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VICE CHAIR
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FROM: Dianna Campagna (_/
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e Gorton The attached correspondence from

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is being forwarded to you for information and consideration. A copy has
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also been sent to Team(s) __./___ for their information. If you
K R. Thompson
have any questions, please call me on 331 -4082. Thank you.
pD. Zelikw
arnvE DIRECTOR

TEL (202) 331-4060

FAX (202) 296-5545
www.9-1 Icommissioagov
 F. Aley Allan
825 Lenton Avenue
Baltimore, MD 21212
March 26, 2004

The Honorable Thomas H. Kean

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
301 7th Street S.W. (Room 5125)
Washington, DC 20407

Dear Governor Kean :

In his testimony before your Commission Secretary Rumsfeld said he knew of no

intelligence prior to 9/11 suggesting that aircraft might be used as missiles. What was
missing was plainly imagination, not intelligence. Brain-storming by a group with varied
interests has proved effective,-in non-governmental circles at least,- to stimulate
imagination in dealing with difficult issues. I wonder if the use of aircraft as weapns
would not have been forseen by a brain-storming group within the government.

For example, the Energy Department representative in such a group would have known
that nuclear power stations are specifically designed to withstand the impact of an
aircraft flying, into a reactor; intentionally or otherwise. It would only have been a short
step from that well-recognized risk to conceive of aircraft being deliberately used by
terrorists against reactors and other strategic targets, -provided that terrorism risks had
been put before a brainstorming group.

What concerns me is that use of the brainstorming technique may still not be a practice of
the government with respect not only to terrorism but other critical risks to the country.
Don't you think that in these dangerous times such an approach should be a standing
practice of the government? Should there not be a small but senior interdepartmental
group, with ever changing representation depending on the issue, to study and report
from time to time on critical issues directly to the President and his cabinet, rather than
leaving critical issues closeted within single departments with necessarily limited points
of view ?

Such a group^ for example, starting from the inference that railroads must be a prime
target for terrorists these days might readily imagine that trains could also be used a
weapons^iust like airliners. What's to keep terrorists from ramming a train at full speed
into the Washington DC station, or Grand Central, or some critical industrial facility,
perhaps with explosives added to attain maximum effect ?

I hope some member of the Commission will ask questions to ascertain whether some
such guided imagination facility now exists.

Respectfully yours,
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