T HE R EVIEW OF S YMBOLIC L OGIC Volume 3, Number 1, March 2010

PASCHS PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS

DIRK SCHLIMM Department of Philosophy, McGill University

Abstract. Moritz Pasch (18431930) gave the rst rigorous axiomatization of projective geometry in his Vorlesungen u ber neuere Geometrie (1882), in which he also clearly formulated the view that deductions must be independent from the meanings of the nonlogical terms involved. Pasch also presented in these lectures the main tenets of his philosophy of mathematics, which he continued to elaborate on throughout the rest of his life. This philosophy is quite unique in combining a deductivist methodology with a radically empiricist epistemology for mathematics. By taking into consideration publications from the entire span of Paschs career, the latter decades of which he devoted primarily to careful reections on the nature of mathematics and of mathematical knowledge, Paschs highly original, but virtually unknown, philosophy of mathematics is presented.

1. Introduction. Moritz Paschs inuence on the development of modern mathematics cannot be overestimated. In 1882 he presented in his Vorlesungen u ber neuere Geometrie the rst rigorous axiomatization of projective geometry, which has been called the birthplace of modern axiomatics (Engel & Dehn, 1934, p. 133) and which earned him the honor of being referred to as the father of rigor in geometry (Freudenthal, 1962, p. 619). Indeed, Paschs lectures exerted a considerable direct inuence on Hilberts thinking about geometry and axiomatics in general, as can be seen from the development of Hilberts lecture notes on geometry in the 1890s, which contain lengthy paraphrases of Paschs discussions, and also from remarks Hilbert made in his correspondence.1 This deep inuence is not acknowledged properly in Hilberts seminal Grundlagen der Geometrie (1899), where Pasch is only credited in a footnote for the rst detailed investigations of the axioms of betweenness, in particular the axiom that became later known as Paschs axiom. Nonetheless, Hilberts brief published remarks have been reason enough for Pasch being mentioned in almost every account of the history of modern geometry. In addition to Paschs impact on Hilbert, his book also exerted considerable inuence on the work of Peano and of the Italian school of geometry,2 and it is discussed in detail in Russells Principles of Mathematics (Russell, 1903, pp. 393403). But, Pasch did not only spark the development of modern geometry, he also lived long enough to witness its progress in the rst three decades of the twentieth century.3 During all this time he was deeply

Received June 3, 2009

1 In a letter to Friedrich Engel from January 14, 1894, Hilbert writes with reference to Paschs

lectures: I have learned non-Euclidean geometry solely from this book (quoted from Tamari (2007, p. 113)). For the development of Hilberts lectures on geometry, see Hallett & Majer (2004). 2 See Peano (1889b), Contro (1976), Gandon (2006), and Marchisotto & Smith (2007). I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for bringing to my attention the article by Gandon. 3 Moritz Pasch was born November 8, 1843, in Breslau, where he also studied mathematics with Schr oter; he wrote his dissertation in 1865 in Breslau, then spent two semesters in Berlin with

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concerned with the foundations of geometry as well as those of analysis and arithmetic, and he developed a distinctive and original philosophy of mathematics. The thesis that underlies the present paper is that Paschs reections on the nature of mathematics, which he presented throughout his life, in particular in his later more systematic accounts, are elaborations and renements of a philosophical position that he put forward already in his famous lectures of 1882. One clear indication of this are the later editions of these lectures in 1912 and 1926, where he had the opportunity to modify or retract his earlier claims, but in which he only elaborated and added minor details. Thus, what we can nd in Pasch is a very thoughtful and consistent approach to the foundations of mathematics. The two main aspects of Paschs philosophy are a formal stance with regard to the validity of mathematical deductions and a strong commitment to an empiricist understanding of the basic concepts of mathematics. On the face of it, these views might appear incompatible in various ways. Firstly, that the meanings of the mathematical terms are given empirically might not square with Paschs particular conception of deductivism, according to which deductions must be independent of the meanings of the terms. Secondly, the introduction of ideal elements in mathematics might stand in conict with an empirical stance, and thirdly, empiricism might appear to be incompatible with the common view that mathematical deductions provide certain and necessary knowledge. (These aspects of incompatibility will be addressed below.) Paschs deductivism and empiricism are mentioned in Ernest Nagels informative paper on the development of geometry and logic (Nagel, 1939), without, however, containing an account of Paschs attempt to reconcile them. Such an account is also missing from Walter Contros detailed analysis of the axioms presented in Paschs 1882 lectures on projective geometry (Contro, 1976), and from the recent, in parts highly speculative discussion in Tamari (2007).4 By drawing on Paschs lectures on geometry, as well as his publications on the foundations of analysis and arithmetic, and his later more philosophical works, this paper presents Paschs quite unique philosophy of mathematics as a coherent system.5 The historical context and Paschs views of the relationship between mathematical and philosophical investigations, which form the framework for Paschs work, are presented in the next section. The tension between his radical empiricism, aimed as providing an epistemological basis for mathematics, and his goal to capture the essence of mathematical reasoning deserves particular attention. While Pasch maintains that empiricism provides the best philosophical foundations for mathematics, he also advances a very modern deductivist methodology for purely mathematical investigations. These views are discussed in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. Finally, Paschs efforts to merge these considerations into a unied whole, which I shall refer to as Paschs programme, are presented in Section 5. In presenting the reections on mathematics and mathematical practice of a deep and clear thinker such as Moritz Pasch, who stood with one foot rm in the empiricist tradition of the nineteenth century, while vigorously striding with his other foot into the modern
Kronecker and Weierstrass, and submitted his Habilitation in 1870 in Giessen; after having been Privatdozent at the University of Giessen he became extraordinary professor in 1873, and was full professor from 1875 until 1910; he died September 20, 1930, at the age of 86. 4 For a coherent interpretation of Paschs mathematical work, see Gandon (2005). (Footnote added November 2009). 5 Not all aspects of Paschs views can be dealt with in a satisfactory manner in the present paper. Some of these are mentioned in the Concluding Remarks below, and are intended to be covered in future work.

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mathematics of the twentieth century, this paper is also intended as a contribution toward a better understanding of the radical transition mathematics underwent at the turn of the twentieth century. 2. Paschs view of mathematics. The received account of the nature of mathematics in the rst half of the nineteenth century was that given by Kant, who considered the theorems of arithmetic and of Euclidean geometry as synthetic a priori. However, interest in this topic was revived after non-Euclidean geometries became to be regarded as acceptable consistent theories through the work of Riemann, Beltrami, and Klein. The presence of viable alternatives to Euclidean geometry cast doubt on Kants transcendental reasoning, and Hermann von Helmholtz famously argued in the late 1860s and early 1870s that the question as to which theory of geometry describes best the space we live in should be answered empirically.6 Around the same time reliance on mathematical intuition was also severely called into question by another development in mathematics, namely in function theory. In the 1860s Weierstrass lectured about the possibility of continuous functions that are nowhere differentiable and soon thereafter many other such monster functions, which deed visualization and which proved commonly accepted intuitions wrong, where studied. It is against this background that Pasch formed his views on the nature of mathematics.7 One of the earliest insights into Paschs own development is offered in letters written in 1882 to Felix Klein.8 Herein Pasch mentions as inuences to his views the lectures of Kronecker and Weierstrass that he attended in Berlin in 18651866,9 and also discussions in the 1860s with his friend and colleague Jakob Rosanes.10 In these letters Pasch also expresses his disappointment regarding the views of the few philosophers that he has read (without mentioning any names, however). Nevertheless, Pasch thought his views to be so commonsensical that he assumed them to be generally shared and he was surprised to hear of Kleins experiences of the contrary. In print, Pasch readily points out that his views are by no means new (Pasch, 1887a, p. 129), but again without mentioning any predecessors. We nd only a brief reference in Pasch (1882a, p. 17) to von Helmholtz (1876), but whether Pasch was in fact inuenced by von Helmholtz, or whether he just quoted the famous scientists in support of a view that he arrived at independently or inuenced by other authors remains an open question. Thus, it seems that the seed to Paschs views on mathematics, which underlie his axiomatization of geometry as well as his other foundational and philosophical investigations, was planted early in his career. As he admits without hesitation (and as will be discussed below), particular aspects of his philosophical outlook evolved over time, but on the whole Pasch remained committed throughout his life to the two pillars of his philosophy: deductivism
6 von Helmholtz (1866, 1876); for a discussion, see DiSalle (1993). 7 For historical overviews of the developments just sketched, see Volkert (1986) and Gray (2007). 8 Letters from June 16 and 22, 1882, held at the Staats- und Universit atsbibliothek G ottingen,

Sig. Klein 11, 176, and 177. Unfortunately, not much material from the time period before 1882 has been preserved in Paschs Nachlass at the University of Giessen. 9 This claim is repeated in Paschs short autobiography (Pasch, 1930b, p. 7), where he praises both Kronecker and Weierstrass for having taught him the necessary tools for his foundational investigations. 10 In his Habilitation lecture of 1870 Rosanes states that in more recent times, one has predominantly switched over to von Helmholtzs so-called empiricist theory, according to which space is nothing more than a concept that has been abstracted from experience and also mentions Locke as an proponent of an empiricist theory of space (Rosanes, 1871, p. 8; emphasis in original).

