Autumn 2011 Issue PDF

S1.iovu Jo0v.
i of
I1iv.1io.i Rii.1ios
Development and Disorder:
Striking a Balance
Wi nter 2008 - Vol . IX - No. 1
Feature: Selection of
columns by SJIR sta
e Sokolkovo Project: From
the Mire of Corruption to the
Freedom of Technology
Alexandra Cox
e Eectiveness of the
Fourth Round of Sanctions
against Iran
Reagan ompson
School Feeding Programs in Kenya:
Transitioning to a Homegrown
Approach
Nica Langinger
F.ii io11 VoiUmi XIII NUmniv 1 s,iv.s1.iovu.iuU
Cover Photo: iStockPhoto
Te Stanford Journal of International Relations, an amliate of the
Department of International Relations at Stanford University, is
published twice yearly.
Copyright 2011. No material may be reproduced without
the consent of the Journal.
S1:iovu Jo0v:i of
I1iv:1io:i Rii:1ios
Eui1ovi.i Bo.vu
Editors in Chief
Amanda McFarlane
Mitul Bhat
Layout Director
Alison Ge
Financial Director
Benjamin Lei
Managing Director
Diana Chou
Section Editors
Ariella Axler
Isabella Yunfei Fu
Tis Journal could not have been published without the support of the Department of International
Relations, and the Publications Board of the Associated Students of Stanford University. Te Journal
would like to thank Professor Judith Goldstein for her guidance and assistance.
Mauricio Grande
Sanjana Parikh
Sophie Wiepking-Brown
Associate Editors
Alexander Binnie
Alex Holtzman
Ben Grafentin
Charles Schroeder
Chris Kremer
Derrick Staten
Elizabeth Fair
Kelly Ding
Marcheta Marshall
Mark Johnson-Hammer
Marshall Watkins
Melissa Hesselgrave
Nica Langinger
Patrick Cirenza
Raiyan Khan
Samra Adeni
Stacey Wong
Sukrit Narula
Tim Norton
Tony Liu
Uttara Sivaram
Layout Editor
Alex Holtzman
Te Fall issue of the Stanford Journal of International Relations, Development and Disorder:
Striking a Balance, examines a wide range of issues in the arena of international politics. From
the political developments surrounding the Iranian nuclear program to the public-private
partnership attempting to spur innovation in Russia, the articles and columns tackle the attempts
to balance a variety of conficting issues and interests in the pursuit of development.
First, Reagan Tompson presents her paper, entitled Te Efectiveness of the Fourth Round
of Sanctions against Iran, which examines the impact of the various US and EU unilateral
sanctions against Iran. Tompson fnds that the sanctions have interfered with the countrys
economic growth but fail to actually cease Irans pursuit of nuclear weapons.
Next, Alexandra Coxs paper, Te Skolkovo Project: From the Mire of Corruption to the
Freedom of Technology, discusses the reasons that prevent Russias emergence as a global
business power. Cox examines the efectiveness of the proposed Silicon Valley project in
Russia, as the latest initiative to transition the country into the competitive global business
market.
Lastly, Nica Langingers paper, School Feeding Programs in Kenya: Transitioning to a
homegrown approach, reveals the inemciencies in Kenyas agricultural sector even though
the country possesses a sizeable sector. Langinger investigates the food-defcit the country is
experiencing by providing reasons for Kenyas failing food economy. She then introduces an
approach to mitigate the efects of this problem on the group most heavily impacted, school
children, by focusing on school-feeding programs.
Te Journal launches a new feature with this issue, columns by staf on relevant international
issues. Tese columns begin with a timely column by Elizabeth Fair on the recent elections
in Tunisia and the countrys transition to becoming the frst truly democratic Arab nation.
Remaining within the sphere of the Middle East, Marshall Watkins argues that the United States
should overcome its diferences with Turkey and build stronger ties with the democratic Muslim
nation, one that has been an increasingly important player in the region. Ariella Axler discusses
the energy needs of the US in the context of the ongoing turmoil in the Middle East and argues
for greater diversity in energy sources and working towards energy independence. Further
east, Raiyan Khan assesses the United States eforts in Pakistan, specifcally the increased use
of drone strikes in the Afpak theater. Lastly, Chris Kremer looks at the historic relationship
between Malaysia and Indonesia, two countries closely related ethnically and linguistically but
with divergent colonial and recent histories. His look at the dynamics of that relationship is
interesting and fts smoothly with the overall theme of balance amidst competing international
pressures.
It is our hope that these papers and columns provide thought-provoking fodder for discussion
and debate. Happy reading and do write to us with feedback. Also, be sure to visit us on the web
at http://sjir.stanford.edu/.
Mitul Bhat and Amanda McFarlane
Editors in Chief
Fvom Tui Eui1ovs
T.nii oi Co1i1s
16
Transitioning to a Homegrown Approach
F.ii io11 VoiUmi XI I I NUmniv 1
By Nica Langinger
26
Drone Strikes in Pakistan: Mitigating
Bloodshed or Amplifying it?
By Raiyan Khan
18
Te Sokolkovo Project: From the Mire
of Corruption to the Freedom of Technology
By Alexandra Cox
28
Te Politics, Economics, and Security of
Middle Eastern Oil Supplies: A Call
for American Energy Independence
By Ariella Axler
6
Te Efectiveness of the Fourth Round
of Sanctions against Iran
By Reagan ompson
30
Malaysia and Nusantara Heritage in
the Adik-Abang Relationship
By Christopher Kremer
Te Election of Ennahda and
the Future of Tunisian Democracy
By Elizabeth Fair
Where West meets East:
the Case for a Special US-Turkish Relationship
By Marshall Watkins
40
38
S1nNvonu JocnNn: ov IN1vnNn1:oNn: Rv:n1:oNs
6 - Fall 2011

by Reagan ompson
e Eectiveness of the
Fourth Round of Sanctions
against Iran
In June 2010, the United Nations Security Council adopted its
fourth round of sanctions against Iran. ere have been further
US and EU unilateral sanctions against Iran and a large private
sector voluntary pullout from the country. But are these three
approaches successful in slowing and ultimately ending Irans
nuclear program? A closer look reveals that these eorts are
helping to strangle the Iranian economy, but have not led to an
end of the Iranian regimes pursuit of a nuclear weapon. Until
Russia, Germany, and China limit their trade with Iran, or
until the world is ready to enact sanctions against the countrys
oil sector, Iran will continue to work toward a nuclear weapon.
I S
Vol. XIII | No. 1 - 7
Reagan Tompson is a senior studying International
Relations with a concentration in Comparative and
Historical Analysis and a minor in Chinese. She is
interested in US foreign policy and has interned the last
three summers at the State Department. She will be
completing a thesis next year on the Chinese infuence in
Africa through the Center for International Security and
Cooperations (CISAC) Honors Program. She wrote this
paper as a student in Dr. Abbas Milanis Political Science
class on Iranian politics.
T
his summer, the United Nations Security Council
adopted Resolution 1929 (UNSCR 1929) as
the frst part of the international communitys
three-pronged response to Iran. Following this
resolution, the United States and other nations enacted
the second prong: unilateral sanctions against Iran.
Te third prong is the withdrawal of private industry
from Iran. As it is essential that the international
community prevent Iran from developing nuclear
weapons, it is important that the sanctioning nations
are able to gauge the efectiveness of their responses.
While this recent round of sanctions has imposed a
signifcant burden on the Iranian regime, it has not
led to any signifcant changes in its behavior. Because
other methods of pressuring Iran, such as oil sanctions,
a military strike, containment, and engagement, are
currently unfeasible, the international community is
forced into an uneasy stalemate while Iran continues
to develop its nuclear program. Tis paper will broadly
review sanctions against Iran and show that the
three-pronged approach of the United Nations (UN)
sanctions, unilateral sanctions, and private pullout
has slowed Irans nuclear program. However, tougher
measures such as sanctions against Irans oil sector
are still necessary to force the regime into irreversibly
dismantling its nuclear weapons program.
I will begin with a background of the previous
rounds of sanctions against Iran before turning to a
discussion on the international communitys three-
pronged approach to Irans nuclear program. I will
also analyze the international and Iranian responses
to these sanctions. Next, I will examine the efects of
these sanctions, in light of their efect on the economy,
pressure on the regime, and ability to achieve their
objectives. I will conclude by explaining that while
sanctions have ultimately failed in achieving their goals,
they are the only realistic option currently available to
the international community.
Iran has a dubious history of adhering to its
international obligations and cooperating with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). As a
signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), Iran is allowed to engage in the peaceful
production and use of nuclear energy. However, its
secret development of nuclear sites within its borders
has caused the world to doubt the peaceful intentions
of the countrys nuclear program. Tensions between
Iran and the IAEA reached a head in 2006 when Iran
failed to comply with IAEA requests and inspections.
When Iran announced that it had successfully enriched
uranium, the Security Council was forced to respond.
On July 31, 2006, the UN Security Council
passed UNSCR 1696, demanding that Iran suspend
all enrichment and reprocessing, as well as research
and development, for its nuclear program. When
Iran failed to comply, the UN unanimously approved
UNSCR 1737 on December 23, 2006, calling on states
to impose a freeze on the fnancial assets of persons and
entities involved in Irans nuclear activities and to block
Irans import and export of nuclear material. Following
further Iranian recalcitrance, the Security Council
unanimously voted in favor of UNSCR 1747 on March
24, 2007. Resolution 1747 imposed an embargo on all
Iranian arms exports and extended the asset freeze and
travel ban to members of the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC). On March 3, 2008, the Security
Council unanimously approved another resolution,
UNSCR 1803, which extended fnancial and trade
restrictions against Iran.1
Afer further resistance from Iran, the Security
Council moved forward with sanctions once more and
adopted UNSCR 1929 on June 9, 2010. Te United
States helped organize votes for this resolution, and the
Obama administration made signifcant concessions to
ensure international solidarity. For example, in order
to obtain Russian support for enhanced sanctions,
President Obama agreed to move a planned US missile
defense shield from Poland and the Czech Republic to
the Mediterranean.2 Brazil and Turkey voted against
the resolution because of a deal they made with Iran
in May 2010. Te agreement stipulated that Iran
would ship 1,200 kilograms of low enriched uranium
to Turkey and then receive nuclear fuel for supposed
use in its medical research reactor. Turkey and Brazil
claimed the deal would be more efective than sanctions

8 - Fall 2011
in getting Iran to cease its enrichment activities.3
Because Lebanon was the only Arab state on the
Security Council, it handled its delicate situation by
abstaining from voting to save face among its Western
allies while appeasing Hezbollah.4
UNSCR 1929 is the strictest round of sanctions
against Iran yet.5 It expanded upon previous rounds of
UN sanctions and added further restrictions on Iranian
trade. First, 1929 subjects additional individuals and
entities, including IRGC amliates, to an asset freeze and
travel ban. Second, the Resolution bans the provision
of fnancial services and insurance to Iran. Tird,
if shipments are suspected of carrying prohibited
material, 1929 gives countries authority to inspect the
shipments, and dispose of cargo. Fourth, the resolution
bars Iran from investing in uranium mining and other
nuclear activities in other countries. Finally, the
resolution requires countries to insist that companies
in their country, including banks, refrain from doing
business with Iran if there is reason to believe that
such business could further Irans nuclear program. To
monitor compliance with this Resolution, the Security
Council established a panel of eight experts to collect
and review reports with information on how countries
have implemented the resolution.
Despite these provisions, there are several
loopholes in the resolution. For example, although
the resolution bans the sale of most categories of heavy
arms to Iran, it only requests restraint in the sales
of light arms and does not bar sales of missiles (that
are not on the UN Registry of Conventional Arms).
Furthermore, although countries have the legal right
to inspect shipments to and from Iran, the inspecting
country must frst receive concurrence from the
country that owns that ship.
Unilateral sanctions are the second prong of
measures against Iran. Te US is by far the most active
participant, though the European Union (EU) and other
nations have followed suit. Te US has been sanctioning
Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. US eforts to
curb international investment in Irans energy sector
began in 1996 with the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA). Te
ISA mandates US penalties on foreign companies that
maintain business dealings with Irans energy sector.
Afer the passage of 1929, President Obama approved
the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability,
and Divestment Act (CISADA), which expanded ISA.
Te CISADA attempts to restrict Irans ability to make
or import gasoline. Executive Orders 12959, 13324,
13553, and 13382 similarly attempt to encircle Iran by
enacting US sanctions on Iranian omcials and freezing
assets of those supporting terrorism and proliferation.
To enforce these sanctions, the US can impose multi-
million dollar fnes on businesses found to be in
violation of the law.
US sanctions, while strict, have not been able
to totally shut of US trade with Iran. Te Treasury
Department has allowed around 10,000 exceptions
to US sanctions to companies like Kraf and Pepsi for
humanitarian or other reasons. A State Department
omcial defended these exceptions by noting that
the legal export of popcorn, chewing gum, cake
sprinkles and hot sauce is not propping up the Iranian
government.6 Others acclaim, however, that favoritism
has allowed Iran economic freedom.
Te US has led the way in encouraging other
countries to enact nation-specifc regulations to further
isolate Iran. Te EU, Australia, Canada, India, Japan,
Norway, and South Korea all have imposed restrictions
against Iran with varying levels of intensity. Te EU
has somewhat aligned itself with the US by prohibiting
EU involvement in Irans energy and fnance sectors.
Within the EU, however, there are varying levels of
cooperation, as I will outline later. Russia and China
have not enacted their own unilateral sanctions against
Iran. As noted above, both these countries support
the frst pronged attack against Iran, UN sanctions,
but are much less enthusiastic about the second and
third prongs. Consequently, Russian and Chinese trade
with Iran is a signifcant reason why the regime is still
fnancially afoat.
