G.R. No. L-20442 October 4, 1971 CIRIACO ROBLES, v.

YAP WING FACTS: Appeal in forma pauperis taken by Robles from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated September 12, 1962, dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Robles was an employee of Yap in its contracting business. On July 6, 1961 at about 1:30 p.m. while Robles was dismantling lumber brace in the construction of a bodega which Yap undertook to construct, Yap negligently failed to provide safety measures within the construction premises, as a result of which a piece of lumber fell and hit Robles on the head, causing him physical injuries; Robles was taken to a medical clinic, where he remained unconscious for several hours; Yap defrayed Robles medical expenses; since then Robles was unable to work, thereby losing his expected earnings at an average of P39.00 a week or a total of P2,340.00, more or less, up to the filing of the complaint; that because of the physical injuries sustained by Robles due to Yap's negligence, he suffered mental anguish, anxiety, fright and pain; and that because he was compelled to hire the services of a lawyer he is entitled to recover attorney's fees. ISSUE: Is the negligence committed by Yap a quasi-delict? No. RULING: The suggestion has been made that there is in this case a claim for moral damages suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the negligence of the defendant and that such damages do not come within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act. It should be pointed out first, that the negligence alleged in the complaint consists of the defendant's failure "to provide safety measures within the construction premises," the nature of which negligence is precisely

covered by Section 4-A of the same Act, which makes the employer liable to pay additional compensation (of 50%) to the claimantemployee for failure "to install and maintain safety appliances, or take other precautions for the prevention of accident or occupational disease." Secondly, the alleged negligence was not a quasi-delict in as much as there was a pre-existing contractual relation of employer and employee between the parties (Art. 2176, Civil Code); and in breaches of contract moral damages may be recovered only where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith (Art. 2220), and neither fraud nor bad faith is alleged in the complaint here. In any event, whether or not such an allegation, in relation to the breach of a contract of employment by the employer, resulting in injury to an employee or laborer, would justify a claim for moral damages and place it within the jurisdiction of ordinary courts is a question which we do not decide in this case, not being the issue involved. FRANCISCO V. ONRUBIA, 46 Phil 327 Torts and Damages When Liability for Quasi Delict Arises FACTS: In November 1922, Onrubia was driving his car in Calle Ascarraga, Manila and he overrun the 9 year old son of Francisco which led to his sons death. Francisco sued Onrubia for homicide through reckless imprudence. The lower court acquitted Onrubia as it ruled that Onrubia did not deprive the automobile he was operating at an exaggerated or unreasonable speed, was not responsible for any imprudence, fault, carelessness or negligence whatsoever, and did not violate any regulation in connection with said death. Now Francisco filed a separate civil suit for damages against Onrubia for P4.5k. Onrubia assailed the civil suit arguing that Francisco did not reserve the right to file a separate civil case against him. Francisco grounded the civil suit on Article 1902 which states that Any person who by an act or omission causes damages

to another by his fault or negligence shall be liable for the damage so done. ISSUE: Whether or not Onrubia is civilly liable. RULING: No. In order to establish the civil liability in a criminal case, it is necessary that the same spring from, or be a consequence of, the criminal liability, and, therefore, if a defendant is acquitted of a crime, a judgment, sentencing him to pay a determinate indemnity by reason of the same crime is not possible. A person not criminally liable for a crime or misdemeanor cannot be civilly liable. The full and complete acquittal of Onrubia necessarily implies his innocence of, and freedom from responsibility for, the crime of which he was accused. Though there is another provision of the Civil Code (Article 1093) which states that Those arising from wrongful or negligent acts or omissions not punishable by law shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter Second of Title Sixteen of this book., and said chapter contains Article 1902, it is necessary that the negligence or fault in question be not punished by law. This is not the case in the case at bar; the negligence complained of in this case is punishable by law, however, said negligence does not exist on the part of Onrubia. FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL. G.R. No. 118889, 23 March 1998, 287 SCRA 718 FACTS: This was a two-car collision at dawn. At around 3 o'clock of 21 April 1987, two (2) vehicles, both Mitsubishi Colt Lancers, cruising northward along

Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, Mandaluyong City, figured in a traffic accident. The car bearing Plate No. PDG 435 owned by Lydia F. Soriano was being driven at the outer lane of the highway by Benjamin Jacildone, while the other car, with Plate No. PCT 792, owned by respondent FILCAR Transport, Inc. (FILCAR), and driven by Peter Dahl-Jensen as lessee, was at the center lane, left of the other vehicle. Upon approaching the corner of Pioneer Street, the car owned by FILCAR swerved to the right hitting the left side of the car of Soriano. At that time DahlJensen, a Danish tourist, did not possess a Philippine driver's license. As a consequence, petitioner FGU Insurance Corporation, in view of its insurance contract with Soriano, paid the latter P25,382.20. By way of subrogation, 2 it sued Dahl-Jensen and respondent FILCAR as well as respondent Fortune Insurance Corporation (FORTUNE) as insurer of FILCAR for quasi-delict before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Unfortunately, summons was not served on Dahl- Jensen since he was no longer staying at his given address; in fact, upon motion of petitioner, he was dropped from the complaint. On 30 July 1991 the trial court dismissed the case for failure of petitioner to substantiate its claim of subrogation. On 31 January 1995 respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court although based on another ground, i.e., only the fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently proved but not that of respondent FILCAR, petitioner failed to establish its cause of action for sum of money based on quasi-delict. ISSUE: For damages suffered by a third party, may an action based on quasi-delict prosper against a rent-a-car company and, consequently, its insurer for fault or negligence of the car lessee in driving the rented vehicle?

RULING: The pertinent provision is Art. 2176 of the Civil Code which states: "Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing To sustain a claim based thereon, the following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff. Petitioner failed to prove the existence of the second requisite, i.e., fault or negligence of defendant FILCAR, because only the fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently established, not that of FILCAR. It should be noted that the damage caused on the vehicle of Soriano was brought about by the circumstance that Dahl-Jensen swerved to the right while the vehicle that he was driving was at the center lane. It is plain that the negligence was solely attributable to Dahl-Jensen thus making the damage suffered by the other vehicle his personal liability. Respondent FILCAR did not have any participation therein. PICART v SMITH, 37 Phil 809 Torts and Damages Doctrine of Last Clear Chance FACTS: In December 1912, Picart was riding his horse and while they were on a 75 meter long bridge, he saw Smiths car approaching. Smith blew his horn thrice while he was still at a distance away because Picart and his horse were on Smiths lane. But Picart did not move his horse to the other lane, instead he moved his horse closer to the railing. Smith continued driving towards Picart without slowing down and when he was already so near the horse he swerved to the other lane. But the horse got scared so it turned its body across the

bridge; the horse struck the car and its limb got broken. Picart suffered injuries which required several days of medical attention while the horse eventually died. ISSUE: Whether or not Smith is negligent. RULING: Yes. And so was Picart for planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But Smiths negligence succeeded that of Picart. Smith saw at a distance when he blew his horn that Picart and his horse did not move to the other lane so he should have steered his car to the other lane at that point instead of swerving at the last minute. He therefore had the last clear chance to avoid the unfortunate incident. When Smiths car has approached the horse at such proximity it left no chance for Picart extricate himself and vigilance on his part will not avert injury. Picart can therefore recover damages from Smith but such should be proportioned by reason of his contributory negligence. AFIALDA v. HISOLE, ET AL., 85 Phil 67 Torts and Damages Liability of possessors or users of animals Assumption of Risk FACTS: Afialda was a caretaker of the carabaos owned by Hisole. In March 1947, without any fault from Afialda or any force majeure, one of the carabaos gored him thereby causing his death. Afialdas sister sued Hisole arguing that under the Civil Code, The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even if such animal should escape from him or stray away. This liability shall cease only in case, the damage should arise from force majeure or from the fault of the person who may have suffered it.

