1ac Cuban Oil

Contention 1: China
US-Cuban oil coop checks US-China resource war. Benjamin-Alvarado 10
Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, PhD of Political Science, University of Nebraska, 2010, Cubas Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation, a Brookings Publication obtained as an ebook through MSU Electronic Resources page 9-11

Those involved in managing the security interests of the United States need to understand the geostrategic implications of interstate relations in the region in terms of energy security, and the extent to which they affect cooperation between the United States and Cuba. This includes an assessment of the medium to long-term evolution of energy cooperation between Cuba and Venezuela; of the broader relations between
states aligned with the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (Alternativa Bolivariana para las Americas, or ALBA) and Petrocaribe consortiums; and of the

growing influence of China in the region. 14 Also discussed in this volume is the extent to which the diversification and dispersion of energy resources in Cuba might be a buffer against disruptions in U.S. energy production
and distribution that could result from natural disasters or market disruptions. Before analyzing U.S. energy security in a geostrategic context, it is necessary to define energy security and strategic energy policy. Energy security is the capacity to avoid disruptions caused by natural, accidental, or intentional events affecting energy and utility supply and distribution systems. Energy security is said to prevail when fuel, power production and distribution systems, and enduser devices possess the five so-called S characteristics, as outlined by Drexel Kleber, the director of the Strategic Operations Power Surety Task Force, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense: 15 Surety. Access to energy and fuel sources is assured. Survivability. Energy and fuel sources are resilient and durable in the face of potential damage. Supply. There is an identified available source of energy traditional fossil fuels, alternative energy (nuclear, clean coal, biomass, landfill gas, municipal solid waste, hydrogen), or renewable energy (hydropower, geothermal pressure, wind, tidal. and solar). Sufficiency. There is an adequate quantity of power and fuel from a variety of sources. Sustainability. Operating practices can be perpetuated by limiting demand, reducing waste, and effectively exploiting alternative energy and renewable resources to the fullest extent possible. The five S energy security and conservation objectives, though initially intended as a guide for the U.S. Department of Defense, have a much broader applicability; not least, they serve as value parameters for energy policy decisionmaking. As Kleber has noted, Expenditures on energy conservation measures are viewed as investments with long-term rewards and dividends which are paid in commodities beyond money national security, soldiers lives, improved manpower utilization, military to civilian transfers, and increased foreign policy options for elected officials, to name a few. 16 What, then, would an ideal strategic energy policy look like for the United States or any other country, for that matter? Mahmoud Amin El-Gamal and Amy Myers Jaffe have set out a detailed analysis of the objectives of a strategic energy policy, including the following: 1. To assure that markets operate efficiently so as to develop the infrastructure necessary to meet growing energy demand 2. To ensure the well-being of the human habitat and ecosystem 3. To ensure that mechanisms are in place for preventing and, if necessary, managing disruptions to energy supply. 17 Articulating these objectives doesnt mean that fulfilling them is simple for policymakers for the following reasons. First, there are no overnight solutions to the energy supply and infrastructure bottlenecks facing the global markets. The trade-offs between energysecurity considerations and national (non-energy) goals across the board must be continuously reviewed. States must adopt an integrated energy policy balancing foreign policy, trade policy, and national security imperatives. In this way, strategic energy policy has the ability to play a significant role in diplomatic discourse, especially where bilateral relations with major oil producers are concerned. For El-Gamal and Jaffe this is a critical consideration, for three principal reasons: 1. U.S. energy independence is not attainable. 2. The policy instruments available to deal with energy supply disruptions are increasingly inadequate. 3. The United States needs to articulate a new vision for optimal management of international energy interdependence. 18 Thus, the questions and issues surrounding and the seemingly

energy security become existential in a manner that has hardly been discussed

heretofore, but clearly resonates in the face of ongoing changes in access to secure energy sources, persistent energy dependency,

insatiable demand for petroleum products to fuel the American way of life. These concerns immediately raise three important questions relevant to our discussion of possible engagement with Cuba in the energy sphere: 1. How will the ongoing development and evolution of Unin Cubapetrleo
S.A. (Cupet), Cubas state oil company, limit or obstruct U.S. efforts to meet its strategic objectives? 2. What role can international oil companies play in the short and long-term development of energy resources and infrastructure in Cuba? 3. How

will the specter of competition with Brazil, Russia, China, and India over scarce petroleum resources affect U.S. energy-security policy, especially in light of the recent energy-development agreements between Brazil and Cuba, and Russia and Cuba, and the Chinese incursion into Latin American energy markets? These questions deserve consideration,
particularly in light of the growing presence of these external actors in Latin American energy markets. How might they increase competition and cooperation over scarce energy resources? In assessing the development of Cupet and its impact on U.S.

geostrategic imperatives,

it is essential

to evaluate how the

United States might promote its interest in a global

and regional energy market shaped and influenced by the

activities of n ational o il c ompanies, especially

their influence on developments in Cuba. Including Mexicos Petrleos Mexicanos S.A. (Pemex) and Venezuelas state oil firm, Petrleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA)both of them NOCs in this evaluation is critically important for ensuring an acceptable strategic context to U.S. interests. 19 The

objective of this highly path-dependent development is the transformation of Cupet into a stable NOC that exhibits high technical competency culminating in upstream oilfield
production and downstream refining and marketing capabilities. It is path-dependent because the set of decisions undertaken to achieve the objective (energy self-sufficiency) is limited by the decisions made in the past by Cuban policymakers, even though past circumstances may no longer be relevant. Prior to 2005, the energy policy objective was clearly centered on the revitalization of existing energy infrastructure and the expansion of domestic production, as limited as that may have been. Now there is a big change in Cubas circumstances: the growing importance of tapping the offshore reserves. An NOC, to be successful, must balance national social and political objectives with commercial objectives. Consequently, U.S. strategic policy must balance the promotion of broader U.S. interests with those of the NOC if there is to be cooperation. 20 In light

of the recent resurgence of oil

nationalism, future cooperation depends largely on the extent to which observers can identify and articulate the common energy-policy interests of NOCs and the United States. In Venezuela, high oil prices have
encouraged the Chvez government to undertake bold social policy initiatives. 21 Some suggest these decisions have come at the expense of critical energy infrastructure needs, thereby increasing the likelihood of energy supply disruptions in the future. Because the United States relies on Venezuela for nearly 1 million barrels of oil daily, the policy decision to prioritize social spending over energy infrastructure revitalization by the Chvez regime could have a significant impact in the United States, if it were to result in diminished capacity in Venezuela to produce and export oil to the United States. 22 In Mexico, state control of the NOC Pemex has had the stultifying impact of prolonged bureaucratic stagnation, resulting in a decline in production and insufficient funding for reinvestment in new exploration and production. This is highly problematic for Mexico because the government derives 40 percent of its revenue from Pemex. 23 It also has raised concerns about the possibility of energy supply disruptions for the United States. In fact, in the first quarter of 2010 Mexicos oil exports to the United States fell by over 8 percent, as compared to 2009. 24 Concerns over the ability of major oil-producing countries and their NOCs to meet future global demand is compounded by insufficient levels of reinvestment and the looming specter of interstate instability. But it is becoming abundantly clear that Venezuelas growing investment in Cubas energy infrastructure creates the basis for a longer-term relationship that will enable Cuba to expand its productive, storage, and refining capacity, as it simultaneously strengthens the Venezuelan position in the region as a supplier of both crude and refined petroleum products for its Petrocaribe and ALBA partners. There

is also growing consternation that NOCs may be used as instruments of state policy inimical to U.S. national interests. 25 In particular, Chinas growing presence in Latin America is being interpreted as a sig n of intensifying competition over energy resources. Flynt Leverett and Jeffrey Bader suggest that this competition could easily be the cause of international conflict in the coming years, as energy
demands place a rising premium on the ability of China already the worlds third-largest crude oil importer, after the United States and Japan to access oil and gas resources.

