DELA CRUZ vs MOYA Nature: Petition for certiorari and mandamus was certified to this Court by the then

Intermediate Appellate Court in its resolution dated August 30, 1983. Facts: - On February 23, 1979, Rodolfo Dela Cruz, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines assigned to the Intelligence and Operations Section of the 432nd PC Company, together with other PC men, received a mission order to proceed to Barangay Pangi, Maco, Sto. Tomas, Davao for the purpose of verifying and apprehending persons who were allegedly engaged in illegal cockfighting. - Dela Cruz and company proceeded to Maco, Davao del Norte and caught in flagrante the operators of said illegal cockfighting, but said operators resisted arrest. - The soldiers left the place but they brought with them to the PC Headquarters the evidence of the crime, such as gaffs and fighting cocks. - The operators of the illegal cockfights, including the deceased Eusebio Cabilto, followed the soldiers on their way back to the PC Headquarters, catching up with them on the Tagum-Mati National Highway. Fighting ensued and in the scuffle, Dela Cruz shot Cabilto. - On August 2, 1979, Dela Cruz was charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Davao, in an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal. - Case was pending trial, P.D. Nos. 1822 and 1822-A were promulgated by the President of the Philippines on January 16, 1981, vesting in courts-martial jurisdiction over crimes committed by members of the Armed Forces or of the Philippine Constabulary in performance of their duties. - Claiming that the crime for which he was charged was committed in relation to the performance of his duties, Dela Cruz filed with the Court of First Instance of Davao a motion to transfer the case to the military authorities so he could be tried by court martial. The motion was denied. Issue: Whether the civil courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter. Held: REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; ONE OF THE ESSENTIAL REQUISITES OF A VALID COURT PROCEEDING. For a court proceeding to be valid, it is essential that the court hearing the case must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, otherwise the entire proceedings are null and void. JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER, DETERMINED BY STATUTE IN FORCE AT COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. JURISDICTION; RETAINED UP TO TERMINATION OF LITIGATION. Once jurisdiction is vested in the court, it is retained up to the end of the litigation.

GENERAL ORDER NO. 59; VESTED IN MILITARY TRIBUNALS JURISDICTION OVER ALL OFFENSES COMMITTED BY MILITARY PERSONNEL. General Order No. 59, dated June 24, 1977, published in 73 Official Gazette (Supplement) #28, pages 6373-1 to 6378-3. (July 11, 1977), military tribunals created under General Order No. 8 exercised exclusive jurisdiction over "(a)ll offenses committed by military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines while in the performance of their official duty or which arose out of any act or omission done in the performance of their official duty; Provided, that for the purpose of determining whether an offense was committed while in the performance of official duty or whether it arose out of an act or omission done in the performance of official duty, a certificate issued by the Secretary of National Defense to that effect shall be conclusive unless modified or revoked by the President . . . "(Section 1.) CERTIFICATE ISSUED BY THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, NOT A CONDITION PRECEDENT FOR THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION BY EITHER CIVIL COURT OR MILITARY TRIBUNALS. The proviso in General Order No. 59 merely states that the certificate issued by the Secretary of National Defense is conclusive for the purpose of determining whether an offense was committed while in the performance of official duty, or arose out of an act or omission done in the performance of official duty. It does not in any way preclude the courts from making any finding as to whether an offense is duty-connected. Nor does it make the certificate a condition precedent for the exercise by either civilian courts or military tribunals of their jurisdiction over offenses committed by members of the AFP. CASE AT BAR. The CFI has no jurisdiction over the case where evidence of the prosecution presented in court likewise shows that the victim was shot while petitioner was executing the mission order. BOLEYLEY vs VILLANUEVA Nature: The case before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari assailing the orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Baguio City[1] that granted private respondent's motion to dismiss the complaint below on the ground that petitioner did not refer the action to the barangay lupon for conciliation or settlement before filing the case in court, as prescribed in the Revised Katarungan Pambarangay Law. Facts: - On August 7, 1996, petitioner Angel L. Boleyley filed with the Regional Trial Court, Baguio City, a complaint against private respondent for collection of a sum of money, as follows: 1.) The sum of P530,000.00 for actual damages; 2.) The sum of P50,000.00 for moral damages; 3.) The sum of P30,000.00 for exemplary damages; 4.) The sum of P30,000.00 as attorney's fees plus P1,000.00 per court hearing;