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Table 1. Layers of mathematical and philosophical investigations

Investigations Research (rough) Mathematical Foundational (delicate) Foundational Philosophical Pre-scientic Goals New mathematical results Stem concepts and propositions Core concepts and propositions Necessary conditions, skills, etc.

and empiricism. Pasch published a systematic account of his views, which I turn to next, only in the last two decades of his career. In order to accommodate his deductivism and empiricism into a coherent picture, Pasch distinguishes between different layers of mathematical and philosophical investigations, which are characterized by different aims and methodologies (see Table 1). According to this picture, mathematical investigations take place at two distinct layers. The rst one, which Pasch describes as rough (derb) mathematics, comprises the usual work that is done by mathematicians in order to obtain new results (Pasch, 1918a, p. 230).11 The bulk of mathematical research falls into this category, and it is worth mentioning already at this point that as a practicing mathematician Pasch was well aware of the distinction between how mathematics is presented and how it is actually done (more on this later). The second layer of mathematical work is foundational in character and it involves carefully working out the fundamental concepts and propositions of a discipline and showing how the entire discipline can be built up from them. Pasch refers to this part of mathematics as heikel (Pasch, 1918a, p. 230), which is translated here as delicate, but could also mean nicky and touchy. His own axiomatization of projective geometry (Pasch, 1882a) and his introduction to analysis (Pasch, 1882b) are examples of such investigations. Delicate mathematics is guided by the difcult demand for a scrupulous completeness of the trains of thought (unbedingte Vollst andigkeit der Gedankeng ange) and is motivated by an urge for pure knowledge (entspringt [ . . . ] dem Drange nach Erkenntnis u berhaupt) (Pasch, 1924a, p. 36). Such investigations aim at an axiomatic presentation of a mathematical discipline, which Pasch calls a stem (Stamm), consisting of stem concepts and propositions (Pasch, 1882a, pp. 74, 98).12 On their basis a mathematical theory can be built up deductively, and as long as they are not given any philosophical grounding, Pasch also refers to them as hypothetical (Pasch, 1917, p. 185) or mathematical (Pasch, 1924a, p. 43). Once a mathematical foundation of a discipline has been given, the philosophical task arises of determining the meanings of the mathematical terms and of giving an account of their applicability to the world. In other words, a substructure (Unterbau) has to be provided that supports and grounds the mathematical theory (Pasch, 1917, p. 185).13 For these philosophical foundations different approaches are possible, and Pasch mentions

11 See also Pasch (1924a, p. 35). 12 In Pasch (1924a, p. 16), Pasch refers to stem propositions also as basic propositions, axioms,

postulates. For more on Paschs choice of terminology, see below.

13 See also Pasch (1924a, p. 42).

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rationalist, a priori, and empiricist accounts as alternatives (Pasch, 1926c, p. 138). For reasons that will be discussed later (Section 3), Pasch himself decided to pursue a radical empiricist approach. The details of Paschs efforts to connect the philosophical substructure to the purely mathematical foundations are discussed under the heading of Paschs programme below (Section 5). Finally, a second layer of philosophical investigations is concerned with uncovering the conditions, skills, and so forth, that are necessary for employing the basic concepts and carrying out the investigations at the higher levels. Pasch refers to this layer as investigations regarding the prescientic origins or simply the origin (Ursprung) of mathematics and thinking in general (Pasch, 1924a, p. 40), and he identies as its fundamental concepts those of thing, proper name, event (in particular that of naming a thing), collective name, earlier and later events, immediate following, and chain of events (Pasch, 1924b, p. 234).14 Paschs investigations at this layer might be characterized, borrowing an expression of Hilbert, as a deepening of the foundations of human knowledge.15 The investigations at each of the top three layers can be pursued independently of the considerations pertaining to a lower layer, which allows for the division of ordinary and foundational research as well as the division of mathematical and philosophical labor. As a consequence, mathematicians can ignore the questions regarding the origins and the applicability of mathematics altogether, and most often they do.16 For Pasch, however, a complete picture of mathematics requires an account of each of these four layers and of their interconnections. To emphasize and illustrate this organic, hierarchical structure Pasch employs terminology that evokes the picture of a tree of mathematics: On the one hand, he refers to the philosophical foundations as a Kern, which is rendered here as core, but could also be translated as pip or kernel, that consists of core concepts and propositions (Kernbegriffe and Kerns atze) (Pasch, 1916).17 On the other hand, the mathematical foundations of a discipline are called a Stamm, translated here as stem, which but could also be rendered as stalk or trunk, that consists of stem concepts and propositions (Stammbegriffe and Stamms atze); in accordance with this botanical metaphor, the domain of philosophical inquiry that is common to all sciences is referred to as an area of roots (Wurzelgebiet) in Pasch (1924a, p. 34). Failure to notice Paschs distinction between a (mathematical) stem and a (philosophical) core, and indiscriminate reference to both stem propositions and core propositions as axioms has led to misinterpretations and disputes in the literature. For example, Kline (1972, p. 1008) mentions that some of Paschs axioms have empirical origins, while Torretti (1978, p. 211, and footnote 49) explicitly disagrees with this assessment and claims that Pasch considers all axioms to be empirically grounded.18 Since also Nagel does not address Paschs crucial distinction between a core and a stem (Nagel, 1939, pp. 193199), it has also been missed by many later commentators who relied heavily on Nagels account.

14 See also Pasch (1927), Pasch (1930a), and (Pasch, 1980, p. 16). The search for such origins can

15 16 17 18

certainly be traced back to Kant, but also some of Paschs colleagues addressed such questions, for example, Dedekind (1888, p. 336), and Veronese (1894, pp. 12). See Paschs discussion of Hilbert (1922) and Hilbert (1923) in Pasch (1924b, pp. 236240). See Pasch (1912, p. 204), Pasch (1924a, p. 43), and Pasch (1927, p. 123). Core propositions are also referred to as primitive stem propositions in Pasch (1924a, p. 16 [1915]), and in Pasch (1924b, p. 232) the core is referred to as a natural stem. A similar claim is made in Boniface (2004, p. 133).

