1964, Roger D Masters, World Politics As A Primitive Political System PDF

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World Politics as a Primitive Political System Author(s): Roger D. Masters Reviewed work(s): Source: World Politics, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Jul., 1964), pp. 595-619 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009448 . Accessed: 14/03/2013 12:22
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WORLD POLITICS AS A PRIMITIVE POLITICAL SYSTEM

By ROGER D. MASTERS*
If the characterizamuchlike theinternational system. political surely tion of world politicsas mere "anarchy"is an exaggeration, accuby a balanceof poweris a fairly or inhibited moderated anarchy The nation-states. betweensovereign rate description of the rivalry as livingin an African people,have been described Nuer,a primitive of polit"ordered whichdependson a "balancedopposition anarchy" system theinternational to describe It is commonplace ical segments."' "In Nuerland so that"mightmakes right." as lackinga government, in any are not invested functions judicial and executive legislative, "the club and the the society, or councils";hence,throughout persons of rights."2 spearare the sanctions peopleprimitive amongtheNuer-or anyother To be sure, politics buthowever thedifferences important to worldpolitics, is notidentical have suggested the possibility of commay be, a numberof writers enough, however, Curiously systems.3 paring thetwokindsof political no effort to elaboratethesesimilarities comtherehas been virtually pointof view.4 froma theoretical prehensively
* The author's has beenundertaken withtheassistance research of a grantfrom the Stimson Fund,Yale University. The Nuer (Oxford I940), i8i; idem, "The Nuer of the 1E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Southern eds.,African Sudan,"in M. Fortesand E. E. Evans-Pritchard, PoliticalSystems(London I940), 293. The Nuer, i62, i69. Cf. R. F. Barton,"IfugaoLaw," University 2Evans-Pritchard, in AmericanArchaeology Publications of California and Ethnology, xv (February
I. REASONS FOR COMPARING PRIMITIVE AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
whichare very systems peopleshavepolitical MANY primitive
PoliticsAmongNations(ist edn.,New York I953), 22I; 3E.g., Hans Morgenthau, Two Models of the International GeorgeModelski, "Agrariaand Industria: System," in Klaus Knorrand SidneyVerba,eds., The International System(Princeton i96i), I25-26; and David Easton,"Political in Bernard Anthropology," J.Siegel,ed., Biennial Review of Anthropology 1959 (StanfordI959), 235-36. At least one anthropologist was aware of the analogy:see R. F. Barton,The Half-Way Sun (New York I930), io9-io; idem,The Kalingas (Chicago I949), ioi; and idem, "IfugaoLaw," IOO, 103. In his introduction to The Kalingas,E. A. Hoebel wrote:"International law is primitivelaw on a worldscale" (p. 5). Cf. Hoebel's The Law of Primitive Man (Cambridge, Mass.,I954), 125-26, 3I8, 32I, 330-33. 4 Since thisstudy was undertaken, an article has been published thatmarksa first See Chadwick F. Alger,"Comparison stepin thisdirection. of Intranational and International American PoliticalScienceReview,LVII (Junei963), 4I4-I9. Politics,"
I9I5),
I5-
596
WORLD POLITICS
moregeneralreaIt shouldbe notedin passingthatthereare three An and international politicalsystems. primitive sons forcomparing politicalscienceand anthropology attempt to bridgethe gap between has meritsbecause such cross-disciplinary endeavorsmay free one research whichoften dominate narrow assumptions from unnecessarily to true with respect political in a given field.This is particularly have often of primitive society aspects anthropology, sincethepolitical analyzed.5 been onlyimperfectly it maynot be amissto pointout thatlong before anthroSecondly, analyzed politicalphilosophers as a discipline, pologywas established states and governments.' thesocialand political antecedents of existing The idea of a "stateof nature," in whichmen lived before the estabof lishment of governments, role in the history plays an important society Althoughrecentstudentsof primitive politicalphilosophy. are "of little of politicalphilosophers" have arguedthat"the theories the scientific value,"7 the existence of a tradition which considered may indicatethat to any politicaltheory "stateof nature"as relevant primitive politicsmore fullythan should consider politicalscientists theynow do. of interThis generalpointis of specific importance forthe theory of inbecauseit can be said thatthe moderntheory nationalpolitics of a "state ofnature" as itsmodel.8 ternational relations tookthenotion have asserted Since anthropologists thatsucha "stateof nature"never of theempirical and theoretical consideration relevance of the existed, of a conceptmay well be in order; not the least of the advantages and international betweenprimitive politicswould be a comparison of the relevance fullerunderstanding of modernpoliticalphilosophy of world politics.9 to a theory
5In 1940, A. R. Radcliffe-Brown said: "The comparative studyof politicalinstituto the simpler branchof social tions, withspecialreference is an important societies, whichhas not yetreceived it deserves" anthropology the attention in Fortes (Preface, and Evans-Pritchard, eds., AfricanPolitical Systems, David xi). More recently, "Such a subfield[as politicalanthropology] does not yet exist" Easton has written: ("PoliticalAnthropology," 210). 6E.g., Montaigne, Essays,I, xxiii ("Of Custom,and that We Should Not Easily and I, xxxi ("Of Cannibals");Rousseau, Changea Law Received"), SecondDiscourse, esp. FirstPart and notesc-q; and Locke, Second Treatiseof Civil Government, esp. chaps.2 and 3. 7Fortesand Evans-Pritchard, African PoliticalSystems, 4. See also HenrySumner of Rousseau'sconception Maine's sharpcriticism of the "stateof nature"in Ancient Law (New York 1874), 84-88,299. 8 On therelations between theconcept ofa "state of nature" and theprevailing theory see KennethN. Waltz, Man, the State,and War of politicsamong sovereign states, H. Cox, Locke on Warand Peace (Ox(New York I959), esp.chaps.6-8;and Richard fordi960), esp. chap.4. 9 Cf. KennethN. Waltz, "Political Philosophy and the Studyof International Re-
PRIMITIVE
POLITICAL
SYSTEMS
597
relations" Finally,as Ragnar Numelin has shown,"international of peoples; the "discovery" (or its analog) existsamong uncivilized is, to the "historical" as it customarily diplomacy cannotbe attributed, theory or Orient.'0 Thus any exhaustive cultures of theMediterranean and the rivalry, warfare, would have to comprehend of worldpolitics peoplesas genuineexamplesof "international diplomacy of primitive politics."
POLITICS II. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN PRIMITIVE AND INTERNATIONAL
At the outset, commonto politicswithina number fourelements first, deserve mention: relations societies and international of primitive withpowerto judge and punish theabsenceof a formal government by the violations of law; second,the use of violenceand "self-help" obligato achievetheirobjectives and enforce members of the system either from of law and moralobligations the derivation tions;third, (i.e., the relationships bargaining particular custom or fromexplicit, on the basis of-and body operating absenceof a formallegislative organizational a predominant making-generalrules); and fourth, in manyfunctions politicalunitsserving principle which establishes system. theoverall social and interThe first betweenprimitive threeof these similarities those when one considers self-evident nationalpoliticsare relatively The societieswhich lack fully developed governments. primitive societies, may not be as clear. In certainprimitive fourth, however, in the eyesof especially territorial politicalunitsare largelydefined, either in terms of kinshipgroupswhichare reckoned members, their is such as in which descent "lineage," the (i.e., groups "unilaterally" or "biin either the male or femaleline froma commonancestor), and of bothmother groupincludesrelatives laterally" (i.e., thefamily or "Western" as in modern, combinations society)."Different father, on a territorial divisions of thesegroups, basis,often providethebasic of theentire structure system. political of sovit is not normally system noted,the international Although
Relations Aspectsof International lations,"in WilliamT. R. Fox, ed., Theoretical Theoryand Inter"Political (Notre Dame, Ind., I959), 5i-68; and ArnoldWolfers, in ArnoldWolfersand LaurenceW. Martin,eds., The AnglonationalRelations," in ForeignAflairs(New Haven I956), esp. xi-xiii. Tradition American 10RagnarNumelin, of Diplomacy(New York 1950), 125 et passim. The Beginnings 11See Fortes ii; and Barton, Systems, "Ifugao Political African and Evans-Pritchard, "Kinship paper entitled unpublished Law," 92-94, iio. Carl Lande, in a stimulating has emphasized the different and Non-Western Societies," in Pre-Modern and Politics of kinship groups. effects of thesetwo types