5.) The costs of suit. - On September 13, 1996, private respondent Albert S. Surla filed with the trial court a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that petitioner did not comply with the Revised Katarungan Pambarangay Law requiring as a condition for the filing of a complaint in court referral of the matter to the barangay lupon chairman or the pangkat, for conciliation or settlement. - On September 17, 1997, petitioner filed an opposition to motion to dismiss on the ground that private respondent was not a resident of Baguio City so that the dispute involving the parties was not within the authority of the lupon to bring together for conciliation or settlement.

of the statute or rule in which it is employed. x x x In other words, resides should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. x x x No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the

residence must be more than temporary

The complaint clearly implies that the parties do not reside in the same city or municipality. The venue of the action is not affected by the filing of defendants (respondents) motion to dismiss stating that he also resided in Baguio City. That is not decisive to determine the proper venue. We rule that there is no need of prior referral of the dispute to the barangay lupon or pangkat in the absence of showing in the complaint itself that the parties reside in the same city or municipality. In thus dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of cause of action or pre-maturity, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, entitling petitioner to the relief prayed for.

- On November 29, 1996, the trial court issued an order dismissing the case for being premature, for not having been referred to the barangay lupon.
- On December 5, 1996, petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration on the ground that private respondent could not invoke the Katarungan Pambarangay Law because he was not a resident of Baguio City. - On February 17, 1997, the trial court resolved to deny the motion for reconsideration for lack

Court hereby GRANTS the petition for certiorari and ANNULS the orders of the Regional Trial Court, Baguio City, Branch 07, dated November 20, 1997, and April 28, 1998. Court orders the trial court to forthwith deny private respondent's motion to dismiss, and proceed to the disposition of the case with all deliberate dispatch.
MENDOZA vs GERMINO Nature: Petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Jose Mendoza to challenge the decision and the resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA). Facts: - On June 27, 1988, the petitioner and Aurora C. Mendoza (plaintiffs) filed a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija against respondent Narciso Germino for forcible entry. - Plaintiffs claimed that they were the registered owners of a five-hectare parcel of land in Soledad, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija (subject property). Sometime in 1988, respondent Narciso unlawfully entered the subject property by means of strategy and stealth, and without their knowledge or consent. Despite the plaintiffs repeated demands, respondent Narciso refused to vacate the subject property. - On August 9, 1988, respondent Narciso filed his answer, claiming, among others, that his

of merit.
- On July 9, 1997, the Court resolved to require the respondents to comment on the petition

within ten (10) days from notice.

- On August 26, 1997, private respondent filed his comment. Issue: Whether or not petitioner was bound to refer the dispute to the barangay lupon or pangkat for conciliation or settlement before he could file an action for collection with the regional trial court. Held: It is obvious that the parties do not reside in the same city or municipality, and hence, the dispute is excepted from the requirement of referral to the barangay lupon or pangkat for conciliation or settlement prior to filing with the court. It is true that plaintiff's complaint should have alleged defendant's place of actual residence, not his postal office address. The allegation of defendant's actual residence would have been ideal to determine venue, which is plaintiff's choice of either his place of residence or that of the defendant or any of the principal defendants. In procedural law, however, specifically for purposes of venue it has been held that the residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation or his actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency, thus: x x x We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term resides connotes ex vi termini actual residence as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. The term resides, like the term residing or residence is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose

brother, respondent Benigno Germino, was the plaintiffs agricultural lessee and he merely helped the latter in the cultivation as a member of the immediate farm household.
- Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the case to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), in view of the tenancy issue raised by respondent Narciso.

- Without conducting a hearing, and despite respondent Narcisos objection, the MTC issued an

- DARAB decided the appeal on July 22, 1998. It held that it acquired jurisdiction because of

order on October 27, 1995, remanding the case to the DARAB, Cabanatuan City for further proceedings.
- On December 14, 1995, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), impleading respondent Benigno as additional defendant. - Plaintiffs alleged that Efren Bernardo was the agricultural lessee of the subject property. Respondent Benigno unlawfully entered the subject property in 1982 or 1983 through strategy and stealth, and without their knowledge or consent. - In 1987, they discovered that respondent Benigno had transferred possession of the subject property to respondent Narciso, who refused to return the possession of the subject property to the plaintiffs and appropriated the lands produce for himself. - The subject property was fully irrigated and was capable of harvest for 2 cropping seasons and could produce 100 cavans of palay per hectare for each cropping season, or a total of 500 cavans per cropping season for the five-hectare land, the plaintiffs alleged that the respondents were able to harvest a total of 13,000 cavans of palay from the time they unlawfully withheld possession of the subject property in 1982 until the plaintiffs filed the complaint. - They prayed that the respondents be ordered to jointly and severally pay 13,000 cavans of palay, or its monetary equivalent, as actual damages, to return possession of the subject property, and to pay P15,000.00 as attorneys fees. - On January 9, 1996, the respondents filed their answer denying the allegations in the

