Cuevas v Munoz Dec. 2000 Parties Petitioner Justice Serafin R. Cuevas substituted by Artemio G.

G. Tuquero, as SOJ Respondent Juan Antonio Munoz Facts The Hong Kong Magistrates Court issued a warran t for the arrest of Munoz for acceptingbribes in violation of a HK ordinance and for conspiring to defraud.Later, the Philippines DOJ was requested by the Mutual Legal Assistance Unit of the Hong KongDOJ for the provisional arrest of Munoz pursuant to the RP-HK Extradition Agreement. The request wasforwarded to the NBI. Subsequently, a warrant for the arrest of Munoz was issued by the RTC.Munoz filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application forpreliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus assailing the validity of the Order of Arrest, which the CA granted on the ff. grounds: 1) that the request was unauthenticated and merefacsimile copies which are insufficient to form a basis for its issuance; 2) that the 20 day period underPD 1069 or the Philippine extradition law was not amended by the RPHK extradition agreement whichprovides for a 45 day period for provisional arrest; 3) the judge issued it without having personallydetermined the existence of probable cause; and 4) the requirement of dual criminality under thePhilippine extradition law has not been satisfied as the crimes complained of are not punishable byPhilippine laws.

iii)The municipal law does not subordinate an international agreement iv)The supporting documents for the request need not be authenticated v)There was factual and legal bases in determining probable cause vi)The offense of accepting an advantage as an agent is punishable under the Anti-Graftand Corrupt Practices Act. Issue Whether the provisional warrant of arrest issued by the RTC was void Ruling Sec. 20 of PD 1069 provides that the requesting state may, pursuant to the relevant treaty orconvention and while the same remains in force, request for the provisional arrest of the accused,pending receipt of the request for extradition.In urgent cases, the person sought may, in accordance with the law of the requested Party, beprovisionally arrested on the application of the requesting Party. There was urgency in the present case as there was a concern of Munoz being a flight risk if hewill be informed of the pending request for extradition especially given the fact that if he will be foundguilty of the charges against him, the penalties are of such gravity as to increase the probability of Munoz absconding if allowed provisional liberty.Sec. 20 (d) of PD 1069 provides that if within a period of 20 days after the provisional arrestthe Secretary of Foreign Affairs has not received the request for extradition, the accused shall bereleased from custody. While the RPHK Extradition Agreement provides for 45 days. Cuevas argument that the latter agreement amended PD 1069 has been rendered moot and academic by thefact that the Phil. DOJ had already received a request for extradition as early as 12 days after hisprovisional arrest.Contrary to Munozs contention, the request for extradition need not be filed in court, ratheronly need be received by the requested state. The request, as well as the accompanying documents, are valid despite lack of authentication. The pertinent extradition law does not provide for a requirement of authentication for the provisionalarrest. Moreover, the authenticated copies of the decision or sentence imposed upon Munoz by HK andthe warrant of arrest has already been received by the Phil. Furthermore, the extradition

Cuevas, as Sec. of DOJ filed the instant petition.Munoz filed for release contending that since he has been detained beyond 20 days, themaximum for the provisional arrest, without a request for extradition being received by the DOJ, heshould be released.Cuevas, on the other hand, avers that: i)The Philippine DOJ had already received a formal request for extradition. ii)There was urgency for the provisional arrest

agreementonly requires authentication for the request of extradition and not for the provisional arrest.Provisional arrest is a solution to the impending risk of flight as the process of preparing aformal request for extradition and its accompanying documents is time-consuming and leakageprone. Thus, it is an accepted practice for the requesting state to rush its request in the form of a telex ordiploma tic cable or facsimile. The temporary hold on private respondents privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restrainton his right to due process which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he decide toresist the request for his extradition to HK. There is no denial of due process as long as fundamentalfairness is assured a party.As to Munoz contention that it should be the Foreign Diplomat who should send the requestfor provisional arrest, as required by PD 1069, the invoked provision only provides for the request forextradition and not the provisional arrest. There is sufficient compliance with the law if the request forprovisional arrest is made by an official who is authorized by the government of the requesting state tomake such a request and the authorization is communicated to the requested state. There was sufficient factual and legal basis for the dete rmination of probable cause as arequisite for the issuance of the Order of Arrest. Probable cause is the existence of such facts andcircumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense hasbeen committed by the person sought to be arreste d. The judge sufficiently complied with therequirement of personal determination if he reviews the information and the documents attachedthereto, and on the basis thereof forms a belief that the accused is probably guilty of the crime withwhich he is being charged. He need not examine personally the complainant and the witnesses HARVEY V. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO [162 SCRA 840; G.R. NO. 82544; 28 JUN 1988] Facts: This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners are the following: American nationals Andrew Harvey, 52 and Jonh Sherman 72. Dutch Citizen Adriaan Van Den Elshout, 58. All reside at Pagsanjan Laguna respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders to the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to apprehended