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states on thebasisof a singleprinciple. ereign is also organized largely In thiscase, the principle is thatof "territorial sovereignty"-i.e., the conception "is alwaysassociated thatsovereignty with the proprietorof the earth'ssurface, ship of a limitedportion and that'sovereigns' interse are to be deemednot paramount, but absoluteownersof the state'sterritory."" This ultimate authority can, of course,be divided, as it is in federal but so, too,withthelineageprinciple states; in some primitive systems which are divided into different levels of units.'3 In primitive societies like the Nuer, lineageor kinshipgroupsperforma wide variety of functions, so thatit is not possibleto pointto a specific actionand define it as "political" ;14 rather, there is a political elementin manyactionswhich simultaneously serveotherpurposes. This characteristic has been described in recentsociological literature as the "functional diffuseness" of traditional social structures.'5 The conception of "diffuseness" is thusopposedto "functional specificity" (i.e., the organization of a specialgroup or institution to perform a givenactivity or function), whichis supposed to prevailin all modern societies. An extreme exampleof thisusage is foundin Riggs'spolar conceptionsof a "fused"system, in which "a singlestructure performs all thenecessary and a "refracted functions," in which,"forevery society," a corresponding function, structure exists."1 Riggs argues that traditional, agrarian societies are "fused," whereas modern, industrialized societies are "refracted." While sucha distinction may indicate an imMaine,Ancient Law, 99 (original italics). The foregoing comparison may appear to come strikingly close to the formulations ofMaine(ibid.,I24-25) and LewisH. Morgan(Ancient Society [New York1877], 6-7)-formulations whichhave been criticized in recent yearsby anthropologists. See
12
13
the inadequacies of the conceptions of Maine and Morgan,especially with reference to theirpresumption of progress in human development, some distinction between primitive or traditional in which kinshipand personal"status"play a presociety, dominant role, and modernterritorial states, based on citizenship and contract, is todayaccepted by manysocial scientists. Indeed,it is paradoxical thatwhile anthropologistshave been attacking the Maine-Morgan dichotomy (by showing that all havea territorial societies element), and political sociologists scientists have beenadopting the distinction fromthe worksof T6nnies,Weber,Parsons,or Levy. E.g., see Fred W. Riggs, and Industria-Toward "Agraria a Typology of Comparative Administration (Bloomington 1959), 28-30, III. 14E.g., according to Evans-Pritchard, "We do not therefore say thata man is acting politically or otherwise, but thatbetweenlocal groupsthereare relations of a structural orderthatcan be calledpolitical" (The Nuer,264-65). 15 See TalcottParsons, The Social System (Glencoe,Ill., I951), 65-67. 16 Fred W. Riggs,"International Relationsas a Prismatic System," in Knorr and Verba,eds., The InternationalSystem, I49. Cf. Modelski,"Agrariaand Industria," in ibid.,fora stimulating adaptation of Riggs'sconcepts.
tration,"in William J. Siffin, ed., Toward the Comparative Study of Public Adminis-
I. Schapera, Governmentand Politics in Tribal Societies (London I956), 2-5. Despite
PRIMITIVE POLITICAL SYSTEMS
599
does etieslike the Nuer."7 Moreover, just as an industrial civilization not presuppose a perfectly "refracted" society, traditional societies are rarely totally "fused."'8 Up to thispointwe have triedto show two things:first, thatthere is a striking between some and similarity primitive politicalsystems themodern international system; and second, thatone element of this similarity is the"functional diffuseness" of political unitsin bothtypes ofsystem. If thisis so,one cannotemploy thepolaropposites of"primitive" and "modern" or "functionally diffuse"and "functionally specific" as the basis of a comparative analysisof primitive political systems. Becauseprimitive political systems varyenormously, one must explicitly distinguish the particular kind of primitive society whichis supposedto present the greatest similarity to world politics. In orderto compareprimitive and international politics, therefore, one needs a classification which distinguishes primitive societiesin terms of their political structure. Althoughthetypologies of primitive hitherto political systems developed byanthropologists havebeenimperfect, it will be usefulto acceptprovisionally the distinction between primitive peopleswhich have developedsome formof governmental institutions and those which have generallybeen called "stateless
societies.""9
to imply in modern portant tendency, it is a radical exaggeration that political systems, "for every function, a corresponding structure exists." The political has a "fused" unitofthemodern state system character which the"diffuse" roleof kinship in primitive parallels groups soci-
17 To be sure,it is easierto specify in the twentiethwhat actionsare "political" century worldthanit was forEvans-Pritchard amongthe Nuer. Nonetheless, as Karl Deutschhas remarked, the nation-state is itself"functionally diffuse," an performing extraordinary range of economic, social,and political See "TowardsWestfunctions. ern EuropeanIntegration: An Interim Assessment," of International Affairs, Journal XVI (i962), 95-96. Cf. GabrielA. Almond,"Introduction," in GabrielA. Almondand James S. Coleman, eds.,The Politics of theDeveloping Areas (Princeton i960), ii, 63. 18 It is simply incorrect to assertthat nonliterate peoples,howevertraditionally minded,were incapable of developing"functionally specificroles," "achievement normsof recruitment," or the "state"as a formalorganization; each of theseattributes,so readilydescribed as "modern," can be found in societies which must be described as "primitive." For an example, see S. F. Nadel, A Black Byzantium: The Kingdom of theNupe in Nigeria (London I942). Cf. Riggs,"Agraria and Industria," 28. Whilesomeanthropologists would arguethatprimitive bands,suchas thoseof the Australian aborigines and African bushmen, are an exception, others would suggest thatthere are some"functionally specific" rolesevenin thesesocieties. 19See Fortesand Evans-Pritchard, PoliticalSystems, 5-23; JohnMiddleton African and David Tait, eds., Tribes Without Rulers (London I958), i-3; Lucy Mair, PrimitiveGovernment (Baltimore i962), Part I; Schapera, Government and Politics, 63-64, 208-I4; and Robert Lowie, Social Organization (New York I948), chap. I4. For a critique of thecategories used by anthropologists, see Easton,"Political Anthropology," 2I0-26.
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POLITICS
that societies will focuson primitive comparison The following as having Suchsystems maybe described lack formal governments. withhaveinfluence sinceindividuals or groups "diffuse leadership," institutionalized coercive authority. There may be a out formally eventogether butsuchan individual, chief" in these societies, "titular themodern a ruler. Since does not act as other influential men, with of"stateshares this structural characteristic as a political system, world, will lifein primitive stateless societies ofpolitical a resume lessness," themto the international political of comparing show the utility system.
III. "SELF-HELP" AND VIOLENCE IN PRIMITIVE STATELESSSOCIETIES
cannotbe referred to an impartial In stateless disputes systems, ofrepattern backed force. The characteristic bya police government or theindividual is "self-help": or civilwrongs to criminal sponding rehimself legitimately or itself feels considers injured which group a crime a tort. in these Self-help orpenalizing for punishing sponsible comwhichappearto be directly two stages involves circumstances in modern of adjudication and enforcement to thefunctions parable that a In either to determine first it is necessary system, legalsystems. and thata particular or groupwill has occurred individual wrong in a particular thepunishment or penalty be punished way; second, orimplemented. for that must be enforced wrong In the simplest bothstagesare accomplished societies, primitive For example, thathas been wronged. or family by the individual whena kinship has been thatone of its members groupdiscovers willbe identigroup and hiskinship theguilty individual murdered, will be inflicted punishment) killing (or other fiedand a retaliatory ofPhilippine in hisstudy indicated As Barton group. bythewronged a crucial raises of legalpenalties20 headhunters, suchself-enforcement group which The kinship stateless peoples. primitive among problem sees of his kin enforces thelextalionis or one a murderer bykilling unrelated Although thisactas notonlynecessary, butalsolegitimate. is killing sinceretaliatory thisinterpretation, mayaccept bystanders maynot consider thekinship groupwhichis penalized customary, there occurs, theretaliation Whenthis punishment.2" tobe a legitimate
