Diamond - Eating Meat and Eating People

Royal Institute of Philosophy
Eating Meat and Eating People Author(s): Cora Diamond Source: Philosophy, Vol. 53, No. 206 (Oct., 1978), pp. 465-479 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Royal Institute of Philosophy Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3749876 . Accessed: 15/01/2014 20:12
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Cambridge University Press and Royal Institute of Philosophy are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophy.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 128.250.144.144 on Wed, 15 Jan 2014 20:12:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
EatingMeat and EatingPeople

CORA DIAMOND ofargument This paperis a response to a certain sort defending therights ofthebackground PartI is a brief andofthesort of ofanimals. explanation I wantto reject;Part II is an attempt to characterize those argument fundamental confusions about moralrelations arguments: theycontain AndPartIII between peopleandpeopleandbetween peopleand animals. of whatI think can stillbe said on-as it were-the is an indication side. animals'
tothepaperis therecent ofanimals' The background discussions rights by and Tom Reganand a number of other PeterSinger philosophers.1 The in many ofthesediscussions is encapsulated basictype ofargument in the The wordI think is originally RichardRyder's, word'speciesism'. but formaking it popular in connection PeterSingeris responsible withan in ourattitude ofargument: that of other obvious sort tomembers species whichare completely we have prejudices analogousto the prejudices of other to members peoplemayhavewithregard races,and theseprewith theways weareblind toourownexploitation judiceswillbe connected oftheother We are blindto thefact that whatwe and oppression group. themof theirrights; we do not wantto see this do to themdeprives from becausewe profit it,and so we makeuse ofwhatare really morally them between and ourselves tojustify irrelevant differences thedifference if we say 'You cannotlive here it fairly in treatment. Putting crudely: to saying becauseyou are black',thiswouldbe supposedto be parallel because an animal 'You canbe usedfor ourexperiments, and youareonly so equally is unjustifiable is thesecond. talk'.If thefirst cannot prejudice, for andRegan ifwe,as a justification In fact, bothSinger differential argue, ofanimals liketheincapacity to use speech, to things we treatment, point inthesamewayas animals those totreating members should be committed
Liberation PeterSinger, Animal NewYorkReview, (New York, See especially andHumanObligations Rights Tom Reganand PeterSinger, eds,Animal and RoslindGodlovitch and Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1976), Stanley (Englewood Men and Morals (New York: Grove,I972), and JohnHarris,eds, Animals, Scottish (Edinburgh: 'Speciesism:The Ethicsof Vivisection' RichardRyder, I974). ofVivisection, forthePrevention Society
1 1975),
Philosophy 53 1978
30
465
Cora Diamond
of our own specieswho (let us say) have braindamagesufficient to prevent the developmentof speech-committed to allowingthem to be used as If we say 'These animalsare not laboratory animalsor as foodor whatever. rational,so we have a rightto kill themforfood', but we do not say the same ofpeoplewhose rationality cannot develop or whose capacitieshave like cases alike. The fundabeen destroyed, we are plainlynot treating mentalprinciplehereis one we could putthisway(theformulation is based to the on Peter Singer's statements):We must give equal consideration interests of anybeingwhichis capable ofhavinginterests; and the capacity to have interests is essentially dependentonlyon the capacityforsuffering and enjoyment. This we evidently sharewithanimals. Here I wantto mentiona pointonlyto get it out of the way. I disagree ofanimals' witha greatdeal ofwhatSingerand Regan and otherdefenders rights say, but I do not wish to raise the issue how we can be certainthat thatdoubt about that animalsfeelpain. I thinkSingerand Regan are right of as it is in many cases in much out in as is, most ordinary cases, place withhuman beings. connection It will be evidentthat the formof argumentI have describedis very close to what we findin Benthamand Mill; and Mill, in arguingforthe forthe rights of all men,and who fight rightsof women,attacksChartists of womencome up, withan argument of drop the subjectwhen the rights of your concernfor exactlythe formthat Singer uses. The confinement rightsto the rightsof menshows thatyou are not reallyconcernedwith as you profess to be. You are onlya Chartist because you are not a equality, laterthatthe confinement of moral lord.2And so too we are told a century concern to human animals is equally a denial of equality. Indeed the of human beingsas 'human animals' is a characteristic description partof the argument. The pointbeingmade thereis thatjust as our languagemay embody prejudices against blacks or against women, so may it against non-human animals.It supposedlyembodiesour prejudice,then,whenwe use the word 'animal' to set them apart fromus, just as if we were not animalsourselves. It is on the basis of this sort of claim, that the rightsof all animals should be givenequal consideration, thatSingerand Regan and Ryderand animalsforfood,and must othershave arguedthatwe mustgiveup killing cut back-at least-the use of animals in scientific research. drastically And so on. That argument seems to me to be confused.I do not disputethatthere are analogiesbetweenthe case of our relations to animalsand the case of a dominantgroup's relationto some othergroup of human beingswhichit in otherways. But the analogiesare not simple exploitsor treatsunjustly
2 'The Enfranchisement of Women'; Dissertationsand Discussions(Boston: Spencer, i864), vol. III, pp. 99-ioo. Mill's share in writingthe essay is disputed, but his hand is evidentin the remarksabout Chartism.
