CASE TITLE: Banda vs. Ermita CITATION: 618 SCRA 488. GR No. 166620.

April 20, 2010 TOPIC: Administrative Agencies FACTS: President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 378, amending Section 6 of EO 285, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Printing Office (NPO) over the printing services requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities. The National Printing Office have exclusive jurisdiction over the following: a. Printing, binding and distribution of all standard and accountable forms of national, provincial, city and municipal governments, including government corporations; b. Printing of officials ballots; c. Printing of public documents such as the Official Gazette, General Appropriations Act, Philippine Reports, and development information materials of the Philippine Information Agency. The Office may also accept other government printing jobs, including government publications, aside from those enumerated above, but not in an exclusive basis. The details of the organization, powers, functions, authorities, and related management aspects of the Office shall be provided in the implementing details which shall be prepared and promulgated in accordance with Section II of this Executive Order. The Office shall be attached to the Philippine Information Agency. Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and instrumentalities are allowed to source their printing services from the private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the condition that the services offered by the private supplier be of superior quality and lower in cost compared to what was offered by the NPO. Executive Order No. 378 also limited NPOs appropriation in the General Appropriations Act to its income. Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure as employees of the NPO, petitioners now challenge its constitutionality, contending that: (1) it is beyond the executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 issued by former President Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative powers; and (2) Executive Order No. 378 violates petitioners security of tenure, because it paves the way for the gradual abolition of the NPO ISSUE: Whether or not the reorganization is within the scope of the Administrative Power of the President. RULING: The issuance of Executive Order No. 378 by President Arroyo is an exercise of a delegated legislative power granted by the Administrative Code of 1987, which provides for the continuing authority of the President to reorganize the Office of the President, in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. The reorganization of such an office through executive or administrative order i s also recognized by the Administrative Code of 1987. It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the Presidents constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue of pre vious delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes. The reorganization is done in good faith, the abolition of positions, which results in loss of security of tenure of affected government employees would be valid.

CASE TITLE: Berris Agricultural Co. Inc., vs. Abyadang CITATION: GR. No. 183404. October 13, 2010 TOPIC: Administrative Agencies FACTS: Abyadang filed a trademark application with the IPO for the mark "NS D-10 PLUS" for use in connection with Fungicide (Class 5) with active ingredient 80% Mancozeb. Berris AgriculturalCo., Inc. (Berris), filed with the IPO Bureau of Legal Affairs (IPO-BLA) a Verified Notice of Opposition against the mark under application allegedly because "NS D-10 PLUS" is similar and/or confusingly similar to its registered trademark "D-10 80 WP," also used for Fungicide(Class 5) with active ingredient 80% Mancozeb.Director Estrellita Beltran-Abelardo of the IPOBLA decided in favor of Berris. However,Abyadang appealed to the CA which reversed the decision. ISSUE: Whether or not Administrative Agencies has jurisdiction. RULING: Administrative agencies, such as the IPO, by reason of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction, are in a better position to pass judgment thereon. Thus, their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded great respect, if not finality by the courts, as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant. It is not the task of the appellate court to weigh once more the evidence submitted before the administrative body and to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency in respect to sufficiency of evidence. The protection of trademarks as intellectual property is intended not only to preserve the goodwill and reputation of the business established on the goods bearing the mark through actual use over a period of time, but also to safeguard the public as consumers against confusion on these goods. On this matter of particular concern, administrative agencies, such as the IPO, by reason of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction, are in a better position to pass judgment thereon. Thus, their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded great respect, if not finality by the courts, as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant. It is not the task of the appellate court to weigh once more the evidence submitted before the administrative body and to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency in respect to sufficiency of evidence.