20 It mustbe emphasized thattheretaliation is legal,beingsanctioned by customary law (or, in Weber'sterms, "traditional legitimacy"). Cf. Mair,Primitive Government, i6-i9; and A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function in Primitive Society(Glen-
coe,Ill.,i952), chap.I2.
21
The Kalingas, See Barton, in worldpolitics: 23i. Note theparallel tendency "One
601
intoa more to"escalate" andpunishment for crime is often a tendency the kinship groups inbetween of "feud" relation or lesspermanent
volved.22
attacks surprise of sporadic theform takes In feuds, usually violence not should of feud condition Hencea groups. or small byindividuals it is a withwhatwe call "war";23 rather, toocompletely be equated (e.g., andaggression violence intermittent inwhich condition ofrivalry killing) appear legitias wellasretaliatory orperson seizure ofproperty The similarto thevictims. andillegitimate whoattack, tothose mate is obvious, ofnature" "state and a Hobbesian ofthis "state offeud" ity areoften kinship groups involved, difference that with theimportant individuals. ofisolated instead apcannot be accurately warfare of modern thenotion Although someviolence primitive fighting, intergroup plied to all primitive of conflict arising war.The gradations times a civilized approximates who sugbyTait and Middleton, havebeenclarified outof self-help because onlyin and warsbe distinguished feuds gestthatprimitive to settle They dispute.24 the to attempt thelatter is there no obligation varies from one primitive range(which a restricted within that argue offeud condition rivalry orless permanent toanother) themore society
use of forceto defendvital is always anotherstate's'legitimate state'saggression nationalinterests'"(Inis L. Claude, Jr.,"United Nations Use of MilitaryForce," vii [Junei963], I I9). Resolution, Journal of Conflict a however, Sun, chaps.5 and 6. In some situations, 22Cf. Barton,The Half-Way eitherbecause the kinsmanwho was group may refrainfrom counterretaliation, to his own kin or becausethe grouplacks the powerto react. was offensive punished of "an eye for an eye" and As Carl Lande has pointedout to me, the principles of both primitive in the operation makesright"may,and oftendo, conflict "might systems. political and international knownto civilized warfare of thetype continuous 23 Numelin arguesthatorganized, of Diplomacy, peoples(The Beginnings unknown amongprimitive man is practically and MelvilleJ.Herskovits, 2I5, 2I9; Government and Politics, chap.2). Cf. Schapera, (New York I955), 207-8. Anthropology Cultural 24 "Introduction," PolitAfrican Rulers,20-22. Cf. Radcliffe-Brown, Tribes Without is made by Barton, "Ifugao notidentical distinction xx. A similar though ical Systems, in societycould also be distinguished Law," 77-78.Kinds of violencein primitive unitsand the degreeto which of the extent to whichgroupsact as corporate terms In this sense,a true "war" would consistof more or less violenceis continuous. in the purestcase, whereas"feuds," groups, betweencorporate hostilities continuous of kinbetween individuals(albeit with the support conflicts would be intermittent the fundasuch an approachwould take into consideration ship groups).Although of Hobbes's conceptof a "stateof war" mentalissue raisedby Rousseau'scriticism of Rousseau [2 in C. E. Vaughan,ed., The PoliticalWritings (see L'ttat de guerre, whichrequire questions Eng., I9I5], I, 293-307), it raisestheoretical vols.,Cambridge, it is useful to therefore, For thepresent, thanis herepossible. a moreexhaustive analysis by anthropolofeudand war as elaborated between thedistinction acceptprovisionally gists.
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families.29
is rendered if notimpossible, unlikely, of closekinbytheexistence shiptiesand relationships of "administrative organization." At this levelthere be a duelor therequirement may that ritual acts of atonement be performed, butprolonged is unlikely group rivalry sincetheindividuals concerned are all members of a single "nuclear group"(whichis,normally, a localcommunity, a kinship or group, both).Within sucha local or family unit,disputes in culminating violence arenotself-perpetuating; as in modern a punishment states, orpenalty "atones" fora crime and thereby completes thelegalcase.25 Outside of thisrange, punishment does not terminate the rivalry arising out of a dispute; although retaliatory violence tendsto be self-perpetuating, Tait and Middleton suggest thatthere is a zone in which violence canbe described as a feud because theopposed groups recognize an obligation to settle their dispute. In thisrange of social interaction there arenormally procedures forarriving at a settlement. Hence, among theNuer, the"leopard-skin chief" holds an office which serves thefunction of settling feuds on thebasisof compensation.26 The "go-between" among theIfugao serves a similar function.27 Thisdoesnotmeanthat suchmeans ofsettling thefeudarealways northatthesettlement successful, is in factpermanent. On thecontrary, Evans-Pritchard concludes: "Though thechief admonishes the relatives ofthedeadmanat theceremonies ofsettlement that thefeud is endedand mustnot be renewed, Nuer knowthat'a feudnever ends'.... Thereis no frequent fighting or continuous unabated hosbutthesorerankles tility, and thefeud, though formally concluded, mayat anytime break out again."28 Hencethesettlement of a feud amounts to a truce-one might saya treaty, given theimpermanence of similar settlements in international politics-between rivalgroups. Such a settlement mayoccurbecause feuding segments need to cooperate on other matters, butit cannot unite them intoa harmonious unitwithout further steps, suchas a marriage between thefeuding Tait and Middleton use the term"juralcommunity" to describe theunitwithin whichdisputes taketheform of feuds to be settled
25 I5,
Tait and Middleton, Tribes Without Rulers, I9-20. See Barton, "Ifugao Law," I4and the example, I20-2I. 26 Evans-Pritchard,The Nuer, I52-54. 27 Barton, The Half-Way Sun, i09-i0, and theexampledescribed on 70ff. 28 The Nuer, I55. Cf. Barton, "Ifugao Law," 75: "Once started,a blood feud was well-nigh eternal (unless ended by a fusion of the families by means of marriage)." 29 See the example in Barton, The Half-Way Sun, II5.
603
by an established procedure.30 Violenceon thisleveltendsto be limited in a way which presents veryrevealing similarities to procedures in international affairs: as with"limited war,"there is a restriction on the meansof violence used and the ends sought, and like some interstate treaties, each rival group is willingto end violence(if only temporarily) becauseof the need to cooperatewith its rivals.Hence the settlement of a feud does not ordinarily precludethe recurrence of violence;as in international treaties, the partiesare theirown judges of themaintenance of the conditions of the peacefulsettlement.3' The feuding condition is thusa relationship betweenrival groups in whichviolenceis a latentbut ever-present threatshould disputes arise.War,as defined byTait and Middleton, is a moreextreme form of competition, sincethereis no obligation to settleconflict, however temporarily. Among manypeopleswith leadersinsteadof rulersand governments, a distinction is made betweenthosegroupswithwhom violenceis limitedto feudingand thosewith whom thereis a continuouscondition of war. A given group is not bound by common of disputesettlement with foreigners or with individuals procedures of the same nation. fromdifferent parts (or "jural communities") For example,whereasconflicting groupsfromthe same Nuer tribe or groupsfromdifferent could onlybe in a stateof feud,individuals Nuer tribesare always in a potential stateof war with each other. or culturally distant violenceis When spatially groupsare involved, evenin theabsenceof a formal at anytime, likely to emerge dispute.32 social distance(which Amongstateless primitive peoples,therefore, thelikelihood correlated withgeographical is highly distance)decreases shouldit occur, will be limited.33 This spatialdistinction thatviolence, between thosewho are "far"and thosewho are "near" tendsto prozones aroundeach groupin manyprimitive of concentric ducea series
Rulers, 9).
30 "The jural community... is the widest grouping within which there are a moral obligation and a means ultimately to settle disputes peaceably" (Tribes Without
