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34, No. 1, Going to War (Mar., 2004), pp. 174-176 Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27552575 . Accessed: 14/08/2013 19:03
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174
notes that at the height of the Iran in the same post. Wallison by Donald T. Regan Contra affair, rhe Washington Post called Regan "the worst chief of staff ever" (p. 273). Wallison and he absolves Regan from any responsibility for Iran-Contra, disagrees, was that the he uninformed about what villains of the Poindexter, noting book?John Robert defends and especially Oliver McFarlane, and the reader is left with Regan, up to. Wallison a sense of injustice at Regan's of his own virtually no mention North?were House. sordid tale of the Iran-Contra affair is Ronald vigorously ignominious leave taking
and hasty exit. Wallison himself makes once his mentor had departed theWhite But the real villain inWallison's himself. Wallison
Shultz saying of secretary of state George quotes Reagan a "He he with had about and would stick him, consistency Reagan: things. Sometimes In wish that he wouldn't" Wallison's view, Reagan's you'd (p. 237). inability to admit arms that he had traded for hostages, and his stubborn refusal to concede "mistakes of former the hostages' freedom, prolonged the heart" (p. 273) in winning the Iran-Contra affair term. and took much of the momentum from the second Thus, the real value of away of the conservative deification Wallison's book is not his advancement of Reagan, but the catbird seat he provides into the chaos that descended upon the White House fol
lowing to it. For the Iran-Contra Wallison the disclosures, describes author's best and Reagan's passive meandering Reagan Commission, either stubbornness testimony ignored that before contributed the Tower or, impres example, Despite read them Reagan's efforts,
verbatim
to the Tower
thereby
enhancing
sion of a president being manipulated by his staff (pp. 249-77). Ronald Reagan was a president of his time. Conservatives and the country are right to give him credit for his policy successes and a general restoration of confidence in the presidency.
politics What for makes
They
years for
in noting
Reagan's
that Reagan
glaring weakness
shaped
was
the rhetoric
his inability
of domestic
to and innovate. Franklin
presidency?as
Washington,
Lincoln,
Roosevelt
makes a
can attest?is
powerful case for
the ability
this argument.
for policy
innovation.
Ironically, Wallison's
book
Edited
S. Conley.
Lanham, MD:
Uni
to
idiot,
Franklin
Ronald
Dwight
a complex and perhaps
Eisenhower,
man of even
Margaret
sim but
shocking realigning,
administration
"reconstructive"
it has also been castigated by two decades of critics as destructive It is to and deceitful. not to the credit of the contributors this volume that they do look beyond the passions that surround the Reagan presidency, but delve into them as part of the subject matter
of their collective reassessment.
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BOOK REVIEWS
I 175
In an introductory the context and Anne Skedler establish essay, Tim Blessing Humanities for the volume, based upon a 2002 conference held at the Interdisciplinary of Reagan of California, Santa Barbara. A second generation Center of the University one both is that takes with and Skedler note, scholarship exception emerging, Blessing
the "lesser Reagan" and "greater Reagan" assessments of the past. Blessing and Skedler
are themselves
as
perhaps overly keen on their subject. They are persuaded by Beth Fischer's recent account {The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War, 1997) of
a man who "knew and understood" (p. 9) all manner of things, because he
Reagan
detailed notes on arcane subjects. Perhaps, but this line of reasoning is open to criticism, which the authors fail to acknowledge. They are on firmer ground when own test poll, and that of Murray 2002 and the results of their presenting analyzing in in in which historians were asked to the White 1989 {Greatness House, 1999), Blessing once wrote
rate Reagan. As Blessing and Skedler conclude, there is still no consensus on Reagan as
experts
tend to evaluate
according
and the
presidency,
The strongest
inter-branch
section,
with the
on White
greatest
House
number
decision making
of contributions.
Congress,
of an
objective
of Reagan's
economic
decision-making
president.
