The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization Author(s): Peter Evans Source: World Politics, Vol.

50, No. 1, Fiftieth Anniversary Special Issue (Oct., 1997), pp. 62-87 Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054027 Accessed: 15/09/2009 20:24
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THE ECLIPSE OF THE

Reflections on Stateness an Era of Globalization
By PETER EVANS*

STATE?
in

J.

P. NETTL'S
fellow ceptual social

classic 1968 article on the state aimed to convince his

scientists can dissolve convinced that "the thing exists and no amount of con it."1 Analysis of the state was "not that "stateness"?the ways among institutional nations, and cen that

restructuring He was

much in vogue," asNettl put it, and he considered this an intellectual

aberration. trality were decades of the state?varied in important center

political behavior and institutions could be understood only if the state

into the back brought since have thoroughly debate vindicated of political Nettl. three analysis. The re Issues of stateness

gained and retained the kind of centrality that he argued they should
have. The While cation revive continues unabated. that he helped content of his vindi form and the vindicated, are full of ironies. The state to econom interest in of the spread Nettl has been almost completely ignored in Nettl's article,2 has been to "state of institu

ics, a discipline the stakes

central to the revival of debate. In part because of this disciplinary shift,

are defined systems salient. than ness" were States) were institutions the efficacy For Nettl, the alternatives differently. in which of public authority other kinds Current about the debates extent with are less about to which a the form

tions (parties in Britain, the law and legal institutions in the United
private of public can (or power society ere

should) be checked by public authority. Reinvigorated political faith in

of markets combined rediscovery of civil

John Ruggie,

like to thank Fred Block, Ha Joon Chang, Neil Fligstein, Stephan Haggard, Atul Kohli, Theda Skocpol, John Stephens, and especially the members of my graduate seminar in an early draft of this paper and, of course, comparative political economy for their useful criticisms of to absolve them from any responsibility for the directions taken by my response. 1 "The State as a Conceptual Variable," World Politics 20 (July 1968), 559. Netd, 2 footnotes Netd was interdisciplinary?his refer to a wide range of sociologists, political scientists, or economic in 1968 he found references to economists in deal and historians?but logic unnecessary on the state. with debates ing *Iwould

WorldPolitics 50 (October 1997), 62-87

ECLIPSE OF THE STATE?

ates a charismatic sponding set of substitutes set of arguments theoretical perspectives Changing institutions for public for the "eclipse of the state." cannot be separated and a corre from real his

63

torical changes in the position of the state. In the brief decades since
Nettl on the state have In the OECD the demands wrote, burgeoned. in transfer payments countries driven increases have demographically as a of in a doubling resulted of government proportion expenditures more GDP. In countries de the desire for rapid economic developing a similar expansion. development Lagging produced velopment in an ominous institutions resulted litical and administrative of po "capacity most some of the In Africa, world, parts dramatically developing gap." institutional real eclipses of the state, in the sense of full-blown collapse, ero there was no threat of collapse, aworrisome took place. Even where to be under way. It was seemed sion of institutional capacity public Perhaps changes the state's forcing decades most in the is how of Netd's ironic, from the perspective analysis, arena have affected "stateness." For Nettl, international rein the international role vis-?-vis system was "invariant," even when domestic arena institutions is viewed denied it.3 Three The col very differendy.

much harder to ignore the state in the 1990s than itwas in the 1960s.

stateness

later the international

lapse of the old bipolar world has diminished the power of statecentric
Si international relations. rivalries to dominate and military economic for transnational of the opportunities multaneously, growth about why for a new series of arguments gains has laid the foundation to these arguments, the intensified states are anachronisms. According transactions that cross national boundaries of economic development as an it marginalized the power of the state, leaving has undermined now saw as stateness arena that Netti is actor. The economic securing as seen the power of the nation-state. transcending political

Changes

in the global ideological climate are as crucial as new flows

a of money and goods, and Netd's key aspect of analysis does anticipate was "stateless the For those changes. Nettl, society par excel England self-examination lence" and "an American simply leaves sociopolitical no room for any valid notion of the state."4 Thus, the relative neglect of
3 Netd (fh. 1) saw the international arena almost purely in realist terms, arguing that in the interna arena the state was "the almost exclusive and acceptable locus of resource mobilization" (p. 563). state is the basic, irreducible unit, equivalent to In Netd's view, "Here [in the international system] the function is invariant," "even where the individual person in a society" (p. 563). Since the "international the notion of the state is very weak, as in Britain and the United States, the effective extrasocietal or in ternational role is not affected" (p. 564). 4Netd(fn.l),562,561.

tional

64

WORLD POLITICS

the concept of the state during the twenty-five his arti years preceding cle was a logical consequence of the "shift of the center of gravity of so cial science to the United the untrammeled States."5 Today, hegemony is one of the most of Anglo-American salient ideological premises forces shaping the specific character of the current global economy, in

cluding the extent to which globalization

state. eclipse of the In this environment starting point.

is viewed as entailing the

a different as a feature

of Anglo-American political culture. It must be dealt with as a domi nant global ideology and potential institutional reality.Therefore, the
question of whether consequences a positive the eclipse of the state is likely and, if so, what the an shift would of such institutional be, takes precedence. for granted.

pursuing Nettls agenda requires can no Statelessness longer be treated simply

The trick is to deal with the question of eclipse seriouslywithout taking

answer

Iwill argue that while eclipse is a possibility, it is not a likely one.

the discourse crisis of state that is not more of eclipse has done is to make negative capacity unrelentingly states will end up as but that institutions marginal s the state role will be ac repressive ways of organizing to a gen responses and defensive. The

What uine

danger meaner, cepted

as the institutions. the collapse of public only way of avoiding consideration of with positive eclipse cripples Preoccupation possibili so that can more effec to increase states' ties for working they capacity meet them. The goal should be to the new demands that confront tively work back toward paring with more I begin different explicit closer something kinds of "stateness" attention at the impact to Nettls and their original com agenda of this time consequences, and ar

to the effects

by looking

of globalization. on stateness of globalization

guing that the structural logic of globalization and the recent history of the global economy can then be read as providing rationales for "high
stateness" a clear as well as "low stateness." That economic affects of current Iwill logic connecting globalization I will argue that the absence of to low stateness makes then move from globaliza on stateness, ar into the nature

the normative and ideological side of the global order a key determinant
of how globalization tion to a discussion guing stateness. are both theoretical perspectives sources of insight

that these perspectives

of the contemporary global order and influential shapers of the political and ideological face ofthat order. Finally, I conclude with a discussion
of what
5

this analysis

implies

for future forms

of stateness.

Ibid., 561.

