STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES

MABANAG VS. LOPEZ VITO CASCO PHIL VS. GIMENEZ MORALES VS. SABIDO ASTORGA VS. VILLEGAS CHAVEZ VS. JUDICIAL BAR COUNCIL SJS VS. DDB AND PDEA TATAD VS. DOE

Mabanag vs Lopez Vito (G.R. NO. L-1123) Journal Adoption of the Enrolled Bill Theory FACTS: Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the required vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution) which has been considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress. HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof. **Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state. Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.

The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Mabanag vs. Vito GR L-1123, 5 March 1947 Facts: Three senators and eight representatives had been proclaimed by a majority vote of the Commission on Elections as having been elected senators and representatives in the elections held on 23 April 1946. The three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the first session of Congress following the elections, on account of alleged irregularities in their election. The eight representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take part in the election of the Speaker, for the same reason, although they had not been formally suspended. A resolution for their suspension had been introduced in the House of Representatives, but that resolution had not been acted upon definitely by the House when the petition for prohibition was filed. As a consequence these three senators and eight representatives did not take part in the passage of the congressional resolution, designated "Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto," nor was their membership reckoned within the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote which is required in proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. The petition for prohibition sought to prevent the enforcement of said congressional resolution, as it is allegedly contrary to the Constitution. The members of the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor General, and the Director of the Bureau of Printing are made defendants. Issue: Whether the Court may inquire upon the irregularities in the approval of the resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution. Held: It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities, that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provision. This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the separation of powers, a principle also too well known to require elucidation or citation of authorities. The difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of political question. The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions of the political departments of the government. If a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect. If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political question. The two steps complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory process as provided in section I of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution "consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is no logic in attaching political character to one and

withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even in dependent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal then into that of ratification. CASCO VS. GIMENEZ G.R. No. L-17931 February 28, 1963CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC., petitioner,v. HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ, in his capacity as Auditor General of the Philippines,and HON. ISMAEL MATHAY, in his capacity as Auditor of the Central Bank, respondents. This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General denying a claim for refund of petitioner Casco PhilippineChemical Co., Inc. FACTS: CascoPhilippine Chemical Co., Inc. was engaged in the production of synthetic resinglues used primarily in the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are "ureaand formaldehyde" which are both being importedabroad.Pursuant to R.A. 2609 Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, The Central Bank issued Circulars fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. The bank also issued memorandum establishing the procedure for the applications forexemption from the payment of said fee as provided byR.A. 2609. Petitioners paid the required margin fee with their 2 import transactions. In both of their transactions through R.A. 2609they wanted to avail the exemption from the payment of said fee as provided by RA. 2609. Petitioners filed a refund requestto the Central Bank and the Central Bank issued the vouchers but was not accepted by the Auditor of the Bank. The refusalw a s a l s o a f f i r m e d b y t h e A u d i t o r G e n e r a l . T h e r e f u s a l a s b a s e d o n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e s e p a r a t e i m p o r t a t i o n o f " u r e a and formaldehyde" is not in accord with the provisions of R.A. 2609. Becuase section 2 of R.A. 2609 clearly provides Ureaformaldehyde and not urea and formaldehydePetitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde" appearing in this provision should be construed as "urea and formaldehyde". Petitioner contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction "and"b e t w e e n t h e t e r m s " u r e a " a n d " f o r m a l d e h yd e " , a n d t h a t t h e m e m b e r s o f C o n g r e s s i n t e n d e d t o e x e m p t " u r e a " a n d "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea" formaldehyde",not the latter as a finished product. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners contentions that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction"and" between the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde" RULING: No, because what is allowed in RA. 2809 is urea formaldehyde, not "ureaand formaldehyde" , both are differentfrom each other. The National Institute of Science and Technology defines urea

