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Chinas Real and Present Danger

Now Is the Time for Washington to Worry
By Avery Goldstein
F ROM OUR SEPTEMB ER/ OC TOB ER 2013 ISSUE

Chinese soldiers participating in a drill (Courtesy Reuters)

Much of the debate about Chinas rise in recent years has focused on the potential dangers China could pose as an eventual peer competitor to the United States bent on challenging the existing international order. But another issue is far more pressing. For at least the next decade, while China remains relatively weak compared to the United States, there is a real danger that Beijing and Washington will find themselves in a crisis that could quickly escalate to military conflict. Unlike a long-term great-power strategic rivalry that might or might not develop down the road, the danger of a crisis involving the two nuclear-armed countries is a tangible, near-term concern -- and the events of the past few years suggest the risk might be increasing. Since the end of the Cold War, Beijing and Washington have managed to avoid perilous showdowns on several occasions: in 199596, when the United States responded to Chinese missile tests intended to warn Taiwanese voters about the danger of pushing for independence; in 1999, when U.S. warplanes accidentally bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the NATO air assault on Serbia;
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Avery Goldstein | Imminent Threats to U.S.-China Relations | Foreign Affairs

and in 2001, when a U.S. spy plane collided with a Chinese fighter jet, leading to the death of the Chinese pilot and Beijings detention of the U.S. plane and crew. But the lack of serious escalation during those episodes should not breed complacency. None of them met the definition of a genuine crisis: a confrontation that threatens vital interests on both sides and thus sharply increases the risk of war. If Beijing and Washington were to find themselves in that sort of showdown in the near future, they would both have strong incentives to resort to force. Moreover, the temptations and pressures to escalate would likely be highest in the early stages of the face-off, making it harder for diplomacy to prevent war. THIN RED LINES It might seem that the prospects for a crisis of this sort in U.S.-Chinese relations have diminished in recent years as tensions over Taiwan have cooled, defusing the powder keg that has driven much Chinese and U.S. military planning in East Asia since the mid-1990s. But other potential flash points have emerged. As China and its neighbors squabble over islands and maritime rights in the East China and South China seas, the United States has reiterated its treaty commitments to defend two of the countries that are contesting Chinas claims (Japan and the Philippines) and has nurtured increasingly close ties with a third (Vietnam). Moreover, the Obama administrations pivot, or rebalancing, to Asia, a diplomatic turn matched by planned military redeployments, has signaled that Washington is prepared to get involved in the event of a regional conflict.