31 Cf. the rarityof the emergence of what has been called a "securitycommunity" in internationalpolitics. Karl Deutsch, et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton I957), chap. i. 32 Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer, 121-22. Cf. Lewis H. Morgan, League of the Iroquois (Rochester I851), 73. 33The conquest of physical space by modern technology has altered the character in the kind of political of "social distance" without destroyingit. Today differences similar to those of geographical distance between primitive regime tend to have effects from tribes; because of their political principles,Communist regimes are those farthest the United States even when they are close to us in miles. Cf. the concepts of "structural distance" (Evans-Pritchard,The Nuer, II3ff.) and "social distance" (Emory S. Bogardus, Sociology [4th edn., New York I954], 535-36).
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boundaries thespecific suchzoneshavebeenfound, Where worlds.34 evidence unclear. Thus there is considerable areoften of eachregion a government, ofmany societies without primitive that, for a member is owedvaries, towhich allegiance community" thegroup or"political on thedispute in question.35 depending differences is related to one of thefundamental This characteristic politics-namely, systems andworld between primitive political many we are accuswhich of various levels of socialintercourse thefusion In modern one can speakof a distinction life, tomed to distinguish. as a nation-state), organized between (normally thelevelofa society For theprimitive, thatof a local community, and thatof a family. all residents of a locality; or kinship thefamily groupmayinclude will tendto have evenif it doesnot,thekinship groupor locality the having either of thefunctions ofa modern society without many of the modern or the uniqueclaimto allegiance political structure primitive political state. drawn between parallels As a consequence, usefultheymaybe in however and international politics, systems in thescope musttakeintoconsideration differences other respects, ofsystems.36 in thetwokinds andpowers ofunits similarithere aresomestriking differences, however, Despite these political ties between societies and international primitive stateless conflict. In to theroleof violence in intergroup systems with respect is a range ofsocial which is relatively exempt there relationships both, groups" composwithin the"nuclear violence; from self-perpetuating theprocedures forsettling or atoning for disputes ing bothsystems, incrimes at leastin principle. of systems, In bothtypes areterminal, conflict between canbe temporarily nuclear groups violent termittent, of further thepotentiality Violence without attacks. settled removing because thelegalsystem group is justified in theeyes oftheaggressive of enforcing one'srights. Sincethepunself-help as a means permits is a tendency this ished denies there fora conflict justification, group
in Barton, 84 See the similar diagrams The Half-Way Sun, 114, and Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer, 114. Note thatBartondistinguishes a "neutral zone" betweenthe "home region"and the zone of feuding. 3 See Mair,Primitive Government, 46-48,104-6. 36 The problem of unitsand levelsof analysis has had surprisingly littleattention in recent theorizing on international politics.For exceptions, see Karl Deutsch, at the International Level (Garden City,N.Y., 1954); Waltz, PoliticalCommunity Man, theState,and War; and J.David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in Inin Knorrand Verba,eds., The International ternational Relations," System, 77-2. Of is the relationship particular importance betweena culturalcommunity or "people" and organized"political communities." Cf. GabrielA. Almond,"Comparative Politxviii (August 1956), 393-408. ical Systems," Journal of Politics,
605
is restrained a tendency which ofhostilities, into to erupt an exchange or themselves to be similar whichconsider between thosegroups between indicate that theanalogy Thesesimilarities "near" eachother. polandinternational systems without governments primitive political classof tobelong to a general fanciful; both appear itics is notmerely and or violence is an accepted in whichself-help political systems ofprocedure. legitimate mode
IV. ORDER IN PRIMITIVE STATELESS SOCIETIES
in primitive societies of violence In discussing the characteristics reon thecompetitive there has beenan emphasis which lackrulers, Whenseenin this ofopposed society light, primitive groups. lationship in which of life security anarchy controlled mayseemto be a barely is inaccurate, tobe expected. Sincethis impression andlimb is scarcely of political to emphasize thevariety importance it is of thegreatest in primitive societies. stateless functions performed Barton's estimate that thelifeofthePhilippine Evenifonedisputes in modern secure ofa citizen societies, headhunter than that wasmore no vestige of it is undoubtedly "a peoplehaving true that, as he says, [can] livingin literal anarchy, and therefore constituted authority Whatdwellin comparative oflifeandproperty."37 peaceandsecurity of nature," conception of a "state merits of Hobbes's everthelogical the that primitive peoples, at leastamong it doesnotseemto follow, a violent war a government produces anarchy of sociallifewithout that violence in it wouldappear ofall against all. Quitethecontrary, law suchprimitive societies often serves thefunction of maintaining andorder according to customary procedures. can be clearly seenif one considfunctions of self-help The pacific doesnotariseoutof conflict ersthecircumstances in which violence in a stateless the of suchsocieties, system. In thesimplest primitive thefamily violence within ofcooperation tendto preclude necessities social tendto restrict and locality, thelimitations oftechnology while thetechgroups; hence, among to these relatively narrow intercourse are rareand feuding relations primitives, nologically leastdeveloped warsvirtually In this and retaliakindofsystem, self-help unknown. tionfunction meansforpunishing effectively as the onlyforcible punishment.38 a strong crimes is, in itself, because socialopprobrium
37Barton, "IfugaoLaw," 6. Bartoncalculatedthe annual death rate fromheadhunting at 2 per iooo duringa periodof "abnormally high" activity (The Half-Way Sun, 200). In the UnitedStates, accidental deathsfromall causesduringi963 were at the rateof 5.3 per iooo. The AndamanIslanders(Cambridge, 38E.g.,A. R. [Radcliffe-] Brown, Eng., I922), 48-52, 84-87.
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Amongprimitive peopleswitha morecomplexstateless such system, as the Ifugaostudied thereare manyoccasions by Barton, forfeuding or warfare, but actualviolence does notariseout of every The dispute. limitation of violencebetweenpotentially feudinggroups is related ofsettling to theinstitutions whichserve thefunction feuds. The Ifugao "go-between" notonlyacts as a mediator in feudswhichhave caused deathson either of violence side,but also actspriorto the eruption in an effort to prevent such killings. In negotiating disputes whichhave not yetled to killing, he emphasizesat everystagethe dangersimplicitin open feuding;by describing thesedangers in detail,the "gobetween"(with the backingof his own familyand the local comto deteran attackby either at large) attempts of the opposed munity families. Institutionalized to prevent pressures the outbreak of violencealso occurwithintherivalgroupsthemselves. Thus, while the closest relativesof an offended on theneed forkillingas a individual may insist for such wrongsas adultery, punishment or refusalto pay sorcery, relations morewealthy to Ifugaocustom, debts, (who, according may be morevulnerable to counterretaliation thanthe killershoulda feud occur) frequently counselmoderation.39 Since retaliation is an action decidedupon by the family as a unit,and sincefeudsare difficult to settle, "the accuser is usuallynot overanxious to kill the accused."40 Whether witha "go-between" or a member originating ofa wronged be avoided, advicethatopen feuding group, or at leastlimited, is characteristic of a phenomenon which has recently receivedextensive attention in foreign affairs-namely, deterrence. Althoughit has sometimesbeen assumedthatdeterrence a rationalcalculation requires of of an attack, the consequences deterrence and self-help among primitivepeoplesdo not presuppose a conscious of the strategic calculation Thus the possibility typeformalized of violent by game theorists.4" stafurther counterretaliation may,in itselfand without calculation, conflicts whenthere bilizerivalries and limit arbiter is no governmental to enforce law and order.
Ibid., 95. Compare the Cuban crisis of October i962. 41 Sophisticated students of strategyhave never assumed, of course, that rivals can deter each other only if theircalculations are formulatedin terms of game theory.Cf. Thomas Schelling's analogy of deterringa child, The Strategyof Conflict (Cambridge, Mass., i960), ii. Nonetheless, popular analyses often assert that deterrenceimpliesand requires-rational calculation on both sides. E.g., Seymour Melman, The Peace Race (New York i96i), 22.
40
The Half-Way Sun, chaps. 3, 5, and 6; and "Ifugao Law," 75-87,92-95,
39On
the characteristics of self-helpand retaliation among the Ifugao, see Barton,

