A German Europe-A European Germany?

On the Debate over Germany's Foreign Policy Author(s): Josef Janning Source: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 72, No. 1 (Jan., 1996), pp. 33-41 Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2624747 . Accessed: 03/11/2013 17:00
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A German Europe-a European over Germany? On thedebate Germany's foreinpolicy

JOSEF JANNING

aboutthe thedebate ofthecountry'sforeign focusand direction considers This article thought distinct strands in both political andphilosophical The author identifies policy. toEuropean their approach and discusses forGermany's respective implications Noting the theEU and toEuropean more broadly. relationships within integration and in simultaneous commitment to deepening widening tensions inherent Germany's the three linesofargumentfor European policy forwards: theEU, he outlines taking the'core and the'newintegrationist'. 'moderate protagonist' intergovernmental', the German of theEast-Westconflict, Like manyothernotionsand institutions To what goal foreignpolicy debate is faced with the loss of the self-evident. the end of thisgreatsimplifier policies after should Germanygear its external The academic, the political and public debates have of European affairs? to foggydiffusion. fromconceptualclarity ranging produced multipleanswers No real or new consensushas yet emergedon the rankingof priorities-do the old stillstand?-and no consensushas been achieved on the appropriate Below the superficial level of continuities, means and institutions. policies and there seems to be no lack of issues.Where pressing actorsare drifting, though is to apply-the to go, what stands, what could be moved?Which framework leadership, nation, Europe or the global economy? All of them? Partners, the choices complicated. values-the termsare ambiguous, The German political class feels uneasy about muddlingits way through What is elsewhere as the historian ArnulfBaring has observed. world affairs, There are in the land of Grundlichkeit. believed to be a virtueraiseseyebrows to aliow for pragmatic too many neighbours,too close and too different relations. of connectionson the switchboard of international manipulations confusedthe tacticshas further Experiencingthe returnof balance-of-power to pick up the sharpanalogyofWilliam Patersonand German semi-Gulliver, Simon Bulmer.' Chancellor Helmut Kohl's strategyin the Maastric:ht
William Paterson and Simon Bulmer,'Germanyin the European Union: gentle giant or emergent Affairs 72: i,JanuaryI996, pp. 9-32. leader?',Intternational

72, Affairs Interntational

(I996)

33-4I

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JosefJanning negotiations was not to worryabout it as long as it would drive Germany's principal neighboursinto deeper European integrationalong the lines of German preferences. European affairs since thenhave demonstrated the limits on thismechanismalone.The foreign of relying policy of Germany, it seems, needs goals more than means,and it needs well-definedtasksand not just policy shapingfactors. Meanwhile,philosophical debatefocuseson Germany's normality. In lightof the new issuesconfronting German foreign policy,the post-national modesty of the Bonn republic appears in its brightestcolours to those, like the philosopher Jiirgen Habermas in his mostrecentessay,2 in whom Germanyas an ordinarystate raises deep suspicions about the return of nationalism. comes fromPeterSloterdijk,3 who urgesa turning Collegiate counterbalance the antagonist away fromthe vacuum of politicalideas thatcharacterized era towardsthe proclamationof new and far-reaching visions for Europe as a multinational federation-thefirst successful model to bridgethe gap between and global institutions. the nation-state Geopolitics and the return of a balance of power It remainsto be seen how much lightthe retrospective of the patterns analysis of the FederalRepublic can caston the foreign policy of the unitedGermany in a new Europe. However,the most controversial notionsin the intellectual debate on the country's future policy all have to do with different of the meanings of thepast.In thisdiscourse, interpretations traditionalists who as realists standagainstmodernists educatedin a structural perceivethemselves of international affairs. Their dissent is of paradigmatic On the analysis quality. is proclaimed, era one hand historical continuity linkingthe post-antagonistic to the interwarperiod and European diplomatic historysince the Holy Alliance. In this view states as actors-their interestsand power, their constellations and coalitions-dominate and foreign policy is statecraft in a primarily anarchic conductedto maximizenationally accountablebenefits environment. No one has expressedthe implicationsof this approach for more elegant or wittiertermsthan the historianand Germany in sharper, political scientistHans-Peter Schwarz, whose books and articles on the in theemerging ofEurope havebecome the of Germany statesystem centrality on the permanenceof reference centres point of manydebates.His reasoning as well the European and global state-systems and the respective constellations, as behaviouralpatterns. in Europe are set else followsfromthis. The limitsof integration Everything them has led to the treaty of by thispermanenceof the nations;disregarding