petitioners at their residences. The Operation Report read that Andrew Harvey was found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the after Mission Report read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and subjects confirmed being live-in for sometime now. Seized during the petitioners apprehension were rolls of photonegatives and photos of suspected child prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes were also found. Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They were apprehended 17 February1988 after close surveillance for 3 month of the CID in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of the arrested aliens opted for self-deportation. One released for lack of evidence, another charged not for pedophile but working with NO VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to face deportation proceedings. On 4 March1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against aliens for being undesirable aliens under Sec.69 of Revised Administrative Code. Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against petitioners for violation of Sec37, 45 and 46 of Immigration Act and sec69 of Revised Administrative Code. Trial by the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced the same date. Petition for bail was filed 11March 1988 but was not granted by the Commissioner of Immigration. 4 April1988 Petitioners filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988. Issues: (1) Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of existence of probable cause. (2) Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches and seizures by CID agents. (3) Whether or Not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to petitioners.

Held: While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it violates the declared policy of the state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well being of the youth. The arrestof petitioners was based on the probable cause determined after close surveillance of 3 months. The existence of probable cause justified thearrest and seizure of articles linked to the offense. The articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore the articles are admissible evidences (Rule 126, Section12 of Rules on Criminal Procedure). The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions to this rule. 1.) Search is incidental to the arrest. 2.) Search in a moving vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view. In view of the foregoing, the search done was incidental to the arrest. The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from questioning its validity. Furthermore, the deportation charges and the hearing presently conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made their detention legal. It is a fundamental rule that habeas corpus will not be granted when confinement is or has become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the beginning. The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in accordance with Sec37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to sec69 of the Revised Administrative code. Section 37 (a) provides that aliens shall be arrested and deported upon warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of a ground for deportation against them. Deportation proceedings are administrative in character and never construed as a punishment but a preventive measure. Therefore, it need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted with assistance of a counsel if desired. Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done under the authority of the sovereign power. It

a police measure against the undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and tranquility of the people. Cuevaz v. Muoz (G.R. No. 140520; December 18, 2000) acts The ong ong Magistrates Court at Eastern Magistracy issued a warrant for the arrest of respondent Juan Antonio Muoz for seven (7) counts of accepting an advantage as an agent and seven (7) counts of conspiracy to defraud, contrary to the common law of Hong Kong The Department of Justice received a request for the provisional arrest of the respondent from the Mutual Legal Assistance Unit, International Law Division of the Hong Kong Department of Justice pursuant to Article 11(1) of the RP-Hong Kong Extradition Agreement. Upon application of the NBI, RTC of Manila issued an Order granting the application for provisional arrest and issuing the corresponding Order of Arrest. Consequently, respondent was arrested pursuant to the said order, and is currently detained at the NBI detention cell. Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus assailing the validity of the Order of Arrest. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring the Order ofArrest null and void on the grounds, among others that the request for provisional arrest and the accompanying warrant of arrest and summary of facts were unauthenticated and mere facsimile copies which are insufficient to form a basis for the issuance of the Order of Arrest. Thus, petitioner Justice Serafin R. Cuevas, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Justice, lost no time in filing the instant petition. Issue: Whether or not the request for provisional arrest of respondent and its accompanying documents must be authenticated. Held: The request for provisional arrest of respondent and its accompanying documents is valid despite lack of authentication. There is no requirement for the authentication of a request for provisional arrest and its accompanying documents. The enumeration in the

provision of RP-Hong Kong Extradition Agreement does not specify that these documents must be authenticated copies. This may be gleaned from the fact that while Article 11(1) does not require the accompanying documents of a request for provisional arrest to be authenticated, Article 9 of the same Extradition Agreement makes authentication a requisite for admission in evidence of any document accompanying a request for surrender or extradition. In other words, authentication is requiredfor the request for surrender or extradition but not for the request for provisional arrest. The RP-Hong Kong Extradition Agreement, as they are worded, serves the purpose sought to be achieved by treaty stipulations for provisional arrest. The process of preparing a formal request for extradition and its accompanying documents, and transmitting them through diplomatic channels, is not only timeconsuming but also leakage-prone. There is naturally a great likelihood of flight by criminals who get an intimation of the pending request for their extradition. To solve this problem, speedier initial steps in the form of treaty stipulations for provisional arrest were formulated. Thus, it is an accepted practice for the requesting state to rush its request in the form of a telex or diplomatic cable. Respondents reliance on Garvida v. Sales, Jr. is misplaced. The proscription against the admissionof a pleading that has been transmitted by facsimile machine has no application in the case at bar for obvious reasons. First, the instant case does not involve a pleading; and second, unlike the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which do not sanction the filing of a pleading by means of a facsimile machine, P.D. No. 1069 and the RP Hong Kong Extradition Agreement do not prohibit the transmission of a request for provisional arrest by means of a fax machine. PAUL JOSEPH WRIGHT vs. CA, G.R. No. 113213 August 15, 1994 Australia and the Government of the Philippines in the suppression of crime, entered into a Treaty of Extradition on the 7th of March 1988. The said treaty was ratified in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in a Resolution adopted by the Senate on September 10, 1990 and became effective 30 days after both States notified each other in writing that the respective requirements for the entry into force of the Treaty have been complied

