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Soliven vs.

Makasiar This case is a PETITION for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila FACTS: In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; and (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause. Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscals finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for recons ideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners contention that they have been denied the administrativeremedies available under the law has lost factual support. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the petitioners were denied due process when information for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently by the President 2. Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran (petitioner) were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable clause 3. Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through filing of a complaint-affidavit DECISION: Finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions. The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc is LIFTED. RATIO: Background of the first issue MARCH 30, 1988: Secretary of Justice denied petitioners motion for reconsideration APRIL 7, 1988: A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice MAY 2, 1988: On appeal, the President, through Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice MAY 16, 1988: Motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary Petitioner Beltran alleges that he has been denied due process of law.

This is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter-affidavits, he filed a Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed, in effect, waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counteraffidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded. Second issue This calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest: Art. III, Sec.2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Petitioner Beltran is convinced that the Constitution requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witness in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrests.

However, what the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In doing so, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witness. Following the established doctrine of procedure, the judge shall: (1) Personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause (and on the basis, thereof, issue a warrant of arrest); or (2) If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the evidence of probable cause. Third issue Petitioner Beltran contends that proceedings ensue by virtue of the Presidents filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial courts jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.

This privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the Presidents behalf. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive is solely the Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person (And there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege). Additional Issue: Beltran contends that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged character of

the publication. He also says that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a chilling effect on press freedom.

Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts And Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the chilling effect point. SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION Guitierrez, Jr., J. Concurs with the majority opinion insofar as it revolves around the three principal issues. With regard to whether or not the libel case would produce a chilling effect on press freedom, Gutierrez believes that this particular issue is the most important and should be resolved now rather than later. Quotable quotes: Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. United States v. Bustos No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted posit ion that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. People v. Perfecto

CRUZ VS PEOPLE FACTS: On June 19, 1990, police officers arrested petitioner without warrant for illegal possession of a .38 caliber revolver with six (6) rounds of ammunition while waiting outside the Manila Pavilion Hotel along U.N. Ave., Manila. On June 25, 1990, Assistant Prosecutor Tranquil P. Salvador, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial Court, Manila, an information[3] against the accused for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866[4]. The trial court proceeded to try the case. After the prosecution presented and formally offered its evidence, the trial court issued an order admitting in evidence the gun and ammunition seized from the accused, over his objections. After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner, on motion and upon leave of court, filed a demurrer to evidence. The trial court denied the demurrer, and ordered the accused to present his evidence. Instead, the petitioner filed an MR, which the trial court denied ISSUE: Whether the trial court made a reversible error in admission of evidence against the petitioner. HELD: The trial court, in resolving petitioners motion for reconsideration, squarely addressed the latters contentions. The trial court ruled that the seized evidence was admissible, and that the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain a conviction, if the accused presented no contrary evidence. We find neither error nor patent abuse of discretion in the rulings of the trial court on these issues. Thus, upon the denial of petitioners demurrer to evidence, he may present his evidence. After trial on the merits and the court issues a verdict of conviction, petitioner may seasonably appeal such decision, raising once again his defenses and objections. The orderly procedure prescribed by the Revised Rules of Court is for the accused to present his evidence, after which the trial court, on its own assessment of the evidence submitted, will then properly render its judgment of acquittal or conviction. If judgment is rendered adversely against the accused, he may appeal the judgment and raise the same defenses and objections for review by the appellate court.

LIM VS FELIX FACTS: On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound. An investigation of the incident then followed. Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator filed an amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing Vicente Lim, Sr. et al of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident. After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order concluding that a probable cause has been established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused.. On October 30, 1989, Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, four (4) separate informations of murder against the twelve (12) accused with a recommendation of no bail. On November 21, 1989, petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with us a verified petition for change of venue w/c was authorized, from the RTC of Masbate to the RTCt of Makati to avoid miscarriage of justice. The cases were raffled to Branch 56 presided by respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix. Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court several motions and manifestations, among others was an order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the best enlightenment of this Honorable Court in its personal determination of the existence of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as its determination of the existence of guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution that no warrant shall issue unless the issuing magistrate shall have himself been personally convinced of such probable cause. Respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the motions and manifestations and issued warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein.

ISSUE : Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists.

HELD: If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.