466
and straightforward, and it is not clearhow fartheygo. The Singer-Regan approachmakesit hard to see what is important either in our relationship with otherhuman beings or in our relationship withanimals.And thatis whatI shalltryto explainin PartII. My discussion willbe limited to eating animals, but much of what I say is intendedto apply to other uses of animalsas well. II Discussionsofvegetarianism and animals'rights often start withdiscussion of humanrights. We maythenbe asked whatit is thatgroundsthe claims thatpeople have such rights, and whether similargroundsmaynotafter all be foundin the case of animals. All such discussions are besidethepoint.For theyask whywe do notkill people (veryirrational ones, let us say) forfood, or why we do not treat people in wayswhichwould cause themdistress or anxiety and so on, when forthe sake of meat we are willingenoughto kill animalsor treatthemin ways whichcause themdistress. This is a totally wrongway of beginning the discussion,because it ignorescertainquite centralfacts-facts which, ifattended to, would makeit clearthatrights are not whatis crucial.We do noteat ourdead,even whentheyhave died in automobileaccidentsor been struck by lightning, and their flesh might be first class. We do noteat them; or if we do, it is a matterof extreme need, or of some special ritual-and even in cases of obvious extreme need, thereis verygreatreluctance. We also do not eat our amputated limbs.(Or ifwe did, it would be in the same kinds of special circumstances in which we eat our dead.) Now the fact thatwe do not eat our dead is not a consequence-not a directone in any event-of our unwillingness to killpeople forfood or otherpurposes.It is not a directconsequence of our unwillingness to cause distressto people. Of course it would cause distressto people to think that they might be eatenwhentheyweredead, but it causes distress because ofwhatit is to is wrong eat a dead person.FHence we cannotelucidatewhat (if anything) -if that is the word-with eating people by appealing to the distressit on would cause, in theway we can pointto the distress caused by stamping someone'stoe as a reasonwhywe regardit as a wrongto him.Now ifwe do not eat people who are alreadydead and also do notkillpeople forfood,it is at least primafacie plausible that our reasons in the two cases mightbe related,and hence mustbe looked intoby anyonewho wantsto claim that we have no good reasons for not eating people which are not also good thisissue,focuses reasonsfornoteatinganimals.Anyonewho,in discussing on our reasonsfornot killingpeople or our reasonsfornot causingthem out of his disruns a risk of leaving altogether suffering quite evidently to other human cussion those fundamental featuresof our relationship beingswhichare involvedin our not eatingthem. 467
Cora Diamond
are It is in factpartofthewaythispointis usuallymissedthatarguments theirrightsto life and not given for not eating animals, for respecting makingthem suffer, which implythatthereis absolutelynothingqueer, been eatingthe cow thathas obligingly nothing at all odd, in thevegetarian in the discussionwhich That is to say,thereis nothing struck by lightning. to eat; it is onlythatone mustnothelp suggests thata cow is notsomething withthoserights thatwe the processalong: one mustnot,thatis, interfere with if we are to eat animals at all conshould usually have to interfere is to But ifthe pointof the Singer-Reganvegetarian's argument veniently. in the same positionas the eating show thatthe eatingof meatis, morally, unlesshe saysthatit is just squeamishof humanflesh, he is not consistent likethat,whichstopsus eatingour dead. If he admitted ness,or something that what underliesour attitudeto dining on ourselvesis the view that not to a person is notsomething to eat, he could not focuson the cow's right of it. the heart as if thatwere be killedor maltreated, but one distressed by the obtusenessof the I writethis as a vegetarian, in particular, I shouldsay,thearguments of Singerand normalarguments, whichdo notbeginto getnearthe Regan. For ifvegetarians givearguments considerations whichare involvedin our not eatingpeople, thoseto whom are addressedmay not be certainhow to reply,but they theirarguments will not be convincedeither,and reallyare quite right.They themselves may not be able to make explicitwhat it is theyobject to in the way the to not eatingpeople, but theywill be left vegetarian presentsour attitude feelingthatbeyondall the natterabout 'speciesism'and equalityand the betweenhumanbeingsand animalswhichis being rest,thereis a difference withthedifference betweenwhatit is to ignored.This is notjust connected withthedifference eat theone and whatit is to eat theother.It is connected betweengivingpeople a funeraland givinga dog one, withthe difference between miscegenationand chacun a' son gout with consentingadult gorillas. (Singer and Regan give argumentswhich certainlyappear to that,and wouldno morestand implythata