Plan sufficiently hedges US energy security. Benjamin-Alvarado 10

Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, PhD of Political Science, University of Nebraska, 2010, Cubas Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation, a Brookings Publication obtained as an ebook through MSU Electronic Resources page 118-19 In chapter 1, I spotlighted five S characteristics of energy security and the related imperatives of strategic energy policy relevant to both the Cuban case as well as that of the United States. The successful

development of Cuban energy resources will enhance the energy security of the United States and its broader geostrategic imperatives in the Caribbean region. Cuba can do this by potentially serving as an entrept for U.S. downstream
activities (refining, marketing, storage, and transshipment). Cuba has already embarked on an aggressive program of investment and development of its refining capacity, which could

potentially support American energy needs by serving

as a hedge against supply disruptions of refined petroleum products or facilitating the redirection of oil
shipments as needed owing to any number of circumstances.

And, US-Sino war goes nuclear. Crisis management wont check Lowther 13

Note: when this card has a line that reads it says, it is referencing a 42-page report by the Washington DC-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Ask your lab leaders about the CSIS and the PONI (Project on Nuclear Issues) several of them have worked for that organization and will have unique insights. The study at hand was prepared by the CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues. The Tapiei Time article was written by William Lowther, who is the Washington DC staff writer for that organization and he is citing a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 3-16-2013, Taiwan could spark nuclear war: report, Taipei Times, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211
Although

Beijing and Washington have agreed to a range of crisis management mechanisms, such as

the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the establishment of a direct hotline between the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defense, the

bases for miscommunication and misunderstanding remain and draw on deep historical reservoirs of suspicion, the report says. For example, it says, it is unclear whether either side understands what kinds of actions would result in a military or even nuclear response by the other party. To make things worse, neither side seems to believe the others declared policies and intentions, suggesting that escalation management, already a very uncertain endeavor, could be especially difficult in any conflict, it says.
Although conflict mercifully seems unlikely at this point, the report concludes that it cannot be ruled out and may become increasingly likely if we are unwise or unlucky. The report says: With

both sides possessing and looking set to retain formidable nuclear weapons arsenals, such a conflict would be tremendously dangerous and quite possibly devastating.

Specifically energy conflicts rapidly escalate- deterrence claims are false Cabral 10
(Jim, Professor of International Relations and Political Science Landmark College, Book Review Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet, Z Magazine, July, http://www.zcommunications.org/rising-powers-shrinking-planet-by-jim-cabral) Not surprisingly, the accelerating

militarization of energy procurement increases the possibilities for armed international conflict . With typical insight, Klare explains how nationalism provides momentum to

risk of escalation is growing even more potent because major energy importers and exporters regularly appeal to that most dangerous of emotions, nationalism, in making their claim over the management of energy flows. Nationalistic appeals, once they have gripped a populace, almost invariably promote fierce emotion and irrationality . Add to this the fact that the leaders of most countries involved in the great energy race have come to view the struggle over hydrocarbon assets as a "zero-sum" contestone in which a gain for one country almost always represents a loss for others. A zerosum mentality leads to a loss of flexibility in crisis situations , while the lens of nationalism turns the pursuit
this process: "The long-term of energy assets into a sacred obligation of senior government officials." The "competitive arms transfers" that represent the militarization of energy procurement also have another disturbing upshot: strengthening and legitimizing repressive, corrupt regimes. In the case of U.S. arms recipients, the list is long and growing. It includes long-time allies in the Persian Gulf regionSaudi Arabia most notablywhose anachronistic social policies effectively reduce women to the status of second class citizens; corruptible African governments in Nigeria, Chad, and Angola, where along with off-shore drilling sites along the continent's west coast U.S.-based oil companies such as Exxon and Chevron currently operate; and more recent allies in the energy rich Caspian Sea region, including what Klare refers to as the "autocratic regimes" of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. While the governments of the oil rich Persian Gulf have long been wooed with deficit countries' military largess, the emergence of the Caspian Sea region's governments as coveted allies may come as a bit of a surprise to some. Klare soberly sketches out a "three-way struggle for geopolitical advantage" in the Caspian Sea basin, as the

U.S., Russia (Caspian states having formerly been Soviet republics), and China funnel arms and other forms of military assistance into the region in competition for influence there. Again stressing the dangers of an escalation of conflict, Klare notes that: "This three-way struggleis militarizing the Caspian basin , inundating the region with advanced arms and an ever growing corps of military advisers, instructors, technicians, and combat-support personnel. [It will] heighten traditional suspicions and rivalries that have long plagued the region. The Great Powers are not only adding tinder to possible future fires, but also increasing the risk that they will be caught in any conflagration ."

This specific type of resource war escalates causing huge death tolls. Lendman 7
(Stephen Lendman is a renowned author and Research Associate of the Center for Research on Globalization (CRG). The Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG) is an independent research and media organization based in Montreal. The CRG is involved in book publishing, support to humanitarian projects as well as educational outreach activities including the organization of public conferences and lectures. The Centre also acts as a think tank on crucial economic and geopolitical issues. Stephen has written extensively on war and peace, social justice in America and many other national and international issues. Stephen Lendman is a recipient of a 2008 Project Censored Award, University of California at Sonoma Resource Wars Can We Survive Them? , June 06, 2007 http://www.globalresearch.ca/resource-wars-can-we-survive-them/5892)
Global Re search

With the worlds energy supplies finite, the US heavily dependent on imports, and peak oil near or approaching, security for America means assuring a sustainable supply of what we cant do
without. It

includes waging wars to get it, protect it, and defend the maritime trade routes over which it travels. That

means energys partnered with predatory New World Order globalization, militarism, wars, ecological recklessness, and now an extremist US administration willing to risk Armageddon for world dominance. Central to its plan is first controlling essential resources everywhere, at any cost, starting with oil and where most of it is located in the Middle East and Central Asia. The New Great Game and Perils From It The new Great Games begun, but this time the

stakes are greater than ever as

explained above. The old one lasted nearly 100 years pitting the British empire against Tsarist Russia when the issue wasnt oil. This

time, its the US with help from Israel, Britain, the West, and satellite states like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan challenging Russia and China with todays weapons and technology on both sides making earlier ones look like toys. At stake is more than oil. Its planet earth with survival of all life on it issue number one twice over. Resources and wars for them means militarism is increasing, peace declining, and the planets ability to sustain life front and center, if anyones paying attention. Theyd better be because beyond the point of no return, theres no second chance the way Einstein explained after the atom was split. His famous quote on future wars was : I know not with
what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones. Under a worst case scenario, its more dire than that. There

may be nothing left but resilient beetles and bacteria in the wake of a nuclear holocaust meaning even a new stone age is way in the future, if at all. The threat is real and once nearly happened during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October, 1962. We later learned a miracle saved us at the 40th anniversary October, 2002 summit meeting in Havana attended by the US and Russia along with host country Cuba. For the first time, we were told how close we came to nuclear Armageddon. Devastation was avoided only because Soviet submarine captain Vasily Arkhipov countermanded his order to fire nuclear-tipped torpedos when Russian submarines were attacked by US destroyers near Kennedys quarantine line. Had he done it, only our imagination can speculate what might have followed and whether
planet earth, or at least a big part of it, would have survived.

