MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Meeting with the Cohen Group, December 12, 2003

Type of Event: Meeting

Date: December 12, 2003

Prepared by: Bonnie D. Jenkins

Classification: Unclassified

Team Number: 3

Location: 1200 19th Street, Suite 500

Participants - Non-Commission: Secretary Cohen, General Joseph Ralston, Deborah

Rosenblum, Robert Tyrer, James Bodner, Mara Rudman, Paul Gephard
Participants - Commission: Commissioner Hamilton, Chris Kojm, Bonnie Jenkins and
Mike Hurley

While not planned, this was a pre-interview of Cohen (we assumed we would receive a
briefing from the Cohen Group). Questions revolved around military intelligence,
homeland defense and military operations against terrorism.

DoD and CIA Intelligence relations

When asked about the relationship between the Department of Defense (DoD) and the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during his tenure as Secretary of Defense, Secretary
Cohen responded that DoD and CIA worked well together. He had a good relationship
with George Tenet and they met regularly. There- was, however, a lot of duplication of
efforts between CIA and DIA.

Cohen had access to Presidential Daily Briefs (PDBs). H6 also had a CIA briefing every
morning. However, if for some reason the briefing did not take place, he could rely on the
PDBs for intelligence updates. Cohen also noted that there was a great deal of
information flowing back and forth between DoD and CIA, and DoD had very good
access to intelligence information. If DoD did not have what it needed and requested
information from CIA, DoD received that information.

There were no significant intelligence issues related to the budget. There were some
concerns, however, over the funding of satellites. There were some high value assets and
the question was who would pay for them. Also, regarding UA Vs, there were some
difficult turf battles that took senior level attention to determine who was in charge. In
 addition, in the field, there were few problems between DoD and CIA. Today, DoD is
moving further in strengthening its own intelligence capabilities.

General Ralston noted that every day [when he was Vice Chair, JCS I assume], he had a
PDB briefer. He, like Cohen, believed the CIA was very responsive to his intelligence
requests. In addition, prior to his trips overseas (he normally traveled 10 days a month),
he was briefed by a CIA analyst on relevant intelligence matters and when he returned
from these trips, he would do a debrief with the CIA. He had a close relationship with the
CIA. '

Ralston also noted that in his last three years in Europe as CINCEUCOM,l he received
daily at least 30 messages that indicated "something was about to blow up." Without
assistance from intelligence providers as to what was important and what was not, he was
forced to review all the messages and make an assessment on each. It was a problem that
every commander had to address. However, the intelligence community (IC) is concerned
about being told after an incident that it failed in its task of notifying relevant individuals
of possible terrorist attacks. Therefore, the IC started "pumping out" a great deal of
information and it was difficult to review and assess all of the information provided. How
does one determine what is or is not important? One question always asked is if the
source is credible, and that is not an easy question to answer. Also, if a mistake is made
and a message is not acted upon, and a"terrorist incident does occur, the CDR is blamed
because the warning message did come across his desk. The bottom line for Ralston is
" that if the IC is made to fear a potential mistake, its own fear of an intelligence failure
will result in it producing more and more messages.

In addition, Ralston noted that as CINCEUCOM, he sometimes had to elevate the threat
condition (THREATCON) in his area of responsibility (AOR). He believed it is not
beneficial to raise a THREA TCON and keep it high since that level will become routine
for those in the AOR and sensitivities to possible attack goes down. He noted that it is
preferable to continually raise and lower the level. In addition, he noted that how and
when to lower the THREA TCOM is sometimes unclear. "Ambiguous information sends
you up, but how do you come down?"

Cohen was asked if he believed 9111 was an intelligence failure. Cohen noted that there
was a lack of integrated communication within the IC and in that respect, there was a
failure. However, there did exist enough ofa pattern that someone should have taken note
that something was taking place. In this respect, there was a breakdown in the sharing of
intelligence among the agencies. While collection of intelligence is important, the
integration of information is more important. There must be cross dissemination of
information. This may require a CIA lead or a separate focal point for this integration.
The FBI, however, should not be the lead on the integration of intelligence. This is
because the FBI culture does not lend itself to being a lead for integration. Cohen also
noted that while there was a lot of information coming in, terrorist groups like to confuse
those who keep track of their activities, so there was also a great deal of "spam."

1 Today the term is Combatant Commander, United States European Command

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Paul Gephard noted that the creation of the Department of Homeland Security has
resulted in there being another agency with a piece of the intelligence pie. In addition, the
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTl C) was envisioned to be the place where all
intelligence is fused. However, TTIC itself seems to have a problem sharing information.
In his view, it is not clear that TTIC is serving the goal of integrating intelligence. In
addition, local and state responders to CT incidents are talking to different agencies in
DC, which is not adequate.

Cohen was asked if the CIA Director should control more of the budget. Cohen
responded that such a proposal must be approved by Congress, the Executive Branch, the
Senate Armed Services Committee (who will definitely not support it), and others. It
would not be a simple task.

The African Embassy Bombings and the TLAM Strikes

Secretary Cohen then noted that after the African Embassies were attacked in August
1998, there was a lot of intelligence regarding terrorists in Afghanistan. The intelligence
received stated that Usama bin Laden (UBL) was connected to the attack. The CIA also
said UBL was tryingto obtain chemical weapons. There was analysis regarding UBL and
the plant the US eventually hit with TLAMs (there was information about a suspicious
"pharmaceutical plant"). The strike was based on this type of specific intelligence
received after the attack and the recommendation was to take out the plant. General
Ralston was sent to the area because the US was in a tense situation with Pakistan and
India after their 1998 nuclear tests and we needed to fly over Pakistan (Ralston was on a
covert mission to Pakistan). The strikes missed UBL by a few hours. UBL was sited at
the plant but unfortunately, he was forewarned. The intelligence in Pakistan had a line
into him. The US had to close its embassy in Pakistan in case there was retaliation and
this action tipped off those who were in contact with UBL.

