G.R. No.

192908

August 22, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH), Petitioner, vs. ST. VINCENT DE PAUL COLLEGES, INC., Respondent. DECISION REYES, J.: Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, where petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways through the Office of the Solicitor General, questions the resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 108499, to wit: 1. Resolution dated October 30, 20092 dismissing petitioners petition for certiorari under Rule 65 for being filed out of time; and 2. Resolution dated July 15, 20103 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. Antecedent Facts The instant case arose from two cases filed by the Republic seeking expropriation of certain properties in the name of St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc. (St. Vincent). In Civil Case No. 0062-04, the Republic sought to expropriate 1,992 square meters out of a total area of 6,068 square meters of land for the construction of the Manila-Cavite Toll Expressway Project (MCTEP). Said property belongs to St. Vincent covered by TCT No. T821169 and located in Binakayan, Kawit, Cavite. In Civil Case No. 0100-04, on the other hand, the Republic sought to expropriate 2,450 square meters out of a total area of 9,039 square meters, also belonging to St. Vincent and covered by TCT No. T-821170. Said property adjoins the property subject of Civil Case No. 006204. Subsequently, the Republic filed in both cases an amended complaint alleging that the subject land originated from a free patent title and should be adjudicated to it without payment of just compensation pursuant to Section 112 of Commonwealth Act No. 141. On August 9, 2005, the Republic filed in Civil Case No. 0062-04 a motion for the issuance of an order of expropriation.4 It was granted by the trial court per Order5 dated August 16, 2005, ruling that the Republic has a lawful right to take the 1,992 square meters portion of the subject property, with "no pronouncement as to just compensation" since the subject property originated from a free patent.6 A motion for the issuance of an order of expropriation was likewise filed by the Republic in Civil Case No. 0100-04 but before this could be resolved, the Republic moved to consolidate the two cases, which was granted by the trial court.7 On November 16, 2006, the trial court denied St. Vincents motion for reconsideration of its Order dated August 16, 2005 granting expropriation.8 As alleged in the petition, no appeal was taken by St. Vincent from said orders.9 After almost 2 years, or on July 28, 2008, St. Vincent filed a Manifestation with Motion for Clarification of the Order dated August 16, 2005,10 contending that although it does not oppose the ruling regarding the

determination of public purpose and the Republics right to expropriate the subject land, it, however, claims that it is entitled to just compensation. Meanwhile, the Republic attempted to implement the Order dated August 16, 2005 by entering the subject portion of St. Vincents property. Aggrieved, the latter demanded upon the Republic and its agents to immediately vacate, and remove any and all equipment or structures they introduced on its property in a demand-letter11 dated October 3, 2008. Due to St. Vincents refusal to honor the order of expropriation, the Republic filed an urgent motion for the issuance of a writ of possession, which was denied by the lower court in its Order12 dated November 25, 2006 2008 . The lower court, however, modified its Order dated August 16, 2005 and required the Republic to immediately pay St. Vincent in an amount equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the property sought to be expropriated. The Republic moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the lower court per Order13 dated January 29, 2009 for lack of factual and legal basis. Seeking to avail the extra ordinary remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the Republic filed with the CA a motion for additional time of fifteen (15) days within which to file its petition. The CA granted the motion in its Resolution14 dated April 30, 2009 and the Republic was given a non-extensible period of fifteen (15) days or until May 4, 2009 within which to file its petition for certiorari. On April 30, 2009, the Republic filed its petition for certiorari assailing the lower courts orders dated November 25, 2008 and January 29, 2009 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. On June 19, 2009, the CA, motu proprio, issued a Resolution15 ordering the Republic to show cause why its petition for certiorari should not be dismissed for being filed out of time, pursuant to A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. The Republic filed its Compliance with Explanation16 dated July 1, 2009 pleading for the relaxation of the rules by reason of the transcendental importance of the issues involved in the case and in consideration of substantial justice. St. Vincent filed its Comment/Opposition17 dated July 15, 2009 alleging among others that the said explanation is merely pro forma due to the Republics failure to justify its explanation. On October 30, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed resolution dismissing the Republics petition for certiorari on the ground that the petition was filed out of time inasmuch as extensions of time are now disallowed by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC18 and as applied in Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals.19 On November 26, 2009, the Republic filed its motion for reconsideration alleging that it merely relied in good faith on the appellate courts resolution granting the former an additional period of fifteen (15) days within which to file the subject petition. On July 15, 2010, the CA rendered the assailed resolution denying the Republics motion for reconsideration, stating that it cannot disobey the ruling in Laguna Metts Corporation.20 Hence, this petition. The Republic relies on the CA resolution granting its motion for extension of time and upon the strength of the substantial merits of its petition. The Republic also invokes Domdom v. Third and Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan,21 where the Court ruled that absent a prohibition, motions for extensions are allowed, subject to the Courts sound discretion.

St. Vincent, however, contends that the present petition fails to neither allege any circumstance nor state any justification for the deliberate disregard of a very elementary rule of procedure like Section 4 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. And in the absence of any such circumstance or justification, the general rule on pro forma motions/pleadings must apply. The Issue The Republic discussed the substantial merits of its case; however, the CA did no more than include such matters in its narration of facts, and neither did St. Vincent dwell on said issues. Hence, the only issue to be resolved in this petition is whether the CA committed a reversible error when it dismissed the Republics petition for certiorari for being filed out of time, pursuant to A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. The Courts Ruling We GRANT the petition. The Court notes that the CA Resolution dated April 30, 2009, which initially granted the Republics motion for extension, was premised on the mistaken notion that the petition filed by the latter was one for petition for review as a mode of appeal. The CA resolution stated, among others: "Provided that this Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review is seasonably filed, as prayed for, x x x."22 Thus, the CA granted extension inasmuch as motions for this purpose are allowed by the rules.23 On this score alone, the CA should have admitted the petition filed by the Republic since the latter merely relied on its Resolution dated April 30, 2009 granting the extension prayed for. Nevertheless, the CA subsequently dismissed the petition filed by the Republic on the ground that the same was filed out of time, following A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. In its Resolution dated July 15, 2010, which dismissed the Republics motion for reconsideration, the CA also relied on the ruling in Laguna Metts Corporation that the sixty (60)-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari is non-extendible. The petitioner, however, insists that Domdom allows extensions of time to file a petition. In order to resolve the instant controversy, the Court deems it necessary to discuss the relationship between its respective rulings in Laguna Metts Corporation and Domdom with respect to the application of the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC to Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Before said amendment, Section 4 of Rule 65 originally provides: Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion. The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.

As amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, Section 4 of Rule 65 now reads: Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion. If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board, an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the courts appellate jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasijudicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. In interpreting said amendment, the Court, in Laguna Metts Corporation, held that: As a rule, an amendment by the deletion of certain words or phrases indicates an intention to change its meaning. It is presumed that the deletion would not have been made if there had been no intention to effect a change in the meaning of the law or rule. The amended law or rule should accordingly be given a construction different from that previous to its amendment. If the Court intended to retain the authority of the proper courts to grant extensions under Section 4 of Rule 65, the paragraph providing for such authority would have been preserved. The removal of the said paragraph under the amendment by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC of Section 4, Rule 65 simply meant that there can no longer be any extension of the 60-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari. The rationale for the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC is essentially to prevent the use (or abuse) of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to delay a case or even defeat the ends of justice. Deleting the paragraph allowing extensions to file petition on compelling grounds did away with the filing of such motions. As the Rule now stands, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration.24 (Citation omitted and emphasis ours) Nevertheless, Domdom later stated: On the Peoples argument that a motion for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari is no longer allowed, the same rests on shaky grounds. Supposedly, the deletion of the following provision in Section 4 of Rule 65 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC evinces an intention to absolutely prohibit motions for extension: "No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days." The full text of Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, reads: xxxx That no mention is made in the above-quoted amended Section 4 of Rule 65 of a motion for extension, unlike in the previous for formulation, does not make the filing of such pleading absolutely prohibited. If such were the intention, the deleted portion could just have simply been reworded to state that "no extension of time to file the

petition shall be granted." Absent such prohibition, motions for extensions are allowed, subject to the Courts sound discretion. The present petition may thus be allowed, having been filed within the extension sought and, at all events, given its merits.25 (Citation omitted and emphasis and underscoring ours) What seems to be a "conflict" is actually more apparent than real. A reading of the foregoing rulings leads to the simple conclusion that Laguna Metts Corporation involves a strict application of the general rule that petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within sixty (60) days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. Domdom, on the other hand, relaxed the rule and allowed an extension of the sixty (60)-day period subject to the Courts sound discretion.26 Labao v. Flores27 subsequently laid down some of the exceptions to the strict application of the rule, viz: Under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, certiorari should be instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case. xxxx However, there are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellants fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances. Thus, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules.28 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours) Note that Labao explicitly recognized the general rule that the sixty (60)-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is non-extendible, only that there are certain exceptional circumstances, which may call for its non-observance. Even more recently, in Mid-Islands Power Generation Corporation v. Court of Appeals,29 the Court, taking into consideration Laguna Metts Corporation and Domdom, "relaxed the procedural technicalities introduced under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC in order to serve substantial justice and safeguard strong public interest" and affirmed the extension granted by the CA to the respondent Power One Corporation due to the exceptional nature of the case and the strong public interest involved. In Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we explained that the reason behind the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC was to prevent the use or abuse of the remedy of petition for certiorari in order to delay a case or even defeat the ends of justice. We thus deleted the clause that allowed an extension of the period to file a Rule 65 petition for compelling reasons. Instead, we deemed the 60-day period to file as reasonable and sufficient time for a party to mull over the case and to prepare a petition that asserts grave abuse of discretion by a lower court. The period was specifically set and limited in order to avoid any unreasonable delay in the dispensation of justice, a delay that could violate the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of their case.

x x x. Nevertheless, in the more recent case of Domdom v. Sandiganbayan, we ruled that the deletion of the clause in Section 4, Rule 65 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC did not, ipso facto, make the filing of a motion for extension to file a Rule 65 petition absolutely prohibited. We held in Domdom that if absolute proscription were intended, the deleted portion could have just simply been reworded to specifically prohibit an extension of time to file such petition. Thus, because of the lack of an express prohibition, we held that motions for extension may be allowed, subject to this Courts sound discretion, and only under exceptional and meritorious cases. Indeed, we have relaxed the procedural technicalities introduced under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC in order to serve substantial justice and safeguard strong public interest. x x x: xxxx The present Petition involves one of those exceptional cases in which relaxing the procedural rules would serve substantial justice and safeguard strong public interest. x x x Consequently, in order to protect strong public interest, this Court deems it appropriate and justifiable to relax the amendment of Section 4, Rule 65 under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, concerning the reglementary period for the filing of a Rule 65 petition. Considering that the imminent power crisis is an exceptional and meritorious circumstance, the parties herein should be allowed to litigate the issues on the merits. Furthermore, we find no significant prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants as respondent was able to file the Petition before the CA within the 15-day extension it asked for. We therefore find no grave abuse of discretion attributable to the CA when it granted respondent Power Ones Motion for Extension to file its Petition for Certiorari.30 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours) To reiterate, under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and as applied in Laguna Metts Corporation, the general rule is that a petition for certiorari must be filed within sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed. Under exceptional circumstances, however, and subject to the sound discretion of the Court, said period may be extended pursuant to Domdom, Labao and Mid-Islands Power cases. Accordingly, the CA should have admitted the Republics petition: first, due to its own lapse when it granted the extension sought by the Republic per Resolution dated April 30, 2009; second, because of the public interest involved, i.e., expropriation of private property for public use (MCTEP); and finally, no undue prejudice or delay will be caused to either party in admitting the petition. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated October 30, 2009 and July 15, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 108499 are NULLIFIED. The Court of Appeals is hereby ORDERED to REINSTATE and ADMIT the petition for certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines in CA-G.R. SP No. 108499 and to proceed with the case with dispatch. SO ORDERED. BIENVENIDO L. REYES Associate Justice

G.R. Nos. 182382-83

February 24, 2010

JAIME S. DOMDOM, Petitioner, vs. HON. THIRD AND FIFTH DIVISIONS OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: By Affidavit of February 15, 2002, Hilconeda P. Abril, State Auditor V of the Commission on Audit (COA) assigned at the Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation (PCIC), requested the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct a preliminary investigation on the transactions-bases of the claims of Jaime S. Domdom (petitioner) for miscellaneous and extraordinary expenses as a Director of PCIC, the receipts covering which were alleged to be tampered.1 After preliminary investigation, the Office of the Ombudsman found probable cause to charge petitioner with nine counts of estafa through falsification of documents in view of irregularities in nine supporting receipts for his claims for miscellaneous and extraordinary expenses, after verification with the establishments he had transacted with. It thus directed the filing of the appropriate Informations with the Sandiganbayan.2 The Informations were separately raffled and lodged among the five divisions of the Sandiganbayan. The First, Second and Fifth Divisions granted petitioners Motions for Consolidation of the cases raffled to them with that having the lowest docket number, SB-07-CRM-0052, which was raffled to the Third Division.3 The Sandiganbayan Third Division disallowed the consolidation, however, by Resolutions dated February 12 and May 8, 2008, it holding mainly that the evidence in the cases sought to be consolidated differed4 from that to be presented in the one which bore the lowest docket number. It is gathered from the records that the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division also denied petitioners Motion for Consolidation.5 Petitioner thus seeks relief from this Court via the present Petition for Certiorari, with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to enjoin the different divisions of the Sandiganbayan from further proceeding with the cases against him during the pendency of this petition.6 Petitioner argues that, among other things, all the cases against him arose from substantially identical series of transactions involving alleged overstatements of miscellaneous and extraordinary expenses. Respondent People of the Philippines (People), in its Comment,7 counters that petitioner failed to file a motion for reconsideration which is a condition precedent to the filing of a petition for certiorari; that the petition was filed out of time since a motion for extension to file such kind of a petition is no longer allowed; that consolidation is a matter of judicial discretion; and that the proceedings in the different divisions of the Sandiganbayan may proceed independently as the Informations charged separate crimes committed on separate occasions. In the meantime, the Court issued a TRO8 enjoining all divisions of the Sandiganbayan from further proceeding with the trial of the cases against petitioner until further orders. Prefatorily, the People raises procedural questions which the Court shall first address.