99-I09.
607
In order toavoid on either anoveremphasis thestability produced by deterrence or theviolence from resulting it willbe useful self-help, to viewbothas necessarily related consequences of a political system which lacks authoritative governmental In political institutions. regimes of thiskind,self-help and deterrence havethefunction of regulating bargaining between opposedgroups, but theyalso serve as a means of organizing socialintercourse in a predictable fashion. Thislatter function is especially to be overimportant, ittends though in analyses looked of deterrence from thestandpoint of a theory of strategy. Retaliation by an offended group, bothas a meansof deterring wrongs and as a method of punishment, can therefore be studied in terms ofitssocial consequences. As Barton points outwith reference to these headhunting, consequences aremultiple, and are sometimes not consciously perceived bythose concerned.42 is Consciously, retaliation a means of maintaining thewell-being of an offended group and of responding to a specific wrong. Unintentionally or unconsciously, selfhelpserves to preserve and unite a group which has beenthreatened by another, to fixresponsibility forwrongs, and thusto maintain a legal order. For a specific individual who executes the retaliation, dangerous exploits required forself-help mayconsciously be a means of gaining glory and influence as well as a meansof preserving his legalrights.43 Sinceall of these functions haveanalogies in theselfhelpconducted by sovereign nation-states, it wouldbe unwise to see in retaliation and deterrence merely a meansof maximizing theadvantage gained byone oftwoor more rivals. The essential character ofboth self-help and deterrence in primitive is thus society political in thebroadest sense: whenthere is no government, retaliation andthethreat ofviolence serve tounite social groups and maintain legalor moral criteria ofright and wrong. Thisuseof might to makeright seemsrepugnant to civilized men,forit has been largely (thoughnot completely) superseded withinmodern society; nonetheless, sucha procedure is consonant witha particular kindofsocial order and cannot be dismissed as having beensurpassed withtheformation of thefirst political society. Primitive legalprocedures maylargely be confined to theinternational political system
42 For the distinctionbetween latent and manifestfunctionswhich is here implied, see Marion J.Levy, Jr.,The Structure of Society(Princeton i952), 83-85. Cf. Barton, The Hall-Way Sun, i96-97. 43 Ibid. Barton also notes that headhunting served the latent function of providing "relief from the monotony of daily life."
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WORLD
POLITICS
today, notions buton thisleveltheuncivilized of self-help and rerole.44 taliation continue to playa decisive theexample of primitive societies whichhavesuccessfully Indeed, institutions shows how difficult it is to subdeveloped governmental stitute hierarchical legalprocedures forself-help. Evenamong peoples liketheAlur, whoareruled a significant bychiefs, category ofwrongs arepunished, at leastin thefirst instance, byretaliation on thepart of theoffended group.45 Onlyif theconsequences of retaliation and counterretaliation threaten thesecurity of innocent bystanders do the chiefs theconflict intervene, making a matter of"public law" punishableby an authority acting in thenameof thetribe as a whole.In thiseventuality, punishment maybe meted out impartially to both parties to a feud;thecreation ofspecifically governmental institutions represents a departure from theprinciple of self-help, and requires a minimal awareness thatthereis an organized community at a higher levelthan that ofthecontending groups.46
V. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AS A PRIMITIVE, STATELESS SYSTEM
The foregoing has attempted to showhow self-help, analysis retaliation, and deterrence can be viewed as a characteristically primitive approach to law and order. this on stateless Through focus primitive thereliance peoples, upon self-help in international and deterrence relations appears tobe evidence that forms a political theworld system thatis in many similar to primitive respects systems. Although it is often that international law and politics argued aresui generis,47 the ofa comparison between international affairs utility andstateless primsocieties itive is shown bytwocharacteristic similarities: therefirst, as a meansof organizing lation of law to violence a coherent social andsecond, and bargainsystem; therelationship ofcustom to rivalry
knownrules.48 ing as meansof makingand applying
44Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V.II30b30-II34aI5. 45 Aidan W. Southall, Alur Society (Cambridge, Eng., n.d.), I44. I60-65. 46 Ibid., I44-46, 234, 237-39-
to describe international relations as a it is fashionable Although

