Lecture 07: Dynamics of Influence in the US Poli 320B 2012

Dynamics of influence in the US: Nature of US Institutions

1. The influence of the president is limited and variable. -- Presidential success on legislation is mostly a matter of the composition of Congress: whether members agree with his policies. NOT MUCH ability for presidents to change of minds in Congress. Statistical evidence: presidential success rates on bills are explained by party and ideological strength in Congress. No evidence of differences in frequency of success related to presidential skill or effort. -- Public opinion leadership may be of some importancemixed evidence. Usually overrated: Presidents dont move the public very much. Examples: Clinton, Obama health care reform. Many speeches, but public support declines. -- Presidents may not control administrative agencies completely. Congress and interest groups are rivals of the president. -- BUT: The president has nearly unilateral power in some areas (e.g. initial commitment of troops abroad), not others. There are gray areas that pres can exploit: E.g., Obama gives states waivers on welfare. 2. The influence of the congressional parties over individual members is limited and variable. Currently very high by US standards; but still less than Canadian. Does a party have a collective strategy on legislation? Sort ofleaders have a preferred strategy. But individuals have considerable autonomy.

3. Decentralized units are powerful: committees (vs whole Congress) and agencies (vs president). A phenomenon of iron triangles: alliance of 1) agency, 2) Cong committees with jurisdiction, and 3) interest groups affected by the policy. Result is strong influence of narrow interests. E.g, Dept of Agriculture; Agriculture Committees; and Farm Groups. They agree on programs to subsidize farmers. 4. Policies that involve the states (e.g., Medicaid, education) are very hard to change. Great complexity because any bill has different effects in different states, due to existing policy differences. 5. Constituencies (interest groups, public opinion) may have greater power than other systemsbecause Congress members are not held responsible for the results.

System performance [Read Malloy and Quirk on how the system performs, compared with Canadian Parliamentary system.] Discussion: Note the example of Canada's budget cuts, mid 1990s.
The turnaround began with Mr. Chrtiens arrival as prime minister in November, 1993, when his Liberal Party in some ways Canadas equivalent of the Democrats in the U.S. swept to victory with a strong majority. The new government took one look at the dreadful state of the books and decided to act. I said to myself, I will do it. I might be prime minister for only one term, but I will do it, Mr. Chrtien said.

Could this happen in the US? ]Why, why not? (See also later discussion.) Discuss now. Come back later. ============================== Exam here Tuesday. Will use scantron forms. Bring No. 2 pencils. Discuss: Agreement reached on the continuing resolution (reopen government) and increasing the debt limit.

How to analyze the effect of institutions on the performance of government? Discuss two dimensions of performance: I. Ideological direction and change. How far policy will lie to left or right? And, how much potential for dramatic changee.g. adoption of major new programs. Or opposite: major cuts in programs?

The US political system is generally somewhat prone to delay, or gridlockinability to act. And when it does act, it generally results in moderate policiesand makes incremental changes.

Why? Not because of president: ideology of president can change sharplye.g., Clinton, to Bush, to Obama. Barrier to dramatic change is need for action by Congress. Parties have only modest disciplinehence need to gain support from moderate members results in moderate policies. In last 10 years, the main barrier to change is more frequent filibustering in Senateneed for 60 votes (of 100).

However, this performance depends on the state of parties, esp. a) divided versus unified government and b) polarization.

Divided vs unified government -- If president and Congress same party, government can act more decisively on issues affecting role of government. Examples: Obamas economic stimulus program, takeover of auto firms, health care reform (Obamacare). -- If president and Congress are from different parties, less likely to have major action. President Clinton after 1994 election (Republicans took control of Congress): he mostly blocked Republican policies, did not pass his own. 2011-2012, Obama with Republican House exceptionally unable to act. Almost no significant legislation.

Polarization -- When parties differ more sharply (Dems more liberal, Republicans more conservative), divided government has more severe effects. I.e., greater difficulty acting. More discussion of this later.

Other conditions that enable major action: -- major national problem or crisis (recession, terrorist attack, etc.). Eg. a financial rescue passage (bailing out banks) in 2008, passed even with Republican Pres (Bush) and Dem Congress. -- strong popular demand for change (environmental movement in 1970s); -- electoral change in strength of the partiese.g. if more Republicans, more cuts in govt. Reagan 1980s.

II.Policy competence: Definition: Ability of government to act intelligently; overcome constituency pressure; and act for long term, general interests. Note that this should not be an ideological judgment. Some liberal policies score high, some low; conservative policies also. (General agreement among policy experts.) Lectures will sometimes identify policies as being, in my view, distorted by constituency pressure, uninformed, or the like. Hopefully not biased (although Im generally a moderate liberal). Still one must be careful to avoid bias. We wont take time for a thorough discussion. Don't take my word for it, necessarily, about these assessments. Consider such claims provisional or illustrativenot the final word. US system has general weakness in overcoming interest groups and uninformed public opinion: (constituency pressures): the cause is independence of individual members of Congress. Voters do not hold them accountable for national conditions, overall results of policy. (For

example, "unemployment is high; I will vote against my member of Congress. It doesn't make sense. The member does not have control.) So Congress members are likely to do what political pressures favor. President more often looks out for broad interests, but president is not in control. Compare Parliamentary systema disciplined governing party is in charge. It has incentives to aim for actual results. ("Unemployment is high. I will vote against the Conservatives. This does make sense.) Recall example of Canada's budget cuts, mid 1990s. See PM attitude.
I said to myself, I will do it. I might be prime minister for only one term, but I will do it, Mr. Chrtien said.

Could this happen in the US? Why not? President could not impose that decision, if expected to be highly costly politically. No one can. So NO ONE has incentives to act as if fully accountable. Divided government and lack of accountability. Obama and the economy: In presidential campaign, Republicans criticize the failure to improve the economy. But Republicans in Congress resisted stimulus measures. They may have resisted intentionally, to prevent Obama from getting credit for a strong economy. US has compensating advantage of more deliberation through separation of powers. Congress sometimes blocks overly rapid decision by president. E.g. Pres Bush, after 2004 elections, push privatizing Social Security. Even with Republican majorities in House and Senate, they held up and blocked. US has disadvantage of lack of a trusted, highly expert, senior civil service. US high levels of agencies are mostly political appointees.

Overall: US system probably more likely than Canadian to act incompetentlyi.e., failing to serve long term, general interests. (Some would debate this.) One view: this lesser competence (interest group influence, lack of attention to general interests) is the price of a system that slows down growth of government.