the amended complaint that sufficiently alleged an agrarian dispute, not the MTCs referral of the case. Thus, it affirmed the PARAD decision.
- Respondents elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. THE CA RULING - CA decided the appeal on October 6, 2003. It found that the MTC erred in transferring the

case to the DARAB since the material allegations of the complaint and the relief sought show a case for forcible entry, not an agrarian dispute. It noted that the subsequent filing of the amended complaint did not confer jurisdiction upon the DARAB.
- CA set aside the DARAB decision and remanded the case to the MTC for further proceedings. Issue: Whether the MTC or the DARAB has jurisdiction over the case. Held: - We deny the petition. - It is a basic rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint. It is determined exclusively by the Constitution and the law. It cannot be conferred by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties, or acquired through or waived, enlarged or diminished by their act or omission, nor conferred by the acquiescence of the court. Well to emphasize, it is neither for the court nor the parties to violate or disregard the rule, this matter being legislative in character. - Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, the MTC shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. - Under Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657, as well as Section 34 of Executive Order No. 129-A, the DARAB has primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. - A case to involve an agrarian dispute, the following essential requisites of an agricultural tenancy relationship must be present: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvest or payment of rental. - Based on these allegations and reliefs prayed, it is clear that the action in the MTC was for forcible entry. - Although respondent Narciso averred tenancy as an affirmative and/or special defense in his answer, this did not automatically divest the MTC of jurisdiction over the complaint. It continued to have the authority to hear the case precisely to determine whether it had jurisdiction to dispose of the ejectment suit on its merits. After all, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or

complaint, claiming, among others, that the plaintiffs had no right over the subject property as they agreed to sell it to respondent Benigno for P87,000.00. As a matter of fact, respondent
Benigno had already made a P50,000.00 partial payment, but the plaintiffs refused to receive the balance and execute the deed of conveyance, despite repeated demands. - Respondents also asserted that jurisdiction over the complaint lies with the Regional Trial Court since ownership and possession are the issues. THE PARAD RULING - In a March 19, 1996 decision, PARAD Romeo Bello found that the respondents were mere

usurpers of the subject property, noting that they failed to prove that respondent Benigno was the plaintiffs bona fide agricultural lessee. The PARAD ordered the respondents to vacate the subject property, and pay the plaintiffs 500 cavans of palay as actual damages.
- Respondents filed a notice of appeal with the DARAB, arguing that the case should have been dismissed because the MTCs referral to the DARAB was void with the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657,[14] which repealed the rule on referral under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 316. THE DARAB RULING

the theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant. - The MTC is duty-bound to conduct a preliminary conference and, if necessary, to receive evidence to determine if such tenancy relationship had, in fact, been shown to be the real issue. The MTC may even opt to conduct a hearing on the special and affirmative defense of the defendant, although under the RRSP, such a hearing is not a matter of right. If it is shown during the hearing or conference that, indeed, tenancy is the issue, the MTC should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. - In the present case, instead of conducting a preliminary conference, the MTC immediately referred the case to the DARAB. This was contrary to the rules. Besides, Section 2 of P.D. No. 316, which required the referral of a land dispute case to the Department of Agrarian Reform for the preliminary determination of the existence of an agricultural tenancy relationship, has indeed been repealed by Section 76 of R.A. No. 6657 in 1988. - Neither did the amendment of the complaint confer jurisdiction on the DARAB. The plaintiffs alleged in the amended complaint that the subject property was previously tilled by Efren Bernardo, and the respondents took possession by strategy and stealth, without their knowledge and consent. In the absence of any allegation of a tenancy relationship between the parties, the action was for recovery of possession of real property that was within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.