See also I22-36,
47 E.g., Stanley Hoffmann,"InternationalSystemsand InternationalLaw," in Knorr and Verba, eds., The InternationalSystem,205. 48 The second of these characteristics is concerned, speaking crudely, with the relationship between what Almond has called the "political functions" of rule-making, rule application, and interestarticulation,while the firstcorresponds roughly to his functionsof interestaggregation and rule adjudication. The last of these functions,in a statelesssystem,should really be spoken of as rule enforcement, for obvious reasons. Cf. "Introduction," in Almond and Coleman, eds., The Politics of the Developing Areas, IU; and see note 82 below.
609
law exists international onlyon that and to admit lawless anarchy,49 must opinions these habitual that itbe called"weak"law,50 condition permits andeven system It is true that theinternational be questioned. of violence but,as and bloodshed; amount a considerable sanctions which have of systems stateless political there is a class has beenseen, fortheenforcebecause characteristic depend uponself-help they this are related in a way law and violence ment of law. In suchsystems under theinternal order from which political thatis quitedifferent to live; if we speakof international man is accustomed civilized it wouldbe well to bearin mindthatit is an "ordered "anarchy," anarchy." law is notnecessarily "weak," one need To prove that international Hoffmann has system. oflaw in a political consider thefunctions only produce has three functions: it should that anylegalorder suggested tothese criteria, According and"flexibility."51 "security," "satisfaction," ofrights byautonupontheself-enforcement a legalsystem dependent in all is "strong" families or nation-states) (be they omousgroups three respects. in a system is assured recognizes which Most "flexibility" obviously, changes in power;to theextent that might makes right, anychange in right. lessevident It maybe somewhat in might changes produce fordisputes, solution a "satisfactory" law produces thatinternational of admitted impossibility of the true because is on thewhole yetthis theverdict force.52 interof brute thestateless And,finally, reversing most especially a modicum of security, evenproduces system national deterrence basedupona mutual rival nations recognition that through be harmed willboth legitimate bytheuse of their (if notdestroyed) In thisrespect it is worth thatthe emphasizing to self-help. right has also fordestruction, potentialities nuclear age,withitsawesome in theunwillingness nationofpowerful seena corresponding increase war.5 states to overt to resort
49Cf.Waltz,Man, theState,and War,chaps.6 and 7. While the present essayis in with Waltz's major theme (i.e., thatwar is a necessary complete agreement consequence of the statesystem, since "in anarchy thereis no automatic harmony"), his theelements of war tendsto understate of legality emphasis on theproblem and order in worldpolitics. 50 E.g., Hoffmann, and International "International Systems Law," 206-7. 51lbid.,2I2. 52 Although withdefeatin war may be of shortduration, the "satisfaction" thisis of military defeat(as the pro-Western not a necessary consequence attitude of West World War II indicates).The limiteddurability and Japanafter Germany of "satisbelow. settlements will be discussed factory" 53Since World War II therehave been numerous international incidents which, would probably have resulted in open warfare. underprenuclear Cf. Herconditions,
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WORLD POLITICS
of a stateless the orderly (if violent)aspects To revealmoreclearly force of therelationship between elements several system, international stateless As in primitive detail. and law needtobe spelledoutin greater a continuing from erupt intermittently notonlydoes violence societies, groups; cofeud or war betweenautonomous of potential condition is sometimes While suchcooperation sporadically. also occurs operation foror prosecute (as in most warfare whichprepare limited to actions havealso beencapable of theinterstate system alliances),themembers in ad hocmultilateral decisions binding cooperative mutually ofmaking a moreinstitutionalized of Europeprovides The Concert conferences.54 which act as a kind of temstructures, exampleof such intermittent of the major the sovereignty while preserving porary"government" international in the system.55 states subject to veto by a decision-making, This type of cooperative limitedmustbe seen as a feasible-ifobviously state, participating or multinotonlyin ad hocbilateral it is present ofprocedure; method international but also in thecontinuously functioning lateralmeetings, (the League of Nationsand the UN) whichhave been organizations in thiscentury." It shouldalso be notedthattheemergence developed a trendtowardconrepresents organizations "functional" of so-called institutions capable of limitedbut very real functioning tinuously in theinternational politicalsystem.57 cooperation of both violenceand as well as the importance The limitations in be emphasized must therefore equally in world politics cooperation
man Kahn, "The Arms Race and Some of Its Hazards," in Donald G. Brennan, ed., Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security (New York i96i), 93ff.On the securityofferedby the "impermeable" nation-statebefore the development of nuclear weapons, see John H. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age (New York I959), Part i. 54 Most notably,of course, in peace conferencesterminating major wars. 55 On the Concert of Europe, see Richard N. Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics (Boston i963), chap. 4, and the referencesthere cited. Compare the political agencies in many statelessprimitive societies: Robert specialized, intermittent H. Lowie, "Some Aspects of Political Organization Among American Aborigines," Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute,LXXVII (0948), I7-i8; and RadcliffeBrown, AfricanPolitical Systems,xix. between the Iroquois Confederacy,which could act as a unit 56 Note the similarity only if a decision was unanimous, and the UN SecurityCouncil. See Morgan, League of the Iroquois, III-I4; and Inis L. Claude, Jr.,Swords into Plowshares (2nd edn., New York I959), chap. 8. 57 Cf. the limited but continuous role of the pangats and "pact-holders"among the Kalinga, which Barton contrasts with the intermittentaction of the Ifugao "gobetweens" and "trading partners" (The Kalingas, I44-46). On the question of the "continuity" or "contingency" of political structures,see Easton, "Political Anthropology," 235-38, 245-46-
611
In so doing, the system. of the international any total assessment peoplesservesthe usefulpurpose primitive with stateless comparison in which ofa political system thecharacteristic properties ofidentifying is retaliation As among the primitives, by self-help. law is sanctioned that civilized is true it a though meansofrighting wrong, an acceptable nations regard strictretaliation-"an eye for an eye"-as a more primiAs among stateless thando savagepeoples.58 recourse extreme to groupsoftenattempt and non-involved is possible, neutrality tives, As amongstateless and inducerivalsto ceasefighting. mediate conflict may escalateserves thatconflict the verypossibility finally, primitives, Hence the relationof law to to deterviolenceon some occasions.59 of primitive anarchy" like the"ordered in themultistate system, force thelack of authoritative from is derived governments, societies without
political institutions.
process-the to the decision-making When we turnmore directly thatin many above-it maybe recalled mentioned secondcharacteristic especiallythose lacking governmental political systems, primitive in a crucialway,since are related and bargaining custom institutions, rules.The same enforceable forestablishing are theonlymethods they for it too lacks an politicalsystem, can be said of the international executive.International or an all-powerful legislature authoritative or rule law can be said to be createdin two major ways: a practice time, a considerable for either havingbeenfollowed becomes a custom, groupsunder as bindingspecific or it is adoptedby mutualconsent, methods While thesecondof theselegislative circumstances. particular treaties formal thatit produces is relatively to theextent unambiguous law slowlyand imperproducescustomary the first and agreements, so thatin periodsof rapid changeone may wonderif any ceptibly, legal ruleshave specific Over time,nonetheless, suchlaw reallyexists. the composing beenadoptedand accepted as valid by thenation-states modern international system.60
58 Henry S. Maine, International Law (New York i888), I74-75. Primitive peoples do not always exact strict retaliation, however; the institutionof a "weregild" or payment in lieu of retaliationis paralleled in internationalpolitics by reparationsand other penalties exacted in the negotiation of peace treaties.Also, compare Morton A. Kaplan, "The Strategyof Limited Retaliation," Policy Memorandum No. i9 (Princeton, Center of InternationalStudies, I959), and, more generally,recent strategicdiscussions of "graduated deterrence"-e.g., Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessityfor Choice (New York i96i), 65-70. 59 Cf. Schelling, The Strategyof Conflict,chap. 8. 600n the characterof internationallaw and its sources, see James L. Brierly,The Law of Nations (4th edn., London I949), I-9q, 229-36; Percy E. Corbett, Law and Society in the Relations of States (New York I951), 3-52; and Morton A. Kaplan and
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WORLD POLITICS
international to be chaotic At anymoment oftime, law seems and uncertain; "doublestandards" oftenappearto bind weak or lawabiding states, whilepermitting theruthless or strong to satisfy their with demands impunity.61 Butwhena longer-range viewis taken and the world is considered as a stateless political system in which self-help is a legitimate means of legalprocedure, disputes overthecontent of international law (likedisputes over thelegitimacy ofeachkilling in a primitive feud) become a predictable consequence of the system's As theworldis now organized, structure. international law almost requires conflict concerning the substantive provisions relating to a given dispute, andwarfare is a legalmeans ofbargaining prior to the ofmore conclusion or lesstemporary settlements.62 One peculiar is characteristic of lawsin a stateless political system thus thelegitimization of dispute concerning theapplication of legal rights to particular circumstances. Whileit is usualin thiscontext to emphasize the relationship offorce tolaw (bypointing outthat "might over makes in anarchy), right" thefrequency ofdisputes andnecessity of the substance of rights the primacy have another consequence:
politicalrivalry. Within a societywith a government, men whose instiinterests conflict mustchanneltheirdemandsthrough a specific
