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GENERAL PRICIPLES VALIDITY OF PENAL STATUTES

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 167011 April 30, 2008

false and untruthful representations in violation of Section 1011 of Republic Act Nos. 8189, by indicating therein that they are residents of 935 San Jose Street, Burauen, Leyte, when in truth and in fact, they were and still are residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa Street, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City, and registered voters of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City, Precinct No. 4419-A, as evidenced by Voter Registration Record Nos. 26195824 and 26195823; and that petitioners, knowing fully well said truth, intentionally and willfully, did not fill the blank spaces in said applications corresponding to the length of time which they have resided in Burauen, Leyte. In fine, private respondent charged petitioners, to wit: Respondent-spouses, Carlos Sison Romualdez and Erlinda Reyes Romualdez committed and consummated election offenses in violation of our election laws, specifically, Sec. 261, paragraph (y), subparagraph (2), for knowingly making any false or untruthful statements relative to any data or information required in the application for registration, and of Sec. 261, paragraph (y), subparagraph (5), committed by any person who, being a registered voter, registers anew without filing an application for cancellation of his previous registration, both of the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881), and of Sec. 12, RA 8189 (Voter Registration Act) for failure to apply for transfer of registration records due to change of residence to another city or municipality."12 The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be conducted by the COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the corresponding Information against petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the prosecution of the same. Petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss13 dated 2 April 2001. They contended therein that they did not make any false or untruthful statements in their application for registration. They avowed that they intended to reside in Burauen, Leyte, since the year 1989. On 9 May 2000, they took actual residence in Burauen, Leyte, by leasing for five (5) years, the house of Juanito and Fe Renomeron at No. 935, San Jose Street in Burauen, Leyte. On even date, the Barangay District III Council of Burauen passed a Resolution of Welcome, expressing therein its gratitude and appreciation to petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez for choosing the Barangay as his official residence.14 On 28 November 2003, Atty. Maria Norina S. Tangaro-Casingal, COMELEC Investigating Officer, issued a Resolution, recommending to the COMELEC Law Department (Investigation and Prosecution Division), the filing of the appropriate Information against petitioners, disposing, thus: PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Law Department (Investigation and Prosecution Division), RECOMMENDS to file the necessary information against Carlos Sison Romualdez before the proper Regional Trial Court for violation of Section 10 (g) and (j) in relation to Section 45 (j) of Republic Act 8189 and to authorize the Director IV of

SPOUSES CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ and ERLINDA R. ROMUALDEZ, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DENNIS GARAY, respondents. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: This treats of the Petition for Review on Certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by petitioners Spouses Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda R. Romualdez seeking to annul and set aside the Resolutions, dated 11 June 20041 and 27 January 20052 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in E.O. Case No. 2000-36. In the Resolution of 11 June 2004, the COMELEC En Bancdirected the Law Department to file the appropriate Information with the proper court against petitioners Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez for violation of Section 10(g) and (j)3 in relation to Section 45(j)4 of Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as The Voters Registration Act of 1996.5 Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration thereon was denied. The factual antecedents leading to the instant Petition are presented hereunder: On 12 July 2000, private respondent Dennis Garay, along with Angelino Apostol6 filed a Complaint-Affidavit7 with the COMELEC thru the Office of the Election Officer in Burauen, Leyte, charging petitioners with violation of Section 261(y)(2)8 and Section 261(y)(5)9 of the Omnibus Election Code, similarly referred to as Batas Pambansa Blg. 881; and Section 1210 of Republic Act No. 8189. Private respondent deposed, inter alia, that: petitioners are of legal ages and residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa Street, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City; on 9 May 2000 and 11 May 2000, petitioners Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda R. Romualdez, applied for registration as new voters with the Office of the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte, as evidenced by Voter Registration Record Nos. 42454095 and 07902952, respectively; in their sworn applications, petitioners made

the Law Department to designate a Comelec Prosecutor to handle the prosecution of the case with the duty to submit periodic report after every hearing of the case.15 On 11 June 2004, the COMELEC En Banc found no reason to depart from the recommendatory Resolution of 28 November 2003, and ordered, viz: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Law Department is hereby directed to file the appropriate information with the proper court against respondents CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ AND ERLINDA ROMUALDEZ for violation of Section 10 (g) and (j) in relation to Section 45 (j) of the Republic Act No. 8189.16 Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereon. Acting on the Motion, the COMELEC found no cogent reason to disturb the assailed En Banc Resolution of 11 June 2004,17 rationalizing, thus: However, perusal of the records reveal (sic) that the arguments and issues raised in the Motion for Reconsideration are merely a rehash of the arguments advanced by the Respondents in [their] Memorandum received by the Law Department on 17 April 2001, the same [w]as already considered by the Investigating Officer and was discussed in her recommendation which eventually was made as the basis for the En Bancs resolution. As aptly observed by the Investigating Officer, the filing of request for the cancellation and transfer of Voting Registration Record does not automatically cancel the registration records. The fact remains that at the time of application for registration as new voter of the herein Respondents on May 9 and 11, 2001 in the Office of Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte their registration in Barangay 4419-A, Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame Quezon City was still valid and subsisting.18 On 12 January 2006, Alioden D. Dalaig, Director IV, Law Department of the COMELEC filed with the RTC, Burauen, Leyte, separate Informations against petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez19 for violation of Section 10(g), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, and against petitioner Erlinda R. Romualdez20 for violation of Section 10(g), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, subsequently docketed as Crim. Case No. BN-06-03-4185 and Crim. Case No. BN06-03-4183, respectively. Moreover, separate Informations for violation of Section 10(j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 were filed against petitioners.21 Hence, petitioners come to us via the instant Petition, submitting the following arguments: I

RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION; and II COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT PREMISED ITS RESOLUTION ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND FAILED TO CONSIDER CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS THAT WOULD JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION.22 On 4 May 2006, petitioners filed a Motion Reiterating Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to Cite for Indirect Contempt,23 alleging that two separate Informations, both dated 12 January 2006, were filed with the RTC by the COMELEC against petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez for violation of Section 10(j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, in Criminal Case No. BN-06-03-9184; and for violation of Section 10(g), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, in Criminal Case No. BN-06-03-9185. Similarly, the Motion alleged that the COMELEC filed with the RTC, two separate Informations, both dated 12 January 2006, against petitioner Erlinda R. Romualdez, charging her with the same offenses as those charged against petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez, and thereafter, docketed as Criminal Case No. BN-06-03-9182, and No. BN-06-03-9183. On 20 June 2006, this Court issued a Resolution24 denying for lack of merit petitioners Motion Reiterating Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to Cite for Indirect Contempt. We shall now resolve, in seriatim, the arguments raised by petitioners. Petitioners contend that the election offenses for which they are charged by private respondent are entirely different from those which they stand to be accused of before the RTC by the COMELEC. According to petitioners, private respondents complaint charged them for allegedly violating, to wit: 1) Section 261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code, and 2) Section 12 of the Voters Registration Act; however, the COMELEC En Banc directed in the assailed Resolutions, that they be charged for violations of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of the Voters Registration Act. Essentially, petitioners are of the view that they were not accorded due process of law. Specifically, their right to refute or submit documentary evidence against the new charges which COMELEC ordered to be filed against them. Moreover, petitioners insist that Section 45(j) of the Voters Registration Act is vague as it does not refer to a definite provision of the law, the violation of which would constitute an election offense; hence, it runs contrary to Section 14(1)25 and Section 14(2),26 Article III of the 1987 Constitution. We are not persuaded.

First. The Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent with the COMELEC is couched in a language which embraces the allegations necessary to support the charge for violation of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189. A reading of the relevant laws is in order, thus: Section 10(g) and Section 10(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, provide as follows: SEC. 10 Registration of Voters. - A qualified voter shall be registered in the permanent list of voters in a precinct of the city or municipality wherein he resides to be able to vote in any election. To register as a voter, he shall personally accomplish an application form for registration as prescribed by the Commission in three (3) copies before the Election Officer on any date during office hours after having acquired the qualifications of a voter. The application shall contain the following data: xxxx (g) Periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration; xxxx (j) A statement that the application is not a registered voter of any precinct; The application for registration shall contain three (3) specimen signatures of the applicant, clear and legible rolled prints of his left and right thumbprints, with four identification size copies of his latest photograph, attached thereto, to be taken at the expense of the Commission. Before the applicant accomplishes his application for registration, the Election Officer shall inform him of the qualifications and disqualifications prescribed by law for a voter, and thereafter, see to it that the accomplished application contains all the data therein required and that the applicants specimen signatures, fingerprints, and photographs are properly affixed in all copies of the voters application. Moreover, Section 45(j) of the same Act, recites, thus: SEC. 45. Election Offense. The following shall be considered election offenses under this Act: xxxx (j) Violation of any of the provisions of this Act.

Significantly, the allegations in the Complaint-Affidavit which was filed with the Law Department of the COMELEC, support the charge directed by the COMELEC En Banc to be filed against petitioners with the RTC. Even a mere perusal of the Complaint-Affidavit would readily show that Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8189 was specifically mentioned therein. On the matter of the acts covered by Section 10(g) and (j), the Complaint-Affidavit, spells out the following allegations, to wit: 5. Respondent-spouses made false and untruthful representations in their applications (Annexes "B" and "C") in violation of the requirements of Section 10, RA 8189 (The Voters Registration Act): 5.1 Respondent-spouses, in their sworn applications (Annexes "B" and "C", claimed to be residents of 935 San Jose [S]treet, Burauen, Leyte, when in truth and in fact, they were and still are residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa [S]treet, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City and registered voters of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City, Precinct No. 4419-A, a copy of the Certification issued by Hon. Emmanuel V. Gozon, Punong Barangay, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City is hereto attached and made an integral part hereof, as Annex "D"; 5.2 Respondent-spouses knowing fully well said truth, intentionally and willfully, did not fill the blank spaces in their applications (Annexes "B" and "C") corresponding to the length of time they have resided in Burauen, Leyte; 6. Respondent-spouses, in (sic) all intents and purposes, were and still are residents and registered voters of Quezon City, as evidenced by Voter Registration Record Nos. 26195824 and 26195823, respectively; photocopies of which are hereto attached as Annexes "E" and "F"[.] Likewise, attached is a "Certification" (Annex "G") of Ms. Evelyn B. Bautista, Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Election Officer, Fourth District, Quezon City, dated May 31, 2000, together with a certified copy of the computer print-out of the list of voters of Precinct No. 4419-A (Annex "G-1" ) containing the names of voters Carlos Romualdez and Erlinda Reyes Romualdez. The Certification reads as follows: "THIS IS TO CERTIFY that as per office record MR. CARLOS ROMUALDEZ and MS. ERLINDA REYES ROMUALDEZ are registered voters of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City, Precinct Number 4419A with voters affidavit serial nos. 26195824 and 26195823, respectively. This certification is issued for whatever legal purpose it may serve." 7. Respondent-spouses, registered as new voters of the Municipality of Burauen, Leyte, [in spite of] the fact that they were and still are, registered voters of Quezon City as early as June 22, 1997; 7.1 That, Double Registration is an election offense.

A person qualified as a voter is only allowed to register once. If a person registers anew as a voter in spite of a subsisting registration, the new application for registration will be disapproved. The registrant is also liable not only for an election offense of double registration, but also for another election offense of knowingly making any false or untruthful statement relative to any data or information required in the application for registration. In fact, when a person applies for registration as a voter, he or she fills up a Voter Registration Record form in his or her own handwriting, which contains a Certification which reads: "I do solemnly swear that the above statements regarding my person are true and correct; that I possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications of a voter; that the thumbprints, specimen signatures and photographs appearing herein are mine; and that I am not registered as a voter in any other precinct."27 Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on the claim that the election offenses charged against them by private respondent are entirely different from those for which they stand to be accused of before the RTC, as charged by the COMELEC. In the first place, there appears to be no incongruity between the charges as contained in the Complaint-Affidavit and the Informations filed before the RTC, notwithstanding the denomination by private respondent of the alleged violations to be covered by Section 261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 12 of Republic Act No. 8189. Evidently, the Informations directed to be filed by the COMELEC against petitioners, and which were, in fact, filed with the RTC, were based on the same set of facts as originally alleged in the private resp ondents Complaint-Affidavit. Petitioners buttress their claim of lack of due process by relying on the case of Lacson v. Executive Secretary.28Citing Lacson, petitioners argue that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined by the actual recital of facts in the Complaint or Information; and that the object of such written accusations was to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him, as will enable him to make his defense. Let it be said that, inLacson, this court resolved the issue of whether under the allegations in the subject Informations therein, it is the Sandiganbayan or the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the multiple murder case against therein petitioner and intervenors. In Lacson, we underscored the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the Complaint or Information, and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial.29 Indeed, in Lacson, we articulated that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the Information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the Complaint or Information.30

Petitioners reliance on Lacson, however, does not support their claim of lack of due process because, as we have said, the charges contained in private respondents Complaint-Affidavit and the charges as directed by the COMELEC to be filed are based on the same set of facts. In fact, the nature of the criminal charges in private respondents Complaint-Affidavit and that of the charges contained in the Informations filed with the RTC, pursuant to the COMELEC Resolution En Banc are the same, such that, petitioners cannot claim that they were not able to refute or submit documentary evidence against the charges that the COMELEC filed with the RTC. Petitioners were afforded due process because they were granted the opportunity to refute the allegations in private respondents Complaint-Affidavit. On 2 April 2001, in opposition to the Complaint-Affidavit, petitioners filed a Joint CounterAffidavit with Motion to Dismiss with the Law Department of the COMELEC. They similarly filed a Memorandum before the said body. Finding that due process was not dispensed with under the circumstances in the case at bar, we agree with the stance of the Office of the Solicitor General that petitioners were reasonably apprised of the nature and description of the charges against them. It likewise bears stressing that preliminary investigations were conducted whereby petitioners were informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against them. They were given the opportunity to adduce controverting evidence for their defense. In all these stages, petitioners actively participated. The instant case calls to our minds Orquinaza v. People,31 wherein the concerned police officer therein designated the offense charged as sexual harassment; but, the prosecutor found that there was no transgression of the anti-sexual harassment law, and instead, filed an Information charging therein petitioner with acts of lasciviousness. On a claim that there was deprivation of due process, therein petitioner argued that the Information for acts of lasciviousness was void as the preliminary investigation conducted was for sexual harassment. The court held that the designation by the police officer of the offense is not conclusive as it is within the competence of the prosecutor to assess the evidence submitted and determine therefrom the appropriate offense to be charged. Accordingly, the court pronounced that the complaint contained all the allegations to support the charge of acts of lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code; hence, the conduct of another preliminary investigation for the offense of acts of lasciviousness would be a futile exercise because the complainant would only be presenting the same facts and evidence which have already been studied by the prosecutor.32 The court frowns upon such superfluity which only serves to delay the prosecution and disposition of the criminal complaint.33 Second. Petitioners would have this court declare Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 vague, on the ground that it contravenes the fair notice requirement of the 1987 Constitution, in particular, Section 14(1) and Section 14(2), Article III of thereof. Petitioners submit that Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 makes no reference to

a definite provision of the law, the violation of which would constitute an election offense. We are not convinced. The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.34 However, this Court has imposed certain limitations by which a criminal statute, as in the challenged law at bar, may be scrutinized. This Court has declared that facial invalidation35 or an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate.36 We have so enunciated in no uncertain terms in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 37 thus: In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that 'one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.' As has been pointed out, 'vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant.'" (underscoring supplied) "To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on the ground of ambiguity." While mentioned in passing in some cases, the void-for-vagueness concept has yet to find direct application in our jurisdiction. In Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, the Bookkeeping Act was found unconstitutional because it violated the equal protection clause, not because it was vague. Adiong v. Comelec decreed as void a mere Comelec Resolution, not a statute. Finally, Santiago v. Comelec held that a portion of RA 6735 was unconstitutional because of undue delegation of legislative powers, not because of vagueness. Indeed, an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a mass acquittal of parties whose cases may not have even reached the courts. Such invalidation would constitute a departure from the usual requirement of "actual case and controversy" and permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context having no factual concreteness. In Younger v. Harris, this evil was aptly pointed out by the U.S. Supreme Court in these words: "[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed

statutes, x x x ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided." For this reason, generally disfavored is an on-its-face invalidation of statutes, described as a "manifestly strong medicine" to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort." In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions that have allegedly been violated must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant has been charged. (Emphasis supplied.) At the outset, we declare that under these terms, the opinions of the dissent which seek to bring to the fore the purported ambiguities of a long list of provisions in Republic Act No. 8189 can be deemed as a facial challenge. An appropriate "as applied" challenge in the instant Petition should be limited only to Section 45 (j) in relation to Sections 10 (g) and (j) of Republic Act No. 8189 the provisions upon which petitioners are charged. An expanded examination of the law covering provisions which are alien to petitioners case would be antagonistic to the rudiment that for judicial review to be exercised, there must be an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, and not conjectural or anticipatory. We further quote the relevant ruling in David v. Arroyo on the proscription anent a facial challenge:38 Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that "reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct." Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered "harmful" and "constitutionally unprotected conduct." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, it was held: It remains a matter of no little difficulty to determine when a law may properly be held void on its face and when such summary action is inappropriate. But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from pure speech toward conduct and that conduct even if expressive falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only "spoken words" and again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.

Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as "manifestly strong medicine," to be used "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is "generally disfavored;" The reason for this is obvious. Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to challenge a law on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations not before the Court. A writer and scholar in Constitutional Law explains further: The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad laws "very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties. In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require the Court to examine PP 1017 and pinpoint its flaws and defects, not on the basis of its actual operation to petitioners, but on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the Court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression. Xxx xxx xxx And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists. Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness. This, too, is unwarranted. Related to the "overbreadth" doctrine is the "void for vagueness doctrine" which holds that "a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." It is subject to the same principles governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a

litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. Be that as it may, the test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice.39 This Court has similarly stressed that the vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.40 As structured, Section 4541 of Republic Act No. 8189 makes a recital of election offenses under the same Act. Section 45(j) is, without doubt, crystal in its specification that a violation of any of the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189 is an election offense. The language of Section 45(j) is precise. The challenged provision renders itself to no other interpretation. A reading of the challenged provision involves no guesswork. We do not see herein an uncertainty that makes the same vague. Notably, herein petitioners do not cite a word in the challenged provision, the import or meaning of which they do not understand. This is in stark contrast to the case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan42 where therein petitioner sought for statutory definition of particular words in the challenged statute. Even then, the Court in Estrada rejected the argument. This Court reasoned: The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law." Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words. The intention of the lawmakers who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Perforce, this Court has underlined that an act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.43

The evident intent of the legislature in including in the catena of election offenses the violation of any of the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, is to subsume as punishable, not only the commission of proscribed acts, but also the omission of acts enjoined to be observed. On this score, the declared policy of Republic Act No. 8189 is illuminating. The law articulates the policy of the State to systematize the present method of registration in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters. A reading of Section 45 (j) conjointly with the provisions upon which petitioners are charged, i.e., Sections 10 (g) and (j) would reveal that the matters that are required to be set forth under the aforesaid sections are crucial to the achievement of a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters. The factual information required by the law is sought not for mere embellishment. There is a definitive governmental purpose when the law requires that such facts should be set forth in the application. The periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration delve into the matter of residency, a requisite which a voter must satisfy to be deemed a qualified voter and registered in the permanent list of voters in a precinct of the city or municipality wherein he resides. Of even rationality exists in the case of the requirement in Section 10 (j), mandating that the applicant should state that he/she is not a registered voter of any precinct. Multiple voting by so-called flying voters are glaring anomalies which this country strives to defeat. The requirement that such facts as required by Section 10 (g) and Section 10 (j) be stated in the voters application form for registration is directly relevant to the right of suffrage, which the State has the right to regulate. It is the opportune time to allude to the case of People v. Gatchalian44 where the therein assailed law contains a similar provision as herein assailed before us. Republic Act No. 602 also penalizes any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of the Act. The Court dismissed the challenged, and declared the provision constitutional. The Court in Gatchalian read the challenged provision, "any of the provisions of this [A]ct" conjointly with Section 3 thereof which was the pertinent portion of the law upon which therein accused was prosecuted. Gatchalian considered the terms as all-embracing; hence, the same must include what is enjoined in Section 3 thereof which embodies the very fundamental purpose for which the law has been adopted. This Court ruled that the law by legislative fiat intends to punish not only those expressly declared unlawful but even those not so declared but are clearly enjoined to be observed to carry out the fundamental purpose of the law.45 Gatchalian remains good law, and stands unchallenged. It also does not escape the mind of this Court that the phraseology in Section 45(j) is employed by Congress in a number of our laws.46 These provisions have not been declared unconstitutional. Moreover, every statute has in its favor the presumption of validity.47 To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative.48 We hold that petitioners

failed to overcome the heavy presumption in favor of the law. Its constitutionality must be upheld in the absence of substantial grounds for overthrowing the same. A salient point. Courts will refrain from touching upon the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota. In the case at bar, the lis mota is the alleged grave abuse of discretion of the COMELEC in finding probable cause for the filing of criminal charges against petitioners. Third. Petitioners maintain that the COMELEC En Banc, premised its finding on a misapprehension of facts, and committed grave abuse of discretion in directing the filing of Informations against them with the RTC. We are once again unimpressed. The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the COMELEC finds statutory expression under Section 26549 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code.50 The task of the COMELEC whenever any election offense charge is filed before it is to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case, and make a determination of probable cause. Under Section 8(b), Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the investigating officer makes a determination of whether there is a reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed.51 In Baytan v. COMELEC,52 this Court, sufficiently elucidated on the matter of probable cause in the prosecution of election offenses, viz: It is also well-settled that the finding of probable cause in the prosecution of election offenses rests in the COMELEC's sound discretion. The COMELEC exercises the constitutional authority to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases for violation of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offense and malpractices. Generally, the Court will not interfere with such finding of the COMELEC absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. This principle emanates from the COMELEC's exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election laws and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided by law.53 It is succinct that courts will not substitute the finding of probable cause by the COMELEC in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.54 According to the COMELEC En Banc, the investigating officer, in the case at bar, held that there was sufficient cause for the filing of criminal charges against petitioners, and found no reason to depart therefrom. Without question, on May 9 and 11 of 2001, petitioners applied for registration as new voters with the Office of the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte, notwithstanding the existence of petitioners registration records as

registered voters of Precinct No. 4419-A of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City. The directive by the COMELEC which affirmed the Resolution55 of 28 November 2000 of Investigating Officer Atty. Tangaro-Casingal does not appear to be wanting in factual basis, such that a reasonably prudent man would conclude that there exists probable cause to hold petitioners for trial. Thus, in the aforesaid Resolution, the Investigating Officer, found: A violation therefore of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8189 is an election offense. In the instant case, when respondents Carlos Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez filed their respective applications for registration as new voters with the Office of the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte on May 9 and 11, 2001, respectively, they stated under oath that they are not registered voters in other precinct (VRR Nos. 42454095 and 07902941). However, contrary to their statements, records show they are still registered voters of Precinct No. 4419-A, barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City, as per VRR Nos. 26195825 and 26195823. In other words, respondents registration records in Quezon City is (sic) still in existence. While it may be true that respondents had written the City Election Officer of District IV, Quezon City for cancellation of their voters registration record as voters (sic) therein, they cannot presume that the same will be favorably acted upon. Besides, RA 8189 provides for the procedure in cases of transfer of residence to another city/municipality which must be complied with, to wit: "Section 12. Change of Residence to Another City or Municipality. Any registered voter who has transferred residence to another city or municipality may apply with the Election Officer of his new residence for the transfer of his registration records. The application for transfer of registration shall be subject to the requirements of notice and hearing and the approval of the Election Registration Board, in accordance with this Act. Upon approval, of the application for transfer, and after notice of such approval to the Election Officer of their former residence of the voter, said Election Officer shall transmit by registered mail the voters registratio n record to the Election Officer of the voters new residence." They cannot claim ignorance of the abovestated provision on the procedure for transfer of registration records by reason of transferred new residence to another municipality. Based on the affidavit executed by one Eufemia S. Cotoner, she alleged that the refusal of the Assistant Election Officer Ms. Estrella Perez to accept the letter of respondents was due to improper procedure because respondents should have filed the required request for transfer with the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte. Despite this knowledge, however, they proceeded to register as new voters of Burauen, Leyte, notwithstanding the existence of their previous registrations in Quezon City.

In their subsequent affidavit of Transfer of Voters Registration under Section 12 of Republic Act 8189, respondents admitted that they erroneously filed an application as a new voter (sic) with the office of the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte, by reason of an honest mistake, which they now desire to correct. (underscoring ours). Respondents lose sight of the fact that a statutory offense, such as violation of election law, is mala prohibita. Proof of criminal intent is not necessary. Good faith, ignorance or lack of malice is beside the point. Commission of the act is sufficient. It is the act itself that is punished. xxxx In view of the foregoing, the Law Department respectfully submits that there is probable cause to hold respondents Carlos Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez for trial in violation of Section 10(g) and (j) in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189. There is no doubt that they applied for registration as new voters of Burauen, Leyte consciously, freely and voluntarily.56 We take occasion to reiterate that the Constitution grants to the COMELEC the power to prosecute cases or violations of election laws. Article IX (C), Section 2 (6) of the 1987 Constitution, provides: (6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and where appropriate, prosecute cases or violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices. This power to prosecute necessarily involves the power to determine who shall be prosecuted, and the corollary right to decide whom not to prosecute.57 Evidently, must this power to prosecute also include the right to determine under which laws prosecution will be pursued. The courts cannot dictate the prosecution nor usurp its discretionary powers. As a rule, courts cannot interfere with the prosecutors discretion and control of the criminal prosecution.58 Its rationale cannot be doubted. For the business of a court of justice is to be an impartial tribunal, and not to get involved with the success or failure of the prosecution to prosecute.59 Every now and then, the prosecution may err in the selection of its strategies, but such errors are not for neutral courts to rectify, any more than courts should correct the blunders of the defense.60 Fourth. In People v. Delgado,61 this Court said that when the COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of an election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the Information in the proper court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of said case must be subject to the approval of the court. The records show that Informations charging petitioners with violation of

Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 had been filed with the RTC. The case must, thus, be allowed to take its due course. It may be recalled that petitioners prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before this Court to restrain the COMELEC from executing its Resolutions of 11 June 2004 and 27 January 2005. In a Resolution dated 20 June 2006, this Court En Banc denied for lack of merit petitioners Motion Reiterating Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to Cite for Indirect Contempt. Logically, the normal course of trial is expected to have continued in the proceedings a quo. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed Resolutions, dated 11 June 2004 and 27 January 2005 of the COMELEC En Banc are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. Title: Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council SCRA Citation: 632 SCRA 146 Date Promulgated: October 5, 2010

Chairperson Eduardo Ermita Vice-Chair Raul Gonzales Acting Defense Secretary Alberto Romulo National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales DILG Secretary Ronaldo Puno Finance Secretary MargaritoTeves AFP Chief of Staff General HermogenesEsperon PNP Chief General Oscar Calderon PGMA Support agencies of the Anti-Terrorism Council, namely: National Intelligence Coordinating Agency NBI Bureau of Immigration Office of Civil Defense Intelligence Service of the AFP Anti-Money Laundering Center Philippine Center on Transnational Crime PNP intelligence and investigative elements

FACTS: This case consists of 6 petitions challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism, aka Human Security Act of 2007. Petitioner-organizations assert locus standion the basis of being suspected communist fronts by the government, whereas individual petitioners invoke the transcendental importance doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers.

Petitioners: This is a consolidation of 6 petitions, thus: GR No. 178552 GR No. 178554 Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr. KMU, NAFLU-KMU, CTUHR BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, HEAD, Guingona, Jr., Lumbera, Constantino, Jr., Sr. Manansan, OSB, Dean Paz, Atty. Lichauco, Ret. Col. Cunanan, Siguion-Reyna, Dr. Pagaduan-Araullo, Reyes, Ramos, De Jesus, Baua, Casambre SELDA, EMJP, PCPR IBP, CODAL, Senator Madrigal, Osmena III, and Taada BAYAN-ST, other regl chapters and orgs mostly based in Southern Tagalog

GR No. 178581

GR No. 178890 GR No. 179157 GR. No. 179461

NGO Concerned citizen, taxpayer, and lawyer KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP, and PCR allege they have been subjected to close security surveillance by state security forces, their members citizens followed by suspicious persons and vehicles with dark windshields, and their offices monitored by men with military build. They likewise claim they have been branded as enemies of the State. certiorari and BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, Anakbayan, prohibition PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD, and Agham would like the Court to take judicial notice of respondents alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the CPP and NPA. They claim such tagging is tantamount to the effects of proscription without following the procedure under the law. Meanwhile, IBP and CODAL base their claim of locus standi on their sworn duty to uphold the Constitution. Petitioners claim that RA 9372 is vague and broad, in that terms like widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace and coerce the government to

Respondents: Anti-Terrorism Council, composed of:

give in to an unlawful demand are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.

Petitioners must possess locus standi. Question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity. The issue of constitutionality must be the lismota of the case. The present case lacks the 1st 2 requisites, which are the most essential.

ISSUES: Petitioners lack locus standi. WON petitioners resort to certiorari is proper NO. WON petitioners have locus standiNO. WON the Court can take judicial notice of the alleged tagging NO. WON petitioners can invoke the transcendental importance doctrine NO. That the person assailing must have a direct and personal interest AND WON petitioners can be conferred locus standi as they are taxpayers and citizens NO. WON petitioners were able to present an actual case or controversy NO. WON RA 9372 is vague and broad in defining the crime of terrorism NO. WON a penal statute may be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners NO. WON there is merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to permit a facial analysis of its validity NO. For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, he must show that: He has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury; The injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; AND The injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. RA 9372 is a penal statute. While Chavez v. PCGG holds that transcendental public importance dispenses with the requirement that petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury, cases involving the constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an altogether different genus of constitutional litigation. Such necessitates closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi. The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does no, however, suffice to clothe the IBP or any of its members with standing. They failed to sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate under the assailed statute revolts against its constitutional rights and duties. Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal who claims to have been the subject of political surveillance also lacks locus standi. The same is true for WigbertoTaada and Osmea III, who cite their being a human rights advocate and an oppositor, respectively. No concrete injury has been pinpointed, hence, no locus standi. Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged tagging. That the person sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct inquiry as a result of the act being challenged. Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure concrete adverseness. In Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary,locus standihas been defined as that requiring:

HELD AND RATIO: Petition for certiorari is improper. Certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial or quasijudicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court states that petition for certiorari applies when any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how respondents acted without or in excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The power of judicial review has 4 requisites: There must be an actual case or controversy.

Matters of judicial notice have 3 material requisites: matter must be one of common and general knowledge must be well and authoritatively settled, not doubtful or uncertain or capable of accurate and ready determination known to be within thelimits of the jurisdiction of the court The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. It can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to: (1) facts evidenced by public records and (2) facts of general notoriety. A court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the Court has no constructive knowledge. Petitioners apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their plea. That no specific charge or proscription under RA 9371 has been filed against them, 3 years after its effectivity, belies any claim of imminence of their perceived threat emanating from the so-called tagging. They fail to particularize how the implementation of specific provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct injury to their organization and members. Notwithstanding the statement of Ermita and Gonzales that the Arroyo administration will adopt the US and EU classification of CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations, there is yet to be filed before the courts an application to declare the CPP and NPA organizations as domestic terrorist or outlawed organization under RA 9372. In Kilosbayan v. Guingona,to invoke the transcendental doctrine, the following are the determinants: The character of the funds or other assets involved in the case The presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; The lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being raised In the case at bar, there are other partiesnot before the Court withdirect and specific interests in the questions being raised. Petitioners cannot be conferred upon them as taxpayers and citizens.

A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress, whereas citizen standing must rest on direct and personal interest in the proceeding. RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from Congress for its implementation, while none of the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and personal interest in the implementation of the law. Generalized interest, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence of a direct and personal interest is key. Petitioners fail to present an actual case or controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA 9372. Judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy. An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest. The pleadings must show: an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right and a denial thereof However, a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a perceived threat to any constitutional interest suffices to provide a basis for mounting a constitutional challenge. This, however, is qualified by the presence of sufficient facts. Prevailing American jurisprudence allows adjudication on the merits when an anticipatory petition clearly shows that the challenged prohibition forbids the conduct or activity that a petitioner seeks to do, as there would be a justiciable controversy. However, in the case at bar, the petitioners have failed to show that the challenged provisions of RA 9372 forbid constitutionally protected conduct or activity. No demonstrable threat has been established, much less a real and existing one. Petitioners have yet to show any connection between the purported surveillance and the implementation of RA 9372. Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic surveillance and supposedly being tagged as communist fronts in no way approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From these allegations, the Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion, which is not its function. If the case is merely theorized, it lies beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness. Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events.

The doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find no application in the present case since these doctrines apply only to free speech cases and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech. Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan: The overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application only to free speech cases, and are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes. Romualdez v. COMELEC:A facial invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate, but the Court nonetheless proceeded to conduct a vagueness analysis, and concluded that the therein subject election offense under the Voters Registratio n Act of 1996, with which the therein petitioners were charged, is couched in precise language. The aforementioned cases rely heavily on Justice Mendozas Separate Opinion in the Estrada case: Allegations that a penal statute is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one, which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect. If facial challenge is allowed, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. Overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of terrorism in RA 9372 is legally impossible absent an actual or imminent chargeagainst them. The doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on the same plane. A statute or acts suffers from the defect of vagueness when: It lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in 2 ways: Violates due process for failure to accord fair notice of conduct to avoid Leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. The overbreadth doctrine decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means, which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.

A facial challenge is likewise different from an as applied challenge. As applied challenge considers only extant facts affecting real litigants. Facial challenge is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. If facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible. There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to permit a facial analysis of its validity. Section 3 of RA 9372 provides the following elements of the crime of terrorism: Offender commits an act punishable under RPC and the enumerated special penal laws; Commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; The offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand. Petitioners contend that the element of unlawful demand in the definition of terrorism must necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression protected by the free speech clause. The argument does not persuade. What RA 9372 seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech. Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one particle of an element of the crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails some mincing of words on the part of offender. Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the criminal conduct alter neither the intent of the law to punish socially harmful conduct nor the essence of the whole act as conduct and not speech.

Concurring opinion of Justice Abad: - He concurs with the majority opinion, but he says he needs to emphasize that the grounds for dismissal in this case are more procedural than substantive. Hence, when an actual controversy arises and when it becomes ripe for adjudication, the specific questions raised here may be raised again.