Te third prong is private sector voluntary
pullout from Iran. Tis response is motivated by the
UN sanctions, but is not required by law. Financial
institutions, energy companies, and businesses make
choices based on cost/beneft analysis and their strategy
thus far seems to be to prevent Iran, a country reliant
on global trade, from being able to do business outside
its borders. Te US Treasury Department began by
blacklisting the largest Iranian fnancial institutions
and banks in other nations such as Britain, France,
Germany, Japan, China, Malaysia, Bahrain, and Italy
followed suit. Te withdrawal of more than 80 large
fnancial institutions such as UBS, HSBC, and AG
has begun to wreck havoc on Irans fragile fnancial
situation. Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
noted that while these actions were not sanctions in the
traditional sense, they were having similar efects and
working towards the same goals.7
I S
Te efect of private pullout is evident in the
major industries, including the energy sector. Major
gasoline suppliers such as BP, Glencore, Lukoil, Reliance
Industries, Royal Dutch Shell, Total, Trafgura, and Vitol
have stopped dealing with Iran. Among many others,
Halliburton, GE, Huntsman Chemicals, Kia, Siemens
AG, Mercedes Benz, Toyota, and Tyssen-Krupphave
omcially ceased doing business in Iran.8 However,
because there are few enforcement mechanisms,
it is dimcult to determine the efectiveness of this
third. Tere have been several accusations that these
companies are making statements against Iran, while
still engaging in clandestine trade with the country.
Te ultimate purpose of the three-pronged approach
of UN sanctions, unilateral sanctions, and private
pullout is to ensure that Iran does not develop a nuclear
weapon. Te hope is that by making it more expensive
portray the international community as a weak force
that desires to unfairly discriminate against Iran and
hurt its people.
In contrast to Ahmadinejad, other Iranian
leaders understand the gravity of the sanctions.
Former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani warned
the regime to take the sanctions seriously and not as a
joke, recognizing the strictness of the worlds response
to Iran.11 Former Prime Minister and leader of the
Green Movement, Mir-Hossein Mousavi similarly
agree with Rafsanjani on the severity of these sanctions.
One of his senior advisors said that the sanctions
would have a clear efect on the day to day lives of the
people.12
With a grasp of the response to Iran, I now turn
to examine the sanctions efectiveness based on their
impact on the economy, pressure on the regime, and
and dimcult for Iran to obtain industrial
equipment and nuclear supplies, the
countrys nuclear program will be
substantially slowed and the regime
will be forced to abandon its nuclear
weapon ambitions. Tus, the sanctions
hope to change the regimes cost-beneft
calculus of its nuclear program. Te
international community would also
like to see the Iranian public voice their
dissatisfaction with the Iranian regime
and state of the economy, which would
push the regime towards compromise.
Further, the international community
wants to ensure the integrity of the international treaty
system and is thus punishing Iran for its decision to
ignore its NPT obligations.
Now with an understanding of the three-
pronged approach to Iran, we can examine how Iran
has responded. Statements by Iranian leaders generally
fall into two categories: those that recognize the impact
of the sanctions, and those that refuse to acknowledge
their infuence. Afer passage of UNSCR 1929, Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Khamenei stated that sanctions have no
efect on the peoples livelihood.9 President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad said the sanctions are annoying fies, like a
used tissue.10 While there is some truth in his statement
that sanctions have been tried in the past and have
failed, his overly colorful language points to his refusal
to acknowledge the real pain sanctions are inficting on
Iran. Ahmadinejad further stated that sanctions actually
make Iran stronger by encouraging self-sumciency and
technical progress. Te Iranian regime is attempting to
completion of stated objectives. When evaluating
whether or not sanctions have accomplished their
goals, it is important to remember that it takes years for
sanctions to afect a nation. Te cumulative efect of
years of sanctions is only starting to have a strong
negative impact on the Iranian economy. It is dimcult
to determine direct causality, but it is safe to assume
that sanctions have exacerbated the problems from
economic and political mismanagement of the regime.
Analysis is also made dimcult by the fact that the
regime has not released up-to-date numbers on
economic data such as gross domestic product (GDP)
or household expenditures. By looking at economic
data such as consumer prices, export prices, oil exports
and imports, the subsidy program, and GDP, it is clear
that the sanctions are having a strangling efect on
Irans economy.
Irans economy is a mess. Te regime claims
that unemployment is 13.2 percent13 but opposition
10 - Fall 2011
leaders insist that it is more likely around 20 percent.14
Similarly, the Central Bank says that infation is at 14
percent,15 but some economic data indicates the rate
could be twice as high.16 Te Iranian consumer price
index (CPI), which measures the changes in the price
level of consumer goods and services, has skyrocketed
in the past years. Tis means that consumer prices
are soaring and businesses are fnding it increasingly
dimcult to make ends meet. According to the Iranian
Central Bank, the general CPI for urban Iranians has
jumped 12.9 percent from 2009-2010. In comparison,
the US CPI increased 1.4 percent for this same time
period.17 Te cost of food and beverages in Iran rose
almost 20 percent from 2009-2010. As Figure 1 shows,
since about March 2002 until March 2011, Irans CPI
has been on a rapid rise.18 As the cost of living in Iran
increases, there is also greater chance for domestic
unrest.
For the international strategy to be successful,
it is essential that the Iranian people see the regime, not
sanctioning nations as the reason for these economic
problems. The world hopes that as Iranian citizens
find it increasingly difficult to afford food, clothing,
water, and other basic necessities, they will turn
against the regime. If a backlash occurs, and Iranians
begin to blame other nations for their economic
malaise, the purpose behind much of the sanctions
will no longer be valid. Currently, it seems that the
Iranian public rightly blames their government for the
economic management. The sanctions are working
to economically isolate Iran and squeeze it from the
global market.
High levels of economic distress stoke existing
levels of social unrest. With about 60 percent of the
that the adverse business environment due to sanctions
contributed to the event. The economic disturbance
caused by the sanctions is also causing internal political
disturbance. There have been several arrests of
supposed nuclear spies and President Ahmadinejad
fired Foreign Minister Mannouchehr Mottaki for
failing to prevent the imposition of sanctions, though
this move was also politically motivated. In response
to the economys poor performance, the Iranian
Finance Minister also fired six cabinet ministers and
two Central Bank governors.
Iran is increasingly dependent on oil exports
for its economic livelihood, but sanctions are
working to curtail Tehrans revenues. As a result of
mismanagement and the inability to procure Western
technology, Irans oil production has fallen from about
4.1 million barrels a day in the mid-2000s to only 3.8
million barrels a day in 2010. The graph on the right
shows this precipitous drop. Figure 2 shows that while
Irans oil production has been cyclical since sanctions
Iranian population
under 30, high
unemployment means
that many young
adults are willing
to participate in
opposition movements
and advocate change.
Although the regime
attempts to suppress
any uprisings, there is evidence of increasing domestic
and political unrest. In July 2010, one month after the
passage of UNSCR 1929, there was a two-week strike
in Tehran by bazaar merchants. Ostensibly it was a
protest against an increase in taxation, but it is likely
I S
were first imposed in 2006, there has been a general
decrease in the total production. Figure 3 shows that
Irans oil-pumping capacity is expected to decline
about 18 percent from current levels of 3.8 million
barrels a day to 3.3 million barrels a day in 2015. This
decrease in production translates into fewer exports as
countries attempt to diversify their oil supply and turn
away from Iran and less revenue for the regime.
These economic pressures are forcing changes
in the way the Iranian government is run. In order
to get basic goods, the government must pay bribes,
middlemen, and black market fees. At the end of 2010,
the regime began to phase out its substantial subsidy
program. It is likely that the government was forced
to end these subsidies due to declining oil revenues
and the increasing cost of doing business in the
international market. The government began with a
reduction in subsidies on gas and bread. Immediately,
the price of bread spiked from 15 cents to 40 cents.
The biggest cuts and jumps in prices are likely yet to
come. This huge increase has the potential to turn the
Iranian people against the regime, though there has
900,000 a day. Further, investment in Irans energy
sector has decreased dramatically. All foreign firms
have pulled out of the South Pars Gas Field Project,
which had the potential to greatly grow Irans natural
gas production.
Increases in consumer prices and decline in oil
production and exports all point to a declining gross
domestic product (GDP). Although the numbers are
difficult to determine, it is clear that each successive
round of sanctions lowers Irans GDP. Figure 4 shows
Irans GDP growth from 1980 to the present. Each
dotted vertical line indicates new international or US
sanctions against Iran. Although GDP growth has
been fairly stable over the past decade, predictions for
the present and future do not look promising.
In addition to the economic problems above,
the Iranian regime faces further commerce issues.
Tehran is unable to attract desperately needed foreign
investment. It is estimated that sanctions have
deterred about $50 billion in investment in Irans
energy sector. Soon after the passage of 1929, Lloyds
of Britain announced that it would cease to insure
Iranian ships and gasoline. This makes international
trade substantially more difficult as firms are
increasingly wary of the risks associated with doing
business with Iran. The US Treasury Departments
sanction of Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines
(IRISL), the regimes shipping company of choice, is
harming Irans ability to ship goods. * There is unrest
among merchants whose trouble obtaining financing,
insurance, and shipping is driving up their costs by an
estimated 40 percent. As the cost of doing business
in Iran increases substantially, it becomes increasingly
difficult to provide employment and goods for a
country of almost 73 million.
Undersecretary of Treasury Stuart Levey noted,
Iran is effectively unable to access financial services
from reputable banks and is increasingly unable to
conduct major transactions in dollars or Euros. In
addition to the withdrawal of large banks noted above,
there seems to be a regional movement against Iran as
well. For example, out of the 48 banks in Dubai, all
but a few have cut off new business with Iranian banks
cited in UN resolutions. These decisions have wide
reaching effects on the Iranian economy. When the
United Arab Emirates, a major Iranian financial hub,
began restricting transactions with Iranian banks in
September 2010, the value of the rial, Irans currency,
fell by about 15 percent.
been little public unrest as of yet. International sanctions
are forcing the regime to make tough economic decisions
that further erode its domestic standing. Although the
government has offered payments to the lower classes,
it is only small amount that few Iranians have actually
received.
Although Iran is home to the worlds third largest oil
reserves, it does not have the refinement capacity to
produce its own fuel and thus it imports a sizeable
amount of gasoline. As many major oil companies have
refused to do business with Iran, it has faced difficulty in
procuring enough fuel to run the country. It is estimated
that since the imposition of the US Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions Act in 2010, gas deliveries to Iran have fallen
75 percent, from about 3.5 million barrels a day to about
12 - Fall 2011
To review, increases in consumer prices point
to the cultivation of a difficult business environment
in Iran, which is stoking domestic unrest. Decreases
in oil production and exports as well as declining GDP
have meant a drop in government revenue, prompting
the end of the subsidy program. Fewer oil imports and
other commercial strains are further indicators of the
tangible impacts sanctions are having on the Iranian
economy and regime.
Despite this progress, there is evidence that
subversion and illegal activity are allowing Iran to
continue to function economically and to expand its
nuclear program. For example, a wide range of US
military and dual-use goods are illegally transshipped
to Iran through the UAE, Malaysia, and Singapore.
There have been several international cases of this
subversion. In a case in 2009, a well-connected Indian
businessman secretly provided cladding, thermal
insulation, and ancillary equipment to Iran in a variety
of shipments. Frighteningly, all of those materials can
be used in the construction of a nuclear reactor. Further
evidence indicates that many Iranians in Azerbaijan
are involved in Iranian regime-related profit making,
sanctions busting, and money laundering.
The practice of establishing front companies
and reshipping materials to Iran also allows the regime
to circumvent sanctions. In 2008, it is estimated that
tell another story.
The UAE is not the only culprit however. Several other
nations have been increasing their trade with Iran
even while the UN and many other countries seek to
economically isolate Iran as a way to encourage non-
proliferation. According to Karim Sadjadpour, an
associate at the Carnegie Endowment, as trade between
to 2.5 billion Euros in less than a
year from January-August 2010.
The German-Iranian Chamber of
Industry and Commerce in Tehran
lists 200 German firms in Iran that
are making a major contribution
to sustaining the present Iranian
regime.
While evidence clearly
suggests that sanctions are negatively
affecting the Iranian economy and
are pressuring the regime to change,
there are substantial and successful
efforts to evade sanctions. In order
to judge the true effectiveness of the sanctions, one
must look at the original intentions of the sanctions.
From the beginning of this paper, I noted that the
primary international objective was to prevent Iran
from developing nuclear weapons. Sanctions are a
way to slow its development and ultimately lead to its
end. Has the three-pronged approach of UN sanctions,
unilateral sanctions, and private pullout slowed Irans
nuclear program? Based on preliminary analysis, yes,
80 percent of the trade between the UAE and Iran was
made up of goods that were re-exported from the UAE.
By shipping goods to the UAE and then shipping them to
Iran, the regime is able to evade sanctions. Thousands of
front-companies in Dubai exist solely to get contraband
materials into Iran. To some, Dubai is known as Irans
backdoor to the West and provides Iran with everything
from household goods to military equipment. While the
UAE officially supports the sanctions, its porous borders
Iran and the EU has declined for the
past years Iranian trade with China
has increased substantially. China is
very dependent on Iranian oil and it is
predicted that trade between Iran and
China will hit $50 billion by 2015.
Figure 5 shows how trade between
Iran and other nations has changed since
2003. China, India, South Korea and
the UAE show huge increases. In order
for sanctions to be truly effective, every
nation needs to be cutting back on its
trade with Iran, not increasing it. There
have been further changes since Figure
5s publication in 2009. Although it
shows that German trade with Iran decreased from
2003-2009, there is evidence to suggest that there
has actually been an increase in trade since 2009.
The German newspaper Handelsblatt reported that
exports from Germany to Iran increased 11.6 percent
I S
the sanctions have slowed the program, but not to a
satisfactory level. On one hand, sanctions have made
it increasingly difficult for Iran to acquire critical
inputs for uranium enrichment, such as carbon fiber
and a type of high-strength steel. On the other, each
day that passes is another opportunity for Iran to
develop its nuclear weapons program and figure out
ways to circumvent sanctions. Figure 6 shows that in
February 2008, Iran produced about 43 kilograms of
low-enriched uranium and that the amount jumped
to almost 120 kilograms in April 2010. Despite all the
sanctions, Iran has continued to enrich uranium and its
nuclear stockpile is increasing rapidly. With regards to
converting its nuclear materials into weapons, Iranian
missile capacity has been increasing as well. Further
more, since 1985, Iranian missile range has also been
steadily improving, despite frequent sanctions.
As of yet, sanctions have failed to curtail the
regimes nuclear program. Tehran seems as obstinate
as ever in its pursuit of a nuclear weapon. Public
outcry has also failed to develop to a point where it
can force the regime to change directions on this issue.
