GARCILLANO vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (G.R. No. 170338 , December 23, 2008) FACTS: Garcillano (in G.R. No.

170338) filed a Petition for Prohibition to restrain the House Representatives Committees from using the tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and for any other purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed to desist from further using the recordings in any of the House proceedings. Ranada and Agcaoili (in G.R. No. 179275), retired justices of the CA, filed a Petition for Prohibition to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution. Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and one of the resource persons summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at its hearings, moved to intervene as petitioner in G.R. No. 179275. While both petitions involve the "Hello Garci" recordings, they have different objectivesthe first is poised at preventing the playing of the tapes in the House and their subsequent inclusion in the committee reports, and the second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation. ISSUES (1) WON petitioners have legal standing. [YES] (2) WON there is an actual case or controversy. [NO: against the House of Rep. YES: against the Senate] HELD (The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the second, G.R. No. 179275.) LOCUS STANDI General Rule: Legal standing or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental act x x x," thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only

when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Exception/Liberal application: However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, the Court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent direct injury test. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo articulates that a "liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings. Garcillano = direct injury. Ranada and Agcaoili = concerned citizens, taxpayers, and members of the IBP. Intervenor Sagge = alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings. Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the execution of the laws and that intervenor Sagge asserts his constitutional right to due process, they satisfy the requisite personal stake in the outcome of the controversy by merely being citizens of the Republic. Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the petitioners and intervenor Sagge advance constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. The issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, and should be resolved for the guidance of all.34 Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal attitude it has shown in prior cases climaxing in the more recent case of Chavez, the

Court recognizes the legal standing of petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili and intervenor Sagge. ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY Versus House of Representatives Court dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic. Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution of actual cases and controversies. By actual cases, we mean existing conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of the Court will amount to an advisory opinion. The power of judicial inquiry does not extend to hypothetical questions because any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Neither will the Court determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. A case becomes moot when its purpose has become stale. It is unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be enforced. The Court notes that the recordings were already played in the House and heard by its members. There is also the widely publicized fact that the committee reports on the "Hello Garci" inquiry were completed and submitted to the House in plenary by the respondent committees. Having been overtaken by these events, the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being moot and academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished. Versus the Senate As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ANTONIO LAUGA Y PINA ALIAS TERIO [G.R. No. 186228. March 15, 2010.]

Facts: Antonio Lauga was accused of the crime of QUALIFIED RAPE. On 12 October 2000, Lauga entered a plea of not guilty. During the pre-trial conference, the prosecution and the defense stipulated and admitted: (a) the correctness of the findings indicated in the medical certificate of the physician who examined AAA; (b) that AAA was only thirteen (13) years old when the alleged offense was committed; and (c) that AAA is the daughter of the appellant. On trial, three (3) witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely: victim AAA; her brother BBB and one Moises Boy Banting, a "bantay bayan" in the barangay. Their testimonies revealed the following: In the afternoon of 15 March 2000, AAA was left alone at home. AAA's father, the appellant, was having a drinking spree at the neighbor's place. Her mother decided to leave because when appellant gets drunk, he has the habit of mauling AAA's mother. Her only brother BBB also went out in the company of some neighbors. At around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, appellant woke AAA up; removed his pants, slid inside the blanket covering AAA and removed her pants and underwear; warned her not to shout for help while threatening her with his fist; and told her that he had a knife placed above her head. He proceeded to mash her breast, kiss her repeatedly, and "inserted his penis inside her vagina." Soon after, BBB arrived and found AAA crying. Appellant claimed he scolded her for staying out late. BBB decided to take AAA with him. While on their way to their maternal grandmother's house, AAA recounted her harrowing experience with their father. Upon reaching their grandmother's house, they told their grandmother and uncle of the incident, after which, they sought the assistance of Moises Boy Banting. Moises Boy Banting found appellant in his house wearing only his underwear. He invited appellant to the police station, to which appellant obliged. At the police outpost, he admitted to him that he raped AAA because he was unable to control himself.