Nicholasde B. Katzenbach, The PoliticalFoundations of International Law (New York i96i), chap.9. Some observers of international relations, Austin's following John legal theory, have doubtedthat a system without a singlesovereign could authority have "true"law. For a criticism of thisapplication of Austin's view,see Maine,International Law, 47-5L. 61 WilliamFoltz has pointed out to me thatthereis also a parallel"reverse double in bothprimitive standard" and international weak and unimportant systems; groups are often permitted actions whichmajor groupswould not commit(or whichwould be strongly criticized if committed). Many primitive systems allow inferior lineages or casteswiderlatitude in manyforms of conduct(dishonesty, petty thievery, public defamation, etc.) than is permitted major lineagesor castes.As long as the stability of thesystem or thevitalinterests of a majorgroupare not threatened, such behavior maybe a useful safety valve.The behavior of so-called in the UN "nonaligned" states GeneralAssembly offers an obviousparallel. 62 From the pointof view of a systematic law need not be a "good." Inanalysis, deed,law need not produce peaceful "order," thoughas civilizedmen we infer from our political experience thatthisshouldbe so. Hence authorities on international law often feelcompelled to go beyondmererestatements of accepted the legal principles; international law texts, longan important method of codifying customary international law, are frequently animated by a desirefor reform. Cf. Maine, International Law, Lecturesi, xii, et passim.Unlikethe sphereof domestic in whichrelativism politics, sometimes seemstenable to scholars, international are difficult law and politics to treat in a whollypositivist fashion without thereby accepting as justifiable a condition of and war whichcivilizedmen tendto rejectas barbarous, legal self-help if not unjust. Hence worldpolitics is perhaps the area in whichit is mostevidentthatsatisfactory cannotdivorceobjectivity political theory (and especially freedom frompartisanship) fromthe quest forstandards of justice.
613
(in principle)thelegitimacy ultimately recognizing structure, tutional which have been sanctionedby governmental of politicalattitudes
decision.63
of intracharacter terminal thisrelatively politics, In international need decisions is often lacking;thepoliciesofone'srivals state political in warfare. In a sense,therefore, even by victory not be legitimized politics(as, indeed,the mightdoes not make rightin international after i9i8). Like primitive Frenchinsisted after i87i and theGermans a settlement settled; are onlytemporarily disputes feuds, international conflict of further is rare." This means whichprecludes thepossibility upon whichthesedifferences and theinterests differences, thatpolitical are based,are oftenmore visiblein world politicsthan in intra-state of one's of thedesires demandsforthesatisfaction politics. Conflicting in the prime factors own group-politicsand rivalry-aretherefore relations.65 international imin world affairs is especially This primacy of politicalconflict and interbetweenprimitive similarity portant becauseof a further are differenprimitive societies Just as some stateless national politics. so the world can opposition, tiatedinto spatial"zones" of increasing "far" fromeach other.66 be dividedinto areas which are politically appearsto be whichoften Here again,a characteristic of worldpolitics of a comin the context morebroadly sui generiscan be understood politics. and international between primitive parison VI.
SOME DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PRIMITIVE AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEMS
resemblethe political systems primitive In arguingthat stateless in manyways,the searchfor analogies international politicalsystem should not obscurethe massivedifferences which must have been someof thesedifby thereader.By specifying onlytoo easilynoticed thoseaspectsin however, it will be possibleto distinguish ferences,
63 But notethat, evenin domestic the legitimacy of governmental politics, decisions maybe challenged bythose who are willingto be "bellicose." Cf. Bertrand de Jouvenel, The Pure Theory of Politics(New Haven i963), i8off. 64For the prerequisites fortheserarecases,see the study citedin note3i. Note the function of "marriage" of rivalkinship (betweenrepresentatives groupsin primitive and between in theearlier societies families ruling periodof themodern statesystem) as a meansof formalizing sucha settlement. 65 Cf. the "principle of political E. Osgood,Limited primacy" emphasized by Robert
"Blocs"and regional systems are, of course, On the relationship readyexamples. betweenthe global system and regionalsystems in international politics, see George Liska,Nationsin Alliance(Baltimore i962), I9-20, 22-24, 259-62.
66
War(Chicago 1957),
I3-I5.
614
WORLD POLITICS
of absence areduetothe that those from isunique world politics which aretwo there In particular, world government. constituted a formally which politics and international primitive between differences general between similarity ofthestructural toseethelimits willmakeit easier the role of political first, to consider, thetwo.It will be necessary ofchange. theimpact andsecond, culture, andcustoms manners, beliefs, that the assumed itisusually Although societies are primitive many are homogeneous, peoples of nonliterate suchheterogeneity indeed, stocks; ethnic of heterogeneous composed to theemergence tobe related forit appears important, is particularly peoples.67 many African among least at institutions, of governmental homogeneity toward cultural is a marked tendency there Nonetheless, without accept sincemostindividuals societies, stateless in primitive of the application Although the established of life.68 way question is disputed, casesmaybe and frequently rulesto specific traditional in occurring ofchange thekinds limits ofculture stability therelative systems.69 most primitive includes currently system political In contrast, the international national has shown, As Almond cultures. political different radically political different facethetaskof integrating which systems political in morehomogeneous to strains thatare absent cultures are subject which in a system thisproblem is evengreater a fortiori, societies; themselves to organize cultures political manyantagonistic permits it could be therefore, In general, nation-states.70 into autonomous a toproduce tend decentralization andstructural that self-help argued primitive thanin most in worldpolitics of instability degree greater societies.71 stateless deThe historical thisproblem. compounds An additional feature over control man's asithasincreased civilization, ofWestern velopment theworld, throughout science ofmodern theeffects andspread nature cultures, political between differences sharp particularly hasproduced contact intocloser these cultures it has brought at thesametime that And, technology. of modern the advent before than was possible
67 See Schapera, Government, and Mair,Primitive I24-25; and Politics, Government chap.5. PoliticalSystems, African 9-IO. 68Cf. Fortesand Evans-Pritchard, of opposed the power and influence 69Hence theremay be disputesconcerning in character. ideological are rarely but theseconflicts groups, of the 400-2. Cf. the importance 70 See Almond,"Comparative PoliticalSystems," in the USSR. problem nationality 71 Note, however, are not as stableand unchanging societies thatmany primitive 224-27, 236, et passim;and J.A. Alur Society, E.g., see Southall, believed. as is often Society(London I954), chap.2. Politicsin a Changing Barnes,
615
different between ofthecontact with this intensification simultaneously societies advanced that technologically apparent ithasbecome cultures, so infinite material progress, to be virtually ofwhatseems arecapable techtheir increase can continuously nations thatthemost powerful states. or "underdeveloped" over "backward" superiority nological scientific of modern, of the interaction The main consequence rapid has beenextraordinarily differences uponcultural technology of in thenumber increase ofwhich thegreat inworld politics, change index.72 The stateless structure superficial is butthemost nation-states the stable, despite maybe tolerably system political of a primitive a similar in legalenforcement; structure, in the reliance uponself-help Even ofinternational maywellleadtochaos. politics, context changing of a more "advanced" witha thecontact people world, in a primitive institutions has often a rapid produced without governmental society tobeexpected, more ofthe latter Itisallthe former.73 domination bythe of theinternational structure is essystem thatthepresent therefore, mustbe and thatquite considerable changes transitional, sentially in thenext century. expected
VII. CONCLUSION: DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH
at thispoint, whether theforegoing The reader maywellwonder, between can the contrast significance: has any theoretical analysis any subprovide system societies andtheinterstate stateless primitive The politics? of world missed bystudents insights otherwise stantive sufof thecomparison is not,in itself, hereproposed novelty relative years ago, Henry eighty of theendeavor. Almost ficient justification Mainesaw thisparallel whenhe remarked: juris"Ancient Sumner may if perhaps a deceptive maybe employed, comparison prudence, except the as it were, nothing, be likened Law, filling tointernational of society."74 aretheatoms between which groups interstices thegreat notedabovemaybe nothing but a "deceptive While the parallels element important the suggests itself formulation Maine's comparison," of world our understanding to clarify whichpromises of similarity politics.
72 On the distinction between"stable"and "revolutionary" international systems, see Hoffmann, "International Systemsand International Law," 208-I I. Hoffmann suggests thatthreevariables determine the stability or instability of an international system: (i) "thebasic structure of the world,"(2) "the technology of conflict," and (ibid., 207-8). In the present essay,emphasis is placed on (3) "the units'purposes" the first of thesevariables-seebelow,section vii. 73 Southall,Alur Society, 229-34. 74Ancient Law, i6i.
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WORLD POLITICS
