DIMACUHA vs. PEOPLE G.R. No.

143705 February 23, 2007

GARCIA, J.:

FACTS:

An honest-to-goodness entrapment operation which has repeatedly been accepted to be a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law was conducted on August 10, 1995 against Dimacuha by the team composed of SPO2 Melanio Valeroso, SPO2 Vicente Ostan, Bello Borgueta, Jose Castelo, Jr. and Felipe Evangelista. SPO2 Valeroso and SPO2 Ostan positively testified that from a distance of more or less 5 to 7 meters, they saw petitioner took out from her brown shoulder bag one (1) small plastic sachet, suspected to be "shabu," and handed the same to their police informant, Benito Marcelo. Immediately thereafter, the two police officers approached the petitioner, the latter's lady companion and Marcelo. SPO2 Valeroso confiscated the said small plastic sachet, containing a white crystalline substance from Marcelo. A subsequent search on the petitioner's shoulder bag yielded another small plastic sachet, also suspected to contain shabu, which was inserted inside the cover of petitioner's checkbook. After laboratory examination, the white crystalline substance contained in the small plastic sachets was found positive of methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu, a regulated drug.

The petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto while in the act of delivering 1.15 grams and in actual possession of another 10.78 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) as a result of an entrapment operation conducted by the police on the basis of information received from Benito Marcelo regarding petitioner's illegal drug trade. From a distance of more or less 5 to 7 meters, the police officers saw the petitioner took out from her brown shoulder bag one (1) small plastic sachet, suspected to be "shabu," and handed the same to their police informant, Benito Marcelo. Immediately thereafter, the two police officers approached the petitioner, the latter's lady companion and Marcelo. SPO2 Valeroso confiscated the said small plastic sachet, containing a white crystalline substance from Marcelo. A subsequent search on the petitioner's shoulder bag yielded another small plastic sachet, also suspected to contain shabu, which was inserted inside the cover of petitioner's checkbook. After laboratory examination, the white crystalline substance contained in the small plastic sachets was found positive of methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu, a regulated drug. Then, they were brought to
the headquarters.

ISSUE:

Whether the warrantless arrest of petitioner was justified under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court; HELD: We pointed out that the interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute and that warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in the following instances: (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognizes permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto; (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit; and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners. Petitioner's arrest, therefore, was lawful and the subsequent seizure of a bag of shabu inserted inside the cover of her checkbook was justified and legal in light of the prevailing rule that an officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any property found upon his person in order to find and seize things connected with the crime. The seized regulated drug is, therefore, admissible in evidence, being the fruit of the crime.

G.R. No. 184800

May 5, 2010

WONINA M. BONIFACIO, JOCELYN UPANO, VICENTE ORTUOSTE AND JOVENCIO PERECHE, SR., Petitioners, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 149, and JESSIE JOHN P. GIMENEZ, Respondents. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.:

On behalf of Yuhengco family, Gimenez filed a criminal complaint for 13 counts of libel against Phillip Piccio and others who are trustees of PEPCI. PEPCI previously purchased traditional pre-need educational plans but were unable to collect thereon or avail of the benefits thereunder after PPI, due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation with prayer for suspension of payments before the Makati RTC. Decrying PPIs refusal/inability to honor its obligations under the educational pre-need plans, PEPCI sought to provide a forum by which the planholders could seek redress for their pecuniary loss under their policies by maintaining a website on the internet under the address of www.pepcoalition.com. By resolution, the Makati City Prosecutors Office, finding probable cause to indict the accused, filed thirteen (13) separate Informations charging them with libel. Several of the accused appealed the Makati City Prosecutors Resolution by a petition for review to the Secretary of Justice who, by Resolution reversed the finding of probable cause and accordingly directed the withdrawal of the Information for libel filed in court. The Justice Secretary opined that the crime of internet libel was non-existent, hence, the accused could not be charged with libel under Article 353 of the RPC. Petitioners, as co-accused, thereupon filed before the RTC, a Motion to Quash the Information on the grounds that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts complained of in the Information are not punishable by law since internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of the RPC; and the Information is fatally defective for failure to designate the offense charged and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense of libel. Petitioners maintained that the Information failed to allege a particular place within the trial courts jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and first published or that the offended parties resided in Makati at the time the alleged defamatory material was printed and first published. The prosecution moved to reconsider the quashal of the Information, insisting that the Information sufficiently conferred jurisdiction on the RTC. Petitioners opposed the prosecutions motion for reconsideration, contending, that since venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases, any defect in an information for libel pertaining to jurisdiction is not a mere matter of form that may be cured by amendment. The RTC granted