Fortunately, sanctions do not seem to be unfairly
targeting the civilian population and Iranian citizens
still blame the regime for their economic situation.
Sanctions have helped show the Iranian regime
the pain of isolation. As private companies and countries
refuse to do business with Iran, it is becoming clearer
that Tehrans list of friends is quickly shortening. It is
evident also that by punishing Iran the international
community has helped ensure the integrity of the
international treaty system, even while nations such as
China and Germany continually undermine that offer.
Nevertheless, the offer of engagement still stands and
there is hope that Iran may one day reintegrate into the
international community if it fulfills its international
obligations.
Despite these positive results, however,
significant loopholes remain. Subversion tactics
are hard to suppress and Iranian oil continues to
flow amidst private withdrawal and a suffering
economy. Ultimately, there is inadequate international
commitment to truly isolate Iran. While there are
estimates that Iran will not have a nuclear weapon until
2015, it is entirely undesirable for Iran to ever have such
a weapon.
Two things are needed for international
sanctions to effectively stop Irans nuclear program.
First, there must be real international unity and
solidarity of mission in isolating Iran. Russia, Germany,
and China need to move to limit their trade with Iran.
Each nation needs to enact its own strict sanctions
against Iran. Countries such as the UAE should not
tolerate the subversion of sanctions. Second, the Iranian
people must demand change. Recent uprisings in the
Middle East provide a glimmer of hope that domestic
unrest can be a powerful tool against dictators.
Sanctions against Irans oil industry might be
the next step the international community is forced
to take against Iran. Iran currently exports about 2.5
million barrels of oil a day, and the loss of this supply
would send global prices skyrocketing. In reality,
however, the world lacks preference and money for
this type of action. Additionally, because oil revenues
make up about 80 percent of the governments budget,
a true embargo on Iranian oil would certainly harm
the civilian population. The sanctioning nations would
have to be sure to prevent any domestic blowback
against the sanctions because sanctions are never
intended to target innocent civilians. Although
sanctions against Irans energy sector are currently
unfeasible, it is plausible to enforce sanctions that
hinder the regimes ability to act. For example, the U.N
could sanction monitoring technology that the regime
uses to spy on its people. Firms should be barred from
making trades like Nokia did in 2008, which provided
the regime with the technology needed to monitor and
control telephone calls.
The international communitys three-pronged
approach to Irans nuclear program consisting of
UNSCR 1929, unilateral sanctions, and the private
pullout have slowed Irans nuclear program. Increases
in consumer prices, decreases in oil production and
exports, the end of the subsidy program, decreasing oil
imports, declining GDP and other commercial strains
show that the sanctions are strangling Irans economy.
However, while sanctions have kept Tehran weak, they
have not forced a fundamental change in the countrys
policies. Sanctions are the only realistic option
currently available to the international community but
currently unsuccessful due to significant loopholes.
Sanctions against Irans oil sector have the potential
to bring the regime to its knees but are currently
infeasible. Irans nuclear program has proceeded due
to a lack of international unity. Countries such as
Russia, Germany, and China need to take their own
independent steps to ensure Iran does not develop the
bomb.
14 - Fall 2011
E
1
Smith, Irans Nuclear Program
2
Philip Russia Says It Will Join Sanctions
3
BBC Iran Signs Nuclear Deal
4
Kollock Lebanon Cautions on Iran Sanctions
5
Warner Examining the Efects
6
Johnson, Treasury Defends 10,000 Exceptions
7
Wright Stuart Leveys War
8
Katzman Iran Sanctions pg. 32
9
Erdbrink, Irans Khamenei Says
10
A.P. UN Approves New Sanctions
Levey Remarks
11
Te Green Voice of Freedom Mousavi Advisor
12
Freedom Messenger Real Unemployment Level
13
Inside of Iran Conficting Reports on Irans Unemployment
14
Daily Star Iran Central Bank Governor Says Infation Rate Rose
15
Newsweek In Iran, Infation Could Treaten Regime
16
Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index
17
Central Bank Consumer Price Index
18
Sadjadpour Lecture
19
20
21
22
Blas Sanctions Put Choker on Iran Oil Exports
23
Blas Sanctions Put Choker on Iran Oil Exports
24
25
26
BBC Squeezing Iran (For an interactive version of the graphic, go to
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-10727616)
27
28
* For a short video on this topic, see http://www.nytimes.
com/2010/06/08/world/middleeast/08sanctions.html.
29
Murphy, Irans Getaway
30
Levey Remarks
31
32
33
GAO Complete and Timely Licensing Data Needed
34
Institute for Science and International Security, State Department
Cables
35
Pan Armenian Net, Iranians in Baku Involved in Money Laundering
Activities
36
DiPaola, Iran May Invade UN Sanctions
Foroohar Dubai Helps Iran Evade Sanctions
37
Tehran Times, Iran-China Trade
38
Blas Sanctions Put Choker on Iran Oil
39
Tehran Times, Iran-Germany Trade
40
Kuntzel Who Is Who in German Trade
41
Levinson, Sanctions Slow Irans Warhead Capacity
42
Financial Times Are Iran Nuclear Sanctions Working?
43
44
Cellan-Jones Hi-Tech Helps Iran
W C
America.gov Clinton: Iran Sanctions Working, Need to be Maintained
US Department of State, January 10, 2010 http://www.america.gov/
st/peacesec-english/2011/January/20110110120608nehpets4.63067
9e-02.html.
Anton, Michael Iran and the Costs of Containment National Review,
May 3, 2010. http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/229663/iran-
and-costs-containment-michael-anton.
Armagost, Jason Iran and the Use of Force Lecture to PS114S, January
12, 2010.
Associated Press UN Approves New Sanctions Against Iran Fox News.
June 9, 2010. http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/06/09/diplomats-
say-russia-france-dismiss-turkish-brazilian-proposal-iranian-
nuclear/.
BBC Iran Signs Nuclear Fuel Deal with Iran May 17, 2010. http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8685846.stm.
BBC Squeezing Iran: Oil and Sanctions July 26, 2010. http://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/world-middle-east-10727616.
BBC Timeline: Iran-US Ties January 16, 2009 http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3362443.stm.
Blas, Javier Sanctions Put Choker on Iran Oil Exports Te Financial
Times, September 13, 2010. http://www.f.com/cms/s/0/8efd517e-
bf5d-11df-965a-00144feab49a.html##axzz1GYK6dIln.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor Consumer Price
Index News Release, January 2011 www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/cpi.
pdf.
Bruno, Greg Te Lengthening List of Iran Sanctions, Council on
Foreign Relations, June 28, 2010, http://www.cfr.org/iran/lengthening-
list-iran-sanctions/p20258.
Byman, Daniel; Indyk, Martin; Maloney, Suzanne; OHanlon, Michael;
Riedel, Bruce Which Path to Persia Te Brookings Institution, June
2009.
Cellan-Jones, Rory Hi-Tech Helps Iran Monitoring BBC News. June
22, 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/8112550.stm.
Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran Consumer Price Index
for All Urban Customers Azar 1389 January 2011 http://www.cbi.ir/
category/1624.aspx.
Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran Export Price Index in
Iran February 2011, http://www.cbi.ir/category/1618.aspx.
Daily Star Iran Central Bank Governor Says Infation Rate Rose to 14
Percent: IRNA, April 30, 2011.
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Apr/30/Iran-central-bank-governor-says-
infation-rate-rose-to-14-percent-IRNA.ashx#axzz1Kxf9qXax.
Dareini, Ali Akbar Ahmadinejad: Sanctions Make Iran Stronger
Te Humngton Post, April 3, 2010, http://www.humngtonpost.
com/2010/04/03/ahmadinejad-sanctions-mak_n_524425.html.
DiPaola, Anthony; Meyer, Henry Iran May Evade UN Sanctions as
UAE Delivers Fuel Bloomberg News, October 29, 2009 http://www.
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=axOOTd6n4eBw.
Erdbrink, Tomas Irans Khamenei Says Sanctions Appear Aimed at
Creating Division Te Washington Post, October 19, 2010, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/19/
AR2010101904749.html.
Faucon, Benoit; Swartz, Spencer Irans Falling Oil Output Means Less
Revenue, Clout June 26, 2010 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014
24052748704569204575328851816763476.html.
Financial Times Are Iran Nuclear Sanctions Working? July 12, 2010.
www.f.com/cms/s/0/994a262a-8dc6-11df-9153-00144feab49a.html.
Foroohar, Kambiz Dubai Helps Iran Evade Sanctions as Smugglers
Ignore US Laws Bloomberg News, January 25, 2010
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=av5smt
Ye_DDA.
Freedom Messenger, Real Unemployment Level in Iran Is Higher than
Omcial Data April 22, 2011.
http://www.freedomessenger.com/real-unemployment-level-in-iran-
higher-than-omcial-data/.
Government Accountability Omce Complete and Timely Licensing
Data Needed to Strengthen Enforcement of Export Restrictions
March 2010 www.gao.gov/new.items/d10375.pdf.
Inside of Iran Conficting Reports on Irans Unemployment Rate April
7, 2011. http://www.insideofran.org/en/cultureaart/629-conficting-
reports-on-irans-unemployment-rate.html.
I S
Institute for Science and International Security, State Department
Cables: Stopping Irans and North Koreas Illicit Procurement for their
Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs December 10, 2010,
http://www.isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/state-department-cables-
stopping-irans-and-north-koreas-illicit-procurement/.
Johnson, Bridget Treasury Defends 10,000 Exceptions to Iran e Hill,
December 24, 2010. http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-brieng-room/
news/135045-treasury-defends-10000-exceptions-to-iran-other-
sanctions.
Katzman, Kenneth Iran Sanctions Congressional Research Service,
February 3, 2011, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf.
Kollock, Paige Lebanon Cautions on Iran Sanctions Lebanon Now.
February 23, 2010. http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArchiveDetails.
aspx?ID=148659.
Kuntzel, Matthias Who Is Who in German Trade with Iran February
4, 2010. http://www.matthiaskuentzel.de/contents/who-is-who-in-
german-trade-with-iran.
Gottemoeller, Rose e Evolution of Sanctions in Practice and eory
Survival Vol. 29 No. 4, Winter 2007-8.
e Green Voice of Freedom Mousavi Advisor: Ahmadinejad Does Not
Represent Iranian People October 12, 2010. http://en.irangreenvoice.
com/article/2010/oct/12/2392.
Levey, Stuart Remarks at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies September 20, 2010. http://useu.usmission.gov/levey_092010.
html.
Levinson, Charles; Solomon, Jay Sanctions Slow Irans Warhead
Capacity e Wall Street Journal, January 8, 2011. http://online.wsj.
com/article/SB10001424052748704739504576067911497955494.html.
MacFarquhar, Neil UN Approves New Sanctions to Deter Iran e
New York Times, June 9, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/10/
world/middleeast/10sanctions.html.
Murphy, Brian Irans Gateway in Dubai Highlights Sanctions Bite
Associated Press, Yahoo News, February 1, 2011 http://news.yahoo.
com/s/ap/20110201/ap_on_bi_ge/ml_iran_sanctions_gateway_dubai.
Newsweek In Iran, Ination Could reaten Regime February 5, 2010.
http://www.newsweek.com/blogs/wealth-of-nations/2010/02/05/in-
iran-ination-could-threaten-regime.html.
Pan Armenian Net, Iranians in Baku Involved in Money Laundering
Activities November 29, 2010, http://www.panarmenian.net/
eng/world/news/57586/Iranians_in_Baku_involved_in_money_
laundering_activities.
Philip, Catherine Russia Says It Will Join Sanctions against Iran e
Sunday Times, September 24, 2009. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/
news/world/us_and_americas/article6846837.ece.
Sadjadpour, Karim, Lecture delivered on March 8, 2010, Stanford
University.
Sanger, David Debate Grows on Nuclear Containment of Iran e New
York Times, March 13, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/14/
weekinreview/14sanger.html.
Smith, Ben Irans Nuclear Program, and Sanctions International Aairs
and Defense Section, Library of the House of Commons, October 13,
2010, www.nti.org/e_research/source_docs/uk/docs/03.pdf.
Tehran Times, Iran-China Trade to Hit $50 Billion June 12, 2010,
http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=221174.
Tehran Times, Iran-Germany Trade Prospering November 4, 2010,
http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=229816.
Wall, Christopher Weak Tea Foreign Policy. June 8, 2010, http://www.
foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/08/weak_tea.
Warner, Margaret Examining the Eects of Economic Sanctions on
Iran PBS News Hour broadcast. September 21, 2010. http://www.pbs.
org/newshour/bb/middle_east/july-dec10/iran_09-21.html.
Wikileaks, Iranian Source Names U.K.-Registered Company as Iran
Sanctions-Buster Possibly Supporting Busheir Project 09BAKU179,
March 6, 2009. http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/03/09BAKU179.
html.
Wikileaks, Irans Money Launderers, Sanctions-Busters, and
Revolutionary Guard Money Makers: A Baku Sampler 09BAKU175,
March 6, 2009. http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/03/09BAKU175.
html.
Wright, Robin Stuart Leveys War e New York Times Magazine,
October 31, 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/02/
magazine/02IRAN-t.html?pagewanted=all.
16 - Fall 2011
US-Pakistan relations can worsen if drone strikes continue to harm civilians
Photo courtesy of Flikr Creative Commons user Travlr
by Raiyan Khan
Drone Strikes in Pakistan:
Mitigating Bloodshed or Amplifying it:
D S
T
ariq Aziz and his cousin Waheed Khan died in
a Hellre missile attack launched by the CIA,
bringing their aunt back to their native Pakistani
village last Monday. Tariq was 16 years old. His cousin
was only 12.
1
eir deaths spurred 2,000 Pakistanis to
stage a protest outside of the parliament building on
November 4
2
and shed light on the fading ecacy of
drone tactics in United States foreign policy.
In the past three years, dronology in the US
has undergone signicant changes in funding and
application. Under Obamas presidency, the use of
drone strikes has escalated, in conjunction with an
alarming number of civilian casualties. Yet many
individuals cannot accept this to be true, as thus far,
US policy has been to err on the side of secrecy, leaving
the public in the dark regarding the details of the use of
these drone strikes. is leaves the media to ll in the
blanks, and as a result various news sources oer a wide
spectrum of statistics in terms of the eectiveness of
drone attacks numbers ranging anywhere from a 98%
civilian casualty rate to a 10% civilian casualty rate.