Case: JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG) v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (GR 125865)Date: March 26, 2001Ponente: J. Ynares- SantiagoFacts: Two criminal informations for grave oral defamation were filed against Liang, a Chinese national who was employed asan Economist by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), by his secretary Joyce Cabal, before the MeTC Mandaluyong City.The MeTC, acting pursuant to an advice from the DFA that Liang enjoyed immunity from legal processes, dismissed thecriminal informations against him. The RTC Pasig City annulled and set aside the MeTC s dismissal. Hence, Liang filed apetition for review before the SC which was denied ruling that the immunity granted to officers and staff of the ADB is notabsolute; it is limited to acts performed in an official capacity. Hence, the present MR. Issue: WON Liang is immune from suit Held: No. Ratio: The Court found no reason to disturb the earlier decision. The slander of a person, by any stretch, cannot beconsidered as falling within the purview of the immunity granted to ADB officers and personnel. The issue of whether or not Liang s utterances constituted oral defamation is still for the trial court to determine J. Puno s concurring opinion: Liang contends that a determination of a person's diplomatic immunity by the DFA is a political question

. It is solely within theprerogative of the executive department and is conclusive upon the courts. Furthermore, the immunity conferred under the ADBCharter and the Headquarters Agreement is absolute. It is designed to safeguard the autonomy and independence of international organizations against interference from any authority external to the organizations. It is necessary to allow suchorganizations to discharge their entrusted functions effectively. The only exception to this immunity is when there is an implied or express waiver or when the immunity is expressly limited by statute. The exception allegedly has no application to the case atbar." It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunityis essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of thegovernment, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the governmentas in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by theprincipal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, inadherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as toembarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases the judicial department of the government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming anantagonistic jurisdiction." Liang, a bank official of ADB, is not entitled to diplomatic immunity and hence his immunity is not absolute. Under theVienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic envoy is immune from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State for allacts, whether private or official, and hence he cannot be arrested, prosecuted and punished for any offense he may commit,unless his diplomatic immunity is waived. On the other hand, officials of international organizations enjoy "functional" immunities,that is, only those necessary for the exercise of the functions of the organization and the fulfillment of its purposes. This is thereason why the ADB Charter and Headquarters Agreement explicitly grant immunity from legal process to bank officers andemployees only with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity, except when the Bank waives immunity. In other words, officials and employees of the ADB are subject to the jurisdiction of the local courts for their private acts, notwithstandingthe absence of a waiver of immunity. Liang cannot also seek relief under the mantle of "immunity from every form of legal process" accorded to ADB as aninternational organization. The immunity of ADB is absolute whereas the immunity of its officials and employees is restrictedonly to official acts. He stands charged of grave slander for allegedly uttering defamatory remarks against his secretary.Considering that the immunity

accorded to petitioner is limited only to acts performed in his official capacity, it becomesnecessary to make a factual determination of whether or not the defamatory utterances were made pursuant and in relation tohis official functions as a senior economist.

o. 149453

October 7, 2003

The records show that as early as May 24, 2002, the respondent filed an urgent motion for the recusation of Justices Renato C. Corona and Ma. Alicia AustriaMartinez for the reason that they were appointed to the Court after the February 19, 2002 oral arguments and did not participate in the integral portions of the proceedings. Justices Corona and Austria-Martinez refused to inhibit themselves and 6 decided to participate in the deliberation on the petition. On March 18, 2003, the respondent filed a motion with the Court for the recusation of Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. on account of his voluntary inhibition when the case was pending before the Court of Appeals. On March 25, 2003, this Court issued a resolution denying the respondents Motion dated March 18, 2003. The respondent thereafter filed his motion for reconsideration of the April 1, 2003 Resolution of the Court in which he prayed, inter alia, for the inhibition of Justice Callejo, Sr. under A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC and that the case be reraffled to another member of the Court who had actually participated in the deliberation and the rendition of its May 28, 2002 Resolution. The respondent likewise sought the inhibition of Justices Conchita C. Morales and Adolfo S. Azcuna, again for the reason that they were appointed to the Court after the oral arguments on February 19, 2002 and after the case had already been submitted for decision. On April 29, 2003, this Court issued a resolution denying the aforesaid motions of the 7 respondent. The Court ruled that A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC is applicable only to cases assigned to the divisions of the Court: The respondents reliance on Supreme Court Circular No. 99 -8-09 is misplaced. As admitted by the respondent, the said circular is applicable only to motions for reconsideration in cases assigned to the Divisions of the Court. For cases assigned to the Court En Banc, the policy of the Court had always been and still is, if the ponente is no longer with the Court, his replacement will act upon the motion for reconsideration of a party and participate in the deliberations thereof. This is the reason why Justice Callejo, Sr. who had replaced retired Justice De Leon, prepared 8 the draft of the April 1, 2003 Resolution of the Court. The Court also ruled that there was no need for its newest members to inhibit themselves from participating in the deliberation of the respondents Motion for Reconsideration: Although Justices Conchita Carpio-Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., and Adolfo S. 9 Azcuna were not yet members of the Court during the February 18, 2002 oral arguments before the Court, nonetheless they were not disqualified to participate in the deliberations on the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the May 28, 2002 Resolution of the Court or of the instant motion for reconsideration. Neither is Justice Callejo, Sr. disqualified to prepare the resolution of the Court on the motion for reconsideration of the respondent. When the Court deliberated on petitioners motion for reconsideration, Justices Conchita Carpio-Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. and Adolfo S. Azcuna were already members of the Court. It bears stressing that transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the February 18, 2002 hearing and oral arguments of the parties are parts of the records of this case. Said transcripts are available to the parties or to any member of the Court. Likewise,

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO ZUO, STATE PROSECUTORS PETER L. ONG and RUBEN A. ZACARIAS; 2ND ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR CONRADO M. JAMOLIN and CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY CLARO ARELLANO, petitioners, vs. PANFILO M. LACSON, respondent. RESOLUTION CALLEJO, SR., J.: Before the Court are the following motions of the respondent, to wit: (a) Omnibus 1 2 Motion; (b) Motion for Reconsideration; (c) Supplement to Motion for 3 4 Reconsideration; (d) Motion To Set for Oral Arguments. The Omnibus Motion The respondent seeks the reconsideration of the April 29, 2003 Resolution of this Court which granted the petitioners motion for reconsideration. The respondent thereafter prays to allow Associate Justices Renato C. Corona, Ma. Alicia AustriaMartinez, Conchita C. Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., and Adolfo S. Azcuna to voluntary inhibit themselves or, absent their consent, rule that such inhibition is in order and to recuse them from further deliberating, discussing or, in any manner, participating in the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration. The respondent points out that the aforenamed members of the Court were appointed by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo after the February 19, 2002 oral arguments and after the case at bar was submitted for the 5 decision of the Court. He asserts that although A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC specifically provides that it applies only to the divisions of the Court, it should likewise apply to this case, in light of the April 1, 2003 Resolution of this Court which set aside its Resolution dated May 28, 2002, apart from the constitutional issues raised by the respondent in his motion for reconsideration and its supplement. As such, according to the respondent, the instant case should be unloaded by Justice Callejo, Sr. and reraffled to any other member of the Court. The Court resolves to deny the respondents motion for lack of merit.

Attys. Rene A.V. Saguisag and Felix Carao, Jr. may not yet have been the counsel of the respondent on February 18, 2002 but by reading the said transcripts and the records of this case they are informed of what transpired during the hearing and oral 10 arguments of the parties. It is thus clear that the grounds cited by the respondent in his omnibus motion had already been passed upon and resolved by this Court. The respondent did not make any new substantial arguments in his motion to warrant a reconsideration of the aforesaid resolutions. Besides, the respondent sought the inhibition of Justices Conchita C. Morales and Adolfo S. Azcuna only after they had already concurred in the Courts Resolution dated April 1, 2003. Case law has it that a motion for disqualification must be denied when filed after a member of the Court has already given an opinion on the merits of the case, the rationale being that a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action of the Court, only to raise an objection of this sort after a decision has been 11 rendered. The Motion to Set the Case for Oral Arguments The Court denies the motion of the respondent. The parties have already extensively discussed the issues involved in the case. The respondents motion for reconsideration consists of no less than a hundred pages, excluding the supplement to his motion for reconsideration and his reply to the petitioners comment on his motion. There is no longer a need to set the instant case for oral arguments. The Issue as to the Application of the Time-bar under Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure Whether Prospective or Retroactive The respondent seeks the reconsideration of the April 1, 2003 Resolution of the Court and thereafter reinstate its Resolution of May 28, 2002. He asserts that pursuant to a long line of jurisprudence and a long-standing judicial practice in applying penal law, Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (RRCP) should be applied prospectively and retroactively without reservations, only and solely on the basis of its being favorable to the accused. He asserts that case law on the retroactive application of penal laws should likewise apply to criminal procedure, it being a branch of criminal law. The respondent insists that Section 8 was purposely crafted and included as a new provision to reinforce the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy disposition of his case. It is primarily a check on the State to prosecute criminal cases diligently and continuously, lest it loses its right to prosecute the accused anew. The respondent argues that since Section 8 is indubitably a rule of procedure, there can be no other conclusion: the rule should have retroactive application, absent any provision therein that it should be applied prospectively. Accordingly, prospective application thereof would in effect give the petitioners more than two years from March 29, 1999 within which to revive the criminal cases, thus violating the respondents right to due process and equal protection of the law.

The respondent asserts that Section 8 was meant to reach back in time to provide relief to the accused. In this case, the State had been given more than sufficient opportunity to prosecute the respondent anew after the March 29, 1999 dismissal of the cases by then Judge Wenceslao Agnir, Jr. and even before the RRCP took effect on December 1, 2000. According to the respondent, the petitioners filed the Informations with the RTC in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 beyond the two-year bar, in violation of his right to a speedy trial, and that such filing was designed to derail his bid for the Senate. In their comment on the respondents motions, the petitioners assert that the prospective application of Section 8 is in keeping with Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides in part that the rules of procedure which the Court may promulgate shall not diminish, increase or modify substantial rights. While Section 8 secures the rights of the accused, it does not and should not preclude the equally important right of the State to public justice. If such right to public justice is taken away, then Section 8 can no longer be said to be a procedural rule. According to the petitioners, if a procedural rule impairs a vested right, or would work injustice, the said rule may not be given a retroactive application. They contend that the right of the accused to a speedy trial or disposition of the criminal cases applies only to outstanding and pending cases and not to cases already dismissed. The petitioners assert that the "refiling of the cases" under Section 8 should be taken to mean as the filing of the criminal complaint with the appropriate office for the purpose of conducting a preliminary investigation, and not the actual filing of the criminal complaint or information in court for trial. Furthermore, according to the petitioners, the offended parties must be given notices of the motion for provisional dismissal of the cases under Section 8 since the provision so expressly states. Thus, if the requisite notices to the heirs of the deceased would be taken into consideration, the two-year period had not yet even commenced to run. In his consolidated reply to the comment of the petitioners, the respondent asserts that the State is proscribed from refiling a criminal case if it can be shown that the delay resulted in a violation of the right of the accused to due process. In this case, there was an inordinate delay in the revival of the cases, considering that the witnesses in the criminal cases for the State in March 1999 are the same witnesses in 2001. The State had reasonable opportunity to refile the cases before the two-year bar but failed to do so because of negligence; and perhaps institutional indolence. Contrary to the petitioners contention, the respondent posits that the revival of the cases contemplated in Section 8 refers to the filing of the Informations or complaints in court for trial. The operational act then is the refiling of the Informations with the RTC, which was done only on June 6, 2001, clearly beyond the two-year bar. The Court finds the respondents contentions to be without merit. First. The Court approved the RRCP pursuant to its power under Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph 5 of the Constitution which reads: (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,

shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. The Court is not mandated to apply Section 8 retroactively simply because it is favorable to the accused. It must be noted that the new rule was approved by the Court not only to reinforce the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy disposition of the case. The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused only. The Court emphasized in its assailed resolution that: In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial 12 of justice. In criminal litigations concerning constitutional issue claims, the Court, in the interest of justice, may make the rule prospective where the exigencies of the situation make the rule prospective. The retroactivity or non-retroactivity of a rule is not automatically determined by the provision of the Constitution on which the dictate is based. Each constitutional rule of criminal procedure has its own distinct functions, its own background or precedent, and its own impact on the administration of justice, and the 13 way in which these factors combine must inevitably vary with the dictate involved. Matters of procedure are not necessarily retrospective in operation as a statute. To paraphrase the United States Supreme Court per Justice Benjamin Cardozo, the Court in defining the limits of adherence may make a choice for itself between the 15 principle of forward operation and that of relating forward. The Court approved Section 8 pursuant to its power under Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph 5 of the Constitution. This constitutional grant to promulgate rules carries with it the power, inter alia, to determine whether to give the said rules prospective or retroactive effect. Moreover, under Rule 144 of the Rules of Court, the Court may not apply the rules to actions pending before it if in its opinion their application would not 16 be feasible or would work injustice, in which event, the former procedure shall apply. The absence of a provision in Section 8 giving it prospective application only does not proscribe the prospective application thereof; nor does it imply that the Court intended the new rule to be given retroactive and prospective effect. If the statutory purpose is clear, the provisions of the law should be construed as is conducive to fairness and
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justice, and in harmony with the general spirit and policy of the rule. It should be 17 construed so as not to defeat but to carry out such end or purpose. A statute derives its vitality from the purpose for which it is approved. To construe it in a manner that 18 disregards or defeats such purpose is to nullify or destroy the law. In Cometa v. 19 Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that "the spirit rather than the letter of the statute determines its construction; hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit or 20 intent." While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to the "letter that killeth" but to the "spirit that vivifieth, to give effect to 21 the lawmakers will." In this case, when the Court approved Section 8, it intended the new rule to be applied prospectively and not retroactively, for if the intention of the Court were otherwise, it would defeat the very purpose for which it was intended, namely, to give the State a period of two years from notice of the provisional dismissal of criminal cases with the express consent of the accused. It would be a denial of the States right to due process and a travesty of justice for the Court to apply the new rule retroactively in the present case as the respondent insists, considering that the criminal cases were provisionally dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. on March 29, 1999 before the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. A retroactive application of the time-bar will result in absurd, unjust and oppressive consequences to the State and to the victims of crimes and their heirs. Consider this scenario: the trial court (RTC) provisionally dismissed a criminal case with the express consent of the accused in 1997. The prosecution had the right to revive the case within the prescriptive period, under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. On December 1, 2000, the time-bar rule under Section 8 took effect, the prosecution was unable to revive the criminal case before then. If the time-bar fixed in Section 8 were to be applied retroactively, this would mean that the State would be barred from reviving the case for failure to comply with the said time-bar, which was yet to be approved by the Court three years after the provisional dismissal of the criminal case. In contrast, if the same case was dismissed provisionally in December 2000, the State had the right to revive the same within the time-bar. In fine, to so hold would imply that the State was presumed to foresee and anticipate that three years after 1997, the Court would approve and amend the RRCP. The State would thus be sanctioned for its failure to comply with a rule yet to be approved by the Court. It must be stressed that the institution and prosecution of criminal cases are governed by existing rules and not by rules yet to exist. It would be the apex of injustice to hold that Section 8 had a platonic or ideal existence before it was approved by the Court. The past cannot be erased by a capricious retroactive application of the new rule. In holding that the petitioners had until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the criminal cases provisionally dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. on March 29, 1999, this Court explained, thus: The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the two-year period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is

inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do so. Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 on March 29, 1999. The new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State would have only one year and three months or until March 31, 2001 within which to revive these criminal cases. The period is short of the two-year period fixed under the new rule. On the other hand, if the time limit is applied prospectively, the State would have two years from December 1, 2000 or until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the cases. This is in consonance with the intendment of the new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus prevent injustice to the State and avoid absurd, unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in the administration of justice. The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999 should be excluded in the computation of the two-year period because the rule prescribing it was not yet in effect at the time and the State could not be expected to comply with the time-bar. It cannot even be argued that the State waived its right to revive the criminal cases against respondent or that it was negligent for not reviving them within the two-year period under the new rule.1a\^/phi1.netAs the United States Supreme Court said, per Justice Felix Frankfurter, in Griffin v. People, 351 US 12 (1956): We should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announced has always been the law and, therefore, that those who did not avail themselves of it waived their rights The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the accused. For to do so would cause an "injustice of hardship" to the State and adversely affect the 23 administration of justice in general and of criminal laws in particular. Further quoting Justice Felix Frankfurters opinion in Griffin v. People, he said, "it is much more conducive to laws self-respect to recognize candidly the considerations that give prospective content to a new pronouncement of law. That this is consonant with the spirit of our law and justified by those considerations of reason which should dominate the law has been luminously expounded by Mr. Justice Cardozo shortly before he came here and in an opinion which he wrote for the Court." Parenthetically, the respondent himself admitted in his motion for reconsideration that Judge Agnir, Jr. could not have been expected to comply with the notice requirement under the new rule when it yet had to exist: 99. Respondent submits that the records are still in the same state of inadequacy and incompletion. This however is not strange considering that Section 8, Rule 117 had not existed on March 29, 1999, when the criminal cases were dismissed, and then Judge Agnir did not have its text to guide his actions. How could the good judge have 25 complied with the mandate of Section 8, Rule 117 when it yet had to exist? Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. In that sense and to
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that extent, procedural laws are retroactive. Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q99-81689 had long been dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. before the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. When the petitioners filed the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 on June 6, 2001, Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 and Q-99-81689 had long since been terminated. The two-year bar in the new rule should not be reckoned from the March 29, 1999 dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-9981679 to Q-99-81689 but from December 1, 2000 when the new rule took effect. 27 While it is true that the Court applied Section 8 of Rule 110 of the RRCP retroactively, it did so only to cases still pending with this Court and not to cases already terminated with finality. The records show that after the requisite preliminary investigation conducted by the petitioners in accordance with existing rules, eleven Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 were filed with the RTC on June 6, 2001, very well within the time-bar therefor. The respondent cannot argue that his right to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases as enshrined in the Constitution had 28 been violated. The respondents plaint that he was being singled out by the prospective application of the new rule simply because before the Court issued its April 1, 2003 Resolution, he announced his candidacy for the presidency of the Republic for the 2004 elections 29 has no factual basis whatsoever. The bare and irrefutable fact is that it was in this case where the issue of the retroactive/prospective application of the new rule was first raised before the Court. The ruling of the Court in its April 1, 2003 Resolution and its ruling today would be the same, regardless of who the party or parties involved are, whether a senator of the Republic or an ordinary citizen. The respondents contention that the prospective application of the new rule would deny him due process and would violate the equal protection of laws is barren of merit. It proceeds from an erroneous assumption that the new rule was approved by the Court solely for his benefit, in derogation of the right of the State to due process. The new rule was approved by the Court to enhance the right of due process of both the State and the accused. The State is entitled to due process in criminal cases as much as the accused. Due process has never been and perhaps can never be precisely defined.1a\^/phi1.net It is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. The phrase expresses the requirement of fundamental fairness, a requisite whose meaning can be as opaque as its importance 30 is lofty. In determining what fundamental fairness consists of in a particular situation, relevant precedents must be considered and the interests that are at stake; private interests, as well as the interests of the government must be assessed. In this case, in holding that the new rule has prospective and not retroactive application, the Court took into consideration not only the interests of the respondent but all other accused, whatever their station in life may be. The interest of the State in the speedy, impartial and inexpensive disposition of criminal cases was likewise considered. The Respondent Failed to Comply with the Essential Prerequisites of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