3 Peter Sloterdijk, ihrer amn Etidedes Zeitalters zurnPrograrntmi Welttnache eitner Falls Europaenvacht. Gedanketne

am Main: Suhrkamp,I995). derBerlinter Republik(Frankfurt JiirgenHabermas, Die Nortmialitdt am Main: Suhrkamp,I994). Absentce (Frankfurt politischetn

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policy Germany'sforeign and doomed to live Maastricht. Germanyis doomed to remaina nation-state with all of the (uncomfortable) consequences.Here Schwarzrejectsa position Karlin thechairat Bonn University, thathas long been held by hispredecessor was builtin the 1950s on his Bracher, whose highreputation Dietrich Bracher. pioneering studyon the collapse of the Weimar Republic, has labelled the and thatintegration and maintains democracy FederalRepublic a post-national

foreign policy.4 at the heart of German integrationist policiesshouldremain

Schwarzeven viewed the old FederalRepublic as a greatpower in Europe and policy styleof the Bonn republicas being depictedthe foreign has frequently internationalist and thus overlyshyin employingits resourcesfor principaliy of nationalinterests. Swingingfromone extremeto the other, the articulation foreign policyin Schwarzconcludedin his i985 essayon the'tamed Germans', postwar Germany had turned from the obsession with power to the neglectof power (Machtvergessenheit). Fromthe end of (Machtversessenheit) thecountry has emergedas the central power ofEurope, theEast-Westconflict in terms of both location and weight. His most recent study develops a Itsdevelopment will and orientation role of Germany.5 rationale forthiscentral shape external relationsthroughoutthe continent.Schwarz recommendsa definedoptionsand controls pragmatic policy which seeks to retainnationally because the artof balancing both in a European and a nationalsense, ambitions, the kind of mentalunrestwhich was Europe fromits centrecould not afford crucial to the failure of the Wilhelmine Reich, as the historianMichael has pointed out. Stiirmer of thisEurope will not be achievedby simply Keeping thepeace and stability of German European policies.Though he patterns continuingthe traditional admires Adenauer's strategicsense and is convinced of the benefits of Westbindung (integrationinto the West), Schwarz remains critical of the As long as crucial supra-national integration. Maastrichtapproach of further the remain in the hands of national governments, elements of sovereignty on theone hand and the mistrust forhegemony Germanquestion-a potential and potential for anti-German coalitions on the other-remains a latent Schwarz concludes,is not Integration, problem of the European statesystem. and so Germanyshould likelyto include thesedomainsof nationalsovereignty, make the best use of its own nationalresources. to bearslittleresemblance the reasoning of thisschool of thought To be sure, on the intellectual of what could be calied the 'neo-nationalists' the writings bias of fringesof the debate.Eloquent as theircritique of the integrationist the nation how putting Germanpolicy maybe, it failsto demonstrate plausibly than the national firstwould better serve the united Germany'sinterests Schwarz has laid out. Thus, some of the authorsaround strategy integration
6th edn (Dusseldorf:Droste, I980); fromhis Republik, derWietmiar Karl Dietrich Bracher,Die Aufldsutig I992). (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Geschichte der currentwritingsee Weuidezeitetn I994).

