President Reagan, the U.S. Senate, and American Foreign Policy, 1981-1986 Author(s): Christopher J.

Bailey Source: Journal of American Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2, Was Irangate Really an "Aberration"? (Aug., 1987), pp. 167-181 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the British Association for American Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27554830 . Accessed: 14/08/2013 19:08
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President Senate, Policy,

the U.S. Reagan, and American Foreign 1981-1986

J. BAILEY

CHRISTOPHER

status in the U.S. Senate following The Republican loss of majority the elections of 1986, and the disclosure of the Reagan Administra mid-term
tion's Contras, secret arms sales to Iran to and an diversion end six years of funds of to the Nicaraguan deference to effectively brought senatorial

1981 to 1986 the Republican foreign policy-making. presidential a degree of controlled Senate had generally afforded President Reagan not in the making of foreign which latitude only contrasted policy From that of his immediate predecessors, but also prepared the Oliver North. for of adventures Colonel the type pursued by atmosphere the foreign policy of Presidents initiatives Whereas Nixon, Ford, and Carter had been subject to considerable senators, scrutiny by thereby markedly
forcing a detailed examination of their consequences, the forbearance

with

shown
To

to the Reagan approach

extent, of a a certain

Administration to policy-making.
therefore, in the

by the Senate
Irangate scandal

encouraged
may relations. be

a much
viewed as

less diligent
a consequence

change

presidential-senatorial

Predictions

these relations between that the pattern of conflict which had characterized the two institutions for most of the 1970s might 1980 change following elections were made by a number of observers. Typical was the suggestion
made by James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver that, "it was plausible to

project succeed

that Reagan in ushering

in the Senate might and the new Republicans just of the domination in a new period of presidential hawkish Republicans seats which the GOP
is Lecturer in U.S. Politics

With Congress/'1 nine of the twelve

Dr Christopher J. Bailey ST 5 5BG, England. 1 James System Journal A. Nathan (Boston:

replacing gained
at Keele

liberal Democrats in 1980 the Republican

in

University,

Keele,

Staffordshire

Little,

and James K. Oliver, Foreign no. Brown, 1983), 21 (1987), 2, 167-181

Policy Making

and the American

Political

of American

Studies,

Printed

in Great

Britain

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168

Christopher ]. Bailey in the Senate

to provide President Reagan with promised of on foreign policy The issues. willingness potential had which to senators from the generally depart bipartisanship, Republican had since the Second World War, American foreign policy governed a of Declaration in May 1978 with the publication already been signalled take-over numerous allies a thirty page critique of Security and Foreign Policy} This was a declaration by which the Carter Administration's together with policies, it was time to that Baker Howard Leader Senator (R. Tenn.) Minority reassess the wisdom of restraining partisan criticism of presidential foreign onNational of President Reagan.3 paved the way for the policies policy decisions, centred around Indeed, apart from a small group of moderate Republicans and Charles Mathias Lowell Weicker Senators (R. Md.), (R. Conn.) senators. For the aims had support of most GOP foreign policy Reagan's even Senator Charles Percy (R. 111.), who as Chairman of the example,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee was more moderate than most of his

the Administration's endorsed policy of military colleagues, Republican of El Salvador. Senator Percy aid to the government and economic on notice "I that this be think those outside forces should declared that,
nation over will in El do whatever "4 is necessary Similar support to prevent was a communist for most state aspects take of Salvador.

expressed

foreign Reagan's This consensus which

issues among Republican senators, policy to a large extent reflected a more general shift to the right in public of the Shah of Iran and the Soviet the overthrow opinion following was obviously a vital aspect in determining invasion of Afghanistan, the between President and the Republican-controlled relationship Reagan
Senate.5 Of perhaps more importance, however, was a changing perception

policy. on foreign

of their proper role in the foreign policy making process. among One consequence of the elections of 1978 and 1980 was the defeat of many of the leaders of the congressional revolution of the early 1970s. In 1978 Senator Dick Clark (D. Iowa), the sponsor of the 1975 amendment which covert aid to guerillas the C.I.A. from giving the prohibited fighting Marxist regime in Angola, was defeated in his bid for re-election. Defeated
2 3 4 5 Congressional John Spanier CBS College 13May Quarterly 1978, n 80. Weekly Report, and Eric M. Uslaner, Foreign Policy and the Democratic Publishing, 1982), 85. on and :

senators

Dilemma

(New York

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reportl, 21 Feb. 1981, 359. account For an interesting nature of the changing of American issues during the late 1970s see Joshua Muravchik, foreign policy National eds., A New Mood," Security: The Growing Power of Congress in David (Beverley M. Hills: Abshine Sage, 1981),

public "The D.

opinion Senate N?rnberger,

and Ralph

261?264.