The following day, AAA submitted herself to physical examination. Dra. Josefa Arlita L. Alsula, Municipal Health Officer of x x x, Bukidnon, issued the Medical Certificate, which reads: hyperemic vulvae with 4 o'clock & 6 o'clock freshly lacerated hymen; (+) minimal to moderate bloody discharges 2 to an alleged raping incident. On the other hand, only appellant testified for the defense. He believed that the charge against him was ill-motivated because he sometimes physically abuses his wife in front of their children after engaging in a heated argument, and beats the children as a disciplinary measure. He went further to narrate how his day was on the date of the alleged rape. He alleged that on 15 March 2000, there was no food prepared for him at lunchtime. Shortly after, AAA arrived. She answered back when confronted. This infuriated him that he kicked her hard on her buttocks. Appellant went back to work and went home again around 3 o'clock in the afternoon. Finding nobody at home, he prepared his dinner and went to sleep. Later in the evening, he was awakened by the members of the "Bantay Bayan" headed by Moises Boy Banting. They asked him to go with them to discuss some matters. He later learned that he was under detention because AAA charged him of rape. On 8 July 2006, the Regional Trial Court, rendered its decision finding appellant guilty of rape qualified by relationship and minority, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It also ordered him to indemnify AAA P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity with exemplary damages of P25,000.00. On 30 September 2008, the decision of the trial court was AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS by the Court of Appeals. The appellate court found that appellant is not eligible for parole and it increased both the civil indemnity and moral damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. On 24 November 2008, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the appellant's notice of appeal. This Court required the parties to simultaneously file their respective supplemental briefs, but both manifested that they will no longer file supplemental pleadings.

The lone assignment of error in the appellant's brief is that, the trial court gravely erred in finding him guilty as charged despite the failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, because: (1) there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her brother BBB; (2) his extrajudicial confession before Moises Boy Banting was without the assistance of a counsel, in violation of his constitutional right; and (3) AAA's accusation was illmotivated. Lauga argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a "bantay bayan," the confession was inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such requirement. Issue: Whether or not Laugas alleged confession with a "bantay bayan" and the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution are admissible in evidence. Held: In the case of People v. Malngan, the court held that the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. The court needs to ascertain whether or not a "bantay bayan" may be deemed a law enforcement officer within the contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution. Pursuant to Section 1 (g) of Executive Order No. 309 issued on 11 November 1987, as amended, a Peace and Order Committee in each barangay shall be organized "to serve as implementing arm of the City/Municipal Peace and Order Council at the Barangay level." The composition of the Committee includes, among others: (1) the Punong Barangay as Chairman; (2) the Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan; (3) a Member of the Lupon Tagapamayapa; (4) a Barangay Tanod; and (5) at least three (3) Members of existing BarangayBased Anti-Crime or neighborhood Watch Groups or a Non Government Organization Representative wellknown in his community. This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangaybased volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the "bantay bayan," are recognized by the local government unit to perform 3

functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a "bantay bayan," particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned. The extrajudicial confession of Lauga, which was taken without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence. The conviction of Lauga was not deduced solely from the assailed extrajudicial confession but "from the confluence of evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As to the credibility of the witnesses for the Prosecution, Lauga assails the inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her brother BBB. AAA testified that BBB accompanied her to the house of their grandmother. Thereafter, they, together with her relatives, proceeded to look for a "bantay bayan." On the other hand, BBB testified that he brought her sister to the house of their "bantay bayan" after he learned of the incident. The testimony of AAA does not run contrary to that of BBB. Both testified that they sought the help of a "bantay bayan." Their respective testimonies differ only as to when the help was sought for, which this Court could well attribute to the nature of the testimony of BBB, a shortcut version of AAA's testimony that dispensed with a detailed account of the incident. CORINTHIAN GARDENS ASSOCIATION, INC., vs. SPOUSES REYNALDO and MARIA LUISA TANJANGCO, and SPOUSES FRANK and TERESITA CUASO [G.R. No. 160795. June 27, 2008.] Facts: Tanjangcos owned Lot 68 & Lot 69 in Corinthian Gardens. Spouse Cuasos, on the other hand, own Lot 65 which is adjacent to the Tanjangcos' lots. Before the Cuasos constructed their house on Lot 65, a relocation survey was necessary. Corinthian referred Engr. De Dios to the Cuasos. Before, during and after the construction of the said house, Corinthian