China might be less cautious about triggering a crisis -- and less cautious about firing the first shot if a crisis ensued.
Also, the United States insists that international law affords it freedom of navigation in international waters and airspace, defined as lying beyond a countrys 12-mile territorial limit. China, by contrast, asserts that other countries military vessels and aircraft are not free to enter its roughly 200-mile-wide exclusive economic zone without express permission -- a prohibition that, given Beijings territorial claims, could place much of the South China Sea and the airspace above it off-limits to U.S. military ships and planes. Disputes over freedom of navigation have already caused confrontations between China and the United States, and they remain a possible trigger for a serious crisis. It is true that China and the United States are not currently adversaries -- certainly not in the way that the Soviet Union and the United States were during the Cold War. But the risk of a U.S.-Chinese crisis might actually be greater than it would be if Beijing and Washington were locked in a zero-sum, life-and-death struggle. As armed adversaries on hair-trigger alert, the Soviet Union and the United States understood that their fundamentally opposed interests might bring about a war. After going through several nerve-racking confrontations over Berlin and Cuba, they gained an understanding of each others vital interests -- not to be challenged without risking a crisis -- and developed mechanisms to avoid escalation. China and the United States have yet to reach a similar shared understanding about vital interests or to develop reliable means for crisis management. Neither China nor the United States has clearly defined its vital interests across broad areas of the western Pacific. In recent years, China has issued various unofficial statements about its core interests that have sometimes gone beyond simply ensuring the territorial and political integrity of the mainland and its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. Beijing has suggested, for example, that it might consider the disputed areas of the East China and South China seas to be core interests.
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Washington has also been vague about what it sees as its vital interests in the region. The United States hedges on the question of whether Taiwan falls under a U.S. security umbrella. And the United States stance on the maritime disputes involving China and its neighbors is somewhat confusing: Washington has remained neutral on the rival sovereignty claims and insisted that the disputes be resolved peacefully but has also reaffirmed its commitment to stand by its allies in the event that a conflict erupts. Such Chinese and U.S. ambiguity about the redlines that cannot be crossed without risking conflict increases the chances that either side could take steps that it believes are safe but that turn out to be unexpectedly provocative. MORE DANGEROUS THAN THE COLD WAR? Uncertainty about what could lead either Beijing or Washington to risk war makes a crisis far more likely, since neither side knows when, where, or just how hard it can push without the other side pushing back. This situation bears some resemblance to that of the early Cold War, when it took a number of serious crises for the two sides to feel each other out and learn the rules of the road. But todays environment might be even more dangerous. The balance of nuclear and conventional military power between China and the United States, for example, is much more lopsided than the one that existed between the Soviet Union and the United States. Should Beijing and Washington find themselves in a conflict, the huge U.S. advantage in conventional forces would increase the temptation for Washington to threaten to or actually use force. Recognizing the temptation facing Washington, Beijing might in turn feel pressure to use its conventional forces before they are destroyed. Although China could not reverse the military imbalance, it might believe that quickly imposing high costs on the United States would be the best way to get it to back off. The fact that both sides have nuclear arsenals would help keep the situation in check, because both sides would want to avoid actions that would invite nuclear retaliation. Indeed, if only nuclear considerations mattered, U.S.-Chinese crises would be very stable and not worth worrying about too much. But the two sides conventional forces complicate matters and undermine the stability provided by nuclear deterrence. During a crisis, either side might believe that using its conventional forces would confer bargaining leverage, manipulating the other sides fear of escalation through what the economist Thomas Schelling calls a competition in risk-taking. In a crisis, China or the United States might believe that it valued what was at stake more than the other and would therefore be willing to tolerate a higher level of risk. But because using conventional forces would be only the first step in an unpredictable process subject to misperception, missteps, and miscalculation, there is no guarantee that brinkmanship would end before it led to an unanticipated nuclear catastrophe. China, moreover, apparently believes that nuclear deterrence opens the door to the safe use of conventional force. Since both countries would fear a potential nuclear exchange, the Chinese seem to think that neither they nor the Americans would allow a military conflict to escalate too far. Soviet leaders, by contrast, indicated that they would use whatever military means were necessary if war came -- which is one reason why war never came. In addition, Chinas official no first use nuclear policy, which guides the Chinese militarys preparation and training for conflict, might reinforce Beijings confidence that limited war with the United States would not mean courting nuclear escalation. As a result of its beliefs, Beijing might be less cautious about taking steps that would risk triggering a crisis. And if a crisis ensued, China might also be less cautious about firing the first shot. Such beliefs are particularly worrisome given recent developments in technology
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that have dramatically improved the precision and effectiveness of conventional military capabilities. Their lethality might confer a dramatic advantage to the side that attacks first, something that was generally not true of conventional military operations in the main European theater of U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Moreover, because the sophisticated computer and satellite systems that guide contemporary weapons are highly vulnerable to conventional military strikes or cyberattacks, todays more precise weapons might be effective only if they are used before an adversary has struck or adopted countermeasures. If peacetime restraint were to give way to a search for advantage in a crisis, neither China nor the United States could be confident about the durability of the systems managing its advanced conventional weapons.