Concededly, the settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari, its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by a re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.9 The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as where the order is a patent nullity because the court a quo had no jurisdiction; where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question, and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner, or the subject matter of the action is perishable; where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; where the petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the grant of such relief by the trial court is improbable; where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.101 a vv p h i l The Court finds that the issue raised by petitioner had been duly raised and passed upon by the Sandiganbayan Third Division, it having denied consolidation in two resolutions; that the issue calls for resolution and any further delay would prejudice the interests of petitioner; and that the issue raised is one purely of law, the facts not being contested. There is thus ample justification for relaxing the rule requiring the prior filing of a motion for reconsideration. On the Peoples argument that a motion for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari is no longer allowed, the same rests on shaky grounds. Supposedly, the deletion of the following provision in Section 4 of Rule 65 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC11 evinces an intention to absolutely prohibit motions for extension: "No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days." The full text of Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, reads: Sec. 4. When and where to file the petition. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial of the motion. If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board, an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the courts appellate jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasijudicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. (underscoring supplied) That no mention is made in the above-quoted amended Section 4 of Rule 65 of a motion for extension, unlike in the previous formulation, does not make the filing of such pleading absolutely prohibited. If such were the

intention, the deleted portion could just have simply been reworded to state that "no extension of time to file the petition shall be granted." Absent such a prohibition, motions for extension are allowed, subject to the Courts sound discretion. The present petition may thus be allowed, having been filed within the extension sought and, at all events, given its merits. In Teston v. Development Bank of the Philippines, 12 the Court laid down the requisites for the consolidation of cases, viz: A court may order several actions pending before it to be tried together where they arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties. (emphasis and underscoring supplied.) The rule allowing consolidation is designed to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression or abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested dockets, and to simplify the work of the trial court in short, the attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants. Thus, in Philippine Savings Bank v. Maalac, Jr.,13 the Court disregarded the technical difference between an action and a proceeding, and upheld the consolidation of a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession with an ordinary civil action in order to achieve a more expeditious resolution of the cases. In the present case, it would be more in keeping with law and equity if all the cases filed against petitioner were consolidated with that having the lowest docket number pending with the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. The only notable differences in these cases lie in the date of the transaction, the entity transacted with and amount involved. The charge and core element are the same estafa through falsification of documents based on alleged overstatements of claims for miscellaneous and extraordinary expenses. Notably, the main witness is also the same Hilconeda P. Abril. It need not be underscored that consolidation of cases, when proper, results in the simplification of proceedings which saves time, the resources of the parties and the courts, and a possible major abbreviation of trial. It contributes to the swift dispensation of justice, and is in accord with the aim of affording the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their cases before the courts. Above all, consolidation avoids the possibility of rendering conflicting decisions in two or more cases which would otherwise require a single judgment.14 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Third Division of the Sandiganbayan is DIRECTED to allow the consolidation of the cases against petitioner for estafa through falsification of documents with SB-07-CRM0052, which has the lowest docket number pending with it. All other Divisions of the Sandiganbayan are accordingly ORDERED to forward the subject cases to the Third Division. SO ORDERED. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice

G.R. No. 187984

November 15, 2010

FRANCISCO A. LABAO, Petitioner, vs. LOLITO N. FLORES, AMADO A. DAGUISONAN, PEPE M. CANTAR, JULIO G. PAGENTE, JESUS E. ARENA, CRISPIN A. NAVALES, OSCAR M. VENTE, ARTEMIO B. ARAGON, ARNOLD M. CANTAR, ALBERTO T. CUADERO, RASMI E. RONQUILLO, PEDRO R. GABUTAN, ELPEDIO E. MENTANG,* WILFREDO R. MIOSA,** RODERICK P. NAMBATAC, MARCIAL D. RIVERA, SANDE E. CASTIL,*** CRISOSTOMO B. ESIC, and AMBROSIO M. CANTAR,**** Respondents. DECISION BRION, J.: We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Francisco A. Labao (petitioner) to challenge the decision2 and resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 01472-MIN.4 The Factual Antecedents The facts of the case, gathered from the records, are briefly summarized below. The petitioner is the proprietor and general manager of the San Miguel Protective Security Agency (SMPSA), a licensed security-service contractor. Respondents Lolito N. Flores, Amado A. Daguisonan, Pepe M. Cantar, Julio G. Pagente, Jesus E. Arena, Crispin A. Navales, Oscar M. Vente, Artemio B. Aragon, Arnold M. Cantar, Alberto T. Cuadero, Rasmi E. Ronquillo, Pedro R. Gabutan, Elpedio E. Mentang, Wilfredo R. Miosa, Roderick P. Nambatac, Marcial D. Rivera, Sande E. Castil, Crisostomo B. Esic, Ambrosio M. Cantar (respondents) and Jimmy O. Bicoy, were SMPSA security guards assigned to the National Power Corporation, Mindanao Regional Center (NPC-MRC), Ditucalan, Iligan City. Each of the respondents had a monthly salary of P7,020.00. On July 27, 2004, the petitioner issued a memorandum requiring all security guards to submit their updated personal data files, security guard professional license, and other pertinent documents by July 30, 2004 for reevaluation in connection with the SMPSAs new service contract with the NPC-MRC. 5 When respondents failed to comply with the petitioners directive, despite several notices to do so, the petitioner relieved them from NPC-MRC duty starting September and October 2004, and ordered them to report to the Senior Operations Officer, Nemesio Sombilon, for new assignments. Sometime in March and April 2005, the respondents filed individual complaints with the Iligan City SubRegional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for illegal dismissal and money claims, claiming they were constructively dismissed when they were not given new assignments for a period of over 6 months, despite repeated requests for NPC-MRC redeployment and for new assignments. The complaints were consolidated. The petitioner and SMPSA denied the charge of constructive dismissal. They countered that the respondents relief from NPC-MRC duty was a valid exercise of its management prerogative. Furthermore, they issued a notice (dated January 17, 2005)6 directing the respondents to report to SMPSAs main office for new assignments, but the latter failed or refused to comply without any valid reasons.

The Labor Arbiter Ruling In a December 27, 2005 decision, Labor Arbiter (LA) Noel Augusto S. Magbanua dismissed the consolidated complaints for lack of merit. He held that the respondents relief from NPC-MRC duty was due to their failure to comply with SMSPAs requirement for its employees to submit updated documents to meet NPC-MRC contract renewal requirements. According to the LA, this was a legitimate exercise of NPC-MRCs management prerogative, in light of the information it received that some security guards carried falsified documents.7 The respondents appealed the dismissal of their complaints to the NLRC. The NLRC Ruling In a July 31, 2006 resolution, the NLRC affirmed the LA decision. It noted that the respondents relief was in good faith, without grave abuse of discretion, and in the best interest of the business enterprise since SMPSA merely exercised its management prerogative and discretion to protect its business interest.8 It also noted that the respondents temporary off-detail did not exceed the 6-month period permitted by law, since the respondents were directed, through the January 17, 2005 notice, to report for a new assignment on January 25, 2005, but they failed or refused to do so. In a September 29, 2006 resolution, the NLRC denied the respondents subsequent motion for reconsideration.9 The respondents counsel, Atty. Demosthenes R. Plando, received the September 29, 2006 resolution on October 13, 2006. Eighty-eight (88) days later, or on January 9, 2007, the respondents, through their new counsel, filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, alleging that they were informed of the September 29, 2006 resolution on December 6, 2006, while Bicoy received a copy of the resolution on November 6, 2006. The CA Ruling In its September 5, 2008 decision, the CA set aside the NLRC resolution, finding that the respondents were constructively dismissed when they were not given new assignments for more than 6 months, from September and October 2004, when the respondents were "off-detailed," until March and April 2005, when they filed their individual complaints for illegal dismissal. The appellate court noted that the January 17, 2005 notice to report for new assignments did not toll the 6-month "floating status" period since the respondents failed to receive the notice before the appointed date, as SMPSA sent the notice by registered mail, which normally takes at least 5 working days to reach the intended recipients.10 Finding that reinstatement was no longer viable under the circumstances, the CA awarded the respondents separation pay at one (1) months salary for every year of service, plus full backwages, allowances and other statutory benefits under the law. The petitioner and SMPSA moved for reconsideration, arguing that the CA should have dismissed the petition outright for late filing, and that there was no compelling reason for the reversal of the LA and the NLRCs factual findings.11