with. Petitioner contends that the provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to the extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. ISSUE: Can an extradition treaty be applied retroactively? HELD: Applying the constitutional principle, the Court has held that the prohibition applies only to criminal legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused. This being so, there is no absolutely no merit in petitioner's contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining the Treaty's retroactive application with respect to offenses committed prior to the Treaty's coming into force and effect, violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time the treaty was ratified. Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board FACTS: In May 1952 petitioners were chargedbefore theDeportation Board with having purchasedUSDollars in the total sum of $130, 000withoutthe necessary license from the CentralBank of the Philippines and having remitted themoneyto Hong Kong and to themselves. Warrants were issued but upon filing forasurety and cash bond they were released. Trial Court upheld the validity of thedelegationby the president to the Deportation Boardof hispower to conduct investigations for thepurposeof determining whether the stay of analien inthis country would be injurious to thesecurity,welfare and interest of the State. Power to issue warrants and fix bondswere heldto be essential to and complement thepower todeport aliens under sec 69 of the revisedadmincode ISSUE: Whether or not the President has thepower to deportaliens and delegate those powers, underEO 398of Pres Quirino which authorized theDeportation Board to issue warrants of arrest of aliens during

investigation (on the groundthatsuch power is vested in the legislature andthatthere must be a legislation authorizing thesame) Held/Ratio: The Pres has the power to carry outorder of deportation but may not order arrestduringinvestigation. And no, power may not bedelegated. Sec 69 of the Revised AdministrativeCodeSEC. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign power . A subject of a foreign powerresiding inthe Philippines shall not be deported,expelled,or excluded from said Islands orrepatriated tohis own country by the President of thePhilippines except upon priorinvestigation,conducted by said Executive or hisauthorizedagent, of the ground upon which Suchaction iscontemplated. In such case the personconcerned shall be informed of the chargeorcharges against him and he shall beallowed notless than these days for the preparation of hisdefense. He shall also have the right to beheardby himself or counsel, to producewitnesses inhis own behalf, and to cross-examine theopposing witnesses." While it did not expressly confer on thePresident the authority to deportundesirablealiens and merely lays down theprocedure, thefact that such a procedure was providedforbefore the President can deport an alien isaclear indication of the recognition, andinferentially a ratification, by thelegislature of the existence of such power in theExecutive. Under the present and existing laws,therefore,deportation of an undesirable alien maybe effected in two ways: by order of thePresident,after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69of the Revised Administrative Code, andby theCommissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board of Commissioners, under Commonwealth ActNo.613.SEC. 52. This Act is in substitution for and supersedes all previous lawsrelating to the entry of aliens into the Philippines, and their exclusion,deportation, and repatriation wherefrom,with the exception of section sixty-nine of Act Numbered Twenty-seven hundred andeleven which shall continue in force andeffect: ..." (Comm. Act No. 613). Re: the extent of the Pres power toinvestigate does it include authority toarrest? May it bedelegated? eres the history Pres Roxas (EO 69) in July 1947 providedforfiling of a bond to secure appearance of alienunder investigation Pres Quirino (EO 398) in

January 1951reorganized the deportation board to issuethewarrant of arrest of the alien complainedof andto hold him under detention during theinvestigation unless he files a bond for hisprovisional release <this is incompatiblewith.>3. The right of the People to be secure intheir persons, houses, papers and effectsagainstunreasonable searches and seizures shallnot beviolated, and no warrants shall issue butuponprobable cause, to be determined by the judgeafter examination under oath oraffirmation of the complainant and the witnesses hemayproduce, and particularly describing theplace tobe searched, and the persons or things tobeseized." (Sec 1, Art. III, Bill of Rights,PhilippineConstitution). Justice Laurel said that this constitutionalprovision is not among the rights of theaccused. Under ourConstitution, the same is declared apopularright of the people and, of course,indisputably itequally applies to both citizens andforeigners inthis country. This requirement "to bedetermined by the judge" do not specifywhowill determine the existence of a probablecause.Hence, under their provisions, any publicofficermay be authorized by the Legislature tomakesuch determination, and thereafter issuethewarrant of arrest. The contention of the Solicitor Generalthat thearrest of a foreigner is necessary to carryintoeffect the power of deportation is validonlywhen, as already stated, there is alreadyanorder of deportation. To carry out theorder of deportation, the President obviously hasthepower to order the arrest of the deportee.But,certainly, during the investigation. The extent of the curtailment of libertydependent upon conditions determined bythediscretion of the person issuing a warrant.Inother words, the discretion of whether awarrantof arrest shall issue or not is personal tothe oneupon whom the authority devolves It is an implied grant of power,considering that noexpress authority was granted by the lawon thematter under discussion, that would servethecurtailment or limitation on thefundamentalright of a person, such as his security tolife andliberty, must be viewed with caution. The guarantees of human rights andfreedomcan not be made to rest precariously onsuch ashaky foundation Filipinas vs. Ch G.R. No. L-2294, May 25, 1951 A corporation borrows its citizenship from the citizenship of majority of its stockholders, regardless of