Gradualism cant solve- Cuba Window is closing- failure to capitalize causes competitors to develop Benjamin-Alvarado 10
Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, PhD of Political Science, University of Nebraska, 2010, Cubas Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation, a Brookings Publication obtained as an ebook through MSU Electronic Resources page 123-4

There is a significant commercial opening for the United States in Cuba, should it choose to pursue it. Cuban energy development will proceed with or without U.S. involvement, but U.S. involvement has the potential of speeding up the pace of development and could create an opening for a broader discussion of important geostrategic concerns for the both countries. To that end we make the following policy recommendations aimed at facilitating the promotion of strategic commercial relations between the United States and Cuba to develop energy resources.

Cuba engagement is key to Obamas credibility---reverses the perceived decline of US influence---solves multilateralism Dickerson 10 Lieutenant Colonel Sergio M. Dickerson, 2010, "United States Security
Strategy Towards Cuba," Strategy Research Project, www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA518053 Conclusion Today, 20 years have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall its time to chip away at the diplomatic wall that still remains between U.S. and Cuba. As we seek a new foreign policy with Cuba it is imperative that we take into consideration that distrust will characterize negotiations with the Cuban government. On the other hand, consider that loosening or lifting the embargo could also be mutually beneficial . Cubas need and Americas surplus capability to provide goods and services could be profitable and eventually addictive to Cuba. Under these conditions, diplomacy has a better chance to flourish . If the Cuban model succeeds President Obama will be seen as a true leader for multilateralism . Success in Cuba could afford the international momentum and credibility to solve other seemingly wicked problems like the Middle East and Kashmir . President Obama could leverage this international reputation with other rogue nations like Iran and North Korea who might associate their plight with Cuba. 35 The U.S. could begin to lead again and reverse its perceived decline in the greater global order bringing true peace for years to come.

Engagement is inevitable, its a question of effectiveness---Obamas credibility solves South China Sea conflict Ghitis 13 (Frida, world affairs columnist for The Miami Herald and World Politics Review. A
former CNN producer and correspondent, she is the author of The End of Revolution: A Changing World in the Age of Live Television. World to Obama: You can't ignore us, 1/22, http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/22/opinion/ghitis-obama-world) President Obama made it very clear: The second term is all about the domestic agenda. If only the world would cooperate.
Obama outlined his goals for the next four years, sketching above all a progressive vision of a country with less inequality and more justice. And, judging by his inaugural speech, he plans to put his shoulder to the wheel. After all, much of the first term was consumed with averting a national economic catastrophe. Now he can get on with building a legacy, reviving that hope and change he promised back during the 2008 campaign. But the most subtly striking part of Obama's inauguration speech was how it largely ignored the rest of the globe. In his 20-minute address, he dedicated perhaps one minute to foreign policy. America, he said, will "try and resolve our differences with other nations peacefully." He vowed the country "will remain the anchor of strong alliances" and it will support democracy. He also declared the United States "must be a source of hope for the poor, the sick, the marginalized, the victims of prejudice..." and stand for "human dignity and justice." Beyond that, he

did not spare a single word for tens of thousands killed by dictators, as they have been in Syria; nothing about the struggle for liberal democratic rights in places like Egypt, which sets the tone for the Middle East. Nothing
about repression and thwarting of freedom of expression, the rollback of democratic rights, or the push to destroy existing democracies, statements that could have come as welcome words of encouragement for people who share American values of freedom and justice in places like Egypt, China,

Iran, Russia or Mali. The president should keep in mind that millions around the world yearn to know they have the backing of the most powerful country on Earth. As he surely knows, even his words make a big difference. And while Obama plans to dedicate his efforts to the domestic agenda, a number of brewing international crises are sure to steal his attention and demand his time . Here are a few of the foreign policy issues that, like it or not, may force Obama to divert his focus from domestic concerns in this new term. Syria unraveling: The United Nations says more than

60,000 people have already died in a civil war that the West has, to its shame, done little to keep from spinning out of
control. Washingtonhas warned that the use of chemical or biological weapons might force its hand. But the regime may have already used them. The

West has failed to nurture a moderate force in the conflict. Now Islamist extremists are growing more powerful within the opposition. The chances are growing that worst-case scenarios will materialize. Washington will not be able to endlessly ignore this dangerous war. Egypt and the challenge of democracy: What happens in Egypt strongly influences the rest of the Middle East
-- and hence world peace -- which makes it all the more troubling to see liberal democratic forces lose battle after battle for political influence against Islamist parties, and to hear blatantly anti-Semitic speech coming from the mouth of Mohammed Morsy barely two years before he became president. Iran's

nuclear program: Obama took office promising a new, more conciliatory effort to persuade Iran to drop its nuclear enrichment program. Four years later, he has succeeded in implementing international sanctions, but Iran has continued enriching uranium, leading United Nations inspectors to find "credible evidence" that Tehran is working on nuclear weapons. Sooner or later the moment of truth will arrive. If a deal is not reached, Obama will have to decide if he wants to be the president on whose watch a nuclear weapons race was unleashed in the most dangerous and unstable part of the world . North Africa terrorism: A much-neglected region of the world is becoming increasingly difficult to disregard. In recent
days, Islamist extremists took American and other hostages in Algeria and France sent its military to fight advancing Islamist extremists in Mali, a country that once represented optimism for democratic rule in Africa, now overtaken by militants who are potentially turning it into a staging ground for international terrorism. Russia repression:

As Russian President Vladimir Putin succeeds in crushing opposition to his increasingly authoritarianrule, he and his allies are making anti-American words and policies their favorite theme. A recent ban on adoption of Russian orphans by American
parents is only the most vile example. But Washington needs Russian cooperation to achieve its goals at the U.N. regarding Iran, Syria and other matters. It

is a complicated problem with which Obama will have to wrestle. Then there are the long-standing challenges that could take a turn for the worse, such as the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Obama may not want to wade into that morass again, but events may force his hand . And there are the so-called "black swans," events of low probability and high impact. There is talk that China and Japan could go to war over a cluster of disputed islands. A war between two of the world's
largest economies could prove devastating to the global economy, just as a sudden and dramatic reversal in the fragile Eurozone economy could spell disaster. Japan's

is only the hottest of many territorial disputes between China

and its Asian neighbors. Then there's North Korea with its nuclear weapons. We could see regions that have garnered
little attention come back to the forefront, such as Latin America, where conflict could arise in a post-Hugo Chavez Venezuela. The president -- and the country -- could also benefit from unexpectedly positive outcomes. Imagine a happy turn of events in Iran, a breakthrough between Israelis and Palestinians, the return of prosperity in Europe, a successful push by liberal democratic forces in the Arab uprising countries, which could create new opportunities, lowering risks around the world, easing trade, restoring confidence and improving the chances for the very agenda Obama described in his inaugural speech. The aspirations he expressed for America are the ones he should express for our tumultuous planet. Perhaps in his next big speech, the State of the Union, he

can remember America's leadership position and devote more attention to those around the world who see it as a source of inspiration and encouragement. After all, in this second term Obama will not be able to devote as small a portion of his attention to foreign policy as he did during his inaugural speech. International disengagement is not an option. As others before Obama have discovered, history has a habit of toying with the best laid, most well-intentioned plans of American presidents.