Chinese analysts seem to overestimate how easy it is to send signals through military actions and underestimate the risks of miscommunication.
Under such circumstances, both Beijing and Washington would have incentives to initiate an attack. China would feel particularly strong pressure, since its advanced conventional weapons are more fully dependent on vulnerable computer networks, fixed radar sites, and satellites. The effectiveness of U.S. advanced forces is less dependent on these most vulnerable systems. The advantage held by the United States, however, might increase its temptation to strike first, especially against Chinas satellites, since it would be able to cope with Chinese retaliation in kind. COMMUNICATION BREAKDOWN A U.S.-Chinese crisis might also be more dangerous than Cold War showdowns because of the unreliability of the existing channels of communication between Beijing and Washington. After the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet Union and the United States recognized the importance of direct communication between their top leaders and set up the MoscowWashington hot line. In 1998, China and the United States also set up a hot line for direct communication between their presidents. But despite the hot lines availability, the White House was not able to contact Chinas top leaders in a timely fashion following the 1999 Belgrade embassy bombing or the 2001 spy-plane incident. Chinas failure to use the hot line as intended might have reflected the reluctance of its leaders to respond until they had reached an internal consensus or until they had consulted widely with their military. The delay might also have reflected Chinas difficulties in coordinating policy, since China lacks a dependable counterpart to the U.S. National Security Council. Whatever the reason, experience suggests that frustrating delays in direct communication are likely during what would be the crucial early moments of an unfolding U.S.-Chinese crisis. Instead, communication between the two countries might initially be limited to either public statements or tacit signals sent through actions. But public statements are aimed at multiple audiences, and nationalist passions in either China or the United States, as well as pressure from allies, might force either side to take a more aggressive public stance than it actually felt was warranted. Absent direct and confidential communication, the two countries might be unable to discuss politically sensitive proposals. They might also be unable to share information that could help head off a disastrous escalation, such as classified details about military capabilities or military maneuvers already under way. Communicating through actions is also problematic, with many possibilities for distortion in sending messages and for misinterpretation in receiving them. Chinese analysts seem to overestimate how easy it is to send signals through military actions and underestimate the risks of escalation resulting from miscommunication. For
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example, the analysts Andrew Erickson and David Yang have drawn attention to Chinese military writings that propose using Chinas antiship ballistic missile system, designed for targeting U.S. aircraft carriers, to convey Beijings resolve during a crisis. Some Chinese military thinkers have suggested that China could send a signal by firing warning shots intended to land near a moving U.S. aircraft carrier or even by carefully aiming strikes at the command tower of the U.S. carrier while sparing the rest of the vessel. But as the political scientist Owen Cot has noted, even a very accurate antiship ballistic missile system will inevitably have some margin of error. Consequently, even the smallest salvo of this kind would entail a risk of inadvertent serious damage and thus unintended escalation. A final important factor that could make a U.S.-Chinese crisis more dangerous than those during the Cold War is geography. The focus of Cold War confrontations was primarily on land, especially in central Europe, whereas a future confrontation between China and the United States would almost certainly begin at sea. This difference would shape a U.S.-Chinese crisis in a number of ways, especially by requiring both sides to make some fateful choices early on. Chinas small fleet of nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and its much larger fleet of conventionally armed attack submarines are most secure when they remain in the shallow waters near the Chinese mainland, where poor acoustics compromise the effectiveness of U.S. undersea antisubmarine operations. Their proximity to Chinese land-based aircraft and air defenses also limits Washingtons ability to rely on its airpower and surface ships to counter them. For Chinas submarine forces to play a role in a showdown with the United States, however, they would have to move out of those safer waters. The prospect of Chinas submarines breaking out would dramatically increase the instability of a crisis. Although U.S. antisubmarine warfare technology would be more effective against Chinas submarines operating in less noisy open waters (where the United States also enjoys air superiority), it would not be perfect: some U.S. naval assets that came within range of surviving Chinese submarines would be at risk. Early in a crisis, therefore, the United States would be tempted to minimize this risk by sinking Chinese attack submarines as they tried to leave their home waters. Especially because there are only a few narrow routes through which Chinese submarines can reach deeper waters, the United States would be tempted to strike early rather than accept an increased risk to U.S. naval forces. Regardless of the U.S. decision, any Chinese attack submarines that managed to reach distant deeper waters would face a use them or lose them dilemma, thanks to their greater vulnerability to U.S. antisubmarine forces -- one more potential trigger for escalation. Chinas nuclear-armed SSBNs present other risks. Under its no-first-use policy, China has clearly stated that any attack on its strategic nuclear forces would justify nuclear retaliation, making a U.S. strike against its SSBNs seem unlikely. Early in a crisis, therefore, Beijing would probably believe that it could safely deploy its SSBNs to distant, deeper waters, where they would be best positioned to execute their launch orders. Such a deep-water deployment, however, would introduce new dangers. One is the possibility that U.S. naval forces might mistake a Chinese SSBN for a conventional attack submarine and fire on it, inviting Chinese nuclear retaliation. Another is the danger that a Chinese SSBN could escalate the conflict without explicit orders from Beijing, owing to the limited communication such submarines maintain with the mainland in order to avoid detection. MANAGING THE RISK The chances of a U.S.-Chinese crisis in the coming years are low, but they are not negligible, and they are made more troubling by the risk of such a confrontation escalating. The most important steps Beijing and Washington can take are those
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that might help prevent crises from developing in the first place. Since uncertainty about the scope of each sides vital interests would be a trigger for such crises, the two countries should deepen political and military exchanges that focus closely on this problem. Even if they cannot achieve full clarity, discussions can help draw attention to what each side believes poses the greatest risks. Although it will be difficult to eliminate the possibility of U.S.-Chinese confrontations, both countries can do more to address the sources of potential instability and improve their ability to manage the risks they would face during a crisis. Leaders in Washington could share their rich experience in crisis management with their Chinese counterparts, emphasizing the importance of policy coordination. In addition, the United States should stress the need for China to use the existing hot line for prompt, direct communication between the countries top leaders during a crisis. China and the United States should also deepen their currently modest military-tomilitary exchanges. Without compromising essential secrets, increasing familiarity with each others military systems and practices would reduce the risk of inadvertent escalation during a showdown. Both sides would be wise to foster greater personal familiarity among the two countries commanding officers, which, in the event of a crisis, would establish a modicum of trust that would be helpful if political leaders sought to de-escalate the conflict. Getting Beijing and Washington to tackle the difficult task of containing a future crisis will not be easy. In the end, it might take the experience of living through a terrifying showdown of the kind that defined the early Cold War. But it should not have to come to that.