distasteforthe latteris merely And so on. It is a markofthe thana taboo on miscegenation.) up to scrutiny of vegetarianism of thesediscussions thatthe onlytool used in shallowness in treatment arejustified is the appeal to themto explainwhat differences the capacitiesof the beings in question. That is to say, such-and-sucha to haveitsinterests being-a dog,say-might be said to have,likeus, a right takeninto account; but its interests will be different because its capacities to explainwhyhe are. Such an appeal maythenbe used by the vegetarian demandvotesfordogs (thougheven thereit is not need not in consistency of the appropriateness of a funeral reallyadequate), but as an explanation fora child two days old and not fora puppy it will not do; and the vegeto explainthat-if he triesat all-in terms tarianis forced ofwhatit is tous, a formof explanation whichforhim is evidently dangerous.Indeed, it is the case thatvegetarians do not touchthe issue of our attitude to normally 468
the dead. They accuse philosophers of ignoring the problemscreatedby animals in their discussions of humanrights,but they equally may be accused of ignoring thehard cases fortheirown view.(The hardnessof the case for them, though,is a matterof its hardnessfor any approach to a much,thatis, from morality deriving muchfrom utilitarianism-deriving utilitarian a possible object of moral conceptionof what makes something concern.) have a I do not thinkit an accidentthat the arguments of vegetarians to be naggingmoralistictone. They are an attemptto show something wrong thatwe all agreethatit is morally morally wrong, on the assumption to raisepeople formeat,and so on. Now the objectionto sayingthatthatis thatit is too weak. What we shouldbe morally wrongis not,or not merely, going against in adopting Swift's 'Modest Proposal' is somethingwe usefulorgans shouldbe goingagainstin salvaging the dead moregenerally: for transplantation, and the rest for supper or the compost heap. And 'morally wrong'is not too weak forthat,but in the wrongdimension.One could say that it would be impious to treatthe dead so, but the word it only asks forexplanation.We can 'impious' does not make forclarity, most naturally speak of a kind of action as morallywrongwhen we have some firmgrasp of what kindof beings are involved.But thereare some actions,like givingpeople names, that are part of the way we come to of whatkind it is withwhich we and indicateour recognition understand to act in And 'morally are concerned. wrong'will oftennot fitour refusals such a way, or our actingin an opposed sortof way, as when Gradgrind calls a child 'Girl numbertwenty'.Doing her out of a name is not like to whichshe has a rightand in whichshe doing her out of an inheritance has an interest. Rather,Gradgrindlives in a world,or would like to, in she has a name,a numberbeingmore whether whichit makesno difference to be named,not and in which a human being is not something efficient, numbered. Again, it is not 'morallywrong'to eat our pets; people who ate theirpets would nothave pets in the same sense of thatterm.(If we call an a crudejoke of for thetablea pet,we aremaking animalthatwe are fattening to eat, it is givena name,is let into a familiar sort.)A pet is not something speak our housesand maybe spokento in waysin whichwe do notnormally ofa to cows or squirrels. That is to say,it is givensomepartofthecharacter it need not be sentimental person.(This may be more or less sentimental; ofrecognizing some at all.) Treatingpets in thesewaysis not at all a matter whichpets have in being so treated.There is not a class of beings, interest pets, whose nature,whose capacities,are such that we owe it to them to it is not out of respectforthe interests treatthemin theseways. Similarly, of beingsof the class to whichwe belongthatwe give namesto each other, them or birthor deathas we do, marking or thatwe treathumansexuality it is not And serious. or various -in their again, ways-as significant each other. in our not is involved interests which eating respectfor our 469
Cora Diamond
what sort of concept 'human These are all thingsthat go to determine being' is. Similarlywith having duties to human beings. This is not a consequenceof what human beingsare, it is notjustified by what human beings are: it is itselfone of the thingswhich go to build our notionof human beings. And so too-very much so-the idea of the difference betweenhuman beings and animals. We learn what a human being is in-among otherways-sitting at a table where WE eat THEM. We are betweenhumanbeings aroundthe table and theyare on it. The difference of and animalsis notto be discovered by studiesofWashoe or theactivities or evolutionary that dolphins.It is notthatsortofstudyor ethology theory is goingto tell us the difference betweenus and animals: the difference is, a central as I have suggested, conceptforhumanlifeand is morean object than observation of contemplation (thoughthatmightbe misunderstood; I