3
Lack of ocial statements coupled with disingenuous
reporting has led to a warped understanding of the
current situation. is creates tension on all sides of the
situation, from the US public to the Pakistani civilians.
In an attempt to construct an accurate portrayal
of drone eectiveness, Peter Bergen, a national security
analyst at CNN and Katherine Tiedemann, policy
analyst at the New America Foundation analyzed
the reporting of civilian deaths from multiple media
organizations to predict the true civilian fatality rate as
32%, or around a third of deaths resulting from drone
attacks.
4
is number, while on the lower end of the
spectrum, is still a gruesome statistic. At what civilian
fatality rate will the US government rethink their drone
strike strategy 50%? 60%? 75%?
An aggressive drone campaign was developed
with good intentions, including the protection of US
lives and the mitigation of damages to innocent people.
Drone strikes have been used to assassinate militants
who have been responsible for the murder of over 4,000
Pakistani people.
5
As seen in Tariq and Waheeds case
however, this campaign is not only inconsistent but also
actually produces counterproductive eects, creating
a pernicious cycle of civilian harm and consequently
inspiring more hatred toward the US.
e worsening conditions in US-Pakistan
relations since the assassination of Osama Bin
Laden signals the ineectiveness of Barack Obamas
problematic stance
on aerial drone
strikes.
6
If the US is
to foster sustainable
friendships with the
Pakistani populace,
then it needs to
restructure their
drone use policy.
Ultimately, if it is
to foster benecial
discourse between
both nations, then
separate tactics
must be adopted
by United States
g o v e r n m e n t
a g e n c i e s .
Attempting to
conduct negotiations in an emotionally charged
atmosphere only provokes further disagreement and
triggers irrational demands by both parties. Instead,
adopting a policy of greater transparency regarding
drone strike information may provide feasible benets
in allowing all sides to reach an accurate understanding
of the situation at hand. Drone strikes may be a
situational necessity due to lack of alternatives, or
may be considered unwarranted. However, without
a complete picture, especially one for the Pakistani
people, drone attacks will continue to be met with
criticism and protest.
R
1 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/04/opinion/in-pakistan-
drones-kill-our-innocent-allies.html?_r=1
2 http://english.aljazeera.net/news/
asia/2011/10/201110307584794254.html
3 http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/
les/policydocs/bergentiedemann2.pdf
4 Ibid.
5 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/12/21/the_
hidden_war?page=0,5
6 http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/
subjects/u/unmanned_aerial_vehicles/index.html
US drone strikes have escalated
in the past few years
Photo courtesy of Flickr
Creative Commons user
james_gordon_los_angeles
18 - Fall 2011
e newly built Skolkovo-Moscow School of Management
Sourced from Flickr Creative Commons user Cea

by Alexandra Cox
e Skolkovo Project:
From the Mire of Corruption
to the Freedom of Technology
e global nancial crisis of the past two years exposed Russias economy as
dependent on oil, gas, and metallurgy, and devoid of the innovative advances
that have come to dene successful western nations. To promote research and
development in the spheres of alternative energy sources and technology, Russia
is attempting to create a Silicon Valley in Skolkovo, a city west of Moscow.
However, the legacy of corruption and bribery remains an impediment to Russias
reemergence as a superpower in the modern business world. Only by combating
corruption and cultivating an open political and business environment can
Russia hope to develop an atmosphere in which a Skolkovo project can succeed.
Sxo:xovo Pno)vc1
Alexandra Cox is a sophomore studying Economics with a
minor in international relations. She is interested in United
States Foreign Policy, particularly with regards to Russia.
She has researched and produced documentary lms
about the Cold War and hopes to continue researching
Russia's emergence from Communism. Alexandra wrote
this paper for her freshman year Program in Writing and
Rhetoric course.
R
ussia knows that it needs business. If it wishes
to remain competitive in the international
economy Russia must develop business in the
sectors of technology and innovation (Laquer 155).
However, it must rst address a legacy of corruption.
As Robert K. Massie notes in his biography of Peter the
Great, Bribery and embezzlement were traditional in
Russian public life, and public service was routinely
looked upon as a means of gaining private prot
(Massie 781). Although Massies statement describes
the country as it was three centuries ago, it could just
as easily portray the Russia of today. In October 2010,
the current President of Russia, Dmitri Medvedev,
announced that one trillion rubles, or roughly thirty-
three billion U.S. dollars, disappear annually on
government contracts (Andersen par. 5). is sum
amounts to three percent of Russias GDP (Iofee par. 2).
Despite the great uctuations in Russias history since
the days of Peter the Great, the legacy of bribery and
corruption remains a powerful impediment to Russias
reemergence as a superpower in the modern business
world. Russias latest initiative to create a Silicon
Valley of sorts in Skolkovo, a city twelve miles west of
Moscow, has the potential to provide the impetus for
Russia to transition into the digital age.
e global nancial crisis of the past two
years exposed Russias dependence on oil, gas, and
metallurgy, and its lack of innovative advancements
when compared to successful western nations (155). In
a world increasingly looking toward green initiatives,
Russias dependence on its limited natural resources
places its economy in a precarious situation (ornock
and Whitaker par. 13). By acknowledging his countrys
need to promote research in technology and alternative
energy sources in order to keep up with other nations,
President Dmitri Medvedev hopes to fundamentally
alter the foundation of the Russian economy. He stated,
During the next decade, Russia should become a
country in which the welfare and the good quality of
life is ensured by its intellectual rather than natural
resources, its innovative economy (Medvedev, Solash
par. 16). Initiated by the government, the Skolkovo
project attempts to diversify Russias homogenous
economy and launch Russia into the modern business
world. Nonetheless, questions remain as to the
legitimacy of such an endeavor within the Russian
political system.
When Mikhail Gorbachev became General
Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
in March 1985, he brought with him a plea for a
restructuring of the Soviet system, called perestroika
(Gorbachev 1). Perestroika is an urgent necessity
arising from the profound processes of development in
our socialist society (1). For nearly a century leading
up to Gorbachevs perestroika reforms, all private
enterprise within Russia was banned or centralized
under state ownership (ornock and Whitaker par. 9).
Entrepreneurship and private enterprise were virtually
nonexistent in Soviet Russia. ough the Soviet Union
had attained superpower status as a military force,
become the foremost producer of steel and oil, and
led the world in space exploration, its economy was
stagnant as a result of Communist collectivization
eorts (Jones and Mosko 1).
With perestroika, Russia witnessed a loosening
of its strict communistic practices. One of the
foundations of the perestroika reforms was a legalized
private economy, which Gorbachev introduced
through cooperatives, permitting private ownership
of businesses for the rst time in nearly half a century.
Gorbachev recognized that private enterprise could
meet needs not being met by the state (Jones and
Mosko 12). Yet private enterprise meant private gain,
and private gain was directly related to capitalism and
exploitation (12).
Aer the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991,
the Russian government began to pass legislation to
transition from the centralized Soviet economy to a free-
market system. e 1995 law entitled On State Support
for Small Business in the Russian Federation called
for government assistance with modern equipment
and technologies including the creation of a network
of business technoparks and business incubators to
stimulate the newly formed small-business sector of
the economy. ough corruption in the early years of
the Russian Federation and the nancial crisis of 1998
prevented these reforms from inducing signicant
change, the reforms laid the foundation for the concept
of Skolkovo (ornock and Whitaker par. 9).
Following the election of President Vladimir
Putin in 1999, Russia continued an ideological movement
20 - Fall 2011
away from its Soviet system. In his introductory speech,
Putin stated, It needs to be recognized that without
the development of [the small business] sector in the
country, there will neither be a steady improvement
in economic growth, nor an improvement in peoples
lives. e more people are involved in small business,
the more stable and healthy is the Russian economy.
In adherence to Putins emphasis on the necessity of
small business development, current President Dmitri
Medvedev states that he hopes the Skolkovo project
will foster an environment of technological innovation
and imagination in Russia that will promote research in
the spheres of alternative energy sources, information
technology, communication, biomedical research,
and nuclear technology (Razumovskaya par. 22).
Skolkovo, President Medvedev says, will try to replicate
Silicon Valleys success while paving its own way to
completion (ornock and Whitaker par. 20).
Currently, two major projects are underway
in Skolkovo. e rst is Innograd, or innovation
city, which will be composed of various technological
companies assembled in one geographic area. e
second is the Skolkovo-Moscow School of Management,
which is already open and training a new generation of
Russian innovators (ornock and Whitaker par. 8).
In order to determine whether Russia will be able to
cultivate the right environment for the success of the
Skolkovo project, it is important to analyze the major
factors that have led to the growth of Silicon Valley from
its beginnings in the 1930s to its current prominence in
the worldwide innovation industry.
It seems remarkable to me, reected William
Eitel, one of the rst radio hobbyists to come to the
Silicon Valley, that on the San Francisco Peninsula,
o the beaten paths of commerce, grew so many
independent new industries, all now of national and
international importance. From just a small group of
rms employing a few hundred radio amateurs, Silicon
Valley has become the main center for electronic
component manufacturing in the United States and
serves as the headquarters for major technological rms
such as Apple and Cisco (Lecuyer 295). Silicon Valley
rose to its current prominence in the international
economy due to a combination of skilled graduates
from nearby Stanford University and the University
of California, Berkeley and patronage from the US
Department of Defense. Recognizing the signicance
of university ties and government sponsorship,
Russia is attempting to draw from the history of the
development of Silicon Valley as it fashions Skolkovo
and Innograd.
Former Stanford University Provost Frederick
Terman is largely credited with establishing the long-
standing relationship between Stanford University
and Silicon Valley (e Rise of Silicon Valley par.
1). In 1925, he returned from his graduate career to
pursue his doctorate at Stanford University (Leslie
76). At Stanford, he launched a commercially-
oriented program in radio electronics and encouraged
collaboration between his students and local electronics
companies (Leslie 76). Under Termans guidance,
Stanford students David Packard and William Hewlett
established an electronics company in their Palo Alto
garage that would grow into todays Hewlett-Packard
Company thus forming the long-standing relationship
between Stanford University and Silicon Valley (e
Rise of Silicon Valley par. 1). e partnership between
Stanford and Silicon Valley continues today with strong
ties between university aliates and companies such
as Google, Cisco Systems, Intuit, Silicon Graphics, and
Sun Microsystems (par. 6).
In a similar vein, President Medvedev hopes
to foster a relationship between Innograd and the
Skolkovo-Moscow School of Management. For
Innograd to succeed, Russia will need motivated
entrepreneurs and engineers knowledgeable about
trends in emerging markets (Yana). In a speech at
Stanford University during his June 2010 visit to Silicon
Valley, President Medvedev addressed the brain drain
Russian President Medvedev, the driving
force behind the Skolkovo project, speaking
at Stanford University about the need for
more technological innovation in Russia.
Sourced from Flickr Creative Commons user jurvetson
Sxo:xovo Pno)vc1
that has aected Russia since the days of the Cold War.
He stated, We want our talented people, and Russia has
always had a reputation for its talented people, to have
every opportunity to fulll their potential. In order to
achieve that we need to reform our education system
and create an opportunity for each talented individual
to be reached by the people who support his or her
ideas (Medvedev). President Medvedev hopes that the
Skolkovo-Moscow School of Management will attract
future business leaders who wish to remain in Russia
and pioneer new technology-based businesses, just as
Stanford University graduates continue to pioneer the
growth of Silicon Valley (Kamyshev par. 8).
In the spirit of embracing innovation, the
Moscow-Skolkovo School of Management oers
students a novel approach to graduate business
programs. Students spend only four out of the
twenty-month program on campus in Skolkovo. e
remainder of the program is spent working o-campus
on consulting jobs located in China, India, and the US
(Skolkovo MBA par. 1). Should the school succeed in
attracting potential students, Russian ocials hope it
will become the new standard for business education
and succeed in training leaders who will set up and
run their own businesses and lead the development of
the Russian economy (ornock and Whitaker par.
26, Mission par. 2).
e global approach of the Moscow-Skolkovo
School of Management MBA program may, however,
have an opposite eect on the brain drain than that
which President Medvedev desires. With students
spending over three-fourths of their education abroad
and as a result establishing connections in countries
outside of Russia, they may nd greater opportunities
during their terms overseas (Kamyshev par. 15).
Russian trade union ocials estimate that more than
one-half million scientists and computer programmers
have le the country since 1991 to nd well-paying jobs
elsewhere in Europe and in the US (Building a Silicon
Valley in Russia 3, Yana par. 4). As Vladimir Babkin,
an advisor to the Russian State Dumas Committee
for Science and Technology noted, ose who are
successful overseas will not return (Building a Silicon
Valley in Russia 3).
While the interactions between local
universities and innovation centers like Silicon Valley
provide the thought power to sustain continued growth,
the history of Silicon Valley reveals the importance of
military and government patronage that may be key to
Russias development of Innograd. In a sense, the US
par. 7). During World War II, the Korean War, and
the Cold War, Silicon Valley companies were able to
capitalize on the militarys demand for microprocessors,
vacuum tubes, and semiconductors, which were
crucial in the manufacture of intercontinental ballistic
missiles, reconnaissance satellites, and other high-
tech weapons and weapon systems (Heinrich 247,
Lecuyer 7). With the launch of Sputnik in 1957, fears
regarding Russias scientic prowess abounded and
the US government kicked investment into a higher
gear (OMara par. 7). By the end of the Cold War,
the nine largest contractors in Santa Clara County,
California, which included Lockheed Missile and
Space, Ford Aerospace, Westinghouse, and United
Technologies, among others, reported more than $11
billion in military defense contracts (U.S. Department
of Defense). Stuart W. Leslie reects on the importance
of the assumptions and priorities of Cold War defense
policy to the development of Silicon Valley. He states
that Silicon Valley was created and sustained in the
name of national security (Leslie 75).
While the military and the Department of
Defense sustained the formation and growth of Silicon
Valley, it also forced local rms to open up new markets
for their products in the civilian sector (OMara par.