ECLIPSE OF THE STATE? Globalization and the Role of the State

65

"Diminished," "defective," and "hollow"were typical adjectives applied

to the state in a recent Glob contemporary special issue o? Daedalus.6 reason not is for the perception alization the only that "state authority and downwards" and in some has leaked away, upwards, sidewards, matters but it is a central one. The effects of global "just evaporated,"7 two in ization flow through interconnected but distinct channels. The of transnational economic character and changing creasing weight have created a new, relations over the course of the last three decades more context for state action. The effect of these constraining political

structural changes has been channeled by the growing global hegemony of Anglo-American ideology. The New Global
Nettl's stant?the

Political

Economy

one con assertion remains that "[t]here only the concluding actor in invariant development of stateness for each national invari has been Now the the international field" inverted.8 presumed ant is the international arena's negative effect on stateness. As wealth transactions that take and power are increasingly by private generated across harder the borders to sustain "national of states the image rather of states than within them, as the preeminent it has be actors at

place come

Waltzian the global level.No one questions that the traditional

competing tem,"9 but the muted great relations leave international international arena to a interests" continues to drive the "interstate power

logic of

sys of the post-bipolar world struggles contaminated and often over increasingly

shadowed by the private logic of the global economy. Nettl likened the
states were the "society" in which "people," but status of states must be order the unique political global most the "citi fact that balanced the against economically empowered arena are transnational zens" of the international (TNCs).10 corporations con of transactions and organizational The growing relative weight cross cornerstone is of the nections that national boundaries globaliza in the current tion. faster and a doubling of the are to OECD GDP in countries the of the exports just begin proportion as fast as investment three times has been direct growing ning. Foreign
6 Daedalus 24 (Spring 1995). 7 124 (Spring 1995), 56. Susan Strange, "The Defective State," Daedalus 8Netd(fn.l),591. 9 Cf. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 10 is quoted in fn. 3. Netd s formulation

and Exports than domestic

more than imports growing transactions around the world

one

and a half

times

1979).

66 trade, and other subcontracting,

WORLD POLITICS
connections (alliances, corporate even faster.11 and so on) have probably been growing sorts of transnational

The impact of both trade and investment ismagnified by the chang

than being an exchange of goods between ing character of trade. Rather a flow of domestic trade is increasingly systems, productive goods that are organized rather than na within networks production globally are created tionally.12 Commodities through in a tion processes performed multiplicity the integration of national of produc territories.

Whether
or excluded

any given territory is included in global production networks

on the decisions actors. from them depends of private can to cannot make their territories but they dic States attractive, try tate the structure of networks. global production In the classic realist world traditional forms of statecraft military intertwined with possibilities closely to have actors were economic presumed gain. Powerful an interest in the and political of "their" states, just as state managers had an inter economic of "their" entrepreneurs. National prowess for economic

were

military capacities est in the capacities ritorial world

was the foundation of military (and therefore diplomatic) strength.Ter

was a route to control over new assets. A expansion productive of global production networks makes the prospective economic from territorial the returns to realist dubious, conquest reducing Access to

on al strategic capital and technology depends liances with those who control global production rather than networks, a on the control of any piece of territory. In global economy particular a over amounts where there is surplus of labor, control of territory large can be more of a burden and population than an asset. on the actors were As long as private economic dependent political a sense it environment made for them to state, provided by particular successes the political and aspirations of that state. Na identify with tional aggrandizement sovereignty might Robert Reich calls
11 Robert Wade,

gain statecraft.

also contain

out the prospect of private profit; threats to threats to profit. The operators of what reason to have much less webs"13 "global identify held

and Its Limits: Reports of the Death of the National Economy Are "Globalization and Global Capi in Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds., National Diversity Greatly Exaggerated," talism (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University offers a compilation of other such statistics, Press, 1996). Wade a nicely account of the ways in which such statistics may along with skeptical and carefully balanced exaggerate globalization. 12 See Robert B. Reich, The Work ofNations (New York Vintage Books, 1992); Gary Gereffi and eds., Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism Korzeniewicz, Miguel (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, see of global networks for social organization, vision of the consequences 1994). For a comprehensive Manuel Castells, The* Information Age: Economy, 1996). (Oxford: Blackwells, ciety 13 Reich (fn. 12). Society and Culture, vol. 1, The Rise of theNetwork So

ECLIPSE OF THE STATE?

with nationalist territorial the ambitions interstate and anxieties. From tive of these as a whole among the perspec is an essential

67

networks, infrastructure piece of economic of disruption and uncertainty.

system and conflicts

states are a source

Underlying the transnational mobility of capital and the construc tion of global production networks is a radically globalized financial
system, whose thority and states have operation in the economic often a fundamental au to poses challenge public realm. There has always been foodoose capital on the fi of international depended cooperation

but the changes that have taken place in the last two decades nanciers, are When Nettl was writing, the fixed exchange quite extraordinary. rate system was still in effect and most countries industrialized major continued to exercise controls over 1980s, by contrast, capital of currencies was left more new cation institutional and Cable framework offers information controls to markets was capital flows. By had been dismanded by advances the end and effect of the of the the value

than to states.14 The

magnified

in communi

of the current dispropor summary economic and the global leverage avail states: in the worlds able to individual "Foreign trading exchange centers exceeds a trillion dollars a financial greater than the total day... Vincent tion between financial markets stock nancial of foreign markets." exchange reserves held by all governments."15 The re

systems. a succinct

sult iswhat Fred Block has called "the dictatorship of international fi

by private declines and These financial state that engages in policies "unwise" deemed Any as the value of its currency traders will be punished its access to capital shrinks.16 certainly contribute is not the connection to the perceived as straightfor

of globalization processes state of evaporation authority, but of its becoming tistics suggest more the

ward as itmight first appear.The state is not eclipsed by the simple fact
on trade. cross-national dependent Existing that greater reliance on trade is associated with state rather than a diminished sta an in a

creased

role for

one. Moreover,

Politics of Block (fn. 14). See also Geoffrey Garrett, "Capital Mobility, Trade and the Domestic the surprising ex Economic 49, no. 4 (1995). Garrett emphasizes Policy," International Organization tent to which have been able to resist "the dictatorship of international fi social democracies European a nancial markets," but he leaves no doubt that resistance growing price. For example, he imposes concludes his study by saying: "[Financial markets have imposed significant interest rate premiums on the power of the left and labor, and these increased with the removal of barriers to cross organized border capital flows_In time, one might speculate that no government would be able to bear this burden" (p. 683).

1995), 27. (Spring 16

14 See Fred Block, The Vampire State and Other Stories (New York: New Press, 1996). 15 A Study in the Loss of Economic Nation-State: Cable, "The Diminished Power," Daedalus

124

68 look at the nations

WORLD POLITICS
that have been most over successful economically stateness may even be a compet that the statistical rela

the last that thirty years suggests high itive advantage in a globalized economy. Cameron noticed years ago David Twenty in advanced industrial economies

(as mea openness tionship was sured by the share of trade in GDP) and the size of government as a rather The than logic plausi positive negative.17 finding suggested shares in ble as that connecting and trade globalization eclipse. Higher crease a to induced traumas; a larger externally country's vulnerability a sector Peter Katzenstein's counterweight. public protective provides case studies of small out the insti social democracies spelled European the this of tutional infrastructure operation underlying logic.18 between are not is now referred These relationships simply artifacts of what to as "the Recent age of capitalism" analy golden (roughly 1950-73).19 et al., and others shows how the sis by Garrett, Kitschelt configuration to continues of public institutions shape the impact of globalization.20

Dani Rodrik has replicated and extended Cameron's statistical findings

using contemporary data. Looking at data on OECD countries for the

1980s and the early 1990s, Rodrik found "aquite strong correlation
between the OECD countries (as a among government expenditures more are to to that trade: countries share of GDP) and exposure exposed the when he extends trade have bigger governments."21 Furthermore, one hundred most to more them of than countries, developing, analysis size of gov between he not only finds "a striking positive relationship to trade" case ernment and exposure (in this government consumption)

but also finds that "the degree of openness during the early 1960's is a
17 of the Public Economy: A Comparative "The Expansion Cameron, Analysis," American Science Review 72, no. 4 (1978). 18 Small States inWorld Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca, N.Y: See Katzenstein, Political Cornell