South China Sea conflict causes nuclear war Wittner 11 (Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York/Albany, Wittner is the
author of eight books, the editor or co-editor of another four, and the author of over 250 published articles and book reviews. From 1984 to 1987, he edited Peace & Change, a journal of peace research., 11/28/2011, "Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?", www.huntingtonnews.net/14446)

While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons.
The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another

example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by Chinas growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged Chinas claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened

U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was asserting our own position as a Pacific power. But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of Chinas offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared
publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else. Of course, China didnt have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some

pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there havent been very manyat least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistans foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use any weapon in
its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, dont they? Obviously, NATO leaders

nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do didnt feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATOs strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing Star Wars and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensiveand probably unworkablemilitary defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S.
government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would win any nuclear war with China. But what would that victory entail? A

nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a nuclear winter around the globedestroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.

Contention 2: Cuba
Cuban oil dependence on Venezuela is unsustainable---Venezuela will cut off supplies Keppel 3/16 (Stephen, ABC News, What Chvez's Death Means for Cuba, Venezuela and the
U.S. http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/chavezs-death-means-cuba-venezuelaus/story?id=18669003) Upon hearing news of the death of Hugo Chvez, scores of Venezuelans gathered in cautious celebration in Doral, a South Florida community with the highest concentration of Venezuelans outside Venezuela. They are hoping that Chvez's passing will bring about change in their homeland. Others in the region were not as happy. Sure Chvez was politically influential in Latin America, but in many ways his economic influence was even greater especially with friendly countries like Cuba, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Argentina, Bolivia and a score of Caribbean nations that benefited from Venezuela's oil-discount program, PetroCaribe. In the name of "economic solidarity," Chvez was extremely generous with these friends, offering oil at discounted rates and with flexible lending conditions. Nicaragua, for example, was known to pay for Venezuelan oil with shipments of beef, sugar, coffee, milk
and even 19,000 pairs of pants. According to figures from the state-owned oil company PDVSA, in 2011 Venezuela sent 243,500 barrels of oil a day (or around 8 percent of its production) to 16 countries across Latin America. Yet the

absence of Chvez and the potential drawdown of economic support would have the biggest impact on Cuba. That country receives more than 100,000 barrels of discounted oil per day and billions of dollars each year in exchange for Cuban medical personnel, technology experts, political consultants and other "professionals." That's because Chvez had a special relationship with Cuba and the Castros. His relationships with other presidents were also often very personal. That approach may be difficult to sustain in his absence. Even if Nicolas Maduro, Chvez's chosen replacement, wins the upcoming election, he will be more susceptible to domestic pressure to reduce Venezuela's foreign aid, given all the economic challenges at home. The Cubans have bad memories of the ending of Soviet patronage in the 1990s and are right to be worried about what the death of Chvez may bring. Where will Cuba turn this time if Venezuelan aid dries up? Maybe the United States. That doesn't mean the U.S. government, however.
Rather, Cuba would likely turn to the nearly two million Cubans living in this country. They are already sending around $2 billion a year back to the island in remittances. Already, Raul Castro seems to have been preparing to make the Cuban economy a little bit more flexible and open to investment, and the Obama administration has made it easier for Cubans in the U.S. to send money back home. Which

brings us to Venezuela's financial situation. The truth is the economic state there has been uncertain and chaotic ever since Chavez got sick, and that is unlikely to change in the short term. There is supposed to be a new election, and it appears that Maduro will win. But he will face a tough economic situation. Plus, he lacks the charisma of Chvez and may not be able to maintain popularity if things get tougher.

US-Cuban oil cooperation is key to revitalize their domestic oil sector Benjamin-Alvadaro 6 (Jonathan, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida
International University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association, The Current Status and Future Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A Special, http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissionedreports/oil-cuba-alvarado.pdf) Why is it important to clarify the current status of Cuban energy in the face of a continuing opposition by the United States to anything resembling what can be construed as good news for the Castro regime? Obviously, because up until this point it hasnt cost the United States much if anything. The current
policy continues to clearly place at the forefront the sanctity and utility of a comprehensive economic and political embargo in the

hopes that it helps to foment a change in regime and a peaceful transition to a democratic system of governance and a complimentary market economy. As

energy security concerns continue to percolate up to an increasingly important status in the realm of national security objectives we may begin to see the erosion of the hard position against the Cuban regime regardless of its leadership. The overview of the Cuban energy developments clearly and unambiguously reveals that the Castro regime has every intention of continuing to promote, design and implement energy development policies that will benefit Cuba for generations to come. Cuba is sparing no effort by instituting bottom-up and topdown policy initiatives to meet this challenge. It has significantly increased its international cooperation in the energy sector and continues to enhance its efforts to ensure energy security in these most uncertain of times. But it stands to reason that no matter how successful these efforts are, they will come up short. Two factors may alter this present situation. First, Cuba may indeed
realize a bonanza from the offshore tracts that will allow it to possibly address its many energy challenges, from increasing oil production and refining capacity, to improving the nations energy infrastructure, ensuring a stable energy future. Second, and no

less significant, is the possibility of normalization of trade relations with the United States. This is important not only because it will allow direct foreign investment, technology transfer and information sharing between these neighboring states but it possibly enhances the energy security of both states, and hence, the region, realized through a division of labor and dispersion of resources that serve as a hedge against
natural disaster and market disruptions. Moreover, all states could derive benefit from the public information campaigns to promote energy efficiency and conservation presently being promoted in Cuba in the face of diminishing energy stocks and uncertain global markets. Ultimately, and only after normalization, the

task still falls to the Cuban government, but the cost will necessarily be spread through a number of sources that are predominately American because of strategic interests, proximity and affinity. It suffices to say that the requisite investment and assistance will have a distinct American tinge to it, inasmuch as American corporations, U.S. government agencies, and international financial institutions, of which the U.S. is a major contributor, will play important roles in the funding of the effort to revitalize the Cuban energy sector. Cuban officials are not averse and perhaps would prefer that the U.S. be its major partner in this effort owing to the fact that most if not all of the cutting-edge technology in energy, oil and gas comes from the United States. It is remarkable that the Cuban energy sector is as vibrant as it presently is, absent the type of infrastructural investment that is available to most developing states, in large part because of the American economic embargo. Finally, the cost is significant and it stands to reason that the longer one waits to address the challenge at hand the higher the cost of modernizing the energy sector . For this reason alone, the American role in assisting Cuba in this effort will be significant and every day that the task is put off, it increases the long-term cost of the effort. This should serve as an obvious point of entry into cooperation with the Cuban government and perhaps can serve as a catalyst for promoting confidence, trust and cooperation in this critical issue area across the region.

