transferred to the First Class Section. Ms. Chiu consulted her supervisor, who told her to handle the situation and to convince the Vazquezes to accept the upgrading. Ms. Chiu informed the latter that the Business Class was fully booked, and that since they were Marco Polo Club members they had the priority to be upgraded to the First Class. Dr. Vazquez continued to refuse, so Ms. Chiu told them that if they would not avail themselves of the privilege, they would not be allowed to take the flight. Eventually, after talking to his two friends, Dr. Vazquez gave in and proceeded to the First Class Cabin. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not by upgrading the seat accommodation of the Vazquezes from Business Class to First Class Cathay breached its contract of carriage with the Vazquezes. 2. Whether or not the Vazquezes are entitled to damages.

HELD: In previous cases, the breach of contract of carriage consisted in either the bumping off of a passenger with confirmed reservation or the downgrading of a passengers seat accommodation from one class to a lower class. In this case, what happened was the reverse. The Vazquezes never denied that they were members of Cathays Marco Polo Club. They knew that as members of the Club, they had priority for upgrading of their seat accommodation at no extra cost when an opportunity arises. But, just like other privileges, such priority could be waived. The Vazquezes should have been consulted first whether they wanted to avail themselves of the privilege or would consent to a change of seat accommodation before their seat assignments were given to other passengers. Normally, one would appreciate and accept an upgrading, for it would mean a better accommodation. But, whatever their reason was and however odd it might be, the Vazquezes had every right to decline the upgrade and insist on the Business Class accommodation they had booked for and which was designated in their boarding passes. They clearly waived their priority or preference when they asked that other passengers be given the upgrade. It should not have been imposed on them over their vehement objection. By insisting on the upgrade, Cathay breached its contract of carriage with the Vazquezes. The Court, however, is not convinced that the upgrading or the breach of contract was attended by fraud or bad faith. Bad faith and fraud are allegations of fact that demand clear and convincing proof. It is not persuaded by the Vazquezes argument that the overbo oking of the Business Class Section constituted bad faith on the part of Cathay. Section 3 of the Economic Regulation No. 7 of the Civil Aeronautics Board, as amended, provides that an overbooking that does not exceed ten percent is not considered deliberate and therefore does not amount to bad faith. The Court of Appeals awarded each of the Vazquezes moral damages in the amount of

P250,000. In this case, we have ruled that the breach of contract of carriage was not attended by fraud or bad faith. The Court of Appeals award of moral damages has, therefore, no leg to stand on. The most that can be adjudged in favor of the Vazquezes for Cathays breach of contract is an award for nominal damages under Article 2221 of the New Civil Code.