4
I

Siedler, aufdieWeltbuhtie (Berlin: Ruckkehr Europas. Deutschlatids Die Zetitraltimacht Schwarz, Hans-Peter

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JosefJanning Rainer Zitelmannare caughtin theiradolescentattitude: breakingtaboos of the old era,as many of the arguments on Westbindung reveal,appearsto be a than a position;but it is nevertheless one thathas to be reckoned pose rather in a brilliant warnsagainstany of with.6Stiirmer, piece on Germany's interests, if geopoliticalromanticism or the wonderlandof these'German incertitudes': in a place, where it has greaterSwitzerlandprevail,Germanywill finditself nor security, nor interests.7 neitherfuture, Interdependence and institutionalism is expressed The oppositepositionto thatheld by Schwarzand Stiirmer more as usual.In its more idealistic business widelybut is farfromsimply advocating of'old structuralists' like Ernst-OttoCzempiel and forms, notablythe writings it is concernedwiththeanalysis of an emerging Dieter Senghaas, global society ifnot integrative forthe development of cooperative and arguments structures of itsproblems, of its normsand governance forthe management preservation In general,the structural, multilateralist or integrationist of its institutions.8 approachesrequiremore complex analysesand theirmessageis less clear.As in the highlyrelevantseries on 'Germany'snew foreignpolicy', a illustrated project of the German Society for ForeignAffairs (DGAP) directedby Karl Kaiser, where authors from both sides present their views, the array of actors and interdependencies, and their rankingand interplayas structures, add up to a confusingpicture.Proponents outlined by the structuralists, thatthough thisreality it still maintain, however, may be evaded analytically matters as the central fieldof foreign The thrust of the approach playing policy. thus seeks to order the alphabet soup of institutions, to assess specific and to contribute to theiroptimization. In the understanding functionality of this school, the integration of Germany in these supra-, multi- and contexts is so fundamentalthat it transcendsthe analytical transnational of nationalvs. integration separation policies.This has been provenin the four decades ofWestGermanintegration and shouldremainthefocusof the united countryas well.Thereforeany foreign policy, be it conducted fromBonn or Berlin,shouldbe rootedin thedevelopment and nurturing of thoseinstitutions which have to steertheseinterdependencies. Not surprisingly, the policy recommendations of the two lines of argument show considerable overlap.Thesuccessof theWestGermanintegration strategy since the early 1950S is remarkable,from both the realists' and the

' See Rainer Zitelmann,KarlheinzWeissmannand Michael Grossheim, eds, Westbindung. Chancen und Risikenfuir Deutschland (Frankfurt: Propylaen,I993). I Michael Stiirmer, 'Deutsche Interessen', Karl Kaiser and Hanns W Maull, eds, Deutschlands neue Aussenpolitik, vol. I: Grundlagen (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1994). 8 Ernst-Otto Czempiel, Die Reform der UNO. Moglichkeiten undMjJ3verstdndnisse (Munich: C. Beck, 1994); Dieter Senghaas, Wohin dieWelt? drjftet dieZukunftfriedlicher Ober Koexistenz (Frankfurt am Main:

Suhrkamp, I994).

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Germany'sforeign policy environment institutionalists' points of view.There has been no international since the formationof the Reich in I871 so responsiveand conducive to been and never has the cost effectiveness Germany'sforeignpolicy interests, sharetheconcernthatthe higherthanin thepostwar period.The two positions but the may alterthese favourable terms, new visibility of German strength While Schwarz and othersperceive this conclusions they draw are different. change as inevitable and seek control through parallel national and the latter structures positionwould opt forreinforced integrationist strategies, of cooperation and integrationin and around Europe. The pressure on nationalmeans,some suspect, maybe through Germanyto act internationaliy guided by a hiddenagenda:to controlGermanpower by exposingit. Germany's responsibility-flashlights from the political debate The short On the politicalscene,these debateshave echoed in different ways. which history of united Germanyalreadycontainsa numberof case-studies of adjustment. the wars in bear witness to the difficulties Most important, demonstrated thelimitations of two policypatterns linkedto formerYugoslavia On theone hand it caliedinto different partsof the Germanpoliticalspectrum. question the argumentthat Germany'seconomic and financialresources, would be adequate to control bargaining process, combined in a multilateral For reasons of domesticpublic opinion the then foreignminister, conflicts. and found himself Hans-Dietrich Genscher, trapped: pushed for recognition the institutional settingturned out to be too weak because Germanywas neither prepared nor willing to support its policy with credible peace In his memoirs,publishedin the autumn of 1995, Genscher's enforcement. the all,it was he who 'discovered' recollectionreadsrather ambiguously--after constitutional of the Basic Law thatwould prevent hurdle,an interpretation actions beyond self-defence in the NATO context.9On the other military of pacifism, which had hand, theYugoslav wars eroded the moral legitimacy of the Federal been a domain of the politicalleftever since the rearmament to the Greens,ethniccleansingin Republic 40 yearsago. From the feminists former Yugoslavia led to the most profoundchange in political preferences The essence of partof Germanpoliticalculture. among the leftor 'alternative' this change was expressedin a positionpaper thatJoseph ('Joschka')Fischer distributed over the summerof 1995-the need to be able to act in cases of genocide. has been givento thegeneralforeign Alongsidethesechangesmoreattention policy revolutionthatthe 'realist'Greensaround Fischerhave enacted almost had been In the I980s the Greens'scepticism on European integration silently. notions.Now, as anti-statist anti-bureaucratic, fuelled by theiranti-centralist, theypreparefora shareof power on the nationallevel,mostof theseconcerns
9 Hans-Dietrich Genscher,Erinnerungen (Berlin:Siedler,I995).