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President

Reagan,

the U.S.

Senate,

and American

Foreign

Policy,

1981-1986

169

a co-sponsor in 1980 were Senator Jacob Javits (R. NY), Powers Resolution, Senator Frank Church (D. Idaho), who movement for to stop the bombing of Cambodia and was

of had

the War led the

largely responsible of the intelligence Senator services, greater oversight introducing who S. had McGovern the Harkin Amend (D. D.), co-sponsored George ment of 1975 which prohibited U.S. aid to countries which violated human who had introduced the (D.Iowa), John Culver rights, and Senator to Iran in 1977.6 The defeat of these resolution banning the sale of AWACS senators deprived the Senate of much of its leadership on foreign policy a vacuum which President Reagan seemed capable of filling. and left issues,
Rather than wishing to confront the executive as their Democratic

had done, the new Republican leaders of the Senate went on predecessors should be given more record to express their feeling that the President in Foreign Policy freedom of action to conduct foreign policy. Writing that has swung toward the Senator Percy argued that: "the pendulum now to swing back toward a middle legislative branch since 1970 ought to in U.S. foreign policy could that contribute greater efficiency ground "7 of the Senate's Chairman Senator John Tower (R. Texas), making. echoed this sentiment when he wrote in Foreign Armed Service Committee,
Affairs that, "By . . . [the mid-1970s] . . . the two branches were locked

in a struggle for control of American foreign policy. To a certain extent has and the President the balance between and Congress Congress won, to with unfavourable side the consequences swung dangerously legislative "8 In amanner which reflected these concerns for American foreign policy. Senator Percy declared that his highest priority as Chairman of the Foreign
Relations Committee was "to determine not only how we can have a

bipartisan During relaxed freedom

foreign policy, the Senate of the first Reagan Administration the initial months some of the restrictions which had been placed on the President's

but one

that meshes

with

the administration.

"9

to give direct aid to countries which violated human rights, and which prohibited 1981 voted to repeal the Clark Amendment it adopted an amendment when prepared by Senator Nancy Bill to the Fiscal Kassebaum 1982 Foreign Aid Authorization (R. Kansas) " we a in office the President's need muscle we're world If power, (S. 1196). in September aid to Angola
6 in the of the issues with which these senators were concerned see Jacob Javits, Who Makes War? The President Versus The Congress period Morrow, 1973). 7 in Foreign Policy, 45 (1981-82), "The Partisan Gap," Charles H. Percy, 9. 8 and Implementa The Formulation Versus the President: "Congress John G. Tower, tion of American 60, 2 (1981/82), 230. Policy," Foreign Affairs, Foreign 9 14 March 1981, 477. Weekly Report, Congressional Quarterly For an examination post-Vietnam (New York:

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170 to act

Christopher J'. Bailey like a world stated Senator power" of the Senate's Select Committee (R. Ariz.), Barry Goldwater on Intelligence.10 was of Senators Percy, Tower, and Goldwater of U.S. foreign policy had been undermined

Chairman

in the arguments Explicit a belief that the effectiveness

assertion. Not only were the procedures by the decade of congressional to allow it to move too open and cumbersome of Congress swiftly and intervention its with secrecy to meet any threat to American but security, in foreign affairs during the 1970s had deprived "Five As Senator Tower wrote, its coherence. interests different with Congressmen regional U.S. policy of much of hundred and thirty-five

in mind and objectives a cannot forge unified foreign policy that reflects the interests of the United "n of this point had, in fact, been gaining States as a whole. Recognition late the and had led Senators Jesse Helms 1970s (R.N.C.), ground during Paul Tsongas and (D. Mass.), Jacob Javits to introduce an amendment in June 1980.12 That such a the repeal of the Clark Amendment as diverse as these three had the support of Senators ideologically of the extent reined of the feeling in the Senate that the executive by the curbs of the early 1970s. to the concern that the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy in too much

seeking measure had been had been

is indicative In addition

activism of the 1970s, Senators impaired by the congressional also had a much more practical reason for allowing the executive more to freedom in 1973 Richard Fenno had quoted conduct affairs. Writing one member as stating that of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee a concern for was : foreign policy
a . . .You used have no In my constituency. me was that because happened the good re-election of my last campaign in interest foreign of Abyssinia and state.13

political liability the main Fall, thing relations, Afghanistan I was more than

they against in what interested happened

in what

to

people

to the people of my

late 1970s developments in electioneering, such as the of negative Political Action Committees by advertising associated with the New Right, served to accentuate the electoral liability of too great a concern with for foreign affairs. In the 1980 elections, four of the five members of the Foreign Relations Committee example, During increased the use
who were seeking re-election were defeated.14 Senators Church and