7). e Department of Defense sought access to the
manufacturing and accounting processes of the Silicon
Valley rms in order to reduce their bargaining powers
(Lecuyer 207). Additionally, the militarys inconsistent
volume requirements made it an unreliable customer
for innovative rms. Because of this, many rms
government was Silicon Valleys rst venture capitalist
(OMara 5); it promoted innovation through research
grants and defense contracts (Heinrich 251, OMara
e recent rapid growth of Russia's economy has depended
largely on natural resource wealth, although projects like
Skolkovo are attempting to diversify the economy
Sourced from Flickr Creative Commons user akk_rus
22 - Fall 2011
moved into commercial markets by expanding their
businesses into the public sector (Lecuyer 207). is
not only spurred business growth, but also inspired the
invention of new technology as capitalism and supply
and demand generated competition.
e Russian governments close involvement
in the Skolkovo project emulates the US governments
participation in Silicon Valleys history, with one
crucial dierence. ough the US government was
largely responsible for the creation of Silicon Valley,
Americas free market economy promoted growth
outside of the governmental sector (OMara par. 9).
e Russian economy, however, remains unstable even
twenty years aer the fall of Communism. Investors
hold reservations about the bureaucracy, red tape, and
expensive capital that still plague the Russian economic
system (Andersen par. 19, Building a Silicon Valley
in Russia 1). As President Medvedev himself noted,
Everything in Russia is a scheme; everything eventually
turns into massive, legalized the (ornock and
Whitaker par. 19). e commonplace corruption that
pervades every sector of public life, all the way to the
Kremlin, could prevent the Skolkovo project from
achieving successes on par with those that President
Medvedev sees in Silicon Valley.
Russias reputation for corruption has become a
clich. In Transparency Internationals annual rankings,
Russia is one of the few countries to consistently fall
in the rankings year aer year. e 2010 survey ranks
Russia 154th out of the 179 countries surveyed, a
position it shares with Cambodia, Guinea-Bissau,
and the Central African Republic (Transparency
International). Corruption has reached such an
extreme level that corporations involved in preparing
for the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi have reported
paying kickbacks of more than y percent (Ioe
par. 2). One road in Sochi cost so much that it could
have been paved in three and one-half inches of Louis
Vuitton handbags (par. 2).
In an eort to dispel negative views of Russia
and encourage venture capitalists to invest in Skolkovo,
President Medvedev declared a war on corruption
(Andersen par. 5). During his visit to Silicon Valley
in June 2010, he stated, Russia is committed to
becoming an open country, open to cooperation with
everyone who is interested in working with us, open
to investments, to trade, to joint projects in any area of
public life and, of course, in the economy (Medvedev).
Nevertheless, Russia has a long way to go before its
corruption falls to an acceptable level and creates an
ease of entrepreneurship on par with that of its western
counterparts.
Since President Medvedevs election, the size
of the average bribe has quadrupled, according to
estimates from the Interior Ministrys Department of
Economic Security (Ioe par.11). Many state projects
are undertaken for the sole purpose of creating a
pool of money that can be siphoned o by interested
parties. Corruption is so entrenched in the Russian
public life that the governments eorts have actually
had a reverse eect on bribery. When bribery becomes
more risky, prices go up, making the bribes larger and
more detrimental to society. An extreme example of
the escalating extent of Russias corruption took place
in August 2004, when two passenger planes fell out of
the sky within three minutes of each other (Dougherty
par. 3). Eighty-nine people were killed (par. 1). Two
suicide bombers had hijacked the planes aer bribing
an airport security ocer with ve thousand rubles,
the equivalent of one hundred seventy dollars (Ioe
par. 10). ese instances of corruption taint the worlds
perception of Russia and call into question the future
success of the Skolkovo project.
Nevertheless, Russia is trying to escape the
seemingly unremitting cycle of corruption. Both the
Russian people and the government are making eorts
to end endemic corruption in their country. In 2008,
President Medvedev began an initiative to make all
government requests for tender available online.
From this initiative emerged Alexey Navalnys website
entitled RosPil. In 2008, Alexey Navalny read that
the Ministry of Health and Social Development was
inviting bids to construct a two million dollar network
that would connect doctors with their patients (Ioe
par. 32). e sixteen-day period that was designated
for the development of the site tipped Navalny o to
the potential corruption within the project (par. 32).
He wrote that without a doubt the site had already
been developed for a much lower sum. Aer igniting
a campaign that resulted in two thousand complaint
letters to the Federal Anti-Monopoly Agency, the
Health Ministry annulled the contract (par. 32).
Navalnys success with the campaign led to an inux
of email messages with links to similar contracts. But,
Navalny realized, I cant, by myself, replace the Anti-
Monopoly Agency and the state prosecutors oce.
And so the idea was born to make a site were the
people could do it themselves (par. 33). Any visitor to
the RosPil website can submit a government request
for tender to public scrutiny (RosPil). If the document
Sxo:xovo Pno)vc1
is deemed suspicious, it is posted to the main page,
where registered members discuss the complaint.
Experts associated with the site evaluate the price of the
project, the parameters, and the schedule to determine
if it is reasonable (Ioe par. 33). If not, Navalny declares
the project a fraud on his blog, which oen causes the
agency who submitted the request for tender to be
inundated with hostile messages, enough so that in
many cases the agency annuls its contracts or shuts the
triumphant future for the Skolkovo project (Laquer
160). As Russian politician Victor Chernomyrdin
famously quipped in 1993, We intended for something
better, but it turned out just as it always does (Building
a Silicon Valley in Russia 3). is quote has become a
catchphrase in post-Soviet Russia and one that has the
potential to dene the Skolkovo project.
Despite its comparisons to Silicon Valley,
Skolkovo will never enjoy the unparalleled success of its
project down completely (Ioe par.
33). In a tally maintained on the
site, RosPil has caused requests for
tender worth $337,540,000 to be
annulled (Results).
If President Medvedevs
eorts and the crusades of the
Russian people against corruption
prove to be more than unattainable
examples of idealism, the Skolkovo
project could establish Russia as a
Sourced from Flickr Creative Commons user kirill.ioris
participant in the international innovation economy.
Innograd oers investors a chance to establish a
foothold in an emerging BRIC country. In the past
decade, the BRIC countries accounted for 27.8 percent
of global GDP growth in US dollars (Ahmed, Kelston,
and Wilson par. 5). Prominent investment banks such
as Goldman Sachs anticipate that these countries will
be wealthier than most current economic powers by
the year 2050 (par. 1). Whether or not these countries
represent the future of the business world will ultimately
be determined by investors themselves and their
willingness to take a risk in a developing economy.
Capitalizing on the worlds current interest in
emerging markets, the Russian government is oering
investors and foreign companies access to tax breaks
and lessened regulations if they invest in Skolkovo
(Building a Silicon Valley in Russia 2). Already, Russia
oers a corporate tax rate of 20 percent, nearly 15
percent lower than the rates found in the US (ornock
and Whitaker par. 17). Special tax rules for
Skolkovo, as well as preferential treatment and special
registration procedures, special oversight and even
special jurisdiction regime, will, President Medvedev
hopes, protect investors from ocials, from criminals,
from some obstacles on their wayIf all these rules are
introduced, he said to a crowd assembled in Stanford
Universitys Dinkelspiel Auditorium, I am sure the
project will succeed (Medvedev).
Despite President Medvedevs optimistic
rhetoric, history points towards a decidedly less
US archetype. e perfect storm of
elements that led to the development
of Silicon Valley, including the
radio entrepreneurs, government
wartime spending, and university
relationships, is nearly impossible
to recreate. But, more so than the
impossibility of imitating in perfect
proportion these elements, the
Russian governments approach
and involvement with the Skolkovo
project will destabilize and perhaps destroy the grand
dream of a Russian Silicon Valley (Kamyshev par. 20).
e Skolkovo project is a top-down approach to business
development, one driven by the government to the extent
that it excludes the Russian people (Kamyshev par. 13,
Yana). e Russian government hopes to, in a sense,
command a technology center into existence. ough
government involvement was an essential component of
the development of Silicon Valley, the innovation sector
in California was largely driven by the excitement and
entrepreneurial spirit of the Bay Area residents (OMara
par. 16).
e Skolkovo project, however, will be a place
apart for scientists. During the Cold War era, the Soviet
Union isolated scientists in scientic centers located in
Siberia (Homan 13). ere, scientists were immune
from the problems of starvation that plagued the
general population of the Soviet Union and were able
to focus exclusively on developing the Soviet nuclear
weapons and space programs (15). e Skolkovo project
poses alarming similarities to these Siberian scientic
enclaves. [Scientists] should be isolated from our
reality, says Andrey Shtorkh, a former guard inside
Sverdlovsk-45, one of the Soviet Unions secret scientic
cities. Skolkovo will be made up of ve villages, each
corresponding to one of ve areas of innovative
development of the Russian economy (Razumovskaya
par. 22). Combined with the corruption already present
in the country, the isolation of scientists in technology
Pervasive corruption has become a
major problem for the Russian people
24 - Fall 2011
centers does not embody the openness that President
Medvedev has said is essential to advancing Russian
society. For business to succeed, the people must be
excited and involved in the technology development
process, not isolated from it. Silicon Valley was not
commanded into existence; rather the innovation
sector developed in California from the bottom up
and was ensured continued growth by the American
economic system, which values entrepreneurship and
its protection (OMara par. 17).
President Medvedevs words, his declarations of
openness, his promises of an end to Russian corruption,
need to become reality rather than slogans that mask
the stagnation and corruption of Russias democratic
progress (Laquer 157, Yana). Before investing in a
project like Skolkovo, Russia needs to cultivate an
environment in which it can succeed; it needs a better
business climate (Building a Silicon Valley in Russia"
1). A better business climate is created by enforcing
stronger rule of law, by supporting entrepreneurship,
and by making investors feel secure in their investments
(Laquer 158). If Russia can truly open itself to
competition in a free market system, then perhaps a
project like Skolkovo would be a feasible endeavor. For
now, however, Russia should focus on creating the open
society President Medvedev so earnestly proclaims.
Otherwise, investing in the Skolkovo project would
merely be another disappointment, reminiscent of the
numerous fully-funded yet abandoned endeavors that
litter the expanse of Russian history.
e Skolkovo project was forced into existence
by the government in an attempt to stimulate growth.
Two decades have passed since the fall of communism,
yet Russia still does not embrace the competition that
makes Silicon Valley successful or the transparency
that creates a stable business environment. ough
the Skolkovo project is developing at a time in which
the reality of Russia cannot sustain the grandeur of
Skolkovos idealism, the eorts of those striving to end
the corruption point towards a future in which Russia
may be able to cultivate an open political and business
environment. As a result of the Skolkovo project,
Russia has taken great strides towards ending the
corruption that has been entrenched in Russian society
for so long. Websites such as Alexey Navalnys RosPil
ensure the continued empowerment of the Russian
public as they confront questionable government and
business practices. Technology, the foundation of the
Skolkovo project, oers the people of Russia a means to
end the corruption that has plagued Russias economic
development.
W C
Swarnali Ahmed, Alex Kelston, Dominic Wilson. Is this the BRICs
Decade? BRICs Monthly. 10/03 (20 May 2010). Web.
is article from Goldman-Sachs discusses the emergence of the
BRIC countries as major players in the international economic
system.
Derek Andersen. What Lies Ahead aer a Year of ieving. e St.
Petersburg Times 21 Dec. 2010. Print.
is article discusses the corruption that pervaded Russian in the year
2010 as well as the implications it has had on discouraging foreign
investments.
Building a Silicon Valley in Russia: An Ill-Fated Kremlin Experiment?
Ergo Nov. 2010. Web.
is article addresses the fundamental issues of Russias attempt to
recreate Silicon Valley. It plays particular attention to Russias need to
create an environment that is attractive for nanciers.
Jill Dougherty. Bribe Got Bomber on Russian Jet. CNN International
15 Sept. 2004: n. pag. Web.
is article discusses the bribery involved in the 2004 Russian airline
bombings.
William Eitel. Electronics Considered Pace-Setter in Regions
Development. Redwood City Tribune. 27 Dec. 1962. Print.
is document discussed the important role the electronics industry
played in the development of Silicon Valley. It oered a historical take
over the years of development from the early 1900s to 1960.
Mikhail Gorbachev. Perestroika: New inking for Our Country and the
World. San Francisco: Perennial Library, 1988.
is text details Mikhail Gorbachevs perestroika plans, his aspirations
for the future of the Soviet Union, and his realizations of its current
problems.
omas Heinrich. Cold War Armory: Military Contracting in Silicon
Valley. Enterprise & Society 3. June (2002): 247-248. Web.
is article argues that military funding for research established the
foundation for a new generation of startups that was necessary for the
development of Silicon Valley.
David E. Homan. e Dead Hand: e Untold Story of the Cold War
Arms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy. New York: Doubleday, 2009.
is text discusses the development of the nuclear arms race between
the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. It also
asserts that the legacy of the Cold War is not over as thousands of
nuclear and biological weapons remain in vulnerable positions.
Julia Ioe. Net Impact. e New Yorker 4 Apr. 2011. Web.
is article discusses Alexey Navalnys campaign to end the
corruption that is so prevalent in Russian society.
Anthony Jones and William Mosko. Ko-ops: e Rebirth of
Entrepreneurship In the Soviet Union. Bloomington: Indiana U.
Press, 1991.
is book discussed Gorbachevs attempts at reforming the Soviet
economy through the use of cooperatives.
Vitaly Kamyshev. Can a Russian Silicon Valley Rise from the Dust?
Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty 23 June 2010. Web.
is text discusses the concerns surrounding Skolkovo, including the
possibility that it may not achieve all that President Medvedev hopes.
It also acknowledges the opinions of Muscovites about the Skolkovo
project, which provides interesting insight into the local mentality.
Sxo:xovo Pno)vc1
Walter Laquer. Moscows Modernization Dilemma: Is Russia Charting
a New Foreign Policy? Foreign Aairs November/December 2010:
153-160. Print.
is article discusses Russias foreign policy as it relates to its
recognition of the necessity for economic development within the
technology sectors of the economy.
Christophe Lecuyer. Making Silicon Valley: Innovation and the Growth
of High Tech, 1930-1970. Cambridge, MA: e MIT Press, 2006.
is book discusses the growth of Silicon Valley and asserts that a
large portion of the development of the area was due to the presence
of radio entrepreneurs, government involvement, and interactions
between businesses and local universities.