OKABE VS GUTIERREZ FACTS: Cecilia Maruyama filed a complaint charging Lorna Tanghal and petitioner Teresita Tanghal Okabe, a.k.a. Shiela Okabe, with estafa. Maruyama alleged, that on December 11, 1998, she entrusted Y11,410,000 with the peso equivalent of P3,993,500 to the petitioner, who was engaged in the business of "door-to-door delivery" from Japan to the Philippines. It was alleged that the petitioner failed to deliver the money as agreed upon, and, at first, denied receiving the said amount but later returned only US$1,000 through Lorna Tanghal. During the preliminary investigation, the complainant submitted the affidavit of her witnesses and other documentary evidence. After the requisite preliminary investigation, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Joselito J. Vibandor came out with a resolution, finding probable cause for estafa against the petitioner w/c was subsequently approved by the city prosecutor. The trial court then issued a warrant of arrest with a recommended bond of P40,000. Petitioner posted a personal bail bond in the said amount. The petitioner left the Philippines for Japan on June 17, 2000 without the trial courts permission, and returned to the Philippines on June 28, 2000. She left the Philippines anew on July 1, 2000, and returned on July 12, 2000. On July 14, 2000, the private prosecutor filed an urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of the hold departure order. Trial court approved the same. Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a verified motion for judicial determination of probable cause and to defer proceedings/arraignment, alleging that the only documents appended to the Information submitted by the investigating prosecutor were respondent Maruyamas affidavit-complaint for estafa and the resolution of the investigating prosecutor; the affidavits of the witnesses of the complainant, the respondents counter-affidavit and the other evidence adduced by the parties were not attached thereto. On July 19, 2000, the petitioner also filed a Very Urgent Motion To Lift/Recall Hold Departure Order dated July 17, 2000 and/or allow her to regularly travel to Japan for the reason that she have 3 minor children residing there relying on her for support. Petitioner also questioned the irregularity of the determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation however the respondent judge ruled that the posting of bail and the filing motions for relief estopped the petitioner from questioning the same. Upon arraignment, petitioner refused to enter a plea and w/ leave of court left the court room. Petitioner filed w/ CA a petition for Certiorari. CA set aside the hold departure order however all the other motions were denied, hence this case.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent judge committed a reversible error in determining existence of probable cause despite lack of affidavits of the witnesses of respondent Maruyama and the latters documentary evidence, as well as the counter-affidavit of the petitioner.

HELD: Yes, the rulings of this Court are now embedded in Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides that:

SEC. 8. Records. (a) Records supporting the information or complaint. An information or complaint filed in court shall be supported by the affidavits and counter-affidavits of the parties and their witnesses, together with the other supporting evidence and the resolution on the case. The respondent judge is hereby DIRECTED to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the petitioner based on the complete records, as required under Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Bache vs Ruiz Search and Seizure Personal Examination of the Judge On 24 Feb 1970, Commissioner Vera of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to J Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for violation of Sec 46(a) of the NIRC, in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sects 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner de Leon make and file the application for search warrant which was attached to the letter. The next day, de Leon and his witnesses went to CFI Rizal to obtain the search warrant. At that time J Ruiz was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, J Ruiz was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, J Ruiz asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. J Ruiz signed de Leons application for search warrant and Logronios deposition. The search was subsequently conducted. ISSUE: Whether or not there had been a valid search warrant. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Bache on three grounds. 1. J Ruiz failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness. Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause. 2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense. The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code. As ruled in Stonehill Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense. Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense. 3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized. The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in the Search Warrant Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and disbursements books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business communications, accounting and business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970. The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized.

A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.

Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 (1986) FACTS: The challenged search warrant was issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984. The petitioner's house was searched two days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was discovered. However, the officers conducting the search found in the premises one Colt Magnum revolver and eighteen live bullets which they confiscated. They are now the bases of the charge against the petitioner. Respondent Judge said that when PC Capt. Mauro P. Quinosa personally filed his application for a search warrant on May 10, 1984, he appeared before him in the company of his two (2) witnesses, Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, both of whom likewise presented to him their respective affidavits taken by Pat. Josue V. Lining, a police investigator. As the application was not yet subscribed and sworn to, he proceeded to examine Captain Quillosa on the contents thereof to ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the same. Afterwards, he subscribed and swore to the same before him. ISSUE: Whether the Respondent Judge failed to comply with the proper procedure in issuing the Search Warrant. HELD: Yes, mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid. (See Rule 126, Sec 4) The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to have applicant Quillosa's deposition taken considering that he was applying for a search warrant on the basis of the information provided by the witnesses whose depositions had already been taken by the undersigned. In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis of mere hearsay and not of information personally known to him, as required by settled jurisprudence.

ALVAREZ VS CFI FACTS: On June 3, 1936, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the Department of Justice, presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David then presiding over the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, an affidavit alleging that according to reliable information, the petitioner kept in his house in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money-lender charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. In his oath at the and of the affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated that his answers to the questions were correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by him from a reliable person. Upon the affidavit in question the Judge, on said date, issued the warrant which is the subject matter of the petition, ordering the search of the petitioner's house at any time of the day or night, the seizure of the books and documents above-mentioned and the immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in accordance with the law. With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner's store and residence at seven o'clock on the night of June 4, 1936, and seized and took possession of the following articles: internal revenue licenses for the years 1933 to 1936, one ledger, two journals, two cashbooks, nine order books, four notebooks, four checks stubs, two memorandums, three bankbooks, two contracts, four stubs, forty-eight stubs of purchases of copra, two inventories, two bundles of bills of lading, one bundle of credit receipts, one bundle of stubs of purchases of copra, two packages of correspondence, one receipt book belonging to Luis Fernandez, fourteen bundles of invoices and other papers many documents and loan contracts with security and promissory notes, 504 chits, promissory notes and stubs of used checks of the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation. The search for and a seizure of said articles were made with the the opposition of the petitioner who stated his protest below the inventories on the ground that agents seized even the originals of the documents. ISSUE: WON the Search Warrant issued by the respondent court valid. HELD: The seizure of books and documents by means of a search warrant, for the purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case against the person in whose possession they were found, is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused to testify against himself (Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal, 42 Phil,, 886; Brady vs. U. S., 266 U. S., 620; Temperani vs. U. S., 299 Fed., 365; U. S. vs. Madden, 297 Fed., 679; Boyd vs. U. S.,116 U. S., 116; Caroll vs. U. S., 267 U. S., 132). Therefore, it appearing that at least nineteen of the documents in question were seized for the purpose of using them as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal proceeding or proceedings for violation against him, we hold that the search warrant issued is illegal and that the documents should be returned to him.

