COMMISSION SENSITIVE

PREVENTING FUTURE ATTACKS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES

SUGGESTED QUESTIONS FOR JOHN PISTOLE

Designated Commissioners: Fred Fielding & Jamie Gorelick

Background: John S. Pistole is Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and

Counter Intelligence at the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He served in various field
and headquarters assignments, all in the criminal field until April 2002 when he became
Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI Counterterrorism Division in Washington. He
became the Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence
on December 19, 2003. The Counterterrorism Division is responsible for the conduct of
terrorism law enforcement and intelligence collection operations in the United States.
The Counterintelligence Division is responsible for identifying and neutralizing national
security threats to the US from foreign countries or entities to prevent penetration of US
Government agencies and to prevent compromise of US critical national assets.

1. There have been four different FBI Executive Assistant Directors for
Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence in the 31 months since the attacks
of September 11, 2001. What effect has this frequent turnover of the person in
charge of the FBI's fight on terrorism had in carrying out the Counterterrorism
mission? Has there been a significant turnover at senior supervisory levels
below the Executive Assistant Director?
2. Our staff heard from FBI special agents in the field that supervisory agents in
the Counterterrorism Division at headquarters lacked the necessary
experience in Counterterrorism to guide their work. Do you agree? What
have you done and what are you doing to address the issue of developing
Counterterrorism expertise in FBI headquarters supervisory agents?
3. We understand that an Asset Vetting Unit has been established within the
Counterterrorism Division, but as recently as January 2004 there were no
personnel assigned to it. Are there now personnel assigned to it? What are
your plans to improve asset validation? What is your level of staffing in the
units of your Counterterrorism Division? Do you have the number of
experienced agents and analysts you need to carry out your mission?
4. Our staff encountered evidence of resistance from special agents in the field
offices to the running of the FBI's Counterterrorism program out of FBI
Headquarters. Have you encountered resistance from FBI field offices to the
Director's decisions that the FBI's Counterterrorism program will be run out
of FBI Headquarters? What are some examples of this resistance? What
effect has this resistance had on the ability of the FBI to carry out its
Counterterrorism mission?

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5. Our staff learned that in some field offices that FBI personnel officially
assigned to work on counterterrorism continue to be pulled away to assist on
criminal investigations. Have you encountered situations in which
counterterrorism special agents have been pulled away to assist on criminal
investigations?
6. We understand that a facility has been secured to house the new Terrorist
Threat Integration Center with significant parts of the DCI's Counterterrorist
Center and most of the headquarters component of the FBI's
Counterterrorism Division. We further understand that this move is to occur
this summer, although details of the plans and the purpose behind it are less
clear. What role does the FBI have in the Terrorist Threat Integration Center?
To what extent will the FBI be a consumer for the Terrorist Threat Integration
Center's products and to what extent will its products drive the FBI's
investigation priorities and collection strategy? Can you describe for us in
detail the plan to co-locate part of the Counterterrorism Division with the
Counterterrorist Center and the Terrorist Threat Integration Center? hi
particular, what is motivating this change, and what are the pros and cons of
it? How will the field offices interact with this new entity?
7. Our staff heard from state and local law enforcement officials that the Joint
Terrorism Task Forces are not really "joint" but rather FBI task forces with
agency liaisons. Several state and local enforcement agencies have begun
their own counterterrorism efforts, separate and apart from the FBI. Our
staff was told that the FBI resented these initiatives and in some cases sought
to impede their implementation. What are you doing to make the Joint
Terrorism Task Forces more "joint?" What are you doing to work more
collaboratively with state and local counterterrorism officials? What is your
view of the state and local independent counterterrorism efforts to collect
intelligence for their local needs as well as making such information available
to the FBI and national level as appropriate via the Joint Terrorism Task
Forces?

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