- In her complaint, respondent alleged that while she was inside the Police Station of Natividad, Pangasinan, and in the presence of other persons and police officers, petitioner Irene Sante uttered words, which when translated in English are as follows, How many rounds of sex did you have last night with your boss, Bert? You fuckin bitch! Bert refers to Albert Gacusan, respondents friend and one (1) of her hired personal security guards detained at the said station and who is a suspect in the killing of petitioners close relative. Petitioners also allegedly went around Natividad, Pangasinan telling people that she is protecting and cuddling the suspects in the aforesaid killing. - Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that it was the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) and not the RTC of Baguio, that had jurisdiction over the case. They argued that the amount of the claim for moral damages was not more than the jurisdictional amount of P300,000.00, because the claim for exemplary damages should be excluded in computing the total claim. - On June 24, 2004, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss citing our ruling in Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. Cyborg Leasing Corporation. The trial court held that the total claim of respondent amounted to P420,000.00 which was above the jurisdictional amount for MTCCs outside Metro Manila. The trial court also later issued Orders on July 7, 2004 and July 19, 2004, respectively reiterating its denial of the motion to dismiss and denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. - Aggrieved, petitioners filed on August 2, 2004, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition , before the Court of Appeals. - On July 14, 2004, respondent and her husband filed an Amended Complaint increasing the claim for moral damages from P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00. - Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss with Answer Ad Cautelam and Counterclaim, but the trial court denied their motion in an Order dated September 17, 2004. - Petitioners again filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the Court of Appeals, claiming that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the amendment of the complaint to increase the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00. The case was raffled to the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals. - Court of Appeals held that the case clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the MTCC as the allegations show that plaintiff was seeking to recover moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00, which amount was well within the jurisdictional amount of the MTCC. - Court of Appeals added that the totality of claim rule used for determining which court had jurisdiction could not be applied to the instant case because plaintiffs claim for exemplary damages was not a separate and distinct cause of action from her claim of moral damages, but merely incidental to it. Thus, the prayer for exemplary damages should be excluded in computing the total amount of the claim. - On January 31, 2006, the Court of Appeals, rendered a decision affirming the September 17, 2004 Order of the RTC denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss Ad Cautelam. In the said decision, the appellate court held that the total or aggregate amount demanded in the complaint constitutes the basis of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals did not find merit in petitioners posture that the claims for exemplary damages and attorneys fees are merely incidental to the main cause and should not be included in the computation of the total claim.

- The CA, therefore, committed no reversible error in setting aside the DARAB decision. While we lament the lapse of time this forcible entry case has been pending resolution, we are not in a position to resolve the dispute between the parties since the evidence required in courts is different from that of administrative agencies. - Petition is DENIED. Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. IRENE SANTE & REYNALDO vs HON. EDILBERTO CLARAVALL, ETC. Nature: Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, filed by petitioners Irene and Reynaldo Sante assailing the Decision dated January 31, 2006 and the Resolution dated June 23, 2006 of the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals. Facts: - On April 5, 2004, respondent filed before the RTC of Baguio City a complaint for damages against petitioners.

Issue: Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the case? Held: - There is no question that at the time of the filing of the complaint on April 5, 2004, the MTCCs jurisdictional amount has been adjusted to P300,000.00. - In the instant case, the complaint for the recovery of damages for the alleged malicious acts of petitioners. The complaint principally sought an award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees and litigation expenses, for the alleged shame and injury suffered by respondent by reason of petitioners utterance while they were at a police station in Pangasinan. - It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs causes of action. It is clear, based on the allegations of the complaint, that respondents main action is for damages. Hence, the other forms of damages being claimed by respondent, e.g., exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses, are not merely incidental to or consequences of the main action but constitute the primary relief prayed for in the complaint. - In Mendoza v. Soriano, it was held that in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court. In the said case, the respondents claim of P929,000.06 in damages and P25,000 attorneys fees plus P500 per court appearance was held to represent the monetary equivalent for compensation of the alleged injury. The Court therein held that the total amount of monetary claims including the claims for damages was the basis to determine the jurisdictional amount. - Considering that the total amount of damages claimed was P420,000.00, the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case. - Lastly, we find no error, much less grave abuse of discretion, on the part of the Court of Appeals in affirming the RTCs order allowing the amendment of the original complaint from P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00 despite the pendency of a petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals. While it is a basic jurisprudential principle that an amendment cannot be allowed when the court has no jurisdiction over the original complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction on the court, here, the RTC clearly had jurisdiction over the original complaint and amendment of the complaint was then still a matter of right. - Petition is DENIED, for lack of merit. Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated January 31, 2006 and June 23, 2006, respectively, are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 60 is DIRECTED to continue with the trial proceedings.