MICROSOFT VS MAXICORP FACTS: On 25 July 1996, National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI") Agent Dominador Samiano, Jr. ("NBI Agent Samiano") filed several applications for search warrants in the RTC against Maxicorp for alleged violation of Section 29 of PD 49 and Article 189 of the RPC. After conducting a preliminary examination of the applicant and his witnesses, Judge William M. Bayhon issued Search Warrants against Maxicorp. Armed with the search warrants, NBI agents conducted on 25 July 1996 a search of Maxicorps premises and seized property fitting the description stated in the search warrants. On 2 September 1996, Maxicorp filed a motion to quash the search warrants alleging that there was no probable cause for their issuance and that the warrants are in the form of "general warrants." The RTC denied Maxicorps motion on 22 January 1997. The RTC also denied Maxicorps motion for reconsideration. The RTC found probable cause to issue the search warrants after examining NBI Agent Samiano, John Benedict Sacriz ("Sacriz"), and computer technician Felixberto Pante ("Pante"). The three testified on what they discovered during their respective visits to Maxicorp. NBI Agent Samiano also presented certifications from petitioners that they have not authorized Maxicorp to perform the witnessed activities using petitioners products. On 24 July 1997, Maxicorp filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals seeking to set aside the RTCs order. On 23 December 1998, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTCs order denying Maxicorps motion to quash the search warrants. Petitioners moved for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion on 29 November 1999. The Court of Appeals held that NBI Agent Samiano failed to present during the preliminary examination conclusive evidence that Maxicorp produced or sold the counterfeit products. The Court of Appeals pointed out that the sales receipt NBI Agent Samiano presented as evidence that he bought the products from Maxicorp was in the name of a certain "Joel Diaz." Hence, this petition. ISSUES: 1) WHETHER THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO ISSUE THE SEARCH WARRANTS; 2) WHETHER THE SEARCH WARRANTS ARE "GENERAL WARRANTS." HELD: On Whether there was Probable Cause to Issue the Search Warrants. We rule that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTCs findings. "Reliable information" is insufficient. Mere affidavits are not enough, and the judge must depose in writing the complainant and his witnesses.

On Whether the Search Warrants are in the Nature of General Warrants A search warrant must state particularly the place to be searched and the objects to be seized. The evident purpose for this requirement is to limit the articles to be seized only to those particularly described in the search warrant. This is a protection against potential abuse. It is

necessary to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that no unreasonable searches and seizures be committed. It is only required that a search warrant be specific as far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow.38 The description of the property to be seized need not be technically accurate or precise. The nature of the description should vary according to whether the identity of the property or its character is a matter of concern.

PEOPLE VS TEE FACTS: Appellant is a Chinese national in his forties, a businessman, and a resident of Baguio City. A raid conducted by operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Philippine National Police Narcotics Command (PNP NARCOM) at premises allegedly leased by appellant and at his residence yielded huge quantities of marijuana. Appellant moved to quash the search warrant on the ground that it was too general and that the NBI had not complied with the requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant. The pendency of said motion, however, did not stop the filing of the appropriate charges against appellant. In an information dated July 24, 1998, the City Prosecutor of Baguio City charged Modesto Tee, alias Estoy Tee, with illegal possession of marijuana. ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant's contention that the description on the serach warrant which says an undetermined amount of marijuana, was too general and hence makes the warrant void for vagueness. HELD: SC held that the appellants contention, has no leg to stand on. The constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity of description of the things to be seized is primarily meant to enable the law enforcers serving the warrant to: (1) readily identify the properties to be seized and thus prevent them from seizing the wrong items; and (2) leave said peace officers with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable searches and seizures. What the Constitution seeks to avoid are search warrants of broad or general characterization or sweeping descriptions, which will authorize police officers to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to an offense. However, it is not required that technical precision of description be required, particularly, where by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, since the requirement of a technical description would mean that no warrant could issue.