Stuart W. Leslie. How the West was Won: e Military and the Making
of Silicon Valley. Technological Competitiveness: Contemporary and
Historical Perspectives on the Electrical, Electronics, and Computer
Industries. Ed. William Aspray. New York: e Institute of Electrical
and Electronics Engineers, Inc., 1993. 75-89. Print.
In this document Stuart W. Leslie asserted that the growth of Silicon
Valley was largely attributed to federal subsidy.
Robert K. Massie. Peter the Great, His Life and World. New York:
Knopf, 1980.
ough this book discusses Tsar Peter the Great, who lived nearly
three centuries before the Skolkovo project was even conceived, the
tales of corruption that surrounded the bureaucratic dealings of the
era were relevant to my argument that bribery and corruption are
inherent aspects of the Russian way of life.
Dmitri Medvedev. Meeting with Representatives of US Public,
Academic, and Business Communities. 24 June 2010, Palo Alto, CA.
Ocial Site of the President of Russia. Web.
is is a transcript of President Medvedevs speech and question and
answer session that he presented at Stanford University during his
visit in June. It discusses his goals for the future of Russias innovative
economic sector.
Mission. Skolkovo-Moscow School of Management. Accessed 9 May
2011. http://www.skolkovo.ru/public/en/about.
is text describes the mission of the Skolkovo-Moscow School of
Management as the education center for future Russian business
leaders.
Margaret Pugh OMara. Cities of Knowledge: Cold War Science and the
Search for the Next Silicon Valley. Princeton: Princeton U Press, 2005.
ough this text did not discuss Skolkovo explicitly, it outlined many of
the key components that led to the development of the Silicon Valley
and asserted that they may be dicult to replicate elsewhere.
Margaret Pugh OMara. Dont Try this at Home. Foreign Policy Sept/
Oct 2010: 149-151. Print.
is article discusses the business and technological innovation
originating in Silicon Valley. OMara reects on international
attempts to duplicate the innovative atmosphere.
Olga Razumovskaya. Medvedev Hopes to Teach at Skolkovo One Day.
e Moscow Times 26 April 2011. Web.
is text discusses Medvedevs hopes for Skolkovo as well as his
frustrations with its development, specically the lack of global
recognition surrounding the project.
Results. RosPil.info. A. Bulk, Alexey Navalny, 2 June 2011. Web. 2 June
2011.
is page features the Amount of questionable / corrupt
procurement stopped by the eorts of those associated with RosPil.
e Rise of Silicon Valley. History of Stanford. Stanford University.
Web.
is article features an overview of the interweaving of history
between Stanford University and the Silicon Valley. It argues that the
development of Silicon Valley was largely due to the inux of talented
students from Stanford University.
RosPil. A. Bulk, Alexey Navalny. Web. 2 June 2011.
is is Alexey Navalnys website, RosPil, which features updates on
the eorts of those in Russia working to end corruption.
Skolkovo MBA. Skolkovo-Moscow School of Management. Accessed 9
May 2011. http://www.skolkovo.ru/public/en/mba.
Contained within this webpage is a detailed account of the Skolkovo-
Moscow School of Management MBA program, which includes the
corporate projects that take place in India, China, Russia, and the
United States.
Richard Solash. In Silicon Valley, Medvedev Looks for Investment
Possibilities. Radio Free Europe. 24 Apr. 2010. Web.
is article discussed Medvedevs visit to the Silicon Valley and the
hopes he expressed to American businesses about the future of the
Skolkovo project.
Robert ornock and Wesley Whitaker. Skolkovo: Russias Emerging
Silicon Valley. Knowledge@Wharton. 2011. Web.
is text addresses the development of Skolkovo as a parallel to that
of Silicon Valley. It addresses the history of the Silicon Valley and
compares it to Skolkovo.
Transparency International. Corruption Perceptions Index 2010
Results. Ed. Transparency International. Web. 2010.
is table features the results of the thirteen surveys conducted by the
Transparency International. It shows how Russia is perceived as one
of the most corrupt countries in the world.
U.S. Department of Defense. Largest Defense Contractors in Santa
Clara County, 1990. Eagle Eye Publishers, 1991. Web.
is table shows the companies in Santa Clara County and their
defense sales at the end of the Cold War. It was crucial for my
argument that the government involvement was necessary for the
development of Silicon Valley.
Alekseenko Yana. Interview with Ben Judah. Can Russian Government
Stop Brain Drain? 27 April 2011. Web.
is interview with Policy Fellow at the European Council on
Foreign Relations, Ben Judah, discusses Russias brain drain and how
Medvedev hopes to combat it.
W C
Mikael Berstein, Chris Clark, Anda Gansca, and Pawel Waluszko. For
Entrepreneurs. Recreating Silicon Valley. Accessed 10 May 2011.
http://www.recreatingsiliconvalley.com.
Gregory Feifer. Russias Silicon Valley Dreams May reaten
Cybersecurity. Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty 14 Nov. 2010. Web.
Gail Lapidus. Personal Interview. 18 May 2011.
A. Michal McMahon. e Making of a Profession: A Century of
Electrical Engineering in America. New York: IEEE Press, 1984.
Iliya Pitalev. Innovations lay foundation for Russias Power
Condoleezza Rice. Ria Novosti 25 March 2011. Web.
Resetting the Stage. e Economist 23 April 2011: 53-54. Print.
Russian Hi-Tech Hub to Run Joint Projects with Stanford. Ria Novosti
25 March 2011. Web.
Barack Obama. 8 Apr. 2010. [Transcript]. Retrieved from C-SPAN
Video Library. Web.
Robert Wessling. Personal Interview. 11 May 2011.
26 - Fall 2011
M
odern era globalization has endowed
power in resource-rich countries, enabling
them to derive inuence from the control
of vital commodities. Oil, one of the most crucial
goods, has therefore been used as a lethal weapon,
sparking harsh repercussions on the global economy
and political dynamic. e most recognized usage
of the oil weapon was the 1973 oil embargo. In
response to US military assistance to Israel during
the 6-day war, the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) sought to exert political
pressure by declaring an oil embargo, raising the
price of a barrel by 70 percent and cutting production
in increments of 5 percent. Oil price shocks had
immediate economic eects, as the quadrupled price
of fuel led to recession, ination, reduced productivity
and economic stagnation. e crises of the past
serve as testimony to the power of geopolicity, and
must prompt caution in the eyes of the international
community about the future of energy security.
by Ariella Axler
e Politics, Economics, and Security of
Middle Eastern Oil Supplies:
A Call for American Energy Independence
E I
T A S O R
As civil unrest spreads throughout the Middle
East, fear of a new oil crisis has arisen. Beginning on
February 15, 2011, with protests in Benghazi, the world
witnessed the unfolding of the Libyan revolution.
e ensuing civil war between Qadda loyalists and
the rebels le the country ablaze- a haze of blood
and ash with over 25,000 buried in the remnants and
4,000 refugees who ed the bloody civil war. In the
midst of the anarchic insurgency, Libyas 1.6 million
barrels per day of supply were taken o the market.
Since Libya is the globes 18th top petroleum
exporter, providing premium quality, low sulfur
oil, Libyas immobilization had tangible impacts
on the international oil market. is global
shortfall will not see immediate compensation;
OPEC ocials, oil analysts, and Libyas former oil
minister, Shokri Ganem, all agree that restoring
production to its previous levels will take years- until
2013 or 2014 at the earliest.
1

Along with Libyan turmoil, there are concerns
that an incident could unfold with Al Qaeda terrorists
roaming near Yemens Aden coast, where 40 percent of
the worlds oil supplies pass through. Any occurrence
of an attack on an oil tanker or disruption to the
transit of fuel in the region would result in devastating
consequences.
E I
e volatility of oil supplies reinforces the need
for energy independence. In order to reduce severe
market uctuation, building up a stockpile reserve is
a necessity. Aer the OPEC embargo, in 1975, the US
established the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Yet, this
reserve is only a short-term solution; oil is a limited
resource, and cannot serve as a sustainable option
for the future. Seeking energy outside fossil fuels is
the most feasible means to absolute energy security.
US investment in alternative, renewable energy is the
rst step to achieving a fruitful energy economy. e
benets of investing in renewable energy sources are
manifoldspanning from increased global political
inuence to job creation, and to cheaper energy prices. A
self-sucient US energy sector would be advantageous
in relation to national security, and would be a lucrative
asset to revitalize the economy.
E
1 Lindsay, Greg. How e Arab Spring Paved e Way For A Double-
Dip Recession, And Why It Might Prevent e Next One . Mon,
11/21/2011 | Co.Exist: World Changing Ideas and Innovation. Codesign.
com. Web. 21 Nov. 2011. <http://www.fastcoexist.com/1678446/how-
the-arab-spring-paved-the-way-for-a-double-dip-recession-and-why-it-
might-prevent-the-ne>.
28 - Fall 2011
Sourced from Nations Online Project
by Christopher Kremer
Malaysia and Nusantara Heritage in
the Adik-Abang Relationship
N
I
ndonesia and Malaysia, which occupy the same
archipelago and have overlapping history and
language, have ercely disputed the ownership
of Nusantara (Archipelago) culture. Indonesia and
Malaysia are both members of ASEAN, but, since
they gained independence from Britain and the
Netherlands, which originally created their articial
borders, they have been locked in a contentious adik-
abang (younger brother-older brother) relationship.
e rst assumption that underlies the notion of
the adik-abang relationship between Malaysia and
Indonesia is that one is superior to the other, and the
second is that the two countries are closely related.
While the paradigm of the modern nation-state has
led Malaysia to view itself as superior within the adik-
abang relationship, it acknowledges Nusantara as being
common to both countries because many Nusantara
practices can ultimately be traced back to islands in
Indonesias territory.
Since Malaysia has become the so-called older
brother of the adik-abang relationship, it has adopted
the stance that Malaysian and Indonesian cultures are
separate, implicitly asserting that Malaysian culture
is superior. Malaysias use of the notion of a distinct
Malaysian culture as a way to assert its dominance
over Indonesia is shown by its shiing stance on
immigration from when it was the younger brother
to when it became the older brother. In the years
aer its independence, Malaysia welcomed the ow
of immigrants from Indonesia and the Philippines as
a way to keep its Malay majority, a policy that became
obsolete when the birth rates of non-Malays and Malays
turned very much in favor of the latter
1
. e fact that
Malaysia shied from a policy of cultural inclusiveness
to one of cultural separateness shows that, as the
country began to secure a sense of national identity, it
no longer needed to rely on an identity common across
the pre-colonial Malay Archipelago to give itself a sense
of unity and history.
Today, Malaysia is able to claim a dierence
between Indonesian and Malaysian cultures because it
has succeeded in distinguishing itself from Indonesia
and does so in order to further the notion of their
distinctness and to reinforce the notion common to
both that it is the stronger of the two countries. is
attempt to distinguish between cultures was evident
when the Malaysian Family and Community minister
announced plans to perform a study on the eects of
Indonesian immigrant maids on the cultural values
of the Malaysian children for whom they cared. Such
plans not only demonstrated a perception among
Malaysian ocials that the two countries have separate
cultural values but also hinted that Malaysian cultural
values are desirable and superior to Indonesian ones.
While Malaysias claim to Nusantara heritage has
been partly shaped by the juxtaposition of superiority
and inferiority in the adik-abang relationship, it has also
been shaped by Indonesias possession of the islands
where many aspects of Nusantara originated. In order
for Malaysia to reinforce its position as older brother
it must not only accept that aspects of its culture
originated on islands currently under the jurisdiction
of Indonesia but also demonstrate that its culture is
not derivative but is rather a distinct form of the same
heritage. One Malaysian ocial stated, It [Rasa Sayang]
is a folk song from the Nusantara and we are part of
the Nusantara
2
. is statement is compatible with
the Malaysian notion that Malaysian culture, however
it may be related to Indonesian culture, is distinct.
Rasa Sayang, for example, originated on Maluku, an
island now part of Indonesia. As well, Gamelan and
Batik, which have local variants throughout Nusantara
countries, both have their origins in Java.
While the majority of ethnic Malays of Malaysia
and the Indonesians are culturally and ethnically quite
similar, the governments of both countries have used
Nusantara heritage as a way to compete with each other.
Both countries have asserted themselves in accordance
to their sense of superiority or inferiority as a nation-
state and have had to shape their claims to correspond
to the geography of the origins of Nusantara. e fact
that Malaysia and Indonesia compete so ercely over
Nusantara heritage attests to how closely related the
two major countries of the Malay Archipelago are and
to how divisive the idea of the modern nation-state
can be for two countries whose lands were united for
centuries.
R:
1 Holst, Frederik. (Dis-)Connected History: The Indonesia-Malaysia
Relationship.Indonesia - the Presence of the Past: a Festschrift in
Honour of Ingrid Wessel. Ed. Antje Missbach and Eva Streifeneder.
Berlin: Regiospectra, 2007. 327-40. Print.
2 Loudres, Marc. Rasa Sayang ours Too...we Have Right to Sing
It New Straits Times. 3 Oct. 2007. Web. 9 Nov. 2011.
30 - Fall 2011

by Nica Langinger
Transitioning to a
Homegrown Approach
School feeding programs have been implemented in Kenya since the 1980s with varying
degrees of success. Used primarily to incentivize the enrollment and retention of rural children
and girls, subsidized meal programs have played an integral part in realizing the countrys
goal of universal primary education. Historically, the involvement of large foreign players
has greatly limited the Kenyan government's role in the direction and stewardship of these
programs. Heavy reliance on foreign aid and management has subjected the programs to
uctuating, and oen conditional, international support. In an eort to transition toward a
more sustainable and nationally integrated alternative, the Kenyan government introduced
the Homegrown School Feeding Program (HGSFP) in 2009. ough nancial strains and
infrastructural challenges have called into question Kenyas ability to successfully fund and
operate its own school feeding program, the countrys renewed commitment to education,
agriculture, and rural development shows great promise.
Children in a rural Kenyan school returning from recess
Photo courtesy of Flikr user computerwhiz417
KvNvnN Scnoo: Fvvu:No Pnoonnms
Nica Langinger is a senior majoring in International
Relations, minoring in Spanish and Portuguese, and co-
terming in Latin American Studies. During her time at
Stanford, she has developed a strong interest in Brazilian
culture, history, and politics. Aer graduation, Nica hopes
to work in Brazil to improve educational and employment
opportunities for historically disenfranchised groups.