the country under whose laws it was organized and created. FACTS: Christern Huenefeld Corporation bought a fire insurance policy from Filipinas Compania de Seguros to cover merchandise contained in a building. During the Japanese military occupation, this same merchandise and the building were burned, so Huenefeld filed a claim under the policy. Filipinas Compania refused to pay, alleging that the policy had ceased to be in force when the US declared war against Germany. Filipinas Compania contended that Huenefeld, although organized and created under Philippine laws, is a German subject, and hence, a public enemy, since majority of its stockholders are Germans. On the other hand, Filipinas Compania is under American jurisdiction. However, the Director of Bureau of Financing, Philippine Executive Commission ordered Filipinas Compania to pay, so Filipinas Compania did pay. The case at bar is about the recovery of that sum paid. ISSUES: W/N Christern Huenefeld is a German subject because majority of its stockholders are under German jurisdiction, despite the fact that it was organized and created under Philippine laws If so, W/N the fire insurance policy is enforceable against an enemy state HELD: The Court of Appeals ruled that a private corporation is a citizen of the country or state by and under the laws of which it was created or organized. It rejected the theory that nationality of a private corporation is determined by the character or citizenship of its controlling stockholders. But the Supreme Court held that Christern Huenefeld is an enemy corporation since majority of its stockholders are German subjects. The two American cases relied up by the Court of Appeals have lost their force in view of a newer case where the control test was adopted. The Philippine Insurance Law provides that anyone, except a public enemy, may be insured. It stands to reason that an insurance policy ceases to be allowable

as soon as the insured becomes a public enemy. Since Christern Huenefeld became a public enemy on Dec. 10, 1941, then the policy has ceased to be enforcible and therefore Huenefeld is not entitled to indemnity. However, elementary rules of justice require that the premium paid from Dec. 11, 1941 should be returned. Thus, Filipinas Compania is allowed to recover the sum paid but only its equivalent in actual Philippine currency, minus the premium that Huenefeld paid after Dec. 11. 1. HAW PIA v CHINA BANKING CORPORATION FACTS Haw Pia had previously contracted a loan from China Banking Corporation in the amount of P5,103.35, which, according to Haw Pia, had been completely paid, on different occasions from 1942 to 1944 through Bank of Taiwan, Ltd., which was appointed by the Japanese Military authorities as liquidator of China Banking Corp. With this, Haw Pia instituted an action against China Banking Corp. to compel the bank to execute a deed of cancellation of mortgage on the property used as security for the loan and to deliver its title.However, upon service of summons, China Banking Corp. demanded from Haw Pia for the payment of the sum of its indebtedness with interests, which also constituted its counter claim in its answer.RTC rendered a decision in favor of China Banking Corp. on the basis that there was no evidence to show that Bank of Taiwan was authorized by China Banking Corp. to accept Haw Pia's payment and that Bank of Taiwan, as an agency of the Japanese invading army, was not authorized under the international law to liquidate the business of China Banking Corp. As such, Haw Pia's payment to Bank of Taiwan has not extinguished his indebtedness to China Banking Corp. ISSUE Whether the Japanese Military Administration had authority to order the liquidation of the business of China Banking Corp. and to appoint Bank of Taiwan as liquidator authorized as such to accept payment HELD