CASE TITLE: BF Homes vs. Manila Electric Company CITATION: GR No. 171624. December 6, 2010 TOPIC: Administrative Agencies FACTS: MERLCO is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws engaged in the distribution and sale of electric power in Metro Manila. BF Homes and PWCC in the other hand are owners and operators of waterworks system delivering water to over 12,000 household and commercial buildings in BF Homes subdivisions. The water distributed in the waterworks systems is drawn from deep wells using pumps run by electricity supplied by MERALCO. ISSUE RULING: Settled is the rule that jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. Republic v. Court of Appeals also enunciated that only a statute can confer jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies. Related to the foregoing and equally well-settled is the rule that the nature of an action and the subject matter thereof, as well as which court or agency of the government has jurisdiction over the same, are determined by the material allegations of the complaint in relation to the law involved and the character of the reliefs prayed for, whether or not the complainant/plaintiff is entitled to any or all of such reliefs. A prayer or demand for relief is not part of the petition of the cause of action; nor does it enlarge the cause of action stated or change the legal effect of what is alleged. In determining which body has jurisdiction over a case, the better policy is to consider not only the status or relationship of the parties but also the nature of the action that is the subject of their controversy. The ERC has original and exclusive jurisdiction under Rule 43(u) of the EPIRA over all cases contesting rates, fees, fines, and penalties imposed by the ERC in the exercise of its powers, functions and responsibilities, and over all cases involving disputes between and among participants or players in the energy sector. Section 4(o) of the EPIRA Implementing Rules and Regulation provides that the ERC shall also be empowered to issue such other rules that are essential in the discharge of its functions as in independent quasi-judicial body. Courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially when the question demands the sound exercise of administrative discretion requiring special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. The court cannot arrogate into itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction of which is initially lodged with the administrative body of special competence.

CASE TITLE: Bureau of Customs Employee Association vs. Teves CITATION: GR No. 181704. December 6, 2011 TOPIC: Administrative Agencies FACTS: Former Pres. Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9335 for the purpose of optimizing the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and BOC and to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board. The Boards in the BIR and BOC are composed of Secretaries of Finance, Budget and their undersecretaries, Director General of NEDA and his deputy Director General, Commissioners of BIR and BOC and their deputy commissioners, two representatives from rank and file employees and representative from the officials nominated by their recognized organization .Each Board has the duty to; 1. Prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the Fund; 2. Set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target; 3. Terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; 4. Prescribe a system for performance evaluation; 5. Perform other functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations and; 6. Submit an annual report to Congress. Petitioner Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA) contends that enactment and implementation of R.A. No. 9335 are tainted with constitutional infirmities. Pursuant to RA 9335 and its IRR, Collection District Performance Contracts was disseminated to lower ranking officials and employees for signing. BOCEA contends that the target was impossible to meet due to governments own policies on reduced tariff rates and tax breaks to big business, the occurrence of natural calamities and because of other economic factors. BOCEA claimed that some BOC employees were coerced and forced to sign the performance contract. The personnel were threatened if they will not sign they would face possible reassignment, reshuffling, or worse be placed on floating status. Petition was filed to the Supreme Court. BOCEA argued among others, that its members and other BOC employees are in great danger of losing their jobs should they failed to meet the required target, in clear violation of their constitutional right of security of tenure and their respective families prejudice. During the first year implementation of RA 9335, BOC employees exerted commendable efforts and exceed their target of 196B of as much as2B for that year alone. However this was attained because oil companies made advance tax payments to BOC. Rewards are given, which they described as unjust, unfair, dubious and fraudulent because only top officials of BOC got huge reward while the employees received only P8,500.00 ISSUES: 1. WON RA9335 and its IRR violates right to security of tenure- it effectively removed remedies provided in the ordinary course of administrative procedure afforded to government employees. 2. WON RA9335 and its IRR violates constitutionundue delegation of legislative powers granted to Revenue Performance Evaluation Board the unbridled discretion of formulating the criteria for termination, manner of allocating targets, the distribution of rewards.

RULING: 1. Clearly, RA No. 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC. The guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the service for causes other than those provided by law and only after due process is accorded the employee. In the case of RA [No.] 9335, it lays down a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection. This standard is analogous to inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service laws. The action for removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due process. In this case there was a valid delegation of legislative power. The court ruled that the test for validity of delegation of legislative power were fully satisfied. RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the implementing agencies carrying out the provisions of the law as stated in Section 2 Declaration of Policy. The court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: Public Interest, Justice and equity, public convenience and welfare and simplicity, economy and welfare. In this case, the declared policy optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and BOC is infused with public interest. The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. Necessarily imbedded in this doctrine is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegari potest, which means "what has been delegated, cannot be delegated." This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another. However, this principle of non-delegation of powers admits of numerous exceptions, one of which is the delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies like the Board in this case.