In its April 22, 2009 resolution, the CA modified its September 5, 2008 decision by dismissing Bicoys petition for having been filed out of time. However, it considered the respondents petition as timely filed. It also opined that disregarding any procedural lapses best served substantial justice.12 The petitioner then filed the present petition. Bicoy, with respondents Castil, Esic, and Ambrocio M. Cantar filed a separate appeal, docketed as G.R. No. 190848. The Court denied this appeal in its April 5, 2010 resolution for late filing and for non-compliance with Rules 45 and 46 of the Rules of Court. The Petition The petitioner argues that: (a) the respondents CA petition for certiorari was filed 28 days late; (b) the respondents new counsel concealed Atty. Plandos October 13, 2006 receipt of the September 26, 2006 resolution and relied on the respondents December 6, 2006 notice of the resolution; and (c) the evidence on record supports the LA and NLRC decisions. The Case for the Respondents In contrast, the respondents submit that: (a) December 6, 2006 is the reckoning date of the 60-day period; (b) Atty. Plandos October 13, 2006 receipt did not bind them because his secretary, Sonia M. Barnachea, misplaced the September 29, 2006 resolution and they should not suffer for her negligence; and (c) the evidence on record does not support the LA and NLRC rulings. Issue The core issues boil down to whether the CA erred in acting on the respondents petition despite its late filing, and in reversing the LA and NLRC decisions. The Courts Ruling We find the petition meritorious. Timeliness of the CA petition for certiorari Under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,13 certiorari should be instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed.14 The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case.15 Time and again, we have stressed that procedural rules do not exist for the convenience of the litigants; the rules were established primarily to provide order to, and enhance the efficiency of, our judicial system.16 While procedural rules are liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business.17 The timeliness of filing a pleading is a jurisdictional caveat that even this Court cannot trifle with.18 Viewed in this light, procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have prejudiced a party's substantive rights; like all rules, they are required to be followed.1avvphi1 However, there are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time

from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant's fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances.19 Thus, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules.1avvphi1 Negligence of former counsel binds the respondents In the present case, the respondents petition for certiorari was filed twenty-eight (28) days late from Atty. Plandos October 13, 2006 receipt of the September 29, 2006 resolution. The respondents insist that they should not suffer for Atty. Plandos negligence in failing to inform them of the September 29, 2006 resolution, and the reckoning date for the 60-day period should be their December 6, 2006 notice. The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural technique.20 The exception to this rule is when the negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court.21 The failure of a partys counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment, to enable him to appeal therefrom, is negligence that is not excusable. We have repeatedly held that notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client, and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face.22 We cannot sustain the respondents argument that they cannot be bound by Atty. Plandos negligence since this would set a dangerous precedent. It would enable every party-litigant to render inoperative any adverse order or decision of the courts or tribunals, through the simple expedient of alleging his/her counsels gross negligence. We thus find that the CA erred in acting on the respondents petition for certiorari despite its late filing. The NLRC resolution was already final and executory, and the CA had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition, except to order its dismissal. Immutability of NLRC resolution The NLRCs resolution became final ten (10) days after counsels receipt, and the respondents failure to file the petition within the required (60)-day period rendered it impervious to any attack through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. Thus, no court can exercise jurisdiction to review the resolution.23 Needless to stress, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.24 All the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest once a judgment becomes final and executory; execution of the decision proceeds as a matter of right as vested rights are acquired by the winning party.25 Just as a losing party has the right to appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision on the case.26 After all, a denial of a petition for being time-barred is tantamount to a decision on the merits.27 Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation, and this will set to naught the main role of courts of justice to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with finality.28

WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 01472-MIN are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Labor Arbiter is REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice

G.R. No. 189191

February 29, 2012

Mid-Islands Power Generation Corporation, Petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals, Power One Corporation, Islands Grid Network Philippines, Inc., David Tan, and Manuel Lauron,* Respondents. DECISION SERENO, J.: Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the 23 December 2008 and 23 June 2009 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA).1 The core issue at bench is whether the CA had the authority to grant a Motion for Extension to file a petition for certiorari, in the light of our Resolution in A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, which took effect on 27 December 2007. Facts The case stems from the Complaint for injunction with urgent prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction (Civil Case No. 70957-SJ) filed by MindoroTech Services Inc. (MindoroTech) and petitioner Mid-Islands Power Generation Corporation (Mid-Islands Power) against respondents Power One Corporation (Power One), Islands Grid Network Philippines, Inc. (Islands Grid), David Tan (Tan), and Manuel Lauron (Lauron). Oriental Mindoro Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ORMECO), an electric distribution cooperative, entered into an Electric Supply Agreement (ESA) with Power One as the formers new electric power provider. Pursuant to the agreement, Power One was permitted to install, construct or acquire, and operate an electric generating facility in Oriental Mindoro. It was also authorized to assign its rights, interests, and obligations under the ESA to an affiliate or to a special purpose corporation that it may organize for the project (project company). Furthermore, Power One was empowered to form other corporations for the purpose of undertaking various aspects of the ESA. As part of the agreement, it was given the right to use the existing Calapan Diesel Power Plant in Oriental Mindoro. Power One invited several potential partners to join it in a business venture involving the management and operations of its ESA with ORMECO and its existing ESA with Central Negros Electric Cooperative (CENECO). Under the proposal, they would form a joint venture to be called "Mid-Islands Power Generation Corporation." This proposed project company would assume all the interests, rights, and obligations of Power

One under its ESA with CENECO (ESA-CENECO) and with ORMECO (ESA-ORMECO). Consequently, on 4 June 2004, Power One entered into a Memorandum of Agreement2 (MOA) with Victor Pascual, Faustino Lim, Philip Uy, and Viscal Development Corporation. The MOA stated that the new company, Mid-Islands Power, would own and implement Phase 1 of ESA-CENECO, which involved existing and proposed power plants in Alijis District, Bacolod City; and Phase 1 of ESA-ORMECO, which concerned the existing Calapan Diesel Power Plant in Calapan City. Under the agreement, the new partners would subscribe to 69.5%; Power One, through its affiliate company Islands Grid, to 29.5%; and a certain Kenneth Uy, to the remaining 1% of the outstanding capital stock of MidIslands Power. It was further stipulated that the management and operations of the newly organized project company, Mid-Islands Power, would be the responsibility of the new co-partners of Power One. Thus, on 15 October 2004, by virtue of an Assignment Memorandum,3 Power One assigned its two ESAs to Mid-Islands Power and notified ORMECO accordingly. In turn, ORMECO acknowledged the assumption by Mid-Islands Power of the rights, interests, and obligations of Power One under the ESA-ORMECO. In July 2005 Victor Pascual, Faustino Lim, Philip Uy, and Container Corporation of the Philippines4 (collectively, Pascual et al.) entered into a Revised Memorandum of Agreement5 (Revised MOA) with Power One, in which the parties agreed to shelve the CENECO project. Instead, they decided to focus on Phase 1 of the ORMECO project and to add Phase 2 of the ESA-ORMECO to their joint venture. Furthermore, the parties stipulated that they would form "an O & M Company," which would operate and manage the Calapan Diesel Power Plant on behalf of Mid-Islands Power. It was agreed that Pascual et al. would own and subscribe to 80% and Power One, through Islands Grid, to 20% of the stocks of the "O & M Company" that would be formed. The business relations between Power One and Pascual et al. eventually turned thorny. On various dates in May 2006, respondent Tan on behalf of Power One sent correspondences6 to Mid-Islands Power. An issue raised therein was the latters inability to fulfill its commitment to complete certain aspects of the ORMECO project within their set deadlines. Power One reiterated that the timely completion of Phase 1 of the ESA would be critical to the achievement of their profit goals. It insisted that Mid-Islands Power should decide and act faster so that the delays in finishing the projects would be cut by half. For its part, Mid-Islands Power broached several issues concerning its monetary advances, future financing arrangements, and proposed revision of the provisions on shareholdings in their Revised MOA. A further exchange of correspondences ensued,7 with both parties raising various concerns, such as lack of the required financing for the ORMECO project; the inability of Pascual et al., through Mid-Islands Power, to complete Phases 1 and 2 of the ORMECO project; and inefficiency in the management of the Mid-Islands Power joint venture. Consequently, in a demand letter8 sent to Pascual et al. through Mid-Islands, Power One asked for the specific performance of Pascual et al.s obligations under the Revised MOA. Power One asserted that the continued delay in finishing the ORMECO project had already resulted in a reduction of the electricity generated to less than 50% of capacity. Power One then informed Mid-Islands that their right to supply power to ORMECO and NPC, as well as to occupy and operate the leased facilities of NAPOCOR, had not taken effect. Power One alleged that it had already informed ORMECO that the assignment of the ESA in favor of MidIslands Power had not taken effect as of 30 April 2006 because of the latters inability to fulfill its obligations under the Revised MOA. Furthermore, Power One informed Mid-Islands Power that ORMECO had supposedly noticed that another company, MindoroTech, had been operating the Calapan Diesel Power Plant in violation of the ESA. Power One thus sought an explanation of the role of MindoroTech and demanded that Mid-Islands provide a clear plan on how the latter would complete Phase 1 of the ORMECO project. Subsequently, on 19