the prosecutions motion for recon and ordered the public prosecutor to amend the Information to cure the defect of want of venue to which the prosecution then admitted. Petitioners moved to quash the Amended Information which they alleged, still failed to vest jurisdiction upon the public respondent because it failed to allege that the libelous articles were printed and first published by the accused in Makati; and the prosecution erroneously laid the venue of the case in the place where the offended party accessed the internet-published article. Issue (1): WON petitioners violated the rule on hierarchy of courts to thus render the petition dismissible. Held: No. The established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts, as a rule, requires that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. A regard for judicial hierarchy clearly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level courts should be filed in the RTC and those against the latter should be filed in the Court of Appeals. The rule is not iron-clad, however, as it admits of certain exceptions. In the present case, the substantive issue calls for the Courts exercise of its discretionary authority, by way of exception, in order to abbreviate the review process as petitioners raise a pure question of law involving jurisdiction in criminal complaints for libel under Article 360 of the RPC whether the Amended Information is sufficient to sustain a charge for written defamation in light of the requirements under Article 360 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 4363. Issue (2): WON grave abuse of discretion attended the RTCs admission of the Amended Information. Held: Yes. Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction. This principle acquires even greater import in libel cases, given that Article 360, as amended, specifically provides for the possible venues for the institution of the criminal and civil aspects of such cases.

Whether or not the venue of internet-published article libel is where the offended party accessed the libelous article. No. In this situation there is no need to embark on a quest to determine with precision where the matter was first printed and published.
The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first publication. To credit Gimenezs premise of equating his first access to the defamatory article on petitioners website in Makati with printing and first publication would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in situations where the websites author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly accessed the offending website.

G.R. No. 192898

January 31, 2011

SPOUSES ALEXANDER TRINIDAD and CECILIA TRINIDAD, Petitioners, vs. VICTOR ANG, Respondent. RESOLUTION BRION, J.:

FACTS:

On September 3, 2007, the Office of the City Prosecutor, Masbate City, issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against the petitioners. On October 10, 2007, the petitioners filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a petition for review challenging this Resolution. On March 3, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Fifth Judicial Region, Masbate City, an Information for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against the petitioners. As the case was covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the MTCC ordered the petitioners to submit their counter affidavits and to appear in court within 10 days from receipt of the said order. The petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion to Defer Arraignment and Proceedings and Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest praying, among others, for the deferment of their arraignment in view of the pendency of their petition for review before the DOJ. The MTCC, in its Order dated May 28, 2009, granted the motion, "subject x x x to paragraph c[,] Section 11, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure." On August 10, 2009, the MTCC reconsidered this order, and set the petitioners arraignment on September 10, 2009. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC. The RTC, in its decision of January 6, 2010, denied this petition. The petitioners moved to reconsider this decision, but the RTC denied their motion in its order dated July 5, 2010. The RTC held that the MTCC judge did not err in setting the arraignment of the petitioners after the lapse of one (1) year and ten (10) months from the filing of the petition for review with the DOJ. It explained that the cases cited by the petitioners were decided before the amendment of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. After the amendment of the Rules on December 1, 2000, the Supreme Court applied the 60-day limit on suspension of arraignment in case of a pendency of a petition for review with the DOJ. The petitioners filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari essentially claiming that the 60-day limit on suspension of arraignment is only a general rule. They cited several cases to show that the arraignment of an accused should be deferred until the petition for review with the DOJ is resolved.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 60-day limit on suspension of arraignment pending resolution of petition for review in DOJ is mandatory. HELD:

Yes. The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which provides: SEC. 11. Suspension of Arraignment. Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:

(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose; (b) There exists a prejudicial question; and (c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; Provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.
In Samson v. Daway, the Court explained that while the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment. In the present case, the petitioners filed their petition for review with the DOJ on October 10, 2007. When the RTC set the arraignment of the petitioners on August 10, 2009, 1 year and 10 months had already lapsed. This period was way beyond the 60-day limit provided for by the Rules. In addition, the cases cited by the petitioners Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How, Roberts, Jr. v. CA, and Dimatulac v. Villon were all decided prior to the amendment to Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which took effect on December 1, 2000. At the time these cases were decided, there was no 60-day limit on the suspension of arraignment.
1w phi 1

G.R. No. 79123-25 January 9, 1989

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EMELIANO TRINIDAD, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellant.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

FACTS: While at Buenavista, accused Emeliano TRINIDAD, a member of the Integrated National Police, assigned at Nasipit Police Station, and residing at Baan, Butuan City, asked for a ride to Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, which is on the way to Davao City. TRINIDAD was in uniform and had two firearms, a carbine, and the other, a side-arm .38 caliber revolver. SORIANO, LAROA, TAN, and TRINIDAD then left Butuan on 20 January 1983 at about 5:20 P.M. bound for Davao City. TAN was driving the Fiera. Seated to his right was SORIANO, LAROA and the accused TRINIDAD, in that order. When they reached the stretch between El Rio and Afga, TRINIDAD advised them to drive slowly because, according to him, the place was dangerous. All of a sudden, TAN heard two gunshots. SORIANO and LAROA slumped dead. TAN did not actually see the shooting of LAROA but he witnessed the shooting of SORIANO having been alerted by the sound of the first gunfire. Both were hit on the head. TRINIDAD had used his carbine in killing the two victims. ISSUE: Whether or not the adduced evidence is insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. HELD: TRINIDAD's defense of alibi is inherently weak and cannot prevail over the straightforward and detailed descriptive narration of TAN

The other inconsistencies TRINIDAD makes much of, such as, that TAN was unsure before the NAPOLCOM Hearing Officer whether TRINIDAD was wearing khaki or fatigue uniform but, in open Court, he testified positively that TRINIDAD was in khaki uniform; and that while TAN declared that TRINIDAD was wearing a cap, prosecution witness Felimon Comendador said that he was not but was in complete fatigue uniform, are actually trivial details that do not affect the positive identification of TRINIDAD that TAN has made nor detract from the latter's overall credibility. Nor is there basis for TRINIDAD to contend that the absence of gunpowder burns on the deceased victims negates TAN's claim that they were shot "point-blank." Actually, this term refers merely to the "aim directed straight toward a target" (Webster's Third New International Dictionary) and has no reference to the distance between the gun and the target. And in point of fact, it matters not how far the assailant was at the time he shot the victims, the crucial factor being whether he did shoot the victim or not.

TAN's testimony remained unshaken even during cross- examination. No ill motive has been attributed to him to prevaricate the truth. He was in the vehicle where the killing transpired was a witness to the actual happening, and was a victim himself who managed narrowly to escape death despite the weaponry with which TRINIDAD was equipped.