am not suggesting it is a matterof intuition).One source of confusion here is thatwe failto distinguish between'the difference betweenanimals and people' and 'the differences betweenanimals and people'; the same of men and sort of confusionoccurs in discussionsof the relationship women. In both cases people appeal to scientific evidence to show that is not as deep as we think;but all thatsuch evidencecan 'the difference' is thatthe differences are less sharpthanwe think. show,or show directly, betweenanimalsand people, it is clearthatwe In the case ofthe difference form the idea of this difference, create the concept of the difference, well the overwhelmingly obvious similarities. knowing perfectly It mayseem thatby thesortofline I have been suggesting, I shouldfind myself havingto justify slavery.For do we not learn-if we live in a slave the structure of a society-what slaves are and what mastersare through lifein whichwe are hereand do this,and theyare thereand do that?Do we a master not learn thedifference between and a slave thatway? In factI do not thinkit works quite that way, but at this point I am not trying to justify anything, onlyto indicatethatour starting pointin thinking about the relationships among human beingsis not a moralagentas an item on one side, and on the othera being capableofsuffering, thought, speech, etc; and similarly(mutatismutandis)in the case of our thoughtabout the relationship betweenhumanbeingsand animals.We cannotpointand say, 'This thing (whatever conceptsit may fallunder) is at any rate capable of so we ought not to make it suffer.' suffering, (That sentence,Jonathan Bennett said, struck himas so clearly falsethathe thought I could nothave meant it literally;I shall come back to it.) That 'this' is a being which I ought not to make suffer, or whose suffering I should try to prevent, a specialrelationship constitutes to it, or rather, any of a numberof such relationships-forexample,what its suffering is in relationto me might depend upon its being my mother.That I ought to attendto a being's and enjoyments sufferings is not the fundamental moral relationto it, determining how I oughtto act towards it-no morefundamental thanthat 470
thisman,being mybrother, is a being aboutwhom I should notentertain sexualfantasies. Whata lifeis likein which I recognize suchrelationships as theformer with at anyratesomeanimals, howitis different from those in which no suchrelationships are recognized, or different ones,and how farit is possible to saythatsomesuchlivesarelesshypocritical or richer or better thanthosein which animals are forus merethings wouldthen remain to be described. But a starting point in anysuchdescription must be understanding what is involved in suchthings as ournoteating people: no more than ournoteating petsdoesthat on recognition rest oftheclaims of a beingsimply as one capableof suffering and enjoyment. To argue otherwise, to argueas Singerand Regando, is~notto givea defence of in humanlife. The Singer-Regan animals;it is to attacksignificance amount to this:knee-jerk arguments liberals on racism and sexism ought to go knee-jerk and and aboutcows showhow guinea-pigs; they certainly thatcan be done,notthatit ought to be. They might reply:If you are toletanimals for right, then we are,orshould suffer thesakeof be,willing in our life-forthe sake,as it were,of the concept of the significance Andwhat human. is that butspeciesism again-morehigh-falutin perhaps thanthe familiar kindbut no less morally forthat?Signidisreputable I amproposing is notan end,is notsomething as an alterficance, though, totheprevention ofunnecessary towhich thelatter native suffering, might be sacrificed. in which human is belong tothe The ways we mark what life ofmoral and no appealto theprevention ofsuffering which is source life, blindto thiscan in theendbe anything butself-destructive. III Have I notthen,by attacking such arguments, sawnoff the completely I am sitting branch on? Is there that he anyother wayofshowing anyone animals doeshavereason to treat better thanhe is treating them? I shalltakeeating them as an example, butwant to point outthat eating To putit at itssimplest evenamong animals, us, is notjust onething. by a friend an example, ofmine hisownpigs;they raises havequitea goodlife, andhe shoots andbutchers them with a neighbour. His children helpfrom in theoperations in various are involved and thewholebusiness is ways, much a subject ofconversation andthought. Thisis obviously insome very from billionchickenwaysverydifferent picking up one of the several breasts ofI978 America outofyour freezer. So whenI speak supermarket I meana lotofdifferent ofeating animals cases,andwhatI saywillapply thanothers. to somemore in trying Whatthenis involved to showsomeone thathe ought notto eatmeat?I havedrawn attention toonecurious feature ofthePeter Singer sortof argument, whichis thatyourPeterSingervegetarian shouldbe
47I
Cora Diamond