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In the course of his career, which spanned over 60 years, Pasch devoted his attention increasingly to the deeper layers of mathematical and philosophical investigations, describing his aim as getting as far as possible to the beginnings (Pasch, 1926b, p. 166). Paschs earliest publications were a few short research articles, after which he brought out two books in 1882, both of which are concerned with foundational mathematical work and are interspersed with philosophical reections. Soon after Paschs lectures on geometry, his Einleitung in die Differential- und Integralrechnung (Pasch, 1882b) appeared.19 But, Pasch was not able to develop the foundations of analysis as deeply as he had intended, and he tried to remedy this in Grundlagen der Analysis (Pasch, 1909) and Ver anderliche und Funktion (Pasch, 1914). Only after his retirement from teaching for almost four decades at the University of Giessen,20 Pasch found the time to write on more philosophical topics. This led to numerous articles and the collections Mathematik und Logik (Pasch, 1919, 1924a), Mathematik am Ursprung (Pasch, 1927), and Der Ursprung des Zahlbegriffs (Pasch, 1930a).21 According to his strong conviction of the existence of a tight connection between correctness of linguistic expression and correctness of thinking (Sprachrichtigkeit und Denkrichtigkeit) (Pasch, 1930b, p. 6),22 Pasch always struggled to nd the most appropriate terminology for expressing his ideas. For example, while he distinguished between basic and stem concepts and propositions in Pasch (1882a, pp. 74 and 98), he began referring to the former as core in Pasch (1916, p. 276), remarking that his original terms Grunds atze and Grundbegriffe were often understood in a different sense than he intended. Changes in terminology also reect changes in Paschs way of thinking. For example, the distinction between rough and delicate mathematics (Pasch, 1918a, p. 230) was rst introduced as one between consistent (konsistent) and disputable (strittig) mathematics 2 years earlier (Pasch, 1916, p. 275). Similarly, the distinction between proper and improper mathematics that Pasch introduces in Pasch (1914, pp. 153157) was later reformulated as one between perfect and imperfect mathematics (Pasch, 1918a, p. 230).23 In later years Pasch also urged to employ different names for mathematical notions and their empirical correlates, on the grounds that their conceptual differences can be easily overlooked if they are both referred to by similar names, and he suggested the terms location, path, segment, bowl, and plate (Stelle, Weg, Strecke, Schale, Platte) as names for the empirical conceptions of point, line, straight line, surface, and at surface (Pasch, 1917, p. 187).24 Pasch was very well aware of the tentative character of axiomatic presentations and he continuously tried to improve on his previous work by publishing lists of corrections to

19 The preface of Vorlesungen (Pasch, 1882a) is dated March 1882, while that of Einleitung (Pasch,

1882b) is dated May 1882.

20 See Pickert (1980, pp. 4957) for a list of the courses taught by Pasch in Giessen. 21 Interestingly, more publications by Pasch appeared in the two decades after his retirement than

before.
22 Pasch elsewhere describes the aim of mathematics as the most complete clarity of thought and

of their linguistic expressions (Pasch, 1924a, pp. 3940); for a practical example, see Pasch (1887b, p. 132), where he introduces new terminology that allows for more precise and shorter formulations. 23 The distinction between perfect and imperfect mathematics will be discussed in connection with the notion of decidability in Section 4, below. 24 See also Pasch (1930a, p. 19) for Paschs use of Rotte instead of Reihe, which he used in Pasch (1909, p. 7).

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earlier publications and slightly changing formulations even in reprints.25 Paschs attitude toward foundational work is expressed quite tellingly his review of a book by Dingler on the notion of logical independence in mathematics, subtitled Also an Introduction to Axiomatics (Dingler, 1915). Here Pasch criticizes the author for reprinting an obviously unnished article without further revisions and for not seriously trying to present a complete set of core propositions (Pasch, 1916, p. 276). Pasch concludes that the book would need further patient work before being able to yield concrete results from the accumulated raw material. In addition, Pasch demands higher standards regarding the exactness of ones thought and expression and a more thorough self-criticism especially from somebody who writes an introduction to axiomatics. There are good reasons to believe that he did hold himself responsible to such standards.26 3. Paschs empiricism. Paschs version of empiricism, the main points of which I will try to outline in this section, differs in important respects from the views held by his contemporaries, but bears some resemblance to the views of Berkeley, Locke, and Hume.27 In contrast to the question as to which geometry is the right description of space, which was the driving force behind von Helmholtzs form of empiricism, Paschs main concern was the nature of the fundamental concepts of mathematics. A satisfactory account of this, according to Pasch, must answer questions regarding the applicability of mathematics as well as the epistemology and certainty of mathematical knowledge. In accord with my thesis that the main elements of Paschs philosophy can be found already in his lectures on projective geometry, I shall begin the discussion with Paschs remarks on the nature of geometry. In the opening sentence of his Vorlesungen u ber neuere Geometrie (Pasch, 1882a, V), Pasch laments that the empirical origins of geometry have not been consistently brought out in the recent treatments of this discipline that tried to meet the increased standards of rigor, and he announces that his lectures aim at carrying out such a project. Shortly after this pronouncement Pasch justies his point of view by claiming that the successful applications of geometry in daily life and in science are based on the fact that the geometric concepts originally conformed exactly with empirical objects, and that only later they were covered by a network of articial concepts to foster the advancement of theoretical developments. By restricting himself from the start to empirical concepts only, Pasch intends to retain the character of geometry as a natural science.28 A few pages later he repeats his resolve of steadfastly holding on to the empiricist standpoint, according to
25 This can be seen, for example, in the additions to the 1912 edition of his lectures on projective

geometry and the various (seemingly overly pedantic) corrections to previous publications that he adds in later works. Just to mention a few, Pasch (1909) contains corrections to Pasch (1882a) on pp. 117188 and to Pasch (1882b) on p. 120; corrections to Pasch (1912) are listed in Pasch (1914, VI) together with further corrections to Pasch (1909). A number of small changes in the text can be found in the versions of Pasch (1894) reprinted in Pasch (1909), Pasch (1919), and Pasch (1924a). 26 Paschs publications, as well as his autobiographical reections and the descriptions of his character and work ethic by people who knew him personally conrm this; see Pasch (1930b, p. 10), Dehn (1928), Engel & Dehn (1934), and Tamari (2007). 27 See Jesseph (1993, pp. 4487) and Pressman (1997); see also John Stuart Mills A System of Logic (Mill, 1851), and Harr e (2003). 28 The view that geometry is a natural science is frequently echoed by Hilbert, see Hallett & Majer (2004, pp. 66, 197, 266, 504).

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which geometry is seen as nothing else but a part of natural science (Pasch, 1882a, p. 3). Thus, Pasch presents his work from the outset as providing philosophical foundations for projective geometry, in addition to purely mathematical ones (see Table 1, above). This combination, which is rather unusual in its extent for a mathematical treatise, may have come as a surprise and possibly also as an irritation to readers who did not share the aims and methods of Paschs conception of mathematics and his philosophical project.29 Paschs original move, which characterizes his version of empiricism and sets it apart from that of his contemporaries, is to take empirical concepts as the starting point for a rigorous development of mathematical theories. This involves two main steps: First, the stem concepts of a discipline have to be developed from the empirical core concepts, and second, the remainder of the theory has to be based on the stem concepts alone. Note, that in order to guarantee the empirical character of mathematics as a whole, its theorems must inherit the epistemological status of the axioms; it is at this point where Paschs deductivism becomes fundamental for establishing his empiricism. As a general and essential criterion for the choice of core concepts Pasch holds that they should be able to explain how the mathematical concepts originated or at least how they could have originated (Pasch, 1917, p. 190).30 Moreover, they should be as few as possible and express the simplest content possible (Pasch, 1894, p. 24). Pasch also insists that the basic terms of a mathematical theory can neither be dened nor can they be reduced to other concepts, but that we can only understand them through reference to appropriate physical objects (den Hinweis auf geeignete Naturobjecte) (Pasch, 1882a, p. 16). In particular, the principle of duality in projective geometry, that is, the fact that the basic terms in the stem propositions can be interchanged systematically while yielding again valid propositions, is taken by Pasch as evidence that these propositions cannot be regarded as denitions of the basic concepts (Pasch, 1914, p. 143). This stands in direct contrast to the modern understanding of axiom systems as implicit denitions of its primitive terms.31 Thus, in geometry Pasch introduces points as those objects that cannot be further divided within the limits of observation determined by the best tools that are currently available to us. He also rejects the common view that lines must be imagined as being innitely extended, since such a demand does not correspond to any perceptible objects (Pasch, 1882a, p. 4); instead, Pasch takes the notion of (nite) line segments as a core concept. In addition to the demand that the basic objects of geometry should be observable, they must satisfy some further restrictions in order to be usable. For all practical purposes, congurations of physical geometric objects (i.e., gures or diagrams), Pasch explains, must be such that, on the one hand, the observer is relatively close to them, and on the other hand, that their parts are sufciently close to allow for an immediate grasp of their relationships (Pasch, 1882a, pp. 1819). As a consequence, one can have immediate evidence that these relationships hold only within a relatively small, bounded region of space.32
29 That readers might be irritated is mentioned, for example, in Tamari (2007, pp. 77, 194195). Two

examples: Russell speaks of Paschs empirical pseudo-philosophical reasons (Russell, 1903, p. 393) and in a recent commentary Majer mentions some curiosities that characterize Paschs approach (Majer, 2004, p. 104). 30 For similar remarks, regarding the axiomatization of arithmetic, see Pasch (1924a, p. 16 [1915]). 31 That Pasch did understand axioms to implicitly dene the primitives is claimed in Tamari (2007, ii, p. 6, and 96). But, compare the footnote in Pasch (1920, p. 145), in which Pasch explicitly denies such an interpretation; see also Gabriel (1978). 32 For similar views on these fundamental assumptions Pasch refers to Riemann (1854, p. 266), Klein (1871, pp. 576 and 624), and Klein (1873b, p. 134).