Tambasen vs People FACTS: On August 31, 1988, P/Sgt. Flumar Natuel applied for the issuance of a search warrant from the MTCC, alleging that he received information that petitioner had in his possession at his house at the North Capitol Road, Bacolod City, "M-16 Armalite Rifles (Mags & Ammos), Hand Grenades, .45 Cal. Pistols (Mags & Ammos), Dynamite Sticks and Subversive Documents," which articles were "used or intended to be used" for illegal purposes]. On the same day, the application was granted by the MTCC with the issuance of Search Warrant No. 365, which allowed the seizure of the items specified in the application (Rollo, p. 15). At around 6:30 P.M. of September 9, 1988, a police team searched the house of petitioner and seized among others, 2 envelopes containing cash in the total amount of Php 14,000. Petitioner filed an urgent motion for the return of the seized articles. MTCC issued an order directing Sgt. Natuel to make a return of the search warrant. The following day, Sgt. Natuel submitted a report to the court. Not considering the report as a "return in contemplation of law," petitioner filed another motion praying that Sgt. Natuel be required to submit a complete and verified inventory of the seized articles. Thereafter, Sgt. Natuel manifested that although he was the applicant for the issuance of the search warrant, he was not present when it was served. On October 7, 1988, petitioner filed before the MTCC a motion praying that the search and seizure be declared illegal and that the seized articles be returned to him. MTCC ruled in favor of the petitioner, however the Solicitor General alleged that assuming that the seizure of the money had been invalid, petitioner was not entitled to its return citing the rulings stating that pending the determination of the legality of the seizure of the articles, they should remain in custodia legis. ISSUE: Whether or not the SW was valid. HELD: On its face, the search warrant violates Section 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, which prohibits the issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific offense. The caption of Search Warrant No. 365 reflects the violation of two special laws: P.D. No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives; and R.A. No. 1700, the AntiSubversion Law. Search Warrant No. 365 was therefore a "scatter-shot warrant" and totally null and void (People v. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 101 [1992]). Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in the search warrant, the police acted beyond the parameters of their authority under the search warrant. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires that a search warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. "The presumption juris tantum of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself prevail against the constitutionally protected rights of an individual (People v. Cruz, 231 SCRA 759) As the Court aptly puts it in Bagalihog v. Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614 (1991), "[z]eal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself abhors." Section 3(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

PEOPLE VS VELOSO FACTS: In May, 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used by an organization known as the Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a member of the House of Representatives. He was also the manager of the club. The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club was nothing more than a gambling house. Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief of the gambling squad, had been to the club and verified this fact. As a result, on May 25, 1923, Detective Andres Geronimo of the secret service of the City of Manila, applied for, and obtained a search warrant from Judge Garduo of the municipal court. Thus provided, the police attempted to raid the Parliamentary Club a little after three in the afternoon. They found the doors to the premises closed and barred. Accordingly, one band of police including policeman Rosacker, ascended a telephone pole, so as to enter a window of the house. Other policemen, headed by Townsend, broke in the outer door. Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the police. One of them was the defendant Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted, and the latter showed him the search warrant. Veloso read it and told Townsend that he was Representative Veloso and not John Doe, and that the police had no right to search the house. Townsend answered that Veloso was considered as John Doe. As Veloso's pocket was bulging, as if it contained gambling utensils, Townsend required Veloso to show him the evidence of the game. About five minutes was consumed in conversation between the policemen and the accused the policemen insisting on searching Veloso, and Veloso insisting in his refusal to submit to the search. Policeman Rosacker took hold of Veloso only to meet with his resistance. Veloso bit Rosacker in the right forearm, and gave him a blow in another part of the body, which injured the policeman quite severely. Through the combined efforts of Townsend and Rosacker, Veloso was finally laid down on the floor, and long sheets of paper, of reglas de monte, cards, cardboards, and chips were taken from his pockets. ISSUE: Whether the resistance of the police was justifiable on account of the illegality of the John Doe search warrant. HELD: No. John Doe' Warrants. It follows, on principle, from what has already been said regarding the essential requirements of warrants for the apprehension of persons accused, and about blank warrants, that a warrant for the apprehension of a person whose true name is unknown, by the name of "John Doe" or "Richard Roe," "whose other or true name in unknown," is void, without other and further descriptions of the person to be apprehended, and such warrant will not justify the officer in acting under it. Such a warrant must, in addition, contain the best descriptio personae possible to be obtained of the person or persons to be apprehended, and this description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person or persons upon whom the warrant is to be served; and should state his personal appearance and peculiarities, give his occupation and place of residence, and any other circumstances by means of which he can be identified. Person apprehended in act of committing a crime, under a "John Doe" warrant, on the other hand, the apprehension will not be illegal, or the officer liable, because under such circumstances it is not necessary that a warrant should have been issued.