10 i Oct. New York Times, 1981, A9. 11 12 See Joshua Muravchik, Tower, 233. 235-36. 13 Richard F. Fenno, in Committees 141. Little, Congressmen Brown, (Boston: 1973), 14 were These Frank Church McGovern (D.Idaho), Jacob Javits (R.N.Y.), George and Richard Stone to gain re-election was John (D.S.D.), (D. Fla.). The only member Glenn (D. Ohio).

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President

Reagan,

the U.S.

Senate,

and American

Foreign

Policy,

i981-1986

171

McGovern, the National television

neglecting

in particular, Conservative
their states

suffered from Political

for the

their interest Committee suggested

of countries

in foreign

affairs with

Action which
sake

and radio commercials commercial

declared

(NCPAC) running that the Senators were

such as Cuba. One

television
a voice-over Globetrotter senator. Cuba

showed
that:

a basketball

player

dribbling

a ball while

While with

taxpayers' problems

name name for a basketball but it's a lousy for a is a great team, was the energy McGovern crisis was George touring brewing, a one month to Africa. at the All Castro. He also Fidel took junket so many No wonder South Dakota. he lost touch with With expense. we need a senator and not a globetrotter.15

at home,

Increasingly
expensive, and

senators
as a

found
were

that foreign
generally

policy
unwilling

concerns were
to undertake

politically
major

result,

initiatives. served

in electioneering during Developments to weaken the effectiveness of the Senate's

the

late

earlier

1970s thus to initiatives

regain its role in foreign At the centre of most policy

executive.

role during
One

of Vietnam. policy-making to reassert its foreign of the Senate's attempts the early 1970s was a belief that many of its constitutional that of war-making,
this concern was the

in the aftermath

prerogatives, Resolutions

particularly
result of

had been
passage of

usurped
the War

by the
Powers

to limit the President's 1973, which ability to attempted to commit U.S. armed forces action. Section 3 of the Resolution provided that the President "shall consult with Congress before introducing United to States armed forces into hostilities." Section 4 required the President of submit a written armed

U.S.

report to the leader of each house of Congress whenever into hostilities. forces were introduced Section 5 Finally, use to the terminate the of armed within President forces required sixty an authorized report, unless Congress days of his initial war powers extension. these requirements had been Although Nixon, Ford, and Carter, and the provisions
never invoked, the reaction in the Senate

Presidents
Resolution

largely ignored by of the War Powers

to use of the armed

forces

by

the President

provides
For

a useful
example,

barometer
throughout

of
the

the
1970s

state
the

of
use

executive?senatorial

relations.

an angry response from of armed force by the President usually provoked senators claiming the Resolution that had been ignored. War Powers the Nixon Administration Senator Thomas criticized (D. Mo) Eagleton for ignoring the Resolution when evacuating U.S. citizens from Cyprus in 1974. Senator Eagleton was joined by Senator Robert Byrd (D.W.Va.)
15 New York Times, 24 March 1980, 136.

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172

Christopher J. Bailey a similar criticism of President Ford over

the evacuation of U.S. citizens from Saigon in 1975, while Senator Javits expressed concern over the evacuation of Phnom Penh. The use of armed force by Presidents Ford and Carter hostages
War Powers

inmaking

held

in attempts to rescue the crew of the Mayague^ in 1975 and the as having violated in Iran in 1980 were also condemned the
Resolution.16

Notwithstanding ranking member the committee

I think, we

by Senator Claiborne Pell (D. R. I.), the of the Foreign Relations Committee, that "I'd like to see same the role it did the Vietnam War days when, play during
a major role in the country," the tension over con

the statement

played

prerogatives appeared to have disappeared at the beginning of the first Reagan Administration.17 More of the typical of the new mood was Senator Tower's description as "probably of the most potentially War Powers Resolution damaging the 1970s Resolution a growing The first major attempt to cite the War Powers legislation."18 to in response did not occur until the 8 March 1982, when concern that the U.S. was being dragged into a war in El Salvador, Minority Leader Senator Robert Byrd introduced S. 2179 to prohibit the use of U.S. armed forces in El Salvador. A careful distinc tion, however,
Powers Resolution