lamb thathas just been hitby a car. perfectly happyto eat the unfortunate of the utilitarian I want to connectthiswitha moregeneralcharacteristic vegetarians'approach. They are not, they say, especially fond of, or in, animals. They may point that out theydo not 'love them'. interested them,and are concernedto put They do not want to anthropomorphize fromone whichtheysee as sentimental anthropotheirpositionas distinct morphizing. Justas you do not have to prove that underneathhis black his rights, skin the black man has a whiteman insidein orderto recognize of to to in emotional responses your do not have see animals terms you people to recognizetheir rights.So the directionof their argumentis: we are only one kind of animal; if what is fairforus is concernfor our interests-and interests, thatdependsonlyon our beinglivinganimalswith if thatis fair,it is fairforany animal. They do not,thatis, want to move people or feathered fromconcernfor people to concern for four-legged ofthem onlybecausewe think people-to beingswho deservethatconcern as havinga littlepersoninside. propagandaof a I wantto takea piece ofvegetarian To makea contrast, verydifferent sort. Learningto be a DutifulCarnivore3 Dogs and cats and goatsand cows, Ducks and chickens, sheep and sows Woven intotales fortots, Picturedon theirwalls and pots. Time fordinner!Come and eat All yourlovely, juicy meat. One day ham fromPercyPorker (In the comicshe's a corker), Then the breastfromMrs Cluck Or the wingfromDonald Duck. Liver nextfromClara Cow (No, it doesn'thurther now). Yes, thatleg's fromPeter Rabbit Chew it well; make thata habit. Eat the creatures killedforsale, But neverpull the pussy'stail. Eat the fleshfrom'filthy hogs' But neverbe unkindto dogs. Grow up into double-thinkKiss the hamster;skinthe mink. Never thinkof slaughter, dear,
3The British Jan/Feb i969, p. 59. Vegetarian, 472
arehere. That'swhyanimals to die, Theyonlycomeon earth and don'taskwhy. So eatyour meat, Jane Legge or confusion is trying to bring outis a kindofinconsistency, Whatthat mixedwithhypocrisy-what it sees as that-in our ordinary ways of confusions thatcomeout,notonlybutstrikingly, thinking aboutanimals, Thatis to say,thepoemdoesnot in whatchildren aretaught aboutthem. ask youto feelin thisor theother wayaboutanimals. Rather, it takesa forgranted. There are certain certain rangeof feelings waysof feeling reflected inourtelling children classical animal stories, inourfeeding birds in thewinter, and squirrels do say-in ourinterfering with whatchildren to animals as we interfere whentheymaltreat smaller children: 'Never to getus to behave pullthepussy's tail'.The poemdoesnottry likethat, of cordiality' it or to getus to feela 'transport towards animals. Rather, topeoplewhose is addressed response to animals already includes a variety of such kindsof behaviour, and taking thatforgranted it suggests that other features ofourrelationship to animals showconfusion or hypocrisy. It is very I think, important, thatit does notattempt anyjustification for ofresponses therange ofwhich kinds against thebackground certain other of behaviour are supposed to lookhypocritical. Thereis a realquestion whether justification wouldbe in place forthesebackground responses. I wantto bring thatout by another poem,nota bitofvegetarian or any other This is a poemofWalter propaganda. de la Mare's. Titmouse If youwouldhappy company win, a tree, Danglea palm-nut from to swayand spin, Idlyin green Its snow-pulped for kernel bait;and see A nimble enter titmouse in. Out ofearth's vastunknown ofair, Out ofall summer, from waveto wave, He'll perch, and prank hisfeathers fair, a Jangle glass-clear wildering stave, Andtakehiscommons thereThis tiny son oflife;thisspright, Humansought, By momentary Plumewillhiswingin thedappling light, Clashtimbrel shrill and gayAndintoTime'senormous Nought, Sweet-fed willflit away. 473
Cora Diamond
sonoflife'. It is important What mehere is thephrase 'Thistiny interests in thepoemwith outofearth's thebird'sappearing that thisis connected He is Nought. ofair,and flitting off intoTime'senormous vastunknown 'sonoflife'.I want very striking phrase with this shown as fellow creature, creature. to saysomethings abouttheidea ofa fellow veryunlikethatof the of thought a direction First,thatit indicates that thebiological fact from Therewe start supposedly argument. Singer are all speciesof animal, and monkeys we and dogsand ratsand titmice but whatis of thisor the other capacity, indeedin terms differentiated of our specieswouldbe appropriate formembers treatment appropriate similar interests. We areall ofanywhose gavethem to members capacities an equalright tohave for a start-with, therefore, animals, though, equally pointforour intoaccount. The starting are taken our interests whatever andbiologically Implicitly is what is general andincommon given. thought wehavea different inthede la Mare, andexplicitly intheJane Leggepoem, is nota biological orfellow creature-which ofliving