August 2006, Power One and Islands Grid barred Mid-Islands Power and MindoroTech from entering the Calapan Diesel Power Plant. On 11 September 2006, MindoroTech and petitioner Mid-Islands Power filed a Complaint (Civil Case No. 70957-SJ) against respondents Power One, Islands Grid, Tan, and Lauron. The complainants argued that, since the interests, rights, and obligations of respondents had already been transferred, respondents must be restrained from preventing them from performing their lawful and valid obligations under the ESA and the Revised MOA. Respondents opposed the Complaint and argued that the assignment of the ESA-ORMECO did not become effective, since certain conditions under the Revised MOA had not yet been fulfilled. According to respondents, the Calapan Diesel Power Plant could not be commercially operated unless the conditions were satisfied; and until due consultation with ORMECO was held, and the latters approval obtained. The Pasig City Regional Trial Court (Pasig RTC) issued a 72-hour temporary restraining order (TRO) to Power One, Islands Grid, Tan, and Lauron. At the continuation of the hearing on the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the parties agreed to the policy of "no touch," in which none of the parties would enter the control and the engine rooms of the power plant. They also agreed to an interim compromise operation of the power plant. In the meantime, the branch sheriff of the Pasig RTC placed the operation of the power plant under the responsibility of Mid-Islands Power and MindoroTech. However, on 20 October 2006 and during the pendency of the Complaint filed by MindoroTech and MidIslands Power, ORMECO filed a separate Complaint (Civil Case No. CV-06-5689) against Power One for specific performance of contract, with an application for preliminary mandatory injunction and damages before the RTC in Calapan City (Calapan RTC).9 On the same day, the trial court issued a 72-hour TRO commanding Power One to perform and comply with the latters obligation to immediately operate the Calapan Diesel Power Plant pursuant to the ESA-ORMECO. The Order also directed that, if Power One failed to perform its obligation, ORMECO would be authorized to operate the power plant. The sheriff of Calapan RTC eventually turned over to ORMECO the operations of the power plant and removed Mid-Islands and MindoroTech therefrom. According to the Calapan RTC judge, the TRO was issued to safeguard public interest, because there was an impending brownout in the whole province of Oriental Mindoro.10 On 6 November 2006, the Pasig RTC issued an Order11 granting the prayer of MindoroTech and Mid-Islands Power for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against Power One, Islands Grid, Tan, Lauron, and their representatives and agents. According to the RTC, actual and imminent danger was present. If the employees of complainants were prevented from operating the Calapan Diesel Power Plant, there would be undue interference with the performance of the ESA, which would in turn result in a power crisis in the area serviced by the Calapan Diesel Power Plant. The Pasig RTC noted that public interest was involved in the full and continuous supply of electricity in Oriental Mindoro. Thus, pursuant to the writ, Mid-Islands Power and MindoroTech were allowed to reenter and operate the Calapan Diesel Power Plant. Thus, on the afternoon of 10 November 2006, the branch sheriff implemented the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Pasig RTC, which allowed Mid-Islands Power and MindoroTech to resume their operations at the power plant. On that same day, however, the Calapan RTC issued a separate writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against these two corporations. Counsel for Power One then went to the power plant and demanded that Mid-Islands Power and MindoroTech vacate the premises. As both parties tried to enforce the two separate writs of preliminary injunction, which were issued by two different trial courts, trouble at the power plant ensued. Eventually, the Calapan RTC sheriff forcibly broke open the doors of the power plant and demanded that the personnel of both corporations leave the premises.

Consequently, respondents assailed the Order of the Pasig RTC before the CA (CA-G.R. SP No. 97243) through a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.12 They argued that the trial court did not have territorial jurisdiction to issue the injunctive writ, because the acts sought to be enjoined had been committed in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro. On 10 December 2007, the CA issued a Decision13 sustaining the Order of the Pasig RTC. According to the appellate court, the lockout indeed happened in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro; but since those who had barred the employees of Mid-Islands Power merely acted pursuant to the orders that officials of Power One issued from its principal office in Pasig City, the acts sought to be restrained had actually been committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the Pasig RTC. On 4 March 2008, the appellate court issued a Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration of Power One and Islands Grid. Afterwards, on 20 April 2009, the CA issued another Resolution ordering the entry of judgment of its 10 December 2007 Decision and as the judgment was no longer appealed to this Court subsequently ruled that the said CA Decision had become final and executory on 2 April 2008. Meanwhile, the Pasig RTC proceeded with the main action for injunction in Civil Case No. 70957-SJ. On 29 September 2008, it rendered summary judgment in favor of Mid-Islands Power and MindoroTech and made the preliminary injunction it issued on 6 November 2006 permanent.14 Pursuant to the Order, Islands Grid and Power One were permanently enjoined from committing acts that would tend to prevent Mid-Islands Power and MindoroTech from exercising and performing the latter twos rights and obligations in operating the Calapan Diesel Power Plant. On 9 December 2008, Power One filed a Motion for Extension of time to file its Petition for Certiorari with the CA and prayed for a 15-day extension. According to Power One, the Petition would question the 29 September 2008 Order of the Pasig RTC granting a permanent injunction against the former.15 Power One claimed that on 10 October 2008, it received the Order that gave it until 9 December 2008 to file a petition for certiorari. However, it posited that the lawyer handling the case had left the firm, and that the other lawyers were not able to act upon the Petition due to "other equally important professional undertaking."16 Pending the CA resolution on the Motion for Extension, Power One proceeded to file a Petition for Certiorari on 23 December 2008. The Motion for Extension (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 106511) was eventually granted on 23 December 2008.17 Mid-Islands Power opposed the Resolution of the CA and argued that the Motion had been granted in violation of A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. On 23 June 2009, the CA denied the Motion of Mid-Islands Power,18 which consequently filed the instant Petition. Issue The sole issue presented before this Court is whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in granting respondent Power Ones Motion for Extension. Discussion According to petitioner, the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in granting Power Ones Motion for Extension to file a petition for certiorari. Petitioner argues that the amendment under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC had already deleted the provision that allows an extension of time to file a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, was previously worded thus: SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether

such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion. The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days. (Emphasis supplied.) In a Resolution dated 4 December 2007, the Supreme Court En Banc issued A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, which amended the aforecited provision as follows: Sec. 4. When and where to file the petition. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial of the motion. If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board, an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the courts appellate jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasijudicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. In Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals,19 we explained that the reason behind the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC was to prevent the use or abuse of the remedy of petition for certiorari in order to delay a case or even defeat the ends of justice. We thus deleted the clause that allowed an extension of the period to file a Rule 65 petition for compelling reasons. Instead, we deemed the 60-day period to file as reasonable and sufficient time for a party to mull over the case and to prepare a petition that asserts grave abuse of discretion by a lower court. The period was specifically set and limited in order to avoid any unreasonable delay in the dispensation of justice, a delay that could violate the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of their case. Consequently, we pronounced that when the CA granted the motion for extension, it in effect disregarded and modified, if not outrightly reversed, the Supreme Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 07-712-SC. We then said that in so doing, the appellate court arrogated unto itself "a power it did not possess, a power that only this Court may exercise."20 Consequently, we ruled that petitions for certiorari must now be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration.21 Nevertheless, in the more recent case of Domdom v. Sandiganbayan,22 we ruled that the deletion of the clause in Section 4, Rule 65 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC did not, ipso facto, make the filing of a motion for extension to file a Rule 65 petition absolutely prohibited. We held in Domdom that if absolute proscription were intended, the deleted portion could have just simply been reworded to specifically prohibit an extension of time to file

such petition. Thus, because of the lack of an express prohibition, we held that motions for extension may be allowed, subject to this Courts sound discretion, and only under exceptional and meritorious cases. Indeed, we have relaxed the procedural technicalities introduced under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC in order to serve substantial justice and safeguard strong public interest. Thus, in Tan v. Ballena, we pronounced: It is a well-settled principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.1wphi1 Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. In deciding a case, the appellate court has the discretion whether or not to dismiss the same, which discretion must be exercised soundly and in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, taking into account the circumstances of the case. It is a far better and more prudent cause of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.23 (Citations omitted.) The present Petition involves one of those exceptional cases in which relaxing the procedural rules would serve substantial justice and safeguard strong public interest. It concerns the operations and management of the Calapan Diesel Power Plant a power-generating facility that supplies electricity to Oriental Mindoro. It was alleged that the dispute between the parties had already resulted in a reduced generation of power, which was supposedly producing electricity at less than 50% of its capacity. A TRO had already been issued previously, as there was an impending brownout in the entire province of Oriental Mindoro. Consequently, in order to protect strong public interest, this Court deems it appropriate and justifiable to relax the amendment of Section 4, Rule 65 under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, concerning the reglementary period for the filing of a Rule 65 petition. Considering that the imminent power crisis is an exceptional and meritorious circumstance, the parties herein should be allowed to litigate the issues on the merits. Furthermore, we find no significant prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants as respondent was able to file the Petition before the CA within the 15-day extension it asked for. We therefore find no grave abuse of discretion attributable to the CA when it granted respondent Power Ones Motion for Extension to file its Petition for Certiorari. As a final note, we convey our strong disapproval over the failure of Power Ones lawyers to file the Petition within the reglementary period. The amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC were meant to be implemented strictly, with a view in mind that the 60-day period to file is a reasonable and sufficient time to prepare a Rule 65 petition. Workload and resignation of the lawyer handling the case are insufficient reasons to justify the relaxation of the procedural rules. He should not have left his client with this very critical piece of work hanging in midair. Were it not for the exceptional nature of the case and the strong public interest involved herein, we would have overturned the approval by the CA of the Motion to extend the period to file a Rule 65 Petition. WHEREFORE the Petition is DISMISSED. The 23 December 2008 and 23 June 2009 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 106511 are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Associate Justice

G.R. No. 185220

July 27, 2009

LAGUNA METTS CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ARIES C. CAALAM and GERALDINE ESGUERRA, Respondents. RESOLUTION CORONA, J.: This petition arose from a labor case filed by private respondents Aries C. Caalam and Geraldine Esguerra against petitioner Laguna Metts Corporation (LMC).1 The labor arbiter decided in favor of private respondents and found that they were illegally dismissed by LMC. On appeal, however, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the decision of the labor arbiter in a decision dated February 21, 2008. Private respondents motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated April 30, 2008. Counsel for private respondents received the April 30, 2008 resolution of the NLRC on May 26, 2008. On July 25, 2008, he filed a motion for extension of time to file petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.2 The motion alleged that, for reasons3 stated therein, the petition could not be filed in the Court of Appeals within the prescribed 60-day period.4 Thus, a 15-day extension period was prayed for.5 In a resolution dated August 7, 2008,6 the Court of Appeals granted the motion and gave private respondents a non-extendible period of 15 days within which to file their petition for certiorari. LMC moved for the reconsideration of the said resolution claiming that extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari are no longer allowed under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC dated December 4, 2007.7 This was denied in a resolution dated October 22, 2008. According to the appellate court, while the amendment of the third paragraph of Section 4, Rule 65 admittedly calls for stricter application to discourage the filing of unwarranted motions for extension of time, it did not strip the Court of Appeals of the discretionary power to grant a motion for extension in exceptional cases to serve the ends of justice. Aggrieved, LMC now assails the resolutions dated August 7, 2008 and October 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It contends that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted private respondents motion for extension of time to file petition for certiorari as the Court of Appeals had no power to grant something that had already been expressly deleted from the rules. We agree. Rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with and should not be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming substantial merit.8 As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for taking certain proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to prevent needless delays and to orderly and promptly discharge judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.9 In De Los Santos v. Court of Appeals,10 we ruled: Section 4 of Rule 65 prescribes a period of 60 days within which to file a petition for certiorari. The 60-day period is deemed reasonable and sufficient time for a party to mull over and to prepare a petition asserting grave

abuse of discretion by a lower court. The period was specifically set to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of the parties to a speedy disposition of their case. (emphasis supplied) While the proper courts previously had discretion to extend the period for filing a petition for certiorari beyond the 60-day period,11 the amendments to Rule 65 under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC disallowed extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari with the deletion of the paragraph that previously permitted such extensions. Section 4, Rule 65 previously read: SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion. The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding 15 days.12 (emphasis supplied) With its amendment under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, it now reads: SEC. 4. When and where to file petition. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from the notice of the denial of the motion. If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board, an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the courts appellate jurisdiction.lavvphil If the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. In election cases involving an act or omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. As a rule, an amendment by the deletion of certain words or phrases indicates an intention to change its meaning. It is presumed that the deletion would not have been made if there had been no intention to effect a change in the meaning of the law or rule. The amended law or rule should accordingly be given a construction different from that previous to its amendment.13lavvph!l If the Court intended to retain the authority of the proper courts to grant extensions under Section 4 of Rule 65, the paragraph providing for such authority would have been preserved. The removal of the said paragraph under the amendment by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC of Section 4, Rule 65 simply meant that there can no longer be any extension of the 60-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari.