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82 comments
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Best Community Juan P alerm
3 months ago

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Realists always assume that the only strategy is one based upon military might and self-interest. One difference between the U.S,-Soviet adversarial relationship and the U.S.-China relationship is that China and the U.S. have so much monetary interaction, unlike that of the former. Neither would escalate a conflict to the degree stated in this article. There is too much at stake. China's military has a direct stake in the Chinese economy and the import-export relationship it has with the U.S. As well, China holds a huge sum of dollars and would never risk the world financial crisis that would occur if the two were to have a military conflict. Even the Chinese know that Taiwan, unlike Hong Kong, is gone and very unlikely to come back to Chinese control. Taiwan won't declare independence despite all the rhetoric and even referendum coming from Taipei. Y es, China and the U.S. will continue to have tension. The hotline doesn't necessarily have to work considering all the other forms of communication out in the world today. Both sides will get the message in any crisis. The realist zero-sum game scenario is dead and the intricate relationship that the U.S. and China are developing is far too important to allow any "minor" conflict (as noted in the article) to undermine such an important global dynamic. Of course China will flex its muscles, but it will do so economically before it does so militarily. This is actually a more sobering thought as a complete economic meltdown would have a far more destructive effect on the relationship which would lead to a potential conflict more than any military first scenario.
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B ing520

Juan Palerm 3 months ago

As a Chinese, you misunderstand our character. Taiwan is an important issue, unlikely to fade away easily. Taiwan is a deep wound in our national pride. The cost we are willing to pay may be much higher than you think. It does not mean we will succeed. It is highly unlikely we would let it go without putting up a fight. I also think you underestimate the desire of Americans to put down Chinese. Americans will never let us have a say in international order which they monopolizes The US ally, Japan, only complicates the issue. Americans have every intention to make us their pussycat and force us to eat whatever they throw at us. They will forever push us to the limit because it is in their gene. Americans are aggressive by nature. They don't feel safe if we are not totally submissive to them. Just look at how Americans treated Japan in 80's.
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Mic hal

Bing520 3 months ago

'Taiwan is a deep wound in our national pride.' Sir, can you explain that to me? And how does Chinese national pride cope with the fact that Taiwanese have no wish to be part of China? I do not wish to stir any fight here but my claim can be easily backed up by reliable data. The ultimate question is, do the Chinese put any consideration into whether people in Taiwan should have any say in determining their fate?
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B ing520

Michal 2 months ago

www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139651/avery-goldstein/chinas-real-and-present-danger

It is a long story. It would take too long to explain. Y ou can google the whole history from various angles. Chinese and Japanese versions are different. Taiwanese version which was published no more than 2 decades ago deviates from both Chinese and Japanese stories. What Taiwan means to China can be understood to a considerable degree by understanding the sentimental complex

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considerable degree by understanding the sentimental complex between Kosovo and Serbia. Serbia is too small a country to dictate her terms. China is huge. if Chinese refuse to have a new perspective on her relationship with Taiwan, the war in my opinion is inevitable. I can understand Taiwan's position and her reliance on the US. The more Taiwan wants to the US to step in, the more China feels Taiwan is a dagger on Chinese throat. If I were to suggest a solution, I'd say that China changes her thinking, but the vast majority of Chinese I spoke to disagree.
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Mic hal

Bing520 2 months ago

Thanks and sorry for late reply. I am aware of some of the complexities, I believe, although would not claim that I understand all of them. The parallel to Kosovo is interesting. However, one big difference is that Kosovo was until recently under Serbian rule whereas there is not a single living soul in China and elsewhere that would remember Taiwan under the control of central government in China. It is documented that MZD was not very interested in Taiwan and even mentioned that Taiwan could seek independence...from Japan of course, neither Nationalist were expressing great interest in Taiwan until before the last years of Japanese control of Taiwan. I am really curios whether there is some consideration among ordinary people in China about whether people in Taiwan should have their say. My anecdotal experience is that there is some understanding of the reluctance on Taiwan's side, but it is very limited anecdotal evidence.
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Michal 2 months ago

Of course I think Taiwan should determine her future by herself. The vast majority of Chinese disagree with me. Nationalist Government from 1911 to 1945 was too weak to do anything about Taiwan. There was a substantial number of Taiwanese working within Nationalist Government during that era. After WW II, the return of Taiwan to China was a main demand from Nationalists, but they ruined the chance to win over Taiwanese by sending a bandit-like military garrison to occupy Taiwan. 14% Taiwanese population immigrated from China after 1949. Taiwanese support for unification with China has dwindled from more than 70% 1989 (prior to Tiananmen Square massacre) to less than 10% 2012. Without democracy, freedom and rule of law, the chance of China's peaceful unification with Taiwan is virtually nil. There were suggestions prior to 1945 that Taiwan should seek independence from Japan because there was no way for China to
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A nas t as ia Mark