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In a similar vein, Pasch also notes that general terms (universals) are introduced only with reference to a nite number of particular objects (Pasch, 1914, p. 3). For Pasch, the further development of a mathematical discipline proceeds from observations to propositions. In geometry, repeated observations of concretely given gures yield simple relations between the basic concepts, some of which are formulated as basic propositions, from which all other propositions of geometry follow. For example, two of Paschs basic propositions are: I. Between two points one can always draw one and only one segment and VI. Given any two points A and B , it is possible to choose a point C , such that B lies within the segment AC (Pasch, 1882a, p. 5). Given the empirical referents of the primitive terms, Pasch notes that these propositions do not hold in general, but that they are subject to certain restrictions. In order to draw a segment between any two points, these points must be sufciently apart from each other, while the points A and B of basic proposition VI must be sufciently close to each other to allow for the actual construction of the third point. These conditions are met in the usual diagrams or mental visualizations that accompany mathematical investigations, but they must be made explicit and kept track of in the deductive development of geometry. Theorems that depend on the above basic propositions, are thus also subject to restrictions. For example, also the construction expressed in theorem 8, which states that Given two points A and B on a line, it is always possible to choose a point C on that line, such that C lies between A and B (Pasch, 1882a, p. 10), and which is proved using the above axioms, cannot be applied indenitely often (i.e., the always must be taken with a grain of salt). While Pasch does not give specic arguments for his empiricist standpoint in his early writings, he does provide an argument in Pasch (1914, pp. 138139), which is based on the applicability of mathematics. In order to apply mathematical propositions to the world, the concepts that occur in them must be related to things that occur in experience, which is straightforward if they are understood to refer to empirical notions from the outset. If, however, mathematical concepts are not understood as referring to empirical objects, in which case Pasch calls them hypothetical concepts, their applicability rests on two sets of hypotheses: First, the axioms themselves are purely hypothetical, and second, the association between mathematical concepts and their empirical correlates is hypothetical, too. The position that Pasch describes here bears strong similarities to that of a hypotheticodeductive account of mathematics, which must be augmented by coordinative denitions to be applied.33 From Paschs empiricist standpoint, however, these two kinds of hypotheses present a detour that does not add any benets, so that the empiricist approach is simpler and thus to be preferred. In Pasch (1917, pp. 185186) Pasch remarks that hypothetical geometry is completely independent from physical objects (Naturgegenst anden), which becomes completely obvious if the terms thing of the rst, second, and third kind are used instead of points, lines, planes, as was suggested by Hilbert (1899). From a mathematical point of view this way of proceeding is unobjectionable for Pasch, but it leaves the relation to gures and applications unexplained. More generally, he maintained that despite the fact that the problem of applicability had been widely discussed from a nonempiricist standpoint no satisfactory solution had yet been given. A second argument for empiricism is presented in Pasch (1922, pp. 34) and Pasch (1924a, p. 44). Here Pasch notes that different viewpoints regarding the nature of geometry, for example, that it is a pure creation of human thought, nd their expression in
33 See Reichenbach (1957, p. 14) or Nagel (1961, p. 93); Hilberts account of the application of

mathematical theories is also similar.

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introductory textbooks. However, a closer look at these expositions also reveals that none of them remains completely consistent in presenting geometry from a single point of view. For example, a body may have been dened as a part of space that is delimited on all sides, but it is later said to be moved, despite the fact that a part of space is not something movable (Pasch, 1924a, p. 44). Without going into further details Pasch argues that it is impossible to purge all allusions to experience from any introduction to geometry, and thus, that a coherent presentation should treat geometry as an empirical science. The lack of a textbook that consistently pursues the empiricist standpoint is explained by the fact that much more work needs to be done to lay bare the prescientic foundations that such a presentation would require.34 Nonetheless, Pasch also recommends teaching geometry in school by starting with empirical notions, since they are what seems to come most naturally to beginners (Pasch, 1909, pp. 134135).

4. Paschs deductivism. In addition to exploring the philosophical foundations of mathematical concepts, Pasch was also interested in capturing an ideal of mathematical reasoning and in providing a general criterion for mathematical rigor. He shared this goal with his contemporaries Frege and Hilbert. A related concern of Pasch regards the clarication of the role of intuition in mathematical reasoning and he engaged in brief discussions with Study and Klein on this issue.35 Paschs later investigations led to a careful analysis of the nature of proofs and to discussions of the notions of decidability, consistency, and mathematical discovery. As in the previous section, I shall begin with Paschs earliest reections on these matters. Pasch informs us in Pasch (1918a, p. 231) that he arrived at his views on deduction only while writing the Vorlesungen u ber neuere Geometrie (1882). Just as the opening sentence of these lectures introduces the reader to the empiricist background of the book, the next sentence expresses the second cornerstone of Paschs philosophy of mathematics: the view of geometry as a science that obtains its results by purely deductive means (Pasch, 1882a, V). What Pasch means by this is that regardless of the content that is intended to be conveyed by the basic propositions, once these have been put forward no recourse to perceptual experience should be necessary for the further development of the theory (Pasch, 1882a, p. 17). He expresses this very modern deductivist stance even more explicitly in the most often quoted passage from his lectures as follows36 : In fact, if geometry is genuinely deductive, the process of deducing must be in all respects independent of the sense of the geometrical concepts, just as it must be independent of gures; only the relations set out between the geometrical concepts used in the propositions (respectively denitions) concerned ought to be taken into account. (Pasch, 1882a, p. 98; emphasis in original)

34 Pasch mentions Thaer & Lony (1915) as a valuable attempt in this direction. 35 On Eduard Study, see Hartwich (2005); I intend to discuss the interactions between Pasch and

Klein in a subsequent paper.

36 Quotations of this passage can be found, for example, in Nagel (1939, p. 197), Kennedy (1972,

p. 133), Torretti (1978, p. 211), Shapiro (1997, p. 149), Boniface (2004, p. 134), Detlefsen (2005, p. 251).

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This passage has been referred to as the birthplace of modern axiomatics37 and is the basis for Tamaris reference to Pasch as the father of modern axiomatics (Tamari, 2007, title), and Freudenthals remark that [t]he father of rigor in geometry is Pasch (Freudenthal, 1962, p. 619). How quickly Paschs conception of mathematical deduction became widely accepted can be gleaned from the fact that 8 years later Klein mentions Pasch as espousing an almost generally held view, according to which in geometric considerations one has to rely only on axioms without making any use of intuition (Klein, 1890, p. 571). Pasch never grew tired of emphasizing again and again the importance of this understanding of deduction, which he also referred to as the genuine mathematical method (Pasch, 1918a, p. 228) and as an imperative (Gebot) for mathematical research, which is completely independent of any position regarding the philosophical foundations of mathematics one might want to adopt (Pasch, 1917, p. 188). As he repeated over three decades after his lectures on geometry were published, mathematical proofs must remain valid if the basic concepts are replaced throughout by any concepts or by meaningless signs (Pasch, 1914, p. 120).38 He refers here to this method as a formalism, that has to be carried downright to the extremes in the development of mathematics (Pasch, 1914, p. 121; emphasis in original), and concludes emphatically: This formalism is the lifeblood (Lebensnerv) of mathematics (Pasch, 1914, p. 121).39 Replacing meaningful terms by variables, for example, changing There are points to There are s, is the key to formalization, according to Pasch. He emphasized that geometric arguments must remain valid even if the geometric terms are replaced by code names (Decknamen) like P-thing, G-thing, and E-thing (Pasch, 1918a, p. 231).40 In general, for a mathematical proof to be rigorous it must rest only on propositions that allow such substitutions and whose inferences remain valid under such transformations (Pasch, 1926c, p. 263). This analysis leads Pasch to distinguish between material words (Stoffw orter) and joins (F ugemittel) (Pasch, 1926c, pp. 243 and 263). As Pasch explains, the former are meaningful terms that denote concepts, which are the material (Stoff ) of the proposition, like two, points, segment, and endpoint. The joins constitute what is needed to connect the material words in order to express relations between the denoted concepts, and they include what are now called the logical parts of expressions.41 They are called the scaffolding (Ger ust) of a stem in Pasch (1924a, p. 11 [1915]), and in Pasch (1894, p. 21) he explains that in order to carry out deductions one only needs to understand those parts of language that are common to all domains of thought (Denkgebieten). This allows Pasch to reformulate his understanding of deduction as follows: The mathematical proof has nothing to do with the meaning of the material words; it depends ultimately only on the joins and thus presents a pure formalism. (Pasch, 1926c, p. 263; emphasis in original)