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The respondent argues that the issue involved in the Court of Appeals is entirely different from the issue involved in the present recourse; hence, any admissions he made in the court below are not judicial admissions in this case. He asserts that the issue involved in the CA was whether or not he was placed in double jeopardy when he was charged with murder in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 despite the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689; whereas the issue in this Court is whether the prosecution of Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01101112 was barred by Section 8, Rule 117 of the RRCP. The respondent avers that the proceedings in the appellate court are different from those in this Court. The respondent posits that this Court erred in giving considerable weight to the admissions he made in his pleadings and during the proceedings in the CA. He stresses that judicial admissions may only be used against a party if such admissions are (a) made in the course of the proceedings in the same case; and (b) made regarding a relevant fact, pursuant to Section 4, Rule 129 and Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence. He contends that contrary to the ruling of the Court, when he filed his motion for the judicial determination of probable cause in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, he thereby prayed for the dismissal of the said cases. His motion carried with it, at the very least, the prayer for the dismissal of the criminal cases. Absent a finding of probable cause, Judge Agnir, Jr. had no recourse but to dismiss the criminal cases. Moreover, the respondent avers that his motion included the general prayer "for such other reliefs as may be equitable in the premises." The respondent also points out that the public prosecutor agreed to the averments in his motion as the latter did not even file any motion for the reconsideration of Judge Agnir, Jr.s order dismissing the cases. The respondent further contends that the Court is not a trier of facts. It has no means to ascertain or verify as true the contrasting claims of the parties on the factual issues, a function best left to the trial court as the trier of facts. He posits that there is a need for the case to be remanded to the RTC to enable him to present evidence on whether or not Judge Agnir, Jr. complied with the notice requirements of Section 8. Echoing the May 28, 2002 ruling of this Court, the respondent contends that it is not fair to expect the element of notice under Section 8 to be litigated before Judge Agnir, Jr., for the said rule was not yet in existence at the time he filed his motion for a determination of probable cause. The respondent avers that the requirement for notices to the offended parties under Section 8 is a formal and not an essential requisite. In criminal cases, the offended party is the State and the role of the private complainant is limited to the determination of the civil liability of the accused. According to the respondent, notice to the prosecution provides sufficient safeguard for the private complainant to recover on the civil liability of the accused based on the delicts; after all, the prosecution of the offense is under the control and direction of the public prosecutor. The contentions of the respondent have no merit. First. The issue posed by the respondent in the CA and in this Court are the same. To 31 32 recall, in Civil Case No. 01-100933, the respondent sought injunctive relief from the RTC of Manila on his claim that in conducting a preliminary investigation in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112, the petitioners thereby placed him in

double jeopardy under Section 7, Rule 117 of the RRCP. When the RTC denied his plea for injunctive relief, the respondent filed his petition for certiorari in the CA, again invoking his right against double jeopardy, praying that: 13. Inasmuch as the case subject of the "preliminary investigation" was dismissed for the reasons mentioned, there currently exists no complaint upon which a valid investigation can be had in light of the clear provisions of Rule 110 which requires the existence of a "sworn written statement charging a person with an offense" as basis for the commencement of a preliminary investigation under Rule 112. 1awphi1.nt For petitioner, the investigation covers exactly the same offenses over which he had been duly arraigned and a plea validly entered before the Sandiganbayan (in Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 57) before its remand to the QC RTC. Hence, to proceed therewith on similar charges will put him in jeopardy of being twice punished therefor 34 (Article III, 21, Constitution). The respondent (petitioner therein) contended that the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 by Judge Agnir, Jr. amounted to a judgment of acquittal; hence, he could no longer be charged and prosecuted anew for the same offense without violating his right against double jeopardy. However, the respondent filed a second amended petition wherein he invoked for the first time Section 8 of Rule 117 of the RRCP: (e) the new criminal cases for Murder filed by respondents against petitioner and the other accused on June 6, 2001 (docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01101112) and pending before respondent Judge Yadao (Annex B) is dismissible on its face as they involve exactly the same accused, facts, and offenses which had previously been dismissed by the QC RTC in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89 on March 29, 1999, hence, can no longer be revived two (2) years after such 35 dismissal in accordance with the clear provisions of Section 8, Rule 117. Indeed, the CA granted the respondents petition based on Section 8, Rule 11 7 of the RRCP. In this case, the respondent invoked the same rule and the Constitution. Thus, during the oral arguments in this Court, the respondent, through counsel, admitted that he was indeed invoking Section 8 anew and the provisions of the Constitution on double jeopardy: JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: You are saying that Sen. Lacson can no longer be prosecuted forever for that crime, for the killing of the 11 in 1995? ATTY. FORTUN: That is my submission, Your Honor. JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

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Let us see your reason for it? ATTY. FORTUN:


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JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: No, I am not talking of the effects, I am asking about the application, you are not asking the Court to apply the doctrine of double jeopardy to prevent a prosecution of Mr. Lacson? ATTY. FORTUN: Because the element of double jeopardy cannot apply 8, 117. JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

First, are you saying that double jeopardy applies or not? JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
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Allow me to qualify the effects of double jeopardy occur with permanent dismissal that is my submission. ATTY. FORTUN:
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So, the answer is yes? No, no, I am not talking of the effects, I am talking of the doctrine, you are not invoking the doctrine of double jeopardy? ATTY. FORTUN: Your Honor, double jeopardy does not apply Section 8, 117 they are (interrupted) JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: That is right. ATTY. FORTUN: ATTY. FORTUN: They are two different (interrupted) They are two different claims. JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: That is what I am trying to rule out so that we do not have to discuss it. ATTY. FORTUN: Very well, Your Honor. JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: You are not invoking double jeopardy? ATTY. FORTUN: As I mentioned we are saying that the effects of a permanent dismissal vest the effects (interrupted) Later, I am asking about doctrines. Since you are not invoking the doctrine of double jeopardy you are resting your case win or lose, sink or sail on the application of 8,117? ATTY. FORTUN: On the constitutional right of the accused under Section 16 of Article 3 which is speedy disposition of cases which implemented 8,817, that is our arguments in this bar. JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Are you not resting on 8,117? ATTY. FORTUN: ATTY. FORTUN: No, Your Honor, we were saying that precisely a permanent dismissal vests the rights of double jeopardy upon the accused who invokes it. JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: What you are saying is the effects, I am not asking about the effects, I will ask that later.

That and the constitutional provision, Your Honor. JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

Do we get it from you that it is your stand that this is applicable to the case at bar? ATTY. FORTUN:

So, you are resting on 8,117? ATTY. FORTUN: Not exclusive, Your Honor. JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: And the Constitution? ATTY. FORTUN: The Constitution which gave life to 8,117. JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: To speedy disposition? ATTY. FORTUN: ATTY. FORTUN: Yes, Your Honor. JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Can a Court, let us see your theory then your theory rest on two provisions: first, the Rules of Court 8,117 and Second, the Constitution on speedy disposition? ATTY. FORTUN: Yes, Your Honor.
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It is my submission, that it is, Your Honor. In addition, of course, to my proposition that Mr. Lacson is covered by the rule on double jeopardy as well, because he had already been arraigned before the Sandiganbayan prior to the case being remanded to the RTC. JUSTICE SALONGA: You are referring to those cases which were dismissed by the RTC of Quezon City. ATTY. FORTUN: Yes, Your Honor. JUSTICE SALONGA: And it is your stand that the dismissal made by the Court was provisional in nature?

It was in that the accused did not ask for it. What they wanted at the onset was simply a judicial determination of probable cause for warrants of arrest issued. Then Judge Agnir, [Jr.] upon the presentation by the parties of their witnesses, particularly those who had withdrawn their affidavits, made one further conclusion that not only was this case lacking in probable cause for purposes of the issuance of an arrest warrant but also it did not justify proceeding to trial. JUSTICE SALONGA: And it is expressly provided under Section 8 that a case shall not be provisionally dismissed except [if] it is with the express conformity of the accused. ATTY. FORTUN: That is correct, Your Honor.

Second. The respondents answers to the questions of Madame Justice Josefina Salonga during the hearing in the CA where he admitted, through counsel, that he gave no express conformity to the dismissal of the cases by Judge Agnir, Jr., were in relation to Section 8 of Rule 117 and not to Section 7 of Rule 117 on double jeopardy, thus: JUSTICE SALONGA:

JUSTICE SALONGA:

And with notice to the offended party. ATTY. FORTUN: That is correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE GUERRERO: Now, you filed a motion, the other accused then filed a motion for a judicial determination of probable cause? ATTY. FORTUN:

JUSTICE SALONGA: Yes, Your Honor. Was there an express conformity on the part of the accused? JUSTICE GUERRERO: ATTY. FORTUN: There was none, Your Honor. We were not asked to sign any order, or any statement which would normally be required by the Court on pre-trial or on other matters, including other provisional dismissal. My very limited practice in criminal courts, Your Honor, had taught me that a judge must be very careful on this matter of provisional dismissal. In fact, they ask the accused to come forward, and the judge himself or herself explains the implications of 40 a provisional dismissal. The respondent, through counsel, even admitted that despite his plea for equitable relief in his motion for a judicial determination of probable cause in the RTC, he did not agree to a provisional dismissal of the cases. The respondent insisted that the only relief he prayed for before Judge Agnir, Jr. was that warrants for his arrest be withheld pending a finding of probable cause. He asserted that the judge did not even require him to agree to a provisional dismissal of the cases: JUSTICE ROSARIO: You were present during the proceedings? ATTY. FORTUN: Yes, Your Honor. JUSTICE ROSARIO: You represented the petitioner in this case? ATTY. FORTUN: ATTY. FORTUN: That is correct, Your Honor. And there was nothing of that sort which the good Judge Agnir, [Jr.] who is most knowledgeable in criminal law, had done in respect of provisional dismissal or the matter of Mr. Lacson agreeing to the provisional dismissal of the case. Yes, Your Honor. I will not second say (sic) yes the Good Justice, but what is plain is we did not agree to the provisional dismissal, neither were we asked to sign any assent to the provisional dismissal. Did you make any alternative prayer in your motion that if there is no probable cause what should the Court do? ATTY. FORTUN: That the arrest warrants only be withheld. That was the only prayer that we asked. In fact, I have a copy of that particular motion, and if I may read my prayer before the Court, it said: "Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that (1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution be conducted, and for this purpose, an order be issued directing the prosecution to present private complainants and their witnesses at the scheduled hearing for that purpose; and (2) the warrants for the arrest of the accused be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the meantime until resolution of this incident." JUSTICE GUERRERO: There is no general prayer for any further relief? ATTY. FORTUN: There is but it simply says other equitable reliefs are prayed for. JUSTICE GUERRERO: Dont you surmise Judge Agnir, [Jr.] now a member of this Court, precisely addressed your prayer for just and equitable relief to dismiss the case because what would be the net effect of a situation where there is no warrant of arrest being issued without dismissing the case?

JUSTICE GUERRERO: If you did not agree to the provisional dismissal, did you not file any motion for reconsideration of the order of Judge Agnir, [Jr.] that the case should be dismissed? ATTY. FORTUN: I did not, Your Honor, because I knew fully well at that time that my client had already been arraigned, and the arraignment was valid as far as I was concerned. So, the dismissal, Your Honor, by Judge Agnir operated to benefit me, and therefore I did not take any further step in addition to rocking the boat or clarifying the matter further because it probably could prejudice the interest of my client. JUSTICE GUERRERO: Continue.
41

When the respondent admitted that he did not move for the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 in his motion for a judicial determination of probable cause, and that he did not give his express consent to the provisional dismissal of the said cases, he in fact admitted that one of the essential requisites of Section 8, Rule 117 was absent. The respondents contention that his admissions made in his pleadings and during the hearing in the CA cannot be used in the present case as they were made in the course of a different proceeding does not hold water. It should be borne in mind that the proceedings before the Court was by way of an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, from the proceedings in the CA; as such, the present recourse is but a mere continuation of the proceedings in the appellate court. This is not a new trial, but a review of proceedings which commenced from the trial court, which later passed through the CA. The respondent is bound by the judicial admissions he made in the CA, and such admissions so hold him in the proceedings 47 before this Court. As categorically stated in Habecker v. Clark Equipment Company: ... [J]udicial admissions on issues of fact, including those made by counsel on behalf of a client during a trial, are binding "for the purpose of the case ... including appeals." While it may be true that the trial court may provisionally dismiss a criminal case if it finds no probable cause, absent the express consent of the accused to such provisional dismissal, the latter cannot thereafter invoke Section 8 to bar a revival thereof. Neither may the accused do so simply because the public prosecutor did not object to a motion of the accused for a judicial determination of probable cause or file a motion for the reconsideration of the order of dismissal of the case. Even a cursory reading of the respondents motion for a judicial determination of p robable cause will show that it contained no allegation that there was no probable cause for the issuance of a warrant for the respondents arrest as a prayer for the dismissal of the cases. The respondent was only asking the court to determine whether or not there was probable cause for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and in the meantime, to hold in abeyance the issuance of the said warrant. Case law has it that a prayer for equitable relief is of no avail, unless the petition states facts which will authorize the 48 court to grant such relief. A court cannot set itself in motion, nor has it power to decide questions except as presented by the parties in their pleadings. Anything that 49 is resolved or decided beyond them is coram non judice and void. Third. There is no need for the Court to remand the instant case to the trial court to enable the respondent to adduce post facto evidence that the requisite notices under Section 8 had been complied with by Judge Agnir, Jr. The Court has thoroughly 50 examined the voluminous records from the Sandiganbayan and the RTC and found no proof that the requisite notices were even served on all the heirs of the victims. The respondent himself admitted that, as held by this Court, in its May 28, 2002 Resolution, "Judge Agnir, Jr. could not have complied with the mandate under 51 Section 8 because said rule had yet to exist." One final matter. The records show that Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01101112 were assigned, through the customary raffle of cases, to Branch 81 of the RTC of Quezon City, the same branch which dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 9952 81679 to 99-81689. In the April 1, 2003 Resolution of the Court, the Presiding Judge

In his memorandum, in lieu of the oral argument filed with the Court of Appeals, the respondent declared in no uncertain terms that: Soon thereafter, the SC in early 1999 rendered a decision declaring the Sandiganbayan without jurisdiction over the cases. The records were remanded to the QC RTC. Upon raffle, the case was assigned to Branch 91. Petitioner and the others promptly filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause (Annex B). He asked that warrants for his arrest not be issued. He did not move for the dismissal 42 of the Informations, contrary to respondent OSGs claim. Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court reads: Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. A judicial admission is a formal statement made either by a party or his or her attorney, in the course of judicial proceeding which removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy. It is a voluntary concession of fact by a party or a partys attorney during such judicial proceedings, including admissions in pleadings made by a 43 party. It may occur at any point during the litigation process. An admission in open 44 court is a judicial admission. A judicial admission binds the client even if made by 45 his counsel. As declared by this Court: ... [I]n fact, "judicial admissions are frequently those of counsel or of attorney of record, who is, for the purpose of the trial, the agent of his client. When such admissions are made ... for the purpose of dispensing with proof of some fact, ... they 46 bind the client, whether made during, or even after the trial."

of Branch 81 of the RTC of Quezon City was directed to try and decide Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 with reasonable dispatch. The Court notes, however, that in Administrative Order No. 104-96, it designated six branches of the 53 RTC of Quezon City as special courts, exclusively to try and decide heinous crimes under Rep. Act No. 7659. Since the accused in the said cases are charged with murder, which under Rep. Act No. 7659, is classified as a heinous crime, the above cases should be consolidated and re-raffled by the Executive Judge of the RTC of Quezon City to a branch thereof designated as a special court, exclusively to try and decide heinous crimes. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent Panfilo M. Lacsons Omnibus Motion and Motion to Set for Oral Arguments are DENIED. The respondents Motion for Reconsideration and its Supplement are DENIED WITH FINALITY. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is hereby DIRECTED to CONSOLIDATE Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 and to RE-RAFFLE the same with dispatch to one of the branches of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City designated as a special court, exclusively to try and decide heinous crimes. SO ORDERED. SECOND DIVISION

conviction was affirmed in toto by the RTC in its decision dated September 10, 1997. Pending resolution of their motion for reconsideration, however, Republic Act No. 8368, An Act Repealing Presidential Decree No. 772, entitled Penalizing Squatting and Other Similar Acts was enacted. In its Order, dated January 28, 1998, the RTC ruled that only petitioners criminal convictions were extinguished by R.A. 8368, and the civil aspect, i.e., the removal of petitioners illegally constructed house and improvements, shall remain [4] executory against them. On a petition for review, the Court of Appeals sustained the ruling of the RTC and denied due course to the petition per its Decision, dated April 30, [5] 1999. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA in its [6] Resolution dated June 9, 1999. Hence, the present recourse taken by petitioners, raising the following issues: 1. That petitioners, being charged with Violation of Presidential Decree No. 772, the express repeal of said decree absolves the petitioners of any criminal or civil liability; 2. That public respondent erred in holding that the civil aspect of the judgment rendered x x x shall be executory against the accused; and 3. That the Honorable Court of Appeals, in affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 96), dated June 9, 1999, grossly erred in ignoring [7] applicable laws and jurisprudence. Petitioners argue that the repeal of P.D. 772 by R.A. 8368 carries with it the extinction of both the criminal and civil aspects of the crime. Private respondent, however, insists that public respondents were correct in ruling that only the criminal liability was absolved and the civil liability remains inasmuch as it was not extinguished in accordance with Article 113 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads: ART. 113. Obligation to satisfy civil liability. -- Except in case of extinction of his civil liability as provided in the next preceding article, the offender shall continue to be obliged to satisfy the civil liability resulting from the crime committed by him, notwithstanding the fact that he has served his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty or other rights, or has not been required to serve the same by reason of amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence or any other reason. In its Motion to Deny Due Course, private respondent also argues that the petition should now be denied as its title to the land subject of this case has already [8] been adjudged in its favor. In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondents, agrees with petitioners that both the criminal and civil liability were rendered extinct with the repeal of P.D. 772, and recommended that the assailed issuances be reversed and set aside. We find the petition to be meritorious.