The plan solves Cuban dependence on Venezuela---revenues lead to political reforms that create stability Pinon 11 Jorge R. Pin is a visiting research fellow at the Latin American and Caribbean
Centers Cuban Research Institute at FIU. Spring 2011, "Why the United States and Cuba Collaborate (and What Could Happen If They Don't)"casgroup.fiu.edu/pages/docs/2157/1306356964_Hemisphere_Vol._20.pdf

If Cubas suspected but yet undiscovered hydrocarbon reserves are proven real, it will take between three and five years to develop them fully. Production volumes would have to reach more than 200,000 barrels per day to have the same positive economic impact currently derived from foreign oil subsidies. If this occurs, significant revenues from oil, natural gas and sugarcane ethanol would integrate Cuba into global and regional markets within the next five years. International oil companies such as Spains Repsol, Norways Statoil Norsk Hydro and Brazils Petrobras are actively exploring Cubas Gulf of Mexico waters. Cuban authorities have invited United States oil companies to participate in developing the islands offshore oil and natural gas resources, but US law does not allow this . Although US oil, oil equipment and service companies have the capital, technology and operational knowhow to explore, produce and refine Cubas potential reserves in a safe and responsible manner, the almost five-decade old unilateral political and economic embargo keeps them on the sidelines. Cuba currently relies on heavily subsidized oil from Venezuela for two-thirds of its petroleum needs. This supply contributes to the Cuban governments ability to maintain a politically antagonistic and belligerent position towards the US. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 made Cuba aware of the political and economic risks and consequences of depending on a single source of imported oil. Only when Cuba diversifies suppliers and develops its offshore hydrocarbon resources, estimated by the United States Geological Survey at 5.5 million barrels of oil and 9.8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, will it have the economic independence to consider political and economic reforms. It is in the US interest to develop a new policy toward the island based on constructive engagement to support the emergence of a Cuban state in which Cubans themselves can determine the political and economic future of their country through democratic means. Cuba is about to embark on an 18-month oil exploration
drilling program to validate the presence of recoverable hydrocarbon reserves. US support of such endeavors would be beneficial in the framework of a constructive engagement policy. The Deepwater Horizon drilling semi-submersible incident and the resulting catastrophic oil spill demonstrate the urgency of developing a policy of energy and environmental cooperation between the United States and Cuba. As Cuba develops its deepwater oil and natural gas potential, the possible consequences of a spill call for proactive planning by both countries to minimize or avoid an environmental disaster. To respond effectively to an oil-related marine accident, any company operating in Cuba would require immediate access to US oil services companies for the nearinstant technology and know-how needed to halt and limit damage to the marine environment. Obviously, the establishment of working relations between the US and Cuba in the area of marine environmental protection would assist enormously in the contingency planning and cooperation necessary for an early and effective response to an oil spill. The United States and Cuba are already parties to a number of multilateral oil pollution agreements, such as the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) and the 1983 Convention for the protection and Development of the Marine Environment in the Wider Caribbean Region (Cartagena Convention). Both agreements address prevention of pollution of the marine environment by ships from operational or accidental causes. The 1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation also offers a precedent for cooperation. The convention is designed to encourage and facilitate international cooperation and mutual assistance in preparing for and responding to major oil pollution incidents. Signatory nations are tasked with developing and maintaining adequate capabilities to deal with such an emergency. In the case of Cuba and the United States, the capabilities must be transnational, as there is no barrier to the movement of oil from one countrys waters to anothers. The United States, therefore, must develop appropriate regulatory and procedural frameworks for the free movement of equipment, personnel and expertise between the two countries as part of any oil spill response. The 1980 Agreement of Cooperation between the United States and Mexico Regarding Pollution of the Marine Environment by Discharges of Hydrocarbons and Other Hazardous Substances (MEXUS Plan) provides the foundation for a similar protocol with Cuba. This would include the establishment of joint response teams, coordinating roles, rapid incident notification mechanisms, joint operations centers and communication procedures, along with regular exercises and meetings. The United States government, irrespective of the current embargo, has the power to license the sale, lease or loan of emergency relief and reconstruction equipment and the travel of expert personnel to Cuba following an oil spill. Cubas

long-term energy challenges will be a consequence of its future economic growth and rising standard of living within a market environment. This anticipated growth will depend largely on the development of a competitively priced, readily available and environmentally sound long-term energy plan. Cuban energy policy should embrace energy conservation, modernization of the energy infrastructure, and balance in sourcing oil/gas supplies and renewable energy sources that protect the islands environment. The country would benefit from the guidance of a variety of partners, including the United States.

Cuban instability causes Latin American instability, refugee crisis, and distracts the US from critical hotspots including North Korea-reconstructing US policy to Cuba is key to solve Gorrell 5 (Tim, Lieutenant Colonel, CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED
STRATEGIC CRISIS? 3/18, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074) Regardless of the succession, under the current U.S. policy, Cubas problems of a post Castro transformation only worsen. In addition to Cubans on the island, there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority. And there are remnants of the dissident community within Cuba who will attempt to exercise similar authority. A power vacuum or absence of order will create the conditions for instability and civil war . Whether Raul or another successor from within the current government can hold power is debatable. However, that individual will nonetheless extend the current policies for an indefinite period, which will only compound the Cuban situation. When Cuba finally collapses anarchy is a strong possibility if the U.S. maintains the wait and see approach. The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast. In the midst of this chaos, thousands will flee the island.
During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.26 Many were criminals; this

time the number could be

several hundred thousand flee ing to the U.S., creating a refugee crisis. Equally important, by adhering to a negative containment policy, the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems.
Cuba is along the axis of the drug-trafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia. The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact, Cubas

actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs 7.5 tons in 1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.27 While there may be
individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba,

the Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably. In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increases. If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more complicated . Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military forces to Cuba, creating the conditions for another insurgency . The ramifications of this action could very well fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas. A proactive policy now can
mitigate these potential future problems. U.S. domestic political support is also turning against the current negative policy. The Cuban American population in the U.S. totals 1,241,685 or 3.5% of the population.28 Most of these exiles reside in Florida; their influence has been a factor in determining the margin of victory in the past two presidential elections. But this election strategy may be flawed, because recent polls of Cuban Americans reflect a decline for President Bush based on his policy crackdown. There is a clear softening in the Cuban-American community with regard to sanctions. Younger Cuban Americans do not necessarily subscribe to the hard-line approach. These changes signal an opportunity for a new approach to U.S.-Cuban relations. (Table 1) The time has come to look realistically at the Cuban issue. Castro will rule until he dies. The only issue is what happens then? The

U.S. can little afford to be distracted by a failed state 90 miles off its coast. The administration, given the present state of world affairs, does not have the luxury or the resources to pursue the traditional American model of crisis management. The President and other government and military leaders have warned that the GWOT will be long and protracted. These warnings were sounded when the administration did not anticipate operations in Iraq consuming so many military, diplomatic and economic resources. There is justifiable concern that Africa and the Caucasus region are potential hot spots for terrorist activity, so these areas should be secure. North Korea will continue to be an unpredictable crisis in waiting. We also cannot ignore China . What if China resorts to aggression to resolve the Taiwan situation? Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan?

Iran could conceivably be the next target for U.S. pre-emptive action. These are known and potential situations that could easily require all or many of the elements of national power to resolve. In view of such global issues, can the U.S. afford to sustain the status quo and simply let the Cuban situation play out? The U.S. is at a crossroads: should the policies of the past 40 years remain in effect with
Additionally, vigor? Or should the U.S. pursue a new approach to Cuba in an effort to facilitate a manageable transition to post-Castro Cuba?

Refugee crises divert Coast Guard resources---they gut mission effectiveness Margaret D. Stock (Associate Professor, Department of Social Sciences, United States Military
Academy, West Point, New York and Lieutenant Colonel, Military Police Corps, United States Army Reserve) 2001, National Security and Immigration Policy: Reclaiming Terms, Measuring Success, and Setting Priorities http://www.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20111110/ACLURM002826.pdf 7 Fed. Reg. 68924 (Nov. 13, 2002) (A surge in illegal migration by sea threatens national security by diverting valuable United States Coast Guard and other resources from counter-terrorism ...); In re D-J-, 23 I & N Dec. 572 (A.G. 2003) (*T+here is a substantial prospect that the release of such aliens .... [would] encourage future surges in illegal migration by sea ... diverting valuable Coast Guard and DOJ resources from counterterrorism and homeland security responsibilities .)