conducted periodic ocular inspections in order to determine compliance with the approved plans pursuant to the Manual of Rules and Regulations of Corinthian. Unfortunately, after the Cuasos constructed their house employing the services of C.B. Paraz & Construction Co., Inc. (C.B. Paraz) as builder, their perimeter fence encroached on the Tanjangcos' Lot 69 by 87 square meters. No amicable settlement was reached between the parties. Thus, the Tanjangcos demanded that the Cuasos demolish the perimeter fence but the latter failed and refused, prompting the Tanjangcos to file with the RTC a suit against the Cuasos for Recovery of Possession with Damages. Eventually, the Cuasos filed a Third-Party Complaint against Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De Dios. The Cuasos ascribed negligence to C.B. Paraz for its failure to ascertain the proper specifications of their house, and to Engr. De Dios for his failure to undertake an accurate relocation survey, thereby, exposing them to litigation. The Cuasos also faulted Corinthian for approving their relocation survey and building plans without verifying their accuracy and in making representations as to Engr. De Dios' integrity and competence. The Cuasos alleged that had Corinthian exercised diligence in performing its duty, they would not have been involved in a boundary dispute with the Tanjangcos. Thus, the Cuasos opined that Corinthian should also be held answerable for any damages that they might incur as a result of such construction. On March 30, 1993, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the Tanjangcos. It ruled that the Cuasos' perimeter wall encroached on the land of the Tanjangcos by 87 square meters. It, however, ruled that the Cuasos were builders in good faith, and gave the Tanjangcos the option to sell and the Cuasos the option to buy the encroaching portion of the land, at a price to be agreed upon by the parties within sixty (60) days from receipt of the said Decision. In the event that the Cuasos were unable and unwilling to purchase the said portion, the perimeter wall should be demolished at the latter's expense. The RTC also ordered the Cuasos to pay monthly rentals of P2,000.00 commencing from the time of the filing of the complaint. The RTC likewise held that C.B. Paraz 4

was grossly negligent in not taking into account the correct boundaries of Cuasos' lot when it constructed the house. It, thus, ordered C.B. Paraz to pay moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees to the Tanjangcos and the Cuasos. The third-party complaint against Corinthian and Engr. De Dios, on the other hand, was dismissed for lack of cause of action. The Tanjangcos filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said RTC Decision which the RTC, however, denied. Dissatisfied with the RTC ruling, the Tanjangcos, the Cuasos, and C.B. Paraz all appealed to the CA. Issue: 1. Whether or not there is legal basis for the Court of Appeals to hold petitioner Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. liable to pay 5% of the judgment money to Sps. Tanjangco on account of the encroachment made by Sps. Cuaso 2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals has legal basis to increase unilaterally and without proof the amount prayed for in the Complaint, i.e., P2,000.00, as reasonable compensation for the use and enjoyment of the portion of the lot encroached upon, to P10,000.00. Held: Undeniably, the perimeter fence of the Cuasos encroached on Lot 69 owned by the Tanjangcos by 87 square meters as duly found by both the RTC and the CA in accordance with the evidence on record. As a result, the Tanjangcos suffered damage in having been deprived of the use of that portion of their lot encroached upon. The CA's findings and conclusions are substantiated by the evidence on record and are more in accord with law and reason. Indeed, it is clear that Corinthian failed to exercise the requisite diligence in insuring that the Cuasos abide by its Manual of Rules and Regulations, thereby resulting in the encroachment on the Tanjangcos' property. Corinthian cannot and should not be allowed to justify or excuse its negligence by claiming that its approval of the Cuasos' building plans was only limited to a socalled "table inspection"; and not actual site measurement. To accept some such postulate is to put a premium on negligence. Corinthian was not organized solely for the defendants Cuasos. It is also

the subdivision of the plaintiffs-spouses Tanjangcos and of all others who have their dwelling units or abodes therein. Since it is an approval tainted with negligence, the necessary and inevitable consequences which law and justice attach to such negligence must, as a matter of law and justice, also necessarily attach to Corinthian.

Corinthian is negligent. Its approval of the plan is tainted with negligence. Petitioner is found negligent under the TEST. The MRRC provides that no new constructions can be started without the approval of the petitioner association. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that Corinthian, through its representative, in the approval of building plans, and in the conduct of periodic inspections of on-going construction projects within the subdivision, is responsible in insuring compliance with the approved plans, inclusive of the construction of perimeter walls. Corinthians failure to prevent the encroachment of the Cuasos perimeter wall into Tanjangcos property despite the inspection conducted constitutes negligence and, at the very least, contributed to the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos. NB 1. The court here categorized the case as falling under tort. Take note that there are discussions regarding similarity or difference of a QD and a tort. (just thinking out loud) 2. This is another case where the court ruled using Article 2176 despite the fact that there is an existing contractual obligation between the parties. (just a thought to ponder on) SJS V Atienza G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007 J. Corona Facts: On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027 and Atienza passed it the following day. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. 5

These were the Pandacan oil depots of Shell and Caltex. But the city of Manila and the DOE entered into an MOU which only scaled down the property covered by the depots and did not stop their operations. In the same resolution, the Sangguniandeclared that the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. It was extended to 2003. Petitioners filed for mandamus in SC urging the city to implement Ordinance 8027. Respondents defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has been superseded by the MOU and the resolutions and that the MOU was more of a guideline to 8027. Issues: 1. Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals, and 2. Whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027 Held: Yes to both, Petition granted Ratio: 1. Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Courtmandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. The petitioner should have a welldefined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act and it must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. Unless the right to the relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will not issue. When a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in interest and they need not show any specific interest. Petitioners are citizens of manila and thus have a direct interest in the ordinances.