Michal 2 months ago

There are two possible answers to this question: how the average joe feels about Taiwan and how the leadership deals with the issue. Most Chinese people have been told from a very early age that Taiwan is and always has been a part of China in a kind of "one day the lost child will come home" type of storyline - with no information or data concerning what people in Taiwan

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information or data concerning what people in Taiwan want/think. Their baby was stolen by the evil men who fought Mao, and one day we will all be reunited China family. It might seem odd but remember - its not as if China asks Chinese people what they want either, so the idea of looking to what citizens want to determine what should happen is grafting a very western perspective onto the whole issue to begin with. The propaganda is all over the place too -- I was once in a cave tour and at the end there was lots of bright colorful lights and a song about how one day, China will be united! As far as the leadership, it does have to do a lot with pride, as in
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K uba ojews k i

Michal 3 months ago

They don't and they shouldn't put that into consideration. Why do western people always want to play democracy everywhere, even where it doesn't belong? West got rid of Kaddafi and now they would all give a lot to have him back, because of "democracy" in north Africa.
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B ing520

Kuba ojewski 2 months ago

I don't think it is a matter of democracy. A democratic China could be more dangerous. Nationalist sentiment is very strong. Japanese PM Abe said that Chinese and Japanese peoples would get along just fine if the Chinese Communist Party stop manipulating the media. It is true that CCP deliberately conceals the Japanese aids and free technical assistances given to China, but I think it more accurate to say that CCP abuses the antiJapan sentiment that has never diminished since Japan's invasion of China. Taiwan is the symbol of that wound.
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Kuba ojewski 3 months ago

I do not know who do you include in 'We'. In any case, point made is pointless, my question has nothing to do with what Western people think. It concerns what Taiwanese want and think. Are you suggesting democracy does not belong to Taiwan? Is that a joke suggestion? Democracy there was not Westimposed but generated from the will of the people to have one. Are you even remotely familiar with the recent history of Taiwan?
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K uba ojews k i

Michal 3 months ago

Oh my, a poor idealist. Do you seriously think China cares about the will of the people on Taiwan? I wouldn't. Democracy doesn't belong to Taiwan if China wants to annex it. If there was no USA, they would've done it already, and there's nothing else to stop them. Simple.
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Mic hal

Kuba ojewski 3 months ago

Alright, I am not an idealist but anyway. What I was interested in was a Chinese perspective on the issue, you can't provide that. Y our assumptions are just that.
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Bing520 2 months ago

The fact that after the Cold War, the U.S. was the only hegemon does
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not mean that the dominance in the international arena will continue. China will continue to increase its wealth, military capability, technological advancement, etc. and will rival the U.S. in the future. The U.S. will have no say in the matter. The one power monopoly will end eventually. Y ou also talk about "national pride" which most people have towards their own nation. However, it is also a subjective element in every relationship that can and does get in the way of logical and rational dialogue between nations and states. Will China and the U.S. go to war over Taiwan? Not if reason is used in the dialogue. To your point about Americans and their inherent aggressiveness, it is obvious your statement is based upon your own anecdotal evidence and not empirical research. I think I argue objectively the opposite in my previous dialogue. To your last pint, China is no pussycat and indeed is a tiger that continues to gain strength. China certainly does not do what the United States says, and we certainly do not have the power (not without creating a world military disaster) to compel China to do what the U.S. says. Japan was an economic powerhouse until their bubble collapsed in the late 80s. That was their own doing and their continued decline is their own doing. To sum up my point, use real evidence in your arguments and don't presume to know what all people in a country are thinking and what is in their genes.
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B ing520

Juan Palerm 2 months ago

I don't disagree with you. Mine is simply a Chinese perspective. Every people believes that their country is peace-loving and nonaggressive and FIRMLY believes the other one is an aggressor. Chinese will always look at Iraq, Korea, Chile, Iran and Vietnam as a fine example of American aggression. Americans will always see Chinese assistance to North Korea, a territorial dispute with her neighbors as proof of her aggressive nature. By the same token, Pivot to Asia is an American way to provide peace and stability and viewed by Chinese as a proof of American threat against Chinese and American means to confine China to a minor role. Chinese point to Panetta's eagerness to sell F-35 to India and American assistance to help South Korea to have longrange cruise missiles that can hit Beijing with ease. It is difficult for Chinese long-term planners to consider Americans as friends. Of course Chinese can wait for American relative decline but no powerful nation has been made into greatness by waiting for their opponents to fade away.
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IA N MCCORRIS TON

Juan Palerm 2 months ago

Americans are not aggressive? Ask that question to people in any of the countries that the U.S. has invaded over the last couple of centuries.
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Juan P alerm

IAN MCCORRISTON 2 months ago

I am quite sure one can find numerous examples of U.S. foreign policy that is considered aggressive. I surely did not discount that. What I did discount is the actual assumption that as individuals, we are aggressive. There are innate aggressive traits in all humans, and being an American does not preclude one to be more aggressive than another. So to clarify my point in the previous statement, show me the empirical
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empirical evidence that statistically shows that American foreign policy from the beginning is inherently aggressive. Tell me what percentage of all foreign policy decisions have been aggressive vs. those that have not been. There are plenty of examples, but I want to see quantification on your part. When I posted my argument against what the author pointed out, I used a rational, logical argument that one is more than welcome to destroy with an even more rational and logical argument. I would like for you to do the same with your point.
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Mark 26

4 months ago

This is a joke-article coming from a bone-head.