Press, 1985). University 19 and Realities: Some Histor See Paul Bairoch and Richard Kozul-Wright, "Globalisation: Myths on in theWorld Economy" ical Reflections and Growth Industrialisation (Paper presented Integration, on "Transnational and at the UNU/WIDER conference in the Developed, Developing Corporations Transitional Economies: University, Sep Changing Strategies and Policy Implications," Cambridge tember 21-23,1995). 20 OECD countries over the period Garrett's Geoffrey analysis (see fn. 16) of data from fifteen to further elucidate institutional con included other measures of globalization, 1967-90, which helps of He found that a "coincidence nections between globalization and the expansion of government. to greater gov and trade leftist unions, strong strong high levels of trade led parties, capital mobility, are ernment in which the consequences of globalization spending." For another analysis of the ways see Herbert Kitschelt et al., eds., Continuity and Change in Contem mediated by national institutions, Press, forthcoming). (New York: Cambridge University porary Capitalism 21 Lecture, delivered during the Rodrik, "The Paradoxes of the Successful State" (Alfred Marshall 1996a), Istanbul, August 22-24 [final version, September], meetings, European Economic Association 31-32. See also idem, "Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments" (NBER Working no. 5537, Paper April 1996b).

ECLIPSE OF THE STATE?

very good predictor three decades."22 A of the expansion of government over the subsequent

69

over the look at contrasting past thirty trajectories regional growth more stateness than simply insulate do may do years suggests that high a source traumas. It may mestic from external actually be populations

of competitive
growth leading major Asian over

advantage in a globalizing

economy. The
have wrote,

dizzying
been the but the of East

of transnational^ economic headline competing economies. headline Few would

may organized production of the thirty years since Nettl has been now the

the past fifty years represents one that could shift prove to be a regional eventually archy of nations, to the rise of Northwestern If earlier. the 250 years Europe comparable state is that the for the headline argument globalization provides grist

growth spectacular that the growth of East Asia dispute a historic hier shift in the economic

on thewane, the East Asia headline has very different implications for
the evolution In the years the middle?have central role to effect tional division of stateness. since Netd used wrote, various East Asian states?from Korea in the

North to Singapore in the South with the People's Republic of China in

dramatic in which the state played a strategies in the interna in Asia's changes position

the role of the state varies across these societies.23 They cases, argue that they are stateless conti offer a new variety of high stateness, quite different from Netd's terms. in economic but perhaps more effective model nental European successes the idea that effective force us to reexamine East Asian of labor. Obviously but no one would

participation
state

in a globalized economy is best achieved by restricting

in economic affairs. They suggest that successful par

involvement

more intense ticipation in global markets may be best achieved through

22Rodrik(fn.21,1996a),32. 23 literature on the role of the state in the East Asian eco For a sampling of the now voluminous in East Asian see Yilmaz Akyuz Nexus and Charles Gore, "The Investment-Profits nomic miracle, on "East Asian Industrialization" paper prepared for the conference Development: (Background Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, Lessons for aNew Global Environment," 1,1996). February 29 and March See also the published version, World Development 24, no. 3 (1996); Alice Amsdtn, Asia's Next Giant South Korea and Late Industrialization Press, 1989); Jos? Edgardo Cam (New York: Oxford University Shared Growth Credible (Washington, pos and Hilton L. Root, The Key to theAsian Miracle: Making The "The Politics of Industrial Transformation: D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1996); Tun-jen Cheng, of California, Case of the East Asia NICs" (Ph.D. diss., University Berkeley, 1987); Peter Evans, Em States and Industrial Transformation Press, 1995); (Princeton: Princeton University Countries The Politics of Growth in Newly Industrializing Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: Press, 1990); Chalmers (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Johnson, Mm and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1982); Robert Wade, in Taiwan's Industrialization Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government (Prince Governing the Bank (IBRD), The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth ton: Princeton University Press, 1990); World and Public Policy (AWorld Bank Policy Research Report) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). bedded Autonomy:

70 state involvement.

WORLD POLITICS
Singapore is the most obvious case in point.24 Singa

pore is not only a highly internationalized economy in terms of its ex treme reliance on trade, but it is also exceptionally dependent for its local economic dynamism on foreign direct investment by transnational
for the capacity At the same time it is equally renowned corporations. state and power of its bureaucracy. as it may be in terms of the conventional wis This case, anomalous dom, underscores what should be logically obvious: small countries bar

gaining with large TNCsmay do better if a competent, unified national

are many on the local side. There in the bargaining participates some to consistent of them with make ways rising wages quite profits, If a state can credibly promise an in and high rates of local reinvestment. a set consistent with such strategies, frastructure along with predictable agenda

of rules and competent rulemakers with whom to dialogue, it is hardly surprising that there is no dearth of TNCs disposed to join the game.25
East Asia success demonstrates the possibility of a positive connection be

tween high stateness (albeit not Netd's

in a globalizing regression and Rodrik's

classic European variety) and

the currendy pervasive belief that the institutional centrality of the state is incompatible with globalization must be explained in terms of the
ideological face of the current global order.

and puts historical meat on Cameron economy connection results. If such a positive exists, then

Ideology

and Interests

in the Global

Order

In any international regime, norms, formal rules, and shared assump in the role of the state as the flows of tions are as important shaping

goods and capital. John Ruggie made the point impeccably fifteen years ago in his explication of how the global political economy of the golden
liberalism."26 age came to be characterized by "embedded sense unrestricted freedom for global in the of relatively Liberalism, was capital,

24 and the role of the state bureaucracy in internationalized On Singapore's strategy of development and Root (fh. 23); Cheng this strategy, see Campos (fh. 23); Gillian Koh, "A Sociological Analysis of in an Evolving Developmentalist State" (Ph.D. Elite: The Bureaucracy the Singapore Administrative and National of Sheffield, England, 1995); Jonathan Quah, "The Public Bureaucracy diss., University Abroad (Washington, D.C.: in K. K. Tummala, Administrative in ta., Systems Singapore," Development and Public Administra of the Market Press of America, 1982); idem, "The Rediscovery University Administration from the Singapore Experience," Australian JournalofPublic tion: Some Lessons 51, no. L. Root, Small Countries, Big Lessons: Governance and the Rise ofEast Asia (Hong 3 (1993); Hilton Press, 1996). Kong: Oxford University 25 to the New," States: From the Old Internationalization and Third World See Peter Evans, "TTMCs Global and Robert Rowthorne, in Richard Kozul-Wright eds., Transnational Corporations and the (London: MacMillan, forthcoming). Economy 26 and Change: Embedded Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions 36 (Spring 1982). Economic Order," International Organization Liberalism in the Postwar

ECLIPSE OF THE STATE?