ISSUE: Whether or not Hisole is liable in the case at bar as owner of the carabao which killed Afialda. RULING: No. The law uses the term possessor and user of the animal. Afialda was the caretaker of the animal and he was tasked and paid to tend for the carabaos. He, at the time of the goring, is the possessor and the user of the carabao and therefore he is the one who had custody and control of the animal and was in a position to prevent the animal from causing damage. It would have been different had Afialda been a stranger. Obviously, it was the caretakers business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences. This action could have been more appropriately raised in court under the provisions of the Workmens Compensation Act as the risk involve was one of occupational hazards. WALTER SMITH & CO. v CADWALLADER GIBSON, 55 Phil 517 FACTS: A steamer Helen C belonging to Cadwallader struck Smiths old wharf being moored by its captain in the port of Olutanga, Zamboanga, partially demolishing it and throwing the lumber piled thereon in the water. Smith brought suit against Cadwallader for damages to the wharf and the loss of the lumber. Cadwallader maintained that Captain Lasa and all the officers of his steamer were duly licensed and authorized to hold their respective positions at the time wharf in question collapsed, and that all the members of

the crew had been chosen for their reputed skill in directing and navigating the steamer carefully and efficiently. ISSUE: Is Cadwallader Lumber liable for damages due to negligence? RULING: No. The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiffs wharf collapsed was a duly licensed captain, authorized to navigate and direct a vessel of any tonnage, and that Cadwallader contracted his services because of his reputation as a captain. This being so, we are of the opinion that the presumption of liability against the defendant has been overcome by the exercise of the care and diligence of a good father of a family in selecting Captain Lasa, in accordance with the doctrines laid down by this court Cadwallader is therefore absolved from all liability. ALBORNOZ v ALBORNOZ, 98 Phil 785 FACTS: The present appeal refers to two claims presented by Elias Racela against the estate of the deceased Perpetua A. Vda. de Soriano and which were dismissed by the trial court. The first claim is based on a supposed sale of one hectare of land for P1,000 executed by the decedent on July 18, 1933 in favor of the claimant. The second is based on another supposed sale of another part of the Defendants land for P1,000 also, in favor of the claimant, made on September 23, 1933. After the supposed sales were made, the decedent sold the same parcels of land in 1934 to one Soriano Ballesteros, who succeeded in registering the deed of sale in his favor. Claimant attempted to register the deeds executed in his favor but the decedent opposed registration. So claimant brought a criminal

action against the decedent for estafa. The court acquitted the decedent of the charge. RULING: The theory upon which the present claim of Elias Racela is based, is that the deceased sold the parcels of land to him and the latter paid the deceased the price therefor of P2,000. The above- quoted portions of the decision clearly indicate that no actual sale was made and that the deeds were executed for another purpose and were, therefore, simulated sales. Where the judgment in a criminal action contains an express declaration that the basis of claimant's action did not exist, the latter's action for civil liability is barred under section 1 (d) Rule 107 of the Rules of Court which provide: (d) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.

ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily liable. RULING: No. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil action against negligent employers. Garcia is well within his rights in suing Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate civil action and this is more expeditious because by the time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is already serving his sentence and has no property. It was also proven that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees because it was shown that Fontanilla had had multiple traffic infractions already before he hired him something he failed to overcome during hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a separate civil action, Barredo would have only been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not being sued for damages arising from a criminal act (his drivers negligence) but rather for his own negligence in selecting his employee (Article 1903). ZULUETA v PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, 45 SCRA 397

BARREDO v GARCIA AND ALMARIO, 73 Phil 607 Torts and Damages Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from Crimes FACTS: At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanillas taxi collided with a kalesa thereby killing the 16 year old Faustino Garcia. Faustinos parents filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla and reserved their right to file a separate civil suit. Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After the criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit against Barredo the owner of the taxi (employer of Fontanilla). The suit was based on Article 1903 of the civil code (negligence of employers in the selection of their employees). Barredo assailed the suit arguing that his liability is only subsidiary and that the separate civil suit should have been filed against Fontanilla primarily and not him.