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CASE TITLE: Commission on Appointment vs. Paler CITATION: GR No. 172623. March 3, 2010 TOPIC: Administrative Agencies FACTS: Celso M. Paler was a Supervising Legislative Staff Officer II with the Technical Support Service of the Commission on Appointments. On April 8, 2003, he submitted a request for vacation leave for 74 working days (from August 1, 2003 November 14, 2003.) But because he already have an approved Leave Application for June 9, 2003 July 30, 2003, Paler left for the United States, without verifying whether his application for leave (for from August 1, 2003 November 14, 2003) was approved or denied. In a letter dated September 16, 2003, the Commission Chairman informed Paler that he was being dropped from the roll of employees effective said date, due to his continuous 30-day absence without leave. Paler moved for an appeal which was granted and he will be immediately reinstated as Committee Secretary of the Commission on Appointments. The Commission then filed a petition for review under Rule 43, but since Paler had already reached the compulsory age of retirement and was no longer entitled to reinstatement, the CA affirmed CSC s Resolutions but Paler should be awarded Backwages, retirement benefits and other privileges that accrued to him from the time of his dismissal up to the date of his retirement. ISSUE: WON the Commission Secretary has the authority to sign the petition and sign the verification and certification on nonform shopping in behalf of the Commission Chairman. RULING: The petitioner in this case is the Commission on Appointment, a government entity created by the Constitution, and headed by its Chairman. There was no need for the Chairman himself to sign the verification. Its representative, lawyer or any other person who personally knew the truth of the facts alleged in the petition could sign the verification. Being the central agency mandated to prescribe, amend, and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws, the CSC has the power to interpret its own rules and any phrase contained in them, wit h its interpretation significantly becoming part of the rules themselves. The Court has consistently yielded and accorded great respect to the interpretation by administrative agencies of their own rules unless there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law. The Civil Service Commission was in the legitimate exercise of its mandate under Sec. 3, Rule I, of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service that administrative investigations shall be conducted without necessarily adhering strictly to the technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial proceedings. This authority is consistent with its powers a nd functions to prescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws being the central personnel agency of the Government.

CASE TITLE: Functional, Inc., vs. Granfil CITATION: GR No. 176377. November 16, 2011 TOPIC: Administrative Agencies FACTS: Samuel C. Granfil was hired as key operator by petitioner Functional, Inc. (FI), a domestic corporation engaged in the business of sale and rental of various business equipments, including photocopying machines. As Key Operator, Granfil was tasked to operate the photocopying machine rented by the National Bookstore (NBS) at its SM Megamall Branch. There is no dispute regarding the fact that, in the evening of 30 July 2002, Granfil attended to a customer by the name of Cosme Cavaldeja (Cavaldeja) who, together with his wife, asked to have their flyers photocopied. It appears that Bonnel Dechavez, the security guard assigned at said establishment, saw Cavaldeja handing money to Granfil after the transaction was finished. After investigating the matter, Dechavez submitted an incident report to NBS Branch Manager Lucy Genegaban (Genegaban). Granfil further asseverated that, with said incident report having been telefaxed to FIs head office, he was asked to report thereat in the morning of 31 July 2002; that instead of allowing him to explain, however, Ballesteros peremptorily ordered his termination from employment; that wishing to explain his side, he sought out Dizon who mere ly ignored and tersely advised him, Magpahinga ka na lang; that refused entry when he tried to report for work on 1 August 2002, he subsequently sought out Cavaldeja whose corroboration of his version of the incident also fell on deaf ears; that having been terminated without just cause and observance of due process, he was constrained to file the 3 September 2002 complaint from which the instant suit originated; that aside from the reinstatement to which he is clearly entitled as an illegally dismissed employee, he should be paid full backwages and 13th month pay for the year 2002; and, that in view of the malice and bad faith which characterized his dismissal from employment, Bautista, Tenorio, Ballesteros and Dizon should be held jointly and severally liable with FI for the payment of said indemnities as well as his claims for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Genegaban requested for Granfils relief as Key Operator of the photocopying machine installed at the NBS SM Megamall Branch; that for the good of all concerned, FI informed Granfil that he was going to be transferred to a different assignment, without demotion in rank or diminution of his salaries, benefits and other privileges; that required to report to FIs main office to act as emergency reliever to other Key Operators while waiting for his new assignment, Granfil misconstrued his transfer as a punishment for his guilt and refused to heed said directive which was within the managements prerogative to issue; that an employees right to security of tenure does not give him such vested right to his position as would deprive his employer of its prerogative to change his assignment or transfer him where he will be most useful; and, that aside from being guilty of insubordination, Granfil clearly abandoned his employment rather than illegally dismissed therefrom. ISSUE: The Honorable Court erred in not giving credence to the factual findings of both the NLRC and Labor Arbiter before whom the case was tried. RULING: FI next faults the CA for not giving credence to the factual findings of Labor Arbiter Eduardo Carpio which was affirmed in the NLRCs 20 April 2005 resolution. As may be gleaned from the above disquisition, however, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC clearly erred in directing the dismissal of the complaint by unduly shifting the burden of proving the illegality of his dismissal to Granfil. While administrative findings of fact are, concededly, accorded great respect, and even finality when supported by substantial evidence, nevertheless, when it can be shown that administrative bodies grossly misappreciated evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, this court had not hesitated to reverse their factual findings. Indeed, said rule does not apply when, as here, it is clear that a palpable mistake was committed by the quasi-judicial tribunal which needs rectification.