stitutional

between

the Senate

and the executive

should
and

be made
the

between
made

Senator
of the

Byrd's

citing

of the War
use of

criticisms

"unauthorized"

force by Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter. The former was an attack on the substance of U.S. foreign policy while the latter called into question the to send marines constitutionality of a course of action. Not until the decision into Lebanon did senators begin to query the procedures of a foreign policy decision. The decision to deploy a contingent of marines the peaceful departure of PLO as part of an international forces from Lebanon was

to a request for help from the Lebanese government. As the marines had been invited by the legitimate government of the the were not Administration took the view that country Reagan they being introduced into a hostile situation, and therefore there was no need to meet This the reporting of Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution. requirements view was challenged to the by Senators Percy and Pell who wrote on 20 President 1982 urging him to make a report.19 Unwilling August
16 For an excellent study of the background, see Robert F. Turner, The War and history of the War provisions, : Its Powers Resolution Implementation Institute, Foreign (Philadelphia, 1983). Policy Research 18 14March Tower, 1981, 479. Quarterly Weekly Report, 28 Aug. 1982, 2158. Weekly Report, Quarterly Powers in 'Theory 2*8.

force to supervise taken in response

Provision, and Practice 17 19 Congressional Congressional

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President

Reagan,

the U.S.

Senate,

and American

Foreign

Policy,

1981?1986

173

to concede tation with

report. consistent This with

the possibility Congress,

report the War and I want will stated Powers of

of hostilities, promptly
that:

Reagan

submitted

to avoid a confron but anxious an ambiguously worded

deployment ... Forces Armed Forces

mission

I am Resolution, hereby providing these members of the United intention . . . this or

on the report Armed States that U.S. ...

undertaken offoreign emphasis.]

is being deployment to the President's constitutional with respect to the conduct pursuant authority relations and as States Armed Forces. of the United Commander-in-Chief [My

to that there is no emphasize become in hostilities involved

expectation

As
was

the report was

little immediate

received
reaction,

during
and

the August
the marines

congressional
were withdrawn

recess there
on 10

the completion September following the Lebanese Cabinet ber, however,

the 20 Septem to help asked for their redeployment of their mission. On

the assassination of President Gemayel. Senators keep the peace following wrote to to and Pell the President cite the War Percy again asking him Powers Resolution before deployment.21 On 29 September Reagan com a report almost of Percy and Pell, and submitted plied with the wishes It declared identical to the one in August. that, "In carrying out their . . . on conflict not mission the American force will engage [and
that] . . . there is no intention or

become
was not

involved
until a that

Congressional
militiamen

"22 in hostilities. reaction to the second

later when Powers the U.S. issue the War

expectation

that

U.S.

Armed

Forces

will

deployment
forces once came again

was
under rose

subdued,
fire to from

and it
Druze

year

prominence.

29 August 1983 Senators Percy Powers with Byrd Resolution, urged are in hostilities within forces that, "American clearly involved declaring "23 the meaning of Section 4 . . .of the War Powers Resolution. On the two the of the death marines and 15 September 1983, following shelling Following and Byrd
of Moslem caucus voted artillery 29-0 positions to introduce by U.S. a warships, the invoking Senate Democratic Powers resolution the War

the death

on of two marines to the cite War Reagan

Resolution.
Baker a

After much

discussion
S.

between
J. Res.

President
159, was

Reagan
eventually

and Senator
drafted and

compromise

resolution,

passed Powers

the War 159 invoked by the Senate in a 54?46 vote. S. J. Res. of and set an eighteen month limit on the deployment Resolution
20 21 Ronald Reagan, Public Papers 2, 1078-79. 1982, Vol. 2 Oct. 1982, 2464. 114.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 22 Ronald 1238. Reagan, 23 1983 Almanac, Congressional Quarterly

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174

Christopher J. Bailey

fact

to declare in writing the the marines, but also allowed President Reagan of the War Powers that he did not recognize the constitutionality What differentiated the debate over S. J. Res. 159 from the calls in 1982 to place restraints on the use of U.S. troops in El Salvador
general agreement in the Senate over the content of President

Resolution.24

by Senator Byrd
was the

Reagan's policy Senator Mathias

towards

Lebanon.