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JosefJanning book on Germany,first have disappeared.Instead, Fischer'sprogrammatic Germanyinto the EU publishedin I994, outlinesfullsupportforintegrating of nationalinterest. and NATO as a matter His plea forforeign policy realism, forGermanyas a civilianpower abstaining however, strictly advocatesa future ? fromany formof hardpower projection. This view coincides with the prevailing mood among the German Social of cautionand through lost casesin front Democrats,developedunderextreme court and public opinion alike, which would allow for the constitutional action'out of area' only under a UN mandateand forpeacekeeping, military 'blue helmet' operations.Elke Leonhard's analysis of the SPD's shadow offerssubtle insightsinto the process of incremental governmentstrategy While quite and policy statements." change over the variouspartyresolutions a la Scharpingfrustrating, a few foundincrementalism manywithinthe party victoryover had neverendorsedthischange.In thislight,Oskar Lafontaine's Scharpingat the partyconventionin November 1995 comes as no surprise: mobilizedthe majority witha masterly speech against the chairman Lafontaine on foreign policy and Germany's Bosnian involvementwhich reversed the abstention of Germanyas and presented Scharping's pragmatic gradualism virtuerather The dilemma,however, a social-democratic than as a weakness. the Social Democrats have tied theirpositionon military remainsunresolved: of the UN system which fewbelieve will takeplace, engagementto a reform of Germanyand the second GulfWardiscredited the chequebook participation in a (still not the party seems unpreparedeven to allow full participation For the timebeing,the SPD is thusconfinedto existing) European framework. the sidelines of the debate. It may hope for the present governmentto just as Helmut Kohl's accomplishthe change and adjustto it when in power, took over the SPD's Ostpolitik. government of the governing Christian At least on the bookshelf,the protagonists WolfgangSchauble, Democrats seem to be aware of thisrole for theirparty. CDU/CSU leader in the Bundestag and Kohl's currentcrown prince,and Volker Riihe, defence minister as well as formerand maybe futurecrown prince, rest their reasoning on the assumption that responsibility-the politically correct synonymfor foreign policy engagement-requires the Germanyneeds a exertionof influenceand the use of power.To be credible, In his schemeforGermanpolicy, employed. military option howevercarefully quoting a line fromthe formerGDR's nationalanthem,Schauble arguesfor seeking no special system, Germany as a 'normal' state in the international and no special missionfor illusionary excuses for free-riding pacifism.His thatwould be operable as a concern is the lack of a German nationalidentity and to theoutside.In his essay framework forsolidarity, both in domesticterms
Politik(Cologne: Kiiepenheuer & derdeutschetn Kriseutnd Zukutift '? JoschkaFischer,RisikoDeutschlatnd. Witsch, I994). " Elke Leonhard,Aus derOppositiont ivill(Cologne: Bund die Maclit.Wie RudolfScliarpinig Kantzler iverdent ant Verlag, I995).