On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. "One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. 3. Need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manilaexpressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. JESUS CUENCO vs. TALISAY TOURIST SPORTS COMPLEX, INC. and MATIAS B. AZNAR III [G.R. No. 174154, October 17, 2008] FACTS: Petitioner leased from respondent a property to be operated as a cockpit. Upon expiration of the contract, respondent company conducted a public bidding for the lease of the property. Petitioner participated in the bidding. The lease was eventually awarded to another bidder. Thereafter, petitioner formally demanded, through several demand letters, for the return of his deposit in the sum of P500, 000.00. It, however, all remained unheeded. Thus, petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money maintaining that respondents acted in bad faith in withholding the amount of the deposit without any justifiable reason. In their Answer, respondents countered that petitioner caused physical damage to the leased premises and the cost of repair and replacement of materials amounted to more than 6

P500,000.00. The RTC issued a Pre-trial Order in which respondent admitted that there is no inventory of damages. The respondents later offered an inventory which was admitted by the said trial court. The RTC ruled favorably for the petitioner. The CA reversed said decision. ISSUE: Whether a judicial admission is conclusive and binding upon a party making the admission. HELD: Yes. Obviously, it was on Coronado's testimony, as well as on the documentary evidence of an alleged property inventory conducted on June 4, 1998, that the CA based its conclusion that the amount of damage sustained by the leased premises while in the possession of petitioner exceeded the amount of petitioner's deposit. This contradicts the judicial admission made by respondents' counsel which should have been binding on the respondents. Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. A party may make judicial admissions in (1) the pleadings, (2) during the trial, by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or (3) in other stages of the judicial proceeding. The stipulation of facts at the pre-trial of a case constitutes judicial admissions. The veracity of judicial admissions require no further proof and may be controverted only upon a clear showing that the admissions were made through palpable mistake or that no admissions were made. Thus, the admissions of parties during the pre-trial, as embodied in the pre-trial order, are binding and conclusive upon them. Respondents did not deny the admission made by their counsel, neither did they claim that the same was made through palpable mistake. As such, the stipulation of facts is incontrovertible and may be relied upon by the courts. The pre-trial forms part of the proceedings and matters dealt therein may not be

brushed aside in the process of decision-making. Otherwise, the real essence of compulsory pre-trial would be rendered inconsequential and worthless. Furthermore, an act performed by counsel within the scope of a "general or implied authority" is

MARTURILLAS V PEOPLE G.R. No. 163217; PANGANIBAN; Apr 18, 2006 NATURE Petition for Review seeking to set aside [1] CA Decision affirming (with modifications as to the award of damages) the RTC Davao City Decision finding Celestino Marturillas (former Brgy Capt of Gatungan, Bunawan District, Davao City) guilty of homicide in Criminal Case No. 42091-98; and the CA resolution denying MR. FACTS: Version of the Prosecution -Nov 4, 1998, abt 6pm: Cecilia Santos called her husband Lito and their neighbor and kumpare Artemio Pantinople for supper. After eating, Artemio returned to the bench in front of the Santosas store and sat on it together with his three children. Lito was still eating supper in their kitchen when he heard a gunshot. From a distance of about 10meters, he also noticed smoke and fire coming from the muzzle of a big gun. Moments later, he saw Artemio clasping his chest and staggering backwards to the direction of Litos kitchen. Artemio shouted to him, Tabangi ko Pre, gipusil ko ni kapitan, (Help me, Pre, I was shot by the captain). Lito did not approach Artemio right after the shooting incident because Cecilia warned him that he might also be shot. Lito did not see the person who shot Artemio because his attention was then focused on Artemio. -Shortly, Lito saw Ernita Pantinople, the wife of Artemio, coming from her house towards the direction where Artemio was sprawled on the ground. Ernita was hysterical, jumping and shouting, Kapitan, bakit mo binaril and aking asawa. She also repeatedly cried for help. Lito then went out of their house and approached Artemio who was lying dead near a banana trunk more than 5meters from his house. Some of their neighbors answered Ernitas call for help and approached them. -When the shooting incident happened [abt 7:30pm], Litos house was illumined by a lamp. Their open-type kitchen (no walls) gave him an unobstructed view of Artemio who was about 5meters away from where he 7