formaldehyde is the synthetic resin formed as acondensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to temperature,acidity, and time of reaction. This produce when applied in water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes afairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished product, w hich ispatently distinct and different from ureaand formaldehyde,What is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts. It is well settled that the enrolledbill which uses the term urea formaldehyde instead of urea and formaldehyde is conclusive uponthe courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved bythe Executive on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and underminingone of the cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicialdecree xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Facts of the Case: Casco Chemical Co., which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues used in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood producers, bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde which are the main raw materials in the production of the said glues. They paid P33,765.42 in November and December 1949 and P6345.72 in May 1960. Prior thereto, the petitioner sought the refund of the first and second sum relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. The Auditor of the Bank, Pedro Gimenez, refused to pass in audit and approve the said refund on the ground that the exemption granted by the board in not in accord with the provision of section 2 of RA 2609. Issue of the Case: Whether or Not Urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of the margin fee. Held: No, it is not exempt from payment of the marginal fee. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished product which is distinct from urea and formaldehyde. The petitioners contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the conjunction and between the terms urea and formaldehyde separately as essential elements in the manufacture of urea formaldehyde and not the latter. But this is not reflective of the view of the Senate and the intent of the House of Representatives in passing the bill. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was passed the only remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree. Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with cost against the petitioner.

MORALES VS SUBIDO FACTS: Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three years but does not possess a bachelor's degree, is qualified for appointment as chief of police. Morales was the chief of detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of the former Chief , Morales was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given a provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila. Subido approved the designation of the petitioner but rejected his appointment for "failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position." Instead, the respondent certified other persons as qualified for the post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads: "Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. - No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city with rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher." Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person who has served the police department of a city can be qualified for said office. Morales however argued that when the said act was being deliberated upon, the approved version was actually the following: 'No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city or who has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.' Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by Congress but when the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change made in the provision was the insertion of the phrase "or has served as chief of police with exemplary record." Morales went on to support his case by producing copies of certified photostatic copy of a memorandum which according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found attached to the page proofs of the then bill being deliberated upon. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the journals, to look searchingly into the matter. HELD: The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing. The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that the SC act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with

consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process. The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question which the SC can decide upon but is not currently being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does not now decide. All the SC holds is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy ASTORGA VS. VILLEGAS FACTS: In 1964, Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of RA 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to Vice-Mayor Astorga presumably under authority of RA 4065. Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a petition with this Court on September 7, 1964 for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel Villegas et al and the members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of RA 4065. Respondent denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila) because the said law was considered to have never been enacted. When the this said law passed the 3rd reading in the lower house as HB 9266, it was sent to the Senate which referred it to the Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator Roxas. Some minor amendments were made before the bill was referred back to the Senate floor for deliberations. During such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made significant amendments which were subsequently approved by the Senate. The bill was then sent back to the HOR and was thereafter approved by the HOR. The bill was sent to the President for approval and it became RA 4065. It was later found out however that the copy signed by the Senate President, sent to the HOR for approval and sent to the President for signing was the wrong version. It was in fact the version that had no amendments thereto. It was not the version as amended by Tolentino and as validly approved by the Senate. Due to this fact, the Senate president and the President of the Philippines withdrew and invalidated their signatures that they affixed on the said law. Astorga maintains that the RA is still vald and binding and that the withdrawal of the concerned signatures does not invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look into the Journal to determine if the said law was validly enacted. HELD: The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the

risks of misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this case. This SC is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the President was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. Note however that the SC is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but only to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. As done by both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive, when they withdrew their signatures therein, the SC also declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was never made into law. To perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body. CHAVEZ VS. JUDICIAL BAR COUNCIL JULY 17, 2012 Facts: In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase a representative of Congress. It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of Congress, such that the absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of a representative from Congress, it should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondents further argue that petitioner has no real interest in questioning the constitutionality of the JBCs current composition. The respondents also question petitioners belated filing of the petition. Issues: (1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been met in this case; and (2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution. Held: (1) Yes. The Courts power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person

challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non are present, especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of government is put in issue. The Court disagrees with the respondents contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a personal stake on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBCs duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the Courts ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders. (2) Yes. The word Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in government to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term Congress must be taken to mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. SJS VS. DDB AND PDEA Facts: Before the Court are 3 consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of Section 361 of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and

employees of public and private offices, and persons chargedbefore the prosecutors office with certain offenses. According to Aquilino Pimentel Jr., a senator of the RP and a candidate for re-election in May 2004 elections, said mandatory drug testing imposes an additional qualification for Senators beyond that which are provided by the Constitution. No provision in the Constitution authorizes the Congress or the COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator. Meanwhile, SJS contends that Section 36(c)(d)(f) and (g) are constitutionally infirm as it constitutes undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. It also violates the equal protection clause as it can be used to harass a student or employee deemed undesirable. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached. In addition to the abovementioned contentions, Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as a citizen and taxpayers maintains that said provision should be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees. Issue: WON Section 36 (c), (d), (f) and (g) are unconstitutional Held: Section 36 (c) and (d) are constitutional while (f) and (g) are not. Ratio: Section 36 (c) and (d) as to students and employees of private and public offices Using US authorities, the Court ruled in favor of the constitutionality of Section 36(c) applying the following reasonable deductions: (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well - being of their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory. Therefore, the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements. Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as much as possible the employee's privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the more important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained professionals in access - controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody. All told,

therefore, the intrusion into the employees' privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal. The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In context, the right to privacy means the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one's person or from intrusion into one's private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person's ordinary sensibilities. And while there has been general agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against unwarranted search, "translation of the abstract prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures' into workable broad guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task," to borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal Court. Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the state's exercise of police power. The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon which thedrug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the challenged law. Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused"? To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the country and thus protect the well - being of the citizens, especially the youth, from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well - defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional. Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency. On the charge of being an undue delegation, the provision in question is not so extensively drawn as to give unbridled options to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. It expressly provides how drug testing for students of secondary and tertiary schools and officers/employees of public/private offices should be conducted. It enumerates the persons who shall undergo drug testing. In the case of students, the testing shall be in accordance with the school rules as contained in the student handbook and with notice to parents. On the part of officers/employees, the testing shall take into account the company's work rules. In either case, the random procedure shall be observed, meaning that the persons to be subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance or in an unplanned way. And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and compromising the confidentiality of the test results are established. Section 36 (f) as to persons charged before the prosecutors office with criminal offenses The Court found the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the

mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicionless." In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves. Section 36 (g)- as to candidates for public office It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is nu l and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be vaLid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation. The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for senators. In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution. TATAD VS. DOE

FACTS: The petitions challenge the constitutionality of RA No. 8180 entitled An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes. The deregulation process has two phases: (a) the transition phase (Aug. 12, 1996) and the (b) full deregulation phase (Feb. 8, 1997 through EO No. 372).

Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the Sec. of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry, and the law does not provide any specific standard to determine when the prices of crude oil in the world market are considered to be declining nor when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable. Issue: w/n the provisions of RA No. 8180 and EO No. 372 is unconstitutional. sub-issue: (a) w/n sec. 15 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power, and (b) w/n the Executive misapplied RA No. 8180 when it considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as factor in fully deregulating the downstream oil industry in Feb. 1997. HELD/RULING: (a) NO. Sec. 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. RA No. 8180 provided that the full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997 regardless of the occurrence of any event. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation. Sec. 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the Presidenthe is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable. Webster defines practicable as meaning possible to practice or perform, decline as meaning to take a downward direction, and stable as meaning firmly established. (b) YES. Sec. 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor to be given weight by the Executive before ordering full deregulation. The Executive department failed to follow faithfully the standards set by RA No. 8180 when it co0nsidered the extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF fund. The Executive is bereft of any right to alter either by subtraction or addition the standards set in RA No. 8180 for it has no powers to make laws.