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policy Germany'sforeign Riihe underlinesthe linkage of power and on Germany's responsibility, but also emphasizes that Germany does not seek options responsibility Germany would and independentof the context of European integration. should not act alone, but should also not be less capable of action than its partners in the EU, WEU, NATO or the various bi- and multilateral arrangements.'2 The united Germany and Europe of Europe's forthe purposesof brevity, German perceptions Oversimplifying United The as follows. choices could be linked with Germany'sneighbours especially wideningto theeastas a meansto dilutedeepening, Kingdomprefers of the Union. Advantageshoped for include the to increase the diversity Policy.Britainseems prepared breakdownof the EU's Common Agricultural union,a thanto face monetary Europe rather to spend money on east-central votingand withmajority potentialsocial union and expandedsupranationality, Francewould opt fora deepeningalong the lines executivepowersin Brussels. in widening in order to tie but sharessome interest of its own preferences Germany to the Union and to fulfilthe Union's principal role on the continent.Meeting the criteriafor monetaryunion seems to be the first reformmay have to be made to keep priority; concessionson institutional should come Germany and the Benelux countriesaboard,and enlargement to the east.The Benelux withoutmajor Frenchfinancialtransfers selectively would like to see deepeningbeforewidening and progress statesthemselves seem to be fears integration.There towards supranational along the old linearity of the may turnthe tide towardssome formof directorate thatenlargement membersince Italydropped southern Spain (theprincipal largememberstates. eitherin wideningor in out of the conceptualdebate) bearsno specialinterest deepening but engages in both to secure attentionand resourcesfor the Most of the other member statesare perceived to be Mediterraneanfront. to any. eitherin line with one of thesepositionsor uncommitted are linked to these contradictory options in a Germany'sown preferences complicatedway.On the one hand,the German politicalelitesclearlyfavour in France,the German deepening on its own merits.Like its counterpart a strong union with the Franco-Germancouple at politicalclasswould prefer the German reform, the political steeringwheel. In terms of institutional towardseffective by European government for deeper integration preference for theiractions is closer to Benelux and democraticlegitimacy institutions positions than to that of France. On the other hand, extendingintegration European policy,as eastwardhas become the nationalconcern of Germany's add up to parallelconcernsforwideningand discussedabove.Thesepreferences

das tieueEuropa (Berlin:Ullstein,I994). Perspektiveu.fiir Veratttsvortuutg. 12Volker Ruhe, Deutschlau-ids

I994). (Berlin:Siedler, derZukutftzugesvatndt Schauble, Utnd Wolfgang

See also

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JosefJanning deepening.The potentialincompatibilities of thisdualismshape the German reasoningon Europe's future organization. Three new lines of argument have been developedbesidesthosewho arguein favour of the present approach:the moderate intergovernmentalists, the core protagonists and the new integrationists. The moderateintergovernmental argument picks up Hans-PeterSchwarz's of theEU's on the nation-state-system and pleadsfortheredefinition argument in the senseof de Gaulle'sunderstanding of integration. finality Among others, in two books."3 In his Hans Arnold has advocatedthe end of the old pattern view, Germanyshould correctthe supranational approach of the Maastricht seek an intergovernmental treaty and actively Europe built on the foundation market of the internal but withoutmonetary union or otherdeeper structures the end of Because he also believesin the decay of NATO after of integration. the East-Westconflict, thatEuropean defenceshould be 'deArnold suggests Americanized'by adding a European Defence Communityanalogous to the EDC of the 195os. Enlargement states should be limitedto the fourVisegrad and extend to include the Baltic statesonly if Russia could be reconciledto would essentially with this.Thus, integration coverLatinEurope; thesouth-east its Orthodox traditionshould remain outside but close to the Union. forsupranationalism,Arnold Germany's pressing concludes, maybe honourable but can only lead to misunderstanding over the aims of German European policy. It should also become clear for Germanythat the goal of a united the Europe withoutnationalistic outbursts will be reachednot by transcending nation-state but rather by makingrational use of it. The core protagonists, on the other hand, sense an unavoidable dilemma between widening and deepening,both of which they consider essentialto On neitherof the two directions are German preferences German interests. both will become sharedby a sufficient of theEU members; majority realizing In such a scenario,it is concluded, it makes sense for even more difficult. which is characterized Germanyto fallback on a core groupof memberstates by convergence,common interests, positive past experience and a clear down to the determination to progress together. Narrowingdeep integration foundersminus Italy, i.e. to France,Germanyand the Benelux states, would create a communityof destinythat should be able to realize all of the Maastrichttreaty's ambitiousgoals. This rationalehas been laid out in the Schauble/Lamers paper of September 1994 as the ultimaterecourse,should otherattempts fail.Christian thefirst Deubner has written conceptualbook on the core concept.'4 His approach spells out the specificadvantagesof the caucus: a good mix of trust of mutualdependence and founders' and mistrust, In such a core,monetary proximity. union could be realizedeven withthe high