was positioned at that time. Although there was a gemilina tree growing in the space in between his house and the store of Artemio, the same did not block his view of Artemio. Likewise, the coconut trees and young banana plants growing at the scene of the crime did not affect his view. -At the same instance, Ernita was also in their kitchen preparing milk for her baby who was then lying on the floor of their kitchen. When she was about to put the bottle into the babys mouth, she suddenly heard the sound of a gunburst followed by a shout, Help me Pre, I was shot by the captain. She immediately pushed open the window of their kitchen and saw the accused wearing a black jacket and camouflage pants running towards the direction of the back portion of Litos house. From there, the accused crossed the street and disappeared. Ernita saw the accused carrying a long firearm which looked like an M-14 rifle and also sensed that accused had some companions with him because she heard the crackling sound of the dried leaves around the place. She had a clear view of accused at that time because their place was wellillumined by the full moon that night and by the two (2) fluorescent lamps in their store. She immediately went out of their house and ran towards Artemio who tried to speak to her but could not do so because his mouth was full of blood. She repeatedly called her neighbors for help; a few responded to her calls and approached them; no brgy tanod or any member of the CFO and CAFGU came to help. -While waiting for the police, Ernita did not allow Artemios body to be touched by anybody. After more than 2hours, [around 10pm] the police arrived, together with a photographer named Fe Mendez who took pictures of the crime scene. Ernita and Lito then approached PO2 Operario and informed him that accused was the one responsible for the shooting. PO2 Operario stayed at the crime scene for about 1hour and waited for the funeral vehicle to pick up the body of Artemio. When the funeral hearse arrived, PO2 Operario told the crew to load Artemios body into the vehicle. Thereafter, he then boarded again their mobile car together with Lito Santos. -Armed with the information that accused was the one responsible for the shooting of Artemio, PO2 Operario proceeded to the house of accused and informed him that he was a suspect in the killing of Artemio. He then invited accused to go with him to the police station and also to bring along with him his M-14 rifle. Accused did Evidence not say anything. He just

got his M-14 rifle and went with the police to the police station where he was detained the whole night of Nov 4, 1998. Accused did not also give any statement to anybody about the incident. The following day, accused was transferred by the police to Tibungco Police Station where he was detained. -Alicia Pantinople, the 44-year old sister of Artemio, after learning about the incident and seeing his brother sprawled lifeless on the ground went around the Bunawan Police Station and noticed a locked door. When she peeped through the hole of the said door, she saw accused reclining on a bench about 2 meters away from the door. He was wearing a brown shirt, black jacket and a pair of camouflage pants. He was also wearing brown shoes but he had no socks on his feet. Seeing that the accused was tapping the floor with his right foot, Alicia confronted him, asking Nong Listing I know that you can recognize my voice. It is me. Why did you kill my brother? What has he done wrong to you? Accused did not answer her. -Nov 5, 1998: Dr. Danilo Ledesma, a medico-legal officer of the Davao City Health Department, conducted an autopsy on Artemios cadaver. His Necropsy Report No. 76 summarized his findings to the effect that the cause of death was a gunshot wound entering at the anterior right side of the chest, perforating the body of the sternum, the heart and the upper lobe of the left lung, and forming an irregular exit at the posterior chest wall left side. During the trial, Dr. Ledesma explained that the trajectory of the bullet indicates that his assailant was in a lower position than Artemio when the gun was fired. Since the wound was negative of powder burns, the assailant must have been at a distance of more than twenty-four (24) inches when he fired his gun at Artemio. He did not also find any bullet slug inside the body of Artemio indicating that the bullet went through Artemios body. Artemios heart and lungs were lacerated and his stomach contained partially digested food particles indicating that he had just eaten his meal when he was shot. Version of the Defense: -Nov 4, 1998, abt 8:30 pm: Marturillas was roused from his sleep by his wife since two brgy kagawads wanted to see him. Dazed after just having risen from bed, he was rubbing his eyes when he met the two Kagawads inside his house. He was informed that a resident of his barangay, Artemio Pantinople, had just been shot. At once, he ordered his Kagawads to assemble the members of the SCAA (Special 8