Coast Guard capabilities are key to naval power projection Scott Decker (LT CMNDER USCG) Feb 2001 The coast guard is capable of conducting and
leading expeditionary harbor defense/port security and Harbor approach defense operations, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA389731
.. .From the Sea touches on this, identifying sealift as a key enabler for joint operations and identifying the potential for Coast Guard involvement. Protection

of our sealift assets is vital to our success as "sea lines of communication carry more than 95 percent of the logistic support for forward-deployed forces.. .Although vessels are vulnerable throughout their voyage, that vulnerability is greatest in the transition area between "blue water" (deep oceans and seas) and "brown water" (coastal regions) and at [the] points of origin and destination."6 This transition area is the Coast Guard's backyard: its units play there everyday .
As America elected to spend the Cold War peace-dividend at home, the Navy sought to increase efficiencies and maximize the use of declining defense funds by improving the multi-mission capabilities of its high-end combatants. As

less capable ships are being decommissioned to save money, the Navy is losing the flexibility it professes is necessary for future success. In essence it is finding itself between the "rocks" of limited defense dollars and the uncharted "shoals" of
asymmetric warfare. Fewer combatants, although highly capable, equate to less forward presence and a net loss when conflict ensues. "If you lose a multi-mission platform, the impact on your overall warfighting capability [is more significant] with the remainder of the force."7 Then CNO ADM Jay Johnson correctly identified the situation in late summer 1999 and recommended a way out: "the Navy must consider increasing the size of its fleet to further diminish the threat of an attack along a coast.. .Simply

put, numbers do matter ."8 While defense spending is likely to rise with the pro-defense Bush administration, it will likely not be enough to support both a significant increase in the number of combatants and the development of a theater missile defense system. The "rocks and shoals" will still exist.
Admiral James Loy, the Coast Guard's current Commandant recently observed, "In the [Cold War] era of a 600-ship Navy, 40 or so Coast Guard cutters were a virtual afterthought. But today with

regional instability and strife around the world along with several hundred coastal patrol boats take on a new significance."9 This statement demonstrates that Coast Guard resources can help
and 116 surface combatants in the Navy, [our 41major] cutters

fulfill the low-end role.

The CINCs have identified these deficiencies as well and are seeking ways to fill the gaps. A 1992

research study on 21s1 century Coast Guard roles and missions asked them the following: "What specialized service could the CG perform for DOD in the next century, and is there a gap in DOD capabilities that the Coast Guard could fill?" The responses ranged from consolidating the Navy's naval control of the shipping mission into the MDZ [maritime defense zone] command

structure to assuming responsibilities for "the low end of the high-low mix of ships." Additional responses addressed providing

capabilities for which the Navy does not have sufficient resources, and presence in low threat areas.10 Seven years later, the Joint Interagency Task Force on Roles and Missions of the United States Coast Guard [hereafter
referred to as' Interagency Task Force'], established by then-President Clinton to "provide advice and recommendations regarding the appropriate roles and missions for the United States Coast Guard through the year 2020,"11 validated this continuing need for Coast Guard involvement, and concluded, "The National Security Strategy and the conclusions of the Quadrennial Defense Review require forces

capable of fighting and winning two nearly simultaneous Major Theater Wars. To effect that strategy, the war-fighting Commanders-in-Chief have incorporated and depend upon Coast Guard assets for their war plans."12 In summation, the CINCs are depending on Coast Guard forcesas key partners in the larger joint USN/USCG harbor defense/port security organization currently in place-to fulfill the vision in Forward...From the Sea that"... U.S. naval forces will assume critical roles in the protection of vital sealift along the strategic lines of approach to the theater of conflict, including the air- and sea-ports of debarkation."13 The Coast Guard is ready to respond: permitting the U.S. to project a "seamless" joint force, filling a critical role in protecting U.S power projection capabilities, and freeing up additional combatants for offensive use.

Reliance on naval mobility and deployment is inevitable because of offshore balancing --- effective naval power is critical to foster cooperation and deescalate all conflicts
England 11 (Gordon England, former secretary of the Navy, James L. Jones, former commandant of the Marine Corps, Vern Clark, former chief of naval operations, Wall Street Journal, July 11, 2011, The Necessity of U.S. Naval Power)
All our citizens, and especially our servicemen and women, expect and deserve a thorough review of critical security decisions. After all, decisions today will affect the nation's strategic position for future generations. The future security environment underscores two broad security trends. First, international political realities and the internationally agreed-to sovereign

rights of nations will increasingly limit the sustained involvement of American permanent land-based, heavy forces to the
more extreme crises. This will make offshore options for deterrence and power projection ever more paramount in support of our national interests. Second, the naval dimensions of American power

will re-emerge as the primary means for assuring our allies and partners, ensuring prosperity in times of peace, and countering anti-access, area-

denial efforts in times of crisis. We do not believe these trends will require the dismantling of land-based forces, as these forces will remain essential reservoirs of power. As the United States has learned time and again, once a crisis becomes a conflict, it is impossible to predict with certainty its depth, duration and cost. That said, the U.S. has been shrinking its overseas land-based installations, so the

ability to project power globally will make the forward presence of naval forces an even more essential dimension of American influence. What we do believe is that uniquely responsive Navy-Marine Corps capabilities provide the basis on which our most vital overseas interests are safeguarded. Forward presence and engagement is what allows the U.S. to maintain awareness, to deter aggression, and to quickly respond to threats as they arise. Though we clearly must be prepared for the high-end threats, such preparation should be made in balance
with the means necessary to avoid escalation to the high end in the first place. The versatility of maritime forces provides a truly unmatched advantage. The sea remains a vast space that provides nearly unlimited freedom of maneuver. Command of the sea allows for the presence of our naval forces, supported from a network of shore facilities, to be adjusted and scaled with little external restraint. It permits reliance on proven capabilities such as prepositioned ships. Maritime capabilities

encourage and enable cooperation with other nations to solve common sea-based problems such as piracy, illegal trafficking, proliferation of W.M.D., and a host of other ills, which if unchecked can harm our friends and interests abroad, and our own citizenry at home. The flexibility and responsiveness of naval forces provide our country with a general strategic deterrent in a potentially violent and unstable world. Most importantly, our naval forces project and
sustain power at sea and ashore at the time, place, duration, and intensity of our choosing. Given these enduring qualities, tough choices must clearly be made, especially in light of expected tight defense budgets. The administration and the Congress need to balance the resources allocated to missions such as strategic deterrence, ballistic missile defense, and cyber warfare with the more traditional ones of sea control and power projection. The maritime capability and capacity vital to the flexible projection of U.S. power and influence around the globe must surely be preserved, especially in light of available technology. Capabilities such as the Joint Strike Fighter will provide strategic deterrence, in addition to tactical long-range strike, especially when operating from

forward-deployed naval vessels. Postured to respond quickly, the Navy-Marine Corps team integrates sea, air, and land power into adaptive force packages spanning the entire spectrum of operations, from everyday cooperative security activities to unwelcomebut not impossible wars of the future.

