Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1. Procedural injury valid and gives special right to assert claim without meet standards for redressability and immediacy. Lujan a. Injuries from abstract procedural rights dont get standing. Lujan: interagency consultation requirement which was violated. 2. If given procedural right, standing when possibility that requested relief will prompt injury-causing party to reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed litigant. Mass v. EPA (where the statute expressly authorized challenges for actions unlawfully withheld) 3. Imminence: Prospective injuries count BUT if relying on future injury must show that its an imminent harmreasonably likely, real and immediate (need that plane ticket!). Lujan a. No standing to get injunction because theres no reason to believe that he will be held in chokehold in the future. Lyons v. LA 4. Interest groups (i.e. enviro) have standing to litigate their own claims and bring claims on behalf of members (Lujan) BUT injury shared by many controversial floodgates to litigation. 5. Bar on generalized grievances: eco-system nexus theory: everything connected so everyone harmed by injury to ecosystem a. PROBLEMS: (a) floodgates (b) becomes policy question and violation of separation of powers to litigate (Scalia: Const. requires that Congress and Pres (Art. II take care) do this, otherwise Congress usurping power and giving it to court). Lujan b. Aesthetic, harms to natural resources count. Ideological interests do not. c. Gen. interests in having the government obey the law do not count. lawsuit for not using notice and comment not enough if notice and comment doesnt directly redress IDd injury i. Counter: injury was reduced odds of success because notice and comment didnt take place. 6. Special solicitude for states in in determining whether they have standing or not because of their stake in protecting quasi-sovereign interests. Mass v. EPA
Constitutional requirements for standing are derived from Art III, which restricts the judicial power of federal courts to cases and controversies that arise under the Constitution, federal laws and treaties. a. Injury: P suffered an injury in fact--invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized and actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical b. Nexus: (1) injury in fact caused by challenged action and (2) can be redressed by the relief sought i. Causation: injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of D, not third party ii. Redressability: must be likely, not merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. II. 3 PRUDENTIAL (JUDGE-MADE) Prudential limitations prevent courts from deciding abstract questions of wide public significance, especially when judicial intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual rights. a. P has to assert her own legal rights or interests. b. Courts dont decide generalized grievances. c. Plaintiffs have to be within zone of interests (this reflected in APA 702) protected or regulated by the provision. i. Consider: 1. Those directly affected by regulation (e.g., car manufacturers) 2. Regulatory beneficiaries (people helped by regulation) 3. Everyone else.
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Major constitutional problems? Remand (with or without vacating) for further consideration by agency. If no, then proceed to Statutory Authority.
Facts: Substantial Evidence Policy: A&C Rulemaking Law: Chevron 553(c), 556-557 Trigger language: a hearing record (Note: not just a hearing) Facts: Substantial Evidence Policy: A&C Law: Chevron Adjudication 554, 556-557 Trigger language: hearing on the record
Facts: A&C Policy: A&C Law: Chevron 553 Notice & Comment *not on the record Licensing, grants, loans Facts: A&C Policy: A&C Law: Mead (Chevron/Skidmore)
II. Informal Adjudications/Exceptions to 553: Interpretive rules/Policy Statements (see outline for pros/cons) a. Some courts apply Mead to determine if Chevron or Skidmore applies i. Was there congressional intent to delegate authority to the agency to speak with the force of law? (In Mead, court says informal adjudication a sign maybe Congress didnt.) 1. Has the agency traditionally made rules with the force of law? 2. Is the rule binding on more than the parties to the matter? 3. Does the statute have formal procedural guidelines that indicate force of law? a. Publication in CFR, hearing on the record, etc. ii. Was the agency interpretation claiming deference an exercise of that authority? (Mere ambiguity no longer enough to get you Chevron consideration). b. Other courts apply Barnhart (interpretive rule later codified through notice and comment, Chevron applied) i. Power of an admin agency to administer a congressionally createdprogram necessarily requires formulation of policy. ii. Interstitial nature of legal question iii. Related expertise of agency iv. Importance of question to admin of the statute v. Complexity of that administration vi. Careful consideration agency has given to question over long period of time. c. When Chevron never applies i. Criminal statutes ii. Statutes interpreted by multiple agencies (no delegation to one agency) iii. Litigation positions iv. Guidance (no force of law) d. If Chevron doesnt apply, apply Skidmore analysis. a. Skidmore Weak Deference: Ct tries to determine what statute means, has the power to substitute its own view. Weight given to agency interpretation depends on the persuasiveness of the interpretation (as opposed to reasonable/permissible of Chevron). Factors to consider: a. Thoroughness of consideration is evident: Did agency carefully consider it at a high level? Did the process by which the agency reached its interpretation require careful consideration? b. Reasoning is valid c. Agency expertise is clear: Does it reflect specialized expertise and broader investigations than available to Ct? d. Uniqueness of facts
b. Chevron Applied i. STEP 1: has Congress spoken to the precise question at issue? (see final sec. for canons) ii. Problems: How clear is clear? 1. Dominant reading: interpret statute as we would in any other case. If not in text and theres ambiguity, start using extratextual tools (text, purpose, history, policy) 2. Other approach: If text not clear, dont use legislative history, just go to step 2, defer to agency if its reasonable. (Very strong reading of Chevron, not normally followed.) 3. If stops at step 1, thats it; court says statute just precludes anything else. MCI iii. POLICY: If Congress wanted to constrain agency discretion by drafting precise language, then the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.