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Jimmy W ang

Mark 2 months ago

Mark, Prof. Avery Goldstein is a well reputed professor and an influential scholar in this field of nuclear deterrence and foreign policy. I had the joy of attending his classes during college, and I know you are the bone-head. I'm surprised you even took the time to troll this comment board and leave a comment
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Mark 2 months ago

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Could you elaborate? Even a tiny bit?

B RIA N W E A V E R

Mark 2 months ago

Mark, try researching what the author is discussing, this is a huge issue and actually the subject of my Master's degree thesis. The only issue I see with Prof. Goldstein's essay is talking about Obama's "Asian Pivot". Many are saying there is no "Asian Pivot" Writer Calum Macleod quotes Sadanand Dhume from the American Enterprise Insitute as saying " So far, Obama's 'pivot' to Asia can be summed up in three letters 'MIA'." Also he reports the Washington Think Tank The Heritage Foundation as saying "the Obama administrations 'Asian Pivot' appears to be in name only." Macleod, Calum. China Launches Charm Offensive as Obama Cancels Asia Trip USA Today Oct 4 2013 Accessed Oct. 11, 2013 http://www.rgj.com/usatoday/ar...
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bs et rader

2 months ago

Another strategic studies product brought to you by the interests at Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, the pentagon, and the defense industry consortium. It would be refreshing and certainly lest costly to invest in a knowledge of Chinese history, culture, and commerce.
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W arren82

bsetrader 2 months ago

yup, sounds like someone's trying to get others to draw 'red lines' for them again...red lines push up the bottom line
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bsetrader 2 months ago

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B ing520
bsetrader 2 months ago

Interesting perspective. It has never occurred to me. Eisenhower may be right warning us about military-industrial complex.
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3 months ago

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A ndrewL

2 months ago

China is on the rise. America is in decline. The Chinese strategist knows time is on his side. The American strategist knows time is not. It's the American that will be eager to exploit his military advantage before it's gone. Hence, America is a clear and present danger to China, not the other way around.
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B ing520

AndrewL 2 months ago

Not that simple. Both must have the will to fight and the backing of people. It is not going to be about money or core interest. It is pride which will be coated as core interest.
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A lex andre Charron-t rudel

Bing520 2 months ago

"It is pride which will be coated as core interest." Pretty much; the CPC has been very good about keeping old grudges alive for political, economic, and international gain. Elsewhere it's called revanchism or irredentism, but I suppose that to the CPC it's just plain, old, nationalism. Additionally, I don't think that economics will stop two sides from going to war; back in 1914, plenty of people argued that Germany and Britain were too economically interlinked to go to war........look where that got them. What brought the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente were their obligations and sense of national pride; pride, too, was what--along with the machinations of a crazed madman and economics--was what made Germany make the opening moves of WWII in europe, and it was national pride, ethnocentrism, economics and sheer hubris that encouraged Japanese leaders to engineer the Mukden incident in 1931. The primary drivers of war have always been wealth, nationalism and territory. Both the PRC and the U.S possess all three, and the desire to acquire or retain it, in ample measure.
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Alexandre Charron-trudel 2 months ago

Y ou articulate better.
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A lex andre Charron-t rudel 1 B ing520 1

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Bing520 2 months ago

is that a request, a comment, or a criticism, Bing520?

Alexandre Charron-trudel 2 months ago

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A compliment, Alexander.

