CASES ON DEPOSIT

1. BPI vs. Intermediate Appellate Court GR# L-66826, August 19, 1988 CORTES, J: Facts: Rizaldy T. Zshornack and his wife maintained in COMTRUST a dollar savings account and a peso current account. An application for a dollar drat was accomplished by Virgillo Garcia branch manager of COMTRUST payable to a certain Leovigilda Dizon. In the PPLICtion, Garcia indicated that the amount was to be charged to the dolar savings account of the Zshornacks. There wasa no indication of the name of the purchaser of the dollar draft. Comtrust issued a check payable to the order of Dizon. When Zshornack noticed the withdrawal from his account, he demanded an explainaiton from the bank. In its answer, Comtrust claimed that the peso value of the withdrawal was given to Atty. Ernesto Zshornack, brother of Rizaldy. When he encashed with COMTRUST a cashiers check for P8450 issued by the manila banking corporation payable to Ernesto. Issue: Whether the contract between petitioner and respondent bank is a deposit? Held: The document which embodies the contract states that the US$3,000.00 was received by the bank for safekeeping. The subsequent acts of the parties also show that the intent of the parties was really for the bank to safely keep the dollars and to return it to Zshornack at a later time. Thus, Zshornack demanded the return of the money on May 10, 1976, or over five months later. The above arrangement is that contract defined under Article 1962, New Civil Code, which reads: Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing belonging to another, with the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning the same. If the safekeeping of the thing delivered is not the principal purpose of the contract, there is no deposit but some other contract. 2. TRIPLE-V FOOD SERVICES INC. VS. FILIPINO MECHANTS INSURANCE COMPANY, GR NO. 160554, FEBRUARY 21,2005 Facts: Mary Jo-Anne De Asis dined at petitioners Kamayan Restaurant. De Asis was using a Mitsubishi Galant Super Saloon Model 1995 issued by her employer Crispa Textile Inc., On said date, De Asis availed of the valet parking service of petitioner and entrusted her car key to petitioners valet counter. Afterwards, a certain Madridano, valet attendant, noticed that the car was not in the parking slot and its key is no longer in the box where valet attendants usually keep the keys of cars entrusted to them. The car was never recovered. Thereafter, Crispa filed a claim against its insurer, herein respondent Filipino Merchants Insurance Company Inc. Having indemnified Crispa for the loss of the subject vehicle, FMICI, as subrogee to Crispas rights, filed with the RTC at Makati City an action for damages against petitioner Triple V Food Services Inc., Petitioner claimed that the complaint failed to adduce facts to support the allegations of recklessness and negligence committed in the safekeeping and custody of the subject vehicle. Besides, when De Asis availed the free parking stab which contained a waiver of the petitioners liability in case of loss, she hereby waived her rights. Issue: WON petitioner Triple V Food Services Inc. is liable for the loss Held: The SC ruled in the affirmative. In a contract of deposit, a person receives an object belonging to another with the obligation of safely keeping it and returning the

same. A deposit may be constituted even without any consideration. It is not necessary that the depositary receives a fee before it becomes obligated to keep the item entrusted for safekeeping and to return it later to the depositor. Petitioner cannot evade liability by arguing that neither a contract of deposit nor that of insurance , guaranty or surety for the loss of the car was constituted when De Asis availed of its free valet parking service.

3. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF JARO vs. GREGORIO DE LA PEA G.R. No. L-6913, Nov. 21, 1913, 26 Phil. 144 FACTS : The plaintiff is the trustee of a charitablebequest made for the construction of a leper hospital andthat father Agustin de la Pea was the duly authorizedrepresentative of the plaintiff to receive the legacy. Thedefendant is the administrator of the estate of Father Dela Pea.In the year 1898 the books Father De la Pea, astrustee, showed that he had on hand as such trustee thesum of P6,641, collected by him for the charitablepurposes aforesaid. In the same year he deposited in hispersonal account P19,000 in the Hongkong andShanghai Bank at Iloilo. Shortly thereafter and during thewar of the revolution, Father De la Pea was arrested bythe military authorities as a political prisoner, and whilethus detained made an order on said bank in favor of theUnited States Army officer under whose charge he thenwas for the sum thus deposited in said bank. The arrestof Father De la Pea and the confiscation of the funds inthe bank were the result of the claim of the militaryauthorities that he was an insurgent and that the fundsthus deposited had been collected by him for revolutionary purposes. The money was taken from thebank by the military authorities by virtue of such order,was confiscated and turned over to the Government.While there is considerable dispute in the case over thequestion whether the P6,641 of trust funds was includedin the P19,000 deposited as aforesaid, nevertheless, acareful examination of the case leads us to theconclusion that said trust funds were a part of the fundsdeposited and which were removed and confiscated bythe military authorities of the United States ISSUE: Whether or not Father de la Pea is liable for the loss of the money under his trust? RULINGS : The court, therefore, finds and declares thatthe money which is the subject matter of this action wasdeposited by Father De la Pea in the Hongkong andShanghai Banking Corporation of Iloilo; that said moneywas forcibly taken from the bank by the armed forces of the United States during the war of the insurrection; andthat said Father De la Pea was not responsible for itsloss.Father De la Pea's liability is determined by thoseportions of the Civil Code which relate to obligations.(Book 4, Title 1.)Although the Civil Code states that "a person obliged togive something is also bound to preserve it with thediligence pertaining to a good father of a family" (art.1094), it also provides, following the principle of theRoman law, major casus est, cui humana infirmitas resistere non potest , that "no one shall be liable for events which could not be foreseen, or which havingbeen foreseen were inevitable, with the exception of thecases expressly mentioned in the law or those in whichthe obligation so declares." (Art. 1105.)By placing the money in the bank and mixing it with hispersonal funds De la Pea did not thereby assume anobligation different from that under which he would havelain if such deposit had not been made, nor did hethereby make himself liable to repay the money at allhazards. If the had been forcibly taken from his pocket or from his house by the military forces of one of thecombatants during a state of war, it is clear that under the provisions of the Civil Code he would have beenexempt from responsibility. The fact that he placed thetrust fund in the bank in his personal account does notadd to his responsibility. Such deposit did not make hima debtor who must respond at all hazards

4. CA Agro-Industrial vs CA and Security Bank and Trust Company G.R. No. 90027 March 3, 1993, 219 SCRA 426 Facts Petitioner (through its President) purchased 2 parcels of land from spouses Pugao for P350 K with a downpayment of P75 K. Per agreement, the land titles will be transferred upon full payment and will be placed in a safety deposit box (SBDB) of any bank. Moreover, the same could be withdrawn only upon the joint signatures of a representative of the Petitioner and the Pugaos upon full payment of the purchase price. Thereafter, Petitioner and spouses placed the titles in SDB of Respondent Security Bank and signed a lease contract which substantially states that the Bank will not assume liability for the contents of the SDB. Subsequently, 2 renter's keys were given to the renters one to the Petitioner and the other to the Pugaos. A guard key remained in the possession of the Respondent Bank. The SDB can only be opened using these 2 keys simultaneously. Afterwards, a certain Mrs. Ramos offered to buy from the Petitioner the 2 lots that would yield a profit of P285K. Mrs. Ramos demanded the execution of a deed of sale which necessarily entailed the production of the certificates of title. Thus, Petitioner with the spouses went to Respondent Bank to retrieve the titles. However, when opened in the presence of the Bank's representative, the SDB yielded no such certificates. Because of the delay in the reconstitution of the title, Mrs. Ramos withdrew her earlier offer to purchase the lots; as a consequence, the Petitioner allegedly failed to realize the expected profit of P285K. Hence, Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against Respondent Bank. Lower courts ruled in favour of Respondent Bank. Thus, this petition.