On the topic of educational quality and accessibility,
Nica found many similarities between rural communities
in Kenya and favelas in Brazil. In writing this paper for
Professor Joel Samo's course on education policy in
Africa, she learned a lot about eective policymaking
amidst extreme social inequity.
Agriculture seek to limit the role of external players in
order to transform the program into a more sustainable
and independent national enterprise.
ough much has already been done to boost
rural attendance, more eort and coordination will be
required to obviate many of the current impediments
to School Feeding Programs. To fully realize the
enormous humanitarian potential of the HGSFP,
special attention must be given to improving the quality
of rural infrastructure, investing in human capital,
increasing local stewardship of feeding programs, and
supporting economic opportunities for small-scale
food producers. Without these critical developments,
the goals of the HGSFP will fail to serve the long-
term interests of ASAL inhabitants and will instead
contribute to a continued cycle of foreign dependency
and educational inequity in Kenya.
H:s1onv ov scnoot
K
Kenyas school feeding program has experienced
continued expansion and renement, especially
during the past decade. Since the introduction of
free compulsory primary education for all Kenyan
children in 2003, the WFP-assisted feeding program
has developed alongside national policies of increased
R
oughly 80 percent of
Kenyans live in rural areas
and eke out a living as
farmers, and poor land quality
and chronic water shortages have
put the country in a constant state
of food insecurity (UNESCO
2005). Although its economy
boasts a sizeable agricultural
sector (mainly focused on exports
of rst-world luxuries like
owers, tea, and coee), Kenya
is a food-decit country with
less than 20 percent of its land
suitable for successful cultivation.
Compounding these diculties,
frequent and severe droughts in
the historically precarious Arid
and Semi Arid Lands (ASAL)
land and scarce water (MoA 2010).
e ASAL, home to roughly 30 percent of the
Kenyan population, has suered through the crippling
social eects of recently intensifying droughts and food
shortages. Kenyas school-aged population is among
the groups most negatively impacted. To alleviate the
health and developmental consequences of childhood
malnutrition, increase primary school enrollment,
and combat social pressures that limit educational
opportunities for girls, the Kenyan government began
a school-feeding program in 1980 (Regnault De La
Mothe 2008). e initiative, signicantly backed by
World Food Program (WFP) funds and management,
is one of the largest and longest-standing school feeding
partnerships of its kind. In 2008, the program served
1.2 million children in 3,600
schoolsnearly 21.3 percent of
all primary school students in
Kenya (USDA 2010).
Recently, in accordance
with Education for All
developmental targets, the
Kenyan government decided
to expand its role in the
implementation of school feeding
programs nationwide (MoE
2003). rough the introduction
of the Homegrown School
Feeding Program, Kenyan
policymakers are looking for ways
to better integrate and promote
goals in education, agriculture,
and rural development through
inter-sectoral cooperation and
progressive policy changes.
Over time, the Kenyan
ministries of Education and
have contributed to high rates
of crop loss, malnutrition, and
violence over limited arable
Child obtaining water, a scarce resource in Kenya

Photo courtesy of Flikr user angela7dreams
32 - Fall 2011
student health, attendance, and performance (MoE
2003). From its inception, it has targeted food inequality
in the most vulnerable areas of Kenya, including school
districts in the ASAL and the informal urban slums
of large cities such as Nairobi and Mombasa (Espejo
2009).
To address historical primary school
absenteeism among Kenyas most impoverished and
traditional communities, free meals are used as an
incentive to attract school-aged children to class.
Within rural communities in which food is scarce,
this daily meal provision relieves much of the burden
of childrearing. e beneciaries of the program are
extremely poor families that are largely unable to provide
the minimum recommended daily allowances (RDA)
of calories, protein, and essential micronutrients to
their children. ese poor conditions may irreversibly
stunt the mental and physical development of young
children, resulting in wasted potentials and lifelong
diculties (Galal 200). e nutritional importance of
the school meal (usually around 700kcal) is immense,
representing more than half of the consumed RDA
values for 40 percent of the participating students
(Finan 2010).
According to eld studies, the magnet eect
of the meal programs has greatly increased school
attendance rates especially among young children. Rural
schools that provide meals show higher attendance
rates and lower initial dropout rates than schools
that do not (Espejo 2009). e immediate nancial
and nutritional benets provided by schooling attract
parents struggling to support their children on low-
yielding subsistence farming. On average, participating
families save between four and nine percent of their
annual income by taking advantage of school meals
and avoiding added food expenditures (Finan 2010).
Additionally, many rural parents have been able to
utilize schooling as a form of subsidized childcare,
which gives them more time to engage in household
chores, farming, or other income-generating activities.
e short and long-term benets to the child are even
more pronounced. Studies tracking the impact of school
feeding have shown improvements in IQ, immunity to
illness, height, and weight among participating children
(Galal 2005). Micronutrient fortication, malaria
treatment, and annual de-worming initiatives have been
implemented alongside school meal programs and have
had considerable eect on increasing overall student
health (Galloway 2009). No longer distracted by hunger
and the crippling eects of extreme malnutrition, the
students are better able to concentrate, understand new
material, and socialize with both teachers and peers.
According to rsthand teacher accounts, children who
receive meals are generally healthier, more receptive,
energetic, and easier to teach (Galal 2005). Following
WFP recommendations, some ASAL school districts
have begun providing fortied morning biscuits to get
a jumpstart on the cognitive and nutritional benets of
feeding (Finan 2010; Galal 2005).
R C
ough signicant gains have been achieved
throughout the country in terms of educational
expansion and accessibility, rural Kenyans continue to
lag far behind their urban counterparts. Between the
years 2002 and 2007, although Kenyas net primary
school enrollment increased from 77 percent to 92
percent, enrollment in the ASAL increased from 17
percent to 29 percent (Finan 2010).
ough school-feeding programs have
increased student enrollment rates, attendance,
to secondary school (Finan 2010). With average
completion rates hovering at around 34 percent in arid
and 57 percent in semi-arid districts, it is clear that even
with the presence of school meals, regional disparities
in education persist. Especially among poor children
and girls, these numbers are far below the standards
Kenya must meet in order to achieve Millennium
Development Goals 1-3 (poverty reduction, universal
primary education, gender equality) by 2015 (MoE
2004).
Unfortunately, the meal programs positive
impact on school attendance appears to weaken with age.
Within traditional rural communities, as children get
older they become valuable economic resources to their
families, and the pressure to contribute to household
chores and earnings steadily mounts. Between seventh
and eighth grade, the appeal of a school meal is suddenly
much less signicant and dropout rates increase with
the rising opportunity costs of staying in school (Finan
2010). As they reach adolescence, boys are expected to
start work as farmhands or manual laborers and girls are
groomed for early marriage in order to fetch a higher
bride price (Bogonko 1992). If a rural childs primary
schooling experience has not instilled the merits of an
education (the catalyst eect), cultural and economic
pressures thwart primary completion and progression
to secondary school (Njeru 2005). Furthermore, due to
a general scarcity of secondary schools in the ASAL,
many bright and otherwise willing rural children
are forced to prematurely end their schooling aer
standard 8 (UNESCO 2005).
Other factors such as water scarcity and
inadequate infrastructure continue to impede full
realization of the central goals of Kenyas school meal
program. Certain nancially strapped schools require
families to contribute money, labor, water, and rewood
to receive the daily meal allowance, compromising the
full eect of the meal incentive (Finan 2010). Rural
schools, widely without rewood to fuel kitchen stoves,
clean water, and money to pay cooks, nd it dicult to
provide daily meal services without burdening parents
for missing inputs (Bwonda 2005). Additionally, schools
are not always equipped with suitable bathrooms and
kitchens to ensure that food is prepared in a hygienic
and safe environment. ese factors undermine the
quality and eectiveness of the feeding program in
many districts in rural Kenya.
Another large obstacle for Kenyan schools to
overcome is related to the poor quality of instruction.
Due in part to FPE initiatives and the popularity of
free school meals, hungry students seeking food aid
have overrun many schoolhouses in the ASAL regions.
According to WFP ndings, the average enrollment
of schools that oer meals is 28 percent higher than
schools that do not, and the average student-teacher
ratio is a staggering 11 points higher than the national
average (Finan 2010). us, although the goal of
increased attendance has been somewhat met, little has
been done to help schools cope with recently inated
student bodies and declining teacher incentives.
e many challenges inherent to the ASAL
have made it increasingly dicult to recruit willing
and qualied teachers to school districts. Kenyan
educators have largely avoided rural schools hundreds
of miles from city centers with few roads, resources,
and exam scores, rural districts have exhibited only
modest gains in completion rates and advancement
Farmer attempting to water crops
Photo courtesy of Food Ethics Council
Lack of resources for schoolchildren
Photo courtesy of USAID
34 - Fall 2011
and networks of support. High student-teacher
ratios, cramped and dilapidated schoolhouses, poor
infrastructure, and a lack of necessary school supplies
threaten to undo many of the notable gains associated
with increased primary school enrollment (Bwonda
2005; UNESCO 2005).
T -

In an eort to transition away from WFP
assistance and create a more sustainable and locally
integrated program, the Ministry of Education began
implementing a Homegrown School Feeding Program
(HGSFP) in July of 2009 (Espejo 2009). is is not the
rst time the government of Kenya has attempted to
institute a federally funded school meals program
through multi-sectoral cooperation. A short-lived
school milk program was introduced in 1980 under
former President Moi in order to simultaneously
increase primary school enrollment and ensure a stable
market for Kenyan dairy producers. e ambitious
initiative that provided free milk to 4.3 million primary
school students failed shortly aer its launch due to high
costs, low accountability, and poor road infrastructure
(Bogonko 1992).
To ensure that the new program does not
meet a similar end, Kenyan policymakers are working
closely with WFP and United Nations representatives
to facilitate a gradual shi of nancial responsibility.
Beginning in 2009, the Kenyan government transferred
over 500,000 primary school children from WFP
programs (mostly from Semi-Arid districts) to HGSFP,
and promised to add 50,000 students each year until
reaching full coverage (Finan 2010). Prior to this
transfer, 71 percent of associated program costs were
provided by WFP, 15 percent were borne by local
communities, and only 14 percent came from the
Kenyan government (Galloway 2009). To guarantee the
success of this new program, the Kenyan government
allocated $5.3 million (along with an additional $2
million from the Japanese government counterpart
fund) in 2009 to subsidize the costs of expansion
(USDA 2009). Even so, with combined annual costs
of the previous program estimated at around $20
million a year (Galloway 2009), the Kenyan Ministry of
Finance must be ready to commit itself to even greater
investment if the government intends to replace WFP
as the main benefactor of school meals in Kenya.
Rather than continuing to rely on WFP agents
to procure foodstus and distribute meals, the new
program transfers cash stipends directly into the bank
accounts of participating schools to be applied to the
program (Finan 2010). e government makes these
cash payments twice a year at the beginning of each
three-month term, with aid amounts determined by
net student enrollment. e government-subsidized
program sets funding levels at nine cents per student
meal, approximately half of what WFP sponsored
programs spend per meal (USDA 2009). Kenyan
policymakers from the ministries of Education, Finance,
and Agriculture, have expressed condence that local
procurement eorts and increased community support
will allow school-feeding programs to survive despite
tighter resources (USDA 2009).
To avoid additional overhead costs associated
with management and distribution expenses, the
government of Kenya has transferred the logistics
of implementation to local School Management
Committees (made up of parents, teachers, and
community members) who are placed in charge of
purchasing food from local farmers, cooperatives, and
traders. Based on eld research, it was observed that:
Community participation and involvement was strong
at every school visited. Each household is asked to
Map of food regions -- Finan (2010)
Legend: Orange=Arid, Yellow=Semi-
Arid, Stripes=HGSFP, Dots=WFP
contribute to the [School Feeding Program], and
typical contributions include rewood, water, cash
for cooks salaries, and salt. When households cannot
contribute, the SMC makes alternative arrangements
purchase of key orphan crops like sorghum, millet,
and cowpeas due to their drought-resistance and ASAL
suitability (MoA 2010). Currently, due to present
system weaknesses, maize still constitutes a majority of
with the family (USDA 2009).
In these ways, the Kenyan government hopes
to integrate schools more fully into rural communities,
provide an economic stimulus for impoverished villages,
boost local agricultural productivity, and establish a
sustainable school meals program independent from
heavy foreign subsidization.
C H
S F P
Critics of the new program cite the fact that
most rural communities in the ASAL do not have the
production supply capability to support a potentially
overwhelming demand for food. According to research
untaken by the USDA with funds provided by the Gates
Foundation:
Without projects or collaboration with
other partners to bolster the supply side of HGSF
Program, the project as currently implemented is a
local procurement project, and not a local production
project. e project schools are in ASALs with limited
production capacity, with 60-70 percent of the food
imported from outside the district. (USDA 2009).
Rural farmers are usually located far away
from key agricultural inputs such as water, fertilizer,
pesticides, and seed, lack adequate large-scale storage
facilities, have little access to aordable bank credit,
and are unable to eciently transport bulk harvests
(MoA 2010). As a result, instead of funneling money
into local communities, many claim that the main
beneciaries of HGSFP are non-local commercial food
traders. Oen, this is not a concern for policymakers
who tend to dene local in more national and even
regional terms (USDA 2009). To protect and foster the
safety net benets associated with small-scale local
agriculture, the Government of Kenya needs to nd ways
to increase the production capabilities of rural farmers.
To address this problem, the Ministry of Agriculture
needs to provide more support in the form of rural
farming grants, infrastructure (roads, storage facilities,
accessible inputs), encouragement of indigenous plant
and animal husbandry, and sustainability reeducation
(Finan 2010). e HGSFP currently encourages the
the food purchased for school meal programs (USDA
2009).
Another point of contention surrounding
HGSFP in rural Kenya is the cost-motivated
prohibition of the purchase of fruit, horticulture, and
livestock products for use within the school feeding
programs. Local communities are currently pushing
for the inclusion of meat in the meal budget to involve
pastoralists who comprise the bulk of the economic
activity in the ASAL (USDA 2009). Incorporating
meat and other livestock products in the school meals
program would go a long way in appeasing pastoralist
groups that may feel marginalized and excluded from
social planning and development initiatives that seem
tailored to exclusively benet agriculturalists (MoA
2010). Since the ASAL is home to a limited number
of productive farmers, more inclusive measures would
certainly serve to increase the food procurement
rates from within vulnerable herding communities.