"embedded" of such a in a social compact that committed liberalism was the advanced indus

71

trial states to insulating (at least partially) their citizens from the costs
system. Embedded

construction, but itwas the product of an Anglo-American ideology significantly constrained by post-World War II fears that failure to
domestic protect populations the preceding decades. might reinitiate the political traumas of

also an Anglo-American

Like embedded liberalism, the current regime is ameans of uniting the contradictory principals of national sovereignty (the keystone of the interstate system) and economic liberalism (which presumes that states
restrain that their desire cross to exercise tions over sovereignty is distinctive What economic transac

will

their borders). about the current can be to which is first of all the economic regime gain degree pursued of of a version of the and, second, sovereignty independendy hegemony untrammeled precepts ideological remarkably Anglo-American by

anxieties over potential political instability. Finally, unlike embedded

as a of primarily liberalism, which was conceived regime for the indus to to is trialized West, the current normative regime apply presumed rich and poor alike. Whether active citizens state involvement from can increase the benefits becomes that a a moot garner country's sover in an ideological climate territorial to limit the discretion actors. In the current of private economic eignty have been tran order global ideological Anglo-American prescriptions to which states must scribed into formal rules of the game, individual point commit WTO themselves are only that as far as capital as economic behave negotiations, the message international international tutelage.
27 of changes in regulatory fashion since the golden For a general discussion age, see Ha-Joon on Regulation in the Postwar Era," Working of Perspectives Chang, "The Evolution Paper (Washing Institute of theWorld ton, D.C.: Economic Development Bank, 1995). For a discussion of the way in as which the WTO constrains economically nationalist industrial policy, see V. R. Pan strategies such chamuki, "WTO and Industrial Policies," Study no. 7, UNCTAD Project on East Asian Development: Lessons for a New Global Environment (Geneva: United Nations, 1996). 28 and Assertive Industrialization: U.S. See, for example, Peter Evans, "Declining Hegemony in the Computer 43 (Spring 1989). Brazilian Conflict Industry," International Organization

the global economy that proscribes using

or risk GATT and the economic becoming pariahs. the most obvious formal manifestations of the doctrine

states and goods are concerned the less individual off the will the better world be.27 Bilateral actors, at least those to which the United States is a party, convey of The private representatives aggressively.28 case in the of countries, capital and, developing same like the IMF, organizations impart the

even more financial financial

72

WORLD POLITICS

The effect of global ideological consensus (sometimes apdy labeled the "Washington consensus") on individual states goes well beyond the
econ imposed by any structural logic of the international more in trying to im fact that becoming omy. The actively engaged not economic local conditions risks the prove just of opprobrium, but of the also makes any state global hegemon private actors, powerfiil a intervention An that considers such very risky proposition. ideology constraints action local may neither state from possible nor desirable responsibility suffer at the hands of the global from economic uncertainty, to resist and indeed power, does, for whatever however, economic Even at least release woes the its citizenry richer states, with

economy. are under

more highly developed institutional capacities for insulating their pop

ulations are more metries The maining likely of international current the same pressure. They have done so,29 but given the asym state to shift it is hard for any individual of both proclivities firms that dominate the only re the global interests. a global

the balance. order fits the ideological and the private superpower

to their iswhether it speaks effectively economy. The question in practice If an economically stateless world could deliver

equilibrium that met the needs of TNCs, then eclipse might

tions

indeed be

investors trying to integrate opera in the offing. In fact, transnational across a contexts need competent, of national pre shifting variety even more sector counterparts than do old-fashioned dictable public can concentrate on their time and energy investors who domestic a relations with individual government building particular apparatus.30 even more same argument to The strongly applies global financial of international is really closer to a finance" capital. The "dictatorship mutual situation. The of the international financial operation hostage into chaos without fiscal and would descend system quickly responsible on actors. markets the Financial of international monetary part policies can pend tional state need states, but easily punish deviant on the existence of an interstate economies actors. Those capable are under who The sit astride in the long run their returns de the principal na system in which the control of competent and "responsible" the international at which financial system transactions of effi

great magnitude

lightning speed regulators. can be for great makes completed

allocational

firms rely on states to create and sustain markets, "Markets, Politics and Globalization" (Manuscript, Berkeley, 1996). See also idem, Fligstein, toMarket Institutions" American Sociological Re "Markets as Politics: A Political-Cultural Approach view 6 (August 1996). see Neil

29 Cf. Garrett (fn. 16); Kitschelt et al. (fn. 20). 30 For a general discussion of the extent to which

ECLIPSE OF THE STATE?

ciency in theory, but it also makes for great volatility in practice.

73
"Rogue

traders" are (as the name implies) supposed to be aberrations; yet the
returns from of enormous the activity makes possibility speculative a a role continual certain After the rogue temptation.31 point, reducing to more states to of interfere increases collective risk power exposure

than it expands the possibilities for individual profits.

The states more actors need competent, that private transnational capable than their own ideology admits does not eliminate the pos are of eclipse. The calculations of even sophisticated managers fact

sibility biased by their own worldviews. Bent on maximizing its room for ma an could in the become neuver, transnational capital easily accomplice on which destruction of the infrastructure of public institutions its to a the ability of states to inter profits depend. Up point, constricting vene in increased profits. By the time state global markets may produce so reduced that the is of the business environ capacity unpredictability even to ment becomes actors who have wide latitude intolerable, major to do business, in choosing where could reconstructing public authority even an one. be a long and painful process, impossible connect interactions The that the complicated global order and do more mestic the prevail likely. Accepting politics make miscalculation to protect constrains the of governments ideology ability ing global costs of in the those who bear the shifts citizens, ordinary especially it is the of international networks. Whether configuration production Bolivian in order state for health and education cutting domestic expenditures or to remain in conformity with the latest restructuring plan

the Clinton administration pushing through NAFTA in order to demon strate its full faith in the free international movement of goods and cap
vis-?-vis of those who lack privileged ital, the perception positions state is is likely to be the same. The international markets perceived, not as the ultimate of national interests, but instead as representative of dimly understood but somehow "foreign" interests.32 were it in their interest to decide that transnational managers have to overcome of state capacity, they would foster the reconstruction reverse as as well institutional accumulated alienation, atrophy. political result of any iron If eclipse does occur, it will not be the inexorable Should clad structural logic. The economic logic of globalization does not in it
31 See Block (fn. 14). 32 there is, of course, a long-standing tradition of seeing the state in these terms, In the Third World that is, as a "tool of imperialism." In the United States a lively folk tradition is rapidly developing along as a as fears of "black helicopters" and visions of the U.S. government analogous lines. As nonsensical sense that U.S. administrations does reflect an underlying pawn of the UN may be, this folk mythology are more responsive to transnational actors than to domestic pressure from below.

the instrument

74

WORLD POLITICS globalization does make it harder for states to

both the potential Only returns when incompetence.

self dictate eclipse.While

exercise from economic effective

it also increases initiative, state action and the costs of

viewed through the peculiar prism of our current global ideological

order does globalization This global ideological movement toward statelessness. logically entail out of the in turn, as much order grows, preju

dices and ideologies of dominant global actors as out of any logic of in terests. Given the degree towhich political effects of global economic
change porary pact on are mediated theoretical by superimposed interpretative on the state become perspectives frames, contem not consequential,

just for the insights they offer, but also because of their potential im
policy.

New Perspectives
Nettl

on the

State

a debate on the nature helped continuing, many-stranded spark and role of the state. Some of the strands consisted of efforts to dem ical and in stateness why variations economic analysis. They like those of Weber, must be a central and element refined in polit revitalized Hintze,

onstrate

perspectives,

pre-Nettl and Gerschenkron, and

added new arguments to them.33Other strands jibed better with the normative and ideological side of the emerging global order.The flour
ishing of neoclassical political economy and the renewed fascination

with civil society are two of the best examples. The logic of each is quite
about globalization, of arguments independent on a with built order Anglo-American global These successful formulations must, politically yet both resonated well visions of statelessness. however, be considered

salient counterposing less public that raise arguments together with new reasons for the stateness. Once of this is continuing importance new on as on state the of the lies much the done, weight perspectives as on stateness the side of side of persistent eclipse.