[G.R. No. 138962. October 4, 2002]

PRESCILLA TUATES and ANDRES DE LA PAZ, petitioners, vs. HON. LUCAS P. BERSAMIN, as Presiding Judge, Branch 96, RTC Quezon City, People of the Philippines and I.C. Construction, Inc., respondents. DECISION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul the following: (1) Decision dated April 30, 1999 and Resolution dated June 9, 1999, rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. [1] 46845; (2) Decision dated September 10, 1997 and the Order dated January 28, 1998 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 96) in Criminal [2] Cases Nos. Q-97-70428 and Q-97-70429; and (3) Decision dated December 16, 1996 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 38) in Criminal Cases [3] Nos. 38-0130 and 38-0131. The facts are as follows: Convicted by the MTC-Quezon City (Branch 38) of the crime of Violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 or the Anti-Squatting Law, petitioners Prescilla Tuates and Andres de la Paz, appealed to the RTC of Quezon City (Branch 96). Their

Republic Act No. 8368, otherwise known as the Anti-Squatting Law Repeal Act of 1997, provides: SECTION 1. Title. -- This Act shall be known as the Anti-Squatting Law Repeal Act of 1997. SEC. 2. Repeal. -- Presidential Decree No. 772, entitled Penalizing Squatting and Other Similar Acts is hereby repealed. SEC. 3. Effect on Pending Cases. -- All pending cases under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 772 shall be dismissed upon the effectivity of this Act. SEC. 4. Effect on Republic Act No. 7279. -- Nothing herein shall be construed to nullify, eliminate or diminish in any way Section 27 of Republic Act No. 7279 or any of its provisions relative to sanctions against professional squatters and squatting syndicates. SEC. 5. Effectivity. -- This Act shall take effect thirty (30) days after its publication in two (2) newspapers of national circulation. Approved, October 27, 1997.
[9]

Other Similar Acts was enacted. Section 3 of the said Act provides that all pending cases under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 772 shall be dismissed upon [15] the effectivity of this Act. This is not to say, however, that people now have the unbridled license to [16] illegally occupy lands they do not own. R.A. No. 8368 was unanimously approved [17] by the members of the Senate of the Philippines present on its third reading. The legislature considered it a major piece of legislation on the countrys anti -poverty [18] program as it sought to confront the perennial problem of poverty at its root, abolish an otherwise inutile and oppressive law, and pave the way for a genuine urban housing and land reform program. Senate records reveal that it is the manifest intent of the authors of R.A. 8368 to decriminalize squatting but does not encourage or [19] protect acts of squatting on somebody elses land. The law is not intended to [20] compromise the property rights of legitimate landowners. Recourse may be had in cases of violation of their property rights, such as those provided for in Republic Act No. 7279 or the Urban Development and Housing Act, penalizing professional squatters and squatting syndicates as defined therein, who commit nefarious and [21] illegal activities ; the Revised Penal Code providing for criminal prosecution in [22] cases of Trespass to Property, Occupation of Real Property or Usurpation of Real [23] Rights in Property, and similar violations, and, cases for Forcible Entry and [24] Unlawful Detainer under the Rules of Court, as well as civil liability for Damages under the Civil Code. Considering that prosecution for criminal as well as civil liability under P.D. 772 has been rendered nugatory with the passage of R.A. 8368, both criminal and civil aspects of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-97-70428 and Q-97-70429 in the RTC as well as Criminal Cases Nos. 38-0130 and 38-0131 in the MTC filed against petitioners should be dismissed. WHEREFORE, finding the petition for review to be with merit, the Decision dated April 30, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46845, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby entered modifying the Decision dated September 10, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 96) in Criminal Cases No. Q-97-70428 and Q-97-70429 and the Decision dated December 16, 1996 issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 38), to the effect that the dismissal of the aforementioned criminal cases likewise include the dismissal of the civil aspects thereof, without prejudice to the filing of civil and/or criminal actions under the prevailing laws. No costs. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

The repeal of P.D. No. 772 under Section 2 of R.A. No. 8368 is explicit, categorical, definite and absolute. As such, the act that was penalized by P.D. 772, i.e., squatting, ceases to be criminal under R.A. 8368, and the previous offense [10] is obliterated. In the same vein, the absolute repeal of P.D. 772 has the effect of depriving a court of its authority to punish a person charged with violation of the old law prior to its repeal. This is because an unqualified repeal of a penal law constitutes a legislative act of rendering legal what had been previously declared as illegal, such that the offense no longer exists and it is as if the person who committed it never did [11] so. Specially so, as in the present case where it is unconditionally stated in Section 3 of R.A. No. 8368 that: (A)ll pending cases under the provisions of Presidential [12] Decree No. 772 shall be dismissed upon the effectivity of this Act. Obviously, it was the clear intent of the law to decriminalize or do away with the crime of squatting. Hence, there being no criminal liability, there is likewise no civil liability because the latter is rooted in the former. Where an act or omission is not a crime, no person can be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, logically, [13] civil liability ex delicto is out of the question. In fact, in People v. Leachon, Jr. we implicitly recognized the unconditional repeal of P.D. 772 by R.A. 8368 when we ordered the dismissal of the petition filed in said case, without any qualification whatsoever, because of the enactment of R.A. 8368, viz.: But the foregoing antecedent facts and proceedings notwithstanding, the petition cannot now prosper because on October 27, 1997, Republic Act No. 8368, entitled An Act Repealing Presidential Decree No. 772 Entitled Penalizing Squatting and
[14]

G.R. No. 96132 June 26, 1992 ORIEL MAGNO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

1.1. WARRANTY DEPOSIT Before or upon delivery of each item of Equipment, the Lessee shall deposit with the Lessor such sum or sums specified in Schedule A to serve as security for the faithful performance of its obligations. This deposit shall be refunded to the Lessee upon the satisfactory completion of the entire period of Lease, subject to the conditions of clause 1.12 of this Article. (Ibid., p. 17) As part of the arrangement, petitioner and LS Finance entered into a leasing agreement whereby LS Finance would lease the garage equipments and petitioner would pay the corresponding rent with the option to buy the same. After the documentation was completed, the equipment were delivered to petitioner who in turn issued a postdated check and gave it to Joey Gomez who, unknown to the petitioner, delivered the same to Corazon Teng. When the check matured, Petitioner requested through Joey Gomez not to deposit the check as he (Magno) was no longer banking with Pacific Bank. To replace the first check issued, petitioner issued another set of six (6) postdated checks. Two (2) checks dated July 29, 1983 were deposited and cleared while the four (4) others, which were the subject of the four counts of the aforestated charges subject of the petition, were held momentarily by Corazon Teng, on the request of Magno as they were not covered with sufficient funds. These checks were a) Piso Bank Check Nos. 006858, dated August 15, 1983, 006859 dated August 28, 1983 and 006860 dated September 15, 1983, all in the amount of P5,038.43 and No. 006861 dated September 28, 1983, in the amount of P10,076.87. (Ibid., pp. 42 & 43). Subsequently, petitioner could not pay LS Finance the monthly rentals, thus it pulled out the garage equipments. It was then on this occasion that petitioner became aware that Corazon Teng was the one who advanced the warranty deposit. Petitioner with his wife went to see Corazon Teng and promised to pay the latter but the payment never came and when the four (4) checks were deposited they were returned for the reason "account closed." (Ibid., p. 43) After joint trial before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, the accused-petitioner was convicted for violations of BP Blg. 22 on the four (4) cases, as follows: . . . finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violations of B.P. Blg. 22 and sentencing the accused to imprisonment for one year in each Criminal Case Nos. Q-35693, Q-35695 and Q-35696 and to pay to complainant the respective amounts reflected in subject checks. (Ibid., pp. 25, 27) Reviewing the above and the affirmation of the above-stated decision of the court a quo, this Court is intrigued about the outcome of the checks subject of the cases which were intended by the parties, the petitioner on the one hand and the private complainant on the other, to cover the "warranty deposit" equivalent to the 30% requirement of the financing company. Corazon Teng is one of the officers of Mancor,

PARAS, J.: This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, from the decision* of the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104 finding the accused petitioner, guilty of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, in Criminal Cases Q-35693 to 35696 before they were elevated on appeal to the respondent appellate Court under CA-G.R. CR No. 04889. The antecedent facts and circumstances of the four (4) counts of the offense charged, have been clearly illustrated, in the Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General as official counsel for the public respondent, thus: Petitioner was in the process of putting up a car repair shop sometime in April 1983, but a did not have complete equipment that could make his venture workable. He also had another problem, and that while he was going into this entrepreneurship, he lacked funds with which to purchase the necessary equipment to make such business operational. Thus, petitioner, representing Ultra Sources International Corporation, approached Corazon Teng, (private complainant) Vice President of Mancor Industries (hereinafter referred to as Mancor) for his needed car repair service equipment of which Mancor was a distributor, (Rollo, pp. 40-41) Having been approached by petitioner on his predicament, who fully bared that he had no sufficient funds to buy the equipment needed, the former (Corazon Teng) referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation (LB Finance for brevity) advising its Vice-President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing and able to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could accommodate petitioner and provide him credit facilities. (Ibid., P. 41) The arrangement went through on condition that petitioner has to put up a warranty deposit equivalent to thirty per centum (30%) of the total value of the pieces of equipment to be purchased, amounting to P29,790.00. Since petitioner could not come up with such amount, he requested Joey Gomez on a personal level to look for a third party who could lend him the equivalent amount of the warranty deposit, however, unknown to petitioner, it was Corazon Teng who advanced the deposit in question, on condition that the same would be paid as a short term loan at 3% interest (Ibid., P. 41) The specific provision in the Leasing Agreement, reads:

the supplier of the equipment subject of the Leasing Agreement subject of the high financing scheme undertaken by the petitioner as lessee of the repair service equipment, which was arranged at the instance of Mrs. Teng from the very beginning of the transaction. By the nature of the "warranty deposit" amounting to P29,790.00 corresponding to 30% of the "purchase/lease" value of the equipments subject of the transaction, it is obvious that the "cash out" made by Mrs. Teng was not used by petitioner who was just paying rentals for the equipment. It would have been different if petitioner opted to purchase the pieces of equipment on or about the termination of the leasepurchase agreement in which case he had to pay the additional amount of the warranty deposit which should have formed part of the purchase price. As the transaction did not ripen into a purchase, but remained a lease with rentals being paid for the loaned equipment, which were pulled out by the Lessor (Mancor) when the petitioner failed to continue paying possibly due to economic constraints or business failure, then it is lawful and just that the warranty deposit should not be charged against the petitioner. To charge the petitioner for the refund of a "warranty deposit" which he did not withdraw as it was not his own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust "debt", to say the least, since petitioner did not receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the safekeeping of the financing company, which is managed, supervised and operated by the corporation officials and employees of LS Finance. Petitioner did not even know that the checks he issued were turned over by Joey Gomez to Mrs. Teng, whose operation was kept from his knowledge on her instruction. This fact alone evoke suspicion that the transaction is irregular and immoral per se, hence, she specifically requested Gomez not to divulge the source of the "warranty deposit". It is intriguing to realize that Mrs. Teng did not want the petitioner to know that it was she who "accommodated" petitioner's request for Joey Gomez, to source out the needed funds for the "warranty deposit". Thus it unfolds the kind of transaction that is shrouded with mystery, gimmickry and doubtful legality. It is in simple language, a scheme whereby Mrs. Teng as the supplier of the equipment in the name of her corporation, Mancor, would be able to "sell or lease" its goods as in this case, and at the same time, privately financing those who desperately need petty accommodations as this one. This modus operandi has in so many instances victimized unsuspecting businessmen, who likewise need protection from the law, by availing of the deceptively called "warranty deposit" not realizing that they also fall prey to leasing equipment under the guise of a lease-purchase agreement when it is a scheme designed to skim off business clients. This maneuvering has serious implications especially with respect to the threat of the penal sanction of the law in issue, as in this case. And, with a willing court system to apply the full harshness of the special law in question, using the "mala prohibitia" doctrine, the noble objective of the law is tainted with materialism and opportunism in the highest, degree. This angle is bolstered by the fact that since the petitioner or lessee referred to above in the lease agreement knew that the amount of P29,790.00 subject of the cases,

were mere accommodation-arrangements with somebody thru Joey Gomez, petitioner did not even attempt to secure the refund of said amount from LS Finance, notwithstanding the agreement provision to the contrary. To argue that after the termination of the lease agreement, the warranty deposit should be refundable in full to Mrs. Teng by petitioner when he did not cash out the "warranty deposit" for his official or personal use, is to stretch the nicety of the alleged law (B.P. No, 22) violated. For all intents and purposes, the law was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate public checking account user. It did not intend to shelter or favor nor encourage users of the system to enrich themselves through manipulations and circumvention of the noble purpose and objective of the law. Least should it be used also as a means of jeopardizing honest-to-goodness transactions with some color of "get-rich" scheme to the prejudice of well-meaning businessmen who are the pillars of society. Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms that the primary function of punishment is the protective (sic) of society against actual and potential wrongdoers." It is not clear whether petitioner could be considered as having actually committed the wrong sought to be punished in the offense charged, but on the other hand, it can be safely said that the actuations of Mrs. Carolina Teng amount to that of potential wrongdoers whose operations should also be clipped at some point in time in order that the unwary public will not be failing prey to such a vicious transaction (Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1987 Edition, Vol. I, P. 11) Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that "criminal law is founded upon that moral disapprobation . . . of actions which are immoral, i.e., which are detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society. This disappropriation is inevitable to the extent that morality is generally founded and built upon a certain concurrence in the moral opinions of all. . . . That which we call punishment is only an external means of emphasizing moral disapprobation the method of punishment is in reality the amount of punishment," (Ibid., P. 11, citing People v. Roldan Zaballero, CA 54 O.G. 6904, Note also Justice Pablo's view in People v. Piosca and Peremne, 86 Phil. 31). Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying the punishment imposed upon the accused, the objective of retribution of a wronged society, should be directed against the "actual and potential wrongdoers." In the instant case, there is no doubt that petitioner's four (4) checks were used to collateralize an accommodation, and not to cover the receipt of an actual "account or credit for value" as this was absent, and therefore petitioner should not be punished for mere issuance of the checks in question. Following the aforecited theory, in petitioner's stead the "potential wrongdoer", whose operation could be a menace to society, should not be glorified by convicting the petitioner. While in case of doubt, the case should have been resolved in favor of the accused, however, by the open admission of the appellate court below, oven when the ultimate beneficiary of the "warranty deposit" is of doubtful certainty, the accused was convicted, as shown below:

Nor do We see any merit in appellant's claim that the obligation of the accused to complainant had been extinguished by the termination of the leasing agreement by the terms of which the warranty deposit advanced by complainant was refundable to the accused as lessee and that as the lessor L.S. Finance neither made any liquidation of said amount nor returned the same to the accused, it may he assumed that the amount was already returned to the complainant. For these allegations, even if true, do not change the fact, admitted by appellant and established by the evidence, that the four checks were originally issued on account or for value. And as We have already observed, in order that there may be a conviction under the from paragraph of Section 2 of B.P. Blg 22 with respect to the element of said offense that the check should have been made and issued on account or for value it is sufficient, all the other elements of the offense being present, that the check must have been drawn and issued in payment of an obligation. Moreover, even granting, arguendo, that the extinguishment, after the issuance of the checks, of the obligation in consideration of which the checks were issued, would have resulted in placing the case at bar beyond the purview of the prohibition in Section 1 of BP Blg. 22, there is no satisfactory proof that there was such an extinguishment in the present case. Appellee aptly points out that appellant had not adduced any direct evidence to prove that the amount advanced by the complainant to cover the warranty deposit must already have been returned to her. (Rollo, p. 30) It is indubitable that the respondent Court of Appeals even disregarded the cardinal rule that the accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, the same court even expected the petitioner-appellant to adduce evidence to show that he was not guilty of the crime charged. But how can be produce documents showing that the warranty deposit has already been taken back by Mrs. Teng when she is an officer of Mancor which has interest in the transaction, besides being personally interested in the profit of her side-line. Thus, even if she may have gotten back the value of the accommodation, she would still pursue collecting from the petitioner since she had in her possession the checks that "bounced". That the court a quo merely relied on the law, without looking into the real nature of the warranty deposit is evident from the following pronouncement: And the trail court concluded that there is no question that the accused violated BP Blg. 22, which is a special statutory law, violations of which are mala prohibita. The court relied on the rule that in cases of mala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether or not the law had been violated, proof of criminal intent not being necessary for the conviction of the accused, the acts being prohibited for reasons of public policy and the defenses of good faith and

absence of criminal intent being unavailing in prosecutions for said offenses." (Ibid., p. 26) The crux of the matter rests upon the reason for the drawing of the postdated checks by the petitioner, i.e.,whether they were drawn or issued "to apply on account or for value", as required under Section 1 of B.P. Blg, 22. When viewed against the following definitions of the catch-terms "warranty" and "deposit", for which the postdated checks were issued or drawn, all the more, the alleged crime could not have been committed by petitioner: a) Warranty A promise that a proposition of fact is true. A promise that certain facts are truly as they are represented to be and that they will remain so: . . . (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, (1979) p. 1423) A cross-reference to the following term shows: Fitness for Particular Purpose: Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is, unless excluded or modified, an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose, (Ibid., p. 573) b) Deposit: Money lodged with a person as an earnest or security for the performance of some contract, to be forfeited if the depositor fails in his undertaking. It may be deemed to be part payment and to that extent may constitute the purchaser the actual owner of the estate. To commit to custody, or to lay down; to place; to put. To lodge for safe- keeping or as a pledge to intrust to the care of another. The act of placing money in the custody of a bank or banker, for safety or convenience, to be withdrawn at the will of the depositor or under rules and regulations agreed on. Also, the money so deposited, or the credit which the depositor receives for it. Deposit, according to its commonly accepted and generally understood among bankers and by the public, includes not only deposits payable on demand and for which certificates, whether interestbearing or not, may be issued, payable on demand, or on certain notice or at a fixed future time. (Ibid., pp. 394-395) Furthermore, the element of "knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason . . . is inversely applied in this case. From the very beginning, petitioner never

hid the fact that he did not have the funds with which to put up the warranty deposit and as a matter of fact, he openly intimated this to the vital conduit of the transaction, Joey Gomez, to whom petitioner was introduced by Mrs. Teng. It would have been different if this predicament was not communicated to all the parties he dealt with regarding the lease agreement the financing of which was covered by L.S. Finance Management. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the accused-petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. SO ORDERED. October 19, 1922 G.R. No. L-18924 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendant-appellee.

There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International Law; to wit, the French rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless their commission affects the peace and security of the territory; and the English rule, based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States, according to which, crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within territory they were committed. Of this two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are authority in the Philippines which is now a territory of the United States. In the cases of The Schooner Exchange vs. MFaddon and Others (7 Cranch [U. S.], 116), Chief Justice Marshall said: . . . When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously

Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellant. Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellee. Romualdez, J.: In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the defendant to the information that initiated this case and in which the appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city. The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, which so held and dismissed the case. The question that presents itself for our consideration is whether such ruling is erroneous or not; and it will or will not be erroneous according as said court has or has no jurisdiction over said offense. The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime, like the one herein involved, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters.

inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual infraction, and the government to degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the country. . . . In United States vs. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court held: . . . No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense or crime committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she came within three miles of a line drawn from the headlands, which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton, International Law [Dana ed.], p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., secs. 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject to such limitations as have been conceded by that sovereignty through the proper political agency. . . . It is true that in certain cases the comity of nations is observed, as in Mali and Wildenhus vs. Keeper of the Common Jail (120 U.., 1), wherein it was said that:

. . . The principle which governs the whole matter is this: Disorder which disturb only the peace of the ship or those on board are to be dealt with exclusively by the sovereignty of the home of the ship, but those which disturb the public peace may be suppressed, and, if need be, the offenders punished by the proper authorities of the local jurisdiction. It may not be easy at all times to determine which of the two jurisdictions a particular act of disorder belongs. Much will undoubtedly depend on the attending circumstances of the particular case, but all must concede that felonious homicide is a subject for the local jurisdiction, and that if the proper authorities are proceeding with the case in the regular way the consul has no right to interfere to prevent it. Hence in United States vs. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), this court held that: Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the Philippine Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit in any local port, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of the Islands, such vessels being considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply when the article, the use of which is prohibited in the Islands, is landed from the vessels upon Philippine soil; in such a case an open violation of the laws of the land is committed with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, no court other than that established in the said place has jurisdiction of the offense, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty. As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to renouncing such jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so far as England is concerned, to which nation the ship where the crime in question was committed belongs. Besides, in his work Treaties, Conventions, etc., volume 1, page 625, Malloy says the following: There shall be between the territories of the United States of America, and all the territories of His Britanic Majesty in Europe, a reciprocal liberty of commerce. The inhabitants of the two countries, respectively, shall have liberty freely and securely to come with their ships and cargoes to all such places, ports and rivers, in the territories aforesaid, to which other foreigners are permitted to come, to enter into the same, and to remain and reside in any parts of the said territories, respectively; also to hire

and occupy houses and warehouses for the purposes of their commerce; and, generally, the merchants and traders of each nation respectively shall enjoy the most complete protection and security for their commerce, but subject always to the laws and statutes of the two countries, respectively. (Art. 1, Commerce and Navigation Convention.) We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this court not triable by or courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not being about in the said territory those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance of the public order. But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute. Moreover, as the Attorney-General aptly observes: . . . The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a foreign vessel at anchor in the port of Manila in open defiance of the local authorities, who are impotent to lay hands on him, is simply subversive of public order. It requires no unusual stretch of the imagination to conceive that a foreign ship may come into the port of Manila and allow or solicit Chinese residents to smoke opium on board. The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as to costs. So ordered. Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur. People vs Lol-lo and Saraw 27 February 1922 | Ponente: Malcolm Overview: Moros surrounded a boat, took its cargo, took two women and left it for it to sink. The marauders, Lol -lo and Saraw, who were in TawiTawi, were arrested for piracy. They questioned the jurisdiction of the Philippines to the case, but the court ruled that piracy is a crime against all mankind, so every court

also has jurisdiction to try these cases. In addition,the Spanish Penal Code is still in force in the Philippines. Statement of Facts: -On or about 30 June 1920: Two boats left Matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another Dutch possession.- B o a t 1 h a d o n e D u t c h s u b j e c t -Boat 2 had 11 men, w o m e n a n d c h i l d r e n , l i k e w i s e f r o m H o l l a n d . -After several days, at 7pm, Boat 2 arrived in Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. - H e r e , the boat was surrounded by 6 vintas, manned by 24 armed Moros.-The Moros first asked for foo d, but once in the boat, t o o k a l l t h e c a r g o , a t t a c k e d s o m e o f t h e m e n , a n d brutally violated 2 of the women.-The Moros took the 2 women with them, placed holes in the ship to let it sink, and left the people there. - A f t e r 1 1 d a y s , t h e M o r o s a r r i v e d a t M a r u r o , a D u t c h p o s s e s s i o n . -The two Moro marauders were identified as Lol -lo, as the one who raped one of the women, and Saraw. - W h i l e i n M a r u r o , t h e t w o w o m e n w e r e able to escape. One day, Lol-lo and Saraw went home to South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu. Here, they were arrested and charged withpiracy at the CFI. The Moros interposed a demurrer, saying that the charge was not within the jurisdiction of the CFI, nor of any court in the Philippines. They were saying that the facts did not constitute a public offenseunder Philippine laws.- T h e d e m u r r e r w a s o v e r r u l e d , a n d L o l lo and Saraw were found guilty, and were both se n t e n c e d t o l i f e imprisonment, together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, two other defendants in another case. In addition toimprisonment, they were ordered to return the 39 sacks of copra they robbed, or to indemnify the offended parties924 rupees, and to pay one-half of the costs. Issue: Did the CFI in the Philippines have jurisdiction over Lol-lo and Saraw? YESRationale -First of all, the facts cant be di sputed. All the elements of the crime of piracy were there. -Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi,and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility. The CFI has jurisdiction because pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime against all mankind,therefore, it can be punished in any competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found.-The jurisdiction of piracy has no territorial limits. The crime is against all mankind, so it is also punished by all. - It doesnt matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3 -mile limit of a foreign state. Those limits,though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes. Issue: Are the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with piracy still in force? YESRationale - Art. 153 of the Penal Code refers to the crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or subjects of another nation not war with Spain shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua. If the

crimeis against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with Spain, it shell be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.Since Spain already ceded the Philippines to the US, the rule is that the political law of the former sovereignty isnecessarily changed. But corollary to this rule, laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to secure good order and peace in the community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue until by direct action of thenew government they are altered or repealed.- T h e i n s t r u c t i o n s o f P r e s i d e n t M c K n i l e y o n M a y 19, 1989 to General Wesley Merrit, Commanding General of t h e Army of Occupation in the Philippines, was clear that municipal laws that provide for the punishment of crime, areconsidered continuing in force so far as they are compatible with the new order of things until superseded.Background on the laws of piracy: -The Spanish Penal Code was applicable to the Philippines because of Art. 156 of the Penal Code. - G r o t i u s : P i r a c y b y t h e l a w o f n a t i o n s is the same thing as piracy by the civil law. Piracy in the p e n a l c o d e as similar to the concepts of civil law, especially since the Penal Code found its inspiration from the Novelas,Partidas and Novisima Recopilacion.-The US Constitution itself defines and punishes piracy that whoever on the high seas, commits the crimeof piracy as defined by the law of nations, shal be imprisoned for life. This de finition rests its conception of piracy on the law of nations. This further shows that the Penal Code is not inconsistent with the provisions inforce in the US.

-Since by the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philipines to t h e U S , i t s l o g i c a l t h a t t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e P e n a l Code be changed simply to substitute Spain to United States, and Spaniards to citizens of the US and citizensof the Philippines.-Therefore, the Penal Code, specifically Art. 153 and 154 of the Penal Code, were still in forc e in the Philippines at this time. Judgment : Piracy was committed with offense against chastity and abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. There are three aggravating circumstances the wrong done was deliberately augmented by causingother wrongs not necessary for its commission, advantage was taken of superior strength and ignominy. There is one mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction. But due to the horrible nature of the crime committed, the penalty imposed isthe capital punishment.The punishment is unanimous for Lol -lo, who raped on of the women, but no unanimous as to Saraw. So only Lol -lo issentenced to be hung until dead.As to Kin As to Kinawalang and Maulanis, they shall indemnify the offendeparties with 924 rupees, and half of the costs of bothinstances THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 151876. June 21, 2005]

SUSAN GO and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. FERNANDO L. DIMAGIBA, respondent. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: Administrative Circular 12-2000, as clarified by Administrative Circular 13-2001, merely establishes a rule of preference in imposing penalties for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22), the Bouncing Checks Law. When the circumstances of both the offense and the offender indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone -- instead of imprisonment -- is the preferred penalty. As the Circular requires a review of the factual circumstances of a given case, it applies only to pending or future litigations. It is not a penal law; hence, it does not have retroactive effect. Neither may it be used to modify final judgments of conviction.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisition, this Court finds the evidence of the prosecution to have established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged and imposes upon the accused the penalty of 3 months imprisonment for each count (13 counts) and to indemnify the offended party the amount of One Million Two Hundred Ninety Five Thousand Pesos (P1,295,000.00) with legal interest per annum commencing from 1996 after the checks were dishonored by reason ACCOUNT CLOSED on December 13, 1995, to pay [9] attorneys fees of P15,000.00 and to pay the costs. The appeal of Dimagiba was raffled to Branch 4 of the RTC in Baguio [10] City. On May 23, 2000, the RTC denied the appeal and sustained his [11] conviction. There being no further appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the RTC [12] issued on February 1, 2001, a Certificate of Finality of the Decision. Thus, on February 14, 2001, the MTCC issued an Order directing the arrest of Dimagiba for the service of his sentence as a result of his conviction. The trial court [13] also issued a Writ of Execution to enforce his civil liability. On February 27, 2001, Dimagiba filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the MTCC Order. He prayed for the recall of the Order of Arrest and the modification of the final Decision, arguing that the penalty of fine only, instead of imprisonment also, [14] should have been imposed on him. The arguments raised in that Motion were reiterated in a Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution filed on [15] February 28, 2001. In an Order dated August 22, 2001, the MTCC denied the Motion for Reconsideration and directed the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against [16] Dimagiba. On September 28, 2001, he was arrested and imprisoned for the service of his sentence. On October 9, 2001, he filed with the RTC of Baguio City a Petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The case was raffled to Branch 5, which scheduled the hearing for October 10, 2001. Copies of the Order were served on respondents counsels and [18] the city warden.
[17]

The Case
[1]

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, [2] [3] assailing the October 10, 2001 and the October 11, 2001 Orders of the Regional [4] Trial Court (RTC) (Branch 5), Baguio City. The October 10, 2001 Order released Respondent Fernando L. Dimagiba from confinement and required him to pay a fine of P100,000 in lieu of imprisonment. The October 11, 2001 Order disposed as follows: WHEREFORE, [in] applying the doctrine as held in the above-entitled cases in this case, the instant petition for Habeas Corpus should be, as it is hereby, GRANTED. The Baguio City Jail Warden is hereby ordered to IMMEDIATELY RELEASE the petitioner from confinement unless he is being held for some other lawful cause other than by virtue of the Sentence Mittimus dated September 28, 2001 issued by CESAR S. VIDUYA, Clerk of Court, MTC 4, Baguio City. Further, the petitioner is required to pay a fine in the amount of P100,000.00 in lieu of his imprisonment, in addition to the [5] civil aspect of the Joint Judgment rendered by MTC 4 dated July 16, 1999.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The Facts

The pertinent facts are not disputed. Respondent Fernando L. Dimagiba issued to Petitioner Susan Go thirteen (13) checks which, when presented to the drawee bank for encashment or payment on the due dates, were dishonored for the reason [6] account closed. Dimagiba was subsequently prosecuted for 13 counts of violation [7] of BP 22 under separate Complaints filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities [8] (MTCC) in Baguio City. After a joint trial, the MTCC (Branch 4) rendered a Decision on July 16, 1999, convicting the accused in the 13 cases. The dispositive portion reads as follows:

Right after hearing the case on October 10, 2001, the RTC issued an Order directing the immediate release of Dimagiba from confinement and requiring him to pay a fine of P100,000 in lieu of imprisonment. However, the civil aspect of the July [19] 16, 1999 MTCC Decision was not touched upon. A subsequent Order, explaining in greater detail the basis of the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, was issued on [20] October 11, 2001. In justifying its modification of the MTCC Decision, the RTC invoked Vaca v. [21] Court of Appeals and Supreme Court Administrative Circular (SC-AC) No. 12[22] 2000, which allegedly required the imposition of a fine only instead of imprisonment also for BP 22 violations, if the accused was not a recidivist or a habitual delinquent. [23] The RTC held that this rule should be retroactively applied in favor of Dimagiba. It further noted that (1) he was a first-time offender and an employer of at least 200

workers who would be displaced as a result of his imprisonment; and (2) the civil [24] liability had already been satisfied through the levy of his properties. On October 22, 2001, Petitioner Go filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the [25] RTC Orders dated October 10 and 11, 2001. That Motion was denied on January [26] 18, 2002. Hence, this Petition filed directly with this Court on pure questions of law.
[27]

Main Issue: Propriety of the Writ of Habeas Corpus

The Issues Petitioner raises the following issues for this Courts consideration: 1. [The RTC] Judge was utterly devoid of jurisdiction in amending a final and conclusive decision of the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 4, dated July 16, 1999, in nullifying the Sentence Mittimus, dated September 28, 2001, issued by x x x [the] Municipal Trial Court, Branch 4, Baguio City, and in ordering the release of [Dimagiba] from confinement in jail for the service of his sentence under the said final and conclusive judgment; 2. Assuming only for the sake of argument that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, the Petition for Habeas Corpus is utterly devoid of merit as [Dimagiba was] not entitled to the beneficent policy enunciated in theEduardo Vaca and Rosa Lim cases and reiterated in the Supreme Court Circular No. 12-2000; x x x 3. Granting for the sake of argument that [Dimagiba was] entitled to the beneficent policy enunciated in the Eduardo Vaca and Rosa Lim cases and reiterated in the Supreme Court Circular No. 12-2000, the minimum fine that should be imposed on [Dimagiba] is one million and two hundred ninety five thousand pesos (P1,295,000.00) up to double the said amount or (P2,590,000), not just the measly amount of P100,000; and 4. [The RTC] judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in hearing and deciding [Dimagibas] Petition for Habeas Corpus without notice and without affording procedural due process to the People of the Philippines through the Office of [the] City Prosecutor of Baguio City or the Office of [28] the Solicitor General. In the main, the case revolves around the question of whether the Petition for habeas corpus was validly granted. Hence, the Court will discuss the four issues as [29] they intertwine with this main question.