Additionally, to better support ASAL interests,
policymakers ought to implement a scaled stipend
system that adjusts for regional food scarcity and
price disparities, rather than the current at allowance
(USDA 2009). Under the current system, droughts and
ever rising food costs have threatened the viability of
school meals programs in food-scarce school districts.
A nal point of debate is founded on the fear that
Government school-feeding programs aim to improve
conditions for Kenyan schoolchildren
Photo courtesy of Flikr user angela7dreams
36 - Fall 2011
direct money transfers to poor schools to be managed
by civilian committees could expose the program to
various strains of ineciency and corruption. Within
the impoverished communities of the ASAL, potential
failures could arise from schools reporting articially
inated enrollment numbers, succumbing to bribery
and seller favoritism, and using government funds for
non-meal related ends (Finan 2010). Without proper
training and oversight, some fear that the HGSFP runs
a high risk of falling short of intended goals. However,
SMCs have been in charge of administrational duties
within the Kenyan educational system for decades
(Bogonko 1992). Since the government has historically
only provided funding for teachers salaries and few
other basic expenses, communities have taken the
essential role of raising funds and budgeting for new
textbooks, supplies, and school beautication projects
(Bwonda 2005). In this respect, local communities have
extensive experience in the administrational duties that
would be required from them under HGSFP.
C
e eects of the school meal program on
the wellbeing of rural Kenyans cannot be overstated.
rough providing daily meals, schools are able to
meet immediate food needs, provide future safety
nets, and oer long-term assistance and empowerment
to children, families, and communities. As the WFP
prepares its exit strategy from the region as the
main agent of school feeding, much care should be
undertaken in ensuring that the transitional period
be free of potential crises. If HGSP has a secure
foundation within Kenya with both funds and
management sourced internally, the program will no
longer need to rely on uctuating and oen conditional
donor support (Espejo 2009). In addition, a successful
transfer of the food provision program to the Kenyan
government would foster inter-ministerial cooperation
and involvement and better integrate the program with
a wide range of national and economic goals.
In order to eect lasting positive change in
the lives of Kenyan children, the government must
instate policies that work toward achievable goals. If
the Kenyan government hopes to ensure the success
of Free Primary Education, there must be considerable
and consistent investment in programs that increase
educational access, participation, and quality,
especially among the most vulnerable and historically
marginalized social groups (Vos 2004). In addition to
supporting programs like HGSFP, the ministries of
Education and Agriculture must also invest in rural
infrastructure by building roads and schools, improve
agricultural capabilities by improving irrigation
systems, farming technologies, and indigenous plant
knowledge, and allocate more funds for basic school
supplies and new teachers (UNESCO 2005). Without
these necessary additions to the current system, the
rewards of FPE will remain elusive for a large and
promising segment of the Kenyan population.
W C
Bogonko, Sorobea N. A History of Modern Education in Kenya (1895-
1991). Nairobi, Kenya: Evans Brothers (Kenya), 1992.
Bwonda, Eldah N., and Enos H. Njeru. Primary Education in Kenya:
Access and Policy Implications, 1989-2002. Working paper no. 62.
Nairobi: Institute of Policy Analysis and Research, 2005.
Espejo, Francisco. Home-grown School Feeding: A Framework to Link
School Feeding with Local Agricultural Production. Rome: World
Food Programme, 2009.
Finan, Timothy. Impact Evaluation of WFP School Feeding Programmes
in Kenya (1999-2008): A Mixed-Methods Approach. Rome: World
Food Programme, 2010.
Galal, Osman, ed. Proceedings of the International Workshop on
Articulating the Impact of Nutritional Decits on the Education
for All Agenda. 2nd ed. Vol. 26. Tokyo: International Nutrition
Foundation for the United Nations University, 2005.
Galloway, Rae. School Feeding: Outcomes and Costs. Food and
Nutrition Bulletin, 2009.
Ministry of Agriculture. Agricultural Sector Development Strategy,
2009-2020. Nairobi: Government of Kenya, 2010.
Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology. Report of the Task
Force on Implementation of Free Primary Education. Nairobi:
Government of Kenya, 2003.
Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology. A Policy Framework
for Education, Training, and Research. Nairobi: Government of
Kenya, 2004.
Njeru, Enos H., and John A. Orodho. Access and Participation in
Secondary School Education in Kenya. Working paper no. 37.
Nairobi: Institute of Policy Analysis and Research, 2003.
Regnault De La Mothe, Marc. "Kenya Case Study." Learning from
Experience: Good Practices from 45 Years of School Feeding. World
Food Programme, 2008. 45-47.
UNESCO Nairobi Oce. Challenges of Implementing Free Primary
Education in Kenya: Assessment Report. Nairobi, 2005
USDA Foreign Agricultural Service. Assessment of Local Production for
School Feeding
in Kenya. Oce of Capacity Building and Development, 2009.
Vos, Rob, and Arjun Bedi. Achieving Universal Primary School
Education in Kenya.
Working paper no. 46. Nairobi: Kenya Institute for Public Policy
Research and Analysis, 2004.
Arid conditions pose problems for agriculture
Photo courtesy of Flickr Creative Commons user Carostan
38 - Fall 2011
T
urkeys armed incursion into northern Iraq in
October 2011, mounted in response to deadly
attacks by Kurdish rebels based in semi-
autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan, was the latest indication
of an emerging regional power increasingly condent
of its capacities and sure of its interests. As American
forces withdraw from Iraq and scal constraints compel
a more restrained and less interventionist foreign
policy, the importance of stronger relations with
Middle Eastern partners becomes apparent. Relations
between Washington and Ankara, strengthened by
the existence of a common enemy during the Cold
War, have begun to fray over political dierences
and recognition of the changing power dynamics of
the Middle East. e model relationship touted by
President Obama with regards to Turkey, however, has
more relevance than ever in an increasingly multipolar
region. Finding common ground with Ankara, and
developing a willingness to address Turkish concerns
and accommodate Turkish interests in the ultimate
pursuit of American foreign policy goals, will be critical
to the success of US-led initiatives in the region, and
would indicate a desire on the part of Washington to
forge new relationships to deal with the challenges of
the 21st century.
by Marshall Watkins
Where West meets East:
e Case for a US-Turkish
Special Relationship
-
Stronger relations with Ankara could help
answer some of the most pressing dilemmas confronting
Washington with regards to the Middle East. As
American troops depart from Iraq, the potentially
destabilizing power vacuum, the threat of increased
Iranian inuence in Baghdad runs directly contrary
to Turkish interests. As shown by last the October
2011 incursion into Iraqi Kurdistan, border security
has remained a priority for the Sunni Muslim Ankara
regime; the prospect of an Iraqi Shia government
supporting the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and
other insurgent groups that might destabilize the
frontier would likely be unacceptable.
Although Turkeys willingness to confront
an increasingly assertive Iran is less out of concern
for the intentions of nuclear-armed Iran than for the
ramications of a regional arms race that would likely
ensue, Turkeys position on Iran is suciently aligned
with American interests. Similarly, even if Turkey does
not support United States led sanctions against Iran,
demonstrated by opposition to an American measure
at the UN, the ultimate objective of a regime change in
Tehran remains a common goal
Turkey could serve as a model in the Middle East of a
secular, stable government that respects Islam, but is
not ruled by it. As shown by the rapturous welcomes
aorded Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan in his
post-Arab Spring regional trips, there is hope for
Washington that the Turkish model will indeed prevail
as more Middle Eastern nations gain the chance for
self-determination. e support provided by Turkey
to rebels in the ongoing Syrian rebellions also enjoys
a degree of legitimacy among the rebels and Arab
observers that the US could currently never hope to
replicate.
However, substantial obstacles could hurt the
United States pursuit of closer relations with Turkey.
Ankaras increasingly antagonistic relationship with
Israel and the United States Congressional attempts
to pass a resolution of the Armenian genocide could
cause a deterioration in relations. Even as both parties
seek to develop a comprehensive Middle Eastern peace
settlement, Turkeys insistence on the inclusion of
Hamas, a group identied as a terrorist organization
by both the United States and the European Union,
is an impediment to co-operation. Moreover, the
increasingly autocratic nature of the Justice and
Development Party (AK Party) which has substantially
curtailed individual freedoms, may seem unappealing
to support, especially considering the US historical
links to the secular Turkish military and liberal elites.
Nevertheless, the upcoming years oer an
unusual convergence of interests between Turkey
and the US not only in the Middle East but within
Europe as well. As the Libyan intervention highlighted
NATOs material shortcomings and the US turns
away from unilateral interventions, Turkeys status as
possessing Europes largest military power becomes
increasingly important. Turkeys ongoing desire for
closer aliation with Europe, historically thwarted by
Germany and France, is a subject the US should seek to
advance whenever possible. e alternative would be
an increasingly isolated and alienated Turkey lacking
incentives for future co-operation with the West.
Turkey and the US, while united on broader policy
objectives, diverge on the minutiae and methods in
many cases. Nevertheless, for both nations closer
ties oer means of safeguarding and advancing
their interests in a manner stemming far more from
pragmatism than ideology. e relationship that
emerges in the upcoming years thus has the potential
to be far more enduring and substantial than regional
dynamics might otherwise suggest. e Middle East
remains, and will remain, an area critical to American
interests. us, a re-allocation of resources to a special
relationship with Ankara could eectively serves
American policy goals in the decades to come.
40 - Fall 2011
People gather in Tunis to protest electoral fraud.
by Elizabeth Fair
e Election of Ennahda and
the Future of Tunisian Democracy
http://www.upi.com/News_Photos/News/Protests-against-
electoral-fraud-in-Tunisia/5812/12/?ref=ma
TcN:s:nN Dvmocnncv
O
n October 24, Tunisia held its rst free
election since the Revolution. Demonstrations
in Tunisia began the Arab Spring, and the
country has been a focal point of global attention as
it creates a new government with dignity, enthusiasm,
correctness, and little outside assistance. Described
as a day of festivities and equality, voters waited in
Ennahda has already expressed that women can choose
to wear the veil or not (it had previous been prohibited
in Tunisia). e party will conform to Tunisian visions
of democracy, not the other way around.
More generally liberal political parties ran a close
second in the election, confounding commentators
and challenging them to make sense of votes for both
line for their turn to
cast a ballot. More than
90 percent of registered
voters (about 55 percent
of the population) came
out on Election Day. Apart
from a few small protests
concerning election
fraud, the results were
issued without incident.
e Ennahda Party won
41 percent of the vote, or
90 of the 217 seats in the
Constituent Assembly,
and was charged with the
responsibility of creating
a new constitution.
Congress for the Republic
Islamists and secular
liberals. Tunisian unity
came rst for voters, and
parties that sought to
distance themselves from
Ennahda or discounted
sharing power with the
group suered at the ballot
box. Such parties were
accused of not creating a
strong platform of their
own and attempting to
tap into fears of a hard-
line Islamist state. A
few hundred people did
protest against what they
saw as Ennahdas election
fraud, but most Tunisians
received the next highest number of votes, gaining 30 of
the 217 seats. What do these parties and seat allocation
mean for Tunisias future?
e Ennahda Party, which won the vast majority
of seats, is a moderate Islamist group, sparking fears
among commentators that their inuence will stie
secular liberal freedoms. Many Tunisians, however,
saw their vote for the Ennahda Party as a vote for
honesty and morality, not necessarily for Islamic
reasons. e Islamist party enlisted support from
the more conservative, working class sectors of the
country. e party was banned by the previous regime,
but continued to work with its working class support
base. Islamist parties represent organized opposition,
giving them an immediate advantage in the rst
elections. ey have brand recognition, but that does
not necessarily mean that have an irrevocable mandate
from the people. eir governance of the country will
count for more than their Islamist tendencies. More
female candidates ran in this party than in any of the
others. Following the spirit of the parity law instituted
for this election, every slate was required to be made
up half by females. e spokeswoman for the party is
the Western-educated daughter of the party leader, and
saw this as an opportunity for cooperation in politics,
if not compromise in civil and human rights.
e question remains of how the new
Constituent Assembly will handle the next few steps
into democracy. Tunisians feel a sense of ownership
for their country and will peacefully defend their
freedoms, and the success of this election stands as an
inspiration to the rest of the world. Nevertheless, the
triumph of Ennahda and the parties that chose not to
bring up religion as an issue for the campaign, raises
a troubling issue that the role of religion will remain
a silent deal-breaker, instead of something dened
openly in Tunisias forthcoming constitution. Tunisia
grapples with the legacy of French-inspired civil
rights and more conservative Islamic views that led to
widespread protests of the recent TV showing of the
lm Persepolis. Free religious expression is a priority,
but if it is not acknowledged as an open right instead
of an assumed one, assumptions about morals could
become codied. Turkey has been cited thus far as a
good example of a secular country ruled by an Islamist
party; let us hope that Tunisia takes this example and
fashions it as their own.
Rachid Ghannouch, leader of the Ennahda party
which won Tunisias first free election.
http://blogs.reuters.com/faithworld/tag/tunisia-ghannouchi-islamist-
ennahda-salafist-saudi-wahhabi-election/
42 - Fall 2011
References
i. Cammett, Melani. e Limits of Anti-Islamism in Tunisia.
31 October 2011. Accessed 6 November 2011. http://mideast.
foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/10/31/will_an_islamist_victory_
translate_to_democracy
ii. e Carter Center Answers Your Questions About the Historic
Oct. 23 Tunisia Elections. Oct. 21, 2011. Accessed 6 November
2011. http://www.cartercenter.org/news/features/p/elections/tunisia/
questions.html
iii. Lewis, Aidan. "Prole: Tunisia's Ennahda Party." 25 October 2011.
Accessed 5 November 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
africa-15442859
iv. Muasher, Marwan. Opinion: e Overblown Islamist reat. 2
November 2011. Accessed 6 November 2011. http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/11/03/opinion/the-overblown-islamist-threat.html?_
r=1&ref=tunisia
v. Tunisia. 28 October 2011. Accessed 5 November 2011. http://topics.
nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/tunisia/
index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=tunisia&st=cse
vi. Tunisian Election Extraordinary Achievement, NDI Mission Finds.
24 October 2011. Accessed 6 November 2011. http://www.ndi.org/
tunisia-election-extraordinary-achievement
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