Yousef Al Ghoul vs CA FACTS: Herein petitioners are detention prisoners who were arrested and charged with illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 123, as a consequence of the search conducted pursuant to the search warrants issued by the RTC of Kalookan City. After their arrest, petitioners filed a motion for bail. However, the resolution of the same was held in abeyance by the trial court pending the presentation of evidence by the prosecution to enable the court to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. Subsequently, the trial court issued the Order dated February 19, 1996 denying petitioners motion for bail on the ground that the law under which petitioners are charged prescribes a penalty of reclusion perpetua and that the evidence of guilt is strong. Thereafter, petitioners proceeded to file a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, assailing the aforementioned orders issued by the trial court admitting the evidence of the prosecution and denying petitioners motion for bail. In its Decision dated September 30, 1996, the CA affirmed the assailed orders of trial court, hence this case. On October 30, 1997, petitioners filed a Manifestation with alleging that with the enactment of Republic Act No. 8294, amending P.D. 1866, the penalty for the offenses under which petitioners are being charged has been reduced from the penalty ranging from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, to only the penalty ranging from prision mayor to reclusion temporal, hence, petitioners are now entitled to bail regardless of the strength of evidence against them. ISSUE: Whether petitioner, thru the enactment of Republic Act No. 8294, amending P.D. 1866 reducing the penalty for the crime charge against him is now entitled to bail. HELD: Consequent to the enactment of RA 8294, the penalty prescribed in Section 1 and 3 of P.D. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives under which petitioners were charged, has now been reduced to prision mayor in its minimum period[11] and prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal,[12] respectively. Evidently, petitioners are now entitled to bail as a matter of right prior to their conviction by the trial court pursuant to Section 4 of SC Administrative Circular No. 12-94 which provides as follows: SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right.x x x. (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule.

UY vs BIR FACTS: Petitioners assail the validity of the warrants issued for the search of the premises of the Unifish Packing Corporation, and pray for the return of the items seized by virtue thereof. On 30 September 1993, a certain Rodrigo Abos reported to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that petitioners Unifish Packing Corporation and Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy were engaged in activities constituting violations of the National Internal Revenue Code. Abos, who claimed to be a former employee of Unifish, executed an Affidavit alleging illegal activities being practiced by the said company among others, selling thousands of cartons of canned sardines w/o issuing receipt. On 1 October 1993, Nestor N. Labaria, Assistant Chief of the Special Investigation Branch of the BIR, applied for several search warrants.The application sought permission to search the premises of Unifish. On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by members of the Philippine National Police, on 2 October 1993, searched the premises of the Unifish Packing Corporation. They seized, among other things, the records and documents of petitioner corporation. A return of said search was duly made by Nestor Labaria with the RTC of Cebu , Branch 28. Petitioner impugned the intrinsic validity of the SW stating that it violates constitutional right to unreasonable search and seizure. 1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash Register Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts; 2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards; 3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts; 4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices; 5. Sales Records, Job Order; 6. Corporate Financial Records; and 7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks ISSUE: WON the SW complied with the proper constitutional mandates. HELD: The SC AFFIRMED the order of the RTC insofar as said Resolutions upheld the validity of the subject Search Warrants authorizing the seizure of the unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, but REVERSED with respect to the rest of the articles subject of said warrants.

GO VS. COURT OF APPEALS [206 SCRA 138; G.R. NO. 101837; 11 FEB 1992] Facts: Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, almost had a collision with another vehicle. Petitioner thereafter got out of his car, shot the driver of the other vehicle, and drove off. An eyewitness of the incident was able to take down petitioners plate number and reported the same to the police, who subsequently ordered a manhunt for petitioner. 6 days after the shooting, petitioner presented himself in the police station, accompanied by 2 lawyers, the police detained him. Subsequently a criminal charge was brought against him. Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and commencing trial without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless arrests. Petitioner in his petition for certiorari assails such procedure and actions undertaken and files for a preliminary investigation. Issues: (1) WON warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful. (2) WON petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation. Held: Petitioner and prosecutor err in relying on Umil v. Ramos, wherein the Court upheld the warrantless arrest as valid effected 1 to 14 days from actual commission of the offenses, which however constituted continuing crimes, i.e. subversion, membership in an outlawed organization, etc. There was no lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113. This is because the arresting officers were not actually there during the incident, thus they had no personal knowledge and their information regarding petitioner were derived from other sources. Further, Section 7, Rule 112, does not apply. Petitioner was not arrested at all, as when he walked in the police station, he neither expressed surrender nor any statement that he was or was not guilty of any crime. When a complaint was filed to the prosecutor, preliminary investigation should have been scheduled to determine probable cause. Prosecutor made a substantive error, petitioner is entitled to preliminary investigation, necessarily in a criminal charge, where the same is required appear thereat. Petition granted, prosecutor is ordered to conduct preliminary investigation, trial for the criminal case is suspended pending result from preliminary investigation, petitioner is ordered released upon posting a bail bond.