37 See Engel & Dehn (1934, p. 133) and Pickert (1982, p. 271). 38 At this point Pasch does not distinguish terminologically between words and concepts, that is,

between linguistic entities and their meanings. He addresses this distinction, however, in Pasch (1926c). See also Pasch (1909, p. 1). 39 This remark is echoed in Pasch (1926c, p. 263). 40 For similar considerations, see also Dedekinds letter to Lipschitz, July 27, 1876 (Dedekind, 1932a, p. 479), and Hilberts letter to Frege, December 29, 1899 (Frege, 1980, p. 40). 41 It appears that Paschs distinction between material words and joins is intended to distinguish nonlogical from logical components of expressions in a natural language.

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Formalization, as the most reliable touchstone for the validity of proofs, can be dispensed with if one is very careful, but this is very difcult, Pasch warns, as the gap in Euclids rst proof illustrates (Pasch, 1926c, p. 140). Nevertheless, Pasch acknowledges the usefulness of diagrams in mathematical practice, as will be discussed below (p. 107). Pasch (1914, pp. 121137) discusses at some length four historical case studies of mathematical errors made by Amp` ere, Cauchy, Dirichlet, and Hasse, which he traces back to a lack of rigour in the development. Such rigor can be achieved through formalization, which for Pasch is a powerful technique to ascertain the logical validity of arguments. As such, Paschs notion of formalization does not involve the presentation of mathematical reasoning in a symbolic language like Peanos or in a completely formalized language like Freges. Pasch explicitly distanced himself from these approaches and promoted formalization only to the extent that it remained compatible with ordinary mathematical practice.42 Pasch realized that his understanding of deduction requires to address the question of what counts as a mathematical proof, and in a letter to Frege from 1894 he expressed his surprise of nding how rarely this topic had been seriously investigated.43 In a lecture on the value of mathematical education delivered in the same year, Pasch pointed out that mathematical proofs serve two main goals. Originally, they were a means for discovering new properties of gures and numbers, but later they were also employed for examining the logical dependencies among propositions (Pasch, 1894, pp. 2324). The second point is vividly illustrated by Paschs own investigations in Pasch (1882a), in particular the discussions of various equivalent axiomatizations in Section 1. Pasch did not consider the study of mathematical inferences as a subject matter of mathematical research per se, but as a matter of independent and general importance properly belonging to the domain of philosophy (Pasch, 1914, p. 33). As is evident from the correspondence with Frege, Pasch showed great interest in Freges work, but he also remarked that due to his age and the heavy demands on his time he was not in a position to familiarize himself with Freges notation.44 Nevertheless, Pasch undertook his own investigations of the notion of proof in order to give an account of the necessary conditions for valid mathematical inferences that apply to informal arguments as well as to those presented in a formal language. While his investigations remained only in the edgling stages, Pasch expressed the hope that they might lead to a renewal of logic and that the indicated path will lead to the main features of a logic that does justice to the accomplishments of mathematics (Pasch, 1918a, p. 232). The position that Pasch arrived at is that [i]t is part of the essence of pure deduction that every proof can be atomized, i.e., resolved into steps of certain kinds, or that it consists of a single such step. (Pasch, 1917, p. 189) In his Begriffsbildung und Beweis in der Mathematik (1925) Pasch illustrates and discusses in great detail how the Aristotelian syllogistic form Barbara, that is, the deduction of All As are C s from the premises All As are B s and All B s are C s, can be atomized into 16 individual steps. According to Paschs analysis, each of these steps in the deduction

42 See Paschs letter to Klein, October 19, 1891; held at the Staats- und Universit atsbibliothek

G ottingen, Sig. Klein 11, 184.

43 Paschs letter to Frege, February 11, 1894 (Frege, 1980, p. 103). 44 Letter from Pasch to Frege, January 18, 1903 (Frege, 1980, p. 105). The preserved correspondence

with Frege consists of seven letters from Pasch in the period from 1894 to 1906.

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is the reformulation of the same content in other words, or the dissection of the original content while retaining only a part of it, or the combination of the contents of previous steps, or a denition.45 Pasch concludes that the most basic inferential steps must be such that one can decide, by a general method in a nite amount of time or of steps, whether they are valid or not. He also discusses questions that he considers to be undecidable, such as whether a given proof can be rendered gap free and whether a given formula is derivable from a set of assumptions. Pasch appeals here to a notion of decidability that he attributes to Kronecker and which he recognized only during his work on Grundlagen der Analysis (1909) as being of fundamental importance.46 Pasch (1914, pp. 153157) distinguishes between proper mathematics, which makes only use of decidable notions, and improper mathematics, which does not, but which is much more common. To avoid speaking of improper mathematics, Pasch later changed the terminology to perfect and imperfect mathematics (Pasch, 1918a, p. 230). In his 1894 lecture mentioned above Pasch remarks that neither Euclidean nor nonEuclidean geometries contradict any facts of experience, but that nevertheless these systems could still be inconsistent (einen inneren Widerspruch enthalten), because experience only refers to approximated usability, which is quite compatible with certain inconsistencies (Pasch, 1894, p. 31). He also maintains that explicit and complete proofs for the consistency of both geometries are still lacking, and suggests that such proofs could be based on analytic means, which would settle the question at least for those who consider the consistency of analysis as necessary (Pasch, 1894, pp. 3132). More than 20 years later Pasch took up the issue of consistency again in a lecture Uber innere Folgerichtigkeit (1915), which was published in Pasch (1919). Here he introduces a classication of inconsistencies, two of which are internal to a theory, while the other two concern applications of theories. An inconsistency of the rst level occurs within a single sentence or between two given sentences. Since they involve only a nite set of sentences, such inconsistencies are decidable (granting the investigator a sufciently long life and a big enough memory). An inconsistency of the second level, however, is one between consequences of a given stem, which are in general innite in number, and Pasch notes that we do not have any general process by which we could decide whether such an inconsistency obtains or not, since this would involve the determination of all consequences of a set of axioms. As a method for establishing consistency Pasch explains how a given set of meaningful propositions can be formalized, resulting in an empty stem, which in turn can be realized by replacing the meaningless symbols by meaningful concepts, yielding a lled stem (Pasch, 1926a, p. 11 [1915]). If a realization of a formalized stem is consistent, Pasch argues, then the original stem is also consistent. In modern terminology, Pasch here describes the notion of relative consistency proofs. To arithmetize a stem, which often depends on a felicitous idea, amounts to showing its consistency relative to arithmetic.47 Pasch defends the standpoint that arithmetic is indeed consistent, while the consistency of any other mathematical discipline must be established by a proof.48
45 See also Pasch (1924a, p. 38), where Pasch refers to his earlier discussions of proofs in Pasch

(1909), Pasch (1912), and Pasch (1914).

46 See Paschs discussion of the notion of decidability in Pasch (1914, pp. 153157), Pasch (1918a),

and Pasch (1927, pp. 8893).

47 Pasch presents this terminology as if it were his own. References to Weierstrass, Kronecker, and

Klein are conspicuously missing; see Klein (1895) and the discussion in Boniface (2007, p. 332).
48 Kroneckers views on the natural numbers seem to loom in the background of this discussion, but

Pasch never mentions them explicitly (see also Footnote 9).