Camara vs Pagayatan, GR No. 176563, April 2, 2007; 520 SCRA 182

Posted by Pius Morados on April 28, 2012

(Special Proceedings Habeas Corpus, contempt) Facts: Petitioner Assistant Vice-President and Head of the Land Compensation Division of the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) was detained under a warrant of arrest respondent judge issued from a contempt citation against the former for LBPs failure to deposit the preliminary compensation in Civil Case No. R 1390 as provided under the trial courts order. LBP was directed to deposit the preliminary compensation, in cash and bonds, in the total amount of P71,634,027.30 with the LBP, Manila, within 7 days from receipt of this order, and to notify the Court of compliance within such period. LBP then complied with this order by depositing the said amount in its head office in cash under its account in trust for, and in bond payable to, the trial courts clerk of court. However the respondent judge found LBPs compliance insufficient and ordered LBP to place the deposit in the name of Josefina Lubrica as payee, in the form that is readily withdrawable. Respondent judge ordered Camara to remain in detention until LBP complies with such order. Hence, petitioner filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Issue: WON a respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of his jurisdiction when he refused to release Camara from detention despite LBPs compliance. Held: Yes. Under section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, a writ of habeas corpus does not lie if it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process. Petitioner does not question the trial courts jurisdiction to issue the Order citing petitioner in contempt. What petitioner assails is respondent judges refusal to release Camara from detention despite LBPs compliance of the full amount of the preliminary compensation. This is grave abuse of respondent judges contempt powers, amounting to lack or excess of his ju risdiction.

G.R. No. 176389

December 14, 2010

ANTONIO LEJANO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 176864 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER ESTRADA and GERARDO BIONG, Appellants. DECISION ABAD, J.: Brief Background On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and Jennifer, seven, were brutally slain at their home in Paraaque City. Following an intense investigation, the police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged. Thus, the identities of the real perpetrators remained a mystery especially to the public whose interests were aroused by the gripping details of what everybody referred to as the Vizconde massacre. Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced that it had solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she witnessed the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's testimony, on August 10, 1995 the public prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide against Webb, et al.1 The Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 274, presided over by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only seven of the accused since Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart remained at large.2 The trial court rendered judgment, finding all the accused guilty as charged. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision. ISSUE: Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut Alfaros testimony that he led the others in committing the crime. HELD: Not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. A positive declaration from a witness that he saw the accused commit the crime should not automatically cancel out the accuseds

claim that he did not do it. A lying witness can make as positive an identification as a truthful witness can. The lying witness can also say as forthrightly and unequivocally, "He did it!" without blinking an eye. Rather, to be acceptable, the positive identification must meet at least two criteria: First, the positive identification of the offender must come from a credible witness. She is credible who can be trusted to tell the truth, usually based on past experiences with her. Her word has, to one who knows her, its weight in gold. And second, the witness story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently contrived. A witness who testifies about something she never saw runs into inconsistencies and makes bewildering claims. Here, Alfaro and her testimony fail to meet the above criteria. Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi. To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence57 that (a) he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.58 He presented documentary and testimonial proof that he was in the United States of America from March 1991 to October 1992 such as travel preparations, immigration checks, details of US sojourn and etc. Alfaros quality as a witness and her inconsistent, if not inherently unbelievable, testimony cannot be the positive identification that jurisprudence acknowledges as sufficient to jettison a denial and an alibi. Webbs documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only with respect to him, but also with respect to Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaros testimony will not hold together. Webbs participation is the anchor of Alfaros story. Without it, the evidence against the others must necessarily fall.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GILBERTO VILLARICO, SR. @ "BERTING", GILBERTO VILLARICO, JR., JERRY