The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention [30] in which individuals are deprived of liberty. It was devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint; or, more specifically, to obtain immediate relief for those who may have been illegally confined or imprisoned [31] without sufficient cause and thus deliver them from unlawful custody. It is therefore a writ of inquiry intended to test the circumstances under which a person is [32] detained. The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a judicial [33] process or by virtue of a valid judgment. However, as a post-conviction remedy, it may be allowed when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, any of the following exceptional circumstances is attendant: (1) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (3) the imposed penalty has been [34] excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such excess. In the present case, the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was anchored on the ruling in Vaca and on SC-AC No. 12-2000, which allegedly prescribed the imposition of a fine, not imprisonment, for convictions under BP 22. Respondent sought the retroactive effect of those rulings, thereby effectively challenging the penalty imposed on him for being excessive. From his allegations, the Petition appeared sufficient in form to support the issuance of the writ. However, it appears that respondent has previously sought the modification of [35] his sentence in a Motion for Reconsideration of the MTCCs Execution Order and [36] in a Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution. Both were denied by the MTCC on the ground that it had no power or authority to amend a judgment issued by the RTC. In his Petition for habeas corpus, respondent raised the same arguments that he had invoked in the said Motions. We believe that his resort to this extraordinary remedy was a procedural infirmity. The remedy should have been an appeal of the MTCC Order denying his Motions, in which he should have prayed that the execution of the judgment be stayed. But he effectively misused the action he had chosen, obviously with the intent of finding a favorable court. His Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was clearly an attempt to reopen a case that had already become final and executory. Such an action deplorably amounted to forum shopping. Respondent should have resorted to the proper, available remedy instead of instituting a different action in another forum. The Court also finds his arguments for his release insubstantial to support the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

Preference in the Application of Penalties for Violation of BP 22

The following alternative penalties are imposable under BP 22: (1) imprisonment of not less than 30 days, but not more than one year; (2) a fine of not less or more than double the amount of the check, a fine that shall in no case exceed P200,000; or [37] (3) both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court. SC-AC No. 12-2000, as clarified by SC-AC No. 13-2001, established a rule of [39] preference in imposing the above penalties. When the circumstances of the case clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the [40] imposition of a fine alone may be considered as the preferred penalty. The determination of the circumstances that warrant the imposition of a fine rests upon the [41] trial judge only. Should the judge deem that imprisonment is appropriate, such [42] penalty may be imposed. SC-AC No. 12-2000 did not delete the alternative penalty of imprisonment. The [43] competence to amend the law belongs to the legislature, not to this Court.
[38]

of his right to equal protection of the laws, since only a fine would be imposed on [47] others similarly situated. The rule on retroactivity states that criminal laws may be applied retroactively if [48] favorable to the accused. This principle, embodied in the Revised Penal Code, has [49] been expanded in certain instances to cover special laws. The issue of retroactivity of SC-AC No. 12-2000 was settled in De Joya v. Jail [50] Warden of Batangas City, which we quote: Petitioner's reliance of our ruling in Ordoez v. Vinarao that a convicted person is entitled to benefit from the reduction of penalty introduced by the new law, citing People v. Simon, is misplaced. Thus, her plea that as provided for in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 as modified by SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001 should benefit her has no basis. First. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence, Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable. The circular applies only to those cases pending as of the date of its effectivity and not to cases already terminated by final judgment. Second. As explained by the Court in SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001, SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely lays down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It does not amend B.P. Blg. 22, nor defeat the legislative intent behind the law. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely urges the courts to take into account not only the purpose of the law but also the circumstances of the accused -- whether he acted in good faith or on a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence -- and such other circumstance which the trial court or the [51] appellate court believes relevant to the penalty to be imposed. Because the Circular merely lays down a rule of preference, it serves only as a guideline for the trial courts. Thus, it is addressed to the judges, who are directed to consider the factual circumstances of each case prior to imposing the appropriate penalty. In other words, the Administrative Circular does not confer any new right in favor of the accused, much less those convicted by final judgment. The competence to determine the proper penalty belongs to the court rendering [52] the decision against the accused. That decision is subject only to appeal on grounds of errors of fact or law, or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Another trial court may not encroach upon this authority. Indeed, SC-AC No. 12-2000 necessarily requires a review of all factual circumstances of each case. Such a review can no longer be done if the judgment has become final and executory. In the present case, the MTCC of Baguio City had full knowledge of all relevant circumstances from which respondents conviction and sentence were based. The penalty imposed was well within the confines of the law. Upon appeal, the conviction was sustained by RTC-Branch 4 of Baguio City. Eventually, the Decision attained finality. Hence, RTC-Branch 5 did not have the jurisdiction to modify the lawful judgment in the guise of granting a writ of habeas corpus.

Inapplicability of SC-AC No. 12-2000

Petitioners argue that respondent is not entitled to the benevolent policy [44] enunciated in SC-AC No. 12-2000, because he is not a first time offender. This circumstance is, however, not the sole factor in determining whether he deserves the preferred penalty of fine alone. The penalty to be imposed depends on the peculiar [45] circumstances of each case. It is the trial courts discretion to impose any penalty within the confines of the law. SC-AC No. 13-2001 explains thus: x x x. Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal provisions of BP 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. x x x. It is, therefore, understood that: xxx xxx xxx

2. The Judges concerned, may in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice, or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice; The Court notes that the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus relied mainly on the alleged retroactivity of SC-AC No. 12-2000, which supposedly favored BP 22 [46] offenders. On this point, Dimagiba contended that his imprisonment was violative

The doctrine of equal protection of laws does not apply for the same reasons as those on retroactivity. Foremost of these reasons is that the Circular is not a law that deletes the penalty of imprisonment. As explained earlier, it is merely a rule of preference as to which penalty should be imposed under the peculiar circumstances of a case. At any rate, this matter deserves scant consideration, because respondent [54] failed to raise any substantial argument to support his contention.

[53]

Modification of Final Judgment Not Warranted


[55]

The practice is prohibited by law because of its deleterious effects on public interest. The effects of the increase of worthless checks transcend the private interest of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interest of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation multiplied a thousand-fold can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an [66] offense against public order. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Orders NULLIFIED. Respondents Petition for habeas corpus is hereby DENIED. Let this case be REMANDED to MTCC of Baguio City for the re-arrest of respondent and the completion of his sentence. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

The Court is not unmindful of So v. Court of Appeals, in which the final judgment of conviction for violation of BP 22 was modified by the deletion of the sentence of imprisonment and the imposition of a fine. That case proceeded from an [56] Urgent Manifestation of an Extraordinary Supervening Event, not from an unmeritorious petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as in the present case. The Court exercised in that case its authority to suspend or to modify the execution of a final judgment when warranted or made imperative by the higher interest of justice or by [57] supervening events. The supervening event in that case was the petitioners urgent need for coronary rehabilitation for at least one year under the direct supervision of a coronary care therapist; imprisonment would have been equivalent to a death [58] sentence. The peculiar circumstances of So do not obtain in the present case. Respondents supposed unhealthy physical condition due to a triple by -pass operation, and aggravated by hypertension, cited by the RTC in its October 10, 2001 [59] Order, is totally bereft of substantial proof. The Court notes that respondent did not make any such allegation in his Petition for habeas corpus. Neither did he mention his physical state in his Memorandum and Comment submitted to this Court. Respondent seeks the retroactive application of SC-AC No. 12-2000 in his favor [60] on the basis alone of the alleged settlement of his civil liability. Citing Griffith v. [61] Court of Appeals, he theorizes that answering for a criminal offense is no longer justified after the settlement of the debt. Respondent, however, misreads Griffith. The Court held in that case that convicting the accused who, two years prior to the filing of the BP 22 cases, had already paid his debt (from which the checks originated) was contrary to the basic [62] principles of fairness and justice. Obviously, that situation is not attendant here. The civil liability in the present case was satisfied through the levy and sale of the properties of respondent only after the criminal case had been terminated with his [63] conviction. Apparently, he had sufficient properties that could have been used to settle his liabilities prior to his conviction. Indeed, such an early settlement would have been an indication that he was in good faith, a circumstance that could have been favorably considered in determining his appropriate penalty. At any rate, civil liability differs from criminal liability. What is punished in the latter is not the failure to pay the obligation, but the issuance of checks that [65] subsequently bounced or were dishonored for insufficiency or lack of funds. The Court reiterates the reasons why the issuance of worthless checks is criminalized:
[64]

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-74324 November 17, 1988 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, & BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA, accused-appellants. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellants.

MEDIALDEA, J.: For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate, FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA and BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA were charged with the crime of MURDER in Criminal Case No. L-175-82 of the Court of First

Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Cavite, under an information which reads as follows: That on or about May 19, 1982 at the town plaza of the Municipality of Rosario, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and assisting one another, with treachery and evident premeditation, taking advantage of their superior strength, and with the decided purpose to kill, poured gasoline, a combustible liquid to the body of Bayani Miranda and with the use of fire did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, burn the whole body of said Bayani Miranda which caused his subsequent death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the aforenamed Bayani Miranda. That the crime was committed with the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and superior strength, and the means employed was to weaken the defense; that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing another wrong, that is the burning of the body of Bayani Miranda. CONTRARY TO LAW (p. 1, Records). Upon being arraigned, both accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. After trial, the trial court rendered a decision finding both accused guilty on the crime of murder but crediting in favor of the accused Pugay the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, the accused Fernando Pugay y Balcita and Benjamin Samson y Magdalena are pronounced guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals by direct participation of the crime of murder for the death of Bayani Miranda, and appreciating the aforestated mitigating circumstance in favor of Pugay, he is sentenced to a prison term ranging from twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and Samson to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua together with the

accessories of the law for both of them. The accused are solidarily held liable to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P13,940.00 plus moral damages of P10,000.00 and exemplary damages of P5,000.00. Let the preventive imprisonment of Pugay be deducted from the principal penalty. Cost against both accused. SO ORDERED (p. 248, Records). Not satisfied with the decision, both accused interposed the present appeal and assigned the following errors committed by the court a quo: 1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN UTILIZING THE STATEMENTS OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS IN ITS APPRECIATION OF FACTS DESPITE ITS ADMISSION THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE NOT ASSISTED BY A COUNSEL DURING THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION. 2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUPPRESSION BY THE PROSECUTION OF SOME EVIDENCE IS FATAL TO ITS CASE. 3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN LENDING CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF EDUARDO GABION WHO WAS ONE OF THE MANY SUSPECTS ARRESTED BY THE POLICE (Accusedappellants' Brief, p. 48, Rollo). The antecedent facts are as follows: The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and at times they slept together. On the evening of May 19, 1982, a town fiesta fair was held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite. There were different kinds of ride and one was a ferris wheel. Sometime after midnight of the same date, Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel and reading a comic book with his friend Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived. These

persons appeared to be drunk as they were all happy and noisy. As the group saw the deceased walking nearby, they started making fun of him. They made the deceased dance by tickling him with a piece of wood. Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferns wheel and poured its contents on the body of the former. Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the latter was already in the process of pouring the gasoline. Then, the accused Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him. The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused with water the burning body of the deceased. Some people around also poured sand on the burning body and others wrapped the same with rags to extinguish the flame. The body of the deceased was still aflame when police officer Rolando Silangcruz and other police officers of the Rosario Police Force arrived at the scene of the incident. Upon inquiring as to who were responsible for the dastardly act, the persons around spontaneously pointed to Pugay and Samson as the authors thereof. The deceased was later rushed to the Grace Hospital for treatment. In the meantime, the police officers brought Gabion, the two accused and five other persons to the Rosario municipal building for interrogation. Police officer Reynaldo Canlas took the written statements of Gabion and the two accused, after which Gabion was released. The two accused remained in custody. After a careful review of the records, We find the grounds relied upon by the accused-appellants for the reversal of the decision of the court a quo to be without merit. It bears emphasis that barely a few hours after the incident, accusedappellants gave their written statements to the police. The accused Pugay admitted in his statement, Exhibit F, that he poured a can of gasoline on the deceased believing that the contents thereof was water and then the accused Samson set the deceased on fire. The accused Samson, on the other hand, alleged in his statement that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on Miranda but did not see the person who set him on fire. Worthy of note is the fact that both statements did not impute any participation of eyewitness Gabion in the commission of the offense.

While testifying on their defense, the accused-appellants repudiated their written statements alleging that they were extracted by force. They claimed that the police maltreated them into admitting authorship of the crime. They also engaged in a concerted effort to lay the blame on Gabion for the commission of the offense. Thus, while it is true that the written statements of the accused-appellants were mentioned and discussed in the decision of the court a quo, the contents thereof were not utilized as the sole basis for the findings of facts in the decision rendered. The said court categorically stated that "even without Exhibits 'F' and 'G', there is still Gabion's straightforward, positive and convincing testimony which remains unaffected by the uncorroborated, self-serving and unrealiable testimonies of Pugay and Samson" (p. 247, Records). Accused-appellants next assert that the prosecution suppressed the testimonies of other eyewitnesses to the incident. They claim that despite the fact that there were other persons investigated by the police, only Gabion was presented as an eyewitness during the trial of the case. They argue that the deliberate non- presentation of these persons raises the presumption that their testimonies would be adverse to the prosecution. There is no dispute that there were other persons who witnessed the commission of the crime. In fact there appears on record (pp. 1617, Records) the written statements of one Abelardo Reyes and one Monico Alimorong alleging the same facts and imputing the respective acts of pouring of gasoline and setting the deceased on fire to the accused-appellants as testified to by Gabion in open court. They were listed as prosecution witnesses in the information filed. Considering that their testimonies would be merely corroborative, their non-presentation does not give rise to the presumption that evidence wilfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. This presumption does not apply to the suppression of merely corroborative evidence (U.S. vs. Dinola, 37 Phil. 797). Besides, the matter as to whom to utilize as witness is for the prosecution to decide.
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Accused-appellants also attack the credibility of the eyewitness Gabion alleging that not only was the latter requested by the mother of the deceased to testify for the prosecution in exchange for his absolution from liability but also because his testimony that he was reading a comic book during an unusual event is contrary to human behavior and experience.

Gabion testified that it was his uncle and not the mother of the deceased who asked him to testify and state the truth about the incident. The mother of the deceased likewise testified that she never talked to Gabion and that she saw the latter for the first time when the instant case was tried. Besides, the accused Pugay admitted that Gabion was his friend and both Pugay and the other accused Samson testified that they had no previous misunderstanding with Gabion. Clearly, Gabion had no reason to testify falsely against them. In support of their claim that the testimony of Gabion to the effect that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on the deceased and then Samson set him on fire is incredible, the accused-appellants quote Gabion's testimony on cross-examination that, after telling Pugay not to pour gasoline on the deceased, he (Gabion) resumed reading comics; and that it was only when the victim's body was on fire that he noticed a commotion. However, explaining this testimony on re-direct examination, Gabion stated: Q. Mr. Gabion, you told the Court on cross-examination that you were reading comics when you saw Pugay poured gasoline unto Bayani Miranda and lighted by Samson. How could you possibly see that incident while you were reading comics? A. I put down the comics which I am reading and I saw what they were doing. Q. According to you also before Bayani was poured with gasoline and lighted and burned later you had a talk with Pugay, is that correct? A. When he was pouring gasoline on Bayani Miranda I was trying to prevent him from doing so. Q. We want to clarify. According to you a while ago you had a talk with Pugay and as a matter of fact, you told him not to

pour gasoline. That is what I want to know from you, if that is true? A. Yes, sir. Q. Aside from Bayani being tickled with a stick on his ass, do you mean to say you come to know that Pugay will pour gasoline unto him? A. I do not know that would be that incident. Q. Why did you as(k) Pugay in the first place not to pour gasoline before he did that actually? A. Because I pity Bayani, sir. Q. When you saw Pugay tickling Bayani with a stick on his ass you tried according to you to ask him not to and then later you said you asked not to pour gasoline. Did Pugay tell you he was going to pour gasoline on Bayani? A. I was not told, sir. Q. Did you come to know..... how did you come to know he was going to pour gasoline that is why you prevent him? A. Because he was holding on a container of gasoline. I thought it was water but it was gasoline. Q. It is clear that while Pugay was tickling Bayani with a stick on his ass, he later got hold of a can of gasoline, is that correct? A. Yes, sir.