The rationale for the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC is essentially to prevent the use (or abuse) of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to delay a case or even defeat the ends of justice. Deleting the paragraph allowing extensions to file petition on compelling grounds did away with the filing of such motions. As the Rule now stands, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. In granting the private respondents motion for extension of time to file petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals disregarded A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. The action amounted to a modification, if not outright reversal, by the Court of Appeals of A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. In so doing, the Court of Appeals arrogated to itself a power it did not possess, a power that only this Court may exercise.14 For this reason, the challenged resolutions dated August 7, 2008 and October 22, 2008 were invalid as they were rendered by the Court of Appeals in excess of its jurisdiction. Even assuming that the Court of Appeals retained the discretion to grant extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari for compelling reasons, the reasons proffered by private respondents counsel did not qualify as compelling. Heavy workload is relative and often self-serving.15 Standing alone, it is not a sufficient reason to deviate from the 60-day rule.16 As to the other ground cited by private respondents counsel, suffice it to say that it was a bare allegation unsubstantiated by any proof or affidavit of merit. Besides, they could have filed the petition on time with a motion to be allowed to litigate in forma pauperis. While social justice requires that the law look tenderly on the disadvantaged sectors of society, neither the rich nor the poor has a license to disregard rules of procedure. The fundamental rule of human relations enjoins everyone, regardless of standing in life, to duly observe procedural rules as an aspect of acting with justice, giving everyone his due and observing honesty and good faith.17 For indeed, while technicalities should not unduly hamper our quest for justice, orderly procedure is essential to the success of that quest to which all courts are devoted.18 WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The resolutions dated August 7, 2008 and October 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 104510 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the petition in the said case is ordered DISMISSED for having been filed out of time. SO ORDERED. RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice

G.R. No. 70203 December 18, 1987 SALVIO B. FORTUNO and CAMARINES SUR II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE (CASURECO II), petitioners, vs. HONORABLE MERICIA B. PALMA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch XXI, Regional Trial Court, Fifth Judicial Region, and JOEL DAVID S. ABANTE, respondents. GANCAYCO, J.:

The issue posed in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order is whether the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings involving the qualification for membership of the Board of Directors of an electric cooperative. Petitioner Salvio B. Fortuno and respondent Joel David S. Abante were candidates for the position of director to represent District V of the Camarines Sur II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (CASURECO II) at the elections of February 9, 1985. On January 30, 1985, Abante filed with the National Electrification Administration (NEA) a petition to disqualify Fortuno as candidate alleging that he is not a resident of the area coverage of District V as required by the By-laws of the corporation. The NEA directed the CASURECO Board of Directors to take appropriate action on the petition in accordance with the By-laws and Election Code. The Board indorsed the petition to the District Election Committee (DEC) which is the body charged with the duty of deciding all election matters, including protests, quarries, referrals, postponements and nullification. 1 In another letter of February 4, 1985 addressed to DEC, Abante likewise sought the disqualification of Fortuno on the same ground of non-residence. The DEC directed Fortuno to submit his comment thereto within 48 hours which was duly complied with. After a hearing on February 9, 1985, the DEC denied Abante's petition to disqualify Fortuno finding that he is a resident of the area coverage of District V. On February 9, 1985, the election was held as a result of which Fortuno obtained 1,429 votes while Abante received 637 votes. Accordingly, the DEC proclaimed Fortuno as the duly elected director for District V. On February 10, 1985, a quo warranto petition with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order was filed by Abante in the Regional Trial Court of Naga City docketed as No. RTC-05-607 entitled "Joel David S. Abante vs. Salvio B. Fortuno, and CASURECO II." On the day of the hearing of the preliminary injunction the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court over the case was raised by said defendants. On March 13, 1985, an order was issued by the trial court upholding its jurisdiction over the subject matter. A motion for reconsideration of said order was filed by defendants but this was denied in an order of March 16, 1985. On March 18, 1985, the trial court issued an order resetting the hearing for preliminary injunction on March 25, 1985 to enable defendants to elevate the matter to the appellate court and issued the restraining order enjoining Fortuno from assuming or otherwise performing the functions of a member of the Board of Directors of CASURECO II until further orders of the Court and the respondent CASURECO II to observe and implement the said restraining order. Hence, the herein petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed on March 18, 1985 with this Court wherein petitioners seek to set aside said orders of March 16 and 18, both of 1985 of the trial court and that a restraining order be issued against the trial court taking further action on the case until further orders. On March 19, 1985, a supplemental petition was filed by petitioners informing the Court of the restraining order the respondent court issued on March 18, 1985 which in effect restrains the continuance in the performance of the duties of Fortuno as an incumbent member of the Board of Directors who was elected in 1981 whose term of office will end on March 30, 1985 and that assuming that he was not a resident of the area of coverage he represents he cannot be arbitrarily suspended or removed from office so that petitioners pray for a restraining order against the enforcement of said order and for the respondent Judge from taking further proceedings in the case.

On March 25, 1985, without giving due course to the petition the respondents were required to comment thereon. The comment thereon having been filed by the respondents, on October 9, 1985 the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their simultaneous memoranda. Only petitioners submitted their memoranda. The case is now submitted for deliberation. The main thrust of the petition is that the respondent court has no jurisdiction over the case citing Section 24 of P.D. 269 as amended, which vests in the National Electrification Administration (NEA) the power of supervision and control over all electric cooperatives as follows: Section 24. Board of Directors. (a) The Management of a Cooperative shall be vested in its Board, subject to the supervision and control of NEA which shall have the right to be represented and to participate in all Board meetings and deliberations and to approve all policies and resolutions. The composition, qualifications, the manner of elections and filling of vacancies, the procedures for holding meetings and other similar provisions shall be defined in the By-laws of the Cooperative subject to NEA policies, rules and regulations... 2 Thus petitioners argue that: Pursuant to the authority granted it by law, the NEA promulgated a standard Electric Cooperative Election Code which the CASURECO II Board of Directors adopted under its Board Resolution No. 108, s. 1982, as amended by Board Resolution No. 84-141 (Exh. 2). This Election Cooperative Election Code provides for the creation of a District Election Committee (DEC) which shall, among other things, 'decide on all election matters including protests, queries, referrals, postponement and nullification' (par. f, Sec. 26, Electric Cooperative Election Code), 'act as Board of Canvassers' (Sec. 26-g, Ibid), and 'proclaim the winning candidate' (Sec. 50, Ibid). lt is likewise vested with the 'sole jurisdiction' over all protests relating to the election of the members of the Board of Directors, although its decision is appealable to the NEA (Secs. 51, 52, Ibid). As already adverted to above, respondent Abante filed two formal complaints questioning the residence qualification of petitioner Fortuno. These two complaints were duly heard and resolved by the DEC in its Resolution No. 04 dated 8 February 1985 (Exh. 4). Abante did not appeal from this Resolution which upheld the residence qualification of Fortuno. In other words, the District Election Committee which is vested with authority to decide questions of this nature has already ruled that petitioner Fortuno possesses the necessary residence qualification, a decision which has long become final, no appeal having been taken therefrom. The question, therefore, of Fortuno's alleged nonresidence within the area coverage of District V had finally been resolved by the duly constituted and authorized administrative body in accordance with the internal rules and regulations of both CASURECO II and the National Electric Administration. Moreover, we earnestly underline the fact that immediately after the elections on the afternoon of February 9, 1985, the DEC proclaimed Fortuno as the duly elected Director for District V. No protest against petitioner's proclamation was filed with the DEC, which has the sole jurisdiction to entertain the same, within the reglementary 72-hour period provided for in Section 51 of the Electric Cooperative Election Code. Therefore, said proclamation may no longer be questioned.