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To show the consistency of arithmetic one would have to show that an axiomatization of arithmetic itself is consistent, or, in other words, this should follow from arithmetic itself.49 Pasch argues that this is indeed the case by appealing to the intimate connection between arithmetic, thought, and language. The source of arithmetic, which nds expression in its core propositions, Pasch contends, is necessary for thought in general and its constituents are so extremely primitive that we are not consciously aware of them. We have committed ourselves to their content when we made experiences and xed them in language. It follows that these propositions and their consequences are binding for us, which justies, for Pasch, our belief in their consistency (Pasch, 1924a, p. 17 [1915]). It is worth pointing out that Pasch does not mention any empirical considerations in his discussions of the consistency of mathematical theories, except in the argument for grounding the consistency of arithmetic.50 The value of the deductive method in mathematics, for Pasch, is that it excludes all arbitrariness in proofs and thus renders them unassailable, which, together with the empirical evidence for the core propositions, is the basis for our ascribing the highest level of reliability to mathematics (Pasch, 1882a, p. 100). Notice how, as a thoroughgoing empiricist, Pasch does not speak of the necessity of mathematics, but only of its reliability.51 For all practical purposes mathematical knowledge is as good as certain. Although strict adherence to the deductive method in mathematics might lead to more long-winded expositions, it has two further advantages for mathematical practice, according to Pasch. Firstly, proofs that have been carried out without any appeal to the meanings of the nonlogical primitives occurring in them are reusable, in the sense that replacing the terms in the assumptions in such a way that they become true statements automatically also yields true statements for the conclusions if the terms are replaced accordingly (Pasch, 1882a, pp. 98, 100). In this way new mathematical results can be obtained in a purely mechanical fashion without having to repeat the derivations (Pasch, 1914, p. 120). Secondly, a deductive presentation of a domain can be exploited to determine which concepts and propositions are necessary or dispensable for the theoretical development of the discipline (Pasch, 1882a, p. 100).52 As mentioned above, Pasch never suggested that ordinary mathematics should be carried out in a formal system and he seriously doubted the feasibility of such an undertaking. Instead, formalization is only a technique, albeit a very powerful one, for ascertaining the rigor of deductions. Already in the rst edition of his Vorlesungen (1882) Pasch notes that it is admissible and useful to think about the meanings of the geometric terms during a deduction, but that as soon as this becomes necessary the incompleteness of the deduction
49 Any reference to Hilbert (1900) or Hilbert (1905) are again conspicuously missing from Paschs

discussion.
50 See Pasch (1894, p. 17) and Pasch (1909, p. 134), which are referred to in Pasch (1917, p. 185).

It is also noteworthy that Pasch does not discuss Dedekinds nor Peanos axiomatizations of arithmetic (Dedekind 1888; Peano 1889a); indeed, in Pasch (1927, p. 90) he remarks that there is no generally accepted set of core propositions for arithmetic. It is possible that he did not accept Dedekinds notions of system and mapping as being empirically grounded, and that he objected to Peanos use of a purely symbolic language. 51 Pasch only rarely speaks of the truth of the core propositions, for example, he refers to them as basic truths (Grundwahrheiten) in a talk to a general audience (Pasch, 1894, p. 21). I think Pasch would agree to Einsteins famous remark that As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality, quoted from (Hempel, 1945, p. 17). 52 See also Pasch (1924b, p. 233).

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is revealed. He mentions that it is actually a common conception that theorems should follow logically from axioms (Pasch, 1882a, p. 99), but that his remarks on mathematical rigor are nevertheless not uncalled for, since this demand remains unfullled more often than not, even in publications that deal explicitly with the foundations of a mathematical discipline.53 As possible reasons for this discrepancy Pasch mentions the frequent use of diagrams or other perceived or imagined pictures that accompany a deduction. But, Pasch does not at all reject the use of diagrams in mathematical practice. In fact, he acknowledges their efciency for representing the relations that are expressed in the assumptions or constructions of a geometric proof in an intuitive way (in anschaulicher Form) (Pasch, 1882a, p. 43). On the one hand, such a representation makes it easy to survey and bring back to memory the relevant relations, and, on the other hand, it stimulates the inventive talent (Erndungskraft) and it is thus a fruitful tool for discovering new relations and constructions (Pasch, 1882a, p. 43). Indeed, for Pasch the creative trains of thought by which mathematicians advance to new knowledge must not and cannot be rendered completely in formal terms (Pasch, 1926c, p. 142). Diagrams are necessary for understanding the core propositions of geometry, Pasch maintains, since the latter express observations made on simple gures. Moreover, every inference can be conrmed by a gure, although the gures themselves do not justify the inferences. How diagrams can be misleading is illustrated by Paschs discussion of the rst proof in Euclids Elements.54 Pasch briey considers the possibility of admitting inferences that are based on gures, but he quickly dismisses it with the comment that one would hardly succeed to delineate clearly which inferences would be acceptable and which would need to be justied by recourse to earlier statements made in the proof (Pasch, 1882a, p. 45). In a similar vein Pasch also notes that the use of familiar terms in mathematical discourse can be misleading, since they evoke, often unconsciously, many associations that are not logical consequences of the axioms (Pasch, 1882a, p. 99). Again, these considerations are considered unobjectionable by Pasch when it comes to the discovery of new geometric truths, where all means can be applied that lead to the end, but not for the verication and presentation of the results (Pasch, 1882a, p. 99).55 5. Paschs programme. Given the distinction Pasch makes between the mathematical and philosophical foundations of a discipline, the general problem arises of connecting these two. In Paschs case, this problem is exacerbated by the fact that he opted for the philosophical foundations to be grounded empirically, instead of, for example, in a Platonic realm of mathematical objects. Thus, his overall framework is put under stress by the tension between his empiricism and his deductivism. Paschs programme, intended to ease this tension, consists in nding adequate ways of combining these two standpoints and in developing deductive theories from empirical cores. Since the reader of Paschs Vorlesungen (1882) might easily miss the general aim and structure of his approach, the development can appear unmotivated and needlessly
53 Pasch (1917, p. 188) mentions Du Bois-Reymond (1882) as an example. 54 Paschs discussion seems to have contributed much to the popularization of the critique of Euclids

proof, so much that it even has been referred to as the rst instance of such a critique, for example, in Friedman (1985, p. 462). 55 Here Pasch distinguishes clearly between what has later been called the context of discovery and the context of justication (Reichenbach, 1938, pp. 67); see also his Forschen und Darstellen (Pasch, 1919), in particular p. 35. For a contemporary discussion of this matter, see Hersh (1991).

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cumbersome. In fact, the stem concepts and propositions of projective geometry,56 which one would expect to nd at the beginning of the book, are only introduced in section 10, after almost 100 pages of long-winded deductions and denitions from the empirical core concepts and propositions that Pasch starts out with. A reader interested in studying projective geometry may well wonder what the rst 100 pages are all about. It is only in Grundfragen der Geometrie (1917) that Pasch explicitly presents his overall conception of geometry (presented in Section 2, above) and discusses his method of extending the meanings of concepts. This is taken up again 5 years later and discussed in detail with reference to the deep contrast (tiefen Gegensatz) between physical geometry and mathematical geometry (Pasch, 1922, pp. 362363). Let us take a look at how Pasch presents these matters in his 1882 lectures on geometry. Here he describes the relation between mathematical theories and their empirical foundations by stating that [m]athematics sets up relations between the mathematical concepts, which should correspond to facts from experience (Pasch, 1882a, p. 17). This makes it sound as if all mathematical propositions have direct empirical correlates. However, while this characterization might well have been an ideal that Pasch had in mind at the time, it does not square with his own way of developing the axioms of projective geometry in his lectures. Paschs approach is captured more accurately in his later, more nuanced reections, in which he only speaks of correlates that have been developed from empirical propositions. Once the empiricist has completed the substructure, he can attach to it the theory that I referred to as mathematical geometry without changing the wording. He would then, whenever one speaks of points understand it as mathematical points, a concept which has been developed from the physical point in the substructure. (Pasch, 1924a, p. 43). Thus, Paschs strategy for bridging the gap between empirical and mathematical concepts can be characterized as follows: Start with empirical core concepts and propositions, and develop theorems through denitions and deductions, which can be used as correlates of the mathematical stem propositions of a particular discipline. This enterprise may involve two different kinds of moves: (a) the lifting of empirical restrictions, and (b) the denition of new concepts that extend previous ones. These are illustrated in what follows. Consider the statement Between any two points on a line segment there is another point. Taken as an empirical statement, it is false. Due to the limits of our perception and the fact that points must be extended to be observable, two points might just be so close to each other that there is not enough space to t another point between them. Thus, if the statement is to be understood as expressing a core proposition about empirical points, it must be augmented with the proviso that the points in question be sufciently apart from each other. As a mathematical proposition, however, the above statement can be accepted without any further restrictions on the relative locations of the points. Thus, we can obtain mathematical statements from empirical ones by simply dropping certain additional conditions, which is one way of connecting a mathematical theory with its empirical substructure.