Q. And when he pick up the can of gasoline, was that the time you told him not to pour gasoline when he merely pick up the can of gasoline. A. I saw him pouring the gasoline on the body of Joe. Q. So, it is clear when you told Pugay not to pour gasoline he was already in the process of pouring gasoline on the body of Bayani? A. Yes, sir (Tsn, July 30, 1983, pp. 32-33). It is thus clear that prior to the incident in question, Gabion was reading a comic book; that Gabion stopped reading when the group of Pugay started to make fun of the deceased; that Gabion saw Pugay get the can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferris wheel; that it was while Pugay was in the process of pouring the gasoline on the body of the deceased when Gabion warned him not to do so; and that Gabion later saw Samson set the deceased on fire. However, there is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention between the two accused-appellants immediately before the commission of the crime. There was no animosity between the deceased and the accused Pugay or Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the incident was accidental. It is also clear that the accused Pugay and his group merely wanted to make fun of the deceased. Hence, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed against the deceased is individual and not collective, and each of them is liable only for the act committed by him (U.S. vs. Magcomot, et. al. 13, Phil. 386; U.S. vs. Abiog, et. al. 37 Phil. 1371). The next question to be determined is the criminal responsibility of the accused Pugay. Having taken the can from under the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before pouring its contents on the body of the deceased, this accused knew that the can contained gasoline. The stinging smell of this flammable liquid could not have escaped his notice even before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act that may be committed by his companions who at the time were

making fun of the deceased. We agree with the Solicitor General that the accused is only guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In U.S. vs. Maleza, et. al. 14 Phil. 468, 470, this Court ruled as follows: A man must use common sense and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury. The proper penalty that the accused Pugay must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from four (4) months ofarresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. With respect to the accused Samson, the Solicitor General in his brief contends that "his conviction of murder, is proper considering that his act in setting the deceased on fire knowing that gasoline had just been poured on him is characterized by treachery as the victim was left completely helpless to defend and protect himself against such an outrage" (p. 57, Rollo). We do not agree. There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused Samson had some reason to kill the deceased before the incident. On the contrary, there is adequate evidence showing that his act was merely a part of their fun-making that evening. For the circumstance of treachery to exist, the attack must be deliberate and the culprit employed means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make. There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on the body of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not have committed the act of setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise. Giving him the benefit of doubt, it call be conceded that as part of their fun-making he merely intended to set the deceased's clothes on fire. His act, however, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility. Burning the clothes of the victim would cause at the very least some kind of physical injuries on his person, a felony defined in the Revised Penal Code. If his act resulted into a graver offense, as what took place in the instant case, he must be held

responsible therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing any qualifying circumstances, the accused Samson is only guilty of the crime of homicide defined and penalized in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. We are disposed to credit in his favor the ordinary mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed as there is evidence of a fact from which such conclusion can be drawn. The eyewitness Gabion testified that the accused Pugay and Samson were stunned when they noticed the deceased burning (Tsn, June 1, 1983, pp. 16-17).
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DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Appellant Renato Garcia y Romano was charged with Murder before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Criminal Case No. Q98-79961 in an Information1 which reads: That on or about the 22nd day of May, 1998, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, being then the driver and/or person in charge of an Isuzu Jitney bearing Plate No. NPJ-948 did then and there unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and operate the same along Zabarte Road in said City, in a careless, reckless, negligent and impudent manner, by then and there making the said vehicle run at a speed greater than was reasonable and proper without taking the necessary precaution to avoid accident to person/s of the traffic at said place at the time, causing as consequence of his said carelessness, negligence, impudence and lack of precaution, the said vehicle so driven, managed and operated by him to hit and bump, as in fact it hit and bumped Sanily Billon y Trinidad, a pedestrian, thereafter, with intent to kill, qualified by evident premeditation and use of motor vehicle, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously ran said vehicle over the victim thereby causing her serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of her untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said Sanily Billon y Trinidad. CONTRARY TO LAW. On arraignment, appellant pleaded "not guilty". Thereafter, trial on the merits followed. The prosecution alleged that at around 12:00 noon of May 22, 1998, Bentley Billon and his younger sister, Sanily, boarded a passenger jeepney on their way to Sacred Heart School in Barangay Kaligayahan, Novaliches, Quezon City to attend remedial classes. They alighted on Zabarte Road in front of the school. Bentley crossed the street and waited on the center island for Sanily to cross. While Sanily was crossing the street, a passenger jeepney driven by appellant, coming from Camarin and heading towards Quirino Highway, hit her on the left side of the body. Sanily fell and was thrown to the ground a meter away from the vehicle. The jeepney stopped. But as Bentley was running towards his sister, the vehicle suddenly accelerated with its front tire running over Sanilys stomach. Bentley and appellant pulled Sanily, who was writhing

The proper penalty that the accused Samson must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from eight (8) years ofprision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The lower court held the accused solidarily liable for P13,940.00, the amount spent by Miranda's parents for his hospitalization, wake and interment. The indemnity for death is P30,000.00. Hence, the indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Miranda is increased to P43,940.00. Both accused shall be jointly and severally liable for the aforesaid amount plus the P10,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00 as exemplary damages as found by the court a quo. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed with the modifications aboveindicated. Costs against the accused-appellants. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 153591 February 23, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee vs. RENATO GARCIA y ROMANO, appellant.

in excruciating pain, from underneath the vehicle and brought her to the Sta. Lucia Hospital but due to lack of medical facilities, she was transferred to the Quezon City General Hospital (QCGH) where she was operated. However, she died four days later. Dr. Emmanuel Reyes,2 Medico-legal of the Southern Police District, Fort Bonifacio, testified that the attending physician, Dr. Santiago C. Sagad, noted lacerations in Sanilys liver and spleen which was caused by a blunt/strong force on the victims body, resulting to her death due to internal bleeding. He opined that the blunt force may have also caused lacerations in the victims intestine and the abrasions on the arm, from the elbow to the shoulder could be the result of the skins contact with a rough surface. Appellant admitted having ran over the victim, but claimed that it was an accident. He narrated that at around noon on May 22, 1998, while driving his passenger jeepney along Zabarte Road, he saw a boy crossing the street followed by the victim. While the vehicle was running, he heard a thud. He immediately applied his breaks and alighted to check what it was. He saw to his horror a girl sprawled underneath his vehicle between the front and the rear tires. He and the victims brother rushed the girl to the Sta. Lucia Hospital, but they transferred her to the Quezon City General Hospital which has better facilities. A week later, he learned that the victim died. On May 2, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment,3 finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the dispositive portion of which reads:4 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, for which, said RENATO GARCIA y ROMANO is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Sanily Billon the sum of One Hundred and Twenty Three Thousand and Five Hundred Pesos (P123,500.00) as actual damages including attorneys fees; Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity for the death of Sanily and Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as moral damages. Cost against the accused. SO ORDERED.

The trial court held that appellant is guilty of murder qualified by evident premeditation because he deliberately ran over the slumped body of the victim. Hence this appeal, raising the following errors, to wit: I THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF EVIDENT PREMEDITAION II THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER AS CHARGED. The issue to be resolved is whether or not appellant is guilty of murder or reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Appellant argues that the trial court gravely erred in finding that the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation attended the commission of the offense. He contends that the mere allegation by the prosecution that he bumped the victim and intentionally ran over her body is not sufficient to establish evident premeditation. He claims that he did not intentionally run over the victim when his vehicle bumped her because he was rattled and was no longer aware of what he was doing. We find from a careful review of the facts on record that the unfortunate incident was more the result of reckless imprudence than of malicious intent. Therefore, the trial court erred in convicting appellant of the crime of murder qualified by evident premeditation. The elements of evident premeditation are: (1) a previous decision by the appellant to commit the crime; (2) an overt act/acts manifestly indicating that the appellant clung to his determination; and (3) a lapse of time between the decision to commit the crime and its actual execution sufficient to allow appellant to reflect upon the consequences of his acts. The victims brother, Bentley, testified that the vehicle stopped after it bumped the victim, but it moved forward and ran over the prostrate body of her sister. From his narration, we find that no sufficient time elapsed for

appellant to decide to commit the crime and reflect on its consequences. Moreover, there was no showing that appellant performed other overt acts to show that he was determined to commit murder. The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent, during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.5 These circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. Appellant could have reacted on instinct and relied on sheer impulse to respond to the situation at hand. While it is possible that appellant deliberately ran over the victim, it is equally possible, if not more probable, that the vehicle moved forward because appellant failed to control its momentum. Indeed, this is more consistent with the unrebutted evidence that the jeepney, which had no handbrake, was moving fast and that appellant became confused when the accident occurred. Furthermore, appellants act of bringing the victim to the hospital despite numerous opportunities to flee from the scene is more compatible with a state of mind devoid of criminal intent. In view of the gravity of the offense involved, the trial court should have been more circumspect in weighing the evidence of both parties. Our own evaluation of the evidence reveals that appellant had no intention to kill the victim. As such, he cannot be held liable for an intentional felony. All reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate negligence, and not criminal intent, must be resolved in favor of appellant.6 Thus, appellant is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In U.S. v. Maleza,7 we explained the rationale behind this crime as follows: A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible.8 Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that reckless imprudence consists in

voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing such act. Compared to intentional felonies, such as homicide or murder, what takes the place of the element of malice or intention to commit a wrong or evil is the failure of the offender to take precautions due to lack of skill taking into account his employment, or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place.9 Appellant showed an inexcusable lack of precaution when he disregarded a traffic sign cautioning motorists to slow down10 and drove his vehicle in full speed despite being aware that he was traversing a school zone and pedestrians were crossing the street. He should have observed due diligence of a reasonably prudent man by slackening his speed and proceeding cautiously while passing the area. The imposable penalty, under Art. 365 (2)11 of the Revised Penal Code, homicide resulting from reckless imprudence in the use of motor vehicle is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, which ranges from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Under Article 65 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty shall be divided into three equal portions of time, each of which shall form one period. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the proper penalty shall be within the medium period, which is three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days. Applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant is entitled to a minimum term to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto mayor, maximum to prision correccional, minimum. Accordingly, appellant should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum.12 The trial court correctly awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. However, the award of moral damages in the amount of P500,000.00 should be reduced to P50,000.00.13 The award of P30,000.00 as actual damages must likewise be modified. The mother of the victim presented receipts that they, in fact, spent P58,257.9014 for hospital bills and funeral expenses. The fact that she received P40,000.00 from insurance will not affect the award of actual damages.15 The award of exemplary damages is deleted for lack of factual basis. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-98-79961,

convicting appellant of the crime of murder is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Renato Garcia y Romano is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, and he is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. Appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P58,257.90 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 157171 March 14, 2006

That on or about May 11, 1995, which was within the canvassing period during the May 8, 1995 elections, in the Municipality of Alaminos, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Election Officer Arsenia B. Garcia, Municipal Treasurer Herminio R. Romero, Public School District Supervisor Renato R. Viray, Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and MemberSecretary, respectively, of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Alaminos, Pangasinan, tabulators Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, conspiring with, confederating together and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, willfully, and unlawfully decrease[d] the votes received by senatorial candidate Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. from six thousand nine hundred ninety-eight (6,998) votes, as clearly disclosed in the total number of votes in the one hundred fifty-nine (159) precincts of the Statement of Votes by Precincts of said municipality, with Serial Nos. 008417, 008418, 008419, 008420, 008421, 008422 and 008423 to one thousand nine hundred twenty-one (1,921) votes as reflected in the Statement of Votes by Precincts with Serial No. 008423 and Certificate of Canvass with Serial No. 436156 with a difference of five thousand seventy-seven (5,077) votes. CONTRARY TO LAW.4 In a Decision dated September 11, 2000, the RTC acquitted all the accused for insufficiency of evidence, except petitioner who was convicted as follows: xxx 5. And finally, on the person of Arsenia B. Garcia, the Court pronounces her GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime defined under Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b) for decreasing the votes of Senator Pimentel in the total of 5,034 and in relation to BP Blg. 881, considering that this finding is a violation of Election Offense, she is thus sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS as maximum, but applying the INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW, the minimum penalty is the next degree lower which is SIX (6) MONTHS; however, accused Arsenia B. Garcia is not entitled to probation; further, she is sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office and she is also deprived of her right of suffrage. The bailbond posted by her is hereby ordered cancelled, and the Provincial Warden is ordered to commit her person to the Bureau of

ARSENIA B. GARCIA, Petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents DECISION QUISUMBING, J.: This petition seeks the review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 245471that affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court2of Alaminos City, Pangasinan, Branch 54, for violation of Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646.3 Based on the complaint-affidavit of Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., who ran in the 1995 senatorial elections, an information dated March 30, 1998, was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, charging Herminio R. Romero, Renato R. Viray, Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, and petitioner, with violation of Section 27(b). The information reads:

Correctional Institution for Women, at Metro Manila, until further orders from the court. No pronouncement as to costs. IT IS SO ORDERED.5 Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the RTC Decision, thus, WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed with modification, increasing the minimum penalty imposed by the trial court from six (6) months to one (1) year. SO ORDERED.6 The Court of Appeals likewise denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal assigning the following as errors of the appellate court: I ON THE FIRST AND SECOND GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY THE RESPONDENT COURT, NAMELY, THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN SECRETARY VIRAY WHO DECREASED THE VOTES OF COMPLAINANT PIMENTEL SINCE HE MERELY RELIED ON WHAT THE PETITIONER DICTATED, AND THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE ALSO BEEN THE TABULATORS BECAUSE PETITIONER WAS THE ONE WHO READ THE ADDING [MACHINE] TAPE. II ON THE THIRD GROUND, NAMELY, THAT PETITIONER DID NOT PRODUCE THE TAPES DURING THE TRIAL BECAUSE IF PRODUCED, IT IS GOING TO BE ADVERSE TO HER. III ON THE FOURTH GROUND, NAMELY, THAT THE PETITIONER WAS THE ONE WHO ENTERED THE REDUCED FIGURE OF 1,921 IN THE CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS (COC), Exh. "7", WHEN THE DUTY WAS THAT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE BOARD.

IV THE REDUCTION OF THE VOTES OF CANDIDATE PIMENTEL WAS CLEARLY NOT WILLFUL OR INTENTIONAL.7 Petitioner contends that (1) the Court of Appeals judgment is erroneous, based on speculations, surmises and conjectures, instead of substantial evidence; and (2) there was no motive on her part to reduce the votes of private complainant. Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a defense in the violation of an election law, which falls under the class of mala prohibita. The main issue is, Is a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under mala in se or mala prohibita? Could good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses? Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law.8Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become punishable only because the law says they are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has been violated.9Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy.10 Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 664611provides: SEC. 27. Election Offenses.- In addition to the prohibited acts and election offenses enumerated in Sections 261 and 262 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, the following shall be guilty of an election offense: xxx (b) Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers, increases, or decreases the votes received by a candidate in any election or any member of the board who refuses, after proper verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes.

xxx Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se.12For otherwise, even errors and mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable. Given the volume of votes to be counted and canvassed within a limited amount of time, errors and miscalculations are bound to happen. And it could not be the intent of the law to punish unintentional election canvass errors. However, intentionally increasing or decreasing the number of votes received by a candidate is inherently immoral, since it is done with malice and intent to injure another. Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear.13Thus, whoever invokes good faith as a defense has the burden of proving its existence. Records show that the canvassing of votes on May 11, 1995 before the Board of Canvassers of the Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan was conducted as follows: 1. After the votes in the 159 precincts of the municipality of Alaminos were tallied, the results thereof were sealed and forwarded to the Municipal Board of Canvassers for canvassing; 2. The number of votes received by each candidate in each precinct was then recorded in the Statement of Votes with appellant, in her capacity as Chairman, reading the figures appearing in the results from the precincts and accused Viray, in his capacity as secretary of the Board, entering the number in the Statements of Votes as read by the appellant. Six Statements of Votes were filled up to reflect the votes received by each candidate in the 159 precincts of the Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan. 3. After the number of votes received by each candidate for each precincts were entered by accused Viray in the Statements of Votes, these votes were added by the accused Palisoc and de Vera with the use of electrical adding machines. 4. After the tabulation by accused Palisoc and de Vera, the corresponding machine tapes were handed to appellant who reads the subtotal of votes received by each candidate in the

precincts listed in each Statement of Votes. Accused Viray [then] records the subtotal in the proper column in the Statement of Votes. 5. After the subtotals had been entered by accused Viray, tabulators accused Palisoc and de Vera added all the subtotals appearing in all Statement of Votes. 6. After the computation, the corresponding machine tape on which the grand total was reflected was handed to appellant who reads the same and accused Viray enters the figure read by appellant in the column for grand total in the Statement of Votes.14 Neither the correctness of the number of votes entered in the Statement of Votes (SOV) for each precinct, nor of the number of votes entered as subtotals of votes received in the precincts listed in SOV Nos. 008417 to 008422 was raised as an issue. At first glance, however, there is a noticeable discrepancy in the addition of the subtotals to arrive at the grand total of votes received by each candidate for all 159 precincts in SOV No. 008423.15The grand total of the votes for private complainant, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, was only 1,921 instead of 6,921, or 5,000 votes less than the number of votes private complainant actually received. This error is also evident in the Certificate of Canvass (COC) No. 436156 signed by petitioner, Viray and Romero.16 During trial of this case, petitioner admitted that she was indeed the one who announced the figure of 1,921, which was subsequently entered by then accused Viray in his capacity as secretary of the board.17Petitioner likewise admitted that she was the one who prepared the COC (Exhibit A-7), though it was not her duty. To our mind, preparing the COC even if it was not her task, manifests an intention to perpetuate the erroneous entry in the COC.18 Neither can this Court accept petitioners explanation that the Board of Canvassers had no idea how the SOV (Exhibit "6") and the COC reflected that private complainant had only 1,921 votes instead of 6,921 votes. As chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers, petitioners concern was to assure accurate, correct and authentic entry of the votes. Her failure to exercise maximum efficiency and fidelity to her trust

deserves not only censure but also the concomitant sanctions as a matter of criminal responsibility pursuant to the dictates of the law.19 The fact that the number of votes deducted from the actual votes received by private complainant, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. was not added to any senatorial candidate does not relieve petitioner of liability under Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646. The mere decreasing of the votes received by a candidate in an election is already punishable under the said provision.20 At this point, we see no valid reason to disturb the factual conclusions of the appellate court. The Court has consistently held that factual findings of the trial court, as well as of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal, particularly where the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court on the matter coincide.21 Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by the members of the board of canvassers in canvassing the results of the elections. Any error on their part would result in the disenfranchisement of the voters. The Certificate of Canvass for senatorial candidates and its supporting statements of votes prepared by the municipal board of canvassers are sensitive election documents whose entries must be thoroughly scrutinized.22 In our review, the votes in the SOV should total 6,998.23 As between the grand total of votes alleged to have been received by private complainant of 6,921 votes and statement of his actual votes received of 6,998 is a difference of 77 votes. The discrepancy may be validly attributed to mistake or error due to fatigue. However, a decrease of 5,000 votes as reflected in the Statement of Votes and Certificate of Canvass is substantial, it cannot be allowed to remain on record unchallenged, especially when the error results from the mere transfer of totals from one document to another. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioners conviction but increasing the minimum penalty in her sentence to one year instead of six months isAFFIRMED.

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