In a letter

to the New

York

Times

stated that the purpose of the Senate's attempts to invoke was to make clear the support for Reagan's the War Powers Resolution "the President is policy: running a serious risk that the American people if it remains a narrow policy will not support our commitment in Lebanon a clear expression of Congressional the Administration without "25 was This view shared Senator Ted Stevens support. (R. Alaska) by to the president's who said, "The sensitivity of the Congress compliance of with marines of the Powers Act is the issue?more than the presence "26 Senator Byrd expressed his belief that at the heart : of the debate was a constitutional rather than a foreign policy question " There are few issues of greater importance than the issue confronting us ? the balance of powers between the legislative and executive branches. the War in Lebanon. issue is bigger than any particular than political parties, bigger than personalities, bigger "27 The consensus on the of the United States. question was further shown by the failure of a resolution office introduced

This

by Senators Alan Dixon (D. 111.), Edward on 28 and Thomas the October (D. Mass.), Kennedy 1983 which Eagleton more to in the The marines three months Lebanon. proposed limiting measure was referred to the Foreign Relations it was Committee where blocked The by Senator Percy.28 passage of S. J. Res. 159 was, in fact, the only example of major constitutional conflict between President Reagan and the Senate over a issue between and after the invasion 1981 foreign policy 1986. Immediately the Senate attached stated
days

foreign policy (S. J. Res. 190)

of Grenada Hart
the

an amendment bill
an

(D. Colo.) (H. J. Res. 308) which

island within ninety

to an unrelated
unless

that U.S. however,

sponsored by Senator Gary the public debt ceiling raising forces must be withdrawn from
was granted by Congress.

extension

The Hart Amendment

24

died,

when

H.

J. Res.
1983, 1983, 1983,

308 was
2015. 1919. 2359.

defeated

Weekly Report, Congressional Quarterly 25 New York Times, 7 Sept. 1983, A23. 26 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 27 New York Times, 17 Sept. 1983, A4. 28 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report,

i Oct.

17 Sept. 12 Nov.

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President

Reagan,

the U.S.

Senate,

and American

Foreign

Policy,

1981-1986

175

on the floor of the Senate. Further surfaced irritation

not given

in April
the

concern over institutional prerogatives when Senator Goldwater considerable 1984 expressed that the members of the Senate Intelligence "were Committee
information we were entitled to receive" about the C.I.A.'s

In a letter he sharply rebuked William of Nicaraguan harbours.29 mining on of the C.I.A., for failing to brief the committee J. Casey, the Director to support the Administration's the issue, but continued of programme covert in fact, actions against Nicaragua. reflected a much more conflicts tended
this

The

the major Lebanon, over foreign policy

constitutional To a certain matters. extent

general pattern. between President

to reflect
of

actions, the exception of and the Senate Reagan concerns rather than constituency Intelligence With
constituency concerns over con

Committee's

primacy

stitutional tended the nature

matters

to be far more

surprising. Constituency than constitutional important of the relationship the President between and Curtis A. Hessles have

is hardly

pressures have always conflicts in defining and the Senate. As

Ben W. Heineman

"the and Vietnam exception of Watergate of their different and Congress has not been between conceptions the President's the nationalism of between but constitutional view, roles, the that is the sum of Congress's and the pluralism parts."30 While can claim to speak for all Americans, in the words of President senators, James

the out, with pointed tension between the President

too much to local "will themselves Madison, likely attach . . . measures too to will often be decided their objects according probable and happiness, but on the prejudices, effect, not on the national prosperity of the government and pursuits and people of individual interests, states. "31Most conflicts between the President and the Senate over foreign policy
programme

have

therefore
has affected

occurred
part of

on
a

those occasions
senator's

when

the President's
This point was

constituency.

noted
causes

by John Rourke
reaction

who

wrote:
or among

"Any

issue of foreign
of a

policy

which

in a segment

a cross-section

political
example, 29 30 31

base

is apt to stimulate
from German

interest
and Irish

and activity
Americans

on his part. "32 For

upon their senators

congressman's

pressure

14 April 1984, 833. Weekly Report, Congressional Quarterly and Curtis A. Hessles, Memorandum Ben W. Heineman for Random House, 1980), 91. "Federalist James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Library, 1961), 296. John Rourke, Congress Press, 1983), 239. Paper Papers, No. in Alexander 46", ed. Clinton Rossiter in U.S.

the President

(New

York

(New

Hamilton, York:

James Madison, New American Westview

32

and the Presidency

Foreign

Policy making

(Boulder:

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176

Christopher J. Bailey American

in the early

hindered
War, and

support
1940s,

for Britain
the

and France
senator,

during
Burton

the First World

K. Wheeler

pro-German

passage (D. Mont.) attempted in campaign The revolution technology during the 1970s accentuated of their the need for senators to be aware of the desires and requirements reliance on led to a greater constituencies. While this development it also meant that such initiatives in foreign policy, initiatives presidential were subject implications. representing the President's
went

to block

of the Lend?Lease

Acts.