YES. Under international law, the Japanese Military authorities had power to order the liquidation of China Banking Corp. and to appoint and authorize Bank of Taiwan as liquidator to accept the payment in question, because such liquidation is not confiscation of the properties of China Banking Corp., but a mere sequestration of its assets which required its liquidation.The sequestration or liquidation of enemy banks in occupied territories is authorized expressly, not only by the US Army and Naval Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs, but also similar manuals of other countries, without violating Art. 46 or other articles of the Hague Regulations. They do not amount to an outright confiscation of private property. The purpose of such sequestration, as expounded in the Annual Report of the Office of the Alien Custodian, is that enemy-owned property can be used to further the interest of the enemy and to impede their war efforts. All enemy controlled assets can be used to finance propaganda, espionage, and sabotage in these countries or in countries friendly to their cause.It is presumed that Japan, in sequestering and liquidating China Banking Corp., must have acted in accordance, either with her own Manual of the Army and Navy and Civil Affairs OR with her Trading with the Enemy Act, and even if not, it being permitted to the Allied Nations, specially the US and England, to sequestrate, impound, and block enemy properties found within their own domain or in enemy territories occupied during the war by their armed forces, and it not being contrary to Hague Regulations or international law, Japan had also the right to do the same in the Philippines by virtue of the international law principle that "what is permitted to one belligerent is also allowed to the other."Taking these into consideration, it appears that Japan did not intend to confiscate or appropriate the assets of said banks or the debts due them from their debtors. The fact that the Japanese Military authorities failed to pay the enemy banks the balance of the money collected by the Bank of Taiwan from the debtors of the said banks, did not and could not change the sequestration by them of the bank's assets during the war, into an outright confiscation thereof. It was physically impossible for the Japanese Military authorities to do so because they were forcibly driven out of the Philippines, following the readjustment of rights of private property on land seized by the enemy provided by the Treaty of Versailles and other peace treaties entered into at the close of WWI. The general principles underlying such

arrangements are that the owners of properties seized are entitled to receive compensation for the loss or damage inflicted on their property by the emergency war measures taken by the enemy. Since Japan war notes were issued as legal tender, Japan was bound to indemnify the aggrieved banks for the loss or damage on their property, in terms of Phil. Pesos of US $.Since the Japanese Military Forces had power to sequestrate and impound the assets of China Banking Corp. and to appoint Bank of Taiwan as liquidator, it follows that payments of Haw Pia to Bank of Taiwan extinguished his obligations to China Banking Corp. Case Digest Laurel vs. Misa Topic: Treason FACTS: The accused was charged with treason. During the Japanese occupation, the accusedadhered to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort. He claims that he cannot be tried fortreason since his allegiance to the Philippines was suspended at that time. Also, he claims that hecannot be tried under a change of sovereignty over the country since his acts were against theCommonwealth which was replaced already by the Republic. HELD/RATIO: The accused was found guilty. A citizen owes absolute and permanent allegiance tohis government or sovereign. No transfer of sovereignty was made; hence, it is presumed that thePhilippine government still had the power. Moreover, sovereignty cannot be suspended; it is eithersubsisting or eliminated and replaced. Sovereignty per se wasnt suspended; rather, it was theexercise of sovereignty that was suspended. Thus, there is no suspended allegiance. Regarding thechange of government, there is no such change since the sovereign the Filipino people is still thesame. What happened was a mere change of name of government, from Commonwealth to theRepublic of the Philippines.DISSENT: During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippineswere suspended. Thus, treason under the Revised Penal Code cannot be punishable where the lawsof the land are momentarily halted. Regarding the change of sovereignty, it is true that thePhilippines wasnt sovereign at the time of the Commonwealth since it was under the UnitedStates. Hence, the acts of

treason done cannot carry over to the new Republic where thePhilippines is now indeed sovereign. Kuroda v. Jalandoni, G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949 I. THE FACTS

Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, was charged before the Philippine Military Commission of war crimes. He questioned the constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that created the National War Crimes Office and prescribed rules on the trial of accused war criminals. He contended the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore he is charged of crimes not based on law, national and international. II. THE ISSUES Was E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional? III. THE RULING

Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations the United State and Japan who were signatories to the two Convention. Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory. Yamashita vs. Styer G.R. L-129 December 19, 1945

[The Court DENIED the petition and upheld the validity and constitutionality of E.O. No. 68.] YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation. In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those person military or civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and policies of international law which are part of the our Constitution.

Ponente: Moran, C.J. Facts: 1. Yamashita was the Commanding General of the Japanese army in the Philippines during World War 2. He was charged before the American military commission for war crimes. 2. He filed a petition for habeas corpus and prohibition against Gen. Styer to reinstate his status as prisoner of war from being accused as a war criminal. Petitioner also questioned the jurisdiction of the military tribunal. Issue: Whether or not the military tribunal has jurisdiction

Held: YES. 1. The military commission was lawfully created in conformity with an act of Congress sanctioning the creation of such tribunals. 2. The laws of war imposes upon a commander the duty to take any appropriate measures within his powers to control the troops under his command to prevent acts