FACTS: Zulueta, his wife and daughter were passengers aboard defendants plane from Honolulu to Manila. Upon reaching Wake Island the passengers were advised that they could disembark for a stopover for about 30 minutes. Plaintiff went to the toilet at the terminal building but finding it full walked 200 yards away. Upon returning he told an employee of the defendant that they almost made him miss the flight because of a defective announcing system. He had a discussion with either the plan captain or the terminal manager. He was told that they would open his bags which he refused and he warned them of the consequences. Just the same they opened his bags and found nothing prohibited. They forced him to go out of the plane and left him at Wake Island. His wife had to send him money and he was able to leave Wake Island and return to Manila thru

Honolulu and Tokyo after two days. This action was to recover damages from the defendant. RULING: The records amply establish plaintiffs right to recover both moral and exemplary damages. Indeed, the rude and rough reception plaintiff received at the hands of Sitton or Captain Zentner when the latter met him at the ramp (What in the hell do you think you are? Get on that plane); the menacing attitude of Zentner or Sitton and the supercilious manner in which he had asked plaintiff to open his bags (open your bag, and when told that a fourth bag was missing, I dont give a damn); the abusive language and highly scornful reference to plaintiffs as monkeys by one of PAN AMs employees (who turning to Mrs. Zulueta remarked, will you pull these three monkeys out of here?); the unfriendly attitude, the ugly stares and unkind remarks to which plaintiffs were subjected, and their being cordoned by men in uniform as if they were criminals, while plaintiff was arguing with Sitton; the airline officials refusal to allow plaintiff to board the plane on the pretext that he was hiding a bomb in his luggage and their arbitrary and high-handed decision to leave him in Wake; Mrs. Zuluetas having suffered a nervous breakdown for which she was hospitalized as a result of the embarrassment, insults and humiliations to which plaintiffs were exposed by the conduct of PAN AMs employees; Mrs. Zulueta having suffered shame, humiliation and embarrassment for the treatment received by her parents at the airport all these justify an award for moral damages resulting from mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation thereby suffered by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs were awarded Pesos 500,000.00 and moral damages, Pesos 200,000.00 exemplary damages, Pesos 75,000.00 attorneys fees and Pesos 5,502.85 actual damages.

AIR FRANCE v CARRASCOSO, 18 SCRA 155 FACTS: Air France issued to Carrascoso, a civil engineer, a 1st class round trip ticket from Manila - Rome. During the stopover at Bangkok, the Manager of Air France forced plaintiff to vacate the 1st class seat because there was a "white man" who had better right to the seat. As a result, he filed a suit against Air France where the CFI Manila granted him moral and exemplary damages. ISSUE: Whether or not Carrascoso was entitled to the 1st class seat and consequently, whether or not he was entitled to the damages awarded. YES RULING: To achieve stability in the relation between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket issued is desirable. Quoting the court, "We cannot understand how a reputable firm like Air France could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of the tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of business that the company should know whether or not the tickets it issues are to be honored or not." Evidence of bad faith was presented without objection on the part of the Carrascoso. In the case, it could have been easy for Air France to present its manager to testify at the trial or secure his deposition

but defendant did neither. There is also no evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by the white man. The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a 1st class seat, worse he imposed his arbitrary will. He forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to tourist class just to give way to another passenger whose right was not established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal is conduct, injurious language, indignities and abuse from such employees. Any discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. Exemplary damages were also awarded. The manner of ejectment fits into the condition for exemplary damages that defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. *Bad Faith - state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purpose