New Economic

Perspectives
none debate has been more than

Of the many strands of thinking on the state that have emerged in the
thirty years since Nettl wrote, rated into the public political thoroughly the "neoutilitarian"34 incorpo version

of neoclassical political economy.While

this line of reasoningwas quite

and Theda Reuschemeyer, Press, 1985), especially the

33 For a review of early efforts in this direction, see Peter Evans, Dietrich Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (New York: Cambridge University initial essay by Skocpol. 34 in Evans (fn. 23), chap. 2. See discussion

ECLIPSE OF THE STATE?

75

independent of arguments for the historical inevitability of eclipse based on the supposed exigencies of globalization, it reinforced them, suggesting that eclipse might be not only inevitable but also desirable.
were to treat the the "golden age" most economists willing During was a source of state as a black box. Economics for poli prescriptions was not it economic but cies that would best promote growth, promi

nent as a tool for the institutional analysis of the state itself. As capitalist growth began to look more problematic in the mid-1970s,
the weak performance this changed. Ironically, in those countries where the 1970s and 1980s evidence by efforts Analysts change: of excessive to over of market state economies in was involvement

least extensive (that is, Britain and the United States) was advanced as Concern with optimizing state policies continued but itwas joined
analyze the institutional mechanisms that underlay "bad" public power the economy.35

policies (that is, those that did not jibe with economic prescriptions).
of "rent in return seeking" conceptualized for political and material as an ex policy-making state bureaucrats support,

rules that enabled produced tive rents.36 States expanded, lective

actors to reap unproduc private economic not because of increased demand for col

Rent of self-seeking bureaucrats. but because seeking goods, seen as aberrant, and took what had been traditionally corrupt practices in of transformed them into the core of the political economy public

stitutions. In this framework approaches likeNettl s, inwhich

tablishment and the maintenance did not make state state the of norms sense. as a vehicle intervention inefficiencies for rent as seeking were preeminent the state s outputs,

the es

among made it

the Reconceptualizing to easier much characterize ical. Older were arguments

about

intrinsically patholog of bureaucracy and the

impossibility of gathering sufficient information to make good policy

If neoclassical economy. political by this reinvigorated were a state of the the negative effects of logical consequence policies more competent nature of then better information, institutions, public advisers were not remedies. The only officials, and more knowledgeable were then either for the rational strategies alleviating reducing problem an absolute to institutions these allocated the resources perverse by trumped
35 States and Economic Development: A Comparative Histori and John M. Hobson. Cf. Linda Weiss cal (Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 1995). Analysis 36 and Gordon Tullock, eds., Toward a Theory ofRent See James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, ed., Neoclassi Press, 1980); David Collander, Seeking Society (College Station: Texas A&M University DUP Activities and Mass.: cal Political Economy: An Analysis Ballinger, (Cambridge, of Rent-Seeking of the Rent-Seeking 1984); Anne O. Krueger, "The Political Economy Society," American Economic Review 64 (June 1974).

76 minimum replacing of marketlike or somehow reliance

WORLD POLITICS
"marketizing" on norms of public incentive systems. the administrative service with structure itself, constraints

the hard

were as in favor of state intervention arguments Keynesian rejected some of taxes to channel outmoded. collective output Using society's was a into "the old practice of bleeding public endeavors equated with

The grudg patient with leeches in order tomake the patient healthy."37
ing acceptance the golden efforts of using the state as a means of ameliorating the lot of as

those disadvantaged by market outcomes, which had prevailed during

age, was supplanted by the firm conviction that as surely

private greed produced public good through the market, public welfare
to stunt the economic virtues of its recipients. Pri only served as as economic litde power, constrained by the distorting possible hand of public policy, was once again touted as the best protector of the vate public good, and the models ideology of statelessness took on a harder, more edge. aggressive Neoutilitarian corruption reaucracies. on rent rent filling views

an did provide the elegant way of explaining that are undeniable facets of most public bu and venality As explanations of such pathologies, that focus perspectives are very usefid. If, however, they crowd out all other in

seeking

terpretations of public behavior, leaving public authority a synonym for

seeking run the a self-ful and venality, they danger of becoming extent that the To of the neoutilitarian prophecy. prevalence

a career in remov and legitimates strips public service of prestige resources real services to con need to deliver ing the public agencies rent becomes motivation the indeed reasonable stituents, seeking only norms and traditions of public ser the public sector. Once for joining vice have been destroyed, basis is an them on a piecemeal reinstituting task. overwhelming While neoclassical into pol economy was easily assimilated political more for with fundamental icy analysis, other innovations, implications economic theories of production and exchange, were harder to incor more "new growth porate. The theory," which provided elegant ways of

formally endogenizing

technological change and brought the idea of

the center an expanded of economic could debates,38 role for the state,39 but was

returns back into increasing as be read easily legitimating

37 38Speech For a

by Senator Kyi in the Senate, January 20,1995, quoted in Fred Block (fn. 14). see Paul Romer "The Origins of Endogenous but nontechnical sophisticated exposition, Economic Perspectives 8 (Winter 1994). Growth," Journal of 39 For example, in the view of Garrett (fn. 16), "'New Growth' theory contends that active govern ment involvement in the economy (for example, public spending on education, physical infrastructure, and hence competitiveness and research and development) may actually increase productivity by

ECLIPSEOF THE STATE?

nonetheless extremely difficult to translate into policy was prescriptions. often highly

77

Admitting

the possibility of increasing returns also required accepting

of markets and competition

the fact that the evolution ria. This be counted did not
outcomes.

path dependent40 and consequendy characterized by multiple equilib

in turn made on to to argue that unfettered markets could maximize but (or welfare) automatically efficiency on market to that could strategies point improve it harder

necessarily

are of this vision of economic consequences growth magnified an to the fact that number of software increasing by products?from more cost of media ideas than Since the images?are things. reproduc The is essentially increase with zero, returns indefinitely an to In of "ideas" subject scope of the market. economy increasing turns rather than to ones, the distribution decreasing "things" subject ing magnitude of returns costs to an idea does not flow from a an idea the re of

income and profits is especially dependent on appropriability. The

logic of marginal a sense of the term, but it does in production meaningful depend on authoritative like the determination of the duration of decisions, and the and intellectual property patent protection regime copyright more generally. more As an economy of enforcement ideas, authoritative produces more more to both and becomes difficult critical property rights prof a state this requires an active, competent itability. In global economy its rules. In that is able to secure the compliance of other states with short, sets the most take

economy (that is, global companies likeDisney orMicrosoft whose as

stronger enforcers The from of the the form of ideas) do not need weaker states; ones, or at least states that are more sophisticated than the traditional state." "night watchman centrality economic over of struggles appropriability of the United States over policies "super of China's most-favored-nation From 301s" to GATT they need and active is evident the course to

privileged

economic

actors

in a global

information

growing the global

last two decades. cancellation

threatened of software come a

negotiations status because

of intellectual property piracy, the question rights facet of economic U.S. international key policy. While

has be other

are like Paul Krugman, by the market" (p. 658). Others, providing collective goods that undersupplied would argue that government efforts to exploit the theoretical possibilities revealed by the new growth theory are likely to do more harm than good; see, for example, Krugman, Peddling Prosperity: Economic in the Sense and Nonsense (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995). Nonethe Age ofDiminished Expectations have been opened up. less, even Krugman would not deny that new theoretical possibilities 40 in the Economy," Scientific American (Feb See, for example, Brian W. Arthur, "Positive Feedbacks ruary 1990).