These facts assume greater significance when it is remembered that private respondent Abante himself, in his Certificate of Candidacy (Exh. 3), expressly agreed to abide by the Electric Cooperative Election Code, thereby placing himself squarely within the jurisdiction of the provisions thereof. We respectfully submit, therefore, that inasmuch as the power to determine and decide the residence qualification of petitioner Fortuno is vested in, and falls within the peculiar function and competence of the NEA, acting through its duly created District Election Committee, that the decision rendered by the latter had already become final, said resolution may no longer be questioned elsewhere. The respondent Court thus is without jurisdiction and authority to review and reverse the aforesaid decision of the District Election Committee. 3 In support of petitioners' theory the cases of Lions Clubs International vs. Judge Amores 4 and of Bataan Electric Cooperative vs. Judge Pedro T. Santiago are cited. 5 In the questioned order of March 13, 1985 of the respondent court it made the following disquisition: The pleadings and motions filed by counsels disclose the following: 1) Petitioner Joel David S. Abante and respondent Salvio S. Fortuno were the only candidates in the election for District Director, District V, CASURECO II, Inc. for the towns of Canaman, Magarao and Bombon held on February 9, 1985. 2) Few days before the election, or on January 30, 1985 Abante in a petition to the National Electrification Administration (NEA) sought the disqualification of respondent Salvio Fortuno on the ground that the latter was not a resident within the area coverage of District V, CASURECO II. The NEA endorsed the petition to the District Election Committee which in resolution No. 04 dated February 8, 1985 denied Abante's petition. 3) A petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction to disqualify Fortuno on grounds of non-residence and to enjoin the CASURECO II from proceedings with the election scheduled on February 9, 1985 was filed before the RTC, which was docketed as Civil Case No. RTC'85-599. After due hearing the Court denied the prayer for postponement of the election and dismissed the petition. 4) The DEC proclaimed Fortuno elected having garnered 1,429 votes as against Abante's votes of 637. No protest was filed by Abante within the 72-hour reglementary period as allegedly provided for in Section 51 of the Electric Cooperative Election Code. The elected board of CASURECO II will assume their position for a term of 3 years on March 30, 1985. Abante, convinced that Fortuno is disqualified because of non-residence in the area, filed this present Special Civil Action for Quo Warranto Respondent Fortuno in raising the issue of jurisdiction contends that judicial intervention is not proper; that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies; that this Court has no jurisdiction over the nature of subject matter of the action; that it is the DEC who is vested with the "sole jurisdiction over all protests of directors, although its decision is appealable to the NEA." It is claimed that Courts may not intervene in the purely internal affairs of the cooperative and in this regard, respondent cited the case of the Lions Club International vs. Judge Amores, et al. (121 SCRA 628) where the Supreme Court opined that: "in accordance with the general rules as to the judicial interference, the decision of an unincorporated association on the question of an election to office is a matter peculiarly and exclusively to be determined by the association and, in the absence of fraud, is final and binding on the courts." But in the same case the Supreme Court also said "The general rule on non-interference in the internal affairs of associations is, however, subject to exceptions, but the power of review is extremely limited. Accordingly, the courts have and will exercise power to interfere in the internal affairs of associations where law and justice so require, and the proceedings of the association are subject to judicial review where there is fraud, oppression or bad faith, or where the action complained of is capricious, arbitrary, or unjustly discriminatory (underlining supplied, p. 628, Vol. 121, SCRA). Paragraph 4 of the verified petition, last sentence thereof, alleges "that the DEC with wanton disregard

of the elementary rules of fair play-due process-arbitrarily denied petitioners complaint for the disqualification of respondent Fortuno." This Court finds that hearing of the petition for preliminary injunction would not constitute undue interference in the internal affairs of the CASURECO II. Respondent CASURECO II in support of its objection to the grant of preliminary injunction has cited the case of Silon vs. Vera (64, Philippine 868) to wit: In quo warranto proceedings instituted for the sole purpose of questioning the legality of the election of the directors of a corporation ... preliminary injunction does not he to prevent said directors and officers from discharging their offices and to restore the former directors, and the issuance thereof constitute an excess of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion. The Court has read the case and found that the facts of the case has no parallel to the case at bar. The doctrine laid down in said case cannot apply even by analogy to the present case. The 'Reply to the objection' filed by petitioner's counsel has clearly pointed out the striking difference between the two cases and the inapplicability of said case to the case at bar. The rule regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute except when there is an express legal provision requiring such administrative step as a condition precedent to taking action in court. This specially in point taking the fact raised by the respondent that the position is not a public office which would be strictly subject to the hierarchy of higher administrative offices. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies may possibly affect the cause of action but not the jurisdiction of the Court. Another factor, in this particular case, is that the petitioner, has no other immediate and adequate remedy than to go to court in view of the forthcoming assumption of office of the new Board of Directors which would not afford sufficient time to raise the matter to the higher NEA authorities in Manila. It is to be noted that this case does not involve the validity of the election proceedings, or the number of votes cast but, simply the question of whether the respondent is qualified or not under the residence requirement of the position for which he was a candidate. it is therefore a justiciable controversy. We agree. Under Section 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court a quo warranto proceeding maybe instituted to determine the right to the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well- founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. 6 Where the dispute is on the eligibility to perform the duties by the person sought to be ousted or disqualified a quo warranto is the proper action. 7 Under Section 6, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court it is provided: SEC. 6. When an individual may commence such an action. A person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an action therefore in his own name. In this connection this Court held that an office in a private corporation is an office of public character in such a sense and to such an extent as to render the remedy available to a person having an interest which is injuriously affected. 8 The action may also be brought by a public utility whose rights are invaded by another. 9 The Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings with the Regional Trial Court in the province in which the defendant or one of the defendants reside, or when defendant is a corporation, in the

province in which it is domiciled or has a place of business; but when the Solicitor General of the Philippines commences the action, it may be brought in a Court of First Instance in the City of Manila or the Supreme Court. 10 From the foregoing provision of the rules and rulings of this Court, the conclusion is inescapable that the quo warranto proceeding filed in the RTC of Naga City questioning the qualification of petitioner Fortuno is within the jurisdiction of said Court. Nowhere in the law can We find any provision that excepts the electric cooperatives from its coverage. True it is that the NEA has supervision and control over the directors of CASURECO II and that under its election code respondent Abante has the remedy of appeal to the NEA within 72 hours which he did not avail of. Be that as it may, it does not deprive said respondent of the right to avail of the right to file the quo warranto suit when it is shown that the DEC committed a grave abuse of discretion or otherwise acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction in the resolution of the qualification of Fortuno. 11 The ruling of this Court in Lions Club International that the "courts will not interfere with the internal affairs of an unincorporated association" cannot apply to the present case as CASURECO II is clearly a duly organized private corporation in the Philippines. Nevertheless, in said case this Court held that its proceedings (Lions Clubs International) are nevertheless subject to judicial review "where law and justice so requires, and ..." where there is fraud, oppression, bad faith, or where the action complained of is capricious, arbitrary or unjust discriminatory. 12 In the present case, Abante alleged in the quo warranto petition that the DEC "arbitrarily denied petitioner's complaint for disqualification of respondent Fortuno" warranting the intervention of the courts. 13 By the same token the case of Bataan Electric Cooperative is predicated on different environmental facts. In said case, what is questioned is the qualification of the voters who voted for the member of the board of directors and not of the one voted for and further the elections sought to be prevented had already been held, so that the petition was considered moot and academic. 14 WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz and Paras, JJ., concur.