Force Protection as a Priority in DoD

Cohen noted that after Khobar Towers, a number of investigations were initiated to find
out what happened and what the failures were. After the attack, he instructed the DoD
that force protection (FP) would be the military's highest priority. This was reflected in a
number of new DoD Directives focused on force protection. Prior to the USS Cole
incident, the military believed the protection of its forces was much improved. However,
the USS COLE incident made the military realize there were still some gaps. The US
Navy, whose ships travel from shore to shore, operates differently than fixed bases.
[Cohen then noted the problems, and these can be found in the USS Cole Commission
report, such as who was in charge, what were the rules of engagement, etc]. There was a
break-down between the Navy and the Department of State (DoS). When the ship is at
sea, the captain is in charge of all aspects of the ship. When the ship is at shore, DoS is in
charge of servicing the ship. Clearly, FP is not as adequate when the military is on
foreign shores. In addition, the Navy also should have been on higher alert.

The FBI and CT

The discussion moved on to the role of the FBI in CT efforts. Cohen and his team noted
that when a major CT issue came up in DoD, the Deputy Secretary of Defense would

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convene a small group and ensure everyone was communicating with each other in the
Department and where necessary, outside the Department. This, however, is not true in
the FBI. The Bureau does not share information because the CT information it acquires
often falls into the area of law enforcement and therefore, the issue of resolving the
problem is of secondary importance. The FBI has a difficult time separating its law
enforcement and counter terrorism responsibilities. There are legal impediments that and
other law enforcement constraints, which are very problematical. Robert Tyrer noted that
what is required is a well regulated, controlled apparatus that has no law enforcement
focus.

Homeland Defense
Cohen noted that prior to 9-11, he believed there was a focused effort against Al Qaeda
(A-Q) outside the United States. There were meetings on a daily basis as to the A-Q
threat overseas and there was generally an integrated picture. Intelligence/policy focused
on the problem. However, the efforts within the U.S. were not as focused. In the United
States, the FBI did not work the problem very well.

Cohen discussed the idea of a CINC in the US that was proposed by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS) but which was immediately "shot down" by Congress and the ACLU. In
response, the military decided to put together a small group of about 30-35 people at
Atlantic Command in Norfolk, VA, who would be able to provide assistance if there was
a domestic attack. In his view, no one could do this better than the military (it is unclear
what he meant by no one can "do this better" e.g., defense, crisis management or
consequence management). This element could be responsive to the Commander in
Chief. Cohen noted the military tried to persuade relevant parts of the US. society that
what was being established in the Atlantic Command was not going to result in any
activity of concern.

Cohen pointed to NORTHCOM as one way the military is now more efficient in
addressing homeland security issues. Cohen, however, is not in favor of the military
. doing CT inside the U.S. While the military is not the first responders for consequence
management, if an incident arises and overwhelms the local authorities, the military will
provide assistance. He also noted the US should be more proactive in what can be done
before the military must go in, for example, at the borders and tracking incoming
containers.

Cohen noted that the 1996 Olympics was a unique experience. However, most people do
not want to see army tanks on the street. To accept that requires a different mindset. The
military is also not great at peacekeeping; it is trained to kill. He noted that if there is
another attack, all of these issues will be swept aside. A greater role for the military will
then begin to exist.

The Role of the Military in Operations

Ralston listed in order of priority the instruments that can be used against CT. They are:
1. political leaders condemn terrorism
2. religious leaders condemn terrorism

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 3. domestic laws against terrorism
4. financial disruption against terrorism
5. military support to those against terrorism
6. military operations against terrorism

Few agencies are able to do what the military can regarding operations and most of the
effective efforts against CT are not military.

Cohen noted he has made speeches on how the military should be used in the global war
on terrorism (GWOT). In his view, the military should be the last CT instrument
implemented. The GWOT strategy should also be multifaceted. The military aspect
should include deploying SOFs, covert action, civilian operatives in the field, work at the
law enforcement level in other countries, sharing intelligence, etc. The US must also
persuade other countries to have a stake in this fight.

Cohen does not believe there was any reluctance to use Special Operations Forces (SOFs)
during his tenure. He reminded us that he originated the idea for SOFs when he was in
the Senate. It was an idea opposed by many who then tried to .limit the new JSOC
Commander to a two or three star General to which Cohen demanded it be a fourstar
General. In addition, Congress resisted using SOFs.

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

Ms. Rosenblum noted that as responsibilities and authorities move to DHS, there may be
gaps. Agencies are told certain tasks are no longer their jobs. The issue is what will
happen if there are gaps? Will DHS fill those gaps? DHS must be prepared to "pick up
the ball."

The DHS is still in a growing phase. What is needed is a clear understanding of different
areas. They have a real challenge and that has taxed the new organization. It takes a lot of
energy to establish a new organization and requires a great deal of time for adjustment.

Finally, other agencies assume that if the military takes on a mission, they themselves are
off the hook. The breadth and width of many capabilities lie in the military and as a
result, if other federal agencies know DoD is involved in a task, the other agencies will sit
back and let DoD take on the entire task. Even when the military notes that it will take on
a task temporarily, in reality, that task takes on a more permanent nature. There is
therefore an unintended consequence of the military taking on more responsibilities in CT
and other areas in general.