78

WORLD POLITICS

forms of regulation are in disrepute, this particular kind of policing is

now treated as one of the cornerstones property are a of economic civilization. a rights specific instance of general point. In the complex of novel authoritative normative exchange intangibles, are measure in which the become the structures, state, by provided large new institutional of efficient The with economics, keystones exchange. on the structures and the its of governance necessity pervasive emphasis trans to any kind of economic frameworks of institutional importance can exist further the that efficient markets actions, argument generalizes in the context of effective and robust nonmarket institutions.41 only Intellectual a broader conclusions look at the evolution from transnational of economic our earlier economic

Neoclassical political economy offers a good rationale for eclipse, but

that flowed reinforces the theorizing examination of globalization actors may have an interest in

itself. Powerful

their own activities but they also the state's ability to constrain limiting on a state to protect their returns, those from especially capable depend assets. In this of the state's institutional optic, the persistence intangible

centrality looks more likely than eclipse. Society

conviction of public

Civil
The dendy

and the
control

State
creates efficiency a only partial can be achieved ideological frame indepen at best.

that allocational

Neither

idealized visions of individuals interrelating by means of bilat

exchanges anxieties for the nor the actual about of capitalist markets experience the maintenance of public order or as ties. of traditional satisfactions community

eral voluntary relieves basic

suages nostalgia New perspectives civil society Anglo-American

new global order.The political spectives in themselves, they fit with the
world was an order, as reflected in to impetus important of civil society was por

on governance role of the potential that highlighted a nice to the economic side of complement provided were not they global per though ideology.42 Even

of the stateless Anglo-American triumph of state-socialist the implosion societies, the charisma
41

of civil

society. The

revitalization

C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance See, for example, Douglass The Economic Institutions of Press, 1990); and Oliver Williamson, Cambridge University (New York: Free Press, 1985). Capitalism 42 For a sampling of the variety of ways which civil society has captured the imagination of social sci Consolidation" Journal of entists, see Larry Diamond, "Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals (New York: Democracy 5 (July 1994); Ernest Gellner, Civil Society: Theory, History and Comparisons (London: Polity Penguin Press, 1994); John A. Hall, ed., Civic Poli andWorld Activism "Politics beyond the State: Environment Press, 1995); Paul Wapner, tics," World Politics 47 (April 1995). (Cambridge:

ECLIPSE OF THE STATE?

trayed, solete, at least by conservatives, just as global markets made as a solution to the social and political obsolete.

79

side of public well-being,

one that could make the state politically ob

the state economically

To fit with the prevailing global order, a focus on civil society had to repress the possibility that social and political malaise might flow from
the pervasive marketization of social relations instead of from the over state. This, of course, was conser intrusion of the bearing precisely what vative interpreters did. Rather than seeing the unchallenged dominion of market as the to a revitalization of traditional primary obstacle saw intrusive the efforts of the state, ostensibly ties, they community as aimed at enhancing welfare, out" Just as neo community.43 "crowding relations

classical political economy negated the state s role in the development of

and efficient productive society, the growing more and exclusionary (and other society parochial state s to to nonmarket the nity) negated ability speak In many cases, the vision of an engaged, organized a more charisma forms needs.44 citizenry unseat of civil of commu

ing oppressive
movements tuses in Eastern

state elites fit the historical facts. The oppositional

state-socialist appara bring down moribund were a The of process Europe prime example. replac in Latin electoral democracies ing authoritarian military regimes with a similar surge of civil as a to America produced society counterweight in these cases, however, the leviathan of state power. Even the idea that

that helped

civil society could provide a substitute for the organized public institu
tions of the state In both Eastern Eu optimistic. proved unrealistically the reinvigoration of civil society rope and Latin America, proved to authoritarian harder to sustain once the unifying focus of opposition rule was more Here dissipated again, complex success. Even by political of relations. theory state-society as in the case of economic thinking on civil society these cases called for a look at

contemporary

theorizing, reveals much

a closer that

is at odds re of

with the global order s assumption that fostering civil society requires
the eclipse of the state. The proposition accelerating lation between the robustness of state institutions of a zero-sum and the vibrancy

civil society is contested even by some of those most convinced of the indispensability of civic associations. A growing body of work suggests
43 James Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1990), 321. 44 communities. Civil society was, of course, the most universalistic basis for organizing Exclusion ary ethnic and religious categories represented potent alternative bases for redefining the nation and re the footing of public authority. While Nettl did not anticipate the upsurge of neoclassical constituting see (fn. 1) the state and nation" as a political economy, he did "snapping of the link between (p. 560) reason for a general decline in stateness, in the world. projecting developing especially

80 that relations thought between

WORLD POLITICS
the state and civil of mutual are more society or synergy. empowerment productively

of in terms

Robert Putnam's brief polemic with Joel Migdal provides a good starting point. Based on his reading of the relationship between "social
in takes capital" and the efficacy of regional governments Italy, Putnam seems to issue with which that societies work, suggest strong Migdal's states and that one of the necessary result in weak for the conditions se of strong states is a "massive societal dislocation, which emergence social associa weakens Not "civic control."45 so, argues Putnam, verely . . . tions are powerfully institutions associated with effective public Putnam's is strong society, strong state."46 What suggests perspective on economic that just as modern markets decisions depend being nested ment in a predictable more flourishes institutional framework, likewise citizens civic and engage easily among private organized a sector as an interlocutor. competent public contexts. the same lesson from very different society has been most between Chazan dramatic, Naomi state and civil society."47

groups when they have have drawn Others and civil organizations a for argues "symbiotic

Looking atAfrica, the region inwhich the disintegration of both state

relationship

During
networks

the crisis of the 1970s and 1980s "both state agencies and social

a process of implosion."48 where Conversely, experienced of intermedi there has been recovery from the crisis, the "reemergence ate social the definition and reasser groups" has "come together with tion of state capacities, the close connection between civil highlighting society and stateness."49 Vivienne Shue, looking at what might be con

45 in the Third and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities Migdal, Strong Societies World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 269. 46 Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton Univer Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in result from their different sity Press, 1993), 176. In part, the differences between Putnam and Migdal of a strong society. Migdal focuses on vertical, clientelistic ties and parochial relationships definitions that fos based on primordial affinities like ethnicity and kinship. Putnam focuses on civic associations ter ties among social rather they may be deeply rooted in history, are modern equals and that, while in form. Putnam's version of society is, however, the one that is relevant to the vision than primordial that the emergence of civil society will permit the withering away of formal leviathans of repressive proponents of civil society have in mind when they work toward fos public authority. What optimistic in Latin America is presumably neither the tering its rebirth in Eastern Europe or its reinvigoration of clientelistic ties nor the reawakening of primordial loyalties and parochial prejudices strengthening but rather the kinds of horizontal civic associations that are the focus of Putnam's argument. I am in and for drawing this point to my attention; cf. Heller, "Social Mobilization debted to Patrick Heller from Kerala" (Paper presented at the annual meetings Democratization: Lessons of the Comparative Association for Asian Studies, April 1996). 47 in Joel Migdal, Atul Life in Sub-Sanaran Africa," the State: Associational Chazan, "Engaging and Transformation (Cam Shue, eds., State Power and Social Forces: Domination Kohli, and Vivienne bridge: 48 Cambridge Ibid., 269. 49 Ibid., 278. University Press, 1994), 258.