which constitute violation of the laws of war. Hence, petitioner could be legitimately charged with personal responsibility arising from his failure to take such measure. In this regard the SC invoked Art. 1 of the Hague Convention No. IV of 1907, as well as Art. 19 of Hague Convention No. X, Art. 26 of 1929 Geneva Convention among others. 3. Habeas corpus is untenable since the petitioner merely sought for restoration to his former status as prisoner of war and not a discharge from confinement. This is a matter of military measure and not within the jurisdiction of the courts. 4. The petition for prohibition against the respondent will also not life since the military commission is not made a party respondent in the case. As such, no order may be issued requiring it to refrain from trying the petitioner. La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Assn vs Ramos Case Digest G.R. No 127882 Facts : On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 2796 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to "govern the exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources." R.A. No. 7942 defines the modes of mineral agreements for mining operations, outlines the procedure for their filing and approval, assignment/transfer and withdrawal, and fixes their terms. Similar provisions govern financial or technical assistance agreements. On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on March 10, 1995 in Malaya and Manila Times, two newspapers of general circulation, R.A. No. 7942 took

effect. Shortly before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7942, however, or on March 30, 1995, the President entered into an FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 9523, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942. This was later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on December 20, 1996. On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary demanding that the DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40, giving the DENR fifteen days from receipt to act thereon. The DENR, however, has yet to respond or act on petitioners' letter. Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. They pray that the Court issue an order: (a) Permanently enjoining respondents from acting on any application for Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements; (b) Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act No. 7942 as unconstitutional and null and void; (c) Declaring the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act contained in DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 and all other similar administrative issuances as unconstitutional and null and void; and (d) Cancelling the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement issued to Western Mining Philippines, Inc. as unconstitutional, illegal and null and void. Issue : Whether or not Republic Act No. 7942 is unconstitutional. Ruling : The Court finds the following provisions of R.A. No. 7942 to be violative of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution and hereby declares unconstitutional and

void: (1) The proviso in Section 3 (aq), which defines "qualified person," to wit: Provided, That a legally organized foreign-owned corporation shall be deemed a qualified person for purposes of granting an exploration permit, financial or technical assistance agreement or mineral processing permit. (2) Section 23, which specifies the rights and obligations of an exploration permittee, insofar as said section applies to a financial or technical assistance agreement, (3) Section 33, which prescribes the eligibility of a contractor in a financial or technical assistance agreement; (4) Section 35, which enumerates the terms and conditions for every financial or technical assistance agreement; (5) Section 39, which allows the contractor in a financial and technical assistance agreement to convert the same into a mineral production-sharing agreement; (6) Section 56, which authorizes the issuance of a mineral processing permit to a contractor in a financial and technical assistance agreement; The following provisions of the same Act are likewise void as they are dependent on the foregoing provisions and cannot stand on their own: (1) Section 3 (g), which defines the term "contractor," insofar as it applies to a financial or technical assistance agreement. Section 34, which prescribes the maximum contract area in a financial or technical assistance agreements; Section 36, which allows negotiations for financial or technical assistance agreements; Section 37, which prescribes the procedure for filing and evaluation of financial or technical assistance agreement proposals; Section 38, which limits the term of financial or technical assistance agreements; Section 40, which allows the assignment or transfer of financial or technical assistance agreements; Section 41, which allows the withdrawal of the contractor in an FTAA; The second and third paragraphs of Section 81, which provide for the Government's share in a financial and technical assistance agreement; and Section 90, which provides for incentives to contractors in FTAAs insofar as it applies to said contractors; When the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Republic vs Sandiganbayan Case Digest Republic of the Philippines (Presidential Commission on Good Government) vs. Sandiganbayan Facts: On 7 August 1991, the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) conducted an Eastern Telecommunications, Philippines, Inc. (ETPI) stockholders meeting during which a PCGG controlled board of directors was elected. A special stockholders meeting was later convened by the registered ETPI stockholders wherein another set of board of directors was elected, as a result of which two sets of such board and officers were elected. Victor Africa, a stockholder of ETPI, alleging that the PCGG had since 29 January 1988 been "illegally 'exercising' the rights of stockholders of ETPI," especially in the election of the members of the board of directors, filed a motion before the Sandiganbayan, prayed that said court order the "calling and holding of the Eastern Telecommunications, Philippines, Inc. (ETPI) annual stockholders meeting for 1992 under the [c]ourt's control and supervision and prescribed guidelines." The PCGG did not object to Africa's motion provided that "(1) An Order be issued upholding the right of PCGG to vote all the Class "A"

shares of ETPI; (2) In the alternative, in the remote event that PCGG's right to vote the sequestered shares be not upheld, an Order be issued (a) disregarding the Stock and Transfer Book and Booklet of Stock Certificates of ETPI in determining who can vote the shares in an Annual Stockholders Meeting of ETPI, (b) allowing PCGG to vote 23.9% of the total subscription in ETPI, and (c) directing the amendment of the Articles of Incorporation and By-laws of ETPI providing for the minimum safeguards for the conservation of assets prior to the calling of a stockholders meeting. By the assailed Resolution of 13 November 1992, the Sandiganbayan resolved Africa's motion, ordering the conduct of an annual stockholders meeting of ETPI, for 1992. Assailing the foregoing resolution, the PCGG filed before the Supreme Court a petition (GR 107789) for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition.