between major powers. This is exactly what we will need to meet the challenges

Naval power solves global food crisis, Arctic war, Iranian aggression and Israel war --- they all go nuclear
Eaglen 11 research fellow for national security Heritage, and McGrath, former naval officer and director Delex Consulting, Studies and Analysis, 5/16/11 (Mackenzie and Bryan, Thinking About a Day Without Sea Power: Implications for U.S. Defense Policy, Heritage Foundation,) Global Implications. Under a scenario of dramatically reduced naval power, the U nited S tates would cease to be active in any international alliances. While it is reasonable to assume that land and air forces would be similarly reduced in this scenario, the lack of credible maritime capability to move their bulk and establish forward bases would render these forces irrelevant, even if the Army and Air Force were retained at
todays levels. In Iraq and Afghanistan today, 90 percent of material arrives by sea, although material bound for Afghanistan must then make a laborious journey by land into theater. Chinas

claims on the South China Sea, previously disputed by virtually all nations in the region and routinely contested by U.S. and partner naval forces, are accepted as a fait accompli, effectively turning the region into a Chinese lake. China establishes expansive oil
and gas exploration with new deepwater drilling technology and secures its local sea lanes from intervention. Korea, unified in 2017 after the implosion of the North, signs a mutual defense treaty with China and solidifies their relationship. Japan

is increasingly isolated and in 20202025 executes long-rumored plans to create an indigenous nuclear weapons capability. [11] By 2025, Japan has 25 mobile nuclear-armed missiles ostensibly targeting China, toward which Japans historical animus remains strong. Chinas entente with Russia leaves the Eurasian landmass dominated by Russia looking west and China looking east and south. Each cedes a sphere of dominance to the other and remains largely unconcerned with the events in the others sphere. Worldwide, trade in foodstuffs collapses. Expanding populations in the Middle East increase pressure on their governments, which are already stressed as the breakdown in world trade disproportionately affects food importers. Piracy increases worldwide, driving food transportation costs even higher. In the Arctic, Russia aggressively asserts its dominance and effectively shoulders out other nations with legitimate claims to seabed resources. No naval power exists to counter Russias claims. India, recognizing
that its previous role as a balancer to China has lost relevance with the retrenchment of the Americans, agrees to supplement Chinese naval power in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf to protect the flow of oil to Southeast Asia. In exchange, China agrees to exercise increased influence on its client state Pakistan. The great typhoon of 2023 strikes Bangladesh, killing 23,000 people initially, and 200,000 more die in the subsequent weeks and months as the international community provides little humanitarian relief. Cholera and malaria are epidemic. Iran

dominates the Persian Gulf and is a nuclear power. Its navy aggressively patrols the Gulf while the Revolutionary Guard Navy harasses shipping and oil infrastructure to force Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries into Tehrans orbit. Russia supplies Iran with a steady flow of military technology and nuclear industry expertise. Lacking a regional threat, the Iranians happily control the flow of oil from the Gulf and benefit economically from the protection provided to other GCC nations. In Egypt, the decade-long experiment in participatory democracy ends with the ascendance of the Muslim Brotherhood in a violent seizure of power. The United States is identified closely with the previous coalition government, and riots break out at the U.S. embassy. Americans in Egypt are left to their own devices because the U.S. has no forces in the Mediterranean capable of performing a noncombatant evacuation when the government closes major airports. Led by Iran, a coalition of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq attacks Israel. Over 300,000 die in six months of fighting that includes a limited nuclear exchange between Iran and Israel. Israel is defeated, and the State of Palestine is declared in its place. Massive refugee camps are created to house the internally displaced Israelis, but a humanitarian nightmare ensues from the inability of conquering forces to support them. The NATO alliance is shattered. The security of European nations
depends increasingly on the lack of external threats and the nuclear capability of France, Britain, and Germany, which overcame its reticence to military capability in light of Americas retrenchment. Europe depends for its energy security on Russia and Iran, which control the main supply lines and sources of oil and gas to Europe. Major European nations stand down their militaries and instead

make limited contributions to a new EU military constabulary force. No European nation maintains the ability to conduct significant out-of-area operations, and Europe as a whole maintains little airlift capacity.

Korean war goes nuclear, spills over globally Steven Metz 3-13, Chairman of the Regional Strategy and Planning Department and Research
Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, 3/13/13, Strategic Horizons: Thinking the Unthinkable on a Second Korean War, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12786/strategic-horizons-thinking-theunthinkable-on-a-second-korean-war Today, North Korea is the most dangerous country on earth and the greatest threat to U.S. security. For years, the bizarre regime in Pyongyang has issued an unending stream of claims that a U.S. and South Korean invasion is imminent,
while declaring that it will defeat this offensive just as -- according to official propaganda -- it overcame the unprovoked American attack in 1950. Often the press

releases from the official North Korean news agency are absurdly funny, and American policymakers tend to ignore them as a result. Continuing to do so , though, could be dangerous as events and rhetoric turn even more ominous. In response to North Korea's Feb. 12 nuclear test, the U.N. Security Council recently
tightened existing sanctions against Pyongyang. Even China, North Korea's long-standing benefactor and protector, went along. Convulsed by anger,

Pyongyang then threatened a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the United States and South Korea, abrogated the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War and cut off the North-South hotline installed in 1971 to help avoid an escalation
of tensions between the two neighbors. A spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry asserted that a second Korean War is unavoidable. He might be right; for the first time, an official statement from the North Korean government may prove true. No

American leader wants another war in Korea. The problem is that the North Koreans make so many threatening and bizarre official statements and sustain such a high level of military readiness that American policymakers might fail to recognize the signs of impending attack . After all, every recent U.S. war began with miscalculation ; American policymakers misunderstood the intent of their opponents, who in turn underestimated American determination. The conflict with North Korea could repeat this pattern. Since the regime of Kim Jong Un has continued its predecessors tradition of responding hysterically to every action and statement it doesn't like, it's hard to assess exactly what might push Pyongyang over the edge and cause it to lash out. It could be something that the United States considers modest and reasonable, or it could be some sort of internal power struggle within the North Korean regime invisible to the outside world. While we cannot know whether the recent round of threats from Pyongyang is serious or simply more of the same old lathering, it would be prudent to think the unthinkable and reason through what a war instigated by a fearful and delusional North Korean regime might mean for U.S. security. The second Korean War could begin with missile strikes against South Korean, Japanese or U.S. targets, or with a combination of missile strikes and a major conventional invasion of the South -- something North Korea has prepared for many decades. Early attacks might include nuclear weapons , but even if they didn't, the United States would probably move quickly to destroy any existing North Korean nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. The war itself would be extremely costly and probably long. North Korea is the most militarized society on earth. Its armed forces are backward but huge.
It's hard to tell whether the North Korean people, having been fed a steady diet of propaganda based on adulation of the Kim regime, would resist U.S. and South Korean forces that entered the North or be thankful for relief from their brutally parasitic rulers. As the conflict in Iraq showed, the United States and its allies should prepare for widespread, protracted resistance even while hoping it doesn't occur. Extended guerrilla operations and insurgency could potentially last for years following the defeat of North Korea's conventional military. North Korea would need massive relief, as would South Korea and Japan if Pyongyang used nuclear weapons. Stabilizing North Korea and developing an effective and peaceful regime would require a lengthy occupation, whether U.S.-dominated or with the United States as a major contributor. The