PADILLA vs CA Facts: Padilla figured in a hit and run accident in Oct 26, 1992. He was later on apprehended with the help pf a civilian witness. Upon arrest following high powered firearms were found in his possession: 1. 2. 3. 4. .357 caliber revolver with 6 live ammunition M-16 Baby Armalite magazine with ammo .380 pietro beretta with 8 ammo 6 live double action ammo of .38 caliber revolver

Padilla claimed papers of guns were at home. His arrest for hit and run incident modified to include grounds of Illegal Possession of firearms. He had no papers. On Dec. 3, 1994, Padilla was found guilty of Illegal Possession of Firearms under PD 1866 by the RTC of Angeles City. He was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from 17 years. 4 months, 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum to 21 years of reclusion perpetua as maximum. The Court of Appeals confirmed decision and cancelled bailbond. RTC of Angeles City was directed to issue order of arrest. Motion for reconsideration was denied by Court of Appeals. Padilla filed lots of other petitions and all of a sudden, the Solicitor General made a complete turnaround and filed Manifestation in Lieu of Comment praying for acquittal (nabayaran siguro). ISSUE: 1. WARRANTLESS ARREST: WON his was illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule HELD: No. Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make his apprehension at the Abacan Bridge illegal. Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedurea peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person (a) when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. When caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammo, petitioners warrantless arrest was proper since he was actually committing another offence in the presence of all those officers. There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. Because arrest was legal, the pieces of evidence are admissible. Instances when warrantless search and seizure of property is valid: ? Seizure of evidence in plain view, elements of which are (a) prior valid intrusion based on valid warrantless arrest in which police are legally present in pursuit of official duties, (b) evidence inadvertedly discovered by police who had the right to be there, (c) evidence immediately apparent, and (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search (People v. Evaristo: objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertedly found in plain view are subject to seizure even without a warrant) ? Search of moving vehicle

? Warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest recognized under section 12, Rule 126 of Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence where the test of incidental search (not excluded by exclusionary rule) is that item to be searched must be within arrestees custody or area of immediate control and search contemporaneous with arrest. Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen who actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run. The court begs to disagree. It is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more success when law enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens. Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea. 2. LICENSE TO CARRY: WON the petitioner is authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry the subject firearms No. In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be established, viz.: (1) the existence of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess. The first element is beyond dispute as the subject firearms and ammunitions were seized from petitioners possession via a valid warrantless search, identified and offered in evidence during trial. As to the second element, the same was convincingly proven by the prosecution. Indeed, petitioners purported Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the more formidable evidence for the prosecution as our meticulous review of the records reveals that the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts contrived and issued under suspicious circumstances. On this score, we lift from respondent courts incisive observation. Furthermore, the Memorandum Receipt is also unsupported by a certification as required by the March 5, 1988 Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense. Petitioner is not in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform personnel or in list of Civilian Agents of Employees of the PNP, which would justify issuance of mission order (as stated in PD 1866). Lastly, the M-16 and any short firearms higher than 0.38 caliber cannot be licensed to a civilian. 3. PENALTY: WON penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment proscribed by the 1987 Constitution Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court in applying P.D. 1866 in a democratic ambience (sic) and a non-subversive context and adds that respondent court should have applied instead the previous laws on illegal possession of firearms since the reason for the penalty imposed under P.D. 1866 no longer exists. He stresses that the penalty of 17 years and 4 months to 21 years for simple illegal possession of firearm is cruel and excessive in contravention of the Constitution. The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and the respondent court are bound to apply the governing law at the time of appellants commission of the offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones. Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law as it stands. And until its repeal, respondent court can not be faulted for applying P.D. 1866 which abrogated the previous statutes adverted to by petitioner. Equally lacking in merit is appellants allegation that the penalty for simple illegal possession is unconstitutional. The penalty for simple possession of firearm, it should be stressed, ranges

from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua contrary to appellants erroneous averment. The severity of a penalty does not ipso facto make the same cruel and excessive. Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The burden of proving the invalidity of the statute in question lies with the appellant which burden, we note, was not convincingly discharged. To justify nullification of the law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication, as in this case. In fact, the constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice by this Court. Just recently, the Court declared that the pertinent laws on illegal possession of firearms [are not] contrary to an y provision of the Constitution Appellants grievances on the wisdom of the prescribed penalty should not be addressed to us. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls exclusively within the province of Congress which enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only function of the courts, we reiterate, is to interpret and apply the laws WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the CA sustaining petitioners conviction by the lower court of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms & ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioners indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to 10 yrs & 1 day, as min. to 18 yrs, 8 months & 1 day, as maximum. People v. Simon Doctrine: Although PD 1866 is a special law, the penalties therein were taken from the RPC, hence the rules in said code for graduating by degrees of determining the proper period should be applied.