greater scrutiny by senators for their domestic senators the for example, Carter Administration, During states with large Jewish and Greek voting blocs voted against

to much

aircraft to Egypt and Saudia Arabia, plans to sell military and to repeal an arms embargo on Turkey. Senator Clifford Case (R.N.J.)
even so far as to make an impassioned defence of Israel, well aware

"The existence that 6 percent of New Jersey's electorate was Jewish: to of Israel, its strength to defend of the preservation itself, is essential to the preservation of NATO, and inevitably, in the end, to the the West, to the of the More States. than it is essential United that, preservation
preservation of the moderate Arab "33 regimes. The pressure on senators

such as Clifford

policies which Other forms of constituency interests, or, as pressure reflected economic a general concern over the direction in the case of the Vietnam War, of American the first Administration both of Reagan foreign policy. During these forms
mining the

ethnic blocs was usually focussed on Case from powerful as damaging were perceived to a particular foreign country.

of constituency
nature of

pressure

had an important
relations. While

impact Central

in deter
was

executive-senatorial

concern

Reagan's policies expressed into a Vietnam because of fears that the United States would be dragged to see the United States associated with type war and a general reluctance countries which abused "strategic efforts of the Jewish lobby. over the Reagan Administration's Concern towards Central policies America was expressed in the In Senate sporadically during this period.
May 1981, for example, the Senate put conditions on the provision of U.S.

over

President

towards

America

consensus"

to build a new human the attempt rights, in the Middle East was frustrated the through

it passed an amendment military by proposed Senator Christopher Dodd J. (D. Conn.) which required President Reagan to make a regular report to Congress that the ruling junta had certifying aid to El Salvador when
made progress 33 Congressional Record, 95th Congress, on economic and political reforms. A concern for human

2nd

sess.,

15 May

1978,

S. 7378.

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President

Reagan,

the U.S.

Senate,

and American

Foreign

Policy,

1981?1986

177

in fact, was at the heart of the Senate's to President reaction El On towards Salvador. the 24 September Reagan's policy 1981 the Senate voted to suspend U.S. military aid to El Salvador unless the junta protected human rights and pursued economic and political reforms, and in the Fiscal Bill listed progress on land reform as one 1982 Foreign Aid Authorization rights, of the annual conditions which El Salvador had to meet in order to aid. When the Constituent of receiving U.S. military Assembly to a reform El Salvador voted on 18May land programme 1982 suspend that if the reforms backed by the United States, Senator Percy declared were abrogated "not one cent of funds shall go to the government of El Salvador."34 the certification certifying the Foreign request Napolean promised
aid to El The

continue

In February stated his belief that 1983 Senator Dodd law is "turning into a farce because the administration is to Congress not to it true" in that knows be March and things

for

Relations Committee approved only half of President Reagan's a further ?60 million aid for El Salvador.35 Only when was in May of El Salvador Duarte elected president 1984, and to initiate a series of wide-ranging reforms,
issue. was also reflected in the 13-4

did

the question

of

Salvador

become concern with

a non-controversial human rights

Senate's

vote

of the Foreign Relations refuse to confirm Ernest W. Rights. the nature The central of President

to recommend Committee that the Senate as Assistant Lefever Secretary of State for issue during Lefever's confirmation hearings human like Lefever, Reagan's rights policy. human rights policy greater overlooking The best way of reducing
he argued, was not

Human was

believed that President Carter's Jeanne Kirkpatrick, authoritarian had alienated friendly regimes while abuses by totalitarian
the human rights

regimes
of

like the U.S.S.R.36

anti-communist

abuses

regimes,

their leaders the security of U.S. them, but by offering to push for and influence thus gained then the friendship quietly using reforms. These arguments were bitterly attacked in the Senate, especially senators, with Senator Pell stating that if Lefever were by Democratic by isolating
confirmed, slackened 34 35 36 Congressional Congressional Quarterly Quarterly Weekly Report, Weekly Report, views on human of her "The its concern message for to human the world rights 22 May 12 Feb. would around be that the world. the "37 U.S. With has only

Jeanne Kirkpatrick's in two contained Double Standards:

collections Rationalism

rights essays. in Politics and Reason The Reagan

1982, n 80. 1983, 344. in general and foreign policies policy See Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Dictatorship

are and

37

198 2) ; and Jeanne Kirkpatrick, D.C: American (Washington Congressional Quarterly Weekly

Phenomenon

Simon and Schuster, (New York: and Other Speeches on Foreign Policy 1983). 900.