ECLIPSE OF THE STATE? sidered the polar opposite case?the People's Republic of China?finds
a similar situdes

81

kind of mutual of state and society. The vicis empowerment of state-society relations under communist and postcommunist ... between rule demonstrate, she says, "an intriguing the relationship a on one of robust of civil the associational life, hand, emergence sphere and state course the consolidation organization, power on the other."50 of social in a relatively strong or resilient

Examining what he calls "the browning of Latin America" over the

sets out the converse of the 1980s, Guillermo O'Donnell argu a ment in way that is consonant with the mutual empowerment hy out that "current of Chazan and Shue.51 First, he points pothesis at the size and deficits of the state as bureaucracy... attempts reducing are also the state-as-law of and the ideological destroying legitimation the state."52 He eration gagement of civil then argues that the crisis of the state leads to a degen and civic en society in which community organization are an atomization."53 "angry replaced by to sustain scattered itself have

These broad arguments that the fate of civil society is linked to the
counterparts interesting the developing world throughout find evidence for "state-society development proj synergy."54 Effective ects at the microlevel in combina often involve state agencies working sector ability of the public at the microlevel. Studies

tion with local social groups. The possibility of coproduction, inwhich

agencies service needed a to and local communities work together produce or collective state appa is associated in turn with good, ratuses that have sufficient de and bureaucratic corps esprit sophistica set tion to move beyond mechanistically the simplest possible imposing case in of centralized is rules. The Taiwan's point archetypal irrigation state which associations, reaucratic decision cluding allocation.55 substantial are built making around a subde melding of centralized and real involvement of local villagers, control over bureaucracies bu in

community States with weaker

the process of local water are incapable of sustain

50 See Shue, "State Power and Social Organization in China" in Migdal, Kohli, and Shue (fh. 47), 66. 51 "On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American O'Donnell, at Some Postcommunist View with Glances 2\, no. 8 (1993). O'Don Countries," World Development nell uses the term "browning" to refer to "territorial evaporation of the public dimension of the state" areas in which both effective bureaucracies and "properly sanctioned (p. 1358), that is, the spread of are lacking. legality" (p. 1359) 52 O'Donnell (fn. 51), 1358. 53 Ibid., 1365. 54 in the special section on "Govern See articles by Burawoy, Evans, Fox, Heller, Lam, and Ostrom ment Action, World 24 (June 1996); and also Judith Social Capital and Development," Development in the Tropics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Tendier, Good Government Press, 1997). 55 See the article by Lam (fn. 54). See also Michael P. Moore, "The Fruits and Fallacies of Neoliberalism: The Case of Irrigation," World Development 17r, no. 11 (1989).

82

WORLD POLITICS

ing the kind of locally oriented bureaucratic competence thatmakes co

production possible.56 for positive-sum The evidence Even in the stateless United relations between the effectiveness of

civic associations and state capacity is not limited to theThird World.

ex historical there are interesting States, the founding of the Chil synergy. In examining amples of state-society one of the most in the dren's Bureau, successful early developments shows how a broad spectrum of geographi state, Skocpol were to this associations critical women's voluntary cally dispersed women notes the for and She also children."57 parallels "statebuilding effort and the relationship between volun between this "maternalist" welfare tary associations another example and economic of farmers and the U.S. synergy Department generating of state-society of Agriculture, social widespread

U.S.

If thiswork is right, a sustained efflorescence of civil society may well

of robust, competent organi a state. the syn counterparts state-society Conversely, states toward less capable and involved ergy view implies that a move to achieve their goals will make it more difficult for civic associations depend zational within on the simultaneous construction

change.58

and will thereby diminish incentives for civic engagement. In the most
extreme case, the result would Once again, this time "browning."59 a closer be a globalized version of O'Donnell's examination of recent theoretical

an in rather than economic, suggests perspectives, political or ca state not in in maintenance of but the terest, expansion eclipse, members of it is interests of this the In case, however, ordinary pacity. are at elites. civil society that play rather than those of transnational

The Future
Newer

of Stateness
as many favor of

like those perspectives, political in of favor arguments strengthening of these perspectives eclipse. Analysis those drawn the analysis lead us to expect states from to

contain in economics, as in state capacities results that produces itself. Together, of globalization play a persistent

parallel these ar

guments

role in the future of

56 See Ostroms (fn. 54) discussion of Nigeria. 57 Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers andMothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 480-91. 58 Inter "State Capacity and Economic Ibid., 486. See also Theda Skocpol and Kenneth Finegold, vention in the Early New Deal," Political Science Quarterly 97 (Summer 1982). For a recent reprise of see Skocpol, from Above," American Prospect 25 (March-April "Unravelling Skocpol's perspective, 1996). 59 O'Donnell (fn. 51).

ECLIPSE OF THE STATE?

83

the global political economy, but such an outcome can hardly be taken for granted. Just because an information-oriented, globalized system of
even more seem to would than prior production depend exercise of public authority does not mean the competent experience volvement of those does countries most that successfid at adapting will economies on that the insti to the modern in the

tutional bases of such authority will survive. Just because the historical globalized economy has been characterized by high levels of state in
not mean their experience be reflected of all, a institutional that prevail globally. Most obvious arrangements ca a more vibrant civil more between association society and positive

pable state institutions will not prevent both from disappearing.

What then can be said about the future prospects of stateness in this

era of globalization? One reasonable and optimistic hypothesis looks to the return of the ideological pendulum. In this view, the recent push to
reduce ous a natural reaction to the the role of the state represented previ state managers. The and of capac glaring overreaching politicians about what the state would be able to accomplish was

ity gap led to a period during which, inDani Rodriks words, "excessive
optimism now re

placed by excessive pessimism." Rodrik suggests further that, having

surmounted "excessive serious reconsideration we are "on the threshold of a pessimism," one that of the role of the state in development,

will lead to an improved understanding of the role that governments can (and have to) play."60
This perspective makes sense. States took on more than they could

handle during the period followingWorld War

pacity

II.Dealing with the ca

was the state s role. Readjustment gap clearly required rethinking s in the state and overzealousness role, natural. The necessary, reducing a return to the past, but it return of the not sanction need pendulum new efforts to turn states into effective instruments would legitimate is whether the question is likely to come point that reflects dispassionate pendulum to the relative ef with of accumulated regard analysis global experience forms and strategies of state action. fectiveness of different for the achievement of collective goals. to rest at a The

Netd, however, brings a historical and ideological dimension to the

story ment that makes that "an American to attain. His argu self-examination simply leaves sociopolitical a for any valid notion of the state" suggests unlikely hegemon To this of the pendulum the proper position dispassionately.61 the efficient middle
2-3.

seem harder

no room to assess

60 Rodrik (fn. 21,1996a), 61 Nettl (fn.l), 561.

84 must be added the

WORLD POLITICS
actors most the problem that the nonstate are normative order private corporate global powerful elites whose in

defining terest global mands

view of where the pendulum belongs is colored by their irreducible in

a set of in protecting private managerial prerogatives. Generating norms to that will the search for reduce de encourage ways on institutions but also support the necessary enhance public for expecting source such a shift are scanty, but there are some.

ment of state capacity will require substantial ideological revisionism.