iv. STEP #2 if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 1. Consider whether agency has come to a conclusion that is at odds with the statutes purpose or otherwise conflicts with the statutory scheme/text. 2. Dominant (policy) approach: Consider purpose, statutory scheme and whether construction is at odds with overarching policy. 3. Statute approach: Focus on using canons to determine whether statutory language supports interpretation (issue: step 1 and 2 conflict; no difference). a. POLICY: If we get to this step, conclusion that Congress did not make explicit decision on qs and/or drafted statute to provide for agency discretion. Agency makes decision. Defer to agencys expertise, for which they can be held accountable. b. Consequences of judgment
MCI o If Step 1: Given dictionary def, can be read as clear intent not to provide authority o If Step 2: agency interpretation unreasonable, contrary to purpose/statutory scheme/policy (tariffs central to Comm. Act; no indication Congress delegated/would have delegated authority to get rid of tariff for all but one company) Brown & Williamson o Major question doctrine: Congress would have to be very clear if it intended to grant such a broad authority to the agency. When the authority in question is a big one, we cannot assume delegation from silence or ambiguity.
VI. Has the agency made an acceptable policy determination (i.e. not A&C)?
I. Arbitrary, capricious, abuse of power or otherwise contrary to law (APA 706(2)(A)) - Even if agencys interpretation of its statutory authority is acceptable, ask whether it has made an acceptable policy determination/exercised its discretion appropriately? Apply arbitrary and capricious review unless organic statute says otherwise. a. Cant consider politics: agency action has to be justified by legal requirements or by the agencys expertise or by free-standing articulated policy justifications, NOT politics. Decisions based on politics/ WH preferences dont pass the Supreme Courts A&C test. Mass v. EPA Counter: If accountability is plus (as dissent thinks it is), then WH has to be able to influence what agency does. Then not arbitrary to heed WH pref. because it ensures greater accountability. b. Rulemaking review State Farm (agency followed procedures APA 553, but still A&C) i. A& C if 1. Agency has relied on factors Congress did not intend it to consider; 2. Entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem; 3. Offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency; OR 4. It is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise. ii. To avoid A&C, need rational connection between the facts found and the choice made. 1. Agency must provide explanation for revocation of a prior action; must explain why the new rule effectuates the statute as well as or better than the old rule. a. POLICY: Earlier policy embodied agencys informed judgment about the best course of action. So change must be explained.
If not reasonable, then remand (with or without vacating) for further consideration by agency. If yes, then enforce agency interpretation.
II. Textual Canons a. Ordinary Meaning: when words have acquired no special meaning in trade or commerce, the ordinary (popular) meaning must be used by the court. See Nix v. Hedden i. If competing ordinary meanings, Ct might look to purpose. See Muscarello v. US ii. POLICY: Why go with ordinary meaning rather than technical meaning? 1. Notice: ordinary meaning is comprehensible to regulated party. 2. Ordinary meaning will result in more uniformity and consistency. b. Ejusdem Generis: if words are of the same nature, specific words qualify gen. see Ali, Circ City, Keffeler c. Noscitur a Sociis: word defined by its associates; see Jerecki and Gregory, Dolan, Williams. d. Expressio Unius: a list implies exclusion of whatever isnt on it; see Holy Trinity dissent, Leo Sheep. e. Punctuation: less weight for language inside parenthetical; placement of punctuation relevant f. May vs. shall: When a statute uses mandatory language, it should be interpreted to exclude discretion to take into account equity and policy factors. g. Whole Act Rule: read whole act (look at design of statute as a whole, incl. objective and policy) see how one section can imply limit/scope of other; see Montana, Brown & Williamson, Witkovich h. Identical words, consistent meanings: identical words, phrases within the same statute should be given the same meaning (Lundy), BUT words may be read differently if context and intent different (Cline). i. Avoid redundancy and surpusage: No clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void or insignificant; if two provisions appear to do the exact same thing, then one is being read wrong. j. Titles, provisos: titles, limitations (provided that) not controlling but provide insight. Holy Trinity k. In pari materia: Statutes addressing the same subject matter generally should be read as if they were one law. More weight if enacted by same Congress and contain same language. i. POLICY: Later act can also be read as legislative interpretation of earlier act and helps courts ascertain the meaning of words used in their contemporary setting.
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