56 They are 22 in total: 8 for line segments, 4 for the plane, and 10 for congruency; the latter are

common to Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry.

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However, not all mathematical propositions can be obtained by simply removing restrictions that are necessary for empirical ones. If this is the case, Pasch resorts to a technique he refers to as extending the meanings of concepts (Begriffserweiterung) (Pasch, 1882a, p. 64) which he employs, for example, for points, lines, and planes in Pasch (1882a) and for numbers in Pasch (1882b). To motivate this technique, Pasch also mentions two extensions of concepts from the history of mathematics: The notion of number originally meant only positive rational numbers, but was extended at some point in history to include also negative numbers, while the notion of power was originally used only for natural numbers as exponents, but was also extended to include negative and rational numbers in a similar way (Pasch, 1882a, pp. 4041). Analogously, Pasch introduces the concept thing for concrete objects, but extends it in Pasch (1909, p. 20) to include sequences and in Pasch (1909, p. 94) to include innite sets.57 Since the method of extending the meanings of concepts plays a crucial role for developing deductive mathematical theories from an empirical core, I will present next how Pasch proceeds to extend the meanings of numbers and then of bundle of lines and points. Pasch extends the meaning of the concept number in his Einleitung in die Differentialund Integralrechnung (1882) to include also irrational numbers on the basis of Dedekind cuts (Dedekind, 1872). He begins by introducing the word number as referring only to positive whole numbers and their quotients, that is, to nonnegative rational numbers, and assumes that for these the relations of equality, greater, and less than, as well as the operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, and exponentiation are known. After deriving a few basic theorems from these assumptions, Pasch notices that not every number can be represented as the power of another number (e.g., that there is no number x in the domain, such that x 3 = 25). Following Dedekind, he considers all numbers whose n th power is less than a given number a as forming a group (Gruppe), which Pasch calls number segment or just segment. Then he notes that for some numbers a and n there is a least number that does not belong to the corresponding number segment (e.g., for a = 25 and n = 2 this least number is 5), but that for others there is no such least number (e.g., for a = 25 and n = 3). Pasch calls those number segments with a least upper bound rational and the others irrational, and proceeds to dene the relations of equality, greater, and less than, as well as the operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division for number segments. On the basis of these denitions he argues that all expressions that involve these notions for numbers also hold of number segments, both rational and irrational. With regard to powers, Pasch shows that, unlike in the case of numbers, every number segment can be represented as the n th power of another segment, and he shows that the powers remain well dened and obey the familiar laws not only for every rational number segment, but also for every irrational one. This allows Pasch to notice that the computations with segments completely subsume the computations with numbers, but also go beyond them, since they allow for the unrestricted application of the inverse operation of taking the power. Once the theory of number segments (which is more complete (Pasch, 1882b, p. 11), since subject to fewer restrictions than the theory of numbers) is adopted, the term number plays no particular role any more, since it can be replaced throughout by rational number segment. This observation motivates Pasch to

57 Another example for the extension of concepts concerns the notion of limit, see Pasch (1918b).

I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this to my attention.

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dispense with the old meaning of number and use this term for number segments instead, so that now we can speak of rational and irrational numbers.58 In sum, Paschs extension of the meaning of the term numbers proceeds in three steps: rst, it is taken to refer only to nonnegative rational numbers; then, rational and irrational number segments are introduced, the former of which correspond to numbers; nally, the term number is applied to number segments in general, which also allows to speak of rational and irrational numbers. Further extensions of the domain of numbers to include negative numbers, zero, innity, and imaginary numbers are also mentioned by Pasch, but he does not present them in detail. To show the usefulness of the newly introduced concept of number, Pasch discusses the measurement of straight lines. Empirical measurements, he notes, can only be made up to a certain limit of accuracy, but mathematics aims at establishing general rules that are independent of limitations of what can be observed (Beobachtungsverh altnisse). This can be achieved by admitting also irrational numbers, since then no knowledge of any particular threshold of accuracy is required (Pasch, 1882b, p. 13).59 It is informative to notice the striking contrast between Paschs and Dedekinds presentations of the introduction of irrational numbers. While Dedekind uses abstract set-theoretic terminology and considers the real numbers to correspond to points on a line, Pasch uses more concrete terminology in his approach and takes the limitations of our empirical interactions with lines as the starting point, distinguishing between the calculation of the length of a line and its measurement. Moreover, while Dedekind clearly distinguishes between a cut and its corresponding number, Pasch redenes the term number to refer to cuts, but, as was not uncommon at the time, he does not distinguish carefully between the term number and the concept of number. Since Pasch obviously would not want to assert that a number has innitely many elements, he must restrict his number talk to only certain properties of cuts, but he completely avoids to address this issue. Pasch also does not comment on the problem that the uncountability of the irrational numbers might pose for his empiricist approach. The latter difculty points at a more general issue of Paschs programme, namely the exact specication of the means that he regards as admissible for the development of new concepts from given ones. Since Paschs attitude is not revisionist, he must be open in principle to accept the results that are obtained by any method used in mathematics. One way of showing the compatibility of mathematical practice with his empiricist standpoint is to nd ways of achieving the same results by licensed methods. In the case of projective geometry, it was accepted practice to introduce ideal points as points at innity where parallel lines meet.60 Such a denition, however, does not conform to Paschs empiricist standards, because innity is not an empirical notion, and so he set out to introduce these objects by other means. In his lectures on projective geometry Pasch extends the meaning of bundle of lines and point (Pasch, 1882a, pp. 3346). On the basis of the notions of points and lines, the latter of which he dened using the
58 In an unusually opinionated review for the Jahrbuch f ur Fortschritte in der Mathematik Paschs

redenition of number was severely criticized for being circular by Hoppe, who insists that the concepts of number segment and irrational number should be kept apart (Hoppe, 1882). 59 Pasch always remained sceptical with regard to the applications of irrational numbers outside of mathematics. After explaining how the square root of 2 arises from considerations regarding the diagonal of a unit square, he writes in Pasch (1909, p. 99): It remains open as to whether every irrational number corresponds to a problem outside of analysis. 60 See Torretti (1978, p. 111).