second Korean War would force military mobilization in the United States. This would initially involve the military's existing reserve component, but it would probably ultimately require a major expansion of the U.S. military and hence a draft . The military's training infrastructure and the defense industrial base would have to grow. This would be a body blow to efforts to cut government spending in the United States and postpone serious deficit reduction for some time, even if Washington increased taxes to help fund the war. Moreover, a second Korean conflict would shock the global economy and potentially have destabilizing effects outside Northeast Asia .
Eventually, though, the United States and its allies would defeat the North Korean military. At that point it would be impossible for the United States to simply re-establish the status quo ante bellum as it did after the first Korean War. The Kim regime is too unpredictable, desperate and dangerous to

tolerate. Hence regime change and a permanent ending to the threat from North Korea would have to be America's strategic objective. China would pose the most pressing and serious challenge to such a transformation of North Korea. After all, Beijing's intervention saved North Korean dictator Kim Il Sung after he invaded South Korea in the 1950s, and Chinese assistance has kept the subsequent members of the Kim family dictatorship in power. Since the second Korean War would invariably begin like the first one -- with North Korean aggression -- hopefully China has matured enough as a great power to allow the world to remove its dangerous allies this time. If the war began with out-of-the-blue North Korean missile strikes, China could conceivably even contribute to a multinational operation to remove the Kim regime. Still, China would vehemently oppose a long-term U.S. military presence in North Korea or a unified Korea allied with the United States. One way around this might be a grand bargain leaving a unified but neutral Korea. However appealing this might be, Korea might hesitate to adopt neutrality as it sits just across the Yalu River from a China that tends to claim all territory that it controlled at any point in its history. If the aftermath of the second Korean War is not handled adroitly, the

result could

easily be heightened hostility between the United States and China, perhaps even a new cold war. After all, history shows that deep economic connections do not automatically prevent nations from hostility and war -- in 1914 Germany was heavily involved in the Russian economy and had extensive trade and financial ties with France and Great Britain. It is
not inconceivable then, that after the second Korean War, U.S.-China relations would be antagonistic and hostile at the same time that the two continued mutual trade and investment. Stranger things have happened in statecraft.

Plan
Thus the plan: As they pertain to crude oil reservoirs, the United States federal government should lift its restrictions that preclude United States firms from exploring, extracting, refining, importing, or coordinating engineering and safety protocols with the Republic of Cuba.

Contention 3: Solvency
First Plan is effective, topical, and US firms would say yes. Benjamin-Alvarado 10
Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, PhD of Political Science, University of Nebraska, 2010, Cubas Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation, a Brookings Publication obtained as an ebook through MSU Electronic Resources page 125-26

There are numerous areas in the energy sector in which the United States and Cuba can and should cooperate: exploration , energy production , downstream operations , transportation, and auxiliary services. In addition, the opportunity for U.S. firms to invest directly in the development of Cuban energy resources should be created. Recent history shows that Cuba possesses the potential to be a strong regional
trade partner in the area of energy and infrastructure development. It might be premature for U.S. firms to begin opening branch offices along Avenida Quinta in the Miramar district of Havana, but it is rational to consider the benefits that would be drawn from the expansion of trade and cooperation between Cuba and the United States in energy development. There will be obvious limitations on such investment opportunities because of the empresa mixta joint-venture model that the Cuban government employs, but as previously stated, international oil companies are not averse to adjusting their investment models to specific market conditions, and in the case of Cuba it would be no different. In fact, there

has been no lack of interest on the part of American international oil firms in developing a Cuban market. The prevailing Cuban model of jointventure investment and cooperation has proved to be attractive internationally, and there are numerous opportunities in this area for American firms as soon as there are significant changes in the Cuban embargo so that this type of engagement can occur.

Second Cuba also says yes. This spills-into broader cooperation Benjamin-Alvarado 10
Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, PhD of Political Science, University of Nebraska, 2010, Cubas Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation, a Brookings Publication obtained as an ebook through MSU Electronic Resources page 120 Undoubtedly, after fifty years of enmity, there is a significant lack of trust and confidence between the United States and Cuba. This is plain from the almost quaint maintenance of a sanctions regime that seeks to isolate Cuba economically and politically but hardly reflects the dramatic changes that have occurred on the island since 1991, not to mention since 2008, when Fidel Castro officially stepped aside as Cubas president. Now, the

opportunity to advance relations in the energy arena appears to be ripe. Since 2004, representatives from American companies, trade organizations, universities, and think tanks have had the
opportunity to meet with Cuban energy officials. The scope and objectives of Cuban energy development schemes have been disseminated, dissected, and discussed across a number of settings where the interested parties are now familiar with and well versed in the agendas and opportunities that exist in this arena. In public discussions, Cuban

energy authorities have made it clear that their preferred energy development scenario includes working closely with the U.S. oil and gas industry and using state-of-the-art U.S. oil technologies. The assessment from U.S. energy experts on the technical acumen and capability of Cuban energy officials has been overwhelmingly positive. 9 Should the U.S. government and the Obama administration see fit to shift its policy so as to allow broader participation of American academics and practitioners in the energy field to attend conferences and meet with Cuban energy officials, it may pave the way to establishing much-needed familiarity and confidence across these communities.

Drilling is inevitable regardless of the embargo Gonzalez 13

Ivet Gonzlez has been the correspondent for IPS Cuba since 2011.Cuba Diversifies But Energy Focus Still on Oil Inter-Press Service News Agency http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/03/cuba-diversifies-but-energy-focus-still-on-oil/

In January 2012, the

Scarabeo 9 drilling rig was brought to Cuba from Asia to sink an exploratory well into the estimates that there could be up to 20 billion barrels of oil reserves in a 112,000-square kilometre area, although the United States projects a total of about five billion barrels. But in November, Cubas Ministry of Basic Industry announced that the rig would be removed from Cuba, after three
seabed in the Gulf of Mexico. Cuba failed attempts to find a commercially viable well, financed by PDVSA, Spains Repsol, PC Gulf a subsidiary of Malaysias Petronas and Gazpromneft of Russia. After this harsh blow, Cupet reported that the Moscow-based firm Zarubezhneft would explore for oil off north-central Cuba using the Norwegian-owned Songa Mercur drilling platform. The Russian state-run company is drilling a 6,500-metre well in an endeavour that is expected to take six months. The

Cuban government has not lost hope that the country will manage to become self-sufficient in energy. In another important development zone, around the port of El Mariel in the province of Artemisa, bordering Havana, the plan is to create a support base for future oil industry activity. But the need to diversify the energy supply is increasingly seen as a priority in Cubas current economic reform process.

US embargo doesnt work in the context of oil its functionally a unilateral embargo. Sotolongo 11
Kristie, Associate Editor, Downstream Newsletter Group, Hart Energy Publishing Internally quoting Kirby Jones, founder of the Washington-based U.S.-Cuba Trade Association http://www.epmag.com/Production/Cuban-Oil-Rush-Beckons-US-EmbargoReform_86074 If it really is 20 billion, then its a game changer, Jonathon Benjamin-Alvarado, a Cuba oil analyst at the University of NebraskaOmaha, told Time magazine in 2008. It provides a lot more justification for changing elements of the embargo, just as we did when we allowed agricultural and medical sales to Cuba more than a decade ago. Cuba

has indeed been successful at attracting foreign trade despite the U.S. embargo , which most of the world renounced two years after the oil find was reported . In 2006, 182 of 186 members of the United Nations voted on a resolution calling for the U.S. to end its trade sanctions. Its therefore no surprise that countries as diverse as China , Norway , India , Canada , Spain and Brazil are content drilling for oil in Cuban waters.