creature, notion, that with an animal, biological It doesnotmean, something biologically concept. ofwhom sense itmakes in a certain a being boat,as itwere, life-itmeans intoTime'senormous itgoesoff that Nought, other to say,among things, as our to animals The response as company. and whichmaybe sought hereofBurns's description in lifeon thisearth (think in mortality, fellows fellow to the mouseas 'thypoor earthborn companion,/An' of himself ofa ofhuman life.It is an extension depends upona conception mortal'), of whathumanlifeis. You can call it anthroponotion non-biological to create confusion. The confusion, though, ifyouwant butonly morphic, the because we do nothavea clearideaofwhat is created phenomena only touseitfor caseswhich are andtend word might cover, 'anthropomorphic' in certain characteristic sentimental ways,whichthe de la Mare poem narrowly. however avoids, of our characteristic to animalsof modesof thinking The extension and includes a great to humanbeingsis extremely complex, responses is a striking kindof as company The idea ofan animal ofthings. variety not a creature does involve it notion of fellow it out that the case; brings or justice.Those are, like charity of moralconcepts just the extension thusthe idea of a of such extensions; indeed,amongthe mostfamiliar ofas somein birds winter, thought fellow creature feeding maygo with a hunted animal a sporting or againwithgiving akinto charity, thing to or of as something akin justice fairness. thatis thought where chance, andthat is extremely ofa fellow creature labile, I should thenotion saythat ofsuch is partly itis notsomething overandabovetheextensions because as justice, andfriendship-or-companionship-or-cordiality. charity concepts ofconcepts was ofthe'friendship' theextension range that (I hadthought and not in titmice some hippopotamuses, cases, possibleonly obviously whales andtheir Greenpeace films oftherelation between e.g.; butrecent
474
rescuersshow that I was probably takingan excessivelynarrowview.) Independence is anotherof the important extendedconcepts,or rather, the idea of an independent life,subject,as anyis, to contingencies; and this is closely connected with the idea of somethinglike a respectfor the animal's independentlife. We see such a notion in, for example, many of circus tricksby animals,as an people's objectionsto the performance indignity. The conception of a huntedanimalas a 'respected enemy'is also closely related. Pity is another central concept here, as expressed,for example,in Burns's 'To a Mouse'; and I should note thatthe connection between pity and sparingsomeone's life is whollyexcluded fromvegetarian argumentsof the sort attackedin Part I-it has no place in the rhetoric of a 'liberation movement'. It does normally, or veryoften, go withtheidea of a fellowcreature, that we do eat them.But it thencharacteristically goes withthe idea thatthey must be huntedfairly or raised withoutbad usage. The treatment of an animal as simplya stage (the self-moving stage) in the productionof a and I should suggest meat productis not part of this mode of thinking; also thatthe conceptof 'vermin'is at least sometimes used in excludingan animalfrom theclass offellowcreatures. However,it makesan importantly different kindof contrast with'fellowcreature'from the contrast you have or as whenanimalsare takenas stagesin theproduction of a meatproduct, on the 'verydelicatepieces of machinery' (as in a recentBBC programme use of animalsin research).I shall have more to say about these contrasts later; the point I wish to make now is thatit is not a fact thata titmouse withina has a life; if one speaks thatway it expressesa particular relation broadlyspecifiable rangeto titmice.It is no morebiologicalthanit would between be a biologicalpoint should you call anotherperson a 'traveller lifeand death': thatis nota biologicalpointdressedup in poeticallanguage. The fellow-creature responsesitsin us alongsideothers.This is brought out by anotherpoem of de la Mare's, 'Dry AugustBurned',whichbegins witha childweepingher heartout on seeinga dead hare lyinglimp on the table. But hearinga teamof fieldartillery kitchen goingby to manoeuvres, she runs out and watchesit all in the brightsun. Aftertheyhave passed, she turns and runs back into the house, but the hare has vanished'Mother',she asks, 'please may I go and see it skinned?'In a classic study of intellectual growthin children,Susan Isaacs describesat some length what she calls the extraordinarily confusedand conflicting ways in which and in we adults actuallybehave towardsanimalsin the sightof children, withwhichchildren have to tryto understand our horror at the connection thattheybe 'kind' cruelty theymaydisplaytowards animals,our insistence to them.4 variedwaysin whichanimal death She mentions theenormously and thekilling of animalsare a matter-of-course feature of the lifechildren 4 Intellectual Growth in Young Children (London: Routledge,I930), pp.
i6o-i62.