RODOLFO ESPANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: On July 14, 1991 Pat. Romeo Pagilagan and other police officers viz, Pat. Wilfredo Aquino, Simplicio Rivera, and Erlindo Lumboy of the Western Police District (WPD), Narcotics Division went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug pushing in the area. They saw petitioner selling something to another person. After the alleged buyer left, they approached petitioner, identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When asked if he had more marijuana, he replied that there was more in his house. The policemen went to his residence where they found ten more cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner was brought to the police headquarters where he was charged with possession of prohibited drugs. On July 24, 1991, petitioner posted bail and the trial court issued his order of release on July 29, 1991. Annabelle Alip, forensic chemist of the WPD Criminal Investigation Laboratory Section, testified that the articles sent to her by Pat. Wilfredo Aquino regarding the apprehension of a certain Rodolfo Espano for examination tested positive for marijuana, with a total weight of 5.5 grams By way of defense, petitioner testified that on said evening, he was sleeping in his house and was awakened only when the policemen handcuffed him. He alleged that the policemen were looking for his brother-in-law Lauro, and when they could not find the latter, he was instead brought to the police station for investigation and later indicted for possession of prohibited drugs. His wife Myrna corroborated his story. The trial court rejected petitioner's, defense as a mere afterthought and found the version of the prosecution more credible and trustworthy and finds guilty of the crime of violation of Section 8, Article II, in relation to Section 2 (e-L) (I) of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179, and pursuant to law hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and to pay a fine of P6,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of default plus costs. The marijuana is declared forfeited in favor of government and shall be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board without delay. Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, however, affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. Hence petition for review. Issue: WON the trial and appellate court erred in convicting the petitioner of the crime charged for violation of Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. WON search made at petitioners house is legal and admissible evidence in court. Held: Negative.

Supreme Court ruled that there is no compelling reason to reverse the decision of the lower and appellate court. It is settled doctrine that findings of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses deserve a high degree of respect. Petitioner failed to show that Pat. Pagilagan, in testifying against him, was motivated by reasons other than his duty to curb drug abuse and had any intent to falsely impute to him such a serious crime as possession of prohibited drugs (marijuana). In the absence of such ill motive, the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duty must prevail. Court has consistently held that alibi is the weakest of all defenses. In order to prosper, the accused has the burden of proving that he was not at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission and that it was physically impossible for him to be there. In the case at bar no clear and convincing evidence was presented by petitioner to prove his defense of alibi and he was not denied of the constitutional right of confrontation and to compulsory process because the fact that a buy-bust operation had indeed been conducted and it was corroborated by the policemen. However, the ten cellophane bags of marijuana found at petitioner's residence are inadmissible evidence in court. Section 2 of Article III of 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom against unreasonable searches and seizures. An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. It may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. In this case, the ten cellophane bags of marijuana seized at petitioner's house after his arrest do not fall under the said exceptions and warrantless search made in his house, however, which yielded ten cellophane bags of marijuana became unlawful since the police officers were not armed with a search warrant at the time. Moreover, it was beyond the reach and control of petitioner. Specific penalty: The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with modification that petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 2 months and 1 day of arresto mayor, as minimum to 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as maximum.

PEOPLE V. MENGOTE [210 SCRA 174; G.R. NO. 87059; 22 JUN 1992] Facts: The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. The patrolmen saw two men looking from side to side, one of whom holding his abdomen. They approached the persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run but unable to escape because the other lawmen surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them the accused-appellant was found with a .38 caliber with live ammunitions in it, while his companion had a fan knife. The weapons were taken from them and they were turned over to the police headquarters for investigation. An information was filed before the RTC convicting the accused of illegal possession of firearm arm. A witness testified that the weapon was among the articles stolen at his shop, which he reported to the police including the revolver. For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the fire arm or that he was licensed to possess it but instead, he claimed that the weapon was planted on him at the time of his arrest. He was convicted for violation of P.D.1866 and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In his appeal he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and therefore the fruit of a poisonous tree. Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search and arrest was illegal. Held: An evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose as provided by Art. III sec 32 of the Constitution. Rule 113 sec.5 of the Rules of Court, provides arrest without warrant lawful when: (a) the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, (b) when the offense in fact has just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating the person arrested has committed it and (c) the person to be arrested has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the accused appellant was merely looking from side to side and holding his abdomen, according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that has just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempt by Mengote in their presence. Moreover a person may not be stopped and frisked in a broad daylight or on a busy street on unexplained suspicion. Judgment is reversed and set aside. Accused-appellant is acquitted.

Caballes vs. Court of Appeals Facts: About 9:15 p.m. of 28 June 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, whileon a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a passenger jeepunusually covered with kakawati leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggledgoods, the two police officers flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by Rudy Caballes yTaio. When asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer, but he appeared pale andnervous. With Caballes consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by NationalPower Corporation (NAOCOR). The conductor wires weighed 700 kilos and valued atP55,244.45. Noceja asked Caballes where the wires came from and Caballes answered that theycame from Cavinti, a town approximately 8 kilometers away from Sampalucan. Thereafter,Caballes and the vehicle with the high-voltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan PoliceStation. Danilo Cabale took pictures of Caballes and the jeep loaded with the wires which wereturned over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Caballes was incarceratedfor 7 days in the Municipal jail. Caballes was charged with the crime of theft in an informationdated 16 October 1989. During the arraignment, Caballes pleaded not guilty and hence, trial onthe merits ensued. On 27 April 1993, Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna rendered judgment, finding Caballes, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft. In a resolutiondated 9 November 1998, the trial court denied Caballes motion for reconsideration. The Courtof Appeals affirmed the trial court decision on 15 September 1998. Caballes appealed thedecision by certiorari. Issue: Whether Caballes passive submission to the statement of Sgt. Noceja that the latter willlook at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive be c onsidered as waiver onCaballes part on warrantless search and seizure. Held: Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined under Section 2,Article III thereof. The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution barsthe admission of evidence obtained in violation of such right. The constitutional proscriptionagainst warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of certain exceptions,namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view;(3) search of moving vehicles; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop andfrisk situations (Terry search); and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. In cases wherewarrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Courtmust be complied with. In the exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to effect a validsearch or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without a warrant, whatconstitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question,determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of thesearch or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search andseizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured. It is notcontroverted that the search and seizure conducted by the police officers was not authorized by asearch warrant. The mere mobility of these vehicles, however,