By Resolution of 26 November 1992, the Supreme Court enjoined the Sandiganbayan from (a) implementing its Resolution of 13 November 1992, and (b) holding the stockholders' meeting of ETPI scheduled on 27 November 1992. On 7 December 1992, Aerocom Investors and Managers, Inc. (AEROCOM), Benito Nieto, Carlos Nieto, Manuel Nieto III, Ramon Nieto, Rosario Arellano, Victoria Legarda, Angela Lobregat, Ma. Rita de los Reyes, Carmen Tuazon and Rafael Valdez, all stockholders of record of ETPI, filed a motion to intervene in GR 107789. Their motion was granted by the Supreme Court by Resolution of 14 January 1993. After the parties submitted their respective memoranda, the PCGG, in early 1995, filed a "VERY URGENT PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO HOLD SPECIAL STOCKHOLDERS' MEETING FOR [THE] SOLE PURPOSE OF INCREASING [ETPI's] AUTHORIZED CAPITAL STOCK," it claiming that the increase in authorized capital stock was necessary in light of the requirements laid down by Executive Order 109 and Republic Act 7975. By Resolution of 7 May 1996, the Supreme Court resolved to refer the PCGG's very urgent petition to hold the special stockholders' meeting to the Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence and resolution. In compliance therewith, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution of 13 December 1996, granting the PCGG "authority to cause the holding of a special stockholders' meeting of ETPI for the sole purpose of increasing ETPI's authorized capital stock and to vote therein the sequestered Class 'A' shares of stock." The PCGG-controlled ETPI board of

directors thus authorized the ETPI Chair and Corporate Secretary to call the special stockholders meeting. Notices were sent to those entitled to vote for a meeting on 17 March 1997. The meeting was held as scheduled and the increase in ETPI's authorized capital stock from P250 Million to P2.6 Billion was "unanimously approved." On 1 April 1997, Africa filed before the Supreme Court a motion to cite the PCGG "and its accomplices" in contempt and "to nullify the 'stockholders meeting' called/conducted by PCGG and its accomplices," he contending that only this Court, and not the Sandiganbayan, has the power to authorize the PCGG to call a stockholders meeting and vote the sequestered shares. Africa went on to contend that, assuming that the Sandiganbayan had such power, its Resolution of 13 December 1996 authorizing the PCGG to hold the stockholders meeting had not yet become final because the motions for reconsideration of said resolution were still pending. Further, Africa alleged that he was not given notice of the meeting, and the PCGG had no right to vote the sequestered Class "A" shares. A motion for leave to intervene relative to Africa's "Motion to Cite the PCGG and its Accomplices in Contempt" was filed by ETPI. The Supreme Court granted the motion for leave but ETPI never filed any pleading relative to Africa's motion to cite the PCGG in contempt. By Resolution of 16 February 2001, the Sandiganbayan finally resolved to deny the motions for reconsideration of its Resolution of 13 December 1996, prompting Africa to file on 6 April 2001 before the Supreme Court a petition for Review on Certiorari (GR 147214), challenging the Sandiganbayan Resolutions of 13 December 1996 (authorizing the holding of a stockholders meeting to increase ETPI's authorized capital stock and to vote therein the sequestered Class "A" shares of stock) and 16 February 2001 (denying reconsideration of the December 13, 1996 Resolution). The petitions were consolidated. Issue: Whether the PCGG can vote the sequestered ETPI Class "A" shares in the stockholders meeting for the election of the board of directors. Whether the Sandiganbayan can order the Division Clerk of Court to call the stockholders meeting and in appointing then Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Sabino de Leon, Jr. to control and supervise the same. Held:

1. When sequestered shares registered in the names of private individuals or entities are alleged to have been acquired with ill-gotten wealth, then the two-tiered test is applied. However, when the sequestered shares in the name of private individuals or entities are shown, prima facie, to have been (1) originally government shares, or (2) purchased with public funds or those affected with public interest, then the two-tiered test does not apply. Rather, the public character exception in Baseco v. PCGG and Cojuangco Jr. v. Roxas prevail; that is, the government shall vote the shares.

resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered: 1] Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country; 2] Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice.