Civilian Armed Auxiliary) so that they could be escorted to the crime scene some 250 meters away. As soon as the SCAAs were contacted, they then proceeded to the crime scene to determine what assistance they could render. -While approaching the store owned by the Pantinoples and not very far from where the deceased lay sprawled, Marturillas and his team was met by Ernita Pantinople who was very mad and belligerent, immediately accusing him of having shot her husband instead of Lito Santos who was his enemy. Marturillas was taken aback by the instant accusation against him. Not being able to talk sense with Ernita, he and his companions backed off to avoid a heated confrontation. They decided to go back to his house. -Upon reaching his house, he instructed Kagawad Jimmy Balugo to contact the Bunawan Police Station and inform them what transpired. Not knowing the radio frequency of the local police, Kagawad Balugo instead radioed officials of nearby Brgy San Isidro requesting them to contact the Bunawan PNP for police assistance since someone was shot in their locality. Moments later, PO2 Mariano Operario and another police officer arrived at Marturillas house, informing him that he was the principal suspect in the slaying of Artemio Pantinople. Upon their invitation, Marturillas immediately went with the said police officers for questioning at the Bunawan Police Station, taking with him his government-issued M-14 Rifle and one magazine of live M-14 ammunition which he turned over for safe keeping with the Bunawan PNP. Such fact is reflected in Bunawan PNPs police blotter to have occurred at around 10:45 pm, Nov 4, 1998. -Nov 5, 1998: Marturillas was subjected to paraffin testing by the PNP Crime Laboratory in Davao City. The next day, the PNP Crime Laboratory released Physical Sciences Report No. C-074-98 finding Marturillas NEGATIVE for gunpowder nitrates. -On this same day, PO2 Operario, after preparing all the affidavits of Ernita Pantinople and her witnesses, prepared and transmitted a Complaint to the City Prosecution Office recommending that Marturillas be indicted for Murder. [see case for full text of the affidavits]. On the basis of these affidavits, then 2nd Asst. City Prosecutor Raul B. Bendigo issued a Resolution finding sufficient evidence to indict Accused for the crime of Homicide and not Murder as alleged in the Affidavit-Complaint.

-Defense witness Ronito Bedero testified that on the night Artemio Pantinople was shot, he was at his house and he saw an unidentified armed man flee from the crime scene who later joined two other armed men near a nangka tree not far from where deceased was shot. All three later fled on foot towards the direction of the Purok Center in Brgy Gatungan. He noticed that one of the three men was armed with a rifle but could not make out their identities since the area where the three men converged was a very dark place. After the three men disappeared, he saw from the opposite direction Marturillas and his team of kagawads and 3 SCAA members going to the scene of the crime but they did not reach the crime scene. A little later, he saw the Marturillas group return to where they came from. -Dominador Lapiz testified that he was one of the first persons who went to the crime scene where he personally saw the body of deceased lying at a very dark portion some distance from the victims house and that those with him at that time even had to light the place with a lamp so that they could clearly see the deceased. He also testified that there were many coconut and other trees and bananas in the crime scene. He also testified that the house of Lito Santos was only about 4meters from the crime scene, while the house of victim-Artemio Pantinople was about FIFTY (50) meters away. He testified that there was no lighted fluorescent at the store of deceased at the time of the shooting. His testimony also revealed that when the responding policemen arrived, Lito Santos immediately approached the policemen, volunteered himself as a witness and even declared that he would testify that it was Marturillas who shot Artemio Pantinople. He further testified that immediately after he went to the crime scene, the widow of the victim and the children were merely shouting and crying and it was only after the policemen arrived that the widow uttered in a loud voice, Kapitan nganong gipatay mo ang akong bana? Ruling of RTC and CA: -The guilt of petitioner had been established beyond reasonable doubt. He was positively identified as the one running away from the crime scene immediately after the gunshot. This fact, together with the declaration of the victim himself that he had been shot by the captain, clearly established the latters complicity in the crime. -No ill motive could be ascribed to the prosecution witnesses. Thus, their positive, credible and unequivocal testimonies were accepted as 9

sufficient to establish the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. -Both courts also rejected Marturillas defenses of denial and alibi, saying these were necessarily suspect, especially when established by friends or relatives, and should thus be subjected to the strictest scrutiny. At any rate, alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses found to be more credible. Hence, this Petition. ISSUES 1. WON the prosecutions evidence is credible. 2. WON the evidence is sufficient to convict him of homicide. HELD 1. YES. Basic is the rule that the Supreme Court accords great weight and a high degree of respect to factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA. Although there are recognized exceptions to the conclusiveness of the findings of fact of the trial and the appellate courts, petitioner has not convinced this Court of the existence of any. Re: Positive Identification -Ernitas testimony that she saw Marturillas at the crime scene is credible because the spot where Artemio was shot was only 30 meters away from her house. Undoubtedly, Ernita is familiar with the accused, who is her neighbor, and a long-time brgy capt of the locality when the incident took place. Ernita was also able to see his face while he was running away from the crime scene. The identification of a person can be established through familiarity with ones physical features. Once a person has gained familiarity with one another, identification becomes quite an easy task even from a considerable distance. Judicial notice can also be taken of the fact that people in rural communities generally know each other both by face and name, and can be expected to know each others distinct and particular features and characteristics. -Ernitas recognition of the assailant was made possible by the lighted two fluorescent lamps in their store and by the full moon. In corroboration, Lito testified that the place where the shooting occurred was bright. The trees and plants growing in between Ernitas house and the place where Artemio was shot to death did not impede her view of the assailant. To be sure, the prosecution presented photographs of the scene of the crime and its immediate vicinities. These photographs gave a