'3

Hans Arnold, Europa amn EG und NATO (Munich: Hanser, I993); Hans Arnold, votn Etide?Die Aufldsung Deutschlands Grosse. Deutsche Maclitund Matngel (Munich: Hanser, I995). Aussetnpolitik ztvischen '4Christian Deubner, Deutsche Europapolitik. Maastricht nachKertneuropa? Votn (Baden-Baden: Nomos, I995).

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policy Germany's foreign aggregated debt of Belgium,because it would be the onlyexceptionnecessary, cooperationand should a defenceunion could be builton thelevel of existing in social and even on the thirdpillar, include the Frenchnucleardeterrence, capable of environmental affairs be more readily this core would policies or Deubner joint decisions than many other combinations. Institutionally, of the Benelux Union and builton the structures advocatesa genuinesystem of of the Franco-German treaty. While the rigidity the cooperationprovisions obvious: the are the concept of a single core seems appealing,its limitations readinessof other member statesto join some but not all aspects of core in Europe could and vitalassetsof integration would be frustrated integration Denmark or even the Czech Republic would thusnot be part be lost.Austria, the Eurocorps would not be of monetaryunion even if theywould qualify; includesSpain;and thepotential accessibleforthecore groupbecause it already at a timewhen would be disregarded of Britainas a net payerin hardsecurity structures are freshly in demand. crediblesecurity the new integrationist approacheshave put forward Againstthisbackground, greater integration: a mix of deeper integration, concept of differentiated memberstatesand the notion of sectoralcores forcommitted responsibilities As a areas such as monetaryor securityintegration."s for high integration ofleadership roleson those it would lead to the concentration politicalsystem, member stateswhich are activelyinvolved in all or most of these sectoral it will open up To others, To some,thismayseem like a nightmare. deepenings. of new possibilities foractiveparticipation and a higherdensity integration. Whatever direction Germany'sEuropean strategychooses, its potential remainsa functionof Franco-Germancooperation.France and Germanyare and unavoidablylinked in theirEuropean ambitions-in creation essentially a lack of exhausted, symbolic politicslargely just as much as in stagnation.With The most consensusbetweenParisand Bonn maybecome a problem. strategic of theareasof cooperationby fourof theleading recentcomprehensive analysis in the fieldrevealsseriousdeficits: thereis hardlyan area institutions research as on which the concepts,interests, and actionsare as convergent perceptions If it is true thatGermanyis obsessed seems necessary for ideal partnership.'6 with the stability of easternEurope and France with the power of Germany, then the axis requires fundamental Both countriesneed to define adjustments. ofEurope theuniting theircommon visionofEurope.Without sucha decision, of within the European Union will not succeed and nor will the formation cores. integration

Because the presentauthoris associatedwith thisconcept it cannot be fullydiscussedin thisarticle.For der ed., Reform reform see WernerWeidenfeld, on institutional a detailed analysisand recommendations Bertelsmann 1996 (Giitersloh:Verlag des Maastrichter zur Revision Europdischen Vertrages Utnion.Materialen 'Europa braucht see JosefJanning, integration Stiftung, I995); fora discussionof differentiated EuropaArchiv I8, I994, pp. 527-36. verschiedene Geschwindigkeiten', itl eitner Zusamtmenarbeit CIRAC-DFI-DGAP-IFRI, eds, Handelnffir Europa.Deutsch-franzdsische Welt(Opladen: Leske & Budrich, i995). verandertetn

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