Report,

Institute, Enterprise 23 May 1981,

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178

Christopher J. Bailey Baker, Helms,

unfavourably,

Senators
the

Hayakawa,
Lefever

and Lugar
withdrew

voting
his

against

reporting
and thus

nomination

nomination,

its first important foreign policy defeat. gave the Reagan Administration attacks on and the Senate's The failure of Lefever's nomination, a of ap towards El Salvador, reflected policy general mood Reagan's nature Administration's in the of the the States about United prehension policies which to prominence rose was not expressed again until the issue of South Africa in 1985, when Americans of the growing many antipathy with towards the Administration's policy of "constructive engagement" to in be reflected the Senate. In July 1985 the Senate South Africa began

sanctions on South Africa, and thereby passed S. 995 imposing economic issue which was to last for over initiated a battle over a foreign policy a year. By October concern in the Senate over apartheid was great 1986 to veto of a broad senators for President override Reagan's enough package of sanctions against South Africa its worst upon the Reagan Administration a vote The South African reflected direction black of one of American by a vote foreign widespread of 78-21, inflicting policy reverse. over the discontent and a desire to court

aspect foreign policy voters. This point was made Senator Richard Lugar when he by " A large majority stated: of senators would like to take some action on a South Africa. They would to cast vote like that indicates their un vote As such the differed from the conflicts between the happiness."38 Senate and Reagan over the Administration's towards the Middle policy the policy of support for the moderate Arab states, which East, particularly were largely the result of pressure from ethnic voting blocs. Indeed, the first major test of foreign policy power between the Reagan Administration and the Senate occurred over the to Saudia sale of AWACS proposed Arabia in 1981. Within of the sale in April 1981 days of the announcement vote counts in the Senate suggested that there were only preliminary senators twelve in favour of the sale while 65, led by Senator Bob Packwood it.39 On the sent 24 June Senator Packwood (R. Ore), opposed
Reagan a letter expressing "deep concern" over the sale, and stating that,

"It

is our strong belief that this sale is not in the best interests of the U.S. and therefore recommend that you refrain from sending this to proposal "40 Opposition
38

Congress.

to the sale was

largely

the result

of a strong

and open

39

19 July Congressional Quarterly 1986, 1606. Weekly Report, See I. M. Destler, in Fred I. Greenstein, "The Evolution of Reagan's Foreign Policy," ed., The Reagan Presidency Press, 122-23. (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins 1983), University 40 Cited by Alexander Caveat and Nicolson, 185. Haig, (London: Weidenfeld 1984),

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President

Reagan,

the U.S.

Senate,

and American

Foreign

Policy,

1981-1986

179

condemnation American

(AIPAC), Hatch's (R. Utah)

more arms, consequences disaster arguments for for

the proposal by the Israeli government, Jewish as such the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee groups in the Senate. Typical was Senator Orrin and their supporters declaration
an arms economy. Israel's

of

that the sale would

race " in An arms he Senate

force
would

the Israelis
and be an have

to buy
dire

engender

the Middle-East, spiral stated.41 containing

economic these that

inflation-plagued wrote Reagan

Israel," a letter to the

To

counter assurances

agreements States against Israel. He also reaffirmed to ensure in the region. continue would Israeli military superiority in the debate was important because by countering intervention Reagan's of the Jewish lobby, he was able to "change the arguments the focus of of the AWACs to include presidential prestige, his ability to carry on foreign of leaders to rely on a steady American the affairs, ability foreign "42 In so was of the new he able to take advantage doing foreign policy. view among senators of their role in the foreign policy making process. the debate and Not behalf, only did the leadership of the Senate lobby hard on Reagan's the re but eight of the fifty senators who had originally co-sponsored of the sale changed their minds.43 The controversy solution disapproving the President's the stakes involved" by putting prestige on the "changed

he had obtained

from

the Saudis

aimed

at preventing that the United

the use

line, stated Senator Roger Jepsen (R. Iowa), one of the eight.44 the Senate rejected the resolution As a result of these factors (H. of the sale by a 48?5 2 vote. This early success, Con. Res. 194) disapproving
however, was not sustained in later votes on arms sales to Arab countries.