clear picture of the place where Artemio was shot. Admittedly, there are some trees and plants growing in between the place where the house of Ernita was located and the spot where Artemio was shot. Notably, however, there is only one gemilina tree, some coconut trees and young banana plants growing in the place where Artemio was shot. The trees and banana plants have slender trunks which could not have posed an obstacle to Ernitas view of the crime scene from the kitchen window of her house especially so that she was in an elevated position. -Given the proper conditions, the illumination produced by a kerosene lamp, a flashlight, a wick lamp, moonlight, or starlight is considered sufficient to allow the identification of persons. In this case, the full moon and the light coming from two fluorescent lamps of a nearby store were sufficient to illumine the place where petitioner was; and to enable the eyewitness to identify him as the person who was present at the crime scene. Settled is the rule that when conditions of visibility are favorable and the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be accepted. Even where the circumstances were less favorable, the familiarity of Ernita with the face of petitioner considerably reduced any error in her identification of him. Neither was there any indication that Ernita was impelled by ill motives in positively identifying petitioner. Re: Inconsistency Between Affidavit and Testimony Although Ernita stated in her testimony that she had recognized the victim as her husband through his voice, it cannot necessarily be inferred that she did not see him. Although she recognized him as the victim, she was still hoping that it was not really he. Thus, the statement in her Affidavit that she was surprised to see that her husband was the victim of the shooting. Ex parte affidavits are usually incomplete, as these are frequently prepared by administering officers and cast in their language and understanding of what affiants have said. Nevertheless, the alleged inconsistency is inconsequential to the ascertainment of the presence of petitioner at the crime scene. They referred only to that point wherein Ernita ascertained the identity of Artemio as the victim. They did not relate to Ernitas identification of petitioner as the person running away from the crime scene immediately after she heard a gunshot. A2010 10

Re: Statements Uttered Contemporaneous with the Crime -It was to be expected that, after seeing the victim stagger and hearing the cry for help, Santos would shift his attention to the person who had uttered the plea Help me pre, I was shot by the captain. A shift in his focus of attention would sufficiently explain why Santos was not able to see the assailant. Santos never pointed to petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime. His statements corroborated those of Ernita and therefore simply added credence to the prosecutions version of the facts. If it were true that he had an ulterior motive, it would have been very easy for him to say that he had seen petitioner shoot the victim. Re: Dying Declaration -Rule 130.37: The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death. -Statements identifying the assailant, if uttered by a victim on the verge of death, are entitled to the highest degree of credence and respect. Persons aware of an impending death have been known to be genuinely truthful in their words and extremely scrupulous in their accusations. The dying declaration is given credence, on the premise that no one who knows of ones impending death will make a careless and false accusation. Hence, not infrequently, pronouncements of guilt have been allowed to rest solely on the dying declaration of the deceased victim. -To be admissible, a dying declaration must 1) refer to the cause and circumstances surrounding the declarants death; 2) be made under the consciousness of an impending death; 3) be made freely and voluntarily without coercion or suggestions of improper influence; 4) be offered in a criminal case, in which the death of the declarant is the subject of inquiry; and 5) have been made by a declarant competent to testify as a witness, had that person been called upon to testify. -The law does not require the declarant to state explicitly a perception of the inevitability of death. The perception may be established from surrounding circumstances, such as the nature of the declarants injury and conduct that would justify a conclusion that there was a consciousness of impending death. Even if the declarant did not make an explicit statement of that realization, the degree and seriousness of the words and the fact that death occurred shortly afterwards may be considered as sufficient evidence that the

