My Background

The Future of z 2001 – Present : University of Maryland

Cooperative Threat Reduction ß Research Fellow; Ph.D. student
z 2001 – Present : Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC)
ß Consultant, DoD Cooperative Threat Reduction Program
Charles L. Thornton z 1998 – 2001 : SAIC
Center for International & Security Studies ß Program Management Support, Russian Nuclear Weapons
School of Public Policy, University of Maryland Protection, Control, & Accounting, Cooperative Threat Reduction
Directorate, Defense Threat Reduction Agency
z 1994 – 1998 : SAIC
Presentation to:
South Korean Delegation ß Policy & Program Management Support, FSU Nuclear Weapons &
Washington Seminar on Cooperative Threat Reduction Fissile Material Security, Cooperative Threat Reduction Program,
Center for Strategic and International Studies Office of the Secretary of Defense
07 December 2005
Charles L. Thornton December 2005 1 Charles L. Thornton December 2005 2

Agenda
z A Theoretical Context

z Lessons from Recurring Themes

z CTR Expansion

A Theoretical Context

Contact Information:
clt@umd.edu [through 2006]
clthornton@yahoo.com [permanent]
PO Box 60428, Potomac, Maryland 20859 USA
+1 301 332 7869 [mobile]
+1 202 318 7795 [fax – private line]
The views and data expressed in this presentation are
my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of my
university, institute, company, or other affiliated
organization. Moreover, the views and data expressed
in this presentation should not be construed as official
U.S. Government information or policy.

Charles L. Thornton December 2005 3 Charles L. Thornton December 2005 4

 Thought Experiment: Inventing CTR
z What if we could start from scratch?
z How would we design the program?
z What are the alternative US policy options? Should the
program be implemented on its own, or in a supporting role?
z Why would a state choose to accept foreign threat reduction
assistance? What are that state’s alternative policy options?
Who would make the policy decisions?
z How would we want to measure the effectiveness/success of
the program?
z How would we design the life-cycle of the program? What is
the end point, or final objective? What is the critical path; how
do we get there?
Conceptual 1: Broad Look
z An arrangement through which states work together to address
common security objectives, generally implemented below the
formal treaty level, and involving the donation of equipment
and services from one state to another
z Effort to extend financial and technical support to dismantle
delivery systems and to secure and control warheads and
fissile materials
z Evolution: process of constructive engagement on a topic both
sides would allow to occur [BEACHHEAD PRINCIPLE]
ß Common purpose – stable managerial control
ß Direct collaboration for mutual benefit, as opposed to
deterrent relationship
z Process of transformation of security relationship from
confrontation to collaboration

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Conceptual 2: Traditional Arms Control Taxonomy 1: Preventive Defense Continuum

z 1961: arms control and military strategy are not antithetical; formal arms confidence & security parallel unilateral
control treaties building measures initiatives
indeed, arms control should be considered a supplementary
means of achieving strategic objectives

z Basic principles:
ß reducing the risk of war
ß reducing the cost of preparing for war
ß reducing the damage should war occur formal cooperative executive agreements
security arrangements & consultative
z 1993: cooperative engagement became the appropriate & military alliances arrangements
principle for dealing with the new security threats

z 9/11: arms control no longer an independent endeavor with

tenuous links to broader national and international security z CTR: links with above, but something new
policies

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 Taxonomy 2: Where does CTR fit? Taxonomy 3: Models for CTR
z Arms Control: Treaties z Cooperative Security: CBMs
Use
ß Written agreements ß Intangibles
Intervention Defense & Mitigation
ß Verification ß Interactions of military officers
and civilian officials
Active Defenses ß Goals/objectives
Counterforce Passive Defenses ß Mil-to-mil programs
Consequence
ß Limitations; reductions
Preemption ß Int’l project management
Management

Pre Post
z Foreign Aid: Marshall Plan
z Collective Security: NATO
ß Contain Communism
Interdiction Cooperative ß NATO model of continual
Threat Reduction ß Post war reassurances among historical
Export Controls Arms Control adversaries
Treaty ß Intended to head off perceived
Regulations threat vice existing forces ß Akin to the Nunn-Lugar
Control Roll Back ß Buy American interaction of military officers,
bureaucrats, business
ß Export American contracting executives, and scientists
Acquisition and business practices
Source:

Charles L. Thornton December 2005 9 Charles L. Thornton December 2005 10

Evolution in Thinking About CTR

formal arms confidence & security parallel unilateral
control treaties building measures initiatives

Lessons from Recurring Themes

formal cooperative executive agreements
security arrangements & consultative
& military alliances arrangements

CTR supporting other policy tools

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 Dismantlement versus Nonproliferation
z Tension between two concepts/objectives of dismantlement versus
nonproliferation
z CTR’s original name: Safe, Secure Dismantlement
z Original legislative emphasis on dismantlement, then quickly
evolved toward nonproliferation
ß Nonetheless, stable managerial control over nuclear operations
was prominent driver at original program conception
Donor-Client Psychology
z Important to US authorizers and implementers
ß “Our money” and “we’re the victors” attitude
ß Rejected principle of reciprocity
z Significant impact on Russian perceptions
ß Psychology of dependence – real; resentment of it
z Statutory linkages: congressional certification requirements

z Tension between US objectives/concerns versus Russian (or other
foreign) objectives/concerns
z Result: ‘coercive threat reduction’
z Where the process has worked well, the parties have subordinated
this theme
ß Successful projects: mutual relationship

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Modes of Expansion
z Vertical: more of the same
ß Expanding existing FSU projects

z Horizontal: expansion of the cooperative aspects of the program to

a conceptual basis for bilateral relations
ß Transforming the security relationship
CTR Expansion
ß Replacing, or at least subordinating, MAD

z Geographical: applied to other regions

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 Generalizing the Model: CTR’s Drivers CTR’s Principles & Concepts
z Arms Control Treaty/Agreement Obligations z Cooperation

z Safety & Security z Expectations

z Economic Disintegration
z Flexibility/Adaptability

z Military Security
z Relationships

z Political Instability
z Economic and Industrial Development

z Other

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Venues for a General Model Conclusions

z Are we currently in a position to initiate major new policy?
z Bilateral Programs ß No: dramatic changes in policy made only during formative moments
ß Therefore, the expansion of Threat Reduction must be evolutionary
z Multilateral
z Too much focus on the transferability of specific projects as designed to
be implemented in the FSU
z Non-Governmental Organizations
z Better: focus on the transferability of the Nunn-Lugar principles as
conceived in early post-Cold War era
z Professional & Commercial Associations
z Policy of incremental possibilities [BEACHHEAD PRINCIPLE]
z Scientific Laboratories ß Keep doors open
ß Adjust policies as needed
z International Organizations
ß Build trust
ß Hope more doors open
z International Groups

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 Discussion

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