The
when

successful
he

passage
active

of the AWACs
involvement or

deal was
in the issue, to

largely predicated
and on other devote as much

upon
time to

President

Reagan's was either

occasions

unable,

unwilling,

senators, pressure from the Jewish lobby helped defeat four of lobbying in October his arms sales proposals. First, 1983 the Senate rejected a arm two to and support brigades of the Jordanian army Reagan proposal as a rapid deployment East. Senator Daniel "strike force" in the Middle Moynihan
41

(D.N. Y.)

declared

that Congress

"would

never

vote

for such

1981, 632. Weekly Report, n April Congressional Quarterly in U.S. Foreign Policy making, Rourke, 259. Congress and the Presidency 43 were: Mark Andrews The eight senators who their minds William (R.N.D.), changed Cohn Slade Gorkin Orrin Hatch (R. Utah), (R. Mi.), (R. Wash.), Jepsen Roger and Edward (R. S.D.), Alan (R. Iowa), Larry Pressler (R. Wyo.), Simpson Zorinsky 42 44 (D. Neb.). New York Times, 28 Oct. 1981, Ai.

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18o

Christopher J. Bailey
measure if that vote were to be known to constituents. "45

a monstrous

caused President 1984 pressure from Senator Packwood to a to withdraw to sell Stinger anti-aircraft missiles Reagan proposal in October 1985 the Senate passed Jordan and Saudia Arabia. Third, war S. J. Res. 228 blocking the Administration's plan to sell advanced Second, inMarch planes worth $1-5-2 billion to Jordan unless Jordan and Israel had begun in May "direct and meaningful" peace talks. Fourth, 1986 the Senate passed S. J. Res. 316 to block President Reagan's plan to sell $354 million to Saudia Arabia. Similar pressure from the Irish lobby worth of missiles led to attempts to block a new extradition treaty between Britain and the United
I.R.A.

States, which
terrorists. Heavy

would

have made
from

it easier
the Reagan

for Britain
Administration,

to extradite
how

pressure

ever, 87?10

the opposition and Joseph Biden (D. Del.). Dodd (D. Mass.), (D. Conn.), Christopher to Jordan and Saudia Arabia to sell weapons The defeat of the proposals can be as fairly minor, and the fact that President Reagan suffered regarded 1981 and 1986 only one major foreign policy reverse in the Senate between area. Unlike in is indicative of the extent of presidential this ascendancy Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter, Reagan were to deal with a Senate whose members in being able in agreement with generally were to allow him important, willing fortunate was

eventually vote despite

ensured

the ratification

of the treaty in July 1986 by a of senators such as John Kerry

his foreign policy aims, and equally some leeway in achieving those aims. This

situation changed dramatically the of elections following congressional 1986 and the gradual emergence of the Irangate scandal. Not in the takeover only did the Democratic Senate remove the basis of President Reagan's support in the chamber, to inject opportunity As with Vietnam in for opposition its supporters on to the a focus

senators with a much needed but Irangate presented themselves into a dispute with the Administration. the late 1960s and early 1970s, to the Administration's foreign
defensive.

the issue provided policy and forced

It is somewhat disclosures
presidential

which
foreign

that it should have been the Irangate ironic, however, to the end of a period of senatorial deference signalled
policy-making. Rather than being an "aberration" as

Commission reported, the Irangate affair owed as much to the to perform failure of Congress its oversight function as it did to problems of management in the National Security Council. By failing to challenge other aspects of President Reagan's the Senate facilitated foreign policy, the Tower
45 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 5Nov. 1983, 2291.

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President

Reagan,

the U.S.

Senate,

and American

Foreign

Policy,

1981-1986

181

of a complacent which attitude within the Administration as arms to measures to Iran led such the sales and the diversion ultimately of funds to the Contras. In amore challenging where foreign environment, were to greater scrutiny by both the Senate and subjected policy proposals it is unlikely that either of these measures would have been the Executive, the growth
implemented.

of the first six years of the Reagan Presidency, in fact, raise a legislature of in about the role the foreign policy questions the late 1970s and early 1980s advocates of the process. During making " " that successful strong presidency argued foreign policy requires secrecy, and that firm leadership, and a national rather than a parochial perspective, was a to in the these The attributes.46 only position president provide The serious seems to suggest that however, experience of the Reagan Administration, these are not the only qualities necessary for successful foreign policy. The is also dependent upon the calibre of the input efficacy of foreign policy to President Reagan, and failing to make any into the system. By deferring to contribution the of policy, the Senate ensured that major making was American formulated without due consideration of all foreign policy involved. If there is any lesson to be learned from the first six seem the of and Irangate in particular, it would years Reagan Presidency, an to be that the "advice and consent" of the Senate should be important the issues part of the foreign
46 See Policy John Spanier York:

events

policy-making
and John Nogee, 1981).

process.
eds., Congress, the Presidency and American Foreign

(New

Pergamon,

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