cantakeplacein andinternational both Although primitive politics between the greatgroupswhichare the atomsof "theinterstices the"groups" whichare "atoms" are not alwaysthe same. society," beentrue in international Whilethis hasobviously affairs at different itis no lessso inprimitive As a result, there times andplaces, societies. oftypes ofprimitive arean immense variety political systems, justas different international there havebeenwidely political systems. iswhether there The question, aredifferent ofgroupsthen, patterns or different structures-which can be identified political as typical alternatives among primitive peoples; ifthis is thecase, then perhaps the ofprimitive havesimilarities types political systems tothepossible types ofinternational political systems. havebeentwomajorapproaches To date, there to theconstruction on theonehand, oftypologies ofinternational systems: models ofthe international in terms system havebeendefined ofbehavioral rules,75 ofinternational andonthe other, types systems have beendistinguished on thebasisof historical evidence.76 Without entering intomethoditcanbewondered ological discussion, whether both ofthese approaches theformer haveshortcomings: tends tobe ad hoc,and thelatter tobe restricted one studies.77 to theperiods Giventheorientation of recent theoretical efforts in political science, theconstruction of a structural ofpolitical typology systems wouldseem to be a useful supplement to other approaches.78 Becausesucha typology appears to derive from "structural-functional" theory, developed especially bysomeBritish anthropologists,79 itwould bewelltospecify more precisely what is meant by"structure," andwhyit is emphasized rather than"function." As Marion J.Levy, Jr., has suggested, the term"structure," in its mostgeneral sense, of action or opera"means a pattern, i.e.,an observable uniformity,
MortonA. Kaplan's 75The mostwell-known exampleof thisapproach is, of course, in International System and Process Politics(New York 1957), chap.2. 76See Hoffmann, "International Systems and International Law," 2I5-33; and Roseand Reaction in WorldPolitics, crance, Action esp. Part ii. 77 Cf. ibid., chap. i, and StanleyHoffmann, ed., Contemporary Theoryin International Relations (EnglewoodCliffs, N.J.,i960), 40-50, 174-84. 78 It seems, for example,that the distinction betweenstateless systems and fully developed states is insufficient becauseit ignores an intermediary typewhichSouthall In such systems, or "segmentary states." of whichfeudalism called "pyramidal" is but of levelsof authority, one example, thereare a multiplicity the most comprehensive without See Southall, of whichis "paramount" being "sovereign." Alur Society, n4Iof the 60; and Barnes,Politicsin a ChangingSociety, 47-53.Furtherdevelopment and its application conception of such pyramidal systems to world politicswill be in subsequent attempted publications. 79E.g., see Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function in PrimitiveSociety,esp. and chap. io. Introduction
617
referto what is done, and structure tion."" Levy adds: "Functions in themeaning of'how' theconcept 'bywhat') refers tohow (including to theresults of actions(or empirical whatis done is done.One refers orpatterns ofaction to theforms phenomena in general), and theother phenom(or empirical phenomena in general).... The sameempirical or a structure, depending enonmaybe an example of either a function in theresults whichit is viewed.. . An interest upon thepointfrom An attention on the concept of function. of operation of a unitfocuses in thepatterns An interest focuses attention on structure. of operation of of a unit and the implications interest in the results of operation sincethe on bothfunction and structure thoseresults focuses attention on lie in theireffects implications thatcan be studiedscientifically As is evident, fromthe point of view of observable uniformities."' which to developa generaltheory sociological theory it is impossible there or "function." Nonetheless emphasizes solelyeither"structure" are good reasonsfor suggesting precede that a structural typology refined "functional" analysis. This advantage can bestbe shownby referring of to Alger'sanalysis the similarities politics.Aland international betweenintranational is useful functions though Algersuggests thatAlmond'slistofpolitical primitive totheparallel between forsucha comparison,82 whenhe turns and international he emphasizesthreefactors, derivedfrom politics, namely, Easton'swork,which are ultimately structural in character: or continuity thedifferentiation of politicalrolesand the contingency of roles which controlphysical of theiroperation, the specialization memberships. force, and thecharacter of overlapping are not immediately The reasonwhy Almond'spoliticalfunctions and international in comparing is not hard to useful politics primitive "A headman ofa primitive see.As Alger society mayperform remarked, If articulator, aggregator, and rule-maker."83 intermittently as interest in by specializedindividuals Almond'sfunctions are not performed concentration on thesefunctions may only manyprimitive societies,
80
82 Algeremphasizes the similarities betweeninternational politicsand the internal nationsand primitive politicsof both developing societies("Comparisonof Intra410-I9). nationaland International Politics," He suggests thatthe "inputfunctions" interest ("political socialization and recruitment, articulation, interest aggregation, and are more relevantthan the "outputfunctions" politicalcommunication") ("ruleand rule adjudication").Cf. Almond and Coleman,eds., making,rule application, The Politicsof the Developing Areas,I6-I7; and note 48 above. 83 Alger, and International "Comparison of Intranational Politics," 412. Cf. Almond and Coleman, eds.,i9.
81Ibid., 60-62.
Levy,The Structure of Society, 57.
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WORLD POLITICS
emphasize the"diffuseness" of roles, without indicating thedifferent in different patterns which emerge to primitive systems. It is necessary see in whatkinds of situations different individuals act in different derived ways;functional "modern" categories from complex political systems may be simply inappropriate for the studyof primitive As Almond himself was at painstopoint out, "The functional categories which oneemploys havetobe adapted totheparticular aspect of thepolitical system with which oneis concerned."85 Since a comparison of primitive and international political systems mustidentify the "particular of eachtype aspects" of system whichare analogous, the useoffunctional categories would tobeunpromising seem atthe outset. In contrast, theuse of a structural of political typology systems, if it to define proves possible kindsof political structures whichexistin both and international primitive hasa double this politics, advantage: approach should one to see notonlythesimilarities permit between butalsothesources ofthedifferences systems, between modern interandprimitive national politics political systems.86 Finally, it shouldbe pointed out thatresearch in thisdirection, to utilize whileit appears recent theoretical derived from approaches
84 An additionalcritiquewhich might be made is that the Almond functions implya politicalteleology: since traditional, "diffuse" systems tend to be replaced by modern,"functionally specific" ones, analysismay be orientedtoward finding thoseactivities whichfavorthe trendtoward"modernity." Cf. Almondand Coleman, minorthedangerof thisimplication eds.,i6-I7. However in theanalysis of developing nations, it wouldcertainly in international be erroneous politics, sincewe have no reason to believethatpresent tendencies will producea world government in which Almond'spolitical functions have been specialized.
societies.84
In addition, an emphasison structure should permitone to handle more explicitly the troublesome problem of defining the "actors" in the international system. Cf. ArnoldWolfers, "The Actorsin International Politics," Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore I962), 3-24. Alger seemsto adopt the so-called "individuals-as-actors" which raisessome severemethodological approach, for example,he sugproblems; gests (in applying Easton'swork) that "international would tend to be dissystems tributed toward the contingent end of the continuum" which ranges from "contingent" to "continuous." This is a questionable conclusion if one considers thatnot onlyinternational but specific roleswithinnationalgovernments organizations, (e.g., "foreign function minister"), in the modernstate system. continuously Cf. Alger, "Comparison of Intranational and International Politics," esp. 416, with the discussion above, p. 6io. As Wolfersconcluded: "While it would be dangerousfor theorists to divert their attention fromthe nation-state primary and multistate systems which continueto occupymost of the stage of contemporary world politics, theory remains if it is unableto includesuchphenomena inadequate as overlapping authoriand divided sovereignty, ties,split loyalties, which were pre-eminent characteristics of medievalactors"("Actorsin International Politics," 24). The structural approach proposed here seemsbest suitedto satisfy the theoretical requirements suggested by Wolfers.
86
85lIbid., i6.
619
isnotdivorced political science, andbehavioral sociology, anthropology, By politicalphilosophy. posed by traditional fromthe problems in whichno of a classof socialsystems theexistence emphasizing of the therelevance are established, governments instituted formally to can be shown politics to international ofnature" ofa "state notion by developed theories of"normative" by-product a mere than be more philosophers. political of a "state "anarchy" since theapparent however, At thesametime, kinds ofthevarious analysis societies, in primitive is found ofnature" someof theimplications that suggests structures political ofprimitive arequestionable. philosophy inpolitical doctrine ofnature" ofthe"state thateven implies societies of stateless thephenomenon In particular, be used cannot a condition such ofnature," ofa "state ifonecanspeak the"state being;as a result, an asocial toprove that manis bynature neednotbe politics) orinternational in primitive (whether ofnature" as opposedto the purely humancondition, thenatural considered of Hence thecomparison or state. community conventional political the specifically, more politics-and, and intranational international and worldpolitics-among primitive of similarities between analysis of thetheory of thesufficiency leadsus to a reassessment other things byLocke,Rousseau, by Hobbesand elaborated established of politics andKant.87
87For a sophisticatedattempt to show the continuing relevance of the philosophy of Rousseau as the basis of a theory of internationalpolitics, see Stanley Hoffmann, "Rousseau on War and Peace," American Political Science Review, LVII (June I963), Cf. Kenneth J. Waltz, "Kant, Liberalism, and War," ibid., LVI (June I962), 3I7-33.
33I-40.

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Trustees of Princeton University

WORLD POLITICS AS A PRIMITIVE POLITICAL SYSTEM

I. REASONS FOR COMPARING PRIMITIVE AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

whichare very systems peopleshavepolitical MANY primitive

I. Schapera, Governmentand Politics in Tribal Societies (London I956), 2-5. Despite

PRIMITIVE POLITICAL SYSTEMS

PRIMITIVE POLITICAL SYSTEMS

PRIMITIVE POLITICAL SYSTEMS

PRIMITIVE POLITICAL SYSTEMS

The Half-Way Sun, chaps. 3, 5, and 6; and "Ifugao Law," 75-87,92-95,

the characteristics of self-helpand retaliation among the Ifugao, see Barton,

PRIMITIVE POLITICAL SYSTEMS

to describe international relations as a it is fashionable Although

PRIMITIVE POLITICAL SYSTEMS

PRIMITIVE POLITICAL SYSTEMS

PRIMITIVE POLITICAL SYSTEMS

PRIMITIVE POLITICAL SYSTEMS

PRIMITIVE POLITICAL SYSTEMS

Levy,The Structure of Society, 57.

PRIMITIVE POLITICAL SYSTEMS

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