{The Reagan Effect, 1999), here com policymaking the other 20th habits with those of Franklin Roosevelt,
The paradox style, at both is that, succeeded seems president's though at not vastly the role different of in per a reconstruc hampered quoted
president. a management
reconstruction in the
been as
Sloan: 131).
"
wonderfully
reflected
'Each morning
contributors
I get a piece
help us
of paper
"
by
(p.
Several
to better
understand
script
Reagan
uses evidence from archival sources to test every day. Andrew Rudalevige over the drafting and the House centralization about ofWhite contingency hypotheses to Congress initiatives. His evidence of legislative indicates that in the presentation followed Reagan administration,
Reagan,
centralization
and those who
of legislative
controlled
initiatives
the White
was
House
visible,
in his
but hardly
name, "like
overwhelming.
other presidents,
House responded
used a variety
rationally to
of sources of policy
incentives within
advice"
its
environment,
working
under
cooperatively
with members
of the Senate and their staffs while the script that Reagan
different answer:
Republican
control.
In answering
White and Bruce J.
the question
Schulman
"who wrote
provide a quite
followed?"
"the American
The
values
value
of
inWhite's
Reagan's family, work,
in which
That and
he draws upon
persona, freedom. White These
"the Gipper"
tells values us, "have
theme
emphasized roots
to
illuminate
persona. peace,
in
our collective
ity on the
subconscious"
had made
(p. 48).
a greater
It would
effort
if White,
claim, and
an author
to explore
subject,
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176
the man's
extent
subject
is putting
Reagan
"revolution"
in a cross-national
in the United States in the anything, special about the turn toward conservatism on or States did conservatives 1980s? The answer: only in the United rely feel-good, in the States conservatives doctrine. United did "supply-side," economic Only place such a low priority on fiscal restraint that overall government spending in the decade increased as a share of GDP
American The culture Reagan and
was
did
so, Schulman
with
believes,
the
for reasons
rooted
in
presidency's
relationship
conservative
movement
is
the subject
Schneider. vatives,
unique
at
contributions
the
to this volume,
disagreements shows among that
by Gregory
paleoconser conservatism
L.
dissecting
neoconservatives,
Right
anti-abortionists,
did
fulfillment
agreed upon
in Ronald
definition
Reagan's White
of what they are
House.
Because
they
conservatives
are no more
conserving,
capable of finding
upon understanding There are
fulfillment
of who
operate
of
absent an agreed
haste. The most
gaps
in
this
signs
notable
gaps are in foreign and military strategies, and the party system. The essay by the editor, comparing Reagan's Eisenhower, legislative leadership with that of Dwight the importance of Reagan's partisan context, but cannot by is valuable in highlighting itself cover the terrain of so large a subject. The signs of haste include the absence of one (Schulman)
Presidency
of the contributors
Reassessing ship on the Reagan a most
of authors
(pp. 258-60).
generation
Nevertheless,
of scholar
addition
to a second
important
presidency.
?Thomas
S. Langs
ton
Tulane University
Constructing Politics.
and Presidential in Postmodern Hyperreality Image-Making and Trevor Parry-Giles. New York: Peter Lang By Shawn J. Parry-Giles Inc., 2002. 245 pp. Publishing, Clinton: Shawn Parry-Giles and Trevor Parry-Giles believe that, in the postmodern world is an exercise in futility. Accord the "real" Bill Clinton
objective upon images how and to answer express for U.S. Bill Clinton the the political was questions, "how of U.S. (p. did the constructed and answer of "what these texts. character politics?" 2). To
of hyperreality,
ingly, images are the they have of Bill
trying to discover
made Clinton of it their reflect such analyze
culture?" constructed
questions,
in a variety
The
candidate's
first such text is the video The Man from Hope, which
acceptance speech at the Democratic National
was
shown prior
in 1992.
to the
Espe
Convention
is their analysis of the film's use of gender. The Man from Hope, though cially noteworthy to establish Clinton's institutions highly feminine discourse, used "familiar masculine credentials for the presidency" (p. 36). They contend that the feminine style of this text
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