declaration was made by the victim with full consciousness of being in a dying condition. -As found by the CA, the dying declaration of the victim was complete, as it was a full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his meaning. It [was] complete and [was] not merely fragmentary. Testified to by his wife and neighbor, his dying declaration was not only admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule, but was also a weighty and telling piece of evidence. Re: Res Gestae -The fact that the victims statement constituted a dying declaration does not preclude it from being admitted as part of the res gestae, if the elements of both are present. -Rule 130.42: Part of the res gestae. -Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae. -Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants or the victims of, or the spectators to, a crime immediately before, during, or after its commission. These statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion, without any opportunity for the declarant to fabricate a false statement. An important consideration is whether there intervened, between the occurrence and the statement, any circumstance calculated to divert the mind and thus restore the mental balance of the declarant; and afford an opportunity for deliberation. -A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule, when the following requisites concur: 1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; 2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and 3) the statements concerned the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. -All these requisites are present in this case. The principal act, the shooting, was a startling occurrence. Immediately after, while he was still under the exciting influence of the startling occurrence, the victim made the declaration without any prior opportunity to contrive a story implicating petitioner. Also, the declaration concerned the one who shot the victim. Thus, the latters statement was correctly appreciated as part of the res gestae. -Aside from the victims 11

statement, that of Ernita -Kapitan, ngano nimo gipatay ang akong bana? (Captain, why did you shoot my husband?) -- may be considered to be in the same category. Her statement was about the same startling occurrence; it was uttered spontaneously, right after the shooting, while she had no opportunity to concoct a story against petitioner; and it related to the circumstances of the shooting. 2. YES. The totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to sustain the conviction of petitioner. The dying declaration made by the victim immediately prior to his death constitutes evidence of the highest order as to the cause of his death and of the identity of the assailant. This damning evidence, coupled with the proven facts presented by the prosecution, leads to the logical conclusion that petitioner is guilty of the crime charged. SC considered the ff: a. Santos testified that he had heard a gunshot; and seen smoke coming from the muzzle of a gun, as well as the victim staggering backwards while shouting, Help me pre, I was shot by the captain. b. Ernita testified that she had heard a gunshot and her husbands utterance, Help me pre, I was shot by the captain, then saw petitioner in a black jacket and camouflage pants running away from the crime scene while carrying a firearm. c. Ernitas statement, Captain, why did you shoot my husband? was established as part of the res gestae. d. The version of the events given by petitioner is simply implausible. As the incumbent barangay captain, it should have been his responsibility to go immediately to the crime scene and investigate the shooting. If he were really innocent, he should not have simply left. e. The prosecution was able to establish motive on the part of petitioner. The victims wife positively testified that prior to the shooting, her husband was trying to close a real estate transaction which petitioner tried to block. This showed petitioners antagonism towards the victim. -These pieces of evidence indubitably lead to the conclusion that it was petitioner who shot and killed the victim. Where an eyewitness saw the accused with a gun seconds after the gunshot and the victims fall, the reasonable conclusion is that the accused had killed the victim. -To be sure, conviction in a criminal case does not require a degree of proof that, excluding the possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof that

produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. That some pieces of the above-mentioned evidence are circumstantial does not diminish the fact that they are of a nature that would lead the mind intuitively, or by a conscious process of reasoning, toward the conviction of petitioner. Circumstantial, vis- -vis direct, evidence is not necessarily weaker. Re: Paraffin Test & Corpus Delicti - The negative paraffin test result and the prosecutions failure to present the gun used in the shooting is not enough to exculpate the accused from the crime. The choice of what evidence to present, or who should testify as a witness is within the discretionary power of the prosecutor and definitely not of the courts to dictate. -A negative paraffin test result is not a conclusive proof that a person has not fired a gun. It is possible to fire a gun and yet be negative for nitrates, as when culprits wear gloves, wash their hands afterwards, or are bathed in perspiration. -The prosecution was able to give sufficient proof of the corpus delicti -- the fact that a crime had actually been committed. [Corpus delicti] is the fact of the commission of the crime that may be proved by the testimony of eyewitnesses. In its legal sense, corpus delicti does not necessarily refer to the body of the person murdered, to the firearms in the crime of homicide with the use of unlicensed firearms, to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom, or x x x to the seized contraband cigarettes. Re: Alibi -As held by the CA: [Petitioners] alibi is utterly untenable. For alibi to prosper, it must be shown that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Here, the locus criminis was only several meters away from [petitioners] home. In any event, this defense cannot be given credence in the face of the credible and positive identification made by Ernita. Disposition Petition is denied. Assailed Decision and Resolution are affirmed with modifications. [SC reviewed amount of damages, since an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review. SC awarded P50k as indemnity ex delicto, P25k for temperate damages, P50k for moral damages, P312k for loss of earning capacity, P20k for attorneys fees, plus costs.] Declaration Against Interest

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