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RABADILLA v. CA! G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000! FACTS:! !

In a codicil appended to the last will and testament of testatrix Alleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was instituted as a devisee of a 511,855 sq meters parcel of land. The codicil was duly probated and admitted before the CFI of Negros Occidental. ! The codicil stated that should the devisee die ahead of the testator, the property and rights shall be inherited by his children and spouse. The codicil also required Rabadilla to deliver 75 piculs of export sugar and 25 piculs of domestic sugar to Maria Marlina, and should he die, his heir shall have the same obligation. Lastly, in the event that the devisee or his heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage the said lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee shall also have the obligation to deliver the piculs. ! Dr. Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife and children. In 1989, Maria Marlena brought a complaint against the heirs to enforce the provisions of the codicil and to revert the ownership to the heirs of the testator. Maria Melena claimed that Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and the Republic Planters Bank in disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction to sell, lease, or mortgage only to the near descendants and sister of the testatrix. She also claims that defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one hundred (100) piculs of sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs domestic sugar) from sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of the complaint as mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated demands for compliance. Lastly, she claims that the banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil which provided that in case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop year to herein private respondent.! The RTC dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the action was prematurely filed as no cause of action against the defendants. The appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court deciding that the testamentary institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a modal institution within the purview of Article 882 of the New Civil Code.! ISSUE: ! Whether or not the testamentary institution of Rabadilla is a modal institution.! RULING: ! Petitioner theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions is not applicable because what the testatrix intended was a substitution in which Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was to be substituted by the testatrix's near descendants should there be noncompliance with the obligation to deliver the piculs of sugar to private respondent.! The contention is without merit.! Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution, or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution. The Codicil sued upon contemplates neither of the two.! In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation. In the case under consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.! Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point, petitioner is correct. In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the property and to transmit the same later to the second heir. In the case under consideration, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the property and its transmission to the second heir. "Without this obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will, there is no fideicommissary substitution." Also, the near descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The property will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of the usufruct to private respondent.! Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here. Under Article 863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A

fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not related by first degree to the second heir. In the case under scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.! The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article 882 of the New Civil Code is the provision of law in point. ! The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession. On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend. To some extent, it is similar to a resolutory condition.! From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.! Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not conditional.!

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Bordalba v. CA (G.R. No. 112443. January 25, 2002)! YNARES-SANTIAGO, J:! Facts: ! In 1980, herein petitioner was granted a Free Patent and was issued an Original Certificate of Title over the herein subject lot. She caused the subdivision and titling of the said lot into 6 parcels, as well as the conveyance of the two parcels thereof. Private respondents, however, claimed ownership over the same lot by virtue of an extrajudicial partition made as early as 1947. Hence, they filed a complaint to declare void the Free Patent as well as the cancellation of the titles issued. The trial court, finding that fraud was employed by petitioner in obtaining the Free Patent, declared said free patent and title void and ordered its cancellation. However, the purchaser and mortgagee of the two parcels conveyed were declared in good faith, hence, upheld their rights over the property. Both petitioner and private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. It ruled that private respondents are entitled only to 1/3 portion of the lot and petitioner should be ordered to reconvey only 1/3 of the lot to the private respondents. Petitioner contends that the testimonies given by the witnesses for private respondents which touched on matters occurring prior to the death of her mother should not have been admitted by the trial court, as the same violated the dead man's statute. Likewise, petitioner questions the right of private respondents to inherit from the late Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, as well as the identity between the disputed lot and the parcel of land adjudicated in the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition.!

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Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of dead mans statute?! Held: No. The dead man's statute does not operate to close the mouth of a witness as to any matter of fact coming to his knowledge in any other way than through personal dealings with the deceased person, or communication made by the deceased to the witness.! Since the claim of private respondents and the testimony of their witnesses in the present case is based, inter alia, on the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and other documents, and not on dealings and communications with the deceased, the questioned testimonies were properly admitted by the trial court.! Likewise untenable is the claim of petitioner that private respondents are not legal heirs of Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay. Other than their bare allegations to dispute their heirship, no hard evidence was presented by them to substantiate their allegations. Besides, in order that an heir may assert his right to the property of a deceased, no previous judicial declaration of heirship is necessary.! Heirs of Conti v. CA (G.R. No. 118464. December 21, 1998)! BELLOSILLO, J:! Facts: Lourdes Sampayo and Ignacio Conti were the co-owners of the property in litigation consisting of a 539-square meter lot at the corner of Zamora and Abellanosa Streets, Lucena City. After Lourdes Sampayo died, private respondents filed an action for partition and

damages before the RTC of Lucena City against Ignacio Conti. After trial on the merits, the court declared respondents as the rightful heirs of Lourdes Sampayo and ordered both parties to submit a project of partition of the residential house and lot for confirmation by the trial court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision ruling that a prior and separate judicial declaration of heirship was not necessary and that private respondents became co-owners of the portion of the property owned and registered in the name of Lourdes Sampayo upon her death and, consequently, entitled to the immediate possession thereof and all other incidents/rights of ownership as provided for by law including the right to demand partition under Art. 777 of the Civil Code.!

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Issue/s: ! (1) WON a prior settlement of the entire estate is essential before heirs can commence any action in behalf of deceased.! 2. WON private respondents could establish co-ownership by way of succession as collateral heirs of Sampayo! Held:! (1) No. prior settlement of the estate is not essential before the heirs can commence any action originally pertaining to the deceased as we explained in Quison v. Salud, Claro Quison died in 1902. It was proven at the trial that the present plaintiffs are next of kin and heirs, but it is said by the appellants that they are not entitled to maintain this action because there is no evidence that any proceedings have been taken in court for the settlement of the estate of Claro Quison, and that without such settlement, the heirs cannot maintain this action. There is nothing in this point. As well by the Civil Code as by the Code of Civil Procedure, the title to the property owned by a person who dies intestate passes at once to his heirs. Such transmission is, under the present law, subject to the claims of administration and the property may be taken from the heirs for the purpose of paying debts and expenses, but this does not prevent an immediate passage of the title, upon the death of the intestate, from himself to his heirs. Without some showing that a judicial administrator had been appointed in proceedings to settle the estate of Claro Quison, the right of the plaintiffs to maintain this action is established. !

(2) Yes. There are two (2) simultaneous issues in an action for partition. First, whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned, and second, if answered in the affirmative, the manner of the division of the property, i.e., what portion should go to which co-owner. Thus, in this case, we must determine whether private respondents, by preponderance of evidence, have been able to establish that they are co-owners by way of succession as collateral heirs of the late Lourdes Sampayo as they claim to be, a sister, a nephew or a niece. These, private respondents were able to prove in the trial court as well as before respondent Court of Appeals.

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