RAMENTOS, and RICKY VILLARICO, Accused-Appellants. Facts: Haide was busy preparing dinner in the kitchen of his familys residence in Bolinsong, Bonifacio, Misamis Occidental. At that time, Haides sister-in-law Remedios Cagatan was attending to her child who was answering the call of nature near the toilet. From where she was, Remedios saw all the accused as they stood at the rear of the kitchen aiming their firearms at the door Ricky Villarico was at the left side, and Gilberto, Jr. stood behind him, while Gilberto, Sr. was at the right side, with Ramentos behind him. When Gilberto, Jr. noticed Remedios, he pointed his gun at her, prompting Remedios to drop to the ground and to shout to Lolita Cagatan, her mother-in-law. At that instant, Remedios heard three gunshots. Francisco Cagatan, the father of Haide, also heard the gunshots just as he was coming out of the toilet. Lolita also heard the gunshots while she was in the sala. She recalled that Haide then came towards her from the kitchen, asking for help and saying: Tabang kay gipusil ko ni Berting (I was shot by Berting). At that, she and Remedios brought the wounded Haide to Clinica Ozarraga, where he was treated for gunshot wounds on his left scapular region (back of left shoulder) and right elbow. He succumbed shortly thereafter due to hypovolemic shock or massive loss of blood. However, some of the facts were proved corroborated by the Defense with the help of Peter Ponggos, who narrated that he had been on board a motorcycle (habal-habal) when Lolita and Remedios asked for his help; and that he then aided Lolita and Remedios in bringing Haide to the hospital. According to Peter, he asked Haide who had shot him, but Haide replied that there had been only one assailant whom he did not recognize. Issue: Whether or not an identification, to be positive, have to be made by a witness who actually saw the assailants? Held: The collective recollections of both Remedios and Francisco about seeing the four accused standing near the door to the kitchen immediately before and after the shooting of Haide inside the kitchen were categorical enough, and warranted no other logical inference than that the four accused were the persons who had just shot Haide. Indeed, neither Remedios nor Francisco needed to have actually seen who of the accused had fired at Haide, for it was enough that they testified that the four armed accused: (a) had strategically positioned themselves by the kitchen door prior to the shooting of Haide; (b) had still been in the same positions after the gunshots were fired; and (c) had continuously aimed their firearms at the kitchen door even as they were leaving the crime scene. The statement of Haide to his mother that he had just been shot by the group of Berting uttered in the immediate aftermath of the shooting where he was the victim was a true part of the res gestae. The statement was admissible against the accused as an exception to the hearsay rule under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides: Section 42. Part of the res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae. Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime . There are two types of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where, although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial

evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that there can be no conviction until and unless an accused is positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. If resort to circumstantial evidence would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence of direct evidence, then felons would go free and the community would be denied proper protection. To conclude, the identification of a malefactor, to be positive and sufficient for conviction, does not always require direct evidence from an eyewitness; otherwise, no conviction will be possible in crimes where there are no eyewitnesses. Indeed, trustworthy circumstantial evidence can equally confirm the identification and overcome the constitutionally presumed innocence of the accused. The petition was affirmed. The accused shall pay the costs of suit.

G.R. No. 160855

April 16, 2008

CONCEPCION CHUA GAW, petitioner, vs. SUY BEN CHUA and FELISA CHUA, respondents. DECISION NACHURA, J.: Spouses Chua Chin and Chan Chi were the founders of three business enterprises 3 namely: Hagonoy Lumber, Capitol Sawmill Corporation, and Columbia Wood Industries. The couple had seven children, namely, Santos Chua; Concepcion Chua; Suy Ben Chua; Chua Suy Phen; Chua Sioc Huan; Chua Suy Lu; and Julita Chua. On June 19, 1986, Chua Chin died, leaving his wife Chan Chi and his seven children as his only surviving heirs. At the time of Chua Chins death, the net worth of Hagonoy Lumber was P415,487.20.4 On December 8, 1986, his surviving heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights in Favor of a Co-Heir5 (Deed of Partition, for brevity), wherein the heirs settled their interest in Hagonoy Lumber as follows: one-half (1/2) thereof will pertain to the surviving spouse, Chan Chi, as her share in the conjugal partnership; and the other half, equivalent to P207,743.60, will be divided among Chan Chi and the seven children in equal pro indiviso shares equivalent to P25,967.00 each.6 In said document, Chan Chi and the six children likewise agreed to voluntarily renounce and waive their shares over Hagonoy Lumber in favor of their co-heir, Chua Sioc Huan. In May 1988, petitioner Concepcion Chua Gaw and her husband, Antonio Gaw, asked respondent, Suy Ben Chua, to lend them P200,000.00 which they will use for the construction of their house in Marilao, Bulacan. The parties agreed that the loan will be payable within six (6) months without interest. Suy Ben Chua issued a check in the amount of P200,000 to the couple. However, the latter failed to pay the amount within the designated period. Suy Ben Chua sent them a demand letter, requesting to settle their obligation with the warning that he will take the appropriate legal action if they fail to do so. Failing to heed his demand, Suy Ben filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against the spouses Gaw with the Regional Trial Court.