475
Cora Diamond
see and are told about. They quite earlygrasp the relationbetweenmeat and the killingof animals, see insect pests killed, or spiders or snakes ofdangerous because theyare distasteful; merely theyhearaboutthekilling and are encouragedearlyto animalsor of superfluous puppies and kittens, fishor collectbutterflies-andso on. I am not concernedhere to ask whetherwe should or should not do to bringout thatwhatis meantby doing to animals,but rather thesethings to an what is meant something animal, by something's being an animal,is such as Mrs Isaacs describes.Animals-these objectswe shaped by things of such a are actingupon-are not given forour thoughtindependently about and responding to them. This is part of mass of ways of thinking whatI meantearlierwhen I dismissedthe idea of sayingof something that whateverconceptsit fellunder, it was capable of suffering and so ought not to be made to suffer-theclaim Bennettfoundso clearlyfalsethathe I mustnot have meantit. I shall return to it shortly. thought This mass of responses,and more, Mrs Isaacs called confused and in it; it is no morejust a But thereare significant contradictory. patterns lot of confused and contradictory modes ofresponsethanis themass which enables us to thinkof our fellowhuman beingsas such. For example,the notion of vermin makes sense against the backgroundof the idea of animalsin generalas not merethings.Certaingroupsof animalsare then as therestare,wheretheidea might be singledout as notto be treated fully and not meanlypoisoned.Again, thatthe restare to be huntedonlyfairly the killingof dangerousanimalsin self-defence forms in part of a pattern of immediate whichcircumstances dangermakea difference, assumingas a the independent life of the lion (say), perceivedin termsnot background limitedto the way it mightserve our ends. What I am suggesting here is that certainmodes of response may be seen as withdrawals fromsome animals ('vermin'), or fromanimals in some circumstances (danger), of them as animals,just as the what would otherwise belong to recognizing notionof an enemyor of a slave may involvethe withdrawing fromthe of him as a personinvolvedof some of what would belongto recognition human being. Thus for example in the case of slaves, theremay be no formal of the slave's name in the same fullsense as there social institution is forothers,or theremay be a denial of sociallysignificant and ancestry, so on. Or a man who is outlawedmay be killedlike an animal. Here then the idea would be that the notion of a slave or an enemyor an outlaw assumes a background of responseto persons,and recognition that what cases is thatwe have something whichwe are nottreating happensin these as whatit-in a way-is. Of course,even in thesecases, a greatdeal of the as forexamplewhatmay be responseto 'human being' mayremainintact, done with the dead body. Or again, if the enemyhoodis so deep as to remove even these restraints, and men dance on the corpses of their in the Lebanon, the pointof thiscan only enemies,as forexamplerecently 476
ofwhat is taken tobe howyoutreat be understood interms oftheviolation youknow itis that, that youare thecorpse ofa human being. It is because is not tobe treated. Andno onewhodoes treating itwith somepoint as that contempt he might feel-in itcouldhavetheslightest difficulty-whatever and beensickinstead. understanding whysomeone had goneoff whose hardheaded slaveholder Now supposeI am a practical-minded freed hisslaves. I might regard sucha man neighbour has,onhisdeathbed, as foolish, butnotas batty, in thewayI should think ofsomeone notbatty if he had, let us say,freed Compare thecase his cowson his deathbed. from his experience in theSpanishCivilWar,ofbeing Orwell describes, manwhowasrunning along thetopofthe unable toshoot at a half-dressed trench with bothhandsas he ran.'I had parapet, holding up histrousers comehereto shoot at "Fascists", buta manwhois holding up histrousers and a fellow-creature, similar to yourself, is nota "Fascist",he is visibly ofenemy at him.'5 The notion ('Fascist')and youdo notfeellikeshooting in a kindoftension, and evena manwhocould fellow creature arethere shootat a manrunning histrousers up might recognize perfectly holding is in suchcases (between there wellwhyOrwellcouldnot.The tension in human notmerely and'fellow 'slave'or'enemy' being') maybe reflected but also in of else's defensiveness actions, recognition ofthepoint someone as when he is from andtheanswer ofvarious where sorts, youasksomeone Andthat is 'SouthAfrica andyoudo nottreat them wellhereeither'. very I am a vegetarian and getting theresponse 'And is liketelling someone whatareyour shoesmadeof?' ofthemanrunning ora sight likethat with an image What youhavethen whichmay checkor alterone's his trousers holding up is something or not compelling for but something whichis not compelling, actions, itsforce, and thepossibility, evenwhere it whocan understand everyone fordiscomfort or of bringing forsomeone, of making is not compelling I shouldsuggest to awareness. that theJaneLeggepoemis an discomfort ofdiscomfort tothesurface-but that sort closer to bring a similar attempt muchless compelling ones than of fellow creatures are naturally images can be. of'fellow human images beings' in answer ofa fellow creature to thequestion: I introduced thenotion I go aboutshowing thathe had reasonnot to eat someone How might I have answered thatso muchas shownthe I do not think animals? I shouldlookforan answer. And clearly theapproach in which direction in whom there is no fellowis notusablewith someone I havesuggested in a at all in thatrange.I am not therefore creature response, nothing animals' on thebasis thanthose whowoulddefend weaker rights position to be of equality. For although of an abstract theypurport principle or human foranyone, Martian reasons which are reasons being providing
i968), andWarburg, (London: Secker andLetters Essays, Journalism 5Collected Vol. II, p. 254.