Issues: 1. Whether or not the disputed contract is an ordinary contract of lease? 2. Whether or not the provisions of the cited contract are valid? 3. Whether or not Respondent Bank is liable for damages? Ruling: 1. No. SC ruled that it is a special kind of deposit because: the full and absolute possession and control of the SDB was not given to the joint renters the Petitioner and the Pugaos. The guard key of the box remained with the Respondent Bank; without this key, neither of the renters could open the box and vice versa. In this case, the said key had a duplicate which was made so that both renters could have access to the box. Moreover, the renting out of the SDBs is not independent from, but related to or in conjunction with, the principal function of a contract of deposit the receiving in custody of funds, documents and other valuable objects for safekeeping. 2. NO. SC opined that it is void. Generally, the Civil Code provides that the depositary (Respondent Bank) would be liable if, in performing its obligation, it is found guilty of fraud, negligence, delay or contravention of the tenor of the agreement. In the absence of any stipulation, the diligence of a good father of a family is to be observed.

Hence, any stipulation exempting the depositary from any liability arising from the loss of the thing deposited on account of fraud, negligence or delay would be void for being contrary to law and public policy (which is present in the disputed contract) Said provisions are inconsistent with the Respondent Bank's responsibility as a depositary under Section 72(a) of the General Banking Act.

3. NO. SC ruled that: no competent proof was presented to show that Respondent Bank was aware of the private agreement between the Petitioner and the Pugaos that the Land titles were withdrawable from the SDB only upon both parties' joint signatures, and that no evidence was submitted to reveal that the loss of the certificates of title was due to the fraud or negligence of the Respondent Bank.

YHT Realty Corp, et al vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 126780. February 17, 2005
Facts: MAURICE McLaughlin is an Australian national who comes to the Philippines for business.
During his trips he stays in Tropicana Copacobana, a hotel recommended to him by Brunhilda Tan. McLaughlin deposited cash (American and Australian dollars) and jewelry to the safety deposit box of the Hotel. The safety deposit box cannot be opened unless the key of the guest and that of the management are present. Lainez and Payam are employees of Tropicana who is charged with the custody of the keys. Thereafter, McLaughlin found out that some of the money and jewelry he deposited were missing. Lainez and Payam admitted that they assisted Tan to open his deposit box. Tan admitted that she stole McLaughlins keys. Tan executed a promissory note to cover the amount of the stolen money and jewelry. McLaughlin wanted to make the management liable. Issue: Whether or not a hotel may evade liability for the loss of items left with it for safekeeping by its guests, by having these guests execute written waivers holding the establishment or its employees free from blame for such loss in light of Article 2003 of the Civil Code which voids such waivers. Held: The issue of whether the Undertaking For The Use of Safety Deposit Box executed by McLoughlin is tainted with nullity presents a legal question appropriate for resolution in this petition. Notably, both the trial court and the appellate court found the same to be null and void. We find no reason to reverse their common conclusion. Article 2003 is controlling, thus: Art. 2003. The hotelkeeper cannot free himself from responsibility by posting notices to the effect that he is not liable for the articles brought by the guest. Any stipulation between the hotel-keeper and the guest whereby the responsibility of the former as set forth in Articles 1998 to 2001[37] is suppressed or diminished shall be void. Article 2003 was incorporated in the New Civil Code as an expression of public policy precisely to apply to situations such as that presented in this case. The hotel business like the common carriers business is imbued with public interest. Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for hotel guests and security to their persons and belongings. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the business. The law in turn does not allow such duty to the public to be negated or diluted by any contrary stipulation in so-called undertakings that ordinarily appear in prepared forms imposed by hotel keepers on guests for their signature. Under the law, the hotel-keeper cannot free himself from responsibility by posting notices to the effect that he is not liable for the articles brought by the guest. Any stipulation between the hotel-keeper and the guest whereby the responsibility of the former as set forth in Articles 1998 to 2001 is suppressed or diminished shall be void. (Art. 2003, NCC).Article 2003 was incorporated in the New Civil Code as an expression of public policy precisely. The hotel business like the common carriers business is imbued with public interest. Catering to the public, hotel-keepers are bound to provide not only lodging for hotel guests and security to their persons and belongings. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the business. The law in turn does not allow such duty to the public to be negated or diluted by any contrary stipulation in so-called undertakings that ordinarily appear in prepared forms imposed by hotel-keepers on guests for their signature. (YHT Realty Corp. v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 126780, February 17, 2005).