During trial, the spouses Gaw called the respondent to testify as adverse witness under Section 10, Rule 132. On direct examination, respondent testified that Hagonoy Lumber was the conjugal property of his parents Chua Chin and Chan Chi, who were both Chinese citizens. He narrated that, initially, his father leased the lots where Hagonoy Lumber is presently located from his godfather, Lu Pieng, and that his father constructed the two-storey concrete building standing thereon. According to respondent, when he was in high school, it was his father who managed the business but he and his other siblings were helping him. Later, his sister, Chua Sioc Huan, managed Hogonoy Lumber together with their other brothers and sisters. He stated that he also managed Hagonoy Lumber when he was in high school, but he stopped when he got married and found another job. He said that he now owns the lots where Hagonoy Lumber is operating. 18 On cross-examination, respondent explained that he ceased to be a stockholder of Capitol Sawmill when he sold his shares of stock to the other stockholders on January 1, 1991. He further testified that Chua Sioc Huan acquired Hagonoy Lumber by virtue of a Deed of Partition, executed by the heirs of Chua Chin. He, in turn, became the owner of Hagonoy Lumber when he bought the same from Chua Sioc Huan through a Deed of Sale dated August 1, 1990. 19 On re-direct examination, respondent stated that he sold his shares of stock in Capitol Sawmill for P254,000.00, which payment he received in cash. He also paid the purchase price

of P255,000.00 for Hagonoy Lumber in cash, which payment was not covered by a separate receipt as he merely delivered the same to Chua Sioc Huan at her house in Paso de Blas, Valenzuela. Although he maintains several accounts at Planters Bank, Paluwagan ng Bayan, and China Bank, the amount he paid to Chua Sioc Huan was not taken from any of them. He kept the amount in the house because he was engaged in rediscounting checks of people from the public market. 20

Prior to the RTC decision Antonio died due to cardio vascular and respiratory failure. Thereafter RTC ruled in favor of Suy Ben Chua declaring that the latter is entitled to the payment of the amount of P200,000 with interest. Concepcion appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA denied Concepcions motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Concepcion contends that her case was unduly prejudiced by the RTCs treatment of the Suy Ben Chuas testimony as adverse witness during cross-examination by his own counsel as part of her evidence. Concepcion argues that the adverse witness testimony elicited during cross-examination should not be considered as evidence of the calling party. ISSUE: Whether or not the adverse witness testimony elicited during cross-examination should be considered as evidence of the calling party. HELD:
A party who calls his adversary as a witness is, therefore, not bound by the latte rs testimony only in the sense that he may contradict him by introducing other evidence to prove a state of facts contrary to what the witness testifies on.35 A rule that provides that the party calling an adverse witness shall not be bound by his testimony does not mean that such testimony may not be given its proper weight, but merely that the calling party shall not be precluded from rebutting his testimony or from impeaching him.36 This, the petitioner failed to do. In the present case, the petitioner, by her own testimony, failed to discredit the respondents testimony on how Hagonoy Lumber became his sole property. The petitioner admitted having signed the Deed of Partition but she insisted that the transfer of the property to Chua Siok Huan was only temporary. On cross-examination, she confessed that no other document was executed to indicate that the transfer of the business to Chua Siok Huan was a temporary arrangement. She declared that, after their mother died in 1993, she did not initiate any action concerning Hagonoy Lumber, and it was only in her counterclaim in the instant that, for the first time, she raised a claim over the business. Due process requires that in reaching a decision, a tribunal must consider the entire evidence presented.37 All the parties to the case, therefore, are considered bound by the favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the evidence.38 As already mentioned, in arriving at a decision, the entirety of the evidence presented will be considered, regardless of the party who offered them in evidence. In this light, the more vital consideration is not whether a piece of evidence was properly attributed to one party, but whether it was accorded the apposite probative weight by the court. The testimony of an adverse witness is evidence in the case and should be given its proper weight, and such evidence becomes weightier if the other party fails to impeach the witness or contradict his testimony.