CASE TITLE: GreenHills East Association, Inc., vs. Ganzon CITATION: GR No. 169741. January 20, 2010 TOPIC: Administrative Agencies FACTS: Greenhills East Association, Inc. (GEA) is the homeowners association of Greenhills East Subdivision, a residential subdivision in Barangay Wack-Wack, Greenhills East, Mandaluyong City. E. Ganzon, Inc. (EGI) has sought to develop a 4,109-square meter lot (the land site) at the corner of EDSA and Ortigas Avenue in BarangayWack-Wack (the Barangay) with its owner, the San Buena Realty and Development Corp. EGI wanted to build on the property a 77-storey mixed-used building with an 8-storey basement for a total of 85 storeys (the project). The proposed SKYCITY Condominium, when built, will be the tallest building in the country. Sometime in April or May 1997, respondent EGI fenced its land site, demolished the structures on it, and began excavation works without first getting a clearance from theBarangay. On July 10, 1997 the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) issued to EGI a Certificate of Locational Viability and on August 11, 1997 the City ofMandaluyong issued to it an Excavation and Ground Preparation Permit. On September 15, 1997 the HLURB further issued to EGI a Preliminary Approval and Locational Clearance for its project. In January 1998 petitioner GEA wrote the HLURB National Capital Region, Regional Director, opposing respondent EGIs project. Not content with its HLURB opposition, GEA filed a separate one addressed to the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). On June 4, 1998 the DPWH advised the Building Official of Mandaluyong to require EGI to secure a Development Permit and a valid Locational Clearance for its project from the HLURB. In a separate development, EGI applied with theBarangay for clearance covering its project. On July 15, 1998, however, the Barangay denied the application. ISSUE: Whether or not the HLURB erred in finding no valid ground to restrict respondent EGIs use of the subject land site, which lies beside a residential subdivision, for constructing a high-rise building. RULING: The Court cannot find fault in HLURBs assertion that the real test of whether a land use serves the need of a district is not in the size or height of the buildings but in the sufficiency or surplus of the business or human activities in a given district to which they cater. Land use is affected by the intensity of such activities. Extraordinary population density or overcrowding, brought about by competition for space in the scarce area of the district, is to be avoided. Using this test, the HLURB, which is the clearing house for efficient land use, found no clear showing that respondent EGIs project if finished would cause havoc in the population level of the land district where the project li es. The Court must respect the factual findings of administrative agencies which have expertise on matters that fall within their jurisdiction. Here, since the HLURB has the expertise in applying zonal classifications on specific properties and since petitioner GEA fails to make out a clear case that it has erred, the Court must rely on its finding that respondent EGIs land site does not, for the purpose of applying height restrictions, adjoin an R-1 zone.