MICHA E L ROS E NZW E IG

Bing520 2 months ago

www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139651/avery-goldstein/chinas-real-and-present-danger

This is the worst history lesson ever. Alexandre's nationalist, jingoistic, economy-based theory of early 20th century great power politics is horrendous. Really Bing520? After all of your articulations, you settle for this baseless nonsense? China is mimicking the U.S- trying to dominate Asia like the U.S. dominates the West. It follows realist logic. China is a provocateur that is creating security complications for the U.S. to

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provocateur that is creating security complications for the U.S. to keep Uncle Sam out of its perceived sphere of influence. Since 1949, China has settled many of its territorial disputes, but today has 6 outstanding disputes. Why? Domestically speaking, China is a victim of hypernationalism. Let's now take the time to remember ideology and its sway over bullshit economics. The Cold War ended because two regimes altered their ideas and their world perspective. Soviet-US face-offs were not about economics, it was ideology! Values will always trump money when security implications are concerned, especially those ties to principles of a state's existence. Go ahead China, throw away your burgeoning status over Taiwan. Lose credibility, increase domestic threats capable of threatening the regime. China lacks domestic and external capital to make any big moves. Vegas showmen, always with cards folded
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MICHAEL ROSENZWEIG 2 months ago

@MI CHAEL RO SENZWEI G Nationalism is real and concrete in China. The small confrontation between China and the Philippines was not directed by Beijing but started by a small marine agency which regulates fishing. Beijing had to reigned in by consolidating all the related agencies into one central command in Beijing. Nevertheless, Beijing can't undo the damage because nationalistic hardliners demanded a tougher position. Before the incident, Beijing & Manila regularly held jointly military exercises and enjoyed close cooperation. Many believe concessions to Manila are necessary to mend the relationship but can't prevail over hardliners. This irrationality is at play. Nationalistic sentiment over Taiwan issue is much stronger. There have been no suggestion within or outside the government as well as party to lessen the demand for unification. Indeed China does not have the means to force the change of status quo at this moment, but they are building the military strength and capabilities in anticipation of confronting
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Jim Ziegler

3 months ago

Y ou know, one sort of core customer service principle is that you don't shoot at your customer. China has the wealth it has because of the US buying it's goods. A war would cause a dramatic economic slowdown for China that would last for decades. These folks aren't stupid, nor are they hot heads.
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Jim Ziegler 3 months ago

Assuming Chinese will forever be your submissive partner for a fistful of dollars could be very dangerous.
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Jim Ziegler

Bing520 3 months ago

Fist full of dollars? Try freighters full of dollars... The Chinese have shown themselves to be a fairly rational actor who dislikes the use of force. We have strong economic ties, and good diplomatic ties. There is no reason to believe that the areas that we do disagree are going to flare up into a shooting war.
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Jim Ziegler 2 months ago

www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139651/avery-goldstein/chinas-real-and-present-danger

It is not going to be over money. Americans do not start a war over money. Nor will Chinese. It will always about one thing we

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over money. Nor will Chinese. It will always about one thing we both call principles.
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Bing520 2 months ago

And what principles are those? Sorry, war is about money, and most Chinese have read enough Marx to understand that.
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fdsaasdf 2 months ago

Hard to imagine Korean War or Vietnam War was all about money to Chinese. Even the Sino-India border war has little to do with money. I doubt the Afghanistan or Iraq war is all about money either. Y ou said yourself that one theory does not explain all. Money does not explain all the causes of war. The South China Sea dispute is obviously about economic resources, but it is a stretch to insist that Senkaku dispute is about money. The current economic losses for both China and Japan outweighs the unproven economic potential of those islands.
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Bing520 2 months ago

To quote Lupe Fiasco about the USA in Af/Pak: "what's in Afghanistan? HEROIN. Y ou think that's by mistake? That they can't stop that?" As for the USA's second war in Iraq, there's a clear money component when you look at the trillions doled out for weapons contracts. Way to call me out on my statement that simplistic explanations do not work in international relations :) Please tell me what principles would cause a collision between the USA and PRC. I can't think of anything because both are such running capitalist dogs at this point. And the current economic losses are the reason that neither Japan nor China engages over the islands. There's not enough economic incentive. If there was proven reserves of hydrocarbons, however, that outweigh a few deaths...
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fdsaasdf 2 months ago

I can't ascertain. I speculate the national pride. Chinese want to restore to the old glory lost more than two hundred years ago. Americans want to maintain the glory of a sole superpower they have attained over the past 100 years. I can constantly feel the impatience of Chinese via their writing and daily conversations about a new place for China and a new order by China. I can also feel Americans' desire and determination to maintain their current status as well as their anxiety of being challenged by Chinese.
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Bing520 2 months ago

Is there anything tangible that you can name other than the emotional outbursts online, which is potentially just PR companies on message boards? I mean, a Great Power War is serious business. When the Italian, German and Japanese fascists went on their wars of aggression, a major reason was access to raw materials (as the Germans and Japanese learned, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139651/avery-goldstein/chinas-real-and-present-danger

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access to raw materials (as the Germans and Japanese learned, foreign occupation is not easy). China has no access problems to raw materials because the American Empire is about nonrestrictive trade barriers, a contrast to the British and French Empires, which were their own worst enemies. Chinese people can complain about past glory all they want, but at the end of the day most Chinese seem to realize there are bigger problems than the evil American imperialists -- air quality, food safety, affordable housing, wages, etc. I see these issues are more fundamental to regain a former civilization than fighting a war with foreigners on the other side of the ocean. Further, I don't think China and the USA have democratic
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fdsaasdf 2 months ago