2. The Clerk of Court, who is already saddled with judicial responsibilities, need not be burdened with the additional duties of a corporate secretary. Moreover, the Clerk of Court may not have the requisite knowledge and expertise to discharge the functions of a corporate secretary. The case of Board of Directors and Election Committee of SMB Workers Savings and Loan Asso., Inc. v. Tan, etc., et al. (105 Phil. 426 (1959). Vide also 5 Fletcher Cyc Corp (Perm Ed) 2074; 18A Am Jur 2d ) provides a solution to the Sandiganbayan's dilemma of calling a meeting when ETPI had two sets of officers. There, the Supreme Court upheld the creation of a committee empowered to call, conduct and supervise the election of the board of directors. Such a committee composed of impartial persons knowledgeable in corporate proceedings would provide the needed expertise and objectivity in the calling and the holding of the meeting without compromising the Sandiganbayan or its officers. The appointment of the committee members and the delineation of the scope of the duties of the committee may be made pursuant to an agreement by the parties or in accordance with the provisions of Rule 9 (Management Committee) of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies insofar as they are applicable. Oposa vs. Factoran, G.R. 101083 Fact: a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth." The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural

Issue: Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action? HELD: YES petitioners have a cause of action. The case at bar is of common interest to all Filipinos. The right to a balanced and healthy ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. The said right implies the judicious management of the countrys forests. This right is also the mandate of the government through DENR. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals (December 7, 1995) Ponentia: Hermosisima, Jr., J.Facts:

1. Republic Act No. 4850 created the Laguna Lake Development Authority (Authority) aGovernment Agency that works toward environmentalprotection and ecology, navigational safety, and sustainable development. Thisagency is responsible for the development of the Laguna Lake area and thesurrounding provinces, cities and towns in view of the national and regionalplans. 2.President Ferdinand E. Marcos then passed Presidential Decree No. 813 amending certain sections of R.A. No. 4850 as response to the deterioratingenvironmental condition of the Metropolitan Manila area and the surroundingareas of the Laguna de Bay. Problems include the environmental impact of development of water quality, inflow of polluted water, increasing urbanizationand floods in Metropolitan Manila. 3.Sec. 1 of P.D. 813 established a policy of development with environmentalmanagement and control, among others for the Laguna Lake DevelopmentAuthority. Special powers, pertinent to this case, were also granted under Sec.3.which include theexclusive jurisdictionof the Authority toissue new permit for the use of the lake waters for any projects or activities in or affectingthe said lake including navigation, construction, and 4.operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like The Authority also has the power to collect fees for these activities and projects which may be shared with other governmental agencies and political subdivisions. 5.The Authority was further empowered by Executive Order No. 927which enlarged its functions and powers. Said Order also named and enumerated towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term Laguna de Bay Region. The Chief Executive based this Order on an assessment that the land andwaters of the Laguna Lake Region are limited natural resources requiring judicious management.

6.UnderSec. 2 of E.O. 927, the Authorityshall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permit for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region. Coverage for Laguna de Bay Region included several provinces, cities and towns around the Laguna Lake. Under Sec. 3, thecollection of fees for the use of the lake water and its tributaries were enforcedby the Authority. 7. Then,Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991 wasenforced. Municipalities around the Laguna Lake Region interpreted this law asdelegating the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing pr ivileges within theirmunicipal waters.8.Municipal governments started issuing fishing privileges and fishing permits tobig fishpen operators. These unregulated issuances of Mayors permits toconstruct fishpens were clear violations of the policies implemented by theAuthority.9.To solve the problem, the Authority issues a notice to the general publicdeclaring as illegal all fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures inthe Bay Region that were not registered with the Authority. The notice includesa threat of penalty of demolition and imprisonment and/or fine. After a month,the Authority sent notices to the concerned owners stating that demolition shallbe effected within 10 days.10.Affected fishpen owners filed seven injunction cases against the Authority invarious trial courts. Authority filed a motion to dismiss the cases on jurisdictional grounds which was denied by the lower court. Temporaryrestraining order/ writs of preliminary injunction was issued enjoining the Authority from demolishing the structures in question. Authority appealed thecase to the Court of Appeals but the Court dismissed the consolidated petitionsof the Authority. CA established that LLDA is not a quasijudicial agency of thegovernment and it cannot exercise quasi-judicial functions as far as fishpensare concerned. CA the Local Government Code of 1991 repealed the provisionsof the LLDA Charter thereby devolving the power to grant permits to the localgovernment units concerned. Authority appealed to the Supreme Court withpetitions for prohibition, certiorari and injunction against the respondents. Issue: WON the Laguna Lake Development Authority should exercise jurisdictionover the Laguna Lake insofar

as the issuance of permits for fisheries privileges isconcerned. Held: Yes. The LLDA should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake insofar asthe issuance of permits for fisheries is concerned.Petitions for prohibition, certiorari and injun ction are hereby granted,insofar as they related to the authority of the LLDA to grant fishing privileges withinthe Laguna Lake Region.Restraining orders and/or writs of injunction issued against the LLDA aredeclared null and void and ordered set aside for having been issued with graveabuse of discretion.Municipal Mayors of the Laguna Lake Region are hereby prohibited fromissuing permits to construct and operate fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culturestructures within the Laguna Lake Region. Previous issuances are null and void.The fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures put by operatorsby virtue of permits issued by Municipal Mayors within the Laguna Lake Region arehereby declared illegal structures subject to demolition by the LLDA.