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core concept of line segment, Pasch initially denes a bundle of lines, as the collection of lines that meet in a common point. He then proves that for lines e, f , and g the relation g belongs to the bundle e f can be dened using the property of being coplanar, but without making any reference to the point in which e and f meet. Thus, this relation can also hold between lines e, f , and g , if e and f have no point in common, and Pasch takes it as the dening characteristic for an extended notion of bundle of lines. Also for these bundles Pasch shows that they are determined by any two lines that belong to them. Moreover, if two lines in a bundle meet in a point P , then all lines of the bundle meet in that same point, so that some bundles can be said to correspond to a unique point, namely P , and these are the ones that were formerly referred to as bundles and are now called proper bundles. Other bundles, however, may contain lines that do not intersect, such that there is no obvious relation between these bundles and particular points, and they are called improper bundles. Finally, after having dened these notions and proved some properties about them, Pasch extends the meaning of the term point to refer to bundles of lines instead (just as he extended the meaning of the term number to refer to number segments). Those bundles that correspond to a point in the original sense are then referred to as proper points, while the others are called improper points. Thus, the extended meaning of the relation of line l goes through point P is that of line l belongs to bundle of lines P . The advantage of this change in terminology is that previous axioms and theorems about points and lines remain valid also under the extended meaning. For example, For any two points there is a line that that goes through both of them is also valid if point refers to a bundle of lines. In addition, now also statements that were false under the original restricted understanding of points become true, if understood as referring to points in the extended sense, for example, Two lines in a plane always have a point in common. Paschs improper points had previously been treated as ideal elements in projective geometry and Torretti describes Paschs approach of introducing these elements only on the basis of ostensive concepts and empirically justiable axioms as his most remarkable feat (Torretti, 1978, p. 213). Nowadays we would describe Paschs method of extending the meaning of concepts by saying that the term point is given two different interpretations: while it originally referred to points, it is later taken to refer to bundles. But, Pasch does not yet possess a conceptually clear distinction between syntax and semantics, and it does not seem to come naturally for him to speak of different interpretations of a given term, in particular, since point is a meaningful term, unlike, say, a mathematical variable. Thus, he speaks of substituting one concept for another in a proposition, changing the meanings of concepts, or replacing concepts by meaningless signs.61 In geometry, the notion of continuity also goes beyond what can be developed on an empirical basis and it indicates the conceptual gap between empirical and the mathematical geometry. Pasch carries through the development of projective geometry to allow for the introduction of coordinates through the construction of rational nets. Thus, these coordinates remain limited to rational values. Nevertheless, he notices that ultimately only an analytic treatment of geometry in terms of real coordinates yields the customary notions of points and lines, which Pasch qualies with the adjective mathematical. He briey considers the possibility of adding an axiom of continuity, but dismisses it on the grounds that it would not be empirically justied and opts for a version of the Archimedean axiom instead
61 See also Paschs notions of formalization and realization of a stem, discussed in Section 4,

above.

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(Pasch, 1882a, p. 126).62 However, given that all his empirically based constructions are subject to limitations, mathematical points allow for more ne-grained distinctions than empirical points do; in other words, every empirical point corresponds to an entire sequence of mathematical points. This phenomenon is referred to as the inexactness of geometric concepts and Pasch emphasizes that the transfer of a diagram into numbers and the return from the results of a calculation to the diagram cannot be carried out with the same degree of exactness (Pasch, 1882a, p. 200).63 Nonetheless, Pasch remarks that also the mathematical points (if appropriately dened) satisfy the stem propositions of projective geometry. Given that he considers real numbers themselves to be grounded in empirical core concepts, this does not seem to pose a serious problem for his philosophy, but it conrms his assertion that geometry presupposes arithmetic (Pasch, 1922, p. 5). Pasch commented that one of the goals he pursued in his lectures on geometry was to show that a reduction of parts of geometry to empirical notions was possible in principle (Pasch, 1887a, p. 130),64 and it appears that many of his contemporaries accepted this reduction. For example, in the article on geometry by Weber and Wellstein in the Encyclopedia of Elementary Mathematics (1905), Paschs book is discussed in the rst chapter on the fundamental notions of geometry (Weber & Wellstein, 1905, pp. 2527). After formulating a critique of the idealization processes that are intended to lead from the empirical raw material of geometry to its abstract objects, the authors ask whether it is possible to build up an intuitive geometry, which they call natural geometry, without recurring to these idealizations, and they note that an afrmative answer to this question is presented in Paschs lectures on projective geometry, this beautiful book that everybody must have read, who is more interested in intensive rather than extensive knowledge of geometry (Weber & Wellstein, 1905, p. 25). 6. Concluding remarks. We have seen how Moritz Pasch formulated the cornerstones of his philosophy of mathematics in his two books of 1882 and continued to develop and rene his views in numerous, more and more philosophical publications throughout his life. Paschs philosophy is quite unique in combining a strong empiricism, according to which the meanings of mathematical terms should be based on observable physical entities, with a deductivist view, according to which the validity of mathematical inferences does not depend on the meanings of the terms. These seemingly incompatible views are brought together in Paschs conception of different layers of philosophical and mathematical investigations, and Paschs programme, which aims at building up correlates of mathematical axioms from an empirical basis. Since Paschs philosophical ideas originally appeared only as interspersed remarks in his mathematical textbooks and were elaborated in more detail only in his later articles it has been difcult to grasp and appreciate his philosophy of mathematics as a whole. This might be part of the reason for the general lack of awareness of his ideas, which Pasch himself noticed (Pasch, 1926b, p. 166). Another reason might be that
62 See Ehrlich (2006, p. 6) and Greenberg (1993, p. 125), who writes that [t]he full signicance of

Archimedes axiom was rst grasped in the 1880s by M. Pasch and O. Stolz.
63 Pasch reminds the reader in Pasch (1882b, pp. 13 and 39) that every number that is used in practice

or that arises from observations or measurements can only have a limited degree of exactness, and he adds in a remark on p. 188 that the inexactness of geometric concepts had been discussed by Klein already in 1873 (Klein, 1883). This is repeated at other occasions, for example, Pasch (1887a, p. 130) and Pasch (1912, p. 203). 64 See also Pasch (1912, p. 203).

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his methodological considerations regarding the nature of mathematical deduction were quickly absorbed by his contemporaries like Peano and Hilbert, whose own contributions soon overshadowed those of Pasch. In the present overview I was able to deal with a number of issues in Paschs philosophy only cursorily, but they nevertheless deserve further and more detailed exploration. Among these are: the origins, principles, and limits of Paschs empiricism together with a comparison with the British empiricists and Paschs contemporaries; Paschs ideas about the most basic constituents of mathematical reasoning and thinking in general; Paschs notion of intuition, in particular in comparison with Klein and Study; the role of denitions, in particular of implicit denitions, in Paschs works; Paschs analysis of logical inference, in particular in comparison with Frege and Hilbert; Kroneckers notion of decidability that became more and more important for Pasch and his distinction between proper and improper mathematics; nally, the reception and inuence of Paschs work in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. I hope to have shown in the present paper that Paschs highly original philosophy of mathematics is worthy of further study and of becoming generally known, both in its own right and as a part of the mathematical and philosophical context in which modern mathematics emerged.

7. Acknowledgments. I would like to thank, rst and foremost, Michael Hallett for helpful comments on previous versions of this paper. In addition, I am also grateful for remarks and comments by an anonymous reviewer of this journal, Greg Frost-Arnold, Jeremy Heis, Paul Rusnock, as well as audience members at the Annual meeting of the Association of Symbolic Logic (Irvine, CA), the PhiMSAMP-3 conference Is mathematics special? (Vienna, Austria), the HOPOS meeting 2008 (Vancouver, BC), the Winter 2008 meeting of the Canadian Mathematical Society (Ottawa, ON), and the Winter meeting of the Association of Symbolic Logic (Philadelphia, PA). Last, but not least, I would like to thank Dr. Rudolf Thaer for generously sharing his knowledge about Pasch with me. Work on this paper was funded by Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC). Translations are by the author, unless noted. BIBLIOGRAPHY Boniface, J. (2004). Hilbert et la notion dexistence en math ematiques. Mathesis. Paris, France: J. Vrin. Boniface, J. (2007). The concept of number from Gauss to Kronecker. In Goldstein, C., Schappacher, N., and Schwermer, J., editors. The Shaping of Arithmetic After C. F. Gausss Disquisitiones Arithmeticae. Berlin: Springer, pp. 315342. Contro, W. S. (1976). Von Pasch zu Hilbert. Archive for History of Exact Sciences, 15(3), 283295. Dedekind, R. (1872). Stetigkeit und irrationale Zahlen. Braunschweig, Germany: Vieweg. Reprinted in Dedekind (1932a), pp. 315334. English translation Continuity and Irrational Numbers in Ewald (1996), pp. 765779. Dedekind, R. (1888). Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen? Braunschweig, Germany: Vieweg. Reprinted in Dedekind (1932a), pp. 335391. English translation in Ewald (1996), pp. 787833. Dedekind, R. (1932a). Gesammelte mathematische Werke, Vol. 3. Braunschweig, Germany: F. Vieweg & Sohn. Edited by Robert Fricke, Emmy Noether, and Oystein Ore.

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DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY McGILL UNIVERSITY 855 SHERBROOKE ST. W. MONTREAL, QC H3A 2T7, CANADA E-mail: dirk.schlimm@mcgill.ca