477
Cora Diamond
of animals,Martiansand whatnot, in fact or whatnot, to respectthe rights I shouldsay,is imagesofa vastly moreuncompelwhattheyare providing, ling sort. Comicallyuncompelling, as we can see when similararguments are used in Tristram Shandyto defendthe rightsof homunculi.But that takesme back to theclaim I made earlier, our thinking thatwe cannotstart about the relationsbetweenhuman beings and animals by saying'Well, herewe have me the moralagentand therewe have it,the thingcapable of and pullingout of that'Well, then,so faras possibleI oughtto suffering' preventits suffering.' When we say thatsortof thing,whatever forceour words have comes fromour readingin such notionsas human being and animal.I am not now goingto tryto replyto Bennett'sclaimthatmyview is clearlyfalse. I shall insteadsimplyconnectit withanotherclearlyfalse view of mine.At the end of Part II I said thatthe waysin whichwe mark whathumanlifeis belongto the sourceof morallife,and no appeal to the prevention of suffering which is blind to this can in the end be anything but self-destructive. Did I mean that?Bennettasked, and he said thathe could see no reasonwhyit should be thought to be so. I meantthatif we appeal to people to prevent and we, in our appeal,try suffering, to obliterate the distinction betweenhuman beingsand animalsand just get people to of 'different speak or think species of animals',thereis no footing leftfrom which to tell us what we oughtto do, because it is not membersof one among species of animals that have moral obligationsto anything. The moral expectations of other human beings demand something of me as otherthan an animal; and we do something like imaginatively read into animalssomething like such expectations when we thinkof vegetarianism as enablingus to meet a cow's eyes. There is nothingwrongwith that; thereis something to keep thatresponseand destroy its wrongwithtrying foundation. I think More tentatively, similarcould be said about imaginasomething tivelyreading into animals somethinglike an appeal to our pity. Pity, beyondits moreprimitive manifestations, dependsupon a sense of human lifeand loss, and a grasp of the situations in whichone human being can ask thathe relent.When we are unrelenting in appeal forpityto another, what we do-to otherpeople or to animals-what we need is not telling are as worthy of concernas ours. And thetrouble-or a thattheirinterests trouble-with the abstract appeal to the preventionof suffering as a principleof actionis thatit encouragesus to ignorepity,to forget what it contributes to our conceptionof suffering and death, and how it is connectedwiththe possibility of relenting. to Bennettthencomes to an expansionof whathe would My non-reply stilltake as false,namelythatour hearing the moralappeal of an animalis our hearing it speak-as it were-the languageof our fellowhumanbeings. A fullerdiscussionof this would involve askingwhat forcethe analogy withracismand sexismhas. It is not totally mistaken by any means.What 478
withthe solidarity has analogies be calledthedarkside of human might or thesolidarity and the of a human group, darkside ofsexualsolidarity in thewritings I havebeen thisis I think present strongly painofseeing and not though, I have been attacking, It is their arguments attacking. of the through their writings notthesensethatcomes their perceptions, we with which most andunrelentingness andunshakeable callousness awful mistake is thatthe to think world.The the non-human confront often for whichare reasons without reasons cannot be condemned callousness or sympathy. no matter how devoidof all humanimagination anyone, on interests, on capacities, on rights, on the bioHence theiremphasis of their perceptions by their logicallygiven; hence the distortion
arguments.6
University of Virginia
withMichaelFeldman. 6 For much to discussions in thispaperI am indebted on an earlier comments Bennett's I have also been muchhelpedby Jonathan ofPartII. version to quote the poems on pp. 472-3 was kindlygiven by the Permission of the Society,and by the Societyof Authorsas representative Vegetarian de la Mare. Trusteesof Walter Literary 479

Diamond - Eating Meat and Eating People

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Diamond - Eating Meat and Eating People

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Royal Institute of Philosophy

EatingMeat and EatingPeople

EatingMeat and EatingPeople

EatingMeat and EatingPeople

EatingMeat and EatingPeople

EatingMeat and EatingPeople

EatingMeat and EatingPeople

EatingMeat and EatingPeople

EatingMeat and EatingPeople

You might also like