does not give the police officersunlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within theinterior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause. Herein, the police officers did notmerely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of Caballes vehicle. They had to reach insidethe vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see thecable wires. It thus cannot be considered a simple routine check. Also, Caballes vehicle wasflagged down because the police officers who were on routine patrol became suspicious whenthey saw that the back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves which, according tothem, was unusual and uncommon. The fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because itis not common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute probable causeas would justify the conduct of a search without a warrant. In addition, the police authorities donot claim to have received any confidential report or tipped information that petitioner wascarrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could otherwise have sustained their suspicion.Philippine jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure. Unfortunately, none exists in the present case. Further, the evidence is lacking that Caballes intentionally surrendered his rightagainst unreasonable searches. The manner by which the two police officers allegedly obtainedthe consent of Caballes for them to conduct the search leaves much to be desired. WhenCaballes vehicle was flagged down, Sgt. Noceja approached Caballes and told him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive. By uttering those words, it cannot be said the police officers were asking or requesting for permission that they be allowed tosearch the vehicle of Caballes. For all intents and purposes, they were informing, nay, imposingupon Caballes that they will search his vehicle. The consent given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty. Inaddition, in cases where the Court upheld the validity of consented search, it will be noted thatthe police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of the accused to besearched. And the consent of the accused was established by clear and positive proof. Neither can Caballes passive submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantlesssearch. Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient to sustain Caballes conviction. His guilt can only be established without violatingthe constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable search and seizure.

ALAIN MANALILI Y DIZON vs COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 113447 October 9, 1997 Panganiban. J: Stop-and-Frisk & Waiver- Exceptions to warrantless search and seizure The CASE: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. FACTS: As found by the trial court, facts in the version of the prosecution, in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, policemen from Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police Station were conducting surveillance along A. Mabini St., Caloocan City, in front of the Caloocan City Cemetery. The surveillance was being made because of information that drug addicts were roaming the area in front of the Cemetery. The policemen then chanced upon a male person who appeared high on drugs. He was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner and tried to avoid the policemen. The policemen introduced themselves and asked if they could see what the male person was holding in his hands. When examined, it turned out to be a wallet with suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. The male person was then brought to the AntiNarcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police Headquarters and was turned over (together with the confiscated wallet and its suspected marijuana contents) for investigation. The man turned out to be the accused Alain Manalili y Dizon. After the microscopic and chemical and chromatographic examinations as conducted by the Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI, the specimen gave a positive result for marijuana. (The foregoing statements have been denied and countered by the version of the defense as attached in the full text) After trial in due course, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan, acting as a Special Criminal Court convicted the appellant of violating Section 8, Article II, R.A. No. 6425 (Illegal Possession of Marijuana Residue). This decision was also affirmed by the Court of Appeals, denying the appeal and the reconsideration through its assailed decision and resolution respectively. Hence, this petition before the SC. ISSUE(s): Whether or not the CA erred in admitting the evidence of the prosecution which are allegedly inadmissible for being products of an illegal search which is unconstitutional (in violation of Sec. 2 & 3, Art III of the Constitution) HELD: Negative. The CA did not err and the petition has no merit. Rule against warrantless search and seizure is NOT absolute. There are five recognized exceptions (with probable cause as the essential requirement) as enumerated in the case of People vs. Lacerna: 1. Search incidental to a lawful arrest,

2. Search of moving vehicles 3. Seizure in plain view, 4. Customs search, and 5. Waiver by the accused themselves of their rights against unreasonable search and seizures In Posadas vs. CA, Stop-and-Frisk had already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a search without warrant. And so, the search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk which was defined in the landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) for purposes of investigating possible criminal behaviour even though there is insufficient probable cause to make an arrest. In the case on hand, the policemen had sufficient reason to stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such investigation, they found marijuana in petitioners possession. Also, in this present case, the petitioner is deemed to have waived his constitutional right against unreasonable search for his failure to raise inadmissibility of any evidence illegally obtained when he failed to raise the issue or to object thereto during the trial. A valid waiver of the constitutional right against unreasonable search requires the concurrence of the following requirements: 1. The right to be waived existed 2. The person waiving it had knowledge, actual or constructive, thereof; and 3. He or she had an actual intention to relinquish the right. Wherefore, the assailed Decision and Resolution are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the sentence of imprisonment pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

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