I believe war is irrational. When we embarked on a war, we rationalized our irrationality. A Japanese lord asked his top sword fighter to kill a defying samurai in duet, the sword fighter reasoned with his Lord, "In a duet, a man has to disregard his own safety in order to win. I have a wife and young kids and therefore can't take that risk." The Lord stood up, kicked right in his face and shouted, "Y ou disgrace our clan. I'll kill you if you don't go." A war is an emotional outburst complete with distorted tangible benefits and aspirations. Chinese have irrational expectation of themselves and Americans. Americans irrationally expect Chinese to behave in the way Americans approve of. Politicians, democratically elected or rising through brutal power struggle, are not as rational as we think they should be. Human race rarely failed to raise the exuberant expectation of the outcome of a war preceding the outburst of a war. Y es, I am the one from Foreignpolicy.com. I recognize your handle, too. Y ou are very good at laying out a clear argument. Thank you, my friend.
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Bing520 2 months ago

That's a great point -- war justifies the irrational. I just sincerely hope you're wrong, and a peaceful rise of a great power happens!
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IA N MCCORRIS TON

Bing520 2 months ago

What any country wants is usually about what their leaders want and not necessarily what their citizens want.
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Mic hal

Bing520 2 months ago

Totally and fully agree with you, people tend to have way too simplistic idea about why wars are fought. Usually do not go beyond financial motivation, resource thirst etc.
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IA N MCCORRIS TON

Bing520 2 months ago

When you get down to it all wars are over money.

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Miguel

2 months ago

How is China an enemy when the U.S. built China, and China, in turn, buys off toxic U.S. debt? And the U.S. is still at it, shipping evermore technology and jobs every day
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that goes by. This is done by treaty. General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs. The Trans-Pacific harmonization deals. Etc. How is China a threat when China is a totalitarian corporate conglomerate owned by JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs, Barclays, and all the rest, using the Communist Party and the army as internal managers? How is China an enemy when U.S. conquests in Central Asia are handed out to Chinese-based consortiums? Here's Afghanistan's copper: it's yours Goldman Sachs, via your Chinese enterprises. These are the usual Cold War like con games. Back in the Cold War you also had NATO building up the Soviets with industry, technology and finance, but they were incredible enemies at the end of the day right? Well, the only ones who suffered from the "clash of titans" were the Third World, with NATO and the USSR playing their dialectical games, and managed to keep those countries underdeveloped, at constant conflict, so as to buy them off on the cheap, and rule them. And it's very profitable in the war departments too, with the big military contractors
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A LDO MA TTE UCCI

2 months ago

Pity China, it just cant win with Prof. GOLDSTEIN. It defines vital interests? It risks getting involved in defending them (this is what happened to the US in Vietnam). It remains vague about them? This may lead to war through miscalculation. It delays the use of the hotline in order to achieve a (hopefully reasonable) consensus in the reply? It could be interpreted as Chinese inscrutability. It might strike first conventionally, lest the US smother Chinese forces with high tech (This is what the Japanese did at Pearl Harbor). By deploying its SSBN, it might invite an attack from the daughter of USS Maddox. Id like Prof. GOLDSTEIN for providing such a splendid example of China paranoia. Has it possibly ever occurred to him that when confronted with a global hegemon, a regional power may be forced to react, and that stop hegemonic bullying may be the simplest and best way forwards? Not one line of the article is wasted on US restraint!
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Ivan Terrible

2 months ago

To simplify it down to the level of cartoons, China military might does not scare me. Chinese are he whipping boy of the Asia. Everybody in Asia kicked their butt: Soviets did it on small scale, Japanese did it, even Vietnamese did it. No obvious reason why that should change
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Ivan Terrible 2 months ago

I could not agree more. Chinese military might, experiences and officer caliber are of dubious quality. PLA may possess some advanced technology in missile. It is however limited in scope and striking capabilities. The officer corp is subjugated by political commissars who are less trained and possess much smaller military competency. Many officers are firmly convinced that the numerical superiority will overcome any technological deficiency. A PLA officer not aligned with political commissars will not be in line for promotion. It says a lot about the quality of PLA military commanders. PLA is upgrading its officers, but the effort is resisted and sabotaged by its own officers whose promotions to a very largest extent are dependent upon personal connections, instead of demonstrated competency. Average Chinese are made to believe China is a militarily powerful nation. The leadership understands the true capabilities of the military forces, but do not hesitate to fool their citizens into believing that their leaders have toiled hard to build a worthy defense force. That's why China is extremely cautious to deploy
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build a worthy defense force. That's why China is extremely cautious to deploy or even to display her military might. Once it is tested, the bubble bursts.
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