Grounds a

The shifting balance of economic dynamism in the interstate system is

possible of revisionism. success extraordinary economic So far, the implications for the kind of stateness of East Asia's that ismost ef

fective in a globalized economy have found surprisingly little place in official discourse. Official (as opposed to academic) analysis has been
remarkably East Asia's tinctively the state tenuate The mon, global of the revisionist of suppression implications the eventual assimilation of dis Nonetheless, experience.62 on of stateness into global discourse East Asian experiences obdurate seems inevitable.63 bias movement Any toward eclipse. reluctance of the United of delivering goods what also serve in this direction States would at in its

the current increasing the burden collective Susan

others

to shoulder, as hege to be valuable perceive

as an for ideological may impetus current of for that argues asymmetries change. Strange, example, a interstate power have created situation in which "the most powerful are able to block, even veto, any exercise of in global issues of authority or of the universal the environment, of financial of regulation, provision for shelter and health care."64 then fur needs She food, presses the present hegemonic, do ther, saying that "the only way to remove based on

basic

nothing veto on better global governance

compelling embracing the same prospects
62

is to build, bit by bit, a

but opposition European-Japanese cooperation some Asians and Africans who Latin Americans, share of remote the interests and concerns for the future."65 However for this kind of collective action, Stranges argument does

identify another potential impetus for ideological shift.66

New Bank and the Art of Paradigm Maintenance," World See, for example, Robert Wade, "Japan, the Review 217 (May-June 1996). 63Left Some would argue that the East Asian experience already constitutes a competing model, at least countries of the region itself. See Barbara Stallings andWolfgang for the developing Streeck, "Capi in Stallings, talisms in Conflict? The United States, Europe and Japan in the Post-Cold War World," Context ofDevelopment ed., Global Challenge, Regional Response: The New International (New York: Press, 1995). Cambridge University 64 Strange (fn. 7), 71. 65 Ibid. 66 source of normative to be found Another unlikely but still intriguing?is potential change?also in the networks of public organizations and officials that are part of the global order. John Meyer, in a

ECLIPSE OF THE STATE? These

have as consequences only insofar they help ambivalent relation of transnational ready as TNCs value the elimination eclipse. Much restrict interest their managerial in keeping prerogatives, on they to further business undercut

85
the al

relatively implausible fonts of ideological change are likely to

to any project of of the ability of states to also recognize the benefits that

of dealing with robust and capable public interlocutors. They have an

state managers

escalating rhetoric on the inevitability and desirability of eclipse ac

complishes stitutional The that main it is easily an interest in the real in avoiding they also have a state. This of the above all else makes marginalization nicely. But problem with conflated with a return-of-the-pendulum a return to "embedded is perspective liberalism." Even

the defensive?something

return of the pendulum likely.

if a return of the pendulum ismore likely than eclipse, the threat of

envi the current global still shapes stateness. What ideological eclipse ronment does is to ensure that responses to a crisis of capacity genuine state at in order will be defensive. aimed increasing capacity Strategies to meet social and look demand for collective goods protection rising denies the state's poten in an ideological climate that resolutely foolish state managers to the and Beleaguered general welfare. as an on to preserve institution the state leaders, bent trying political come some own innovative with their (and may up organi positions), the scope of and some salutary ways of reducing zational improvements states attempt, but their what strategy is likely to be reneging primary tial contribution on the old commitment to embedded as a liberalism. project ing the capacity gap is redefined meaner kind of stateness. In the most cians and return sinister version The problem of constructing of clos a leaner,

of this

state managers gain support essential for sustaining the state's role to activities for restricting ser to deliver markets. The of transnational the profitability capacity can for themselves vices that the affluent (for example, supply privately institu restricted the more is sacrificed, while health and education) to deliver essential business services and secu tional capacity necessary

stateness, leaner, meaner politi in for the state as an institution

classic article, presents a strong case for the collective power of public officials to shape global norms at in Al of the Nation-State," "The World the transnational level; seeMeyer, Polity and the Authority bert Bergesen, Press, 1980). Meyer's ed., Studies in theModern World System (New York: Academic more recent changes in global ideology, but there is unconvincing, especially in view of general model in public institutions are some very interesting, if modest, examples of transnational networks rooted order. See, for example, Peter Haas, that have effected "Banning change in the global normative International Efforts to Protect Stratospheric Ozone," Chlorofluorocarbons: Community Epistemic 46 (Winter 1992). Organization

86

WORLD POLITICS In turn, delivering security

of the more desperate and international. kind be more

rity (domestic and global) ismaintained.

means devoting and reckless among resources

to the repression the excluded, both domestic

Rescuing embedded liberalismwould require a very different config

uration of of state-society and a relations different correspondingly one founded on relations of mutual stateness, empowerment

tween state institutions and a broadly organized civil society of the kind suggested by Chazan and her colleagues.67 Engaging the energy and
in the of citizens and communities of ser imagination coproduction vices is a way of enhancing the state s ability to deliver services without scarce material resources from to demand more in having society. The creased service work social then intangible important such a strategy simultaneously rewards the of civil the reservoir of po society, thereby augmenting reinvigoration to in in it is almost certainly tential participants subject coproduction, returns. Like the returns to the bureaucratic of creasing development in an earlier era, the returns to more forms of organization innovative on stateness forms of based synergy could be prodigious. state-society within the state. Since Unfortunately, the movement toward eclipse has already made this approbation an becomes that comes with more effective, responsive reward for those who

kind of institutional development unlikely. The kind of capacity neces

a sary to make the state a dependable partner in strategy of state-society scarce are less synergy is already in supply. Civic groups correspondingly to be attracted to of mutual that involve empowerment strategies likely to disillusionment with the state s capacity agencies. Legitimate antistate the discourse exacerbated of the deliver, pervasive by Anglo state the state as an ally seem farfetched. and Finally, are to see a elites threat likely important, political perhaps private in any form of state-society synergy that involves subordinate groups. are slim, but of The synergy prospects state-society political they that makes engaging most or state managers For beleaguered altogether. meaner at with the stateness, leaner, political politicians It promises tractions of a strategy of state-society synergy are obvious. away out of the to It also currendy asphyxiating capacity gap. promises should not be discounted disenchanted generate of public a set of allies much less ambivalent potentially elites who institutions than are the business about the value the constitute

American global order, has solidified into a domestic political climate

principal political pillar of the leaner,meaner state.The logic is equally

67 See Migdal, Kohli, and Shue (fn. 47), especially and Accommodation Forces: On Political Contention Kohli and Shue, "State Power in the Third World." and the Social

ECLIPSE OF THE STATE?

powerful from the point of view of civic organizations. even more Leaner, Leaner, meaner

87 to put
states

will do little for them. They need capable state organizations

their policy to guarantee liances with preferences the global civic actors into practice business climate. than TNCs need meaner

is still more

likely, but the possibility

no less implausible labor organizations tieth century.

that state apparatuses might forge new al

in the early decades is of the new millennium than the alliances that were actually forged between and the state during the early decades of the twen

Probing beneath the rhetoric of globalization

problematic mination quite consistent with Netd's original

and eclipse reveals a

admonitions. Project

ing the institutional evaporation of the state provides little more illu
than attention ignoring from

it altogether. with Preoccupation eclipse serious ongoing shifts in the nature of state ness. It also inhibits forms of stateness. of more promising exploration and ex mesmerized by the power of globalized Becoming production in the is equally counterproductive. Whether the future unfolds change a leaner, meaner state or embodies more of direction unlikely probable on the economic elements of state-society synergy does not depend distracts
stateness.

logic of globalization alone. It also depends on how people think about